THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
TIBET AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Gülay Batman | Student Number: 5652332 | Supervisor: K. Nimako | University of Amsterdam
January 2009
Student: Gülay Batman
Student Number: 5652332
Master thesis in Political Science, section International Relations
Course: Regional Groupings, supervisor: Professor K. Nimako
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science, University of Amsterdam
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FOREWORD
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”
Martin Luther King
The complexity of the political realities of the Chinese presence in Tibet exposes the
controversial fields of international politics. In this thesis I want to outline a clear perspective
to this conflict, reviewing how it has arrived at its current state by presenting the causes and
the consequences of the clash of two great civilizations. By analyzing this issue in terms of
the principle of self-determination this thesis outlines important aspects of the process which
enabled me to provide recommendations towards a peaceful resolution.
In order to explain the present day situation in Tibet coherently, I did not allow myself to be
prejudiced with respect to any party. Questions about whether Tibet was independent or part
of China in the past, and whether it should now have the right to self-determination, will
therefore be approached from contradicting versions of history from Beijing and the Tibetan
exiles in India. My attempt to describe Tibet’s situation since the Chinese presence is
therefore the result of much research that is based on Chinese, Tibetan and third-party
sources. However, the existence of ambiguous perspectives on the truth – as they are used to
substantiate historical and ideological claims – seems to diminish the plausibility of virtually
all publications. The substantial difference between Chinese reporting of the situation in Tibet
and what Tibetans say themselves, makes it difficult to make statements about economic and
political realities. Simultaneously, it makes me question whether one could be entirely
objective in this matter.
During the readings, I must confess that I was emotionally gripped by the fact that the fate of
a nation once again is being threatened as the world community stands by. I seriously
question the capacity and the willingness of the international community, committed to the
high ideals of the United Nations, in delivering either peace or justice. Although the discourse
of international politics in theory constitutes certain norms and principles, the practice
exposes no more than an interest-led game. From this point of view, self-determination is a
powerful reflection of “the controversy-ridden fields of International Relations” (Margalit and
Raz: 439).
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MAP OF TIBET ....................................................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 7
The Significance of Self-Determination in International Relations....................................... 7
Selecting the Case .................................................................................................................. 8
Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 8
1 THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION ......................................................... 11
1.1 Defining the Concept ..................................................................................................... 11
1.1.1 The ‘Self’ in Self-Determination............................................................................. 11
1.1.2 The ‘Peoples’ who are entitled to the Right to Self-Determination ........................ 12
1.1.3 Incentives to the Claim to Self-Determination........................................................ 15
1.1.4 Self-Determination, Autonomy and Independence................................................. 16
1.2 Self-Determination and IR ............................................................................................. 17
1.2.1 Realism.................................................................................................................... 18
1.2.2 Marxism .................................................................................................................. 19
1.2.3 Liberalism................................................................................................................ 21
1.2.4 Common Grounds ................................................................................................... 21
1.3 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 22
2 NORMS AND PRACTICES .............................................................................................. 24
2.1 Self-Determination in Historical Context ...................................................................... 24
2.1.1 The strange Alliance of Wilson and Lenin.............................................................. 24
2.1.2 The Aftermath of the First World War.................................................................... 25
2.1.3 Becoming an International Standard ....................................................................... 26
2.2 Theory versus Practice ................................................................................................... 28
2.2.1 Self-Determination in the post World War II era.................................................... 29
2.2.2 Self-Determination in the post Cold War era.......................................................... 30
2.3 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 30
3 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL TIBET....................................................................... 31
3.1 Historical Analysis ......................................................................................................... 31
3.1.1 Priest-Patron Relation ............................................................................................. 31
3.1.2 Issue of Sovereignty and Independence .................................................................. 32
3.2 Tibet under Communist Rule ......................................................................................... 33
3.2.1 Chinese Positions and Strategies............................................................................. 34
3.2.2 Tibetan Positions and Strategies ............................................................................. 37
3.3 State Power versus Non-Violence? ................................................................................ 40
3.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 41
4 TIBET FROM IR PERSPECTIVE ................................................................................... 42
4.1 Chinese and Tibetan Portrayal of the Question.............................................................. 42
