•
CHAPTER THREE
Constitutional Monarchy in Cambodia
This chapter examines the existing issues and concerns about the constitutional
monarchy in Cambodia.
Cambodia has been a monarchy from 1970-93.
In 1970, General Lon Nol
removed Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and declared Cambodia a republic. IJ.1
•
late 1940s, became a constitutional monarchy from being an absolute monarchy (Rainsy,
2008). King Sihanouk first took the throne in 1941 and led the country to independence
from France in 1953. He abdicated in 1955 to take direct control of the government, but
was ousted in 1970 by Gen. Lon Nol, who established a republic. I
On September 24, 1993, with the promulgation of new constitution, monarchy
was restored, and general elections were organised under the supervision of the United
Nations. Sihanouk, after becoming king again in 1993, became the protector of the
constitution who respected the constitution and the advised the government on important
national issues. He spoke about the "national reconciliation and the protection of human
rights, often taking the government to task when he feels that the rights of ordinary
Cambodians are threatened".
2
"CPP-SRP coalition may threaten Cambodia's monarchy: Ranariddh", Asian Political News, Phnom Penh,
and 11 February, 2002.
I
Julio A Jeldres, "Cambodia's monarchy, 10 years on", Asia Times Online. 2 October, 2003.
http://www.atimes.com/atimeslSoutheastAsialEJ02Ae04.html.
-
2
70
He enjoyed "respect and popularity, particularly with rural population for
•
providing them with food, accommodation, money and clothes when they visited capital
to see him. He wrote about various issues such as, deforestation, poverty, corruption, the
partiality of the judicial system, landless fmmers, the pillage of Cambodian antiquities,
land-grabbing, Cambodia's borders and political developments.
3
leldres commented that Cambodia is the "only monarchy in the world where the
most senior official of the royal palace is not only an elected member of the Nai:ional
Assembly but also a member of both the Politburo and the Central Committee of the
ruling Cambodian People's Party. In the past, the minister of the royal palace did not
belong to any political party and was strongly qualified to provide the necessary support
and advice the monarch requires". He further commented that the critics a!e th~ opinion
"-
'd'-"
".-'- .
that the "king was isolated
in
his
palace
and
has
lost
the
direct
contact
he
used
to
have
.
,
.
.
•
with-his people when, in the 1950s and '60s, he spent most of his time visiting every
corner of the kingdom, opening clinics, dispensaries,
hospitals, schools and colleges".
4
According to the Cambodian Infonnation Center, "The monarchy is the supreme
administrative body and symbol of legitimacy, sovereignty and independence of the
country".
,.
In order to understand the background of the Constitutional Monarchy, it is
imperative to discuss its historical background briefly.
Many Kings, queens, and usurpers who had illegally seized the throne have ruled
Cambodia since the first century. They declared themselves as legitimate rulers in order
to maintain their legitimacy, recognition, and control over the people. The Thai and
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
71
,
Vietnamese conquerors, in an attempt to occupy Cambodia, placed many kings and
queens on Throne from 16th-19th centuries.
5
•
In 1863, the French protectorate preserved the throne for King Ang Duong and his
dynasty. They were aware of the fact that without the help from monarchy, they would
not be able to rule Cambodia. The monarchy helped to legitimize the French rule, and
facilitated the French in establishing relationship between the French administrators and
the common people.
6
-
In 1970s, Pol Pot used King Sihanouk's popularity to mobilized.. poor Eeasants in
---'
--
...,... .
-.-'..-....
-
.
his revolutionary movement to gain power in 1975. However, soon after gaining power,
he house arrested Sihanouk and his family members, and some of royal family members
were killed or starved to death. 7 Even in 1979, the Communist Vietnam installed their
own government to rule the country, which lacked legitimacy as the UN and the
.--
international communities did not recognize this govemment. In 1990, Vietnam -withdrew
.
.
,
its troops from the country and the UN conducted first democratic elections. The Excommunist Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen lost the 1993 election to the Royalist Party
(FUNCINPEC), and to save his power, "Hun Sen proclaimed himself as a faithful
royalist and even became an adopted son of King Sihanouk. At the same time, he
threatened the civil war if Prince Ranariddh refused to share power with him".
