Collaboration between
watchdogs:
Learnings from the Western
Australian Experience
November 2015
Dr Peter Wilkins
Adjunct Professor, John Curtin Institute of Public Policy
Senior Research Fellow, Curtin Not-for-profit Initiative
Curtin Business School
Professor John Phillimore
Executive Director,
John Curtin Institute of Public Policy
Curtin Business School
Professor David Gilchrist
Director, Curtin Not-for-profit Initiative
Curtin Business School
Not-for-profit Initiative
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from Curtin Business School’s
Linkage with Business Grant Scheme, which enabled us to research and write this report.
We would particularly like to acknowledge and thank the Western Australian watchdog
agencies and their officials who made the time to provide information and participate in
discussions about the project: the Ombudsman; the Auditor General; the Inspector of
Custodial Services; the Information Commissioner; the Public Sector Commissioner; and the
Acting Commissioner for Children and Young People. All opinions and any errors in analysis
and interpretation rest with the authors.
DISCLOSURE
Peter Wilkins was an Assistant Auditor General at the Office of the Auditor General until
early 2009, after which he served as Deputy Ombudsman until early 2014.
David Gilchrist was an Assistant Auditor General at the Office of the Auditor General
between 2008 and 2011.
ISBN 978-0-9944849-0-1
Collaboration between watchdogs:
Learnings from the Western Australian Experience
Executive Summary
Collaboration between watchdogs such as the Auditor General and the Ombudsman has only
rarely been the subject of research. This collaboration could be relevant wherever there is
potential overlap in their roles or interests, and/or where integrating activities can provide
synergies. Collaboration can include the sharing of information and other forms of
communication, collaborative investigations and enhancing watchdog capacity to collaborate.
Concerns have however been raised about the implications of watchdogs collaborating,
including that it is an impediment to their ability to oversight each other.
This report describes a pilot research project that has explored collaboration between seven
Western Australian (WA) watchdogs: the Auditor General, Public Sector Commissioner,
Corruption and Crime Commissioner, Ombudsman, Information Commissioner, Inspector of
Custodial Services and Commissioner for Children and Young People.
It assesses examples of collaboration to develop an understanding of the issues involved and to
develop and where possible test analytic frameworks that could provide the foundation for
broader and more detailed research that looks at collaboration between watchdogs in Australia
and New Zealand. Five forms of collaboration are used to assist the analysis of thirteen
examples of collaboration between Western Australian watchdogs as indicated in the Table
below. The examples are spread across the five forms of collaboration, ranging from one to
four examples per form.
An assessment of the intensity of collaboration in each of the thirteen examples of
collaboration was made. It is important to note that the degree of integration should be suited
to the context, with no merit automatically attached to it being high, medium or low.
A high degree of integration is identified in three examples, a medium degree in five examples
and a low degree of integration in five examples. The degree of integration of the examples is
spread reasonably evenly across the five forms, with each form involving either one or two
degree of integration.
A majority of the examples provide benefits associated with improved watchdog effectiveness.
For instance, the joint Integrity Coordinating Group (ICG) products on issues such as integrity in
decision making and gifts (see page 13 for details) indicate a clear focus on maximising impact
on the public sector on these issues. Presenting in a single package the requirements and
advice of several watchdogs using consistent terminology can boost impact by removing the
tensions and potential ambiguities of having separate but overlapping packages from each
1
watchdog. Fewer examples are identified as providing benefits associated with improved
efficiency. An example where efficiency is a primary benefit is the ICG meetings that serve the
purpose of preventing unnecessary duplication and administrative burdens that could arise
from the watchdogs fulfilling their roles in isolation.
Table ES1. Degree of integration of collaboration examples
FORM
Low
DEGREE
Medium
ICG meetings
Structured
communications
Communications
specifically
authorised by
legislation
ICG products
Participation in
national and
international groups of
watchdogs with similar
roles
Coordinated
awareness-raising
Providing information
relevant to the role of
another watchdog
Communications
mandated by
legislation
Collaborative
investigations
High
Notifications
Suicide investigation
Roles on a statutory
body
BHDC investigation
Investigations
concurrent with other
jurisdictions
Reports including
comments from another
watchdog
Staff secondments
ICG graduate program
Building capacity
Watchdog collaboration introduces risks that need to be managed to reduce the likelihood of
sub-optimal results. These are discussed here in terms of independence, acting within remit;
ability to oversight each other; keeping Parliament informed through proportionate
accountability arrangements; recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration; and
developing the capacity of watchdogs to collaborate.
2
In considering the wider implications of collaboration issues addressed include the nature of
overlap between watchdogs, the effect of watchdog collaboration on diversity, accountability,
governance, and recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration.
While theoretical considerations of watchdog independence may point to being very wary of
collaboration, a focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight system highlights the
benefits of collaboration. The analysis in this report indicates that WA watchdogs are very
vigilant about protecting their independence but are also open to collaboration supported by
identification and management of the risks involved. While different perspectives have
emerged from parliamentary committee inquiries the Parliament has been both cautious and
innovative in its responses to overlap between watchdog roles and authorising a wide range of
collaborative practices.
The analytic frameworks developed in this project provide substantially different perspectives
on collaboration from those developed for the general public sector. It may be useful to reflect
some of these learnings back into research into collaboration in the general public sector.
3
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6
2. Concerns expressed about collaboration between watchdogs ............................................... 7
2.1 Concerns about the accountability of WA watchdogs and their ability to oversight each
other ...................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 A framework to categorise collaboration between watchdogs ......................................... 9
3. Examples of watchdog collaboration .................................................................................... 11
3.1 Structured communications ........................................................................................... 11
Integrity Coordinating Group Meetings ............................................................................ 11
Integrity Coordinating Group Products ............................................................................. 13
Participation in national and international groups of watchdogs with similar roles .......... 13
Coordinated awareness-raising ........................................................................................ 14
3.2 Communications specifically authorised by legislation.................................................... 15
Providing information to other watchdogs ....................................................................... 15
3.3 Communications specifically required by legislation ....................................................... 18
Role on a statutory body .................................................................................................. 18
Mandated notifications .................................................................................................... 19
3.4 Collaborative investigations ............................................................................................ 20
Between WA watchdogs ................................................................................................... 20
Reports concurrent with watchdogs from other jurisdictions ........................................... 22
Reports including comments from or references to another watchdog ............................ 23
3.5 Building capacity............................................................................................................. 24
Graduate program ............................................................................................................ 25
Staff secondments ............................................................................................................ 25
4. Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 25
4.1 Analytic framework ........................................................................................................ 25
Intensity of collaboration ................................................................................................. 26
Purpose and benefits ........................................................................................................ 26
4.2 Effectiveness .................................................................................................................. 28
4.3 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................ 31
4.4 Managing risks................................................................................................................ 33
Independence: ................................................................................................................. 33
Acting within remit ........................................................................................................... 34
4
Oversighting each other ................................................................................................... 34
4.5 Wider implications/Future prospects.............................................................................. 35
Overlap between watchdogs ............................................................................................ 35
Effects of collaboration on diversity ................................................................................. 36
Accountability .................................................................................................................. 37
Governance ...................................................................................................................... 38
Recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration ..................................................... 39
5. Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 40
References ............................................................................................................................... 42
Appendix A: Banksia Hill Detention Centre Case Study ............................................................. 50
5
1. Introduction
Collaboration by public sector agencies is an age-old endeavour that continues to challenge
practitioners and policy makers and fascinate researchers (Wilkins et al 2015). In this regard a
useful definition of collaboration is that it “… means joint working or working in conjunction
with others. It implies actors—individuals, groups or organisations—cooperating in some
endeavour” (Wanna 2008: 3).
By contrast collaboration1 between watchdogs tends to happen quietly and has only rarely
been the subject of research. The term ‘watchdogs’ is used here to describe independent
positions created to scrutinise the public sector and report findings to Parliament, the most
long standing of these being the Auditor General and the Ombudsman (Wilkins 2015).
In terms of the dearth of research, a notable exception is a book chapter that looks at the
implications of recent (2012) provisions allowing the Commonwealth Auditor-General to
conduct audits of state and territory bodies that receive money for a Commonwealth purpose
and in particular options of how this might interact with the roles of State and Territory
Auditors General (Gerald 2015). More generally, collaboration between watchdogs could be
relevant wherever there is potential overlap in the watchdogs’ roles or interests, and/or where
integrating activities can provide synergies.
The significance of overlap in roles was highlighted by the Chief Justice of Western Australia
(WA) who commented that:
… the various agencies which might be loosely grouped within the "integrity branch" of
government reveals much opportunity for overlap between the functions and activities of those
agencies. In Western Australia, an Integrity Coordinating Group was established in 2005 … with
a view to providing greater policy coherence and operational coordination amongst the various
agencies charged with improving integrity within the public sector. That appears to me to be a
most commendable initiative (Martin 2011: 18-19).
The need for collaboration between watchdogs has been identified in similar terms by the WA
Public Sector Commissioner (PSC2), who observed:
[m]anaging within the multifaceted accountability in this State requires the interaction,
collaboration and partnerships of public sector agencies, including accountability agencies, to
work effectively (PSC 2013a: 5).
In contrast to these generally positive views, concerns have been expressed about the role and
accountability of watchdogs, and in particular the implications of their interacting with each
other. These concerns have been raised with a specific focus on the legislation and practices in
WA (Martin 2013, Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission (JSCCC)
2014).
1
‘Collaboration’ is used as a general term for working together in this report, unless it is used in the context of a
spectrum of intensity (as explained at page 26).
2
PSC is used to denote both the Public Sector Commission and the Public Sector Commissioner.
6
This report describes a pilot research project that has explored collaboration between WA
watchdogs. While noting the concerns expressed and responses to them, it does not seek to
further progress that debate but instead seeks to learn lessons about collaboration between
watchdogs by assessing examples in the WA context. It is a pilot project in the sense that it has
used WA examples to develop an understanding of the issues involved and to develop and
where possible test analytic frameworks that could provide the foundation for broader and
more detailed research that looks at collaboration between watchdogs in Australia and New
Zealand.
Information was collected through document analysis and interviews with watchdogs and their
senior staff.
The next section of this report identifies relevant watchdogs in the WA context, concerns
expressed about collaboration between them and a framework to categorise these
collaborations. Subsequent sections provide examples of collaboration between watchdogs in
the WA context followed by discussion and analysis of the examples that amongst other things
sheds further light on the concerns raised about this collaboration.
2. Concerns expressed about collaboration between watchdogs
The watchdogs of immediate relevance to this project are the members of the Western
Australian Integrity Coordinating Group (ICG): Auditor General, the Public Sector
Commissioner, the Corruption and Crime Commissioner, the Ombudsman and the Information
Commissioner.
This project has also included the Inspector of Custodial Services (ICS) who has a watchdog role
in relation to prisons and related services and the Commissioner for Children and Young People
who has a focus on those under the age of 18 years. Both have collaborated on a bilateral basis
with ICG member agencies.
These watchdogs have in common statutory independence in their scrutiny roles, direct
relationships with Parliament, roles related to information and transparency, and a primary
focus on analysis and persuasion as their means of contributing to accountability and improved
public services, achieving their influence by the ‘power of the pen’. They report directly to the
Parliament and are accountable to oversight by Parliament for their own performance. For
example, the Public Sector Management Act (PSM Act) provides the parameters for the actions
of the PSC and the accountabilities associated with the performance of its statutory role. 3
Each watchdog has distinct responsibilities as set by its legislation and there are differences in
their scope and powers. For instance, the Ombudsman’s role includes local government
whereas the Auditor General’s does not (although he can ‘follow’ State dollars), and both have
very significant powers to require that information be provided whereas the ICS does not.
Inevitably there are also areas of overlap. For instance, the ICS has a specialised jurisdiction
3
The PSC is accountable to both the Premier as the Minister responsible for administration of the PSM Act as well
as directly to Parliament.
