A Limited Government Amendment
Jeffrey H. Anderson
I
n t h e e y e s o f A m e r i c a’s f o u n d e r s , unlimited government was a recipe for tyranny. It was with this in mind that they
designed a series of carefully planned restraints for our republic, establishing a government with powers that are specifically enumerated, and­
explicitly granted by the people. Indeed, in Federalist No. 45, James Madison
stressed that the new Constitution would not be the “same doctrine” of
the “old world” — namely, “that the people were made for kings, not kings
for the people” — simply “revived in the new, in another shape.” Rather,
Madison promised, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined.”
But Madison’s expectations about the self-containing nature of
America’s new government proved a bit too optimistic. In the two centuries since, the size and scope of the federal government have sporadically,
but steadily, expanded. And in the past few years, a $700 billion bailout for Wall Street, a $787 billion economic-stimulus package, and the
passage of a major health-care overhaul — which aims to inaugurate a
trillion-dollar-plus entitlement and dramatically reshape the relationship
between individuals and the state — have brought the tension over federal spending to a head. Tea Party protests have sprung up across the
­country; their participants object primarily to the centralization of power
in Washington at the expense of individual liberty, and to the profligacy
of Congress at the expense of the nation’s future solvency. To a degree not
seen in many decades, Americans appear determined to provide a correction to the expansion of federal power.
In Madison’s defense, however, this expansion has not been a product
of the Constitution as written and ratified, but rather of changes to it,
Je f f r e y H. A n d e r s o n is director of the Benjamin Rush Society, which promotes lower
costs and increased access to health care through greater competition and choice.
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through rulings and amendments. These include the Supreme Court’s
­expansive reading of the power to regulate interstate commerce, its severing of the power to tax from Congress’s other enumerated powers, its
narrow reading of the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the
states or the people, and, above all, the addition of the 16th Amendment,
granting the federal government essentially unlimited power to tax
Americans’ ­income. All are developments that have inflated federal power
well ­beyond the limits originally established by the Constitution.
Yet this warping of the framers’ intent is less a cause for alarm than for
action. If nothing else, the growth of the state clarifies our responsibilities
as citizens. After all, the Constitution didn’t emerge from the clouds: It
was written by flesh-and-blood Americans, in response to the events and
challenges of their day. And it includes an amendment provision allowing
later generations to adapt the document to the events and challenges of
our own times. Today, a correction is in order — and our founders wisely
furnished us with the means to provide it.
T he Per il s of t he Bot tomle ss Pur se
In short, we need to pass a constitutional amendment to limit our federal government. The surest and best way to impose such a constraint is
to cut off the source of government’s growth, by limiting its power to
spend. The great powers of government are those of the sword and the
purse — and ours needs to be told that the purse is not bottomless.
Our government was not designed to serve as a clearinghouse for
Americans’ money — far from it. In the words of the Declaration of
Independence, governments derive their “just Powers” from “the Consent
of the Governed,” and “are instituted ” “to secure ” “certain unalienable
Rights,” among which are the rights of “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness.” Yet as with the Constitution, this early principle, too, has been
altered over the years by those seeking to expand government’s reach. In
crafting the 1936 Democratic platform, President Franklin Roosevelt replaced government’s duty to secure the right to pursue happiness with a
government responsibility to promote happiness itself: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident — that the test of representative government is
its ability to promote the safety and happiness of the people,” Roosevelt
declared. Of course, this is not exactly what the founders had in mind.
The Declaration’s language is rooted in the political philosophy of
John Locke, who wrote that we have a natural right to property in three
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Jeffrey H. Anderson · A Limited Government Amendment
forms: “Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name,
Property.” Therefore, according to the Declaration of Independence
(as informed by Locke), the purpose of just governments is not to act
without limit, in any manner they wish, but rather to secure our natural and inalienable right to property, broadly understood. As James
Madison asserted, “Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort,” adding: “This being the end of government, that alone is
a just ­government which impartially secures to every man whatever
is his own.”
