COUNTRY REPORT: MOLDOVA
BORDERS
Subtitle:
Critical overview of borders and policy in the Republic of Moldova.
Author:
Octavian îcu, Free International University of Moldova
Keywords: Borders, Moldova, EU eastward enlargement
Contents
1. Introduction to the problem
2. Historical background to modelling Moldovan borders
3. Historical Boundaries – Soviet Boundaries
4. Research and literature on post-Soviet borders in Moldova
5. Borders and neighbours
6. Border regimes and EU neighbourhood policies in Moldova
7. Conclusions: borders and the new political scene after 2009
8. Bibliography
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1. Introduction to the problem
The Republic of Moldova was never an independent political entity until 1991. Its fate
was inextricably linked to that of the Romanian Principalities, the Ottoman Empire,
the Russian Empire, Romania and, more recently, the Soviet Union. Prior to 1812 the
current territory of Moldova was part of the Romanian Principality of Moldova, the
emergence of which is dated to 1359. After the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806-1812
and for most of the nineteenth century until 1917, Moldova – known as Bessarabia –
was part of the Russian Empire1. At the same time, the core of the Romanian
Principality of Moldova joined Wallachia in 1859 to form the Romanian modern state.
After World War I, Bessarabia was returned to Romania and for 22 years it was part
of the Romanian state. Bessarabia came under the Soviet sphere of influence
following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Soviet troops invaded and occupied
the territory in 1940 and on 2 August 1940, the Soviet Union created the Moldovan
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), which was a result of joining occupied Bessarabia
with the Moldovan Autonomous SSR, which had existed since 1924 within the
1
The Paris Conference of 1856 decided to return the southern part of Bessarabia to the Principality of
Moldova, but the Berlin Congress of 1878 returned it to the Russian Empire.
1
Ukrainian SSR. Romania retook the territory during World War II in 1941 but lost it
again when it was re-occupied by the USSR from 1944 to1991.
These territorial and political fluctuations, together with the peripheral position
that it had within the states that it found itself, have strongly affected the evolution
and stability of Moldova in the twentieth century and especially after 1991. These
changes in the geographical and political landscape often have been portrayed as
the constant shift from West to East and back, but in fact the clash over this territory
is the very specific confrontation between Romanian nationalism, which wanted its
lost children to ‘return home’, and Russian/ Soviet imperialism, which was driven by
geopolitical considerations to control Moldova. This confrontation has left a particular
legacy for the current political and national physiognomy of the Republic of Moldova
and the issue of borders and identity basically are the main problems of its postindependence history.
Since Soviet-era boundaries are the main foundations upon on which the
newly-independent Moldova has to build its new political and national identity, an
analysis of the effect of Soviet nationality policy in the Moldovan SSR is helpful to
understand current realities in the Republic of Moldova.
2. Historical background to modelling Moldovan borders
The current Republic of Moldova was a part of the Soviet Union for almost 50 years
(even more for some parts), the first state in history to be formed out of ethno-political
units. The USSR confronted growing nationalisms by systematically promoting the
national consciousness of its national minorities and by creating for many of them the
institutional forms specific to nation-states (Martin 2001; Suny 1993; Slezkine 1994).
The logic and content of Soviet nation-building policy has been identified elsewhere
and is widely accepted to be focused mainly on four attributes of national form: the
creation of ethno-national territories; linguistic indigenisation; the creation and
promotion of native elites; and support for minority culture. T. Martin considers the
term ‘Affirmative Action Empire’ to best distinguish the Soviet Union from other
alternative types of states, including empires (2001, 2-18).
Despite the similarities in the implementation of nationality policy across the
Soviet state, one must admit that there was a notable difference between the
indigenisation policy for non-Russians in the interwar period and that of the post-war
2
period in the newly-acquired territories of the Baltic States, western Ukraine and
Belarus, and the newly-created Moldovan SSR. Since the populations of these
territories previously experienced either independence or other forms of state/ nationbuilding that had strengthened the sense of national identity, they were faced by the
opposing force of Soviet nationality policy. In their cases, from the very beginning, it
was about ‘destroying’ rather than ‘constructing’, in contrast to what happened in the
Soviet republics during the 1920s, after which the stages of their indigenisation was
focussed on ‘sovereignty’ rather than on identity-building.
The case of the Moldovan SSR was exceptional amongst the western Soviet
republics in that Soviet identity-building aimed to create a nation when little sense of
nationhood existed, except in the sense of regionalism within the Russian Empire or
Greater Romania. At this point the case of Moldova was more similar to that of the
republics of Central Asia at the beginning of the indigenisation programme in the
1920s (see on this point Akiner 1997; Pipes 1964), making it distinct from the other
western republics of the Soviet Union that already had a strong sense of identity. In
other words, the ingredients for the indigenisation policy – the creation of a national
territory, linguistic indigenisation, the forging of elites and national culture – as
invoked by the architects of Soviet nation-building policies, were promoted in Soviet
Moldova in order to stress ‘Moldovan’ primordialism and its distinctiveness from
Romania.
In this case, according to George Schopflin’s typology (1993, 28-30), one
looks at the Baltic States as traditional societies, which despite the Soviet
experience, preserved what they could from the past, but changed in unperceived
ways due to Sovietisation; Moldova, however, is a society brought into being by the
Soviet Union, which owes its physical creation, political status and even ethnic
identity to Soviet nation-building policies.