7
over prisons and has work underway on people in remand (OICS 2015) while the Auditor
General has reported recently on bail and the interactions between the granting of bail or
prisoners being held on remand (Auditor General Western Australia 2015). The most significant
differences relate to the decision-making roles of the Information Commissioner (IC), the role
of the PSC in advising Ministers and CEOs about changes in the public sector to improve
efficiency and effectiveness4 and the primary role of advocacy of the CCYP.
There are also many differences in their powers. Of significance to this research project is that
to a considerable extent they oversight each other (Martin 2013). For instance, the Auditor
General audits all the other watchdogs, is itself independently audited, is subject to scrutiny
and according to their legislation is the subject of review by the PSC and the CCYP in relation to
matters affecting children and young people.
To varying degrees the watchdogs identify and report on their collaboration with other
watchdogs. For instance, the Ombudsman Western Australia has indicated that the Office
works collaboratively with other integrity and accountability agencies to encourage best
practice and leadership in public authorities (Ombudsman Western Australia 2014a: 104).
The concerns that have been expressed about the role and accountability of watchdogs in
Western Australia exist in the context of broader concerns about the nature and extent of
oversight in many public sectors internationally. The terms ‘The Audit Society’ (Power 1997)
and ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane 2012, Power 2012) capture these concerns succinctly. In the
Australian context a review of Queensland’s Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 observed that “…
the "integrity industry" within the public service is bloated, inefficient and thriving” (Callinan
and Aroney 2013: 144)
2.1 Concerns about the accountability of WA watchdogs and their ability to oversight each
other
The Chief Justice of Western Australia raised concerns in a 2013 Whitmore Lecture about
collaboration by integrity agencies through the ICG. He asked whether they remain fully
accountable to Parliament for their actions and whether the interactions between them
impede their ability to oversight each other (Martin 2013).
In particular, he commented that “[t]he combination of powers conferred upon separate and
distinct agencies by the Parliament might well take the collaborative exercise of those powers
well beyond anything contemplated by Parliament at the times the separate pieces of
legislation were enacted” (Martin 2013: 37).
It has been reported that in a subsequent conference presentation he stated that his purpose
was “… to stimulate thought and perhaps even debate on the need to give careful and
principled consideration to the mechanisms of accountability and transparency which are
applied to the so-called watchdog agencies …” (Wheeler 2014: 742).
4
The PSC is subject to Ministerial direction regarding the creation and abolition of departments and the conduct
of special inquiries and functional reviews, and “… must accommodate and be responsive to changing policy
settings and priorities of the government of the day” (PSC 2013: 4).
8
The Chief Justice’s concerns have been taken up by the Western Australian Parliament. The
Chairman’s Foreword in a report by the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime
Commission (CCC) on ‘The CCC’s interaction with the State’s Integrity Coordinating Group’
identified that the stimulus for the inquiry was concerns expressed by the Chief Justice in his
2013 Whitmore Lecture (JSCCC 20145). The Joint Standing Committee raised the risk posed by a
possible conflict of interest as a consequence of the relationship the CCC had with the ICG
agencies, and the possible diminution of the CCC’s ability to oversight them.
The Committee questioned the benefits of the CCC’s involvement in the ICG, finding that its:
… regular interaction with the Integrity Coordinating Group is presently an irrelevant factor in its
effectiveness at carrying out its responsibilities contained in the Corruption and Crime
Commission Act 2003 (JSCCC 2014: 24).
It recommended that the CCC should:
… ensure that contributions to Integrity Coordinating Group activities do not exceed those that
would be incurred should it liaise with agencies on an individual basis to fulfil its obligations
under section 18(2)(g) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003” (JSCCC 2014: 10);
… consider whether it would be more effective for it to have stand-alone meetings with relevant
Integrity Coordinating Group agencies, as required (JSCCC 2014: 24).
and that
[w]hile it continues to participate in the Integrity Coordinating Group, the Corruption
and Crime Commission should include its activities and associated costs of this
involvement in its annual report (JSCCC 2014: 24).
The Chief Justice’s Whitmore Lecture was also raised by the Public Accounts Committee in a
2014 report into amendments to the Public Sector Management Act 1994, noting that:
the Chief Justice expressed some alarm at the degree of independence and power the Public
Sector Commissioner now exercised, particularly in the management and administration of
public sector bodies. He went on to acknowledge the role that independent integrity agencies
had to play, but argued the balance between independence and accountability had shifted too
far towards independence … several members acknowledged the potential significance of the
points raised by the Chief Justice regarding the power and accountability of the Public Sector
Commissioner (and other integrity offices) (Public Accounts Committee 2014: 2).
These concerns were raised in our discussions with the watchdogs and are considered further
in this report.
2.2 A framework to categorise collaboration between watchdogs
There are no well-established frameworks for the analysis of collaboration between watchdogs.
Such a framework is developed and piloted in this project by analyzing collaboration between
Western Australian watchdogs. It builds on the work of Gerald (2015) who assessed the
5
Un-numbered page at the front of the report.
9
potential for what she terms cooperative performance audits in the context of the legislation
that allows Commonwealth Auditor-General audits of states and territories 6, referred to in her
report as cross-jurisdictional performance audits (CJPAs).
Her framework used as a broad concept a collaborative investigation7 which involved two or
more watchdogs. Three main types closely aligned with her framework are parallel (concurrent
or sequential), coordinated, and joint, with less to more integration involved respectively,
namely:
Parallel: conducted simultaneously or sequentially by two or more watchdogs after
agreeing on a common issue. They use separate teams from each watchdog and table
separate reports.
Coordinated: investigations falling somewhere in between parallel and joint investigations
with the watchdogs potentially having separate teams, although they might involve a joint
team producing separate reports, or concurrent investigations with joint and individual
reports.
Joint: conducted by a single audit team composed of staff from two or more watchdogs. It
involves a much greater degree of collaboration between the two agencies and results in a
single report. If conducted across jurisdictions it is tabled in the Parliaments of each
participating jurisdiction. In practice, joint audits are rare. 8
Gerald considers various audit elements including audit planning, developing criteria and
methodology, sharing information, and sharing audit activities (such as client interviews or
report writing) and comments that as more of these elements are shared the cooperation
involves greater integration. Thus cooperation is viewed as a spectrum. It is acknowledged by
Gerald that the distinction between the first two types is ill-defined and this mitigates against
the use of these categories as the primary elements of a framework for this project.
However, collaboration between watchdogs can take many forms beyond investigations. It can
also include the sharing of information and other forms of communication, and enhancing
watchdog capacity to collaborate to achieve better outcomes. From our discussions with WA
watchdogs, we developed a broader framework that includes five forms of collaboration
between watchdogs:
• Structured communications between watchdogs that are not specified in legislation
• Communications specifically authorised by legislation
• Communications between watchdogs mandated by legislation
• Collaborative investigations involving two or more watchdogs
• Building watchdog capacity to collaborate.
6
McPhee (2012) notes that: amendments to the Auditor-General Act 1997 give the Auditor-General the authority
to audit Commonwealth Partners, including state and territory bodies, and contractors, that receive money for a
Commonwealth purpose and have agreed to use the money in achieving the Commonwealth purpose.
7
‘Investigation’ is used as a generic term for performance audits, reviews, own motion investigations and similar
inquiry provisions in watchdog legislation.
8
Gerald (2015) notes that occasionally the National Audit Office in the UK undertook joint audits with the Audit
Commission, the [former] external public auditor for local government in England and Wales. For example, a 2005
joint audit entitled ‘Delivery Chain Analysis for Bus Service in England’ had a joint audit team that produced a
single joint report.
10
The next section of this report provides examples of collaboration between watchdogs in the
Western Australian context grouped according to these five forms of collaboration.
3. Examples of watchdog collaboration
Thirteen examples of collaboration between Western Australian watchdogs are identified in
Table 1. They are categorised according to the five forms of collaboration identified above and
features of each example are presented in the sub-sections of this chapter. The Banksia Hill
Detention Centre is identified as an example a number of times and as well as being discussed
below is documented as a case study in Appendix A.
More than half of the collaboration forms are communication based (7 out of 13). In terms of
legislative authority, most are authorised by legislation in general terms (10 out of 13) with the
remainder either specifically authorised (1 out of 13) or mandated (2 out of 13). On this basis,
most are at the discretion of the watchdog (11 out of 13).
The following sub-sections of this chapter detail the examples in Table 1.
3.1 Structured communications
The communications considered in this section are authorised in general terms by legislation
but not mandated specifically by legislation. For instance, regular meetings are a structured
communication process and enable the sharing of non-restricted non-confidential information. 9
Information might flow one-way or be an exchange of information, with the generation of new
ideas and opportunities being a particular benefit of these collaborations.
Integrity Coordinating Group Meetings
A formal structure known as the Integrity Coordinating Group exists in WA as a forum to
coordinate the exchange of information, share perspectives on integrity issues and to
collaborate to assist Western Australian public authorities effectively deal with integrity issues
(Integrity Coordinating Group nd(1)).
It has as members the independent officers of the Auditor General, the Public Sector
Commissioner, the Corruption and Crime Commissioner, the Western Australian Ombudsman
and the Information Commissioner.
The ICG was created in 2005 and is formalised to the extent it has its own website and
procedures. However it is not established through legislation and the participation of the
independent officers is voluntary and they could withdraw at any time. It does not receive its
own budget allocation from Parliament and does not provide an annual report. Information on
its activities is available on its website and some of its members refer to their participation in
the ICG in their own Annual Report. For instance, the Ombudsman reports that his Office has a
senior representative who participates in the ICG’s joint working party (Ombudsman Western
Australia 2014a: 121).
9
For the PSC there are no secrecy provisions so the communications are possible under a general power – “[t]he
Commissioner has all the powers that are needed for the performance of the Commissioner’s functions” (PSM Act
section 22G) – whereas for other agencies with secrecy provisions there are other provisions such as those for the
Auditor General that he may provide advice or information relating to his responsibilities if he is of the opinion
that it would be in the State’s interests and would not compromise his independence (AG Act section 23(2)).
11
Table 1 Western Australian examples of collaboration between watchdogs
Structured communications
Authorised by legislation
ICG meetings
ICG products
Participation in national and international groups of watchdogs with similar roles
Coordinated awareness-raising and access events for agencies and the
community
Communications specifically authorised by legislation
Specifically authorised by legislation
Providing information relevant to the role of another watchdog
Communications mandated by legislation
Mandated by legislation
Role on a statutory body
Notifications
Collaborative investigations
Authorised but not mandated specifically by legislation
Between WA watchdogs – suicide prevention
Between WA watchdogs – Banksia Hill Detention Centre
Concurrent with watchdogs from other jurisdictions
Reports including comments from or references to another watchdog
Building capacity
Authorised but not mandated specifically by legislation
ICG Graduate program
Staff secondments for personal development
12
Integrity Coordinating Group Products
The ICG has produced four joint communications on broad integrity issues that have
been addressed at seminars organised by the ICG. Information on each is available on its
website (at www.icg.wa.gov.au):
• Raising concerns - taking action on integrity issues (2008)
• Integrity in decision making - info sheets and checklists (2011)
• Conflicts of interest - guidelines and scenarios (2011)
• Gifts, benefits and hospitality - A guide to good practice (2013)
For instance, the Ombudsman described the 2008 launch of the ‘Raising concerns’ product as
… influenced by feedback to the 2007 Forum, to take a very practical approach, adopting
hypothetical-style scenarios utilising professional actors … Over 170 senior staff from State
Government agencies, local governments and public universities attended the ICG Forum to
hear the views of the integrity agencies on issues such as misuse of corporate credit cards, theft
of government resources, inappropriate access and disclosure of confidential information and
mismanagement of grievance processes … Feedback from attendees was extremely positive
with 97 per cent saying that they were either very satisfied or satisfied with the overall quality
of the event (Ombudsman WA 2008: 3).
The launch of the most recent product on gifts, benefits and hospitality involved:
… 280 employees from State government, local government and public universities attend[ing]
the hypothetical-style event ... Public Sector Commissioner and ICG Chair, Mal Wauchope said
that the product assists public authorities to identify risks associated with gifts, benefits and
hospitality. 'It also contemplates how authorities can manage those risks and promote good
decision making through sound policies, transparent record keeping, communication and review
activities,' Mr Wauchope said (ICG 2013a).