Prince Ranariddh accepted to form a coalition government to avoid a civil war.
The new coalition government was fOJ med under a co-premiership of Prince Ranariddh
and Hun Sen. Once again, Sihanouk was crowned as a constitutional monarch. However,
this time, the constitution put a limit on his powers. Pol Pot and Hun Sen consolidated all
power, Sihanouk's constitutional power, and used him as a tool to legitimize Hun Sen's
"Legitimacy and Monarchy in Cambodia", Cambodian Information Center, 3 January, 2008.
http://www.cambodia.org/blogs/editorialsI2008/01/legitimacy-and-monarchy-in-cambodia.html.
5
6 ·b·d
I I .
7
Ibid.
72
rule. Because of his frustration, sense of powerlessness, and misuse of his constitutional
powers by Hun Sen, King abdicated his throne in 2004. His son Prince Sihamony
succeeded him
8
•
Thus, many scholars argue that Cambodian monarchy is a weak institution, which
fails to represent an ultimate source of power that can help to protect national
sovereignty, stability, and democracy, despite the fact that the constitution has granted
the power to the king. An example of weak monarchy is the bloody coup launched by
Hun Sen to oust Prince Ranariddh from power in 1997. Hun Sen ignored King Sihanouk's
request to resolve the issue with peaceful negotiation. He deprived the King from using
his
constitut~o~~_:~d
¥
'
used him "[a]s a rubber stamp and shield to legitimize his
dictatorship". Many condemned Hun Sen for launching a coup against the king, and
ignoring the constitutional monarchy, which is based on democratic principle.
9
Contemporary Issues of Concern about Constitutional Monarchy
"The royalist FUNCINPEC party, which Sihanouk established before becoming
king again in 1993, when the monarchy was reinstalled, has been the CPP's coalition
partner since a 1993 election organized by the United Nations". 10 "Cambodia's royal
succession is not hereditary, and King Sihanouk has no power to appoint a successor.
Unoer the 1993 Constitution, a successor must be chosen by a nine-member "throne
.
council," which is dominated by allies of Hun Sen". I I
The 1993 Constitution has been criticised by the king for the reason of not
according the Monarch with adequate powers. According to the king, Article 7 of the
g
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
"CPP-SRP coalition may threaten Cambodia's monarchy: Ranariddh", Asian Political News, Phnom
Penh, 11 February, 2002.
10
II
Ibid.
73
Constitution specifies that the King of Cambodia can reign but not rule. However, Article
17 maintains, "the provision as stated in the first .clause of Article 7, "[t]he King of
Cambodia shall reign but shall not govern," absolutely shall not be amended. This means,
under no circumstances Article 7 can be amended. This way, on one hand, the monarchy
is subject to carry out various responsibilities, but on the other hand, it possesses no
powers to execute responsibility. 12
It is imperative to examine important constitutional provisions, which specify the
role and the function of Monarchy.
According to Article 8 of the Constitution, "The King of Cambodia shall be a
symbol of unity and eternity of the nation. The King shall be the guarantor of the national
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the
protector of rights and freedom for all citizens and the guarantor of international treaties".
According to Article 9, "The King shall assume the august role of arbitrator to
ensure the faithful execution of public powers."
Article 23 asserts, "The King is the Supreme Commander of the Royal Khmer
Armed Forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Khmer Armed Forces shall be
appointed to command the Royal Khmer Armed Forces. As per Article 24, "[T]he King
shall serve as Chaiiman of the Supreme Council of National Defense to be established by
law. The King shall declare war after approval of the National Assembly".
Article 132 states, ''The initiative to review or to amend the Constitution shall be
the prerogative of the King, the Prinie Minister, and the President of the Assembly at the
suggestion of 114 of all the assembly members. Revision or amendments shall be enacted
by a Constitution law passed by the Assembly with a 2/3 majority vote". This clearly
Sam Rainsy, "Monarchy in Cambodia- A contemporary outlook, The Internationallnstitutefor
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Phnom Penh, 11 September, 2004.