3. Historical Boundaries – Soviet Boundaries
The Soviet understanding of nationhood was firmly based on the Stalinist linkage
between nationality, territory and indigenous political elite. It also is a well-known fact
that building upon Stalin’s own definition of nation, the Soviet authorities promoted
the idea that nation was fixed to territory. The major ethnic groups were assigned
their officially-recognised territories that were organised into an elaborate
3
administrative hierarchy of ethnic stratification, in which the fifteen Soviet Socialist
Republics (SSRs) represented the highest rank of statehood accessible to a Soviet
nationality (Motyl 1992, 33-35). Even though scholars of Soviet nationality policies
assert that the ‘Piedmont Principle’ was not a major motivation, they admit that in a
single exceptional case –that of the Moldovan Autonomous SSR – this principle was
the main reason for the creation of a SSR (Martin 2001, 9, 274).
Since the Soviet Union never recognised the Romanian annexation of
Bessarabia after World War I, the Soviets put great pressure on the Romanian
authorities through the organisation, training, and financing of subversive activities in
Bessarabia. This pressure peaked with the creation of the Moldovan ASSR inside the
Ukrainian SSR in 1924, in what V. Zatonsky called “our own Moldovan Piedmont”
(Martin 2001, 274). Despite its small size and its dubious Moldovan ethnic character,
as Moldovans represented 31,6 per cent of the population while Ukrainians were 49,
6 per cent2, the newly-created administrative unit received the status of autonomous
republic because of the future political perspectives of Moldova, i.e. the eventual
annexation of Bessarabia. For the same reason, despite a protest by Romanian
communists, a distinct Moldovan literary language was established and a separate
Moldovan national identity was cultivated in the Moldovan ASSR (King 2000, 36-62).
The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic was created by the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR on 2 August 1940, allegedly through the initiative of the majority working
people of the region (Repida 1977, 246-247). Roughly speaking, the creation of the
Moldovan SSR was the result of the joining together of historical Bessarabia and the
Moldovan ASSR, but not in their integrity – only six of the original thirteen districts
(raiony) of the ASSR were annexed by the SSR.
As usual the Soviets did not follow any ethnic, historical or cultural logic in the
creation of the new republic, but only strategic considerations. As a result three
counties of historical Bessarabia (Cetatea Alba, Ismail and Hotin), were annexed to
the Ukrainian SSR in exchange for parts of the Moldovan ASSR (Sed’maia 1940,
183). Besides the idea of destroying the historical integrity of Bessarabia, the Soviet
officials’ strategies included securing the USSR’s access to the Danube River –
through a reliable Slavonic republic – and making the Moldovan SSR a landlocked
entity. It is undeniable that Ukrainian communist officials influenced this Soviet policy,
2
According to the Soviet census of 1926 (Vsesoiuznaia 1928, 24).
4
both in terms of the Soviet ultimatum of 26 June 1940 concerning Bessarabia, the
terms of which claimed the province from Romania on the basis of its Ukrainian
majority (Pactul Molotov Ribbentrop 1992, 17-18), and due to the Piedmont Principle.
Khrushchev proposed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union that the new Moldovan SSR would be created through the unification of the
“…Moldovan population only” and not through a merge of the territories of
Bessarabia and the Moldovan ASSR (Aspects des Relations Russo-Roumains 1967,
163; Lazarev 1974, 524). With Bessarabia’s new borders, this disputed territory that
formerly lay between the Nistru and the Prut Rivers ceased to be a single unit
precisely because it was expected that this would complicate any future attempt to
return the area to Romania.
In lasting terms, the unification of Bessarabia and Transnistria – or the ‘left
bank’ and ‘right bank’ of the Nistru River – two distinct entities that had never existed
before as a common entity, was fateful for the further evolution both of the Moldovan
SSR and the Republic of Moldova. Economically- and demographically-speaking,
Soviet Moldova gradually developed as two republics in one: a largely rural,
agricultural and indigenous Moldovan in Bessarabia, and a more urban, Slavonic,
and largely immigrant population in Transnistria working in Soviet-style heavy
industry (King 2000, 100). Most of Moldovan industry operated as an appendix of the
great Soviet enterprises located in Transnistria, which was producing 1/3 of
Moldova’s industrial output. Besides the inherent distortion in the ethnic balance in
the Moldovan SSR, this peculiar Soviet industrial policy generated the long-lasting
foundations of future Transnistrian separatism. On 2 September 1990, the region,
supported by Moscow, proclaimed itself an independent entity – the Pridnestrovian
Moldovan Republic (PMR) and ceased to take orders from the central government of
the Republic of Moldova.
Regarding the creation of the Moldovan SSR, the first manifestation of
‘Moldovan’ patriotism by the local communist elites occurred in February 1946 when
the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova N.
Salagor, the Head of the Council of Ministers N. Coval, and the Head of the Supreme
Soviet of the Moldovan SSR F. Brovko addressed a letter to Stalin arguing against
the annexation of the three Bessarabian districts to the Ukrainian SSR by invoking
historical, economic, linguistic and cultural arguments. This demand, however, was
never realised ( îcu 2010a, 14).
5
There is evidence that at that moment amongst Moldovan elites existed the
idea of creating a unified Soviet state for Moldovans, including the territories of
historical Moldova up to the Carpathians and including Bukovina with Cernauti, i.e
parts of Romania and the Ukrainian SSR (Ca u 2000, 51-52). The idea of ‘Greater
Moldova’ supported both the legitimisation of Bessarabia’s annexation from Romania
and the justification of using the symbolic markers of ‘Moldovan Soviet primordialism’
shared also by Romania. Ironically, the idea of ‘Greater Moldova’ reappeared after
the Republic of Moldova achieved independence, but this time it was pushed ahead
by Chi in u
in order to prevent any eventual Romanian suggestions of the
Romanian character of the country.