Some products arise from specific work by one or more of the ICG members. For instance, the
guide on gifts, benefits and hospitality identifies that the CCC had investigated allegations of
misconduct in connection with possible attempted bribery of officers and that the Auditor
General had conducted audits in relation to purchasing hospitality and entertainment and an
audit on the gifts policies and registers of public sector agencies (ICG 2013b).
Participation in national and international groups of watchdogs with similar roles
Involvement by watchdogs in national and international bodies involving participants with
similar roles brings benefits in terms of access to information and ideas to improve practices
and to ‘avoid reinventing the wheel’. Similarly, they also make a contribution to the others
involved by sharing their experiences and ideas. Two examples are provided to illustrate the
nature of involvements by watchdogs in national and international bodies closely related to
their roles, illustrating both the contributions being made and the benefits accrued.
The Ombudsman reported that he participates in national and international groups of
watchdogs with similar roles, including the Australia and New Zealand Ombudsman
Association, the International Ombudsman Institute and the Australasian and Pacific
Ombudsman Region (APOR) of the Institute (Ombudsman Western Australia 2014a: 122-123).
More generally, the Ombudsman indicated that where appropriate his Office shared
13
information and insights about its work with Ombudsmen from other jurisdictions, as well as
with other accountability and integrity bodies (Ombudsman Western Australia 2014a: 122).
The Office of the Auditor General has reported on its involvement in the Australasian Council of
Auditors-General (ACAG) and the Auditor General’s membership of the Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board. It included the comment that the involvement “continues to be beneficial and
extremely important in developing and sharing knowledge, information, experience and better
practice examples in auditing” and summarises the work of four ACAG sub-committees:
Financial Reporting and Auditing, Performance Audit Executives Group, Information Systems
Audit Group and Audit Quality Assurance Panel (Office of the Auditor General 2014: 29).
ACAG has its own website which makes clear that it “is an association established by AuditorsGeneral for their mutual support and for the sharing of information” and includes among its
objectives “[p]romoting co-operation in the conduct of audits” (ACAG nd).
The Information Commissioner meets counterparts at a forum known as the Association of
Information Access Commissioners (AIAC), which is a network comprised of statutory officers
with responsibilities related to freedom of information (FOI). While most have unique
positions, in New Zealand, South Australia and Tasmania the position is held by the
Ombudsman. The AIAC aims to improve communication between the various jurisdictions
(Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2013). The Association makes clear that it
does not discharge any decision making or regulatory function.
The PSC is involved in a cross-jurisdictional forum for Commonwealth, state and territory public
service commissioners and New Zealand’s State Services Commissioner which occurs on a biyearly basis. This is a collegiate initiative and was not established to fulfil a statutory obligation
tied to legislation. It provides opportunities for commissioners to discuss contemporary
challenges in public administration and serves as a forum for exchanging information and
sharing experience (Australian Public Service Commissioner 2014: 27).
The ICS, being the first such position in Australia, has assisted in the commencement of a
second such position in NSW.
The CCYP meets counterparts in a network of children and young people Commissioners,
Guardians and Advocates known as Australian Children’s Commissioners and Guardians
(ACCG). In a communiqué, the network indicates that it “… aims to promote and protect the
safety, well‐being and rights of children and young people in Australia, and ensure that the best
interests of children and young people are considered in public policy and program
development across Australia” (ACCG 2015: 1).
Coordinated awareness-raising
Awareness-raising of agency staff and members of the community is practiced in different ways
by watchdogs, in part guided by whether their legislation gives them a specific education role
as is the case for the Information Commissioner, or not as is the case for the Auditor General.
Some watchdogs participate jointly in regional seminars. For instance, the Ombudsman reports
that his Office continued the Regional Awareness and Accessibility Program (RAAP) that
enables it to deliver key services to regional communities, increase awareness and accessibility
14
among regional and Aboriginal Western Australians and deliver key messages about the
Office’s work and services. RAAP involves “… other integrity and accountability agencies
including the Health and Disability Services Complaints Office, the Office of the Information
Commissioner, the Commissioner for Victims of Crime, and the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s
office” (Ombudsman WA 2014a: 126).
The Information Commissioner reports that as part of the RAAP led by the Ombudsman, his
Office visited Broome and Kununurra and has visited all the major regions of the State over the
last five years (Office of the Information Commissioner 2014: 10).
Other coordinated awareness-raising arises from invitations by professional bodies such as the
Institute of Public Administration of Australia and the Governance Institute, and tertiary
education institutions inviting a number of watchdogs to give presentations at seminars or in a
panel discussion at a conference or course. An example of this occurring as part of a university
course is illustrated by a Government Accountability unit that included presentations from six
watchdogs and other public sector leaders (Ombudsman WA 2012: 3).10
3.2 Communications specifically authorised by legislation
Some communications considered are specifically authorised by legislation giving the watchdog
a discretion to collaborate by providing information relevant to the functions of the other
watchdog. The following sub-sections provide three examples of such provisions.
Providing information to other watchdogs
Most watchdogs operate under strict confidentiality provisions, although in general
information can be disclosed for the specific purposes of their legislation. For instance, the
Ombudsman is required to conduct investigations in private (Section 19(2) Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1971). Other provisions indicate that information obtained as part of an
investigation cannot be disclosed except for the purposes of the investigation or a few other
limited reasons. There is a limited discretion to release information if it is judged to be in the
public interest or in the interests of any agency to which the Act applies or of any person.
However, there are also some specific information sharing provisions in the legislation. For
instance, the Ombudsman may disclose information obtained in the course of, or for the
purpose of, an investigation under the Act to the ICS, the Corruption and Crime Commission
and the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission provided the
information is relevant to the functions of the other watchdog. Similar disclosures can be made
to the Commissioner for Children and Young People (CCYP) where the information is relevant
to the death of a child (Section 22 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971).
The Ombudsman records that his staff attended regular meetings with representatives of the
OICS and that the meetings “… have proved useful in allowing both offices to become better
informed of issues affecting the corrective services sector in Western Australia” (Ombudsman
WA 2014a: 128). He also indicated that his Office liaised with a range of other public sector
agencies including the Corruption and Crime Commission (Ombudsman Western Australia
10
The first named author delivered lectures to this course as Deputy Ombudsman and participated in the RAAP.
15
2014a: 128). The occurrence of such meetings might be agreed through an exchange of letters
or the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). For instance, there has been an
MOU between the Ombudsman and the CCC (JSCCC 2014: 21).
Healthway referral
Another example is provided by a referral by the Auditor General to the PSC of issues identified
by audit work undertaken at Healthway (the Western Australian Health Promotion
Foundation). The Auditor General reported to Parliament that following identification of the
issues “[d]iscussions with the Foundation did not address our concerns and hence we, along
with the Foundation, referred the issues to the Public Sector Commissioner for consideration”
(2014a: 19). This is documented in a subsequent PSC investigation report that states the
catalyst for the investigation was:
…a formal referral from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). Healthway also raised the OAG
concerns with the Public Sector Commission (PSC) and initiated its own internal review. After
considering the nature of issues raised and information provided by the OAG and Healthway,
the PSC determined that an investigation by the Public Sector Commission into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the matters referred by the OAG was warranted (2015a: 4).
The report makes specific reference to “The audit assessment by the OAG for 2013-14 and
Healthway’s management response to the OAG findings” (2015a: 15). As distinct from
concurrent work, this example illustrates the role for working together sequentially.
Corruption, Crime and Misconduct
The CCC has had powers since its creation in 2003 to fulfil its functions amongst other things by
referring allegations or matters to other WA watchdogs so that they can take action themselves
or in cooperation with the CCC (section 18(2)(c) and (g)) and by “consulting, cooperating, and
exchanging information” with other WA watchdogs.11
Recent legislation has introduced specific provisions to support collaboration between the PSC
and CCC in conjunction with the shifting of responsibility for minor misconduct of public
officers and for misconduct prevention and education programs from the CCC to the PSC.12 In
several places the legislation provides that one entity “may consult, cooperate, and exchange
information” with the other. 13 In one provision the PSC is to be “supported” by the CCC (section
45A(4)) and in another the CCC is to assist “… in cooperation with the Public Sector
Commissioner, those public authorities or that public authority…” (section 21AB(1)). Elsewhere,
there is a provision that the PSC can perform the minor misconduct function by “consulting,
11
The legislation refers to ‘independent agencies’, a defined term encompassing: the Parliamentary Commissioner
[Ombudsman]; the Director of Public Prosecutions; the Auditor General; the Inspector of Custodial Services; and
the Public Sector Commissioner (Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003, section 3).
12
In December 2014, Parliament passed amendments so that the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003
(CCM Act) has the Public Sector Commissioner (PSC) responsible for the oversight of minor misconduct of public
officers and for misconduct prevention and education programs whereas the Corruption and Crime Commission
(CCC) focuses its attention on police misconduct, and on serious misconduct and corruption.
13
The legislation provides that the CCC “… may consult, cooperate, and exchange information” with the PSC in
relation to the CCC’s prevention and education function in relation to police misconduct (section 21AA(3)), its
capacity development function: public authorities (section 21AB(3)). It also provides that the PSC “… may consult,
cooperate, and exchange information” with the CCC in relation to the PSC’s prevention and education function
(section 45A(3)).
16
cooperating, and exchanging information” with other WA watchdogs (and counterpart agencies
in other jurisdictions (section 45B(2)(g)).
The CCM Act provides specific legislative capacity for PSC to collaborate with the CCC and other
independent agencies in the performance of its functions relating to minor misconduct and
education prevention.
PSC is also a member of the ICG. It is an informal arrangement to enable participating bodies
the opportunity to coordinate their activities, avoid duplication and overlap and better
promote integrity in the public sector. Each member is acutely aware of its own statutory
powers and limitations.
The PSC has observed at a joint forum involving the two Commissioners that there will be grey
areas and overlaps under the new arrangements, and comments that both he and the CCC “…
are committed to working to the intent of Parliament by working together to minimise the
impact on you and your organisation. We are underpinning this with an MOU” (PSC 2015b: 2).
A Parliamentary committee report following the passage of the amendments through
Parliament commented on a new overlap that had been created, making a finding that:
[t]here is a substantial degree of overlap of conduct that can be defined as either minor
or serious misconduct under the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003, and many
notifications will contain allegations involving both types of misconduct (JSCCC 2015a: 25).
This highlights the need for quite specific provisions regarding cooperation between the two
watchdogs to counter the issues arising from the separation of what was previously the
responsibility of a single agency. In this regard the Committee also found that the two
watchdogs:
… are working collaboratively to produce notification guidelines by 1 July 2015 for public sector
agencies and their staff with the aim to clarify their responsibilities under the Corruption, Crime
and Misconduct Act 2003 for identifying and reporting allegations of minor and serious
misconduct (JSCCC 2015a: 30).
The Chairman had commented in his Foreword to the report that “[t]he Committee is confident
the two agencies are working collaboratively, and with goodwill, on the transfer of the
functions as required under the amended legislation” (2015a).
The committee also commented on what it saw as a gap in oversight created by the
amendments, finding that the amended Act “… will not provide a clear avenue for a person to
lodge allegations of minor misconduct against the Public Sector Commissioner” (2015a: 11).
The CCC issued guidelines for the notification of serious misconduct in accordance with its Act
(section 30) and recorded that the guidelines do not apply to the ICS or the Parliamentary
Inspector (2015).14 These guidelines are identified in a joint information resource released by
14
Section 28 imposes a duty on the Ombudsman and the Inspector of Custodial Services to notify serious
misconduct to the CCC, but it is discretionary for the CCC to issue guidelines.
17
the two Commissioners indicating that they have been working closely to make the notification
process as simple as possible while addressing the new legislative requirements. The joint
information resource makes clear to those considering making a notification “[d]o not notify
both agencies as this will cause unnecessary duplication and effort. If either the PSC or the CCC
assesses the matter differently to the public authority, we will use referral powers in the
legislation to direct the matter appropriately and advise the principal officer of the reasons for
that referral” (Corruption and Crime Commission and Public Sector Commission 2015: 3).
