L%l
ASSAM: MULTIPLE REALIGNMENTSAND
FRAGMENTATION OF PARTY SYSTEM
SandhyaGoswami
Electoral politics in Assam in the last two decadeshas witnessedmultiplication in the number of
political parties and politicisation of multiple ethnicities.Sincethe critical and realigning electionin
1985,Assamhas movedfrom an era of 'catchall'formations to that of 'clevagepolitics'. The Assom
Gana Parishad (AGP), formed in 1985,a culmination of regional aspirations of the Assamesepeople,
cameto power in the sameyear. Thispaved the wayfor the multi-party systemin Assamwith the Congress
systemgiving way to political parties of various ethnic groups or smaller cultural communitieswhich
have now begun to play a significant role in Assam'spolitics. The Congressparty continuesto remain a
strongforceto reckonwithin thestate;yet it is nowherecloseto thedominanceit exercisedinthepre- 1985
era. The BJP has enteredas an independentelectoralforce in the last decade,but more as a sectarian
than as a nationalistforce. However,greaternumberof partiesin Assamhasnot necessarilymeantmore
and better choicesand better policies.
Electoralpolitics in Assam in the last twenty movementgave expressionto Assamesenationalyears can serve as a textbook illustration of the ism and at the sametime it triggeredvarioussubcomplexities of the relationship between social regional and ethnic aspirations. The regional
cleavagesand competitivepolitics. Every profes- aspirationsof the Assamesepeopleculminatedin
sionalor lay studentof Assampoliticswould notice the formation of a regionalparty called the Asom
two fundamentalchangesin the last two decades:a Gana Parishad(AGP) in 1985.The party came to
'fragmentation'
of the party political space and power in the sameyear and thus managedto conexplosionof ethnicitiesin the arenaof politics.The solidateits presencein Assampolitics.
party systemhas changedfrom single party dominanceof the Congressto a truly multi-partysystem
With thiselection,theCongresssystemin Assam
that showshigh degreeof party fragmentation.The gaveway to a multi-partysystemin which political
slow and somewhatdormant processof politicisa- partiesof variousethnic groupsor smallercultural
tion of ethnicitieshas suddenlygatheredmomen- communitieshave beganto play significantroles
tum. It is hard to miss the link betweenthesetwo [Baruah, 1998]. Since then, electoralpolitics in
processes:
multiplicationin the numberof political Assamhasbegunto reflectthe political logic of the
partiesis intrinsicallylinkedto the politicisationof state'smulti-ethnicreality.Sub-regionalpartieslike
multiple ethnicities.Assamhasmoved from an era the Autonomous State Demand Committee
of 'catch-all' formationsto that of 'cleavage-based(ASDC), United Minority Fronr (UMF), People's
polit ic s ' .
Democratic Front (PDF) and All Bodo Student
Union (ABSU), articulatingthe interestsof smaller
The paper develops this argument by recon- ethnic and cultural communities,have also made
structingthe story of electoralpoliticssince1985, theirpresence
felt. Theleft parties,oncevery critical
the 'critical' or the 'realigning' election that of regional,and particularlyAsomiyaregionalpolchangedthe structure of political competition in itics, face a steadypolitical declineand have been
Assam. The ground for this electoralrealignment forced to acceptthe reality of the regionalforces.
was preparedby the Assam movementof 1979-85 The CongressParty continuesto remain a strong
on the foreign-nationalissuethat brought consid- force to reckon with, yet it is nowherecloseto the
erable changesin the support structureand issue dominanceit exercisedin the pre-1985era. The
articulationof political parties in Assam.' The rainbowcoalitionthat it had put togetherhascome
SandhyaGoswami is Reader,Departmentof Political Science,Guwahati University, Guwahati, Assam.
E-mail: sandhya_goswami
@yahoo.com
JOURNALOF INDIANSCHOOLOF POLITICALECONOMY
JAN..JUNE2OO3
apart.The BharatiyaJanataParty(BJp) hasentered Assamese(57.8 per cent) and Bengalis(21.6 per
as an important electoralforce in the last decade, cent).The populationof Assamis alsodividedunder
but more as a sectarianthan as a nationalistforce. severalcategories,like immigrant Muslims, Hindus,Nepalese,teagardencommunity,etc.The facts
Thesedevelopmentshad a profound impact on of ethnic demographyhave important impactson
the politics of the state.The entry to new social the statepolitics in Assam.It is, therefore,difficult
groupsand partieshas the potentialof giving more for a political party to win an election without
a
meaning to competitive democracy.None of the supportbaseamongthe dominantgroupsin a given
national parties can possibly ignore the effective constituency.The presenceof linguistic,religious
challengeof regional and ethnic basedpartiesin and ethnic diversity leavestremendousscopefor
Assam.Yet greaternumberof partieshas not nec- politicalpolarisationon ethniclines.It appearsthat
essarilymeant more and better choicesand better minorityvotesoftenplay a decisiverole in moulding
policies. Elected governments have repeatedly the final outcomeof the electionsin Assam.
failed to translate popular support to effective
policies.Gun culture has penetratedinto the elecThe socialdiversityof present-dayAssamis the
toral processof Assam through the connivanceof productof a very complexhistory.The periodfrom
the stategovernment.
1826is a formativeepochin the history of Assam.
It markednot only the end of the independentand
Social and Historical Contextof Electoral politics powerful Ahom monarchy but usheredin a new
regimeof foreign domination,the effectsof which
Assam,oneof thesevenstatesin north-eastIndia can be felt eventoday.The processof colonisation
with diverse populationand nagginginsurgency in Assamwasaimedat restructuringthe societyand
activities,occupies2.4 percentof thetotal landarea monetisingits economy to effectively serve the
anda strategicpositionin the politicalmap of India. imperialinterest.The administration,the land revThe political map of Assamhasundergoneseveral enueandtaxationmeasures
weregearedto themajor
changessince independence.Assam of today is taskof colonialexploitation.The closedsocietywas
reducedto the Brahmaputravalley, Barak Valley, exposedto immigrationlabour,new skills and new
andthe two hill districts- Karbi Anglong andNorth ideas.This immigration has done much towards
Cacharhills.The statehasapopulationof morethan opening out and colonising the fertile and
26 million with a densityof 340 personsper square sparsely-peopled
districtof Assam,while relieving
kilometersas per the Censusof 2001.
other provincesof a portion of their surpluspopulation.
The social compositionof Assam is strongly
influencedby two inseparablehistoricalfacts - the
The establishmentof the Assam Tea Company
extraordinary role of immigrants in the state's was part of the schemeof colonisingwasteland in
populationand the ethnic cultural diversity of the Assam to provide new avenuesof investment
for
immigrants. Even without the immigration, foreign capital [Guha, 1968]. The tea indusrry
Assam's indigenous population is extremely required a regular supply of labour. Therefore.
diversein cultural,linguisticand religiousterms. attracteda large number of labourersfrom Bihar.
Major componentsof its social mosaic are the Chotanagpur,Uttar Pradeshand the MadraspresHindus (67 per cent) and the Muslims (28.5 per idency. Thousands of labourers were annually
cent).The ScheduledCastesand ScheduledTribes recruitedfor the plantationsfrom other provinces.
represent7.4 per cent and I2.I per cent [Census, Most of them did not return home,and formed the
l99ll respectively.
The major linguisticgroupsare biggestmigrant group in Assam's population.The
VOL.] 5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
next streamof migration was that of peasantsfrom
the EastBengaldistricts,some85 to 90 per centof
whom were Muslims. This rural migrationcontinuedduringthe years1901-1947,
andwas on sucha
scalethat the indigenouscomponentof the Assam
valley populationwent down considerablyin percentageterms by the middle of the twentiethcentury. No doubt the immigrants contributed to
Assam'seconomyby bringinglargetractsof waste
land under cultivation;but they adverselyaffected
the social and cultural life of Assam [Goswami,
much opposition, primarily becausethe Surma
valley, dominatedby Bengalis,in those days was
not a part of the Assam Congress.It was a part of
the Bengal Congress.Therefore,it could createa
strongsupportbaseamongthe Assamesecommunity. It is interestingto note that in the Assembly
election of 1946, on the basis of pro-Assamese
appealCongresscould manageto poll as high as
78.3 per cent of votesin the generalconstituencies
[Guha,1977,Pp.355-56].But, afterindependence,
it was forcedto redefineits supportbase.
l99sl.
Independence
andthepartitionof thecountryled
to the merger of the Muslim dominated Sylhet
district into East Pakistan(Bangladesh)while the
predominantlyBengali speaking Cachar district
remainedwith Assam.This provided,as it historically did in most part of India, a specificareafor
politicalmanipulation.The inclusionof Cachar,the
populousBengali speakingarea,under the Assam
PradeshCongressCommitteebroughtabouta significant change in the politics of the state. The
Bengali speaking population became electorally
significant.With the continuousinflux of refugees,
both Bengali Hindus and Muslims, from the erstwhile EastPakistanandwith the tribal communities
like the Khasis,Garos and Bodos trying to assert
their own identities,the situationbecamecomplicated.As is evidentfrom thepoliciespursuedby the
Congresson the official language,the medium of
instruction,and the establishmentof refineries,the
AssamPradeshCongressparty appearedto follow
a middle path. The Congress party's attitude
This decisionon the languagequestionstrucka towardsthe demandsof the variousgroups,like the
severeblow to the nascentAssamesenationalism hill tribes and the Bodos, showed elements of
and even to the very survival of the Assamese uncertainty.2 For instance, when the Bodos
nationality.In such a situationthe Congressparty demandedintroductionof Bodo as the medium of
sided with the Assamesesub-nationalism.
In its instructionup to the secondaryschoollevel in the
electionleaflet[Guha,19771itcommented'unless thenGoalparadistrictin 1968,the thenchief minthe province of Assam is organisedand basedon ister of Assam statedit to be contradictoryto the
Assameselanguageand culture,the survivalof the government's
policy [Narain,1976.p.
educational
Assamesenationality will become impossible'. 431.The demandfor a separatestatemade by the
Such a pro-Assamesenationalistpolicy could be hill tribeslike the Khasis,the JaintiasandtheGaros,
followed by the Congressin that period without which was articulatedby the All PartyHill Leaders
Another plank of the imperialistpolicy was to
suppresslocal languagesand to set up artificial
boundariesfor the sake of a cheapand simplified
administration.
This policy affectedthelocalmiddle
classesand by promotingdifferencesbetweenthem
and the immigrants, servedas an instrumentthat
would help divide and rule. The British rulers
introducedBengali in the schoolsof Assamand as
a court languagein April 1836on the groundthat it
was very difficult and too costly to replace the
Persianscribeswho were on leave or had left the
service. The Assameselanguageremained suppressedduring the whole periodfrom 1836to I 871,
As a result, the servicesof the Bengalis became
indispensable
in almostall the governmentschools,
whetherAnglo-vernacularor vernacular,sincelocal
teacherswere not availablein adequatenumbersto
impart lessons in Bengali which became the
m ediumo I i n s tru c ti o n .
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Conference(APHLC), also did not receivea sympathetic responsein the beginning. In fact, the
APHLC legislators resigned en-block from the
Assam assembly,soon after the 1967 assembly
elections,in order to pressurisethe central governmentfor the formation of a separatehill state.
]AN.-JUNE2OO3
From 'Catch-All' to Fragmentation: Electoral
Competition,I 952-I 99l
During the pre-independence
period, the Congress championed the cause of the 'Assamese
national identity' in terms of safeguarding
Assameselanguageandculture.This historicalfact
was in someway responsiblefor the uninterrupted
Moreoverthecontinuousinflux of refugeesfrom
dominanceof the Congressparty in the electoral
theerstwhileEastPakistanin thepost-independencehistory of Assam
for three decadesfrom 1952 to
periodand with more and more tribal communities 1978.The Congressnever lost more than threeto
like the Khasis,Garos,Bodos trying to asserttheir four parliamentaryseatsout of the 12 or 14 Lok
own identities,the situation becameincreasingly Sabhaconstituenciesin the first six generaleleccomplicated.The Asomiya middle class, in the tions to the Lok Sabha.Even in 1977.when the
meantime,becamemoreaggressive.