Nevertheless the most important fact is that the Soviet Union had created for
the Moldovans, as Ronald G. Suny (1993, 111-112) has argued for other Soviet
republics, a territorial nation with is own state apparatus and ruling elite that had the
symbols of any sovereign state, with a national flag and seal, but without real
sovereignty or the right to full political expression. In this sense, for the first time the
‘imagined community’ of Moldovans took both physical form and political meaning
during the Soviet period. Having secured sovereignty following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova now has been embarking upon state and
nation-building. When evaluating the present complex realities in Moldova in terms of
its borders and identity, we should bear in mind that Moldova’s sense of state and
nation and the nature and form of its post-1991 state and nation-building is bound up
with its place, real and imagined, within the Soviet Union. In fact, the Republic of
Moldova is a society brought into being by the Soviet Union, and it owes its physical
creation, political status and even ethnic identity to Soviet nation-building policy.
Soviet-era forms are the main foundation upon which independent Moldova has to
build its new political and national identity.
4. Research and literature on post-Soviet borders in Moldova
Starting from this historical aspect, there are three perspectives in approaching the
issue of borders in the Republic of Moldova, each of which have its supporters in
politics, academia, media, NGOs and the public. These trends will be accordingly
presented in the following sections of this report. The first perspective is one of
Romanian orientation, which sees the Republic of Moldova as the second Romanian
6
state and its history as part of the general history of all Romanians. According to this
point of view, the current borders of the Moldovan state were shaped as a result of
Russian imperial policy, which annexed Bessarabia in 1812, and then by Soviet
expansionist policy during and after the Second World War. Supporters of this
approach, who are located both in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, view the
geographical and political modelling of borders a policy promoted by the Soviet
Union, which together with ‘anti-Romanism’ and Russification was part of Moscow’s
arsenal to denationalise the Romanians in the Moldovan SSR. From this perspective,
the resistance of Romanians in the Moldovan SSR to these policies and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union made it impossible to incubate ‘Moldovenism’, and
the majority population of the republic managed to preserve its attachment to the
Romanian language and identity. As a result, the independence of the Republic
Moldova3 was seen as a step towards re-unification with Romania, following the
German path of re-unification. Very powerful in the late 1980s – early 1990s, the
arguments of the Romanian-oriented leaders were reflected in the Independence
Declaration of the Republic of Moldova adopted on 27 August 1991, which
proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Moldova from the Soviet Union,
condemned the annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire in 1812 and by the
Soviet Union in 1940 and proclaimed the Romanian character of the new state
(Legea privind Declara ia 1991).
This position lost its political force after the 1992 war in Transnistria, but
remained powerful amongst intellectuals and large segments of population, who
identify themselves as Romanians and are best represented by the slogan
‘Bessarabia is Romanian land’ (Basarabia - p mânt românesc). The proponents of
this orientation perceive Russia (and the Soviet Union) as the ‘historical enemy’ and
as the main threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Moldova. At the same time, the supporters of this position are very critical of the
ceding of the former territories of Bessarabia to the Ukrainian SSR and sometimes
articulate arguments to exchange Transnistria – which in their perspective never was
a part of the Moldovan historical state – for the southern and northern part of
Bessarabia, which currently are a part of Ukraine.
3
Romania was the first state to recognise the independence of the Republic of Moldova.
7
This political current became powerful both politically and intellectually again in
the context of the changing political landscape in the Republic of Moldova after the
2009 parliamentary elections and street riots, which led to the overthrow of the Party
of Communists’ government and the bringing to power of the democratic Alliance for
European Integration. Union with Romania is no longer relevant for the supporters of
this ideology, but the idea of union with Romanians within the European Union
through Moldova’s eventual EU membership has gained elaboration and support.
The proponents of this political current are situated both in Romania and the
Republic of Moldova and amongst representatives of the Romanian intellectual
diaspora in the West as well. The most important research articles on the peace
treaties, agreements and conflicts over borders as elaborated by representatives of
this trend include: Agachi 2003; Agrigoroaei 1993; Agrigoroaiei 2007; Bruhis 1992;
Buga 2002; Bulat 1991; Bulat 2002; Calafeteanu 1995; Chicu 1992; Chirtoag 2007;
Dabija 2007; Enciu 2003; Ieremia 1992; Ionescu 2002; Mischevca 1999; Moraru
1995; Moraru 2009a; Moraru 2009b; Po tarencu 1998; Po tarencu 2006;
1994;
canu, E. 1999;
canu, I. 1995;
canu, I. 1993a;
canu, I. 1998;
canu, I. 1993b;
canu, E.
canu, I. 1994;
canu, I. 2007; îcu 2004; îcu 2010a; urcanu
1998; V ratic 2000.
The main studies in state-making and nation-building developed by the
Romanian-oriented historians include: Be leag 1996; Ca u 2000; Cojocaru 2009;
Dabija 2002; Frunta u 2002; Negru, E. 2000; Negru, Gh. 2000; Olaru-Cemîrtan
2006; Olaru-Cemîrtan 2007; Pasat 2000; Petrencu 2004; Postic 1997; Stavil 1996;
canu 1994;
canu 1997; îcu 2007; îcu 2008a; îcu 2009a.