The importance of powers to share information is also evident for particular work contexts
where the mandates overlap. For instance, cases of alleged misconduct by prison officers might
come under either or both the CCC or PSC, and might arise from information first obtained by
the Ombudsman or ICS. Further complexities could arise at locations such as secure court
facilities where police and court staff and private contractors might be present.
During Parliamentary debate on the amendment Bill the Attorney General commented on
a scenario involving both police and prison officers engaged in joint conduct referring to an
example of a joint cell extraction by police and prison officers, and observed that such a
scenario could involve a mix of serious misconduct within the jurisdiction of the CCC, and some
minor misconduct within the jurisdiction of the PSC. In relation to an alternate approach of the
CCC retaining some oversight of minor misconduct in regard to prison officers he indicated that
the matter could be considered at a later time (Hon M. Mischin 2014: 12).
3.3 Communications specifically required by legislation
There are communications that are mandated by legislation, which means that the watchdog
does not have a discretion to collaborate.
Role on a statutory body
The State Records Act 2000 creates a State Records Commission that has three watchdogs (the
Auditor General, the Information Commissioner and the Ombudsman) as Commissioners by
virtue of their primary statutory position. As Commissioners they are in effect required to
collaborate to fulfill the Commission’s functions that include:
• monitoring the operation of and compliance with the Act;
• monitoring compliance by government organisations with their recordkeeping plans;
and
• inquiring into breaches or possible breaches of the Act (State Records Commission nd).
The Commission also establishes principles and standards. It reports directly to Parliament and
is required to provide Parliament with an annual report on the operation of the legislation and
can submit at any time a report to Parliament about contraventions of the Act.
Their roles as Commissioners requires them to communicate and make decisions, but not in
their watchdog capacities. There is a close overlap between some aspects of their watchdog
roles and their roles as Commissioners. For instance, the Auditor General issued a report in
2013 ‘Records Management in the Public Sector’ and in his overview indicates that “[m]y
experiences on the Commission have confirmed my understanding of the importance of good
recordkeeping and the need for agencies to pay greater attention to this aspect of their
18
business” (Auditor General Western Australia 2013a: 4). Similarly, the Information
Commissioner commented in a review of the administration of freedom of information that
“[e]ffective operation of FOI is heavily dependent on sound recordkeeping” (Office of the
Information Commissioner (OIC) 2010: 18) and observed that:
… poor recordkeeping can fundamentally undermine the intent of FOI. It is crucial that an
agency can quickly and reliably identify all documents which may come within the scope of a
FOI request and then make a decision as to whether and how those documents are to be
disclosed. The review found that not all agencies are able to meet this goal and that many
particularly struggle with managing electronic records such as emails (OIC 2010: 8).
Mandated notifications
Reporting misconduct
Under the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 there is an obligation on the
Ombudsman and the ICS to notify serious or minor misconduct to the CCC or PSC respectively
(sections 28 and 45H(1)), although the PSC can issue guidelines that relieve these persons of
the obligation to report under this provision and may instead require they report under the
guidelines (section 45J(2)). Conversely, before referring allegations to the Ombudsman or
Auditor General, the PSC and CCC are required to first to consult with them (section 45S(1)).
Receiving and reporting Public Interest Disclosures
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 enables whistleblowing and creates the concept of a
proper authority to whom disclosure of public interest information may be made, this including
the Corruption and Crime Commission, the Auditor General and the Ombudsman (section 5(3)).
The proper authority must investigate or cause to be investigated the information disclosed to
it under this Act (section 8(1)) although the Corruption and Crime Commission and the
Ombudsman are exempt from this requirement (section 12).
Under certain circumstances a proper authority may refer a matter to another person, body, or
organisation having power to investigate the matter opening the way for referral of certain
disclosures to another watchdog (section 9).15
The Act gives the PSC the role of monitoring compliance with the Act and assisting public
authorities to comply with the Act (section 19). It requires that public authorities including the
three watchdogs identified as proper authorities 16 must provide information annually to the
PSC on the number of public interest disclosures received and the results of any investigations
conducted and the action, if any, taken as a result of each investigation (section 23(1)(f)). An
overview of the operation of the Act is provided annually in the State of the Sector Report
including, where significant, the numbers received individually by the watchdogs (PSC 2014a:
15
Section 9(1) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 states in part that “[i]f a proper authority forms the
opinion that a person may be, may have been, or may in the future be, involved in a matter that may be the
subject of a disclosure of public interest information, the proper authority must take such action as is necessary,
reasonable, and within its functions and powers, to (a) prevent the matter to which the disclosure relates from
continuing or occurring in future; (b) refer the matter to the Commissioner of Police or another person, body, or
organisation having power to investigate the matter; or … “.
16
They are non-SES organisations and thereby included in the definition of public authorities.
19
47).
3.4 Collaborative investigations
Described below are two examples of collaborative investigations involving two or more WA
watchdogs. Both involved some degree of coordination and were ‘parallel’ and broadly
concurrent. A third example involves a WA watchdog participating in an investigation that was
concurrent with watchdog investigations in other jurisdictions. Examples are also given of
watchdog reports including comments from another watchdog and reports including crossreferencing to the legislated roles of other watchdogs. No examples of joint audits or closely
integrated collaborative investigations were identified.
Between WA watchdogs
Banksia Hill Detention Centre
A major disturbance at the Banksia Hill Detention Centre (BHDC) in January 2013 led to
coordinated action involving the ICS and Auditor General in separate investigations, and other
concurrent forms of involvement in the issues by the Ombudsman and CCYP.
The ICS was directed by the Minister for Corrective Services to conduct a review into the major
incident that occurred at BHDC. The terms of reference included “the context of the incident
and its contributing or causal factors; security infrastructure and practices; the adequacy of
emergency management planning and responses; and the subsequent housing of detainees at
Hakea Prison” (OICS 2013: v). The Inspector commented that:
[c]ontemporaneously with this review the Auditor General conducted a performance audit of
the project to redevelop Banksia Hill in the period from 2009 to 2012. His audit was fully
independent of my Inquiry but the findings of the two reports are consistent in every respect
(OICS 2013: v).
It is made clear that:
For reasons of efficiency, there was a small amount of data and information sharing between
OICS and OAG. It was also considered sensible to release the two reports together. Tabling of
the reports at the same time seeks to provide Parliament with a greater context and a more
rounded view of developments at the facility. The OAG findings have proved to be consistent in
every respect with those of this Inquiry and in that sense, the reports provide valuable mutual
validation. However, the two reviews were conducted fully independently. The OAG report is
separately published and stands in its own right (OICS 2013: 9).
The Auditor General investigated the management of a $30 million capital works project to
increase the capacity of the BHDC. The report commented that:
[t]he ICS felt that the incident in January 2013 may be related to the redevelopment project at
BHDC. Based on an assessment against our topic selection criteria, the Auditor General decided
to conduct a performance audit of the BHDC redevelopment project. The ICS’ review and our
audit were conducted fully independently and the reports are separately tabled and stand alone
(OAG 2013b: 7)
and made the point that “[t]ogether the two reports provide Parliament with a fuller
picture, however both were conducted independently” (OAG 2013b: 13).
20
The report by the Auditor General observes that the reduction of juvenile detention facilities
from two to one limits the department’s ability to respond to operational issues and that it did
not have any options for alternative accommodation should the need arise. However, it did
not make any direct comments on the relevance of the investigation to the major incident,
making clear that its “… causes and impact are not a subject of this report” (OAG 2013b: 4).
Staff of the Ombudsman attended Banksia Hill soon after the riot and provided assistance to
the young people in detention. They also attended the adult prison (Hakea) that housed the
Banksia Hill detainees following the riot. They were there to:



Observe conditions at Banksia Hill and Hakea;
Meet with staff and detainees; and
Provide an opportunity for detainees to make complaints to the Office if they wished to do so
(OWA 2013: 36).
The Ombudsman provided relevant information to the ICS as part of the Inspector’s Directed
Review of the incident at Banksia Hill (Ombudsman Western Australia 2013 p36). He also
provided specific support to the ICS review through the secondment of his Principal Legal and
Investigating Officer to the Office of the Inspector for the duration of the Inspector’s inquiry
(Ombudsman Western Australia 2013: 36). The Inspector expressed appreciation for this
assistance in his report (OICS 2013: 150).
The Commissioner for Children and Young People (CCYP) made a submission to the ICS review
observing that following the incident she had amongst other things spoken with and written to
the Ombudsman on a number of occasions to advise of complaints received from parents and
other interested parties and to request that the Ombudsman conduct an investigation into
visiting restrictions.
Suicide Investigations
The Ombudsman and the Auditor General undertook related projects examining aspects of
suicide in the community. The Ombudsman’s report on youth suicide was tabled in Parliament
on 9 April 2014 and observed that “… the Office of the Auditor General is undertaking a
performance audit focusing on whether the State Strategy has been successful in delivering
effective, sustainable action to reduce suicide” citing the OAG website as its source for this
statement. This was in the context of a commentary on the State level strategic framework –
the Western Australian Suicide Prevention Strategy 2009-2013 (OWA 2014b: 92).
The investigation by the Ombudsman analysed information from multiple sources on a cohort
of young people who had either died by suicide or were suspected of having died by suicide,
and the report included two recommendations regarding the future suicide prevention strategy
calling for consideration of the development of differentiated strategies relevant to each of the
four groups of young people identified (2014b: 96) and of possible expansion of the Strategy to
encompass the investigation’s recommendations about “… ways that State government
departments can prevent or reduce suicide by young people” (2014b: 97).
The Auditor General tabled his report on the implementation and initial outcomes of
the State Strategy approximately a month later on 7 May 2014. The report did not make any
21
specific reference to the Ombudsman’s investigation or report. It made four recommendations
about any future suicide prevention strategy (Auditor General Western Australia 2014b).
Reports concurrent with watchdogs from other jurisdictions
One Western Australian watchdog has also participated in broadly concurrent investigations
with counterparts in other jurisdictions. The Auditor General and his counterparts used ACAG
processes to facilitate the decision-making across jurisdictions. 17
In a coordinated approach the WA Auditor General joined six other Auditors General18 in
investigating concurrently the implementation by their jurisdiction of the National Partnership
Agreement on Homelessness (NPAH). He stated in the report that:
…as a member of the Australasian Council of Auditors-General (ACAG), [he] agreed to conduct a
concurrent, but independent, performance audit of the National Partnership Agreement on
Homelessness along with … other Auditors General. The audit objective and questions are
broadly consistent between ACAG members but decisions about the audit scope and
methodology are made independently by each Auditor General (Auditor General Western
Australia 2012: 16).
The Commonwealth Auditor-General in a subsequent report indicated that ACAG “… agreed in
2010 to increase collaboration, where appropriate, in the conduct of performance audits on
topics that have a national dimension” (ANAO 2013:16), and distinguished its work from that of
the State and Territory Auditors General as follows:
[t]he objective of the state and territory jurisdiction audits was to examine whether or not the
relevant government agencies were meeting their obligations under the NPAH, and whether or
not the NPAH was making a difference for homeless people. The Australian National Audit
Office (ANAO), in preparing this report, has considered the findings of the reports completed by
the state and territory Auditors-General (2013: 16).
Five of the six reports were tabled in time for this consideration, and it included an overview of
the concurrent audit reports that noted that the reports:
identified a number of thematic issues. One of the common issues was that despite the
implementation of a range of homelessness initiatives, the expected reduction in homelessness
will not be achieved in any of these state and territory jurisdictions. This is coupled with a
reported lack of focus on measuring the outcomes being achieved or evaluation of the
effectiveness of the funded initiatives … At an administrative level, the Auditors‐General
identified that the respective governments were generally meeting their performance and
financial reporting commitments under the NPAH, but the validity of the reported information
could not be established in all instances (2013: 4).