As wasevident voters in most parts of India had rejected the
from the policiespursuedby the Congresson issues CongressPartyof Indira Gandhifor the emergency
excesses,
the electoratein Assamgavethe party l0
like official language,medium of instructionand
out of l4 seatsin the Parliamentwith 50.6 per cent
establishmentof refineries, the Assam Pradesh vote share.Its share votes
of
in the parliamentary
Congresswas trying to do sometight rope walking. elections,up to that period,remainedabove45 per
But, the centralleadershipof the party appearedto cent;in the assemblyelectionsits lowestvote share
be insensitiveto the problems of the state.This duringthis periodwas43.5 per cent.
insensitivity gradually became more and more
During this period the Congress Party was
pronounced.
gradually losing its widespreadsupportbase;yet
there was little by way of a political alternative.
The Congressalways took stepsto gain popSome regional political groups and parties did
ularity on the eve of electionsand tried to undo the emergein Assam.Someof these,like
the All party
damagescausedby its policies.For instance,on the Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC) with nonissuesof the establishmentof a secondoil refinery Assamesespeakingethnic supportbase,beganto
in Assamandthe demandof a separatehill state,the do fairly well. But, their influencewas confinedto
Assam Congresstook coursesof actions which selectareasthat were later carved out of Assam.
actuallyalienatedthe large sectionsof the popula- Attemptsto challengetheCongressin the dominant
Asomiya community by the PeoplesDemocratic
tion who were supportingthesedemandsand then
PartyandtheUjani AssamRajyaParishadcouldnot
it tried to salvage the situation by announcing makeany mark in
the electoralpoliticsof the state.
measuresto placatethesesectionsjust before the The six-yearlong Assam agitationwas a political
elections[Narain, 19761.Till the late sixties and watershedin this respect.It was only after this
early seventiesthe Asomiyamiddle classwas con- agitationthat the regional forces in the Asomiya
trolling the affairsof the statethroughthe Congress areas could become significant in the electoral
Party and, therefore, such attitudes could be arena.
interpretedas the attitudesof the Asomiya middle
The first major setbackfor theCongresscamein
class.Of course,there were tusslesfor leadership
the wakeof theJanataParty'sascentto power at the
within the party leadingto factionalpolitics which center.Indira Gandhi's defeat
was followed by a
contributedto the erosionof its supportbase.
split in the Congressparty. Assam was one of the
VOL.] 5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTSANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
few stateswhere the rival Congressled then by
Devraj Urs held its own and emergedstrongerthan
theCongress(Indira).The first trial of strengthtook
placein the assemblyelectionsof 1978in which the
Congress(I)was reducedto a single digit both in
terms of votes and seats.The Congress(U),on the
other hand, turned in a more respectableperformancewith 26 seatsand24 per cent votes.The split
of votes among both the parties benefited the
non-Congress
parties.The JanataParty,thatlargely
drew upon the socialist parties, emerged as the
single largestparty with 53 seatsand 27 per cent
votes. The change of governmentin the center,
leading to correspondingchangesin the political
alignmentin the state,had affectedthe resultsof
theseelections.Though the same issue of Emergency excessesremainedcentralto the campaigns
of both the 1977 parliamentary and the 1978
Assemblyelections,yet the resultswere very different.
and holding of fresh elections.The Lok Sabha
elections,which could not be held in the statein
1984 due to disturbedconditions,were also held
along with the Assembly electionsin December
1985.
The 1985 election was a 'critical' election for
Assam,for it led to a reconfigurationof the party
systemand a durablerealignmentof socialgroups
with political parties.The electionsled to a very
high level of popularparticipationand enthusiasm.
The turnoutjumped to 79 per cent, 12 percentage
points up from the previousrecordset in the 1978
elections.The principal actorsbehind the Assam
agitation recast themselvesinto a new political
party, the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP). This
regional party derived its strength from the perceptionof a threatto theAsomiyaidentityasa result
of largescaleimmigration.In theassemblyelections
of 1985,the AGP rode on a wave to power,on the
foreignersissue.Yet it needsto be rememberedthat
The years following this election were full of even in this moment of its glory, the AGP could
political instability and upheaval.The Janatagov- securelessthan 35 per cent votesand win only one
ernmentfell in Assam even before the 1980 Lok morethanthebareminimum requiredfor a majority
Sabhaelection,giving way to a shortlived Congress in the Assembly.The A.G.P did emergeasthe focal
ministry. This is when the Assam agitation had pointof non-Congress
mobilisationandpushedthe
alreadyhit its peak. President'srule was imposed nationaloppositionpartiesto the sidelines.At the
on Assam and electionsto only two Lok Sabha sametime, this successunderlinedthe limitations
constituencies
couldbe heldin this 'disturbed'state. of its catchmentareathe Congress(I)won 25 seats
OnceMrs. Gandhicamebackto powerat theCentre, and polled 23 per cent votes. Part of the reason
shemade variousabortiveattemptsto install Con- behind the AGP's victory was that during this
gress ministries. Once the term of the assembly election the pro-Asomiya nationalist votes
expired,Mrs. Gandhi decidedto gamble with the remainedsolidly behindthe AGP, but the votesof
holdingof assemblyelectionsin thestatein theteeth the forces inimical to the movement got divided,
of popular resistance.The election to Assam with theUnitedMinority Front (UMF) capturingl7
assemblyheld in 1983was a politicaldisaster.The seatsand securingabout 12 per cent votes.The left
officially reportedturnout was 323 per cent; the partieshadput up a remarkableperformanceduring
media reportedthe real turnout, especiallyin the the post-EmergencyAssembly election of 1978
Asomiya areas,to be much lower. The Congress with theCPI(M) winning 11 searsandthe CPI five
came to power led by Hiteshwar Saikia, but the seats.The RevolutionaryCommunistPartyof India
governmentlackedpopularlegitimacy.The politi- (RCPI) too won four seatsin that election.But, in
cal impassewas broken after Mrs. Gandhi'sdeath 1985, primarily because of their anti-Assam
by her sonandthe new primeministerRajiv Gandhi, movementstand,they were almostwiped out. The
who enteredinto anaccordwith thestudentsleading CPI could not win any seat and the CPI(M) won
the Assam movement.The 1985 Assam Accord only two. The Plains Tribal Council of Assam
pavedthe way for the dissolutionof the Assembly (PTCA) won threeseatsin Bodo areasand United
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
JAN.-JUNE2OO3
Tribal NationalLiberationFront (UTNLF), another
tribal party,won a singleseat.The Congress(S),
the
historical continuity of Congress(U),won four
seats.
analysisof this electionshowsthat the rurnoutwas
exceptionally high in the immigrant areas and
lowestin the Congressdominatedteagardenareas.
The AGP performedbest among the areasdominatedby theAsomiyacommunity,includingthe tea
Thoughno direct surveydatais availablefor this growing areas.It did manageto get a respectable
crucial assemblyelection,broad inferencescan be shareof votesand a few seatsin the immigrantand
drawnby analysingresultson the basisof the social the tribal areasas well, presumablyby mobilising
backgroundof variousconstituencies.
The assem- the minority Asomiya population. Most of the
bly constituencies
havebeendividedinto four broad UMFA votes were concentratedin the immigrant
categories:those with the dominanceof Bengali constituencies
and the PTCA securedvotesalmost
immigrants,thosewhere the ScheduledTribes are exclusivelyin the tribal areas.Squeezedfrom both
numerically preponderant,those seats of upper the ends, the Congressdid poorly everywhere,
Assamdominatedby Tea growing workersand the especiallyamongthe immigrantareas.It couldsave
remainingseatsthat aredominatedby the dominant its face only in the tea growing areaswith 34 per
Asomiya community. A look at category-wise centvotesand9 seats.
Table 1. Category-wise Analysis of Assembly Elections in Assam, 1985
Region/
District
Seats
Turnout
(vo)
AGP
(l)
(2)
(3)
Won/
Cont.
(4)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ST dominated
Others
l5
29
l9
63
81.6
73.8
77.8
80.0
4n4
t9/29
9/12
33t56
Total
t26
79.2
65/l I I
Congress
Vote
(vo)
UMFA
ICS
(s)
Won/
Cont.
(6)
Vote
(Vo)
(7)
Won/
Cont.
Vote
(Vo)
(8)
2t.7
41.0
25.9
38.4
lns
9/29
2/t9
t3t62
12.8
33.9
21.4
22.2
6il3
0t6
lts
nt36
35.0
25n25
23.2
18/60
(e)
Won/
Cont.
(l0)
Vote
(7o)
(I l)
33.1
1.5
3.1
13.3
l/l0
0/18
l/l I
2t33
6.3
0.8
3.8
3.2
).2
(Conrd.)
Table l. (Concld.)
Region/
District
(l)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ST dominated
Others
Total
Left Parties
PCTA
Other Parties
Won/
Cont.
(12)
Vote
(vo)
(l 3 )
Won/
Cont.
(l4)
Vote
(vo)
(ls)
Won/
Cont.
(l6)
t/8
0n2
0/8
lt32
8.0
4.0
4.0
6.2
0/0
0t7
3lt2
0/9
0.0
2.6
t7.2
1.2
0/l 8
0t40
0n3
0t73
3.6
01t44
5.7
Vote
(vo)
(l7)
Independent
Won/
Cont.
(l 8 )
Vote
(vo)
(1 e )
J.Z
2t38
U t ' |t
3169
31255
15.8
l3.l
22.1
t2.3
2.8
9t533
z.J
3.1
1.9
Source:CSDS, Data Unit.
Note: The classificationof assembly.constituencies
usedin this and subsequenttableshasbeendevelopedby the author on the basrs
of local political information and availableestimates.The 'ST dominated' cbnstituencieswere identified on the basisof the proportion
of ST_populationin the constituencyand not just on whetherthe constituencywas reservedfor ST or not. The category'other'
includesmainly areasdominatedby Asomiya Hindus.
VOL.]5 NOS.] &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
The 1985electionsignalledthe end to the one
party dominance by the Congress. Initially it
appearedthat the Congresssystemwould give way
to a bipolar competitionbetweenthe Congressand
the AGP. A close look at the verdict showsthat it
was far from instituting a two-party system.Put
together,the two big partiesdid not commandeven
60 per cent of the popular vote. The Congress'
rainbowcoalitionhadbegunto comeapartandeach
slice was headedin a different direction.What the
1985electionhad institutedwas a systemof high
mobilisation and intensecompetition among differentsocial groups,a competitionthat was bound
to introduceand sustainparty fragmentation.The
subsequent
electionswere to demonstratethis.
227
with 5.5 per cent votes.The BJP, which was never
a significantforce before,won ten Assemblyseats
and polled 6.4 per centvotes.Sincethe NAGP and
the BJPappealedto the samesocialconstituencyas
the AGP, their performancewas bound to affect the
electoralprospectsof the AGP very badly. It could
be arguedthat the threeformationsput togetherhad
polled more votesthan the Congress;but this fact
was of no more than a statisticalconsolation.
This electionalsoprovedthat the declineof the
left wasnot a temporaryphenomenon.
The CPI (M)
won two and CPI four seats in these elections.
Among the partiesrepresentingethnic minorities,
the newly formed Autonomous State Demand
The next trial of electoralstrengthtook placenot Committee(ASDC) of Karbi Anglong districrwon
in 1989,as in the rest of the country,but in 1991. four assemblyseatswith 1.6 per cent votes.Other
TheLok Sabhaelectionscouldnotbeheldin Assam, suchpartiesdrew a blank.
as disturbed conditioned prevailed again. The
Lok Sabhaelectionswere also held along with
VidhanSabhaelection
couldalsonot beheldin time
for the samereason.If anyonethought the Assam the assemblypolls. The scenarioat the parliamenagitationhad thrown Congressout of the arenaof tary level was not much different from that of the
statepolitics,he was disprovedby the resultsof the Assemblyelections.At the parliamentarylevel, the
assemblyelectionsheld in 1991. The Congress Congress
managedto win eightseatsout of l4 with
stageda remarkablecomebackby winning 65 seats 28.5per centvotescomparedto only four seatsthat
and securinga clear majority. The comebackwas it won in the 1985elections.The AGP won
only a
remarkable,not for the size of its majority, but the singleseatwith 17.6votes.The
NAGP could not
recoverystagedin the aftermathof the Assamagiwin any seatbut polled a significant5.9 per cent
tation.In termsof popularvote share,the Congress
votes.Like its performancein the Assemblyeleccould poll only 29 per cent votes;thus the verdict
tions, in the parliamentaryelectionstoo, the BJP
did not actuallyreflect a resurgenceof supportfor
won two seatswith 9.6 per centvotes.