Conversely, a government that views itself as the provider for nearly every conceivable human need — rather than as the securer of that which has
already been provided by nature, by nature’s God, or through the industrious efforts of particular human beings — is liable to have a very different
record of activity (and thus of spending). As the Declaration’s principal
author wrote in an 1816 letter from Monticello, the lesson “that private
fortunes are destroyed by public as well as private extravagance” is indeed
an important one. Thomas Jefferson continued:
And this is the tendency of all human governments. A departure
from principle in one instance becomes precedent for a second;
that second for a third; and so on, till the bulk of the society is
reduced to be mere automations of misery, to have no sensibilities
left but for sinning and suffering. Then begins, indeed, the bellum
omnium in omnia [war of all against all], which some philosophers
observing to be so general in this world, have mistaken it for the
natural, instead of the abusive state of man. And the fore horse of
this frightful team is public debt. Taxation follows that, and in its
train wretchedness and oppression.
It is unlikely that Jefferson would have anticipated the state in which
America finds itself today: having amassed $13 trillion in federal debt,
including, incredibly, $3 trillion in just the past three years. But he
certainly understood the ill effects that follow swiftly upon such government extravagance, and the threats to our well-being and liberty that
we face if we fail to change course.
The growth of government is therefore at the heart of our dilemma,
and limiting its future expansion is the key to restoring some semblance
of limited, constitutional authority. Both to highlight that problem
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and to solve it, we need a Limited Government Amendment, to read
as follows:
Section 1: The annual rate of growth in total federal spending
shall not exceed the rate of inflation, plus two percentage points,
and neither budgeted nor actual spending shall exceed this limit,
apart from the exceptions listed below. If no budget is passed,
then the most recently passed budget, excluding any exceptions
granted in Section 2, shall apply.
Section 2: Defense spending shall not be limited during a time
of formally declared war, and further exceptions to the spending
limits specified in Section 1 may be granted by the legislatures in
three-quarters of the several states, upon the application of twothirds of both houses of Congress, as they deem necessary; but
any such exceptions shall not be included in determining spending limits for subsequent years.
Section 3: The spending limit for the first fiscal year following
the cessation of hostilities in a declared war shall be the limit that
was established for the fiscal year preceding the declaration of
war, excluding any exceptions granted in that year, and adjusted
for compounded inflation through all fiscal years completed in
the interim.
Section 4: The rate of inflation used in determining spending limits shall be the rate from the most recently completed fiscal year
prior to the passage of a given year’s budget, and the method of
measuring inflation shall not be altered substantially from longestablished norms. Spending that is not defense spending shall
not be characterized as such; each exception granted by the states
shall apply only to one fiscal year if not granted anew; and every
citizen of the United States shall have standing to sue in federal
court to enforce the language of this amendment.
Such an amendment, far-fetched as it might seem at first, would be
both practical and reasonable. Merely proposing it and forcing a debate on it would put the question of the size and scope of government
squarely before the American people; it would also force the champions of a ballooning welfare state to make a case against any real limit
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Jeffrey H. Anderson · A Limited Government Amendment
on government’s growth. And were the amendment actually to be enacted, it would not only dramatically reduce future deficits and debt, but
would also revive the principle that government has limited ends which
it ought to pursue by limited means.
A needed R e st r a i n t
Of course, the mere mention of a constitutional amendment — let alone
one that would, after a century of ever-expanding government, so explicitly constrain the growth of the state — is likely to draw claims of
“extremism.” But there is nothing extreme, at least in the American
context, about the notion of the citizenry limiting the government.
The founders universally embraced the idea as a necessary condition
of liberty and prosperity, even as they recognized that it would require
ongoing diligence on the citizens’ part.
And indeed, the Constitution has undergone frequent updates since
1787 — particularly throughout the first half of the 20th century, and as
recently as 1992. In that year, the 27th Amendment — a provision to prevent a sitting Congress from changing its own salary — was enacted. The
amendment had originally been proposed in 1789 along with the amendments that became the Bill of Rights; it was part of Madison’s effort to
inspire public trust in the new government. The proposal was passed by
Congress but ratified by only six states, and had lain mostly dormant for
nearly two centuries — until an undergraduate at the University of Texas
discovered the proposed amendment while doing research for a course
paper. Realizing it had no expiration date, and recognizing that congressional pay was still a thorny issue, he began a ten-year ­letter-writing
campaign to state legislatures, undertaken at his own expense. Eventually,
his effort ­succeeded; the amendment was ultimately ratified by 45 states.