4.2 The Relation between China and Tibet .......................................................................... 43
4.2.1 The China-Tibet Dialogue....................................................................................... 43
4.2.2 Motivations and Strategies ...................................................................................... 44
4.3 The Role of the West within the Tibet Question............................................................ 44
4.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 45
5 TOWARDS A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION .................................................................... 46
5.1 The Case for Self-Determination ................................................................................... 46
5.1.1 Tibetans as a People ................................................................................................ 46
5.1.2 Historical Claim ...................................................................................................... 47
5.1.3 Aggression of an Inadequate Government .............................................................. 48
5.2 Future Political Status .................................................................................................... 49
5.2.1 Possible Solutions ................................................................................................... 49
5.2.2 Possible Methods of Conflict Resolution................................................................ 50
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5.3 The Role of the International Community ..................................................................... 52
5.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 54
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 56
Implications as for the Main Question ................................................................................. 60
LITERATURE ....................................................................................................................... 61
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MAP OF TIBET
(Source: Tibet Information Network)
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INTRODUCTION
The Significance of Self-Determination in International Relations
The map of the world in the twentieth century changed after every one of the three great
conflicts. Yet only on one occasion, at the end of the First World War, did the great powers
make changes collectively (Gottlieb: 2). Perhaps no contemporary norm of international law
has been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to selfdetermination. Yet the meaning and content of that right remain as vague and imprecise as
when they were enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 (Hannum: 27). The
premises on the principle of self-determination were formed and crystallized in the wake of
the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War. The First World War
provided the context for understanding the idea of self-determination while the Second World
War transformed the principle from an idea into a legally binding principle within the United
Nations (Cassese: 5). The end of the Cold War saw another revival of self-determination in
which the conversion of liberation into oppression in several post-Communist societies, and
the number of increase in conflicts of nations seeking for greater autonomy within states
exposed the flaws on the dominant conception of the right to self-determination.
The absence of a comprehensive understanding of the concept in the twenty first century does
not change the fact that a significant number of today’s most violent conflicts seem to be led
by the desire of an ethnic or religious group within a state searching for greater autonomy or
even secession. The importance of the claim to self-determination is also reflected in the fact
that the realization of the principle has been recognized by the United Nations General
Assembly as a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of other human rights (UNPO 1996). The
United Nations have been based on a political theory that had sought to settle the principle of
the territorial integrity of states with that of the self-determination of peoples. However, this
theory is rested on the assumption that the Western model of the liberal nation-state provided
a universal recipe for stability and justice (Freeman: 358). Despite the pronouncements on the
principle of self-determination, this is a right more often denied than protected. While the
United Nations declare that ‘all peoples have the right of self-determination’, the international
response to the increasing groups claiming this right is inconsistent – illustrated by the
recognition of East-Timor, Kosovo and Eritrea while denying it to Palestine, Kurdistan and
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Apparently not every people have the right to rule
over themselves. Is there a justification for extending this right to one nation while denying it
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to another? An answer to this question requires an understanding of the notion of the nation
which is difficult to address for “on the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It
was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the
people are” (quoted in French and Gutman: 138).
Selecting the Case
This thesis tries to clarify some of the complexities surrounding the implication of the right to
self-determination. It does so by exploring the meaning and implementation of the principle
and by virtue of presenting a case. In selecting one, I have concentrated on cases where the
question of self-determination has arisen not as a result of the decolonization process. Tibet
offers a fruitful case for exploring the implications of persisting complexities within the
principle of self-determination for many reasons aside from the fact that it is not a
decolonization case. Tibet is the subject of one of the world’s longest running ethno-territorial
conflicts. This case has been at the centre of controversy since China’s occupation led to the
1959 Lhasa uprising and the Dalai Lama’s escape to India. Moreover, the Tibet question is
interesting for it resembles contradicting perspectives relating to different proposals, covering
several International Relations issues.
Methodology
This study aims to find whether Tibetans are qualified to make a legitimate claim to the right
to self-determination. To come up with a comprehensive answer to this research question the
following sub questions need to be dealt with as well:
1) What is the meaning of the concept of self-determination?
2) To what extent are the rules on self-determination operational in the post-cold war era?
3) Has Tibet belonged to China historically? And, perhaps more important, has the PRC
acted as a legitimate government of the Tibetan people?
4) Which IR tradition suits best to explain the China-Tibet dialogue?