Congress.A look at theseresultsshowsthatthemain
reasonsfor the Congressvictory, despitepoor vote
Table2 showsthattherewasa substantial
erosion
share, were the division of the pro-Assamese
AGP
of
votes
in
all
categories
of
seats,
except
in the
nationalistvotesbetweentheAGP andNutanAsom
ST
seats
where
it
somewhat
retained
its
votes.
The
GanaParishad(NAGP), a breakawayfactionof the
played
NAGP
the
spoiler
for
the
AGP,
especially
in
AGP, and the unprecedentedperformanceof the
the
Asomiya
dominated
areas
including
the tea
BJP.
gardenareas.The BJPtook a significantsliceof the
The AGP's vote share of 17.9 per cent was anti-migrantvotersin the migrant dominatedareas
practicallyhalf of what it got duringthe 1985wave. and thusmadethingsdifficult for the AGP. For the
But its seatswere lessthan one third of what it had first time, the BJPregisteredits presencein the state
in thepreviousAssembly.The NAGP won five seats in theAsomiyaandthe immigrantdominatedareas.
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
JAN.-JUNE 2OO3
Table 2. Category-wise Analysis of Assam, 1991
Region/
District
Seats
Turnout
(vo)
AGP
(l)
(2)
(3)
Won/
Cont.
(4)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
l5
29
t9
63
8 3 I.
70.3
73.0
75 . 1
0^4
0/29
4n6
t5t6l
Total
t26
74.1
t9/120
Consress
NAGP
BJP
Vote
(Vo)
(5)
Won/
Cont.
(6)
Vote
(Vo)
(7)
Won/
Cont.
(8)
Vote
(vo)
Won/
Cont.
(10)
9.2
18.8
16.9
20.r
9n5
2 7t 2 9
4/t8
26/62
30.4
44.4
22.0
25.2
0t7
0/25
l/8
4t45
1.9
6.8
6.4
t/5
0 / lI
0/2
9t3t
66il24
29.2
5.5
tjt49
(e)
-l ^+
Vote
(Vo)
(l l)
6.1
1.0
0.2
10.8
6.7
(Contd.)
Table 2. (Concld.)
Region/
Distnct
ASDC
Left Parties
Other Parties
Independent
Won/
Cont.
(l)
(tz)
Vote
(vo)
(l 3 )
Won/
Cont.
(l4)
Vote
(vo)
(l 5 )
Won/
Cont.
(l6)
Vote
(Vo)
(17)
Won/
Cont.
08)
Vote
(vo)
(l 9 )
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
2/5
2/t5
0t7
2t39
8.4
6.1
3.8
6.6
0/0
0tl
4t4
0t3
0.0
0.2
9.9
0.1
0/48
o/73
0t29
Ut97
t 7. l
8.7
8.7
I1.8
3/77
0/20'7
6t63
6t5tl
26.3
14.0
3 5 I.
19.0
1.6
v347
l 5/858
2t.4
Total
6.3
Source:CSDS, Data Unit.
The tablealsobringsout the unevencharacterof the major communitiesof Assam.It did not enjoy
the Congress votes. An analysis of the the confidenceand the electoral support of the
constituency-wiseperformance of the Congress largest and the dominant Asomiya community.
Party shows that, in this election, Congressper- Therefore,the Congresswas now forcedto forge a
formancewas much betterin the areasdominated coalition of the various 'minority' groupsthat put
by the non-Assamesespeakingpopulation.Out of togetherconstitutea majority in the state.It was
a
the 65 seatsit won, at least40 were constituencies precarious
strategy,for even when it succeededit
where 'Ana-Asomiya', 'Na-Asomiya'3or the tea
could barely give Congressthe kind of majority it
garden labour population was electorally signifihad enjoyedin the past.In that sense,the decline
cant. It's biggest gains were concentratedin the
thatstartedin 1977continueddespitethepartybeing
tea-growingareas.It also regainedheavily in the
able to form a governmentin the state.In the parimmigrantareas,thusindicatingthatit hadwon back
liamentaryelectionsas well, the Congressfared
the supportof theMuslims. The Congressbenefited
in the Asomiya dominatedareasand doubled its betterin the areasdominatedby tea gardenlabour
seats,but mainly due to the split causedby the and Na-Asomiyas.In the Asomiya areasit could
NAGP's presence.The Congressmade a clean win where it did, only becauseof a split in the
sweepin its traditionalstronghold,the tea growing Asomiya nationalistvotes betweenthe AGP and
NAGP. Even at the parliamentary-level
electionthe
areas.
Congresswasexperiencingan erosionof its support
The Congresscamebackto powerin 1991,asit baseand the regionalforceswere gaining ground.
would later in 2001,but not in its traditionalrole as Electoralpolitics of the statewas thus becominga
a party representinga rainbowsocialcoalitionof all spherewhere Asomiya nationalistforces and the
VOL.] 5 NOS.I &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
l l Y
parties representingthe interestsof the smaller communities.This move wasdirectedat mobilising
ethnic groups were beginning to challenge the near total tribal support for his party. But, the
Congress,the most dominantnationalparty.
Congressgameplan failed primarily becauseof the
lack of credibilityof theparty andits leadershipand
Successof AGP's Inclusivist Strategyin the 1996 the unitedopposition'sability to keep
the focus on
Elections
corruption and violation of democratic rights.
Organisations
like the Committeefor the Protection
By the time Assam went to the polls in 1996,
of Freedomof Expression(CPEE) and the Ganaboth for the Parliament and the Assembly, the
Congressfound itself in a very difficult situationnot tantrikAdhikar SurakhyaSamiti(GASS)formedby
only becauseof the alienationof a large sectionof influentialsectionsof thepress,intellectualsandthe
partiesplayedan importantrole. The
Asomiyasbut alsobecauseof the fact that the AGP non-Congress
and pro-oppositionline takenby the
andNAGP hadcometogetheronceagain.The AGP anti-Congress
had realised the inherent limitations of its social extremiststoo createdproblemsfor Congress.
constituency and thus seen the importance of
keepingat leastsomeminority groupswith it. The
That state repression,corruption and ethnic
other opposition parties including the left parties identity remained crucial issuesfor the election
and even UMF - a party which had beenclaiming becameclearfrom thefact that almostall manifestos
to representthe interestsof the religious and lin- of themajor non-Congress
partiesfocussedon these
guistic minorities - joined hands with the AGP
issues.The AGPmanifestopromisedto bring anend
particularlyin view of theunprecedented
corruption
to mal-administrationand corruption. Autonomy
and indiscriminate use of the repressive state
and the problemsof the tribal peopleof Assamare
machineryby the HiteswarSaikiagovernment.The
situationwas furthercomplicatedby theproblemof the other two issuesthat they promisedto solve if
extremistpolitics of organisationslike the United they came to power. The AGP manifesto also
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and Bodo declaredthattheConstitutionneededto beamended
Security Force (BDSF). In early 1995, most to grant autonomy to the states,The CPI (M)
observerswould haveagreedthatthe next elections manifesto accusedthe Congressgovernment of
would be fought on the issuesof corruption and letting lose a reign of terror in the name of conviolation of democraticrights [Baruah,1996).
trolling extremists.It also accusedthe Saikia government of sowing seeds of conflict among the
Alive to this possibility,the Congresstried to Rabha,Tiwa and Mishing people in the name of
changethe focus of politics to ethnicity, an issue grantingautonomy.It identifiedthe governmentas
which could give it an advantageover others.In a the instrument massive
of
corruption.The CPI too
clevermove, Saikia soughtto ensurethat the issue
identified corruption,repressionand problemsof
of ethnic identitiesin this multiethnic stategained
nationalitiesas major issues.The BJP included a
vital importancein electoralpolitics.The articulate
sectioncalled 'Administration'in its manifesto.in
sectionsof the Bodos,the Karbis and the Mishings
havebeentrying to mobilise 'their' peopleon ethnic which corruptionandviolationof democraticrights
line. The Bodos and the Karbis had alreadybeen were highlighted.Even a small party like the Peodemanding political autonomy and their move- ples DemocraticFront (PDF), representingBodo
ments, like many such others, had acquired an ethnic identity, blamed the Saikia ministry of
anti-governmentcharacter.Saikiadeclaredthat his corruption, atrocitiesand of complicating ethnic
government would grant autonomy to all tribal problems.
JOURNALOF INDIANSCHOOLOF POLITICALECONOMY
It was interestingto note that except the BJP,
noneof the partiesincludingtheAGP, really harped
on the issue of the detection and deportationof
'foreigners'
though most of them insisted that
immigration from Bangladeshshould be stopped.
BJP was the only party which advocatedthe pre1985AGP line. But this issueneverreally took off
becauseits main vehicle,the AGP, decidedto play
it down, particularlybecauseof the alliancesit had
to form to keep the non-Congressvotes together.
Saikia's attempt at diverting the attentionof the
electoratefrom theseissuesby playing ethnicpoliticsin factboomeranged,
leadingto divisionamong
communities
like theRabhas.
LalungsandMishings
and alienationof alarge numberof tribalsfrom the
CongressParty.Even BPP(P),its ally in the Bodo
areas,could not keep the focus on issuesSaikia
chose.The ethnic issuein fact remainedlive in the
Bodo and Karbi areasbut was monopolisedby the
anti-Congress
UDF and ASDC.
The AGP leadershiphad realisedthat alliances
were critical to the possibility of defeating the
Congress.Newspaperreports,particularly in the
regionalpress,beginningfrom 1994 showedthat
the non-Congressforces in Assam were getting
together,initially on the issue of staterepression
[BaruaandGoswami,1999].TheAGP andall major
non-Congresspolitical forces moved towards an
understanding.
This understanding
culminatedin an
allianceof the five major parties- the AGP, theCPI,
the CPI (M), the Autonomous State Demand
Committee (ASDC) and the Bodo PeoplesParty
(Sangsuma)[BPP (S)]. There were efforts to bring
the Janata Dal and the United Minorities Front
(UMF) also into the front. In the meantime.the
National DemocraticFront, a bannedorganisation
of Bodos,directedthe Bodo politicalpartiesto unite
so that the anti-CongressBodo votes did not get
divided. As a result, in the Bodo dominatedareas,
the BPP(S), the Plains Tribal Council of Assam
(FITCA) and the United DemocraticFronr (UDF)
decidedto come together.The Bodo People'sParty
(Premsing)IBPP(P)1,however,remainedwith the
JAN.-JUNE2OO3
Congress.The United People's Party of Assam
(UPPA),a partyrepresenting
minority interests,too
arrived at an understandingwith the AGP. In the
pre-electionallianceformationof the non-Congress
forces,the BJP was isolated.The JanataDal kept a
low profile.The Congressthuswas without a major
ally. It did forgean allianceof sortswith theBpp(p)
in Bodo areaswhich could not actuallyimproveits
position. The major sectionsof the left, regional
forcesand the ethnicand religiousminoritiesstood
solidly behind the AGP-led alliance. The most
significant part of this alliance was the coming
togetherof the AGP, CPI and CPI(M). From rhe
beginningof theAssamagitationthe lateseventies,
the left partiesand the forcesbehindAGP had been
at logger-heads.
The agitation,becauseof its focus
on Bengali immigrantsfrom Bangladesh,came to
be viewed as anti-Bengali.The left parties also
opposedthe agitationon ideologicalgrounds.
But the experienceof five years in power and
five yearsin oppositionseemedto havehelpedAGp
to learn some lessons.It realisedthat it could not
rule Assam without securing the support of the
Ana-Asomiyapopulation.Its silence,on the issue
of detectionand deportationof immigrants,during
the campaignperiod, as reflectedin its manifesto,
indicated this realisation. The new inclusivist
strategyof the AGP had thus three components:
AGP underMahanta'sleadershipacceptedbackthe
dissentingfaction led by Bhrigu Phukan;rhe party
enteredinto a political coalition with the left; and
theparty underscored
the needfor a socialcoalition
with the non-Asomiyapopulationof the state.