It was a classic case of an average citizen remaining vigilant over the
Constitution — and a fairly recent case at that.
Even so, there are some who now say that citizen action isn’t in order;
that the centralization and consolidation of power in Washington is
simply the irreversible wave of the future; that we no longer have anything to fear from such power (or anything to lose); that the founders’
experiment is an anachronism; that limited government is dead.
But that is the extreme view. The reasonable view, plainly supported
by the events of recent years, is that federal spending is out of control
and needs to be limited. This would also appear to be the popular
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view, as the Tea Party indicates a groundswell of support for limited
­government. The challenge, however, is channeling that salutary ­energy,
momentum, and civic engagement into concrete action of lasting
­significance. The Limited Government Amendment would have just
that sort of profound impact.
And yet it would not require us to do something unrealistic or
untried. The amendment would not even prevent the growth of government; it would merely limit that growth to not more than 2% per year
in real terms. This is hardly an unheard-of degree of austerity in modern
times. Looking at the presidents who took office after 1950, the average
annual growth in real federal spending was lowest under Eisenhower
(-0.4%), ­followed by Clinton (1.5%), the first Bush (1.8%), Reagan (2.6%),
Ford (2.9%), Nixon (3.1%), Carter (4.3%), the second Bush (4.6%), Kennedy
(4.7%), Johnson (6.0%), and Obama (12.7% so far, based on projected
2010 figures). In these tallies, the 2009 omnibus spending bill signed by
President Obama is actually counted toward President Bush’s spending,
since it provided funding related to his 2009 budget. And the portion of
the economic-stimulus funds that was spent in 2009 after the program was
proposed by President Obama didn’t count in his tally, either — ­because
the funds weren’t appropriated in Obama’s first fiscal year. If they were
added to Obama’s 2010 spending, his tally would be 22.5%.
As these numbers indicate, limiting the growth of real annual federal spending to 2% has not been typical, but it certainly has been
achieved — under a variety of circumstances, without putting the nation’s security in peril, and without resorting to extreme austerity. No
one would argue that fiscal policy during the Clinton years was a model
of tight-fisted parsimony, or that it prevented the nation from ­responding
to challenges at home and abroad. Indeed, during the 1990s — a decade that included the final stages of the Cold War, a new hot war, a
sharp economic downturn, and a return to economic growth — both
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton kept the average growth in
spending below the amendment’s limit.
In other words, we have kept federal spending under control before — and we can do it again. But clearly most politicians are not inclined
to try. The kind of discipline such an effort would require over the long
run thus seems possible only with the help of a constitutional amendment.
Over time, though, the results of such discipline would be extra­
ordinary. Consider that, from 1970 to 2009, in real (inflation-adjusted)
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dollars, annual federal spending increased from $1.1 trillion to $3.5
­trillion. Under this proposed amendment (assuming no exceptions
­because of declared wars or via the approval of state legislatures), ­annual
­spending would have increased from $1.1 trillion in real dollars to no
more than $2.5 trillion — $1 trillion less than actual spending. Total federal ­spending across the four decades would have fallen from $51.4 trillion
to $43.6 trillion in today’s dollars, a reduction of $7.8 trillion. All other
things being equal, our staggering $13 trillion debt would have been
reduced to just over $5 trillion. And that’s even if Congress had spent
every cent it was constitutionally allowed to under this ­amendment. If
Congress had shown any additional restraint, even in some years, the
debt tally would have fallen yet further.
Even looking at a much smaller time window — one starting in
2000 — the amendment would still have made a tremendous difference.