However, as self-determination is the right to choose whether or not to be independent, it is
not an option for Tibet’s political status. Therefore, having outlined the legal case of Tibet’s
right to self-determination, an accompanying question would be:
5) What kind of political system should Tibet have and what should its relation to China be
like?
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My analysis of the question whether Tibet should have the right to self-determination will be
framed within the tradition of political philosophy. By the ‘tradition of political philosophy’, I
mean the writings of leading figures, which I will review critically and identify what they
have in common and on what they differ in the field of self-determination. The first chapter,
as the primer part of the theoretical framework, will introduce greater clarity into debates
about the nature and validity of the claim to self-determination.
Helen Quane relates the diverse interpretations of self-determination to “the range and legal
status of the state practice on which the interpretations are based, the significance attached to
the historical context in which the principle emerged, and the extent to which writers
recognise that the meaning attributed to the principle of self-determination has evolved over
time” (Quane: 538). Therefore, chapter two tries to clarify some of the confusion around the
definition of self-determination by examining the development of it through history. Then, by
examining the relationship between law and fact in the context of self-determination, this
chapter completes the theoretical framework which will function as the basis for my analysis
of Tibet’s right to self-determination.
After having traced self-determination’s development from a political ideal into an
international legal norm, and the role that it plays in practice, I will proceed with an historical
and political overview of Tibet. In chapter three, the historical context concerns first the
historical relation between the two civilizations through a number of imperial phases and then
the period of the British imperialism for many writers argued that the Tibetan question in the
contemporary world acquired its formative shape in the context of British imperialism. The
political context concerns the Chinese and Tibetan perception on the situation by reviewing
respectively the economic reforms and the current situation in Tibet.
Approaching the political realities behind the conflict, chapter four addresses the Tibet
question from the perspective of international relations, arguing that even though marxism is
correct in its explanatory focus on the motives of the concerning actors, as realist ends reveal
behind them, an all-embracing guide to the understanding of the Tibet question would be a
combination between realist and marxist political theory.
In chapter five I will make an attempt to apply the criteria that I have examined in the
theoretical framework to legitimate the claim for self-determination. In doing so, I will focus
on the China-Tibet dialogue, and the role of the international community. The international
community is relevant considering their moral right and practical duty to intervene, to
prevent, and shorten conflicts. Their position within the Tibet question shows insights on the
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working of power in a global capitalist political economy, and the injustice in the field of
International Relations.
In the very last part of this thesis, I bring back the sub questions which helped me to
conceptualize the Tibet question within the framework of International Relations, and develop
a coherent answer to the main question whether Tibetans are qualified to make a legitimate
claim to the right to self-determination. I will conclude with resuming statements.
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1 THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
1.1 Defining the Concept
Although there are several and occasionally conflicting interpretations of the term selfdetermination, in abstract terms it can be formulated as the right of a people to determine their
own destiny, allowing them to choose their own political status and to be involved in their
economic, social, and cultural development (UNPO 1996).
The principle of self-determination is at least explainable in four different ways. First, it is not
clear whether the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’ refers to the state or to its members. A second
concern is the people who are entitled to the right to self-determination. Even though all
peoples have the right to self-determination is there a justification for extending this right to
one nation and denying it to another? A third question is whether the peoples claim to selfdetermination is leading to suppression or whether the peoples oppression is leading to the
demand for self-determination? Finally, what kind of independence would satisfy the
principle of self-determination? In other words, does self-determination mean secession
automatically? I will try to answer each of these questions respectively in the following
subparagraphs.
1.1.1 The ‘Self’ in Self-Determination
The common understanding of the principle in the beginning of its emergence was the belief
that the international community consisted of sovereign states which were recognized by each
other (Freeman: 355). This concerned their territorial integrity and right to manage their
domestic affairs without outside interference. However, as the premises on self-determination
legally evolved, the contradicting nature of the concept implied a cluster of moral and
political arguments with both internal and external implication. Internally, self-determination
could be used for freedom from outside interference. Externally, the principle has been sort of
a challenge to existing boundaries. As Cassese puts it: “In the hand of would-be states, selfdetermination is the key to opening the door and entering into that coveted club of statehood.
For existing States, self-determinations is the key for locking the door against the undesirable
from within and outside the realm” (Cassese: 6).