This inclusivist strategypaid rich dividendsin
the final outcomeboth at the Assemblyandthe Lok
Sabhalevel. The AGP succeededin regainingthe
majority in the state Assembly. On its own, the
party's tally of 61 fell a little short of the majority
mark of 64, but its left allies (includingrhe ASDC,
a Marxist-Leninistgroup) contributedanother 10
seatsand thus gave it a clear majority, The party
improved its vote sharedramaticallycomparedto
VOL.]5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
thedebacleof 1991. The returnof the NAGP helped confronted.
the party in not only recoveringthe 6 per cent votes
thatit hadtakenaway,but alsoin improvingits vote
The samepatternwasrepeatedin the Lok Sabha
shareby anotherfew points. Eventually,the party
electionsheld at the sametime. The Congressand
secured30 per cent votes, about 12 percentage
points higher than its vote share in the previous the AGP won five seatseach.One seatwent to an
election.This performanceappearslessimpressive independentcandidate. Compared to 1991 the
than its historicvictory in 1985,but it needsto be Congresslost threeseats,and the BJP lost one.The
rememberedthat the AGP contestedonly 99 seats AGP gained four seats.The
CPI(M), ASDC and
this time. Its partners- the CPI, the CPI(M) and the
independentsretainedtheir one seat each. ComASDC - securedanother6 percentagepoints.The
Congresstally was reducedto half, despitethe fact paredto the l99l elections,the Congresslost four
that the party improvedits vote shareslightly.This seatsto the AGP but it won one seatfrom the BJP.
was a clear effect of the 'oppositionunity' that it Thusthe Congress'losswas AGP's gain.
Table 3. Category-wiseAnalysis of Assam Election, 1996
Region/
Distnct
Seats
Tumout
(vo)
AGP
(l)
(2)
(3)
Won/
Cont.
(4)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
l5
29
t9
63
84.7
74.6
80.4
77.9
4il0
lt24
5l12
41t53
Total
L26
6u99
Congress
Left Parties
Won/
Cont.
Vote
(Vo)
(7)
Won/
Cont.
(8)
Vote
(vo)
(e)
Won/
Cont.
(10)
Vote
(vo)
(ll)
21.3
30.2
18.4
35.5
4il5
t6t29
Ut9
t5t63
29.6
40.0
22.1
29.9
0/13
0t29
0il6
4t63
10.4
6.7
6.0
12.9
2t6
U6
0/0
2/10
8.6
5.3
0.0
30.1
36n26
30.7
4nzl
10.3
Vote
(Vo)
(s)
(6)
-). I
4.0
(Contd.)
Table 3. (Concld.)
Region/
District
0)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
Total
rNC(T)
Other Parties
Independent
Won/
Cont.
(12)
Vote
(vo)
(l 3 )
Won/
Cont.
(14)
Vote
(vo)
(ls)
Won/
Cont.
(l6)
Vote
(vo)
(l 7 )
Won/
Cont.
(18)
Vote
(Vo)
(le)
0/0
0/0
5t5
0i0
0.0
0.0
t2.5
0.0
zil5
0t29
0/10
0/57
6.2
5.4
1.5
3.0
2n3
0t36
0/6
0/53
4.8
2.6
0.7
1.9
vt3t
U95
8 t 7|
U36t
t9.l
9.8
38.8
13.1
1.9
zml
3.7
2^08
))
r11658
t7.l
Source:CSDS, Data Unit.
The category-wiseanalysisin Table 3 explains
the anatomyof this election.The AGP gainedback
some Muslim supportin the immigrant areasand
madeits principal gainsin the Asomiya dominated
seatsand the tea growing areas.It did not register
any significantgainsin the ST seats.Its gainswere
evenly spreadout, exceptfor the tribal dominated
seats.The allianceensureda genuinepresencefor
the AGP in all the areasof the statesinceit had built
up a rainbowcoalitioncutting acrossethnic lines.
The Congress'major lossof votesandseatswas
in the tea growing areas.However,the party led in
theseareasover the AGP alliancein termsof votes,
232
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
thoughit trailed the alliancein all other areas.The
electionalso saw the splinteringof the tribal votes
with a strong showing by independentsin these
seats.The Congressseemedto retain its influence
amongthe immigrantsthoughit won only 4 of the
15 seatsin theseareas.
JAN.-JUNE 2OO3
could be understoodin termsof the generalfeeling
among Assam voters that political partiesdo not
carespeciallyfor particularcommunities.
It has often beenheld that the tea belt has been
the preserveof the Congressand during the last
decade,the Congressparty has been able to retain
The unity of the major non-Congresspartiesof its hold overthe main componentof this region,i.e.,
regional, leftist and ethnic orientationsplayed a the tea labourer community.oEven during the
decisiverole, particularly in the tribal-dominated AGP's wavein 1985thesevotershelpedthe Conareasof the state.Theseareashad beentraditional gresswin the Dibrugarh parliamentaryseat comCongressbastionsin which the party could domi- fortably.In fact, the AssamChahMazdoorSangha,
natetill 1985.But in thiselectionthe non-Congressan affiliate of INTUC, has beenorganisingthe tea
alliancecould defeattheparty in constituencies
like labour of Assam since 1947. The organisational
Baithalangsu,Halflong, Diphu, Gossaigaon,Sidli strengthof INTUC in theteabeltof theBrahmapurra
andUdalguria[Goswami,2001a].In theKarbi areas, Valley had beenon, of the reasonsfor the Congress
ASDC won all the five seats.In the Bodo areas, dominancein thisregionIseeGoswamiandSharma,
independents
owing allegianceto the variousBodo 19911.The situationseemsto have changedradifactions, which were part of the non-Congress cally, The BJP,CPI and the AGP havebeenrrying
opposition,won sevenseatsandAGP won the other to find a foothold in this region.The AGP in facr,
two seats.In the Karbi areasASDC's margin over has startedthe Assam Chah Shramik Parishadto
counter the INTUC, In Chabua area 15,000 tea
the Congresswas so high that the latter appearedto
workers were reported to have left the INTUC
belosingits electoralsignificance.In theBodo areas
controlled Assam Chah Mazdoor Sanghato join
the winning marginswere not very high becauseof
Assam Chah Shramik Parishad(The Assam Trithe fact that in thoseareasno dominanttribal party
bune, April 17, 1996). The AASU too had been
emerged.The tribal votes thus were divided. But
trying to influence the Tea Tribal Student
they went againstthe Congress.The resultsof this
Organisationfor quite sometime now. In the 1996
electionexposedthe myth that in Assam,the ConAssemblyelections,of thetotalof 29 suchtealabour
gressinfluenceover tribals was overwhelming.
communitydominantconstituencies,
the Congress
won 16, AGP won 11 and CPI won one seat.The
In the immigrant areastalsothe allianceproved
AGP thus madeinroadsinto the Congressbastion.
to be effective.In theseareas.out of a total of 15
seats,the Congresswon four, AGP four, CPI(M)
The limited direct evidenceavailablefrom the
two, UMF two, CPI one,Congress(T)
oneandPDF post-pollsurveydataof theCSDSthrowssomelight
won one seat.Thus,the AGP and the Congressdid on other dimensionsof voting behaviour in
that
equallywell. Even their vote sharesremainedmore crucial election. Unlike most Indian states,age
or lessequal.It is interestingto note that the UMF, mattersin voting patternsin Assam.The AGP did
claiming to representminority interestsand par- substantiallybetteramongthe youngervotersthan
ticularly immigrant minority interests,could win did the Congress.The Congresslost most heavily
only two seatsin this region.The experienceof the to AGP in the agegroup26-35,i.e.,thosewho were
five yearsof AGP rule, whentherewereno riots and born in the 1960sand were initiatedinto public life
when no real attempts were made to deport the just whenthe Assammovementwasat its peak.The
immigrant settlersof the 'chars' must have moti- genderpatternalsodid not conformto the all-India
vatedthe immigrant populationto try its luck with picture. Here the Congresslagged behind by 6
the front. The UMF's failure to make an impact percentagepoints among the women voters;both
VOL.]5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
the BJP and the AGP did much berter among
women.In termsof classprofile, as revealedin the
educationof the voter, the patternconformedto the
all-Indiapicture:the lower the level of educational
opportunities,the higher the vote for the Congress.
AGP did betteramongthosewith intermediatelevel
233
of education,while the BJP had alreadyestablished
itself as the favouriteof the highly educatedmiddle
class.The surveydataalsoconfirmsthat the AGP's
inclusivist strategyhad succeededin splitting the
Muslim votesandsecuringa goodchunkof thedalit
and adivasivote for the AGP and its allies.
Table 4. Lok Sabha Election, Assam f996 - Who Voted for Whom
(l)
INC
(2)
BJP
(3)
Age
25 years and below
26-35 years
36-45 years
46-55 years
56 years and above
26.2
25.8
46.9
36.0
38.-5
19.0
25.8
t0.2
16.0
t9.2
54.8
47.0
38.8
48.0
42.3
0.0
t.5
4.1
0.0
0.0
Gender
Male
Female
3 6 .I
29.9
t7.2
21.8
44.3
48.3
2.5
0.0
41.6
24.1
20.0
20.2
t3.7
t6.7
40.0
36.0
51.0
59.3
40.0
2.2
2.0
0.0
0.0
22.1
3 8 l.
27.1
39.4
ll.l
19.0
27.1
12.8
66.7
33.3
44.7
47.9
0.0
9.5
t.2
0.0
z) -+
28.9
2.7
46.t
47.3
1.6
0.0
Education
Illiterate
Pnmary and Middle
Intermediate
Graduateand above
Caste
ScheduledCaste
ScheduledTribe
OtherBackward
Others
Religion
Hindu
Muslim
J-).-l
50.0
AGP and Allies
(4)
Others
(5)
Note: Basedon Assamsample.ofthepost-pollsurvey.ofthe NationalE_lection
Study 1996conductedby CSDS.N (Sample)=22g.
In As.s_am,
thesurvey was conductedin a randomlyselectedsampleof 3 Lok Sabhaconstituencies,
6 Aisembly Constitu^encies
and
l2 polling sfations.The Assampart of the nationalrepresentativeiampleanalysedheredid not necessarilyconstitutea representative
samplefor the stateof Assam.