12
74
suggests that the "monarch is guarantor of the independence of the Judiciary to be
assisted by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy" (Rainsy, 2004).
Hay argues, since Cambodian independence in 1953, the political powers of the
country has been the retained in the hands of elites. The provisions made in earlier
consti;io;s to
s~uard rights if citizens have not provided any effective legal checks
on the excessive use of power.
\3
Describing the absence of provisions of checks and balances, Hay asserts that the
Constitution of 1993 "remains little more than a proclamation of intentions". According
to him, "Article 51 stipulates that all powers belong to the people and that they will
exercise these powers through the National Assembly, the Royal Government and the
Judiciary". However, in reality, there no clear-cut separation powers between the three
..
..
.. ,-.......
\....,---~~
-,
branches of
the
government.
"This
can
be
seen
most
clearly
with
regard
to
the
National
.
....
Assembly which was directly elected by the people" (Hay, 1998).
The first National Assembly failed to exercise its legislative powers effectively or
to control the govemment. Assembly members considered no private bill,
and
the
,
government drafted all those legislations, which were passed by the National Assembly.
Assembly never questioned the Prime Minister or any minister. Thus, the National
Assembly became a "rubber stamp of the government" (Hay, 1998).
•
According to Hay: .
While the effectiveness of the National Assembly was undelmined by a
packed legislative schedule and the lack of technical expertise needed to
Lao Mong Hay, "Cambodia's agonizing quest: political progress amidst institutional backwardness",
Conciliation Resources (CR), November 1998. http://www.c-r.org/our-worklaccordlcambodialagonisingquest.php .
13
•
75
draft laws, the real problem was the absence of conditions conducive to
open debate and the blatant disregard by both the CPP and FUNCINPEC
for constitutional procedure. Party leaders regularly suppressed debate on
sensitive issues or delayed the passage of legislation which threatened the
stability of the fragile governing coalition or personal interests.
The
generally tense political climate did not favour the creation of other bodies
intended to serve as checks and balances on the use of power. The
National Congress during the 1950s and early 1960s was an annual openair meeting at which the popUlation received government reports and
raised issues of concern with their government. In the 1990s it could have
served as an outlet for popular grievances, and as a way for the people to
interact directly with their representatives, but it has never been convened.
Moreover, the purpose of Supreme Council of the Magistracy was to assist
the King in ensuring the independence of the judiciary. However, "the
•
promised refol'mof the judiciary has never come about. Most current
judges were appointed before 1991, more on the basis of their political
loyalty to the CPP than on merit. Few have adequate legal training or are
considered impartial. Moreover, in blatant contravention of constitutional
provisions regarding the separation of powers, the Minister of Justice - a
government official - controls the judiciary" (Hay 1998).
In Hay's opinion, the reason behind this problem was the inability of the King to
guarantee the independence of the judiciary as envisaged in the Constitution. By
interpreting every action of the king as political interference, the government and its
officials "consistently refrained the king from exercising his legitimate powers to the
extent that is possible. Instead, he has been content to make general proclamations calling
for human rights to be respected or expressing his disapproval of unfolding political
events. The King's ability to check abuses of power has thus been greatly undennined and
the monarchy's future role in Cambodia's political life is being called into question" (Hay,
1998).
•
76
Government's attitude towards Monarchy
From the beginning, Hun Sen had been against the king for his interference in the
political affairs ofthe country. To give an example ofking's involvement in the national
politics was his orders of releasing the students who were arrested and brought to trial.
The king asked the government to release those students who were accused of burning
Thai Embassy and caused damage to Thai businesses in the Cambodia, after the anti-Thai
riots in January 2003. Hun Sen directed Sihanouk to stay out of this issue, however, ihe
king was convinced that the students and other people arrested were scapegoats and that
the real culprits were at liberty. Moreover, he promised and gave them amnesty.14
In addition to the ruling CPP, Cambodian elites criticized the King for failing in
his efforts to "rebuild the institution of the
mQnarchy ensuring that it outlasts him".