In the past decade alone, annual federal spending increased from $2.3
trillion to $3.5 trillion in real dollars. Under this amendment, it would
have increased from $2.3 trillion to no more than $2.7 trillion in real
­dollars. Thus, the real-dollar increase would have been, at most, about
$400 billion instead of about $1.2 trillion — or only about one-third
as much. Total federal spending across the decade would have been
­reduced by $2.6 trillion (in actual dollars), and 2009 spending would
have been only 76% as high as it actually was. Moreover, the highly unpopular $787 billion economic-­stimulus package wouldn’t have ­become
law, unless three-quarters of the state legislatures had granted an exception to pass it — an unlikely ­scenario — or Congress had budgeted so
frugally as to allow itself the wiggle room for an extra $787 billion in
spending (more unlikely still).
The real question, though, is what the amendment would do going forward. Assuming the continuation of the average inflation rate
across the past quarter-century of 2.7% — and assuming that, without
this amendment, federal spending would continue to increase at the
7.6% rate at which it has grown across the past decade (a reasonable
assumption, given that the non-inflation-adjusted rate of increase in federal spending across the past 40 years has been 7.8%) — the results of the
amendment would be quite dramatic.
In this scenario (again, assuming no exceptions because of declared wars or via the approval of state legislatures), the 2020 budget
would be $7.7 trillion without the amendment, but no more than $5.7
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trillion — only 76% as high — with the amendment, a difference of at
least $2 trillion in 2020 alone. Total federal spending for the decade of
2011 to 2020 would be $56.9 trillion without the amendment, but no
more than $47.1 trillion with the amendment — a difference of at least
$9.8 trillion. (In reality, both inflation and federal spending may well be
significantly higher in the coming decade; overall, however, the amendment’s effects would be much the same.)
When we look at a 30-year period, the savings become astronomical.
The 2040 budget would be $33.5 trillion without the amendment, but no
more than $14.4 trillion — only 43% as high — with it, a difference of at
least $19.1 trillion in that one year alone. Total federal spending across
the three decades from 2011 to 2040 would, amazingly, be $422 trillion
in today’s dollars without the amendment, but no more than $240 trillion with it — a mind-boggling difference of $182 trillion.
Keep in mind that these numbers are not based on the worst-case
scenarios for spending without the Limited Government Amendment,
but rather on mid-range expectations. Forget the proverbial $64,000
­question: When it comes to deciding whether we want this amendment,
Americans face a $182,000,000,000,000 question.
Since a trillion — or a million millions — can be hard to conceptualize, here’s another way of thinking about it. One hundred and
eighty-two trillion dollars over 30 years is a total of $482,311 for every
man, woman, and child that the Census Bureau projects will be living
in the United States at the end of that period — or $16,077 per person,
per year. If you’re the sole income earner for a family of four, your share
is $1.9 million, or $64,308 per year. That’s what average Americans stand
to save, annually, from the passage of this amendment.
coll at er a l benefi ts
The amendment offers other important benefits and advantages. It
would, for one thing, allow the nation the flexibility to address unforeseen challenges. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 23 that
­“­­­[­t­]­he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and
for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the
power to which the care of it is committed.” This warning ­certainly applies to the spending power; thus, the Limited Government Amendment
would not place any limits whatsoever on defense ­spending during
a time of declared war. It would also allow for exceptions in other
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moments of crisis, when the need for additional spending is so plain
that the great majority of Americans — through their state ­legislators — acknowledge it.
As prudent and necessary as the exception for wartime spending
would be, it would be equally imprudent and unwise to grant an exception for defense spending on undeclared wars or other conflicts. It is
worth noting that the last time the United States made a formal declaration of war was during World War II; all the conflicts since have had
some other form of congressional approval (like the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that led to Vietnam, and the vote authorizing the ongoing war in
Afghanistan), or no congressional sanction at all (like Korea and other
ventures sponsored by the United Nations, and those forays launched by
presidential action, like our uses of force in Grenada and Somalia).