In addition, the concurrent audit reports contributed to the overall conclusion regarding the
performance of the Commonwealth department, including the statement that the department
only prepared limited information but that the available reports on the concurrent audits
indicated that:
17
18
The ANAO 2013 report on the NPAH lists it as the first concurrent audit.
ACT, NT, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and Commonwealth.
22
there was evidence of better consultation and engagement across the homelessness sector, but
that it was not clear how changes in the service delivery system were assisting the state and
territory governments in reducing homelessness by the levels agreed in the NPAH. It was also
noted in the reports that without a strong focus on evaluating the effectiveness of individual
initiatives, it was not clear whether some of the funded initiatives had been more effective than
others in reducing and breaking the cycle of homelessness (2013: 17).
The overview, drawing together of common themes and contribution to the overall conclusion
demonstrates the practical benefits of watchdog cooperation through concurrent audits on
issues that involve more than one level of government.
Reports including comments from or references to another watchdog
In a 2014 report on cloud computing the Auditor General indicated that he sought advice from
the State Records Office (SRO)19 and the Information Commissioner about their views on the
use of cloud computing within government agencies. He included a summary of the advice
provided by each as an Appendix titled ‘Central agency views about the use of the cloud’ in his
report (Auditor General Western Australia 2014c: 32).
This is an innovative way to provide the views of other watchdogs and their corresponding
expertise alongside the work of the lead watchdog in a way that can assist a reader to
immediately have a more complete view of the issues covered. In this case it allowed the SRO
to convey amongst other things the view “… that although there are potential benefits for
government agencies utilising cloud computing there are a number of risks that should first be
properly assessed” and to list major issues in relation to records and information management
which agencies need to consider and mitigate when considering cloud computing. It also
enabled the SRO to advise that it is developing a new guideline to provide information
management advice on cloud computing specific to WA government agencies.
Similarly, the Information Commissioner was able to highlight that agencies considering or
using cloud based services need to factor the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act
1992 into the early stages of any planning or procurement process. In particular, he was able to
highlight that “it may be more difficult or costly to undertake reliable and comprehensive
searches for all documents which may be within scope of a particular FOI application …
Conversely, the well-planned and executed use of cloud services may enhance the ability of an
agency to achieve the objects of the FOI Act, by allowing for efficient and effective searches
across all relevant data holdings and speedy retrieval, especially where this replaces or
interconnects previously incompatible and distributed systems” (IC reported in Auditor General
Western Australia 2014d: 32).
In contrast with the example above, it is also informative to consider that there are examples
where there is no explicit collaboration but there are interactions between statutory roles. An
example of this is the PSC’s State of the WA Public Sector 2014 report that makes reference to
the work of the Auditor General in relation to key performance indicators, governance of public
19
The SRO has responsibility for managing, preserving and providing access to the State's records. It operates as
an independent Government agency and is accountable to the State Records Commission which has responsibility
for approving the disposal of State records.
23
sector boards and records management. The report also contains comments on statements on
the extent to which some watchdog agencies (CCYP, OIC and Ombudsman) have complied with
the public sector standards in human resource management, codes of ethics and any relevant
code of conduct (2014a: 102-104). Similarly, the CCYP’s State of Western Australia's Children
and Young People report makes reference to two reports by the Ombudsman, one by the ICS
and five by the Auditor General (CCYP 2014). In the other direction, the ICS drew on the
content of an Issues Paper by the CCYP in his BHDC report (2013: 122).
The Ombudsman in turn has made reference to the work of the Auditor General, for instance
referring to an Auditor General’s report on managing student attendance in his report on youth
suicide. Amongst other things, this was used to source an indication of irregular or chronic nonattendance (as it was not defined in the relevant policy), the Auditor General having observed
that “… attendance less than 60 per cent (that is, the student misses more than two days per
week) causes ‘severe educational risk’ ” (Ombudsman 2014b: 146).
A further example of this interconnection is the Auditor General’s issuing of Opinions on
Ministerial decisions to not provide information to Parliament that is supported by an Audit
Practice Statement that makes some reference to the Freedom of Information Act. The Practice
Statement describing the approach to this work advises that refusal to provide information
simply because it can be accessed under the Freedom of Information Act is likely to be
considered unreasonable and not appropriate. It also states that a Minister is unlikely to have
to provide a Notification to the Auditor General of a decision not to provide information if the
information is already publicly available or is already being sought under the Freedom of
Information Act (Office of the Auditor General 2015: 16).
In a specific area the two pathways to accessing information remain entirely separate.
Information is provided in the Audit Practice Statement on how the Auditor General will
approach cases where the Minister’s reason for not providing the information was that it was
commercially confidential or significant in nature. The Freedom of Information Act makes no
reference to commercially confidential information although it does have provisions in the Act
regarding trade secrets, commercial and business information. The Auditor General’s guidance
makes no specific reference to the FOI provisions regarding trade secrets, commercial and
business information that is identified as exempt or to the additional provision that under
certain circumstances the matters may not be exempt including if its disclosure would, on
balance, be in the public interest (Clause 4 of Schedule 1).
While this last example does not entail collaboration, it illustrates the need for clear
communication to Ministers and the public sector about how the respective watchdogs
function.
3.5 Building capacity
A specific example where WA watchdogs have worked together to enhance their capacity to
collaborate is a program run for new graduate officers. More generally, there are secondments
of staff between watchdog agencies to provide personal development.
24
Graduate program
The PSC described the ICG Graduate program as providing the opportunity to strengthen
knowledge of oversight and accountability in government and one graduate of the program
commented that “I have built on my experiences at each placement and carried them over to
the next” (ICG 2013c). The Ombudsman reported that his Office was involved in the ICG
graduate program which involves a graduate working in each of the member agencies over a
two year period in total (OWA 2014a: 121).
The graduates carry the experience with them when they take up a position in one of the
watchdog agencies and have particular experience and knowledge that equips them to
collaborate with the other two watchdogs in particular.
Staff secondments
Interviews held as part of this research confirmed that there have been secondments of staff
between watchdog agencies to provide personal development as well as to provide skills
relevant to individual projects. However as this is part of normal operations of agencies there
are no statistics or consolidated information to characterise the extent or collaboration
benefits of this practice.
A further example of secondments in support of a specific project arises from the PSC-initiated
Special Inquiry regarding the delivery of public health services at the Peel Health Campus that
acknowledges and thanks the OAG, the Department of Health and the PSC for the release of
staff for the Inquiry.
4. Discussion
Issues addressed in this section are the characteristics of these examples along with their
implications in terms of their contribution to watchdog effectiveness, efficiency and risks to be
managed. In the first sub-section an analytic framework is developed to enable an assessment
of collaboration in terms of its intensity and purpose.
4.1 Analytic framework
Collaboration in the public sector has been characterised in different ways but there is no
single model suited to categorisation of different collaborations. Amongst other things, this is
because collaboration can involve sharing across many different dimensions, including goal
setting, risk, reward, resources and culture (O’Flynn 2008 p184).
Wanna comments that collaboration:
… is a complex phenomenon. Different aspects of collaborative relations can be evident or come
into play in various examples of real collaboration … Conceptually, therefore, we have two
distinct dimensions of collaboration that intersect continually and differentially: first, the scale
or degree of collaboration, and second, the context, purpose or motivation behind collaborative
activity… the scale of collaboration can be depicted as an escalating ladder of commitment—
from the lowest level of perfunctory collaboration to the highest and most elaborate level of
integration (Wanna 2008: 4)
Both the degree and purposes of collaboration as identified by Wanna are considered below to
25
provide frameworks for analysis.
Intensity of collaboration
To capture the intensity of collaboration involved in each example documented above, we first
considered the framework derived from the work of Himmelman (2002). His framework has
four strategies that are in the form of a spectrum with increasing aspects of integration:
• Networking: an informal relationship in which information is exchanged for mutual benefit.
• Coordination: a more formal linkage in which information is exchanged and activities are
altered in pursuit of mutual benefit and achievement of common purpose.
• Cooperation: an exchange of information, altering activities and resource sharing for mutual
benefit in pursuit of a common purpose. Formal agreements can be used.
• Collaboration: a willingness of the parties to enhance one another’s capacity – helping the
other to “be the best they can be” for mutual benefit and common purpose. In collaboration,
the parties share risks, responsibilities and rewards, they invest substantial time, have high
levels of trust, and share common turf (O’Flynn 2008: 185-186).
The four strategies have been reinterpreted in various reports (see for instance Australian
Research Alliance for Children and Youth (ARACY) 2013 and Nous Group 2013). ARACY
describes coordination, cooperation and collaboration as being “… part of a continuum of joint
working relationships” (2013). Gerald (2015) in the context of a model of cooperative auditing
presents a continuum of less to more integration across the three main types ranging from
parallel (concurrent or sequential) to coordinated to joint.
Alongside these frameworks, the further issue of the extent to which projects are
complementary can also be considered, with the complementarity arising by some degree of
integration or none.
After trialing a number of approaches, it has been found impractical in this study to categorise
the varied examples of collaboration in terms of the four strategies and variants of them,
because they are not unique and being multi-dimensional can have significant areas of overlap.
Instead a broad characteristic of the ‘degree of integration’ arising from the approach of Gerald
is used to characterise the intensity of collaboration. Given the pilot nature of this project a
three-interval scale (Low-Medium-High) is used to enable it to be applied in an illustrative
manner. It is important to note that the degree of integration should be suited to the context,
with no merit automatically attached to whether it is low, medium or high.
The classifications in Table 2 are the judgment of the authors and have not been independently
validated. As such, they should be regarded as tentative and are provided to assist in exploring
the implications of seeking to classify examples of watchdog collaboration using a scale broadly
sourced from the literature.
Purpose and benefits
To capture the purpose of the collaborations it is necessary to blend a number of sources. A
central concept is collaborative advantage arising from synergies, scoped as “… something has
to be achieved that could not have been achieved by any one of the organisations acting alone”
(Huxham and Vangen 2008: 30). The same authors warn:
26
‘don’t do it unless you have to.’ Put rather more formally, the argument is that unless potential
for real collaborative advantage is clear, it is generally best, if there is a choice, to avoid
collaboration. It is worth noting, however, that collaborative advantage sometimes comes in
non-obvious forms and may be concerned with the process of collaborating—for
example from the development of a relationship with a partner— rather than
the actual output (Huxham and Vangen 2008: 42).
Table 2 Degree of integration of collaboration examples
FORM
Low
DEGREE
Medium
ICG meetings
Structured
communications
High
ICG products
Participation in
national and
international groups of
watchdogs with similar
roles
Coordinated
awareness-raising
Communications
specifically
authorised by
legislation
Providing information
relevant to the role of
another watchdog
Communications
mandated by
legislation
Collaborative
investigations
Suicide investigation
Notifications
Roles on a statutory
body
BHDC investigation
[Joint investigation}
Investigations
concurrent with other
jurisdictions
Reports including
comments from another
watchdog
Staff secondments
ICG graduate program
Building capacity
27
Categories of ‘success’ in collaboration have been identified as including achieving outcomes
and getting processes to work (Huxham and Hibbert 2008: 54). In the context of cooperative
Federalism, Wanna and colleagues point to a focus on:
bringing the strength of difference and shared perspectives to the table in order to build the
capacity for governments to think and lead together (Wanna et al 2009: 25)
Direct benefits of collaboration have been identified as:






increasing innovation – by drawing on a broader pool of ideas and approaches.
increasing the effectiveness of services – deliver better outcomes aligned with the
policy or program objective.
increasing the cost effectiveness of services – deliver the desired outcomes at lower
overall cost.
increasing the efficiency of service delivery – deliver the services cheaper than if
delivered by public sector.
reducing risk – both political risk from the project failing and direct risks to both public
sector
employees and to those impacted by the service (Nous Group 2013: 12-13).
Gerald identifies advantages of various collaborative investigation approaches that include the
increased credibility of the report, with more points of view brought into the analysis leading to
more and/or fairer findings. They can also provide a broader sense of the whole issue and a
greater impact (Gerald 2015: 423-4). In various situations, these benefits can be achieved if the
work of two or more watchdogs is complementary.