.
According to-them, "king's acceptance of atop official from the CPPas minister·of the
royal palace had violated the ancient rule that the king is above politics and that the
Ministry of the Royal Palace should be led by a non-political person of recognized
intellectual qualities".
IS
Highlighting the po1)ition of Monruochy after the national election of 2003,
opposition leader Sam Rainsy states that the role of the monarchy was put on the litmus
test during the II-month political deadlock after the elections. None of the three major
parties received two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to fOlm a new
independent government. The FUNCINPEC and the CPP had been a coalition paltner in
the previous two mandates. The opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) joined to fOllu the
Alliance of Democrats, which preferred a new coalition of all three parties. However, a
political deadlock emerged when the Alliance of Democrats demanded the new coalition
government to establish a comprehensive political program for the next mandate. The
Julio A Jeldres, "Cambodia's monarchy, 10 years on", Asia Times Online. 2 October. 2003.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes!Southeast_Asia/EJ02Ae04.html .
14
15
Ibid.
•
77
•
winning CPP, first refused any negotiation, and later maintained that the government be
formed before proceeding to discuss the government programs.
16
The Alliance of Democrats made five fundamental demands and commitments
from the new government:
a. elimination of all border treaties signed in 1979 and in the 1980s,
b. Control of illegal immigration,
c. judicial refonn,
d. refOlm of the National Election Committee, and
e. anti-corruption measure. (Rainsy, 2004)
According to Rainsy, "the ruling party, CPP, does not have a respectable track
deadlock
severely
violated
the
Constitution,
rule
record on the four issues". The political
.
.
oflaw, and democratic principles. It created mistrust among the members of the National
Assembly of the two ruling parties. Because of which leaders resorted to "a package
vote", and a show-of hands voting system. This system pennitted the president of the
National Assembly and the prime minister to be elected on the same ticket at the same
time. This ''package vote: was contrary to the Constitution which originally required the
election of the National Assembly president prior to getting the vote of confidence on the
new government headed by a prime minister nominee (Rainsy, 2004).
In order to ensure two-thirds majority, the leaders illegally adopted a new article
in the Constitution that allowed a "show-of-hands" voting procedure. This again was in
contradiction to the rule that required a secret ballot. Considering the fact that the
combined number of their elected members of the National Assembly made up more than
80 percent of the Assembly - they would require only 67 percent to respect and comply
with the Constitution - the mistrust among the leaders and members of parliament of the
two ruling parties must have been so deep rooted that they conspired to effect what His
Majesty the King referred to as a "repetitive Constitutional rape". His Majesty seemed to
16
•
Ibid.
78
be so much frustrated with the prolonged deadlock and the violation of the Constitution
•
that he has practically lived in exile for more than half a year, and expressed his wish to
abdicate (Rainsy, 2004).
The issue of abdication
In addition to other provision related to monarch, there is no provision in the
Constitution for a monarch to abdicate. King was reluctant to take over as a monarch
again in 1993, rather, wanted to contest the presidential election. "However, the
intervention of several countries, which were worried that Sihanouk as a powerful
president would act to defend the interests of his own country first, thereby creating
tension with Cambodia's neighbors and instability in the region, led Cambodian
politicians to fOlmalize the restoration of the monarchy with a constitutional monarch
who reigns but does not rule" .. Later, on several occasions, he indicated that he would
.
.
"abdicate if a simple majOIity of the membeis of the National Assembly authorized him
to do SO".17
According to the constitution, the King remains the Head of State for life. Article
12 states that "in case of the death of the King, the President of the Assembly shall take
over the responsibility as Acting Head of State". FurtheI more, Article 13 directs that
"within
a period of not more than seven days, the new King of the Kingdom of Cambodia
..
shall be chosen by the Royal Council of the Throne. The Royal Council of the Throne
shall consist of: -The President of the National Assembly -The Prime Minister -Samdech
the Chiefs of the Orders of Mohanikay and Thammayut -The First and Second VicePresidents of the Assembly. The organization and functioning of the Council of the
Throne shall be detennined by law" (Rainsy, 2004).