Charles Beitz defines the dimensional meaning of self-determination as a difference between
respectively a negative and positive requirement of autonomy. While the internal meaning
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takes the political order as it is, the external meaning threatens the established order (Beitz:
93).
In short, self-determination involves a conflict between two competing selves. While the
extern meaning entitles the right of self-determination to the state within the international
community, the intern meaning refers to the citizens of the state. This thesis will focus on the
latter.
1.1.2 The ‘Peoples’ who are entitled to the Right to Self-Determination
“On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because
the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are” (quoted in French and
Gutman: 138). The principle of self-determination clearly is difficult to use without a proper
definition of the “peoples” who are entitled to it. Ever since President Woodrow Wilson
enunciated the premises on the principle, the content and its means for implementation
remained vague until this day on. Wilson and Lenin referred to peoples as the subjects of the
right to self-determination, but they did not specify who constitutes the people, the members
of the state or the members of the nation? Even though much has already been written on this
subject, attempts to define the peoples have been unsuccessful. To start with, it is confusing
that political theorists often use the terms ‘nations’ and ‘states’ interchangeably. This
misleadingly suggests that the population of one state is similar to one nation (Moore: 901).
Misleadingly, because social, political, and economic changes caused by immigration, and the
establishment of new states inhabited by more than one nation (Tamir: 571), made the idea of
‘one nation, one state’ simply outdated.
Another interpretation of ‘peoples’ is expressed through referring it to groups of individuals
linked by a common language, history, race, and culture (Quane: 537). Even though
International Law considers the presence of such common characteristics sufficient to identify
groups eligible for self-determination, many writers reject such a consideration. Gutman and
French for example, claim that such criteria to be inadequate to distinguish a group from the
larger population of which they are part (Gutman and French: 139). They argue that a nation
is a population that calls itself a nation and is so called by others. Additionally, Immanuel
Wallerstein argues that in the interstate system reciprocal recognition is fundamental to the
legitimacy of sovereignty. Without the recognition of people’s collective identity given by
others, the existence of entities as sovereign states is excluded (Moore: 908).
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However, pessimistically, Gutman and French also write that “there is no definitive method
for ascertaining precisely which populations constitute nations and which not” (Gutman and
French: 139). This would mean that the extent of the principle is inexplicable and we do not
know which populations are supposed to have the right to determine their own government
and which not. In other words, there is no justification for extending the right to one nation
and denying it to another.
In order to prevent such a situation in which every people have the right to claim the right to
self-determination, Gutman and French come up with the assumption that nations can be
identified by the use of objective criteria. The constitution of an independent state is only
justified when significant positive consequences like an increase in individual freedom,
economic wealth or opportunities for self-realization through cultural autonomy are made
possible (Gutman and French: 140-143). This makes sense considering that claims for the
right to territorial integrity or secession are likely to arise when “socioeconomic and political
discontent becomes focused on discrepancies between the boundaries of historically and
culturally distinct communities and the borders of states whose control over these groups is
perceived as illegitimate” (Keitner: 3).
In addition to the argument made by Gutman and French, Beitz concludes that a people’s
claim to self-determination can only be justified by showing that its recognition is necessary
to create or restore just conditions: “Since the exercise of self-determination by a group
characteristically involves a change in the distribution of personal, political, and property
rights, it requires a justification against the general presumption that existing arrangements
should not be interfered without good reasons” (Beitz: 111, 112).
David Miller and John Stuart Mill have yet another understanding of the notion of a nation.
Miller defines a nation as “a community of people with an aspiration to be politically selfdetermining,” and a state as “the set of political institutions that they may aspire to possess for
themselves” (Miller: 19). Mill had an opposing view on this since he ascribed individual
freedom to the members within a community. He argues that we are to treat states as selfdetermining communities, whether or not the citizens choose their government and openly
debate the policies carried out in their name (Walzer: 87). Thus, while Miller argues that the
right derives from individual freedom, Mill asserts the other way around. Miller and Mill
therefore differ in the process by which a community arrives at that settlement. This
methodological difference actually reflects the two-folded character of democracy which
implies the rule of the majority, not responding to the needs of the individuals claiming the
right to self-determination, on one hand, and “the right of the people to choose by whom they
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are to be governed and under what political system or ideology” (Mukhi: 21), on the other
hand. The latter implication lines with Miller’s perspective which includes the choice whether
to be ruled by their own leaders, belonging to the same nationality or by external leaders.