A synthesis of these approaches provides two key elements of purposes of collaboration as:


Effectiveness – achieving desired outcomes, including informative and insightful
investigation reports (arising from broader and better-informed content); and
Efficiency – achieving outcomes in a cost effective manner, including avoiding
duplication and unnecessary burdens.
The synthesis also identifies that to achieve these potential benefits it is important that risks
associated with collaboration are managed so as to reduce the likelihood of the project
producing sub-optimal results, and that it protects independence, acts within remit, and
maintains the ability to oversight each other.
What follows in the next three sections is a qualitative assessment of the WA examples using
this analytic framework.
4.2 Effectiveness
The examples where watchdogs have worked together of their own volition indicate their
recognition that they can be more effective through certain collaborative activities. Their
meetings through the non-statutory Integrity Coordinating Group enable the sharing of
information and ideas that helps to shape their individual action and is characterised on the
intensity spectrum as ‘low’. The progression of these discussions to provide jointly developed
and own products on issues such as integrity in decision making and gifts where all or most ICG
28
members have a role indicates a clear focus on maximising impact on the public sector on
these issues. Presenting in a single package the requirements and advice of several watchdogs
using consistent terminology can boost impact by removing the tensions and potential
ambiguities of having separate but overlapping packages from each watchdog. In this regard,
the Public Sector Commissioner commented in a submission to a Parliamentary Committee:
I consider the ICG to be successful in assisting the sector by reducing confusion around the roles
and responsibilities of the member agencies, sharing information about activities and oversight
functions and limiting forum shopping (PSC 2013: 6).
The ICG products are a good example of synergies being created through integration rather
than the driver being overlaps in functions. More generally, integrity is an overarching concept
for the watchdogs with each having largely separate functions contributing to public sector
integrity.
The jointly delivered ICG products are characterised on the intensity spectrum as ‘high’,
although it is in the context of providing general information and guidance whereas a joint
investigation would be a much more significant contribution by providing evidence-based
findings and recommendations on a specific issue investigated. The products have been
created through joint working to serve a common purpose and the rewards and risks are
shared. The joint ownership and unified presentation are a significant contributor to the
effectiveness of the products. The coordinated regional awareness-raising events by contrast
retain separate presentations and are characterised as ‘low’ - they are more about improved
efficiencies as discussed below than improved effectiveness.
Similarly, participation in national and international groups of watchdogs with similar roles
provides information and ideas regarding best practice and learnings that informs their own
decisions and adds to their effectiveness.
Where Parliament has specifically enabled communications such as the Ombudsman sharing
otherwise confidential information with the ICS and the ICS having broader powers including to
disclose information if in the opinion of the ICS it is in the interests of any person or the public
interest, it serves a purpose of maximising the effectiveness of the watchdog receiving the
information. Given the nature of these communications it is understandable that they are not
in general reported publicly. An exception is the referral by the Auditor General to the PSC
regarding issues identified at Healthway (Auditor General Western Australia 2014a), the
referral having been identified in the subsequent PSC investigation report (PSC 2015a: 4).
Where Parliament has required communications to occur between watchdogs it serves the
purpose of maximising the effectiveness of the watchdog receiving the information. The
requirement may imply a clear recognition of such benefits or that the issue involved is
sufficiently routine and can be tightly specified in legislation. An example of the former is the
legislation establishing that three watchdogs also serve as State Records Commissioners,
whereas an example of the latter is the reporting to the PSC of overview information on Public
Interest Disclosures on an annual basis.
29
Intermediate between information sharing being enabled or required by Parliament, is the
legislation indicating that the CCC and PSC ‘may’ cooperate and share information for purposes
such as the CCC’s education function in relation to police misconduct. While providing
discretion for the watchdog, the specific inclusion of these provisions indicates an expectation
by Parliament that the two entities will cooperate whenever it is appropriate. There is early
evidence from a Parliamentary committee report subsequent to the passage of the
amendments of this occurring, including the cooperative approach to separating what was a
function of a single agency across two while maintaining necessary flows of information
between them.
The joint notification process is a significant early test of this cooperation. The arrangement
whereby a notification can be lodged with one watchdog and will then be shared with or
transferred to the other makes the process easier for someone considering making a
notification.
The most common outcome desired from collaboration in investigations is to provide broader
coverage of the issues. For instance, the Auditor General observed about his investigation of
the capital works project to increase the capacity of the BHDC that was concurrent with the
investigation by the ICS that “[t]ogether the two reports provide Parliament with a fuller
picture, however both were conducted independently” (2013b: 13). The tabling of the two
reports on the same day further emphasises the benefits to Parliament and the wider
community of having the two inter-related perspectives on issues relevant to the events at
BHDC available at the same time. This information points to the two BHDC investigations along
with the role of the Ombudsman being characterised on the intensity spectrum as ‘medium’.
The two reports on suicide also provided broader coverage of relevant issues but a significant
feature of the coordination involved appears to have been to avoid duplication so the example
is discussed further in the next section on efficiency.
One WA watchdog has undertaken investigations concurrent with counterparts in other states
and territories and nationally. The Auditor General’s investigation of WA’s implementation of
the National Partnership Agreement on Homelessness was concurrent with work by six other
Auditors General. In adopting broadly consistent audit objectives and questions across the
investigations it is a good example of cooperation providing broader coverage both vertically
between the Commonwealth Department and states and territories, and horizontally across
states and territories. It is notable in this case, that the report by the Commonwealth AuditorGeneral included an overview of the available concurrent reports drawing together common
themes and that the concurrent reports contributed to the overall conclusion of the
Commonwealth Auditor-General. This demonstrated the practical benefits of watchdog
cooperation through concurrent audits on issues that involve more than one level of
government.
Broader coverage is also achieved where a watchdog actively seeks input from another
watchdog, thus drawing in information arising from the different roles and the expertise of
each watchdog. This is illustrated by the innovative approach of the Auditor General in seeking
and including in his report on cloud computing the input from the SRO and the IC about their
views on the use of cloud computing within government agencies. Not clearly articulated, but
30
potentially also important, is assigning roles to the watchdog best equipped to deal with the
subject matter.
The ICG graduate program involves watchdogs joining together to develop their capacity to
collaborate by having staff members have worked for counterpart watchdogs and thereby have
an inside knowledge of their role and way of working. While a small initiative, it is
characterised on the intensity spectrum as ‘high’. It is complemented by staff secondments that
require cooperation and arise commonly to meet an individual’s personal development but
also at times meet the specialised skill needs associated with a specific project of the host
watchdog.
Not evident in the examples identified is a potential contribution to watchdog effectiveness by
leveraging off the different sectors that each has within its mandate. For instance, the Auditor
General does not have Local Government within its mandate although it can ‘follow the dollar’
and look at where State agencies have directly funded Local Government activities (two
examples being audits of CCTV (2011) and some Royalties for Regions projects (2014d)). The
Ombudsman has underway ‘An investigation into local government collection of outstanding
rates’ (Ombudsman nd), a topic that is outside the Auditor General’s mandate although the
Ombudsman’s investigation would not necessarily have the same focus as would an
investigation by the Auditor General.
It is not held universally that collaboration through the ICG makes a positive contribution. A
Parliamentary Committee observed that it had not received any evidence that showed that
there was a tangible benefit arising from the CCC’s formal involvement within the ICG but
instead found that the CCC’s involvement with the ICG “… is presently an irrelevant factor in its
effectiveness at carrying out its responsibilities contained in the Corruption and Crime
Commission Act 2003” (JSCCC 2014: 22).
Given the benefits for watchdogs identified in this section it remains a relevant question
whether the benefits of collaboration through the ICG outweigh the risks involved. The
observation by the Committee that it had not received any evidence of benefits may reflect the
circumstances of that particular inquiry. It may also point to the benefits of research and
analysis that looks at both benefits and risks of watchdog collaboration and to the importance
of communicating the benefits of collaborations along with how the risks are being addressed.
4.3 Efficiency
A number of the examples have a sole or complementary purpose of improving efficiency. In
general terms, these benefits arise from a greater consistency of approach by watchdogs and
providing agencies with guidance that is integrated rather than fragmented. Having a single
reference point for agencies reduces the administrative burden on them.
For instance, there are efficiency benefits arising from the ICG meetings by preventing
unnecessary duplication and administrative burdens that could arise from the watchdogs
fulfilling their roles in isolation. Events launching the products are well attended and receive
positive feedback from the public sector leaders and managers who attend.
31
Similarly, the coordinated awareness-raising events in regional WA reduce administrative
burdens for the public sector by bringing together information from the watchdogs involved in
a single event and are more cost effective for the watchdogs by sharing costs. They are
characterised on the intensity spectrum as ‘low’.
Two watchdogs planning concurrent investigations might usefully coordinate their work to
avoid duplication. This appeared to be the case for the two reports on suicide as it is not
evident that there was significant interaction between the two watchdogs beyond using ICG
processes to be informed about each other’s investigations and to consider the implications of
expected tabling dates. This example is characterised on the intensity spectrum as ‘low’, with
the main communication being about each watchdog understanding the scope and timing of
the other’s investigation to avoid duplication. Through the concurrent investigations broader
coverage of suicide issues was provided through very different approaches to the issue.
In a review of functions of the CCYP the Joint Standing Committee on the Commissioner for
Children and Young People reported that early in her term the CCYP:
had not conducted any special inquiries due to her wish not to duplicate the functions or
inquiries of other authorities such as the Ombudsman or the Auditor General. Using the Auditor
General’s 2008 performance examination of the juvenile justice system as an example, the
Commissioner advised that she had contemplated an inquiry in this area, but had chosen not to
proceed. Instead, the Commissioner used the information in the Auditor General’s report ‘to
advocate to relevant government agencies about what action they might need to take’ (JSCCCYP
2012: 117).
There is a wider overlap of interests, with the Ombudsman having the role of handling
complaints including from children and young people, and the CCYP having an interest in the
accessibility of complaint handling systems for children and young people. To this end the CCYP
issued generic guidelines in 2009 to help businesses and organisations develop better, childfriendly complaints systems, and updated these in 2013 “about ways complaints systems can
be made more accessible and responsive to children and young people and those that care for
them” (CCYP 2013). The Commissioner has recorded that the guidelines were developed in
consultation with the Ombudsman (JSCCCYP 2012: 142).
In a review of the functions of the CCYP the Joint Standing Committee noted that the CCYP Act
requires the Commissioner to ‘take reasonable steps to avoid the duplication of functions
performed by other government agencies’. It also noted the Commissioner’s advice that:
the state Ombudsman already has a role in relation to individual complaints, and the state
Ombudsman can drill down to that level, and the state Ombudsman also can on his own motion
initiate a more systemic inquiry arising from those individual cases. From time to time,
individual complaints are referred to me and I refer them to the Ombudsman. I have referred
particular issues to the Ombudsman and I have asked him to consider not only the individual
issues, but whether a more systemic issue arises (2012: 14).
The Committee indicated that it “appreciates the need to improve agency efficiency by
reducing the duplication of functions” (2012: 141) but considered that there were
potential gaps in the existing complaint processes and concluded that CCYP should have as a
32
discretionary function the ability to investigate individual complaints “as an agent of last
resort” (2012: 144).
It also noted the Ombudsman’s comments in evidence given to the Committee that where
multiple agencies have an interest in an issue they have to ensure that the situation is as
efficient as possible and that “[c]iting the Integrity Coordinating Group as an example, the
Ombudsman explained that ‘good communication and ongoing good communications is the
principal source of alleviating those sorts of issues” (2012: 146).
A 2013 PSC review of the CCYP Act 2006 considered these issues further and recommended
that the CCYP be able to receive child abuse complaints from children and young people, or
adults, and to refer the complaints to the relevant investigative authority but should not have a
role in investigating the substance of individual complaints that are received (2013b: 88).
4.4 Managing risks
In seeking to make gains in effectiveness and efficiency through collaboration, watchdogs also
face risks that need to be managed to reduce the likelihood of sub-optimal results. These are
discussed here in terms of independence; acting within remit; ability to oversight each other;
keeping Parliament informed; recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration; and
developing the capacity of watchdogs to collaborate.