Reversalin the I99B Lok SabhaElection
to stateterrorism becauseof its own experiences
during the movementthat led to its formation,and
Theruling AGP faceda testof its popularityearly its commitmentsmadein the electionmanifesto,the
on asthe mid-term electionsto the Lok Sabhawere AGP governmentimposedrepressivemeasures,in
heldin 1998.The issuesin thisLok Sabhaelectionstheshapeof a unifiedcommand,similarin form and
were the same as in 1996. Only the party at the contentto thosefollowed by the Congressministry.
receivingend changed.A completereversalof the This led to the alienationof the Assamesemiddle
electoralreality unfoldedand, like the Congressin classfrom the AGP.
the last election,it was AGP which facedthe music
in this election.The situationprevailingin Assam
The performanceof thegovernmentwasso poor
just before the 1998 Lok Sabhaelectionwas not that even a normal obligationlike paymentof salconduciveto theelectoralpoliticsof theruling AGP. aries to employees, including school teachers,
Contraryto popularexpectations
of a party opposed releaseof funds for institutionsof higher learning
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
JAN.-JUNE 2OO3
like universities,could not be fulfilled. The bitter State Demand Committee, Mishing Mimang
confrontationof the governmentwith the major tea KebangAutonomousDemandStrugglingFrontand
houseslike the Tatas over the issueof harbouring the Karbi Anglong unit of the CPI(ML) under the
extremistshad alsoreflectedthe immaturity on the bannerof AssamPeople'sFront was significantfor
part of the government.While the attemptsof the electoralpolitics in Assam.The AGP stood alienteagroupsto placatethe ultraswas understandable,atedfrom the tribal electorate.Another problemthe
particularly in view of the growing power of the party facedwas factionalpolitics within it leading
extremistgroupsin the stateduring the preceding to the exit of Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, the former
few years, the government's failure to provide AASU generalsecretaryand the most important
securityto the industry, which was so vital to its leaderof the Assam movementand the formation
economy, definitely eroded its credibility. This of AssamJatiyaParishad.
confrontation with the tea lobby drained lot of
energy and time, when pressing problems like
The problemsof insurgency,corruption,ethnic
extremistviolence,ethnic conflictsand infiltration identity, repealof IMDT Act and stability consriplagued the state (See, The Assam Tribune, tutedthemain plankfor electionpropaganda
in 1998
November 27, 1991 The Statesman,January26, Lok Sabhaelection.Most of the manifestoshad
1998).Letter of credit (LoC) scandalregarding focusedon theseissues.The BJP,in a sectioncalled
illegal withdrawal of more than hundredof crores 'North East' in its manifesto,blamedthe Congress
of rupees from the governmenttreasury in con- government for its failure to cheek the illegal
nectionwith the supply of fodder to the veterinary migrantsin its narrowand selfishinterest.Further,
department, involving several ministers of the it promisedto repealthe Illegal MigrantsDetermiearlier governmentas well as the incumbentmin- nationby TribunalAct (IMDTA) andsrrengrhen
rhe
istry includingits chief ministertogetherwith a host existingimmigrationlaws and rules and enactnew
of governmentofficials, turnedout to be one of the onesto make illegal infiltration difficult and deny
major scandalsthat rocked the stateand provided the extensionof benefits of citizenship to such
the opposition a powerful plank in the election entrantsTo be in tunewith the aspirationsgenerated
campaignagainstthe AGP.
by the 'AssamAgitation' overthe foreigner'sissue,
it promisedto maintaina NationalRegisterof CitThe extremists'call to the peopleto keep away izens.The Congress(I)campaignconcentratedon
from the electoralprocesshad further addedto the the stabilityplank (TheAssamTribune,Ianuary26,
uncertaintyand confusion('A Lessonfor AGP', 1998).In a separate
manifestoon Assam,it favoured
editorial, The Statesman,March 10, 1998; North a peaceful solution to the burning insurgency
EastTimes,January4,1998)prevailingin thestate. problemin the state.It also demandedthe shifting
To make mattersworse,the killing of a closeaide of the Oil India andTea GardenHeadquarters
to the
of the AGP president, in Nowgong by ULFA, state.The AssamPeople'sFront (APF), a combine
instilledfear amongthe workersof politicalparties. of ASDC, ADSF and CPI(ML) promisedro conThe ULFA's call to the peopleto boycott the polls tinue with its efforts to form a strongregional force
this time came as a surpriseas the extremistoutfit to fight the corruptAGP, Congress(I)andthefascist
in the earlier electionshad not given such a call to BJP in the state.AssamJatioSanmilonin its manthe masses.In fact, the 1991 and 1996 polls had ifestofocusedon the issuesof correctvoters'list up
passedoff without interferencewith the funda- to 2000, repeal of IMDT Act, solution of the
mental rights of the people (The Assam Tribune, unemploymentproblem, flood control and a corFebruary 2, 1998). The situation was further ruption free state. Thus corruption, political
complicatedfor the AGP by rhe fact that unlike in autonomy and cultural identity of smaller
1996,smaller ethnic and religious partieslike the communities,State repression,immigration and
ASDC, the PDF and United Minority Front did not developmentremained major issuesin the camjoin handswith theAGP in thiselection.The coming paign.But corruptionandethnicidentity seemedto
togetherof the tribal groups like the Autonomous over-shadowall otherissues.
VOL.]5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
The Lok Sabhaelectionof 1998wasparticularly
significantas it was held in the midst of a call by
militant organisations,
namelythe ULFA andBodo
extremists,for boycott of the elections.As a consequence,votersturn out was low in the Assamese
dominated areas of the state.TThe ULFA's poll
boycott call greatly demoralised the Assamese
voters, the main support base of the AGP. That
electioneeringwas on a very low key was also
evident from the Post Poll Survey conductedby
CSDS. The study indicateslow intensityof canvassingand voters' participationin the poll campaign.
The boycott call was instrumentalin tilting the
balancein favour of the Congresswhich capitalised
on its known pocketsof influenceamongminorities
andteaworkersof the state.While theelectoralbase
235
of the Congresswas shrinkingand endingin many
statesin India, it appearedto have been able to
maintain part of its electoralbase in Assam. The
party polled 38.9 per cent of votes and gainedten
seatsand its ally, the United Minority Front won
one seat.The AGP and its allies,CPI(M) and CPI
contestedl2 seatsbut failed to retain even one of
the five seatsit held in the last election.The BJP
emerged as an important electoral force and
increasedits vote share.Smallerpartiesreflecting
the ethnic and religious identities,namely ASDC,
UMF supportedby Congressand an independent
candidatesupportedby ABSU, couldretainoneseat
each. On the whole the mandatewas againstthe
AGP led allianceand also indicativeof declineof
the AGP's support among scheduledcastesand
scheduledtribes.
Table 5. Lok Sabha Election Assam 1998 - Who Voted for Whom
INC
()\
BJP
(3)
AGP and Allies
(4)
Others
Age
25 years and below
26-35 years
36-45 years
46-5-5years
56 years and above
41.2
49.3
64.4
66;l
63.0
35.3
29.6
26.7
19.0
14.8
20.
12.
4.4
14.
62.9
78.5
4.4
314.8
Gender
Male
Female
57.4
51.4
24.3
30.I
t2.
10.
26.1
8'7.2
Education
Illiterate
Primary School
Middle School
High School
Collegeno Degree
Graduateand above
62.5
59.0
45.5
46.7
3 9 I.
25.0
26.1
25.6
21.3
20.0
26.1
50.0
4.5
10.
18.
20.
30.
25.
6.8
3 5 I.
29.1
013.3
44.3
0-
Caste
ScheduledCaste
ScheduledTribe
OtherBackward
Others
50.0
25.0
45.2
6 8 .I
50.0
37.5
38.7
t2.l
0.0
25.
t4.
8.8
0.0
012.5
02.2
I 1.0
Religion
Hindu
Muslim
41.2
75.6
42.9
2.6
13.
9.0
42.5
t2.8
(l)
1^
(s)
Note:Basedon Assamsample_of
the post-pollsurveyof the NationalElectionStudy 1996,conductedby CSDS.N (Sample)= 265.
In Assam, the survey was conductedin a randomly selectedsampleof 3 Lok Sabhaconstituencies,6 Assembly Constitu-encies
and
l2 polling stations.The Assampart of the nationalrepresentativesampleanalysedheredid not necessarilyconstitutea representative
samplefor the stateof Assam.
236
]OURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
JAN.-JUNE2OO3
A comparativeanalysisof the surveysof 1996 votes.The BJP was alsosuccessfulto a greatextent
and 1998Lok Sabhaelection(Tables4 and 5) by in finding a foot hold in this region.It increasedits
CSDS indicated the changing pattern of support baseamongtea communityat the cost of the AGP.
baseof differentparties.It appearsfrom the surveys The confrontationand bitternessthat developed
that the support of AGP and allies among the betweenthe AGP and the major tea housesmight
Muslims went down dramaticallyin this election have facilitatedthe entry of BJP into the tea comcomparedto a robustsupportin 1996.On the other munity. But, the fact remainsthat eventspreceding
hand, the support for the Congress among the the elections deflected their electoral preference
Muslims went up to nearly three-fourthsas against awayfrom theAGP andcloserto the Congress(Z/ze
50 per centin 1996.The acceptance
of BJPis shown AssamTribune,February16, 1998).
by substantialgainsin supportfrom groupsthathad
previouslyshunnedit, e.g., the scheduledcastes.
The results in the immigrant dominatedconThe BJP has also increasedits baseamong sched- stituenciesalso went in favour of Congress.Interuled tribes and OBCs. The increasein its base estingly,loyalty of a sizeableportion of minority
among SCs and STs came at the cost of the AGP. Muslims who sidedwith AGP and alliesin the lasr
The surveyalsorevealsthat the patternof voting by election, shifted to the Congressthis time. The
age,genderandclassremainedsimilarto whatwas Congressretainedall the seatsin these areasby
noticedin the 1996electionsdespitea severeshift polling high percentages
of votes.The major reason
in the levels for different parties.The Congress for this changemight have been the apprehension
gainedin all the sectionsand the AGP lost every- in the minds of the minority communitythat in the
where,but in relativetermsthe relationshipdid not event of the BJP forming the governmentat the
changevery much.The AGP securedcomparatively centre, it would certainly repeal the IMDT Act
more votesamongthe young than amongthe older which was considereddetrimentalto the interestof
group while it was the other way round for the the immigrant religiousminority (Ajir Asom, FebCongress.The Congressdid relativelybetteramong ruary 5, 1998; The Sentinel,February 6, 1998).
men, although AGP's relative advantageamong Further,theminoritiesseemedto havelosttheirtrust
women shifted this time to the BJP. Clearly, the in the AGP for its mysterioussilenceover the issue,
with theAGP affectedwomenmore particularlywhen AASU urged the centreand the
disenchantment
than men. In classterms,the Congressmaintained state governmentsto delete the names of those
a classicalsubalternprofile: the lower the educa- voters marked as 'doubtful' in the electoralroll
tional opportunity, the higher the vote for the publishedin 1997and to repealthe IMDT Act (The
Congress.The AGP andtheBJPdid relativelybetter AssamTribune,February16, 1998).It wasapparent
amongthe bettereducated.This, of course,neednot from theelectionresultsthatthereligiousminorities
reflectthe effectsof education:in all likelihood,the ralliedon thesideof theCongressandtheimmigrant
AGP and the BJP drew their support from com- linguisticHindu minority aswell as a smallportion
munities that happento have had better accessto of indigenouspeoplesupportedthe BJP. But, the
educ ati o n aolp p o rtu inti e s .
shift of the minority supportwas to be seenin the
context of the position of the UMF. Electoral
A significant shift of tea garden labour and alliancewith UMF in Barpetaconstituencyhelped
immigrantMuslim votersto the Congressandcaste theCongress.
The UMF whichcouldpoll only 26.7
Hindu votersto BJP led to the AGP's debaclein the per centof votesin 1996electionwas catapultedto
Lok Sabha election. The Congresscould retain a high of 58.6 per cent of votes in this election.
Dibrugarhand Jorhattea gardenlabour dominated Commentatorspointedout that Hindu polarisation
Lok Sabhaseatsby polling ashigh as65 per centof in Assaminvariablyconsolidated
theMuslim voters
VOL.] 5 NOS.] &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTSANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
in a more organisedway [Dutt, 1998].The rise of
BJP in constituenciesdominated by Muslims,
namely Dhubri, Nagaonand Barpeta,only helped
partieslike Congressand UMF becauseit cut into
AGP votes.
However, this time the AGP seemedto have
receivedsome succourfrom the fact that the All
Assam Student Union (AASU), a main stay of
Asomiyaregionalsentiments'decidednotto oppose
thepoll, in sharpcontrastto the 1998electionswhen
the AASU had called a 23-hour bandh to protesr
againstholdingof polls,astheirdemandfordeletion
of the namesof foreignersfrom the electoralrolls
was not met. Moreover,the presidentof the organisation,Mr. Sarbananda,
Sonowalrelinquishedhis
post and joined AGP to become the party's
candidatefor the Lakhimpur constituency.At the
sametime, a split within the UMF, an ally of the
Congress,affected the electoral prospect of the
Congress.The Hafiz faction of the UMF merged
with the Nationalist CongressParty (NCP) and
anotherfaction led by Osmani merged with the
IndianNationalCongress(INC) beforetheelection.
The JamiatUlema-e-Hind'sr0
decisionto support
theINC all overthecountry,helpedtheINC to retain
substantialsupportof the religiousminority voters.
The Congressappearedto be weak in tribal
dominatedconstituencies
even in the 1998 Lok
Sabhaelection.The massiveturn out of voters in
these constituenciesin spite of poll boycott call
indicatedthe prevailing assertivebehaviourof the
tribal electoratein supportof their ethnic identity.