Because in the end, it is the people’s happiness, the economical prospects that wins over the
ideologies.
Perhaps the cultural interpretation of Seton-Watson on the distinction of nation and states
makes more sense, considering that “the right of a nation to preserve its existence as a social
group (community) is distinct from the right of individuals to govern their lives and to
participate in a free and domestic political process.” Seton-Watson’s defines a state as “a legal
and political organization with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens,”
and a nation as “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of
solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness” (quoted in Tamir: 568).
Within the morality of International Relations, Beitz, like many theorists I will discuss in
paragraph 1.2, uses the aspect of political obligation. He quotes Christian Wolff to emphasize
that nations, like individuals are moral equals: “Nations are regarded as individual free
persons living in a state of nature”. Rights and obligations of the nations, like peoples, are the
same. Wolff also writes: “Since by nature all nations are equal, since moreover all men are
equal in a moral sense whose rights and obligations are the same; the rights and obligations of
all nations are also by nature the same.” (Beitz: 75). Beitz makes a link to the state by
claiming that the state might be given a moral character by constructing its rights and liberties
on a foundation of individual rights and liberties. As Michael Walzer writes, “the rights of
states rest on the consent of their members.” The social contract which shapes a common life
is to be understood as “a metaphor for a process of association and mutuality”. Thus, the state
not only protects its citizens’ individual freedom, it also safeguards their shared life and the
independent community they have made (Walzer: 54). But it is the consent of the individual
citizens that provides the underpinnings of the state’s autonomy and secures the analogy with
individual liberty: “Given a genuine contract, it makes sense to say that the territorial integrity
and political sovereignty can be defended in exactly the same way as individual life and
liberty” (Beitz: 77). The consent of citizens justifies a right of autonomy for their government.
Because, following Benn and Peters, states are “associations of individuals with their own
common interests and aspirations, expressed within a common tradition” (Beitz: 78). Then the
autonomy of states would rest on one aspect of the autonomy of persons, namely their liberty
to associate in pursuit of common ends. Therefore state governments are representatives of
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persons exercising their freedom of association. The liberty of states is a consequence of the
liberty of persons to associate.
In contrast to Beitz’ view, moral philosopher John Rawls distinguishes peoples from states by
emphasizing their moral character and reasonability, which he claims is missing with states
because their rationality excludes the reasonable (Rawls: 27-28). As Thucydides marked the
underpinnings of international relations, the content of world politics is led by the struggles of
states for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy (Doyle: 81). The
interests of states do not allow them to be stable for the right reasons as people.
Further, Rawls refers the moral nature of people to patriotism. He argues that their moral
nature includes a certain pride of their history and achievements. The due respect they ask for
is a due respect consistent with the equality of all peoples (Rawls: 45). This presumption
seems to link Gutman and French’ recognition and Beitz’ moral character founded by
characteristics of what International Law requires.
All in all, it seems logical to presume that state and nation are two aspects of the same
concept. One relating to the institutional sphere, and the other to the individuals who comprise
the formation it. As Tamil puts it: “the nation symbolizes a belief in the existence of special
ties and obligations among members of the nation” (Tamil: 568). However, while political
philosophy is not able to provide a clear definition of a people, international law luckily is.
According to UNESCO’s definition, a people is a group of individuals who (a) enjoy some or
all the following common features: (i) a common historical tradition, (ii) racial or ethnic
identity; (iii) cultural homogeneity; (iv) linguistic unity; (v) religious or ideological affinity;
(vi) territorial connection; (vii) common economic life. (b) must be of a certain number who
need not be large (e.g., the people of micro states) but must be more than mere association of
individuals within a state; (c) must have as a whole the will to be identified as a people or the
consciousness of being a people - allowing that groups or some members of such groups,
though sharing the foregoing characteristics, may not have the will or consciousness, and last;
(d) possibly must have institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics
and will for identity (TPPRC: 4-8).