The king's constitutional monarch is not allowed to get involved in the
appointment of ministers. The selection of is made by the govemment. "In the last
coalition government between the.FUNCINPEC and the CPP, the royalists did not raise
17
•
Ibid.
79
the issue of the Ministry of the Royal Palace during the discussions leading to the
formation of the coalition and seemed content with leaving things as they were". 18
•
According to Jeldres, "Cambodia has a non-hereditary monarchy. The Council of
the Crown, which has not yet been properly established, as the National Assembly has
never passed the legislation that makes it operative, elects the king. Were the king to
abdicate, the president of the Senate, who happens also to be the president of the ruling
CPP, would became regent until a new monarch is elected". Therefore, Hun Sen made it
clear that he can nominate the king for the reason that he controls the membership of the
Council of the Crown. He wanted a king who shared friendly relationship with the CPP,
and did not interfere with the government.
19
According to Rainsy, the Constitution makes no reference of abdication that can
provide relief to the King of "the perceived heavy burden besides death". Therefore, the
---
-
King-is deplived of deciding his future. It is for this reason the opposition demands a·
constitutional amendment, or a liberal interpretation of the relevant articles. He said that
the government has not agreed to make this amendment to the Constitution in this matter
of abdication (Rainsy, 2004).
In 2002, the SRP leader Sam Rainsy agreed to fOlln a coalition government with
the CPP, "if his party.- wins enough seats in next year's parliamentary elections". Prince
Norodom Ranariddh expressed that the country's constitutional monarchy system could
be threatened if Prime Minister Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) enters into a
coalition with the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) instead of his FUNCINPEC
royalist party. He said, "When the royalist party becomes a minority, then there would be
a threat against the monarchy system". He speculated that the CPP and SRP would "tum
against the monarchy" after King Sihanouk dies. As far as Sam Rainsy's relationship
18
19
Ibid.
•
Ibid.
80
•
with FUNCINPEC was concerned, he was expelled from the party in 1995, and had
strained ties with the king.
20
,
The king Norodom Sihanouk went into self-imposed exile in January 2004, in
Beijing. He announced his abdication in favor of his son Norodom Sihamoni as a new
king on October 14, 2004. However, Cambodian constitution makes no provision for
abdication. King Sihanouk complained of his marginalisation from the Cambodian
politics, as the politicians had to face hardships to form a government after an
inconclusive election in July 2003. Another concern, he expressed, was the "failure to
fonnalize a nine-member Throne Council which, under the Constitution, should choose
his successor within a week of his death or incapacity". As the Constitution does not
specify the abdication, this "adds to the uncertainty of the moment". Moreover, "the
council was dominated by supporters of Prime Minister Hun Sen, and a change of
monarch would not affect
~~
prime
minister's
grip
on
power"
at
that
time.
"Diplomats
." .
and other analysts said the king could be attempting to force the issue now to ensure the
royal line survives and to secure his own influence in the choice of his successor".21
Then Prime Minister Hun Sen, acting head of state Chea Sim, two top Buddhist
monks and other senior political figures who were loyal to Hun Sen, made up the ninemember throne council. Hun Sen supported King Sihamoni, who he would stay away
from Cambodian politics, unlike Sihanouk, who often interfered in political decisions. It
,"
can be said, "While the reigning monarch used to have great authority", however, the
contemporary monarchy is "largely symbolic and wields no real power".
22
"CPP-SRP coalition may threaten Cambodia's monarchy: Ranariddh", Asian Political News, Phnom
Penh, 11 February, 2002,
20
Mydans Seth, "Abdication by Cambodia's King Throws His Nation into Confusion", The New York
Times, 8 October, 2004,
21
22
"Cambodia Chooses New Monarch", BBC, 14 October 2004,
81
The issue of succession
•
Moreover, there is no constitutional provision over the issue of nominating king's
successor. According to Rainsy, "His Majesty has made plans for the Queen after his
demise; he has bestowed upon royal family members high ranking royal titles. In fact, he
has done just about everything he could for the future of the monarchy, except
nominating his successor. Under the current Constitution, he can not". Rainsy argues that
this issue of succession is of prime importance, which is ignored by the ruling parties.