Therefore,the emergingtribal movementsstarted
assertingtheir views on demandslike creationof
Udayachal, Bodoland and an autonomoustribal
statein the hills from the 1991electiononwards.In
the Karbi dominated autonomousparliamentary
constituencythe ASDC candidateJayantaRongpi
was electedto the parliamentfor the fourth consecutiveterm and its margin over Congresswas
quite high. In the Bodo areas,however,the victory
marginswere not high as no dominantBodo leader
The insurgentgroupswere playing a dominant
emerged.The electionresultsin theseareasclearly
role in influencingthedemocraticprocessin Assam.
reflect the ethnic polarisationas well as ethnic
The ULFA'S role in the 1998 polls came under
accommodation.
focus following its active campaign against the
ruling AGP throughcoercion,intimidationandeven
AGP Debaclein the Lok-SabhaElection.1999
murder of the active workers and district level
leaders.This campaignof the bannedoutfit resulted
Another parliamentary election came sooner
in the stayingaway of large segmentsof the electhananyoneexpected.The BJP's short-livedrule at
toratefrom the battleof ballot in 1998.With the fear
theCentrebeganto affectthe localpolitical agenda. psychosisgripping
large areas of Brahmaputra
There was a spate of news about the Pakistani valley
on account of the grave threat from the
Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) conspiraciesand bannedoutfit,theexercise
of franchiseby thepeople
intriguesin Assam in the local newspapers.*
The was severelyaffected.However, in the 1999 Lok
decision of Asam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Parishad, an sabha election, the same threat from
the outfit
influential youth organisation,percievedby some remainedin partsof theBrahmaputravalley
but with
scholarsas being close to ULFA, to form a new a difference.Without openlycallingfor the boycott
regionalparty called Assam Gana SangramPari- of the election,ULFA in an issueof its mouth-piece
shad addedto the discomfort of the AGP. The aim Swadhinata,vowed to make this electiona bloody
of the proposed party to stand as a political one." But the situationin Assamunderwenta sea
alternativeto uphold and rejuvenateregionalismin changeowing to the assertionof the democratic
the statewas a direct challengeto the ruling Asom right to voteby a largesectionof thepeople.Despite
GanaParishad.
bandhcalls andsomeincidentsof violence.like the
238
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
murder of BJP's candidatefrom Dhubri, gunning
down of threeAGP supportersandpolicepersonnel,
the people participated in the election in large
numbers.In Nalbari district, for example,which is
consideredto be a hotbedof insurgentactivities,the
polling was peacefull and 48 per cent voters had
exercisedtheir franchise.''Voters have silently
registeredtheirconsciousdefianceandthisincluded
membersof ULFA leader'sfamilies.
JAN.-JUNE2OO3
Assam,now preferredto avoidthe issue,apparently
for the fear of losing immigrants' votes. Their
manifestoonly saidthat the foreignersliving in the
stateshouldbe deportedasper the provisionsof the
AssamAccord and the erectionof the barbedwire
fencing along the internationalborder should be
completedsoon.Significantlythe Congresspromisedto effectivelycheckillegal infiltration- a major
contentiousissue of the region, and to establish
bordertrade routesat selectedlocationsalong the
The midterm poll did not enthusethe electorate internationalborder.t3However, the Assam State
in Assam.The fracturedpolity confrontedby many Committeeof the BJP made illegal migration one
problems including insurgencyand insurgency of its main planks,rabut the manifesto of the
related ethnic conflicts, besides growing unem- National Democratic Alliance (NDA) remained
ployment,seemedto seevery little light evenin the silenton the issueThe NDA manifestosaidthat the
mostvital democraticexercise.Apart from acouple Alliance would maintainterritorial integrity of the
of postersandgraffiti put forwardby partieslike the North Eastern region and would deal with the
Congress,Asom Gana Parishadand the BJP, no securityrelatedproblems.TheNationalistCongress
othervisibleelectioncampaignwaswitnessedin the Party (NCP) in Assam seemed to have moved
state.Electionfever was significantlylow this time. accordingto its own strategy.In a separateregionTherewereno big rallies,nor processions
nor proper specific manifestoNCP promisedto treat Northcampaigning.
No issuesseemedto haveemergedas East as a specialdevelopmentalzone.'' Its game
crucial,eventhoughimplicationof insurgencywith plan seemedto be designedto boostBJP's support
their impact on the people emergedas major item so as to weaken the Congress.The left parties
on the agendaof the electorate.It appearedthat maintaineda low profile.The creationof a separate
politicalpartiestriedto getvotesby levelingcharges stateof Bodolandseemedto be the main election
and accusationsagainsteach other on the issueof plank of the candidatessupportedby the ethniccurrying favour with the U.L.F.A. for electoral basedpartiesin the Bodo area,like the All Bodo
purpose.
Student'sUnion and the Bodo People'sAction
Committee.
The euphoriaover the Kargil issuedid work in
someparts
of Assam.The CSDSsurveyshowedthat
The Lok Sabhaelectionin Assam in 1999 was
out of the respondentswho were satisfiedwith the moreor lessa replicaof the 1998Lok Sabhaelection
government's action and who said Kargil had with seeminglyminor and yet very significantshift
influenced their vote, there was a strong swing in the power balancethe verdict of the electorate
towardstheBJPHowever,sinceon thebalancethere was clearly a reflectionof the electorate'sdisilluwere more people who were satisfiedthan dissa- sionmentwith the Asom Gana Parishad,the torch
tisfied with the government'saction in Kargil, the bearerof regionalpoliticsin the state.The AGP and
BJP made a net gain out of the conflict. Illegal allies contested8 seatsbut failed to retain even a
migration of people from the neighbouringBan- singleseat.The party that had suffereda split just
gladeshwas no longerthe main poll plank of any of beforethe election,could poll only l3 per cent of
the political partiesof the state.The AGP, which votes. The Congressseemedto have marginally
wasformedasa fall out of theAssammovementfor capitalised
on the split in the AGP's vote bank,yet
the detection and deportationof foreignersfrom its supportbasehadnot significantlyincreased.
The
VOL.15 NOS.] &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
239
strengthand weaknessof the Congressand BJP impressionon the public. The writing was on the
appearedto be a result of aggregationor disaggre- wall for everyoneto read. As one of the leading
gationof regionalpolitical partiesbasedon various newspapers
commented:
ethnic,cultural and regional issues.The Congress
partyappearedto haveconsolidatedthe gainit made 'Schemesaimedat public welfarearewelcome,but
in the 1998election.The partypolled38 per centof they cannot be an end in themselves.What is of
votes and won eleven seatswhile only one of its utmostimportanceis their proper implementation.
candidatesfrom tribal dominant constituencylost It is herethat the AGP governmenthas not proved
security deposit. The significant developmentof its competence. Undeserving persons were
this election was that the BJP emerged as an appointedas teacherswho cannotplay an effective
important electoral force. The party not only role in improving the quality of education.Similar
increasedits vote shareto nearly30 percentbut also anomaliesare saidto havecreptinto the processof
expanded its support base through out Assam. the implementationof their public welfarescheme.
Smaller parties like ASDC and an independent What further appearsto have alienatedthe people
candidates
supportedby ABSU couldretainoneseat from the AGP is the rampantcorruptionprevailing
each.On the whole, the mandatewas againstthe at all levelsof thegovernment.The governmentwas
AGP led allianceandthereforeindicativeof decline expectedto take stepsthat will eliminate corrupt
but sadly
of the AGP's support base among the Muslim, practicesin the governmentdepartments,
enough,
nothing
concrete
was
done.
This
has
Scheduledcasteand ScheduledTribe communities.
inevitably lowered the image of AGP in public
estimation.Further the governmenthas not done
The Return of the Congressin AssemblyElections
anythingnoteworthyin the directionof bringingan
2001
end to the ULFA-SULFA conflict that hassilenced
many preciouslife. It looks as if the AGP wantsto
Thus, the one-sidedverdict of the Lok Sabha
keep this conflict alive for serving its political
election had set the stage for the forthcoming
purposes'(TheNorth East Times,March 30,2001).
eleventhstateAssemblyelectionsheld on May 10,
2001. Nothing seemedto be goingright for theAGP.
The United LiberationFront of Assam (ULFA)
The AGP's popularity had declinedon accountof
indulgedin large-scaleviolencein the run up to the
the poor performanceof its government.The party
election.Political violence and vengeancein the
had not takencareto restrainits rapacityand share statehad
taken many preciouslive untimely. For
the trials and tribulationsof the people.Therewere example,the rebels had killed
as many as 1,548
allegationsof its involvementin secretkillings as peopleincluding333 securitypersonnelin Assam
well as rampant corruption. On the eve of the between 1997-2000.In separateattacks, between
declarationof thepoll schedule,theAGP announced October and December, a total of 109 Hindi
severalschemes,notablythe chief minister'sself speakingpeople had been massacredby armed
employment scheme, appointment of teachers militants in different parts of Assam
[Hussain,
underoperationblackboard,appointmentto fill up 2001]. However,therewas revulsionin the state
the vacantpostsin the AssamElectricityBoard,etc. againstviolence.Peoplein thousandstook to the
Theseschemeswere apparentlyaimedat mustering streetsto denouncethe violenceby militants.This
the support of the unemployed youth and their kind of mass protest was a clear indication of
family members in the Assembly elections.All people's displeasurewith the functioning of the
thesedeeds,however,failed to make a favourable government.
240
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
JAN.-JUNE2OO3
Theelectionscenarioin Assamtook a significant with theUnitedMinority Front (UMF). In thatcase,
turn with the decision of the AGP and the BJP a significant segment of Muslims would have
leadershipto forge an alliancein spiteof the strong proppedup theparty'spoll prospects.
The Congress
oppositionfrom the stateunits of both the parties. party also becomewise to the political fragmentaThe AGP was doubtful if it could win on its own. tion and cameto an understandingwith the United
Therefore,it gravitatedtowardsthis arrangement
of Minority Front. In the pastelections,the Congress
convenience[Chaudhari,2001]. The understanding party had not felt the needfor electionallianceor
betweenthe two brought about a new equationin adjustmentsas the oppositionhad never presented
the electoralpolitics of the state.The poll alliance a real threat.
issueflared up anger,dissatisfactionand intensive
conflictamongthe BJPrank andfile. The BJPyouth
This electionalso witnesseda third front. The
leadersheld big rallies at the stateBJP headoffice NationalistCongressParty had come to an underin Guwahatito protestagainstthe alliancedecision. standingwith seven smaller parties:Asom Gana
For severaldaysin succession
the headoffice of the Sangram Parishad (AGSP), PurbanchaliyaLok
Assam unit of the BJP at Guwahati came under Parishad(PLP),Asom JatiaSanmilan(AJS),Janara
attackof the disgruntledelementsof the party. In Dal (secular),RevolutionaryCommunistParty of
thecaseof the AGP, the resentmentwaslessviolent India (RCPI),and Asom LabourParry(ALP). They
and subdued.The stateBJP leaders,thoughfaction formed a Regional Democratic Alliance as an
ridden,were at leastin touchwith grassroot cadres. alternativeto the Congressand AGP-BJP partnerThe decisionaboutthe alliancehad beentakenover ship. Altogether 40 political parties, including
their headsand behind their backsby the national national ones, took part in the election and 914
party set-up.This was hardly a welcome sign for candidatesfiled nomination papers. The main
successfulworking of democracy and effective contenderswere the Congressand the AGP-BJp
intra-partysolidarity.A seniorBJP leader,Hiranya alliance.Seatadjustments,
re-groupingandinternal
Bhattacharyya,resignedfrom the party and floated squabbleswithin the partiesfor the ticketsappeared
a new party called Asom BJP. He even decidedto to be of moreconcernto partiesthanissues.Electors
putup sixtycandidates
in theelection.The 'friendly' were seemingly not very enthusiasticabout the
contestsbetween the AGP and the BJP in ten election.Electioncampaignwasconfinedto public
constituencies
further fuelled controversy.
meetings,poster-wars,
bannerdisplay,wall writing
with catchyslogansand the massrallies organised
By aligning itself with the BJP, the AGP lost by different political party leaders.The campaign
threeof its former allies,the CPI and CPM and the in this electionwas on a very low key as the issue
United People'sParty (UPP).The UPP, represenr- of the alliancebetweenthe AGP and BJP and its
ing the minority interests,joined handswith the after effectshad dominatedthe scene.Attendance
Samajwadiparty.The AGP-BJPalliance,however, was low evenin the electionmeetingaddressed
by
had managedto come to an understanding
with the the Prime Minister.