The second political trend in borders and state/ nation-building is a ‘Moldovan’
one, which was formed in the context of the interwar period by the Soviet ideology
and propaganda machine and gained consistency in the post-war period, becoming
an official party line in both the Soviet Union and the Moldovan SSR. In this thinking,
Moldovans and Romanians are two different peoples who speak two different
languages, and their histories, even if they intersected in time, had different paths
that started from their ethnogeneses. Considered historically ‘dead’ when the Soviet
Union collapsed, this trend has found a new usefulness in Moldova’s independence
period, especially under Communist Party rule (2001-2009), justified in the name of
8
Moldovan statehood4. Post-Soviet ‘Moldovenism’ almost became state policy under
Communist rule when it restored most of the historical arguments generated in the
Soviet era that promoted the idea that the existence of Moldovan statehood in itself is
an argument for its justification. According to this idea, the Republic of Moldova
traces its history from the mediaeval Moldovan Principality of 1359 and all
consecutive changes left a particular legacy on the modelling of borders. The
supporters of the ‘Moldovan’ political current usually blame Romania for its
‘imperialist’ view of Moldova and consider Russian/ Soviet influence as positive. The
proponents of this thinking especially are critical of Romania’s hesitation to sign a
basic border treaty with the Republic of Moldova. The Romanian authorities consider
the treaty a consequence of the historical injustice that resulted from the SovietGerman pact of 1939, while the Moldovan authorities (especially the Communist
governments of 2001-2009) perceive this reluctance as Romania’s ‘hidden agenda’
to re-take its historical province. The historians who support this orientation have
been encouraged by the Moldovan government especially after 1994, when
‘Moldovenism’ has been defined, but it has also connections to the Russian
Federation, which is very sensitive to the idea of ‘union’ between the Republic of
Moldova and Romania.
Amongst the most important ‘Moldovenist’ publications on borders and state/
nation construction can be mentioned: Moldovan 1993; Stati 2000; Stati 2001; Stati
2002; Stepaniuc 2004; Stepaniuc 2005. For a critical view and perspective on these
two trends, see: Ca u 2000; King 2000; Frunta u 2002; îcu 2008a.
The third perspective on the issue of borders and on the Moldovan state as a
whole comes from the eastern part of Moldova, where a consistent majority of
Russians control Transnistria and consider themselves integrally as part of the
Russian political and cultural world. ‘Transnistria is Russian land’ (Pridnestrovie –
russkaia zemlia) is representative of their view, regardless of the fact that Moldovans/
Romanians represent one third of its population, as well as another third are
Ukrainians. The emergence of the Moldovan Transnistrian Republic (Moldavskaia
Pridnestrovskaia Respublika – PMR) on 2 September 1990, was realised with the
4
The ‘Moldovan’ trend began in the interwar period in the works of C. Rakovski, B. Dembo, L.
Alecsandri, acquired consistency in the Soviet Union after 1944 (N. Derjavin, M. Serghievski, A.
Borschiv, B. Serebrenikov, A. Udal ov, L. Cerepnin, etc..) and the Moldovan SSR (I. Ceban, A. Grecu,
A. Borschiv, N. Nar ov, N. Mohov, A. Lazarev, V. Taranova, A. Surilov, B. Kolker, I. Kopanski, V. Levit,
S. Afteniuk, S. Brîseakin, A. Repida, D. Ursu, etc.) and continued in post-Soviet Moldova with the
works of V. Stati and V. Stepaniuc.
9
powerful support of the Soviet centre and later with that of the Russian Federation,
led to a war and to the division of the Republic of Moldova into two parts. Both parts
(the Republic of Moldova and PMR) consider the conflict as a war for independence
and integrity: Chi in u from the Russian Federation and Tiraspol from the Republic
of Moldova.
Within this point of view that is basically outside of Moldovan control, the
authorities from Transnistria have developed a particular perspective on the issue of
borders and the Moldovan state. The origins of the Transnistrian state is dated to
1924, when the Soviet Union created an Autonomous Republic of Moldova within the
Ukrainian SSR. Never being a part of the Moldovan mediaeval state, the
Transnistrian regime rejects the historical connection to the Republic of Moldova,
even though it has occupied the city of Bender that is located on the right bank of
Nistru River, i.e. in historical Bessarabia, and pretends to be the ‘genuine’ successor
to the ‘Moldovan Soviet State’ created in 1924. The authorities of the PMR insist on
independence and see no future in a united Moldovan state, cultivating at the same
time the idea of a distinct ‘Transnistrian people’ (Pridnestrovskii narod), a melting pot
of Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians, each ethnic group constituting around one
third of the population. The representatives of this political current see the Republic
of Moldova and Romania (but occasionally Ukraine as well, especially after the 2005
Orange Revolution victory and pro-European policy of Ukraine) as the main threat to
their integrity and border security, and consider the Russian Federation as the only
supporter and guarantor of their existence as state.
Amongst the most important representative research and literature of the
Transnistrian idea related to borders and state-/ nation-building are: Babilunga 1993;
Babilunga 1997; Babilunga 1998; Babilunga 2007; Galinsky 2005; Galinsky 2006;
Grosul 2000-2001; Guboglo 2001; Smirnov 2000; Volkova 2005.
5. Borders and neighbours
5.1 States with interest in Moldova’s borders
The Republic of Moldova’s borders are a subject of interest from three states. Two of
them – Romania and Ukraine – are its immediate and only geographic neighbours,
while the Russian Federation manifests interest towards the Republic of Moldova
when invoking the historical past and the presence of the large Russian minority, but
10
in fact its attitude is determined by ‘Great Power’ geopolitical considerations. At the
same time, there are two other important entities that have expressed their interest in
the issues of the borders and future of the Moldovan state – the European Union and
the United States of America.