Whatever one’s views about the wisdom of these undeclared wars,
it is hard to dispute that they have proven contentious over the years,
deeply dividing the American public. An additional advantage of this
amendment — and its explicit tying of defense-spending exceptions to a
declaration of war — is that it would force elected officials to be much
more careful about entering into foreign entanglements, and would move
Congress to accept its constitutional responsibilities and formally declare
war when the nation has clearly entered one. Every member of Congress
would be on the hook and accountable for the conduct and outcome
of each war he voted to authorize. And no use of force could take place
without the implicit approval of the American people, through their duly
elected congressional representatives.
As further security against unforeseen developments or emergencies that might arise, three-quarters of the state legislatures — upon the
application of two-thirds of both houses of Congress — could grant
one-year exceptions to the amendment’s spending limits for any reason
whatsoever, and could re-issue such exceptions as often as they deemed
appropriate. If there is truly a reason why the federal government
must spend more money, then three-quarters of the states will likely
­concur. It is hard to imagine, for instance, more than one-quarter of the
states objecting to extra funding for the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, or to help Lower Manhattan recover from the attacks
of September 11th.
By the same token, however, requiring broad approval from the
states for such emergency funding would also likely impose useful
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constraints. If the money appropriated for such aid is limited to what
three-quarters of the states will authorize, rather than drawn from an
endless federal slush fund (as is the practice today), government authorities (federal, state, and local) will have much more incentive to ensure
that recovery work and spending are done efficiently, and to root out
expensive fraud and waste — both of which were problems in the aftermaths of Katrina and September 11th.
The provision requiring a two-thirds congressional majority for
­spending exceptions, meanwhile, provides an important protection
against federal extortion of the states. For instance, it is easy to imagine
a scenario in which Congress might try to make federal grants to the
states — such as the massive amount of funding tied to Medicaid — part
of an exceptions-­spending provision, rather than funding these programs
through the regular budget. With almost every state thoroughly dependent
on federal money, most states would simply have to approve the exceptions
­measure — regardless of whether they approved of all the spending provisions contained therein — simply to preserve their own fiscal solvency. But
by requiring two-thirds of the members of Congress to risk their jobs by
supporting such shenanigans, the amendment significantly reduces the
appeal of federal schemes plotted at the states’ expense.
The use of an inflation-adjusted limit, too, offers advantages. First, it
would tie the growth of government to real spending power, rather than
to economic growth. Attempts by government, through the Treasury
and Federal Reserve, to influence the inflation rate itself (in order to
permit more government spending) would thus prove futile, since they
would only reduce the purchasing power of the additional spending.
Second, the level of permitted spending would likely increase faster in
tough economic times (when inflation tends to be higher, while economic growth is lower) and more slowly in good times — allowing for
countercyclical fiscal policy within reasonable bounds. And because
the amendment places limits on the definition of inflation, it would
allow for changes in economic thinking to be reflected in economic
policy — but would still prevent policymakers from playing fast and
loose with terms to a degree that would make the inflation-adjusted cap
on spending meaningless.
Among the amendment’s greatest benefits, however, are its provisions for enforcement. For one thing, it sets Congress and the president
against each other as checks: The president cannot unilaterally violate the
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amendment, because he doesn’t control the purse; Congress cannot unilaterally violate it either, because it is the president — not Congress — who
actually carries out government’s spending. Furthermore, the amendment turns the American people into an enforcement mechanism, as
they would be able to vote out lawmakers who violated the terms of the
amendment. Election Day would thus become both a punishment for
and deterrent against politicians’ ­engaging in such lawlessness.
Finally, per section four, every citizen would have the standing to
sue in order to ensure the amendment’s enforcement. This provision
is intended to prevent a situation in which the president and Congress
have colluded to violate this new section of the Constitution and yet
no citizen — or only a very few citizens — can demonstrate enough direct ill effects to establish standing to sue in federal court. By having
the language of the Constitution itself explicitly grant every American
this standing, the amendment makes it easier for any citizen to challenge the laws that fund annual budgets if these measures violate the
­amendment — and so make it easier for the judiciary to strike down
such laws as unconstitutional.
Check s a nd Ba l a nce s
Like all constitutional modifications, the Limited Government
Amendment could be proposed either by Congress or through a convention called upon the application of two-thirds of state legislatures.