All Bodo StudentsUnion (ABSU) and the Haliram
Terang faction of the AutonomousStateDemand
The ULFA, throughtheir pre-electionactivities,
Committee (ASDC). There were doubts in the inducedfear amongthe supportersof the AGP and
public mind asto how much influencethesegroups BJP combine [Goswami,2001b]. The campaign
would wield in their troubledand divided commu- was marred by violence, revolved by and large
nities.Although the ABSU still mattersmosrin the around corruption,chargesof nexus betweenthe
Bodo politics,the AGP would havebeenin a more politiciansand militants,illegal infiltration. scrapadvantageous
position if it had forged an alliance ping the IMDT Act and other local issues.Like
VOL.] 5 NOS.] &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTSANDFRAGMENTATION
oF PARTYSYSTEM
earlierelections,most of the partiesthis time also
seemedto have promised to end insurgencyand
bring peace back, rid Assam of illegal foreign
nationals,usher in economic growth and reduce
unemploymentandcorruptionandmaintainthelaw
and order situation.Secretkilling too occupiedthe
center stage.The Congressmanifestocommitted
itself to bringing to an end the problem of secret
killings by giving priority andemphasis,on talk with
rebelsandto initiatetheprocessof politicaldialogue
to solve the insurgency problem. Further, with
regardto IMDT, it said, 'Congresswill try its level
bestto foil any attemptto scrapthe IMDT Act'. The
failure of the AGP - led governmentto hold Pan- .
chayat electionsduring their tenurepromptedthe
Congress to emphasise the issue. Holding
Panchayatelectionswithin a year was one of the
major promisesmade by the party.
The AGP's electoralcompulsionswereclear.It
waslosingits core supportto both the Congressand
theBJPaswasevidentfrom the 1998and 1999Lok
Sabhaelections.The Congresshad already consolidatedthe Muslim and the tea gardenvotes.The
AGP had to gain what it had lost of its coresupport
to the Congress- its main enemy,and ally with the
BJP to keep that supportunited.Therefore,IMDT
Act and the foreignersissue emergedas a major
political plank for the allies. The AGP manifesto
declared:'Foreigner'sissueis a hang over in the
processof developmentof the stateand its security
andsafety.The demographyis very badlydisturbed
andthe integrityof the statewill be threatenedif the
foreigners'issueis not resolvedonce for all. AGP
will leaveno stoneunturnedto gettheissueresolved
with active co-operationof the Government of
I ndia' .
The result of the Assemblyelectionwas a foregoneconclusionin the wake of the 1998and 1999
Lok Sabhaelectionverdicts.Besides,theAGP-BJP
alliancewasa gravetacticalerrorof boththeparties.
Eventually,the surprisein the resultwas in the lack
of a completesweepin favour of the Congress.The
241
Congresssecured70 seatswith a vote shareof a
little lessthan 40 per cent. The AGP and its allies
won 40 seatswith a vote shareof 36 per cent.But
this big pictureis somewhatmisleading.It appears
asthoughthe Congresssecureda largeleadin terms
of seatson the basisof merefour percentagepoints
leadoverits rivalsin votes.Actually,thevoteshares
of all candidatesof the AGP - led allianceadd up ro
36percentonly if we includeeventhoseseatswhere
the partnersfought each other. The AGP and the
BJPtogethersecured29 percentof thepopularvote.
Thus, on an average,for seatswhere the Congress
faced the AGP-BJP combine,the Congresshad a
lead of l0 percentage
points.
The verdict needsto be understoodin its disaggregatedpatterns.The AGP andtheBJPwon 20 and
8 seatsrespectively.In terms of votes, the AGp
polled 20.1 per cent while the BJP polled 9.3 per
centof votes.The left parties,oncea forceto reckon
with, werewipedout.The weakeningof ideological
politics had marginalisedthe left parties.Smaller
parties like ASDC (U), the ABSU-BPAC, rhe
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) basically a
regionaloutfit headedby SaratSinhaunderwhose
symbolBhrigu Kumar Phukan'sAsom JatiaSanmilan contestedthe election),the Samajwadiparty
(SP) and the Samata Party and independents
togetherwon 27 seatsand polled about30 per cent
of votes.The AGP-BJP alliancebrought immense
gain to the ABSU-BPAC politics as thesesmaller
formationsmanagedto win ten seatsout of the
twelve contested. While this election was
undoubtedlya victory for the Congress,it was also
a boostto the smallerregionalparties.This was the
resultof the fragmentationof the political spacein
Assam.The anti-foreignermovementled to Asomiya nationalismand also triggered off various
sub-regional and ethnic aspirations that found
expressionthroughsmallerparties.
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
The Congresswon mostly at the expenseof the
AGP andwrested40 seatsfrom it andits allies,while
retaining25 of the seatsit held earlier.Most of the
gains came from the AGP's home turf of Lower
Assam.However,the Congressdid not quite sweep
its strongholdof UpperAssam.It won 37 seatshere,
the samenumberof segmentsit led in the 1999Lok
Sabhaelectionsand a gain of 14 over the last
Assemblyelections.
Unlikethe 1991elections
when
mostof theCongressseatscamefrom upperAssam,
theCongress'performancein thesetwo regionswas
this time balanced.
The AGP-BJP combine's prospects were
adverselyaffectedby thehigh levelsof unpopularity
of the Mahantagovernment,even amongthe AGP
supporters.
The AGP tried to avoiddefeatby allying
JAN..JUNE2OO3
with the BJP,hopingto reapadvantageof electoral
arithmetic.But the alliancewas strongly opposed
and underminedby the workersof both the parties.
Both the partiesfailed to persuadetheir supporters
to votefor thealliance.The two majorfactorsbehind
the AGP's defeat were its unpopularity and its
alliancewith the BJP.However,this doesnot mean
that the AGP would have won in the absenceof an
alliance.An analysisbasedon the surveyconducted
by the CSDS suggeststhat if the two parrieshad
contestedseparately,the AGP and the BJP would
have increasedtheir vote sharesfrom 20 to 22 per
centand9 to 15percentrespectively
[Yadav,2001].
But the logic of first-past-the-post
system would
havemeantfewer seatsfor both the parties.Alliance
or no alliance,the AGP faceda disaster.
Table 6. Category-wise Analysis of Assam Assembly Elections (200f )
Region/
District
Seats
Tumout
(7o)
(l)
Won/
Cont.
(6)
Vote
(Vo)
(7)
Won/
Cont.
Vote
(Vo)
(3)
Won/
Cont.
(4)
Vote
(vo)
(2)
(e)
Won/
Cont.
(l0)
Vote
(vo)
(ll)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
l5
29
l9
63
80.5
71.6
79.0
14.1
4/t2
6trl
l/5
9t43
22.6
23.9
6.8
22.0
36.2
49.6
30.3
39.7
0/3
2n3
0t4
6t26
1.5
ll.6
3.7
10.7
t/10
0/15
0i5
2/32
4.6
1.9
0.6
2.9
Total
t26
75.1
20/77
20.0
8/15
20t29
8il9
35t63
'7
Ut26
39.8
8t46
9.3
AGP
Congress
(s)
BJP
(8)
2.5
(Contd.)
Table 6. (Concld.)
ASDC
Region/
Distnct
TRMC
Other Parties
Won/
Cont.
(t2)
Vote
(vo)
(l 3 )
Won/
Cont.
(14)
Vote
(vo)
(l 5 )
Won/
Cont.
(l6)
Vote
(vo)
(17)
Immigrants
Tea Growing Areas
ScheduledTribes
Others
0/0
0/0
2t5
0/0
0.0
0.0
6.9
0.0
0t4
0/5
0/0
rlt4
l.l
0.3
0.0
0.7
0t23
0t40
0t3l
2/90
7.6
Total
2t5
l.l
v23
0.5
2n84
(l)
Source:CSDS, Data Unit.
Independent
Won/
Cont.
(18)
Vote
(vo)
(le)
I1.3
7.0
2t42
t/73
8t45
81233
20.4
8.4
40.4
11.0
7.3
t9t393
19.5
+.J
VOL.] 5 NOS.] &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREALIGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
The Congressmanageda substantialincrease, an overwhelming59 per cent of votes among the
almost l0 percentagepoints, in its vote share Muslim respondents,
comparedto only 14 for the
comparedto the previouselection.In its traditional AGP and negligiblesupportfor the BJP (Table7).
stronghold in the tea growing areas, the party A detailedanalysisshowsthattheAGP-BJPcounter
secured10 percentagepoints more than its state mobilisationalso worked in ten constituencies
like
average,but won 20 out of 29 seats.The AGP and Hojai, GauripurandDhubri (Table8).It is apparenr
BJP alliance,on the other hand,could retain eight from theelectionresultsthatthereligiousminorities
seatswith 35.8 per centof votes,for its voteswere ralliedon thesideof theCongressandtheimmigrant
concentrated
in afew constituencies.
The BJPseems Hindu minority as well as the indigenouspeople
to have increasedits supportbaseamongtea com- supportedthe BJP Hindu polarisationin Assam
munities.The Congressestablished
a clearleadin invariably consolidatesMuslim votes in a more
the Asomiya dominatedconstituencies
over the organised
way fGoswami,2003].This hugeleadof
formidableAGP-BJP alliance.The Congresswon about40 percentage
pointsamongtheMuslims may
35 seatscomparedto only 15 by the AGP-BJP havemadethe vital differencebetweenvictory and
combine.Although the surveyresultsshowthat the defeat for the AGP. The election results proved
AGP-BJP maintainedan edge over the Congress again that any deviation from a policy of social
among the Hindu upper caste respondents,this inclusiveness
coststhe AGP verv dearlv.
advantageof nearly 10percentage
pointswaswiped
out amongother communities,including the lower
Like the immigrant areas,the tribal belt conOBCs, ScheduledCastes,ScheduledTribes other stituenciesalso witnesseda turnoutcloseto 80 per
thanthe Borosand 'others'representing
the various cent. This indicated the upsurge of the tribal
ethnic minorities and smaller communities,thus electoratein support of their ethnic identity. The
resulting in an overall lead for the Congress.As Congressdid not get major chunk of the votes in
expected,the BJP did well amongthe uppercaste theseconstituencies,but it forged aheadin nonHindus,but theAGP failedto secureany substantial Bodo areasto pick up eight seatswith 30.3per cent
leadin this section.In termsof caste,the AGP vote of votes,a big gaincomparedto the l99l and 1996
was fairly evenlydistributed.It alsomanageda fair Assemblyelectionwhenit could win only one seat
bit of the tribal vote, thanksto its alliancewith the in theseareas.As many as 40 per cent votes went
Boro formations.
to independentcandidatesin the tribal seats.These
includedthe ABSU-BPAC candidaresin rhe Bodo
A substantialportion of that lead seemsto have areaswho were allied to the AGP but contestedas
comefrom the Muslim voterswho constitutea little independents.
The AGP alsodid a little betrerin the
over one-fourthof the electorateand are known to theseseatsdueto its tribal allies.The surveyresults
have turned out in larger numbers.There are clear supportthis reading.The Congresswas virtually
indicationsthat the CongressregainedMuslim blanked among the Bodos, while its got some
support in this election. The AGP-BJP alliance supportamongthe Miris and othertribal groups.It
failed to neutralisethe apprehensionand suspicion is clear that but for the support among the tribal
of religious minorities about the BJP's political groups,the AGP could havesuffereda much worse
ideology and agenda. The decision to go into electoralperformance.
alliance with the BJP must have cost the AGP a
significantnumberof Muslim votes.The Congress
An analysisof the voting patternby othersocial
won eight of the fifteen immigrantdominatedseats. variablesindicatesa continuity of the patternnotBut the effect was spreadall over the state.The iced in the previouselections,exceptin the matter
state-widepost-pollsurveyundertakenby theCSDS of age.In this electionthe sharpdifferencesin the
with a robust samplesize of 1,236confirmsthis age profile of the supportersof the two main
reading.The surveydatashowthattheCongressgot contendersseem to have disappeared.The AGP
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
enjoyed only a nominal edge among the younger
voters, comparedto its support among the older
voters.Interestingly,the Congressalso did a little
better among the youngestgroup of voters,those
who turned adult during or after the 'nineties,thus
indicatingthat the AGP's charmover the youth had
considerably
diminished.As in earlierelections,
the
AGP did betteramongwomen,but the gap reduced
now to only four percentagepoints.Interestingly,it
appearsto be the first election since the Assam
movementin which the Congressgot asmany votes
from women asit did from men.A look at thevotins
]AN.-JUNE2OO3
by educationandclassunderlinesthe strongsupport
for the Congressamongthe poorer and lessprivileged sections of society. In both respectsthe
Congressgot nearlytwice as many votes from the
worst off than it got from the well-off. The BJp
support-group
hasthe sameclassprofile asit hasin
the rest of the country: the richer and the more
educatedthe people,the higherthe votefor theBJP.