2.2 Romania
Romania was the first state to recognise the independence of the Republic of
Moldova on 27 August 1991. The Romanian government considered the
independence of Moldova a “…proclamation of an independent Romanian state on
the territories forcibly annexed as a result of the secret agreements established as a
result of the Moldotov-Ribbentrop pact and a decisive stept towards the peaceful
solving of its fateful consequences that turned against the rights and interests of the
Romanian people” (Rela iile politico-diplomatice moldo-române 1991). The most
important issues regarding the border regime between the Republic of Moldova and
Romania during the period after 1991 were the negotiations relating to the Basic
Political Treaty, European integration, negotiation of the border agreement, the
facilitation of human and transport circulation across the border, customs cooperation and the creation of common free economic zones.
The Treaty of Partnership and Co-operation signed on 28 April 2000 stressed
the special character of relations between the two countries, based on the common
historical past and cultural and linguistic community, but engaged Romania to
maintain the unity and integrity of the Moldovan state (Chirila 2009, 10-40). The good
evolution of relations between Romania and Moldova and between Romania and
Ukraine led to the creation of two Euro-regions – the Lower Danube (1998) and
Upper Prut (2000). However, the two governments have not succeeded in signing a
Basic Political Treaty, which left unsolved the question of the border between the two
countries. After the Party of Communists came to power (2001-2009), the issue of
the treaty and border became crucial in the relations between Moldova and Romania.
Romania considered it ‘dead’ and the border a consequence of the ‘unjust
aggressive Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty’. Moldova’s President Voronin considered
Romania the last ‘empire’ in Europe and denounced “the Romanian hidden agenda
regarding the Moldovan state” (Pre edintele Vladimir Voronin 2003) to the
international community. Romania maintained its attachment towards the principle of
‘one nation – two states’ and considered the signing of a border treaty as ‘outdated’
11
at the European level (Chirila 2009, 25). At the same time, during this time Chi in u
insisted on the ‘two states – two nations’ principle.
In the context of radical political change after the 2009 parliamentary elections,
the newly-created Alliance for European Integration (AEI) succeeded in signing in
November 2010 the agreement concerning the border with Romania, but not the
Basic Political Treaty (România i Republica Moldova 2010). The agreement was
favourably met by European Union officials, and President of the European
Commission Barosso considered it an example of “...how things could work when
there is mutual interest and understanding” (Barroso salut 2010).
The most important works on the border and territorial issues between the
Republic of Moldova and Romania are: Chirila 2009, 10-40; Ciurea 2010; Cojocaru
2001; Pîntea 2006; Prohni chi 2002; Negru 1997; Noile frontiere în Europa 2004.
2.3 Ukraine
The relations between the two new independent states started in 1992 with the
signing of the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendship and Collaboration. The
most sensitive problems in the relations between Moldova and Ukraine are the
Transnistrian issue and security on the eastern border of Moldova as result of the
Transnistrian problem, and the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the borders
as a whole (Boian 2009, 40-48). Until a new border treaty between the two countries
was signed between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the existing border
between the Moldovan and Ukrainian SSRs was accepted as the bondary. The
border agreement was signed on 18 August 1999 in Kyiv and immediately started the
process of delimitation, which was to be followed by the process of demarcation
(Tratat 1999). The most complicated problem in this process was related to the
ceding to Ukraine of seven kilometres of the Odessa-Reni road near Palanca village
in return for almost one kilometer of Danube River access. As result of the border
agreement, in July 2001 this territory passed to Ukraine and was considered
Ukrainian property on the territory of the Republic of Moldova (Parlamentul 2001).
After the EU became involved in the settling of the Transnistrian issue, the
Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova
and Ukraine (EUBAM) was agreed in October 2005 and was officially launched on
1 December 2005. EUBAM works very closely with the EU’s Special Representative
for Moldova and aims to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud from the
12
Transnistrian region by providing advice and training to improve the capacity of the
Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services (Misiunea 2005).
Ukraine is also involved in the ‘5+2’ negotiations regarding the settlement of
the Transnistrian problem and former President Iuschenko initiated a plan for the
democratisation of the regions of the left bank of Moldova as a precondition for their
reintegration with the Republic of Moldova – the so-called ‘Plan Iuschenko’ (Boian
2009, 45).
The territorial problems and border issue between the Republic of Moldova
and Ukraine are examined in Barb ro ie 2005; Berbeca 2010a; Berbeca 2010b;
Boian 2009; Osoianu 2009; Pîntea 2006; Prohni chi 2002; Noile frontiere în Europa).
2.4 Russian Federation
In the context of post-Soviet politics, relations between the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Moldova are marked by many contradictions. On one side, Russia
officially supports the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and officially is
involved in the ‘settlement’ of the Transnistrian conflict. At the same time, Moscow is
the main supporter of the separatist regime in Tiraspol and provides the
Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic political, economic, financial and military aid ( îcu
2008c, 162).
Russia initiated two plans for maintaining the territorial integrity of Moldova
both having the fixed idea of federalising the Republic of Moldova, with Chi in u and
Tiraspol as equal centres, thus creating an instrument to influence and pressure the
Republic of Moldova and maintain its military bases in Transnistria. The first plan was
the ‘Primakov Memorandum’ (Memorandum ob osnovakh… 1997), signed in 1997
and the second was the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’ (Vrabie 2009, 83) that was
supposed to be signed in 2003, but was rejected by Moldova’s communist
government as a result of massive protests and external pressure.