Independence:
Each of the watchdogs is created under legislation that requires them to implement their
functions independent of any influences that may be applied to them by the government of the
day and provides only a few circumstances where some of them may receive requests or
directions from a Minister. They should also implement their functions independent of any
public sector agencies and of any other watchdogs. It is evident that successive holders of the
statutory watchdog roles have been very focussed on maintaining this independence.
The informal nature of the ICG means that any member can withdraw at any time so that there
can be immediate relief if a watchdog has concerns about the effect of participation on their
independence. This can be contrasted with the statutory role for the three watchdogs who are
also State Records Commissioners who would have no relief should they believe that
participating in the functions of the Commission weakened their independence in any way.
As State Records Commissioners it is possible that they would have knowledge through their
watchdog role that assists them in understanding issues coming before them and that
potentially they do not have the authority to share the specific information with their fellow
Commissioners. The bringing of expert knowledge to the State Records Commission may have
been a consideration in making the three watchdogs Commissioners. In the other direction, as
watchdogs they might at some point have a role of assessing their own contribution to the
work of the Commission in fulfilling their watchdog functions. It would appear that these
potential conflicts were not of sufficient concern to prevent Parliament assigning the three
watchdogs the roles of State Records Commissioners or limiting their jurisdiction in relation the
Commission.
33
Acting within remit
A specific concern raised by the Chief Justice about the work of the ICG is that it may see the
watchdogs acting beyond their respective statutes. The specific example raised was the
creation of a definition of integrity by the ICG when it is not a term defined in any of the
watchdogs’ statutes. He commented that:
I do not mean to suggest that there is any particular component of the proposed definition of
integrity, or the enunciated qualities of public administration to which objection should be
taken. It is, however, of some concern to me that these statutory agencies have banded
together to promulgate definitions of conduct and standards of behaviour which are separate
and distinct from the language used in the statutes creating their agencies, and which defines
their separate jurisdictions. (Martin 2013: 39).
The Chief Justice clarified that he raised this point as
a response to various suggestions made over the last 10 years or so to the effect that various
statutory agencies with different functions and responsibilities should be collectively regarded
as a fourth arm of government, united in the discharge of a shared responsibility. It appears to
me that there may be significant dangers in this proposition, including the risk of distraction
from the specific language used by the Parliament in conferring functions upon each agency,
and in defining the standards to be applied and observed by each agency. (Martin 2013: 40).
In effect, the Chief Justice’s concerns can be summarised as integrity agencies acting beyond
their remit. In response, Wheeler points to the ICG definition of integrity as having no legal
standing other than as a generalised statement, and that while the statutes do not in
themselves contain standards of conduct, other statutes might be interpreted as providing
standards of conduct that apply to the watchdogs (such as the PSM Act and PID Act) and that
there is little effective difference between the ICG definition and relevant language in the
statutes (Wheeler 2014: 750-751).
Oversighting each other
Under their respective statutes, WA watchdogs have mandates that include oversighting each
other. A summary of this mutual oversight across eight watchdogs derived largely from Martin
(2013)20 21 is that as a watchdog, the:
Auditor General audits all the other watchdogs and is itself independently audited
Ombudsman has coverage over the PSC, Auditor General and CCYP in relation to their
functions as CEO or Chief Employee;
Information Commissioner has coverage over the Public Sector Commission and CCYP;
Public Sector Commissioner can undertake reviews or special inquiries of all the
watchdogs or their offices;22
Inspector of Custodial Services does not oversight other watchdogs;
Corruption and Crime Commission has standard oversight roles other than for the
Parliamentary Inspector of the CCC and itself;
20
Martin notes that the tabulation “is not conclusive or an exhaustive account” (Martin 2013: 42).
The mandate of the CCYP was not addressed in the Martin 2013 tabulation (or text).
22
The PSC powers to monitor and report on compliance with the public sector principles of the PSM Act and to
investigate under section 24 of the PSM Act do not apply to the Auditor General.
21
34
Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission has coverage over the
CCC; and
Commissioner for Children and Young People has powers to examine all watchdogs in
relation to matters affecting children and young people.
Given this web of oversight, the question arises of whether collaboration of watchdogs might
constrain their ability to oversight each other. The JSCCC raised this as a concern for the CCC’s
ability to oversight the other members of the ICG based on a review in Queensland that raised
concerns of conflicts of interest. The Committee gave weight to the view expressed by the
Commissioner of the CCC that “this risk was minimised because ‘we are the subject of a great
deal of oversight. It is hard to imagine a body that has more oversight than us’”. It found that
the CCC “is subject to greater structural independent oversight than the other Integrity
Coordinating Group agencies” (JSCCC 2014: 23). However, it did not make findings or express a
specific view on whether the risk was sufficient to require any specific action. It did in the
immediate context of this analysis make two recommendations that:
The Corruption and Crime Commission should consider whether it would be more
effective for it to have stand-alone meetings with relevant Integrity Coordinating Group
agencies, as required … [and]
While it continues to participate in the Integrity Coordinating Group, the Corruption
and Crime Commission should include its activities and associated costs of this
involvement in its annual report (2014: 24).
The first would not seem to mitigate any concerns about the risk of reduced ability to oversight
the other watchdogs, while the second adds a transparency requirement that might be seen as
mitigating the risk.
4.5 Wider implications/Future prospects
In deciding whether to adopt a collaborative approach a basic consideration is whether the
benefits outweigh the costs. In cases where the legislation requires collaboration this decision
does not arise, but in all cases where collaborative approaches are being implemented,
decisions are being made about how this is achieved. However, there is no established
assessment process to underpin such decisions, and they are primarily a matter of judgment
within the framework set by legislation. For watchdogs, this means that at times their
judgement may be called into question.
In considering the wider implications of collaboration, we consider the nature of overlap
between watchdogs, the effect of watchdog collaboration on diversity, accountability and
governance, and recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration.
Overlap between watchdogs
The coming together of five watchdogs in Western Australia under the banner of integrity
suggests they have much in common. To encompass the various functions of the five
watchdogs a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘integrity’ is required. The definition
developed by the ICG includes earning and sustaining public trust by serving the public interest
and using powers responsibly (ICG nd(2)) whereas everyday use of the term may suggest a
narrower focus on honesty. The common interest of the ICG members might be interpreted as
building the capacity of the sector to act with integrity as broadly defined.
35
The examples of collaboration identified in this project suggests there is significant overlap of
functions and interests but this view could be missing the important differences in approach in
areas where there is an apparent overlap. For instance, in looking at youth suicide the
Ombudsman built on the information generated by his child-death review function whereas the
Auditor General’s investigation adopted what can be interpreted as a managerial perspective
on the implementation of a broad strategy, focused on success in delivering sustainable action
and governance and implementation approaches.
Notwithstanding this view, there are other areas where overlap has been clearly recognised as
an issue such as the grey areas in the reporting of misconduct under the recent amendments
that have created the CCM Act 2003.
Effects of collaboration on diversity
Parliaments have distributed roles across several watchdogs in recognition of their different
functions, practices in other jurisdictions and circumstances at the time of their creation. It is
unclear if distributing the responsibilities in this way limits the influence of each in the
Parliament and the community because there are multiple contributors to integrity and
accountability, or if by contrast it increases the influence of each because their individual roles
are recognised and respected.
Alternative views on the effects of collaboration by watchdogs can be made by contrasting the
view that coordinated watchdog operations may substantially enhance the impact and effect of
powers given to any one agency with the view that a collaborative exercise of powers may go
beyond what was contemplated by Parliament (see page 3, Martin 2013: 37-38). The potential
to enhance watchdog impact through collaboration is limited by some of the confidentiality
provisions of their legislation and the absence of provisions to enable specific types of
collaboration. If Parliament had concerns that in certain contexts it wanted more or less
collaboration between watchdogs, then there are opportunities for it to consider whether
there are reasons to change the legislation concerned. As already indicated above,
collaboration between watchdogs has been an area of active interest by WA Parliamentary
Committees.
While overlap in watchdog roles is the starting point for most collaborations, it is not
necessarily the case that eliminating overlaps is a desirable or practical goal. In this regard, the
Chief Justice has warned that:
[d]ifficult issues can arise when endeavouring to minimise the extent of this overlap by defining
the jurisdiction of the respective agencies in such a way that they are mutually exclusive (Martin
2011: 19).
It is not evident that any of the examples of collaboration identified above point to a need to
review legislation to constrain watchdogs’ powers to collaborate. To the contrary, it is
reasonable to ask whether Parliament enabling greater collaboration between watchdogs
would benefit Parliament and the community. While there has been little focus on harmonising
the legislation for members of the ICG and that the same is true of other Australian
jurisdictions (Wheeler 2014: 748) this should not deter a consideration of the circumstances
36
where legislation might enable greater collaboration. This has occurred through amendments
to the legislation for the Commonwealth, Queensland and Tasmanian Auditors General,
including provisions for joint audits. The WA Parliament has recently addressed a specific
overlap issue by enabling a joint notification system involving the PSC and the CCC through the
CCM Act and extending provisions that specifically authorise cooperation and the exchange of
information. On this basis, there could be benefits in the WA Parliament reviewing the issue
broadly across all its watchdogs.
To the extent that value was placed by the Parliament on the diversity of approaches and
cultures in different watchdogs, a question that arises is whether collaboration between
watchdogs might be leading to convergence in approaches and a loss of diversity. The way that
organisations adopt similar structures or practices is described as institutional isomorphism.
Possible influencing factors include a common legal environment and pressures arising from
performance measures, and from professionalisation and cross-organisational professional
networks (Jacobs and Jones 2009: 17). There are also strong influences of professional culture
in maintaining differences between watchdogs (Wilkins 2012). Any loss of diversity through
collaboration between watchdogs therefore warrants consideration as collaborations are
planned and implemented.
Accountability
Watchdog accountability is provided through a wide range of measures, including annual
reports to parliament, oversight by parliamentary committees and being audited by the
Auditor General (Wheeler 2014: 748). There are different views on whether there are
sufficient appropriate accountability measures for collaboration between watchdogs. Much
will depend on the roles of the watchdogs and the nature of the collaborations.
The Chief Justice has expressed concern about the lack of transparency and mechanisms to
review actions by watchdogs. His view is that accountability to Parliamentary committees is not
sufficient as “…their practical capacity to oversee the actions of these agencies in individual
cases is very limited” and that because of exemptions from the FOI Act an aggrieved person
“will face significant practical difficulties in gathering sufficient evidentiary material to attract
the interest of a parliamentary committee” (Martin 2013:23-24).
The PSC in a submission to a Public Accounts Committee Inquiry into Amendments to the Public
Sector Management Act 1994 helpfully describes the numerous transparency and
accountability arrangements for his position in terms of accountability as Commissioner and as
CEO, and to Parliament and the Courts (2013: 51-53). Similar arrangements, with variations,
would apply to the other watchdogs. There has not however been an analysis of the
accountability arrangements for collaboration between watchdogs.
The report of the Inquiry into Amendments to the Public Sector Management Act 1994
reviewed committee oversight of WA watchdogs and noted that while there are specific
committees oversighting the Auditor General, the CCC and the CCYP there is no committee
nominated for the PSC. It recommended that a mechanism be established to ensure the PSC “is
subject to regular oversight through the parliamentary committee system” (Public Accounts
Committee 2014: 162). While making other references to the Chief Justice’s Whitmore lecture
the report did not address specifically his comments regarding the oversight capacity of
37
committees or concerns about accountability for collaboration by the PSC with other
watchdogs.
A consideration of accountability for any of the examples of collaboration described in section
3 above would need to start with an analysis of the need for and nature of any additional
accountability arrangements. For instance, given the nature of ICG meetings and products,
what is the need for additional transparency beyond what is provided on the ICG website? The
communication at meetings and associated costs are not of a nature or scale that would
warrant additional reporting requirements in any equivalent public sector setting. The
expenditures of each of the participating watchdogs are too small to warrant reporting as a line
item in each of their annual reports. Similarly, the ICG products are not of a nature or scale that
would warrant additional reporting requirements – they are available on the ICG website and
widely publicised in the public sector, and some watchdog Annual Reports also make mention
of them. The equivalent of the ICG products would be available from agency websites and
might be mentioned in agency annual reports in equivalent public sector settings, although this
would not be a requirement.