The AGP doesnot sharethis profile. It doesbetter
amongthosewith moderateeducationand modest
means.
Table 7. Assam Assembly Election 2001: Who voted for whom
0)
INC
(2)
BJP
(3)
AGP
(4)
Age
Upto 25 yrs
26-35 yrs
36-45 yrs
46-55 yrs
Above 55 yrs
42.7
38.8
39.1
31.8
40.6
5.7
9.4
10.5
13.5
22.5
2t.l
20.2
15.5
l8.l
29.1
30.7
30.3
38.5
27.7
Gender
Male
Female
39.9
39.4
9.6
9.1
I8.3
/.2.J
32.2
29.3
Education
Non Literate
Upto Primary
Upto Matric
College and above
46.2
42.0
38.6
2',7.5
5.6
10.2
9.5
14.5
17.9
22.4
20.9
18.0
30.3
25.4
31.0
40.0
Class
Poor
Lower
Middle
Rich
42.4
33.9
25.5
5.5
1.5
17.0
t4.3
20.1
21.3
18.8
15.3
3l.l
28.8
30.4
44.9
Community
Kayastha
Other Upper Caste
Upper OBC
Lower OBC
Rajbanshis
2t.4
32.2
34.8
48.6
l'7.9
14.3
16.8
13 . 6
18.6
2t.7
20.5
10.0
50.0
45.7
29.4
3 l. l
t 7. l
28.6
t 7. 5
29.4
t6.7
22.4
13.9
8.1
21.6
61.8
47.2
36.4
25.7
22.1
Other SC
Boro
Miri
Other ST
Muslims
Others
A 1
a
+J.J
s0.5
4.4
3 6 l.
30.8
58.8
62.8
8.r
z+.-)
3.6
10.3
4.4
10.3
1.6
7.0
Others
(s)
Note: Assam AssemblyF,lectionStudy,200l, Post-pollsurveycarriedout by the CSDS with the authoras the StateCoordinator.
A stratified random sample of 1236 electorswas selectedfrom24 assemblyionstituencies.The respondentswere approachedthe
day a.fter.polling(or with_ina few days, but before the counting of votes), given a dummy ballot paper of their corisiituencyand
askedto indicate the candidate.they had voted for. The reportedvoting patternhas been weightedheie by the actual vote shire of
the leading parties at the statelevel.
VOL. 15 NOS. I &2
ASSAM:MULTIPLE REALIGNMENTS AND FRAGMENTATION OF PARTYSYSTEM
The electionresultsclearlyprovethe fact thatthe
electorateprefersto judge partiesin terms of their
ability to provide governance.The intenseunpopularity of the Mahanta governmenthad actually
affectedthe poll prospectof the AGP-BJPcombine.
Interestinglythis sentimentwas frankly sharedby
the AGP supportersthemselves[Yadav,2001].In
the CSDS post poll survey 2001, when voters in
Assam were askedto evaluatethe performanceof
theAGP governmentin the precedingfleyearc,22
per cent of AGP supportersreplied that they were
completelydissatisfiedwith the government,3l per
centfeltthatit haddonenothingto solvetheproblem
of insurgency and 72 per cent AGP supporters
consideredit corrupt.
Conclusion
245
transformedthe natureof political alignmentsin the
state.The shortterm consequence
wasthe fall of the
Congressand the rise of the AGP as the carrier of
theAsomiyanationalism.AlthoughtheAGP did nor
succeed,unlike the TDP in Andhra Pradesh,in
consolidatingits political positionand emergingas
the stable alternativeto the Congress,the party
systemin Assam underwenta long-term change.
The Assam movement started the processesof
ethnicisationof politicsandpoliticalfragmentation.
Since then a numberof regional and sub-regional
partieshaveemergedasan importantpoliticalforce
in Assampolitics.Assam'smulti-ethnicand polycultural reality addeda peculiardimensionto this
trend as most of thesepartiesare basedon one or
the other ethnic group. The phenomenonis not
confined to the regional and sub-regionalparties
alone.The nationalpartieshave also gonethrough
the processof ethnicisation.The decline of Congress'shegemonyhas beenmet by two important
political developments- the growing significance
of regionaland ethnicbasedparties,and the rise of
BJP. Since the main issue that has dominated
electionsin Assam is the concernfor identity, the
Congressand the BJP havealso soughtto mobilise
a few sections.
With the emphaticreturn of the Congressin the
latest assemblyelections,it might be tempting to
concludethat things are back to where they were
before the Assam agitation shook the political
frameworkof the state.But nothingcould be further
from reality. The Congressof today is radically
differentfrom the Congressof the Congresssystem.
It is no longerthe umbrellaorganisationthat covers
all the variousethnicitiesand communitiesof the
state.The Congressis principally dependenton the
Yet, to describethechangein Assamasajourney
supportof the Muslims and otherethnicminorities
'catch-all'party
from
systemto political and ethnic
of thestate.Despitethe widespread
disillusionment
fragmentation
does
not
do full justice to the comwith the AGP, the Congressis yet to win back the
plexities
politics
of
of
ethnicity
that hasdominated
trustof the dominantAsomiyacommunitythatused
the
electoral
arena
in
the
last
two decades.The
to be themainstayof the Congressin Assam.Unlike
in most other states,the Congressis not the most transformationin Assam is betterseenas a reconfavouredparty of the ScheduledTribes.No wonder figurationthat involvesmultiple realignments.
It
theparty doesnot enjoy thekind of hegemonyit had includes the familiar and standardstory of the
renegotiationof political loyalties by the exisring
in t he pr e -1 9 7 8d a y s .
socialgroups.The disillusionmentof the Asomiya
In that sensethe return of the Congressshows middle class the Congressand with searchfor a
how far the state has traveled from the days of the political vehicle for their aspirationsis an illustraCongresssystem. The cut-off point was not the tion of thisprocess.The changingvoting preference
defeatof the Congressin 1978:Congressrecovered of the Muslims across the various elections
from such defeatsall over the country. It was the constitutesanotherinstanceof the sameprocessof
anti-'foreigners'
movementfrom l9l9 to 1985that electoralrealignment.
JOURNAL OF INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
This standardstory does not recogniseanother
kind of realignmentthat has taken place simultaneously.Assam has also witnessedthe reworking
of the boundariesof socialcommunitiesthemselves
or a redrawing of the politically active social
cleavages.Competitive politics creates and recreatesimaginedcommunities.The suddenpolitical
salienceof thevariousdivisionswithin theMuslims
or the rise of a large number of hitherto unknown
tribal groups illustrates this process. Electoral
JAN..JUNE2OO3
competitionhas mobilisedmany formerly passive
socio-economicgroups and brought them into
political arenaThis period in Assam politics also
illustratesa re-alignmentin the relationshipamong
variouskinds of pre-existingsocial cleavages:for
instance,betweenreligion and migration, or languageand casteor tribe and region. The simultaneous operationof these realignmentshas made
contemporaryAssam into a virtual laboratoryof
politicsof ethnicities.
Table 8. Voting Pattern in Highly Muslim Populated Constituencies In Vidhan Sabha Elections,200l
(l)
Turnout
(2)
INC
(3)
AGP
(4)
46.76
Barpeta
Sarbhog
Jania
Baghbar
Sarukhetri
87.0
76.3
82.6
78.3
45.9
3.72
33.76
57.68
13.93
Chenga
Mangaldoi(SC)
Hojai
Jamunamukh
Mankachar
79.0
76.1
72.5
16.6
87.1
39.80
44.1
47.54
44.0
7.84
SouthSalmara
BilasiparaEast
BilasiparaWest
Dhubri
Gauripur
84.3
82.1
84.1
82.1
85.9
59.9
28.61
21.13
51.21
47.82
Dalgaon
Laharighat
Dhing
Abhayapuri North
GoalparaEast
83.0
79.5
19.3
84.1
78.7
28.82
55.93
53.05
5.9
l 1.8
45.38
GoalparaWest
Jaleswar
Rupahihat
Samaguri
Nowgong
8 l. 6
8 l. 3
8l.0
80.7
69.t9
t8.42
53.0
42.67
48.98
33.40
6.28
I 1.90
42.87
44.56
43.48
I t.-)
BJP
(5)
CPM
(6)
28.7
25.6
n.4
4.26
32.8
29.5
21.7
37.7't
2.88
38.24
3.26
25.70
I 1.6
11.67
CPI
(1)
INC(T)
(8)
IND
(e)
NCP
(l0)
0.34
0.31
2.96
JJ. I
41.80
6 . 1I
55.5
21.8
32.6
)4)
3 8 .91
29.93
13.3
31.54
2.21
33.4
20.7
t9.42
5t.t2
A '
+.J
I 7. 4
5.0
I 1.45
2.40
9.99
0.38
0.89
1.2
1.5
42.65
4.76
43.38
25.5
36.45
23.t2
38.85
t2.56
1.54
t2.18
4.26
3-5.75
3.9
Source:Election Reports,Governmentof Assam.
NOTES
3. The term'Ana-Asomiya'refersto all non-Assamese
while
'No-Asomiya'
refers to immigrant Muslim settlers of the erstL The term foreign national is popularly usedto refer to the while East Pakistanwho areassimilatedin the Assameseculture.
4. See, Resolution,the State Convention,September6-7,
immigrants from Bangladesh,againstwhom the Assam move1 9 9 4 .A l s o [ G o s w a m i ,2 0 0 1 ] .
ment was launchedby the All Assam StudentsUnion in 19i9.
5. To identify immigrantareas,
SeeM. Bhuyan,1971.As per
2. The AssamPradeshCongresspasseda seriesof resolutions
the l99l Census,percentageof Muslim populationin Dhubri
opposingseparationofthe hills from the state.Seefor instance,
was 70.45,Barpeta56.07,and Nagaon41.19.
the Resolution of the Assam Pradesh Consress Committee
6. Tea Belt area includes Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Lakhimpur,
(APCC) Executive,June 1966.
Tezpurconstituencieswheremajor chunk of electoratesare from
VOL.I5 NOS.1&2
ASSAM:MULTIPLEREAI,IGNMENTS
ANDFRAGMENTATION
OF PARTYSYSTEM
tea gardencommunities.
7. For example,at Sualkuchi,an Assamese-dominated
area
the turnout of voters in the 22 polling stationswas only 5 per
cent, The Assom Tribune, February 17, 1998. Similarly, in
Jalukbariassemblysegment,polling percentagewas only 28 per
cent; The Report on Generul Election 1998, Government of
Assam.
8. The North EastTimes,( 1999)August l, Guwahati,Assam
Tribune ( 1999)August 23, Guwahati,Agradoot ( 1999)August
12,Guwahati.
9. For information on this the organisation and the issues
raisedby it, see,Apurba K. Baruah,Studentand Youth Organisationin North EastIndia,Reportofan ICSSR,NERC, Project,
submittedto ICSSR,NERC, Shillong.
10. The North Eust Times,August Zi , 1999.
11. TheAssumTribune,August 26, 1999.
| 2. The A ssam Tribune, August27, 1999: A sombani,August
27. t999.
13. The Assam Tribune (1999) Augusr 28, Guwahati, The
Duinik Asom (1999) August 27, Guwahati.
14. The North Eust Times(1999) Augusr29, Guwahati.
15. TheAsserntTribune,Guwahati,August 28, 1999.
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217
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