Given the nature of this amendment, the state legislatures would almost certainly need to be the originating source. But Congress might
ultimately be coaxed into action: If the American people could persuade anything approaching two-thirds of state legislatures to advance
this idea, then Congress might prefer to propose the amendment itself,
rather than inviting a convention to do so.
It is true that the constitutionally sanctioned process of having state
legislatures call a convention to propose an amendment has never been
utilized. One possible reason for inaction in this vein has been the
­theoretical possibility of a runaway convention; in light of the very real
and pressing dangers that we already face to our liberty and solvency,
­however, such potential concerns are comparatively trivial. Besides,
there are two reliable checks against potential mischief.
First, the state legislatures could legally constrain their respective
convention delegates to vote only on this particular amendment. This
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measure would be similar to many states’ current policies that legally
bind their Electoral College delegates to vote for the candidate who receives the largest share of the state’s popular vote. If even a significant
minority of states were to undertake this precaution, it is unlikely that
any other potential amendments could achieve the majority support they
would need to be formally proposed.
Second, if any other potential amendments were to be officially
­proposed, they would still have to be ratified by three-quarters of the state
legislatures or by conventions in three-quarters of the states — ­whichever
Congress preferred — to have any legal effect. Such a supermajority requirement is unlikely to be met by ill-advised proposals.
It should be no surprise that this second check is in place. The
­founders, after all, knew what they were doing. And they presumably
would not have empowered state legislatures to call a subsequent convention to propose a constitutional amendment if they had thought this
provision would subvert the work they were in the midst of completing
at Independence Hall.
T he R igh t A mendmen t
Frustration with federal excess has spawned other ­constitutional-­amendment
proposals in recent years. Most noteworthy are a Term Limits
Amendment, a Balanced Budget Amendment, and Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett’s recent proposals for a Federalism Amendment.
Each of these proposals represents an attempt to rein in excesses of federal
power, and each has its merits — but each addresses something other than
the real problem. In expelling many of the shameless spendthrifts who
populate Capitol Hill, a Term Limits Amendment would also remove from
office many good, cost-conscious members of Congress; the mix would
by no means be guaranteed to improve. A Balanced Budget Amendment,
meanwhile, would limit deficits but not necessarily spending; it might only
succeed in causing taxes to be raised to European levels.
Barnett’s Federalism Amendment would repeal the 16th Amendment
and severely curtail the federal government’s ability to interfere in states’
policies and activities. In addition to being a somewhat immoderate
­proposal, calling for federal judges or supermajorities of states to rein in
the federal government seems overly optimistic. Judges have consistently
shown their willingness to apply tortured readings of the Constitution
to avoid checking Congress. And state governments are often nearly as
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bloated and profligate as the federal government, run by representatives
too similar to their free-spending counterparts in Washington.
The only other direct option for constricting government would be
to place limits on government’s funding source. But at a time when
America owes $13 trillion, cutting off revenue would be unwise. Besides,
as our Congress has consistently shown, it doesn’t have to have money
to spend it. Furthermore, over time, if our government’s ability to spend
becomes limited, its appetite for taxation will be limited, too: After all,
taxing and spending isn’t much fun without the latter part. So the real
problem is excessive spending, and that is what we must stop.
Obviously, an amendment to constrain the growth of spending would
not have an easy time getting enacted. It would require a protracted
­effort, and it would face long odds. But it is worth remembering that
most other constitutional amendments did at some point, too — not to
mention the Constitution itself.
A further advantage of the Limited Government Amendment over
other recent proposals is that it is designed to generate constructive
debate in the course of that enactment struggle. The amendment’s advocates would not need to argue against government as such — or even
against the need for modest expansions of government’s activities over
time — but simply for some prudent limits. Its opponents, meanwhile,
would have to make the case not only for allowing government to
­expand, but for allowing it to expand without limit. Such a debate would
be enormously clarifying for the country. It could also have the added
benefit of inspiring similar amendments to state constitutions. At a time
when many states are awash in red ink and some even teeter on the brink
of bankruptcy, such proposals might prove of great use to cost-conscious
governors and legislators (not to mention state taxpayers), and offer a
useful proving ground for the national-level amendment.