One option could be for the ICG to produce its own annual report, but if this is understood to
be equivalent to the Annual Report of a statutory body it would appear to be disproportionate
for a non-statutory body which is based on participation by choice and does not receive or
manage its own funds. The combined expenditure of the participating watchdogs is too small to
warrant separate reporting and it would appear that the progressive disclosure of ICG products
and activities on its website creates an adequate level of disclosure.
Given the transparency provided by the ICG website and with all of the ICG members being
able to be called before Parliament to give evidence it is not evident that the ICG collaboration
and the current disclosure arrangements undermine relationships with Parliament and its
committees.
However, given the recommendation by the JSCCC for the CCC to include in its annual report
details of the activities and associated costs of its involvement in the ICG (2014: 24) there might
be merit in the ICG collectively providing additional overview information on its activities on its
website with individual watchdogs continuing to decide how they report in their Annual
Reports on their involvement in the ICG.
Governance
In most respects the watchdog collaboration arrangements are informal and do not require
formal governance arrangements. One arrangement that does involve elements of governance
is the existence of non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between two watchdogs
being used to record understandings achieved between watchdogs.
An example of such an MoU is one between the CCYP and the Ombudsman relating to
complaints from children and young people. It is said to provide for “the
sharing of information about individual matters and systemic issues” (JSCCCYP 2012: 61).
A review of Queensland’s Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 was critical of the existence of MoUs
between watchdogs, commenting that:
38
[i]t is an indication to us of a lack of clarity in the statutory framework that the various units of
public administration think it is necessary or desirable for them to carve out for themselves
agreements about where their agreed functions lie (Callinan and Aroney 2013: 144).
By contrast, while other concerns about collaboration were raised by the Joint Standing
Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission in its 2014 report, it implicitly accepted
their existence, recommending that the CCC:
should review its Memorandum of Understanding with the Ombudsman to ensure that it
remains current, relevant and minimises the probability of duplication between the agencies
(JSCCC 2014: 21).
It is hard to see that capturing in writing non-binding understandings between watchdogs
weakens their independence or their relationship with Parliament. However, in the interests of
accountability it would appear that they should be made publicly available on the websites of
the watchdogs involved.
Recognising and overcoming barriers to collaboration
It is evident that the primary barrier to many forms of collaboration between watchdogs are
the statutory provisions that require them to be independent, their different roles and powers
and secrecy provisions.
This is most evident in relation to undertaking joint investigations that in certain circumstances
may have the potential for better quality and impact than an investigation undertaken by one
watchdog in isolation.
In the context of federal-provincial programs in Canada the case was made for joint audits
particularly given the benefits to taxpayers and the public, but barriers identified included that
performance audit practices can vary significantly among audit offices and what was described
as a ‘fixation on independence’ (Mayne 2010).
Barriers to joint audits have been identified in interviews with Australian auditors as including:
information sharing restrictions, and administrative and personnel issues that could arise when
composing an inter-jurisdictional team. Questions about which legislation team members would
work under, which set of rules would they be held accountable to, and by whom they would be
paid, were all identified (Gerald 2015: 406).
Gerald concluded that barriers to cooperative audits in Australia relate:
primarily to priorities, resources, secrecy provisions, and timing, and are consistent with those
and others identified in the literature and the survey. The latter two — secrecy provisions and
timing — appear to be the easiest to resolve through legislation amendments and the
demonstration of flexibility by audit agencies with respect to their timing and tabling programs
(Gerald 2015: 419).
Similarly, former Australian Auditor General Ian McPhee observed that
39
confidentiality provisions in most audit legislation in Australian jurisdictions (including at the
Commonwealth level) constrain the sharing of client information between audit offices
and that the exceptions were:
Queensland where legislation provides that the Auditor-General is able to disclose information
to the Commonwealth and other state Auditors-General where an audit is conducted jointly or
in collaboration with another Auditor-General; and Tasmania where legislation gives the
Auditor-General the authority to carry out an audit on behalf of or in collaboration with the
Auditor-General of the Commonwealth or another state or territory if the Auditor-General
reasonably believes the Commonwealth or that state or territory has an interest in the audit
(McPhee 2012: 4).
It is therefore evident that while there are significant institutional barriers to collaboration
between watchdogs many of these could, if there was a strong case, be removed by legislative
change
In addition to institutional barriers, it is also important for watchdogs to have the capacity to
collaborate. Networking can be an important means of creating a culture of collaboration.
Unstructured communications between watchdogs were not identified as a category in section
3 because of practical difficulties in documenting their nature and frequency. However, their
importance should not be underestimated in providing for greater effectiveness, with the
sharing of general information and ideas through these channels supporting the work of each
of the watchdogs. The structured meetings of the ICG provide a foundation for networking and
help to embed a culture of collaboration.
5. Conclusion
While theoretical considerations of watchdog independence may point to being wary of
collaboration, a focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the oversight system highlights the
benefits of collaboration. The analysis in this report indicates that WA watchdogs are very
vigilant about protecting their independence but are also open to collaboration supported by
identification and management of the risks involved. While different perspectives have
emerged from parliamentary committee inquiries the Parliament has been both cautious and
innovative in its responses to overlap between watchdog roles and authorising a wide range of
collaborative practices.
The analytic frameworks developed here provide substantially different perspectives on
collaboration from those developed for the general public sector. For instance, there is a strong
emphasis for the general public sector on issues such as the role of lead agencies, formal
agreements and leadership (Wilkins et al 2015) whereas between watchdogs communication is
the dominant form of collaboration (see Table 1). This is in part due to the particular
responsibilities of watchdogs but it may be useful to reflect some of the learnings back into
research into collaboration in the general public sector. For instance, the use of a scale of
degree of integration to classify the examples of watchdog collaboration could be applied in
the general public sector as a complement to the commonly used frameworks based around
networking, coordination, cooperation and collaboration.
It might be possible in subsequent work on watchdog collaboration to develop and validate
40
with independent assessors a more finely grained spectrum of collaboration with more levels
than simply low, medium and high. This would avoid confounding the features of coordination,
cooperation and collaboration developed in the literature with the dictionary meanings of the
terms. The spectrum could be for the generic attribute of degree of integration as developed
above, or could be based separately on integration and/or other characteristics including the
extent to which activities are altered or to which a common purpose is served, the extent of
mutual benefit and others. Further research could also identify systematically the intended
purposes and benefits of watchdog collaborations and use this as the basis of a structured
approach to assessing the contribution of collaboration to what has been achieved.
Extending the research to cover the rest of Australia and New Zealand would provide a much
richer data set to enrich understandings of the potential and limitations of collaboration
between watchdogs to assist Parliaments, watchdogs and the community to better understand
current practices and opportunities to enhance effectiveness and efficiency.
41
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49
Appendix A: Banksia Hill Detention Centre Case Study
A major disturbance at the Banksia Hill Detention Centre (BHDC) in January 2013 led to
coordinated action involving the Inspector of Custodial Services (ICS) and Auditor General in
separate investigations, and other concurrent forms of involvement in the issues by the
Ombudsman and Commissioner for Children and Young People (CCYP).
The ICS was directed by the Minister for Corrective Services to conduct a review into the major
incident that occurred at BHDC. The terms of reference included “the context of the incident
and its contributing or causal factors; security infrastructure and practices; the adequacy of
emergency management planning and responses; and the subsequent housing of detainees at
Hakea Prison” (2013:v). The Inspector commented that:
[c]ontemporaneously with this review the Auditor General conducted a performance audit of
the project to redevelop Banksia Hill in the period from 2009 to 2012. His audit was fully
independent of my Inquiry but the findings of the two reports are consistent in every respect
(OICS 2013:v).
He made clear that:
For reasons of efficiency, there was a small amount of data and information sharing between OI
CS and OAG. It was also considered sensible to release the two reports together. Tabling of the
reports at the same time seeks to provide Parliament with a greater context and a more
rounded view of developments at the facility. The OAG findings have proved to be consistent in
every respect with those of this Inquiry and in that sense, the reports provide valuable mutual
validation. However, the two reviews were conducted fully independently. The OAG report is
separately published and stands in its own right (OICS 2013:9).
Sources used by the ICS were identified as including:
 a 2008 report by the Auditor General: The Juvenile Justice System: Dealing with Young
People under the Young Offenders Act 1994;
 the work of the Ombudsman Western Australia; and
 the work of the Commissioner for Children and Young People including a paper
published during the course of this review (OICS 2013:13).
The Auditor General investigated the management of a $30 million capital works project to
increase the capacity of the BHDC. The report commented that:
[t]he ICS felt that the incident in January 2013 may be related to the redevelopment project at
BHDC. Based on an assessment against our topic selection criteria, the Auditor General decided
to conduct a performance audit of the BHDC redevelopment project. The ICS’ review and our
audit were conducted fully independently and the reports are separately tabled and stand alone
(OAG 2013:7)
and made the point that “[t]ogether the two reports provide Parliament with a fuller
picture, however both were conducted independently” (OAG 2013:13).
50
Staff of the Ombudsman attended Banksia Hill soon after the riot and provided assistance to
the young people in detention. They also attended the adult prison (Hakea) which housed the
Banksia Hill detainees following the riot. They were there to:



Observe conditions at Banksia Hill and Hakea;
Meet with staff and detainees; and
Provide an opportunity for detainees to make complaints to the Office if they wished to do
so (Ombudsman Western Australia 2013: 36).
The Ombudsman provided relevant information to the Inspector of Custodial Services as part of
the Inspector’s Directed Review of the incident at Banksia Hill (Ombudsman Western Australia
2013: 36). He also provided specific support to the ICS review through the secondment of his
Principal Legal and Investigating Officer to the Office of the Inspector for the duration of the
Inspector’s inquiry (Ombudsman Western Australia 2013 p36). The Inspector expressed
appreciation for this assistance in the report (OICS 2013:150).
The Commissioner for Children and Young People (CCYP) made a submission to the ICS review
noting that “[t]he Commissioner has made ongoing and consistent representations, advocating
for changes to the youth justice system to promote better outcomes for children and young
people” including having commissioned a research a paper on youth justice in WA, and
published an issues paper on youth justice, published several policy briefs on matters relating
to youth justice and has continued to advocate through submissions and speeches for
improvements to youth justice in WA” (CCYP 2013:2). The submission referred to the Auditor
General’s 2008 performance examination of the youth justice system.
The submission also observed that following the incident:
… [t]he Commissioner met with and wrote to the Commissioner for Corrective Services on a
number of occasions expressing her concern about the wellbeing of children and young people
who were in detention … The Commissioner also spoke with and wrote to the Ombudsman
Western Australia on a number of occasions:
 to advise that complaints that had been received from parents and other interested
parties
 to enquire what mechanisms and strategies were in place for the Ombudsman to
receive complaints from young people and their parents and
 to request that the Ombudsman conduct an investigation into the visiting restrictions
that have been imposed on children and young people at Hakea Prison.
Following the Commissioner’s representations, both the Ombudsman Western Australia and the
Department of Corrective Services designated a specific contact person for complaints regarding
the Banksia Hill incident. The contact details of these officers were forwarded to those
individuals and organisations who made contact with the Commissioner’s office regarding
specific concerns (CCYP 2013:13).
The ICS acknowledged receipt of the submission in his report (OICS 2013: 150).
The CCYP also released four media statements relating to youth justice subsequent to the
submission to the ICS review:
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1 May 2013: Diversion programs and improved collaboration key in youth justice.
2 Jul 2013: Concern over delays in returning young people to Banksia Hill.
7 Aug 2013: Action on youth justice urgently required.
21 Aug 2013: Independent person required to ensure young people are safely returned
to Banksia Hill.
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