1.1.3 Incentives to the Claim to Self-Determination
While colonization was the main incentive to the claim to self-determination in the pre-Cold
War era, today, as many groups are seeking for independence, it is relevant to ask again
whether the demand is leading to suppression or whether it is the other way around. In other
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words, ‘which came first, the chicken or the egg?’ Although it is very likely to accept the
presumption that the demand for autonomy encourages states to suppress their people in the
name of national security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, in many cases it is not the
peoples claiming self-determination who first use force. Consider the suffering caused to the
people of Abkhazia by the Georgian and Russian blockade around Abkhazia, the increase in
Indonesian repression on East Timor, and the Bosnian people of Sanjak who were denied
constitutional rights and then subjected to military and police terror 1 (Moore: 901).
Approaching this issue from deontological point of view, International Law declares that
states have the legal duty to fulfil three fundamental tasks. The first one is to protect all the
members of the state, the population. The second one is to promote the social, economic, and
cultural welfare of that population. And the third is to represent the interests of that population
internationally. If a state fails to fulfil these tasks over a period of time, and instead represses
the people it is supposed to protect, destroys their culture, economically exploits them, or
represents other interests than those of the people, then that state lacks legitimacy in respect of
all the members of the state or of that part of the population which it oppresses (Herzer 1999:
3, 55).
In addition to the legal perspective on the adequacy of state functioning, Michael C. van Walt
van Praag, legal adviser to the Dalai Lama, argues that the more a people is oppressed and its
identity is denied by the rulers, the stronger grows the desire for national identification and
recognition. Therefore, the urge for independence would be reduced if states would respect
the desire of diverse peoples to express their own cultural traditions (UNPO 1996). Thus, the
issue is not how to suppress the many claims for self-determination. It is rather how to ensure
that states do respect the rights and aspirations of peoples and minorities within their borders.
1.1.4 Self-Determination, Autonomy and Independence
Like many writers, Robert Ewin claims that territory is necessary if the people are to be selfgoverning for the reason that historical connection with a territory might be psychologically
important in self-identification as a people: “If they are to be self-governing, they must be
self-governing somewhere” (Ewin: 2). Indeed, the common understanding of the principle in
the beginning of its emergence was the belief that international society consisted of sovereign
states which were recognized by each other (Freeman: 355). This contained their territorial
integrity and right to manage their domestic affairs without outside interference. However, the
1
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/1996/19960802.sanjak.html, last visited April 29, 2008.
16
right to self-determination does not necessarily mean secession from an existing state.
Exercise of this right can result in a wide range of outcomes. Although in some cases
demands for autonomy may be satisfied only by the emergence of a new independent state in
which sovereign authority can be exercised, in other cases successful autonomy may imply no
more than the demand of a national entity to protect its identity and its members ability to
‘enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language’ 2 (Hannum: 4). This means that the self-determination claim does not have a
territorial component necessarily, and thus need not mean independence. Non-territorial
autonomy means that a particular entity is granted autonomy rights and all its members can
enjoy these rights, regardless of where they live on the territory of their “host-state” (Weller
and Wolff: 15). Early implementations of this kind of autonomy were related primarily to
cultural and/or religious groups. The Ottoman Empire adopted the so-called ‘millet’ 3 system,
according to which non-Muslim communities enjoyed some degree of religious and cultural
autonomy.
Autonomy within a larger nation-state, however, offers the best of both worlds, combining the
benefits of being part of a great state in terms of defence, foreign relations and economic
opportunities, with preservation of local laws, customs and culture (Harris 2008). Hong Kong
is a well defined example of this autonomous arrangement.
All in all, the importance lies within the right to choose. Margaret Moore even emphasizes
that because the principle endangered the unity of many multi-national states, after 1945 selfdetermination was interpreted as not implying a right to secession (Moore: 901).
1.2 Self-Determination and IR
In the international arena, which lacks a single sovereign source of law and order, political
theories are based on the interdependence of theory and practice, achieved through a
combination of “utopia and reality” (Carr: 14). In this regard theories help to structure the
interpretation of history in the present and past and shape attitudes towards policies because,
“history and historical analysis are different from contemporary politics and political analysis
only in time” (Doyle: 23).
The discipline of international relations can be divided along comparative lines between
realism, liberalism, and marxism. These three traditions are the main worldviews which have
2
3
Article 27, General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
‘Millet’ means ‘people’ in Turkish
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shaped our perception to world politics. Yet, John Rawls’s Theory of Justice provides a clear
illustration of the finding that the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Mill or Marx on
the intern meaning of self-determination is minimalistic for the justification of state borders is
being left out and then all issues relating to the membership. (Buchanan: 348). Therefore, I
will address the issue by their perspective on international law and morality as foundations for
self-determination. In this order, marxists and liberals defend the principle. The marxists do
so to promote socialist revolution, and the liberals to protect and promote human rights
(Doyle: 419). The realists, ignoring the element of morality in any world order, will defend
only the extern meaning of the principle to secure the sovereign (Carr: 136).