Above all, both as a proposal and as a ratified amendment to our
Constitution, the Limited Government Amendment would focus the
country on the right issue: the question of spending. With spending comes
regulation; with spending comes taxation; with spending comes the consolidation of power. The danger inherent in such consolidation was already
evident to Alexis de Tocqueville back in the 1830s, when he warned against
it in Democracy in America. To Tocqueville, the surest way to undermine
people’s incentive and ability to actively govern themselves was to consolidate money and power in a centralized government. Government action,
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he believed, would then increasingly take the place of free human action
and interaction, leading to a scenario in which, as he put it,
the sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; it covers its
surface with a network of small, complicated, painstaking, uniform
rules through which the most original minds and the most vigorous
souls cannot clear a way to surpass the crowd; it does not break wills,
but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces
one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not
destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize,
it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally
reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid
and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
But in the wake of this stunningly prescient description, Tocqueville
also offered encouragement and advice on how we should proceed. He
wrote that the “perils” he described are not “insurmountable,” and that
our instincts to combat them “will always be found because they come
from the foundation of the [democratic] social state, which will not
change. For a long time,” he added, this “will keep any despotism from
being able to settle in, and [it] will furnish new arms to each new generation that wants to struggle in favor of men’s freedom.”
It would appear that the time has come for this generation’s struggle to
reclaim some of America’s lost freedoms. The majority of Americans have
reached the limits of their tolerance for obtrusive centralized power — and,
as is evident in the Tea Parties and other popular appeals to the early days
of the republic, many are eager to restore the founders’ vision.
Still, there are some who, though alarmed by the unbridled expansion of government, might be reticent about championing a Limited
Government Amendment. For them, a thought experiment is in order.
Suppose that everything falls into place for the repeal of Obamacare, the
greatest immediate threat to limited government in our day. Suppose
opponents of that entitlement, most of them Republicans, take the
House in 2010. They also take the Senate in 2010 or 2012, by a significant
(but likely not filibuster-proof) majority. They win the White House in
2012. With President Obama himself having been removed from office,
supporters of Obamacare read the clear writing on the wall and don’t
dare to filibuster in the Senate. Opponents subsequently pass a law in
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Jeffrey H. Anderson · A Limited Government Amendment
January 2013 to repeal Obamacare, thereby removing that scourge to liberty and fiscal solvency from the books. Celebrations ensue, and a great
victory for American ideals and limited government has been won.
Then what?
A n E ssen t i a l R ev ision
It is our duty as American citizens to keep vigil over our Constitution,
strengthening and maintaining it, rather than blithely expecting it to
maintain itself. Thomas Jefferson warned against those who would refuse to tend to our founding documents, writing: “Some men look at
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark
of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of
the preceding age a wisdom more than human and suppose what they
did to be beyond amendment.” And President George Washington, in
his farewell address, shared with his fellow citizens his fondest hopes
that “the free Constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be
sacredly maintained — that its administration in every department may
be stamped with Wisdom and Virtue.” He certainly did not think that
the document would maintain itself.
Our forefathers wrote and ratified our Constitution to include
an amendment process, so that if a correction, or recalibration, were
needed, we could provide it. Adapting the Constitution to the concerns
of the day doesn’t mean allowing judges to mold the document into a
vehicle to impose their will: That is lawlessness. Rather, it means that
the Constitution can be changed, through the proper legal process,
by the American people.
We find ourselves in a moment at which the freedoms our fore­fathers
intended for us are endangered by the very government meant to secure those freedoms. Were the founders here today, they would almost
certainly urge Americans to take action to avoid the pitfalls of “public
debt,” excessive taxation, and the “wretchedness and oppression” that
­follow — let alone to combat the dangers that an overbearing government
poses to our civic fabric and way of life. The best way to take up that call
is through the Limited Government Amendment. And given the urgency
of America’s predicament, the best time to advance it is now.
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