The interests of the Russian Federation in Transnistria are determined by the
following considerations: a) to maintain the strategic position of the Russian
Federation in South-Eastern Europe; b) to defend the interests of the Russian
population and other nationalities in Moldova that consider Russia as their historical
motherland; c) to maintain the strategic links with the economic enterprises of
Transnistria, many of them being unique within the military-industrial complex; d) to
solve the conflict in the interest of Russia’s own stability and the consolidation of
13
Russia’s relationships with the states of the ‘Near Abroad’ having a Russian minority;
e) to establish stable and predictable relations with Romania and to prevent the
growth of its nationalist influence on Moldova (Bezopasnosti 1994, 52-54). The issue
of territorial integrity is used by the Russian Federation to influence policy-making in
the Republic of Moldova, but at the same time the Transnistrian issue is part of the
‘Great Power Game’ between Russia, the European Union and the USA.
For details on the Russian Federation’s implication in the Transnistrian conflict
and in the territorial issues of the Republic of Moldova from a Moldovan perspective,
see Cebotari 2007; Chirtoac
2001; Cojocaru 2000; Cojocaru 2001b; Gheorghiu
2005; Grecu 2004; Gribincea 1998; Gribincea 1999; Mînz rari 2009; Prohni chi 2002;
Nantoi 2003; Serebrian 2003;
îcu 2007b;
îcu 2008c;
îcu 2009a;
îcu 2010b;
Vrabie 2009. The Transnistrian (Russian) perspective on these issues is found in the
works of Babilunga 2007; Babilunga 1998; Galinsky 2006; Grosul 2000-2001;
Guboglo 2001.
6. Border regimes and EU neighbourhood policies in Moldova
6.1 General background of EU-Moldova relations
Since 1991 EU-Moldova relations have evolved in a very complicated international
environment determined by the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union suffered a
great internal transformation that resulted in its disintegration; fifteen Soviet republics
emerged as sovereign and independent states. At the same time the fall of the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe and German reunification brought a profound
transformation of the political and even territorial architecture of Europe. The
European Community faced a great challenge in accommodating these realities, but
the EC adapted very soon to this new international reality. The EC expressed its view
on the developments brought by the dissolution of USSR in two documents: the
‘Declaration on Developments in the Soviet Union’, adopted by the Maastricht
European Council by 9-10 December 1991; and the ‘EPC Declaration on the
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union’, adopted on 16 December 1991 (European Strategy 2007). Following these
documents, in 1992 the European Commission proposed to replace the ‘Agreement
between the EC and USSR on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation’,
14
signed in December 1989, with agreements to be concluded bilaterally with CIS
members.
Along with the establishment of new relations with the former Soviet republics,
the EC committed itself to support their political and economic transformation. The
EC TACIS programme thus became the main instrument that aimed to enhance the
transition process in all former Soviet republics, except the Baltic States. When
TACIS was initiated in 1991, the technical assistance through this programme was a
stand-alone activity. Later it became part of the more complex policy approach of the
EU towards countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, due to the
gradual development and formalisation of their bilateral relations through new legal
frameworks – Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs).
EU-Moldova relations began late in the middle of 1995, reluctantly and
evasivly if compared to other Central-East European states or even the Baltics. From
the very beginning of its independence the Republic of Moldova has had to endure
the difficult legacy of the USSR’s break-up. Moldova’s incoherence in foreign policy
after 1991 was much complicated by the secessionist conflict in Transnistria and by
Russia’s assertive power in the region. Therefore, a certain equilibrium in foreign
policy and neutrality as a security policy option were chosen as the safeguards of
Moldova’s fragile statehood. Having these in play, Moldova was reluctant to follow
the examples provided by the Baltic States in their approach to relations with the EU.
At the same time, the incoherence in the foreign policy of subsequent Moldovan
governments also made the EU reticent towards Moldova ( îcu 2008a, 163).
While the Baltic and some other Central and East-European states had signed
agreements with the EC with a distinct perspective on the future, Moldova as well as
other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were offered a
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) – a type of bilateral treaty mainly
based on economic and trade relations. After two rounds of negotiations, the
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Moldova was signed
in November 1994 (Chirila 2009, 49) and entered into force on 1 July 1998. This
provided a new contractual relationship between the EU and Moldova and set out a
co-operative framework for a broad spectrum of policy areas: to provide an
appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the parties allowing the
development of political relations; to promote trade and investment and harmonious
economic relations between the parties to foster their sustainable economic
15
development; to provide a basis for the legislative, economic, social, financial, and
cultural co-operation; to support the efforts of Moldova to consolidate its democracy
and to develop its economy and to complete the transition to a market economy.
There were some periods when Moldovan officials tried to put more serious
question concerning the EU on the state’s agenda, though these were attempts to
obtain economic help and special priorities in trade without a clear understanding of
what Moldova itself needed to do to reform its internal system. Many high-ranking
officials were not interested in very radical changes in the existing system because of
their own interests. On the EU’s part, there was little interest in this region when
internal European discussions addressed the further expansion to the east. The
existence of the Transnistrian frozen conflict in Moldova was viewed by EU officials
as something not important for them since it was far away from their borders. And
lastly – but not least – the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria led to the
acceptance of this space as ‘natural’ for Russian interests and a reason not to
interfere in the region.
A few days after its fifth enlargement wave in May 2004, the EU launched the
European Neighbourhood Policy that articulates a revised policy approach towards
sixteen countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. The main vehicle for taking the ENP
forward was the Action Plans, documents which set the frame for dialogue in the
short- and medium-terms between the EU and its neighbours in a variety of fields.