Although the Constitution allows Royal Council of the Throne to choose a new King,
selection process and a necessary legislation for the Council Administration has not been
established (Article 13).
In Rainsy's words, "The ruling parties explicitly argue that any discussion about
succession while the current Monarch is still alive is most disrespectful to . the King,
-
,
,.
.,
.
which is prohibited under Article 7 of the Constitution". Pointing out the-ruling party's
lack of respect for the constitution, he further states:
As some members of the Royal family are quite active politically and are
involved in different camps, there would be some room for clever
manipulations to keep these active royal members in check politically,
especially when it is an open secret that the royal
members
in
different
.'
camps support different candidates to be the next king. The uncertainty as
to who will be the next king would be sufficient to play one of the camps
against another to maintain their political support. Perhaps a more crucial
matter is the fact that the Constitution simply reflects the country's
tradition of ignoring the importance of succession planning concept. The
Constitution allows only a seven day period for choosing the new King
(Article 13), which could hardly be sufficient for a prudent selection of a
worthy successor. The likelihood is that the new King has not been
"groomed" to bear the burdens of the Throne. The absence of succession
planning has not been confined only to the royal family in line for the
82
throne. In fact, the Cambodian leadership in general, can be characterised
with a short sighted notion that there is no need to have a succession
•
planning. Perhaps, this is in consistence with the concept that the
Cambodian leaders are imposed upon the country, not to serve the nation
responsibly. But the country has suffered beyond the widest imagination
every time there was a leadership change, especially in the past 50 years.
When the then Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed by
the republicans in 1970, the country was subsequently thrown into turmoil
and war. The new leaders in successive regimes did not have sufficient
experience and necessary skill in managing the country; they had not been
trained, and had had no experience as decision-makers, and thus their
demises in 1975 and in 1979 - leading to untold anguish of the people were not entirely unexpected. Millions of Cambodians were either killed
or died unceremoniously .in.. the. past. 50 years due to the lack of
experienced and trained le~d~~s (Rainsy 2008).
Along the same lines, according to Cambodian Information Center, with the
growing weakness of the monarchy, many politicians and foreigners have used the
political ambition and legitimacy".
monarchy as a tool in order to "tl1dr
,..
_.
',"'N'
~-"
,,-
..
••
Rainsy further states:
The demand of Article 7 that the King is inviolable can not unfortunately
secure the respect the King needs, even though it may shield the Monarch
"
.
from an open attack. Any King
needs to rise above politics, and receive
..
support from all politioal persuasions. The current arrangement for
choosing a crown prince may not encompass all political persuasions. The
Royal Council of the Throne, which is charged with the responsibility of
choosing a new King, does not represent all political opinions; for a
democracy based on parliamentary system, it seeks to exclude the
83
opposition's view. The nine-member Council of the Throne consists of the
president and the two vice-presidents of the Senate, the president and the
•
two vice-presidents of the National Assembly, the prime minister, and the
two Buddhist patriarchs. Nevertheless, even with the exclusion of a
political persuasion, it has been a serious concern that the Royal Council
of the Throne may never reach a consensus in choosing the next King.
Hence, there has been a strong push for a simple majority when it comes
to voting for a particular candidate to succeed. Such further exclusion will
mean that the successor would not be likely to rise above politics. Such an
approach implies that securing a successor is far more important than
ensuring that the next King would enjoy support, and hence command
respect, of all political persuasions (Rainsy, 2008).
To conclude, based on above findings, it is suggested that 1993 constitution
..
.
undennines--the glory of the king. It is an important issue of concern, which requires
-.
immediate attention of the government.
We can say that Cambodia's monarchy has changed significantly over the years.
Chea Vannath maintains that although Sihanouk remained a powerful and stabilizing
force in Cambodian politics, despite the fact, his powers reduced eventually. He played a
-
-
decisive role in promoting the negotiations ..Paris Peace Agreement in the 1991 .
'-
'
r'
~
Thereafter, following the elections in 1993 and the 1998, he "prevailed upon to resolve
the political deadlock over the fOlmation of the new govemment".23
•
However, Cambodian politics has been perceiving monarchy as a threat, hence,
have made number of efforts to eliminate it. The first successful attempt to eliminate
Sihanouk was overthrowing him in 1970 by his own government. Then, during the
Chea Vannath, "The monarchy's future public role: to reign but not to rule?" in Lao Mong Hay,
Cambodia's agonizing quest: political progress amidst institutional backwardness. Conciliation Resources
(CR), November, 1998. http://www .c-r.orglour-worklaccordlcambodialagonising-quest.php.
13
84
Khmer Rouge period, he was house arrested, and again in the 1980s when the ruling State
of Cambodia regime resisted efforts by armed groups, including the royalist faction
founded by Sihanouk, to overthrow it. 24
I
Ever since, King Sihanouk became the constitutional king again in 1993, he had
been politically marginalized. Whereas, Hun Sen and other anti-royalists often criticised
him for interfering in government activities. Many others interpreted his reluctance to
exercise his full constitutional powers as a sign of weakness. Prince Ranariddh, Prince
Chakrapong - Ranariddh's half-brother and Prince Sirivudh - the former Foreign
Minister-had also suffered political hardship and humiliation at the hands of Hun Sen.
This resulted in his temporary exile from Cambodia. This act of Hun Sen was considered
as a "campaign to discredit the royal family and to keep it out ofpolitics".25
V annath states that the proponents of the view that monarchy is of an "antiquated
.
."
irrelevant part of political life", propose a pure democratic form of government. In this
fonn of government, affairs of the state are managed by elected institutions rather than
individuals or privileged groups, and all citizens should have equal access to obtain top
leadership positions. "The rural people remain loyal to the monarchy largely through
ignorance and should be educated in the virtues of republicanism". He points out that the
"1970 coup essentially emerged from the discontent of republicans and intellectuals who
accused Sihanouk of autocratically handling state affairs and suppressing dissent by
force". 26
Nevertheless, another school of thought argues:
"the majority of Cambodians still believe in the monarchy and that to abruptly
break the ties between them and the monarchy would prove destabilizing. The people
look on Sihanouk, who led Cambodia to independence, as a. patriotic leader and the
'father' of the nation".
24
Ibid.
2S
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
85
Moreover, public polls indicated that the "King remains the most popular
Cambodian political personality. Out of respect for the people's will, therefore, Cambodia
is likely to remain a constitutional monarchy with the King as head of state".
27
Recommendations: Chea Vannath, in his article recommended that if monarchy
wished to remain the choice of majority, there is a need of constitutional amendment of
certain articles.
a)
In order for the monarchy to unify the nation, it needs to be respected by
all parties. "Therefore, it should not get involved in political power struggles or in fOllllal
party politics".
b)
Issue related to the procedures of need to be clarified. "A crown prince or
princess should be identified far enough in advance, which can allow the grooming of
new monarchs and prepare the people psychologically".
c)
The constitutional.title "Monarch for Life" should be modified. This
•
would allow amomnch to abdicate if they wish to (Vannath, 1998).
"In July 1997, Hun Sen rejected the King's wish to abdicate in protest at Prince
Ranariddh's violent overthrow, accusing Sihanouk of insubordination before the supreme
law of the land" (Vannath, 1998).
He asserts:
Cambodia's monarchy has a potentially crucial role to play in unifying the nation
and promoting peace. For this to come about, however, it needs a clear vision and
purpose and must itself adopt a proactive attitude towards refOIm and adapt to presentday realities. However, it is the Monarchy's very intimacy with Cambodian politics today,
which poses the biggest challenge, as it seeks to define a new, more independent role for
itself (Vannath, 1998).
27
Ibid.
86