The Republic of Moldova met the EU initiative towards its neighbourhood with mixed
feelings. On one hand, Moldova welcomed the EU’s intention to deepen its relations
with neighbouring countries, but on the other hand it was more or less disappointed
as the new Neighbourhood Policy did not contain a clear European perspective for
Moldova. Additionally, Moldova’s luke-warm reception of the document was due to it
being included with states without a European leaning. Despite these attitudes, the
EU’s initiative towards its neighbourhood brought Moldova new hopes for its future in
Europe. Although the ENP does not offer the perspective of membership, the
Moldovan authorities understood this initiative as an additional way of co-operation
with the EU and as “a bridge towards the following stage – association and
integration into the EU” (Gheorghiu 2005).
On 9 December 2004, the European Commission launched the EU-Moldova
Action Plan, together with six similar documents for Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Already on 22 February 2005, at the
16
seventh meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council held in Brussels, Jean
Asselborn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of
Luxembourg, on behalf of the Council, and the Prime Minister of Moldova Vasile
Tarlev signed the EU-Moldova Action Plan (Reuniunea 2005). However, the Voronin
administration’s double standards and ambiguity towards relations with the EU has
forced the latter to take small steps in its policy towards Moldova, which in practice
means that it is not obliged to take any measures unless the target country starts to
correspond to European norms and values, a prerequisite for future accession. The
communist administration was ambiguous in its attitudes to the EU soon after the
launching of the Eastern Partnership, which also includes Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine (EU might get… 2008). Russia voiced concerns over
the Eastern Partnership, seeing it as an attempt to expand the EU’s sphere of
influence. Following ‘Big Brother’s’ rhetoric, in an interview with Russia’s
Kommersant newspaper on 27 February 2009, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin
rejected the country’s participation in the programme.
On the eve of Moldova’s parliamentary elections on 5 April 2009, the Party of
Communists looked for Moscow’s promised support in exchange for anti-EU and
anti-NATO rhetoric. On 7 April 2009, violent street protests and a brutal government
crackdown followed the elections, after the anti-Communist opposition claimed the
vote was rigged. Russia asked the European Union and Romania to guarantee the
sovereignty of its ally Moldova after Voronin accused neighbouring Romania of
engineering a coup attempt after demonstrators ransacked parliament during the
post-election protests and waved EU and Romanian flags from his offices.
A re-run of the legislative elections on 29 July 2010 saw the ousting of the
communist government by a coalition of four opposition parties, calling themselves
the ‘Alliance for European Integration’ (AEI). EU integration is the AEI’s declared top
priority and the new Moldovan prime minister and foreign affairs minister flew to
Brussels for their first diplomatic trip. The new Moldovan government has presented
ambitious targets for the process of forging closer ties with the EU. The launch of
negotiations on a new Association Agreement occurred on 12 January 2010, but
moves towards further visa liberalisation and a deep and comprehensive free trade
agreement with the EU largely depends on the continued sustainability and
operability of the new government.
17
6.2 Border and EU neighbourhood in Moldova
In 2007 the European Union and the Republic of Moldova became neighbours after
Romania joined union. Three main problems affected the European Union as a result
of this proximity in terms of border regime and security. The first one is related to the
Transnistrian conflict, which is the closest instability along the EU’s border – a bit
more than 100 km from Romanian territory. The second issue results from the
particularity of relations between Romania (a member of the EU since 2007) and the
Republic of Moldova. The third one is related to the engagement of Ukraine in the
stabilisation and security of the Republic of Moldova’s border, especially in relation to
the Transnistrian sector. Since the later two problems already were outlined above,
the present section will be devoted to the Transnistrian problem in the context of EU
neighbourhood policy (ENP).
Conflict resolution was not named a priority objective of the ENP. While
explicitly identified in all documents, crisis managment was overshadowed by the
principles of trade liberalisation with and democratisation of neighbouring regions.
However, the EU could not avoid involvement in the resolution of crises along its
borders. In this sense, an underlying principle of the ENP was adopted accepting
responsibility for security and stability in the region and the need to settle conflicts
(Popescu 2005, 9). There are several reasons for the EU getting involved in settling
of question of the territorial integrity of Moldova: the existence of the Transnistrian
regime poses challenges to European enlargement, e.g. criminal activities on its
immediate borders; the Transnistrian conflict is the closest one to the EU’s borders;
the region is a source of tension in EU-Russia relations; any dividing up of the
Republic of Moldova affects its viability as a state and future existence. To this end, a
greater integration of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into ENP,
as well as an intensification of the common political dialogue with Moldova, Russia
and Ukraine would help solve the issue, but EU policies should be long-lasting and
focussed on two basic issues. The first is to strengthen the Moldovan state and to
increase its attractiveness. The second is to reduce and mitigate the influence of
factors that support the functionality of the Transnistrian regime (on these aspects,
see: Albu 2007; Bu caneanu 2006; Popescu 2005).
The EU’s involvement in the Transnistrian issue started at the end of 2002 and
was directly connected to the process of enlargement. At this time, a 2002
Commission paper stressed clearly that “…the stability of Moldova clearly matters for
18
the EU…and the EU needs to help Moldova address its problems” (Popescu 2005,
29). Some other factors, however, influenced the deeper involvement of the EU in
Moldova’s territorial integrity question: a discrediting of the conflict settlement
mechanism; the provocative attitudes of the Transnistrian authorities; Russian
policies toward Moldova; and the EU-Russia dialogue on European general security
issues ( îcu 2008a; Gheorghiu 2005).
The first concret diplomatic action by the EU was the rejection of the ‘Kozak
Memorandum’ in November 2003, which forced the communist Vladimir Voronin to
abandon the Russian plan for settling the Transnistrian problem. The next step that
followed was the EU attending the Joint Constitutional Commission, composed of
Moldovan and Transnistrian deputies, to draft a new constitution for a reunified
Moldova – Brussels constantly was called by Moldova to act as mediator in the
conflict. Starting from 2003, upon the initiative of the European Commission, a
consulatation between the EU, Ukraine and Moldova began on the issue of joint
border controls on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including the Transnistrian
segment (see, e.g. Chirila 2009, 10-40). On 7 June 2005, the EU announced that its
assistance would increase to 22 million euro, primarly dedicated to the strengthening
of border controls between Moldova and Ukraine (Popescu 2005, 32).
During four rounds of negotiations held in January, February and June 2004
Moldova negotiated its Action Plan (EUMAP) with the EU, containing a special
chapter related to the Transnistrian conflict and the development of good
neighbourhood relations with Ukraine (Bu caneanu 2006). The document stressed a
“…strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict” and
“…its further engagement” in the problem (Popescu 2005, 32). Shortly after the
signing of the EUMAP on 25 February 2005, the EU started to show that it was
serious when it promised a strong commitment to support the settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict. In March 2005 the Council appointed an EU Special
Representative (EUSR) for Moldova, whose mandate was primarily linked to the
resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Since October 2005 the EU began to
participate as an observer to the negotiation process for the settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict in the so-called ‘5+2’ process (Chirila 2009, 168). Following the
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Border Assistance Mission
to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in August, the official opening ceremony of the
19
EUBAM took place on 1 December 2005. The EUBAM was offered a two year
mandate, which was extended in 2007 for another two years ( îcu 2008a, 165).
7. Conclusions: borders and the new political scene after 2009
The implications of EU involvement took new shape after the changing of the
Moldovan political landscape after the 2009 Parliamentary elections and the ousting
of the communist government. The EU supports the idea of the Republic of
Moldova’s integrity and considers Transnistria a part of the Moldovan state. Being a
member of the ‘5+2’ negotiations concerning the Transnistrian issue, the EU supports
the initiatives and plans for resolution promoted by the Republic of Moldova as long
as the Russian Federation supports the Tiraspol regime in promoting the ‘Kozak
Memorandum’ of 2003.
The settlement of the Transnistrian problem and the Moldoval territorial
integrity were on the agenda of various negotiations between A. Merkel, N. Sarkozy
and D. Medvedev during 2010. At the meeting with Moldova’s Prime Minister Vlad
Filat in Berlin on 12 May 2010, the Federal Chancellor of Germany stressed explicitly
that it “…will support the efforts of the Republic of Moldova for solving of
Transnistrian problem” and “…will interfere with Russia in this sense” (Merkel 2010).
Already on 5 June 2010, at a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
concerning the formation of an ‘EU-Russian Political and Security Committee’ (ER
PSC), German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that the new joint ‘crisis
management mechanism’ could be tested in the case of Transnistria. “You could try
something like that in concrete cases that we still have to resolve. In our opinion, the
situation in Transnistria is a very favorable example”, Chancellor Merkel said to the
Russian President (Rettman 2010).
French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Merkel met on 18-19 October 2010 in
Deauville, France, with Medvedev ahead of summit events scheduled for the coming
weeks: NATO, NATO-Russia, and the European Union-Russia. The three leaders’
joint Deauville declaration called on the EU to launch a modernisation partnership’
with Russia; to adopt a road-map for visa-free travel between Russia and the
European Union; and to embark on institutional and operational co-operation
between Russia and the EU on European security. The three leaders pledged to
“…jointly work on security issues in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zones” (Socor
20
2010). Specifically, the three pledged to seek “…closer co-operation, apt to
contribute in a most tangible way to mutual confidence and collective actions on
conflict prevention and conflict management, opening the way for settling ancient
conflicts, such as that in Transnistria” (ibid.). In this way, Transnistria was the only
issue specified as a possible object of Franco-German-Russian co-operative action,
a fact that reveals the importance of the issue on the EU-Russia agenda.
“If Russia is interested in co-operating with Europe, especially on security
issues, then it should contribute by helping to resolve the long-running conflict in
Transnistria”, said Angela Merkel at an unofficial meeting with Dmitry Medevedev in
Berlin on 27 October 2010 (Dempsey 2010). There is no doubt that Chancellor
Merkel’s initiatives, by focusing high-level attention on the Transnistria conflict, can
help achieve the first serious negotiations in years on the problem. “This is a big step
Chancellor Angela Merkel is taking”, said Kalman Mizsei, Europe’s special envoy to
Moldova. “This is about resolving a conflict that is closest to Europe’s borders. The
EU must now really become involved in ending this conflict”, he added (Dempsey
2010).
In this sense the demilitarisation of the current peacekeeping force in
Transnistria and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region should be
maintained on the highest agenda. But at the same time, the firm support to increase
the democratic and economic attractiveness of the Moldovan state should continue in
order to successfully realise its territorial integrity. The main publications on EUMoldova relations and border issues are Albu 2007; Baltag 2007; Bu caneanu 2006;
Chiril
2001; Chirila 2009; Croitoru 2007; Gheorghiu 2000a; Gheorghiu 2000b;
Gheorghiu 2002; Gheorghiu 2005; Gheorghiu 2006; Graur 2002; Gudîm 2002; Klipii
2001; Lobjakas 2006; Popescu 2005;
îcu 2008a; Umane 2000; Umane 2003;
Ungureanu 2001.
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