1.2.1 Realism
Realism 4 has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic
International Relations. This tradition was shaped by the Greek historian Thucydides twentyfive hundred years ago. Machiavelli in the sixteenth century, Hobbes in the seventeenth
century, and Rousseau in the eighteenth century laid the modern foundations of the core of
contemporary realism (Baylis & Smith: 162).
The realist rejection of self-determination, including the territorial component, can be
explained by three main arguments. First, according to Hobbes, whether or not a people
within the boundaries of a state may enjoy the right to self-determination is a matter of
domestic jurisdiction of the state (Koksennieni: 249). However, he claims that the intern
meaning of self-determination is a political principle that clearly disturbs the sovereignty of
established states or the stability of the international community. Realists recognize the
principle of self-determination as an expression of interests and reject the right as it
undermines established authority and thus creates a situation of anarchy within national
boundaries. They explain that nations simply do not possess distinctive common
characteristics to restrict the principle of self-determination to particular peoples. In this
4
Realism in the international relations meaning consists in the idea that interests, anarchy, and power shape
world politics (Jackson: 7). Realists focus on interests rather than ideologies. The state is the principal actor in
international politics. Outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a condition of anarchy exists. Under
anarchy, the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed. The survival of the state within international politics
depends on power, which is defined narrowly in military strategic terms. The power-seeking behaviour of states
is rooted in the biological drives of human beings. The balance of power is therefore not natural, it must be
constructed (Morgenthau: 4).
18
matter any group could establish an independent state where they desire, which inevitably
results in anarchy.
A second argument concerns the doubt of the efficacy of international law and morality.
Realists tend to see all states as caught in a state of war which the only source of security is
self-help (Doyle: 390). Their strong belief in the state as sovereign and the lack of on
overarching international authority does not permit them to recognize the existence of
international organizations and thus reject the principle committed to the values of the United
Nations to begin with. The state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws (Baylis and
Smith: 172). Besides, as realists distinguish ethics from law, it may be oppressive or immoral.
Law can be used by the state as an instrument of coercion against those who oppose their
power. The law therefore is the weapon of the stronger: “The spirit of the laws of all countries
is to favour the strong against the weak and him that has against him that has not. This
drawback is inevitable and there are no exceptions to it” (Rousseau quoted in Carr: 164, 165).
They explain that the base of law is that certain rights are claimed by people for an end that
often is different than is presumed in the beginning.
A final argument is covered by Thucydides, who noted that rules are only fit for relations
among equals. Among unequals, the only rules that count are the will of the strong and the
obedience of the weak (Doyle: 391). This is an argument to which I shall return in the outline
of the marxist thought.
1.2.2 Marxism
Although some argue that marxist thought ended with the collapse of Communist Party rule in
the Soviet Union, and that the future is liberal and capitalist (Baylis: 226), there are many
signs to believe that the marxist contribution to the study of International Relations is
significant to our understanding of world politics. This stream perhaps can even be called as
one of the most progressive within the tradition of International Relations for it believes that
knowledge must reflect a certain context, a certain time, and a certain space (Baylis and
Smith: 227).
In general, the Marxist perspective on self-determination, as a part of international law, is
sceptic. To start with, by emphasizing on the relativity of law, Marx argues that all law is a
“law of inequality”. Like Thucydides, Marx argued that law reflects not an ethical standard,
but the policy and interests of the ruling class that govern international society. In this regard,
Lenin said that “the right to self-determination of small nations is made illusory by the
19
development of the great capitalist powers and by imperialism” 5 . He emphasized his
scepticism on the attainability of the principle by citing Karl Kautsky: “This ‘best’ national
state is only an abstraction, which can easily be developed and defended theoretically, but
which does not correspond to reality” 6 . In Theses on the Right of Nations to SelfDetermination, Lenin sought the meaning of self-determination not in general concepts of
law, but rather in the economic history of national movements during the Russian Programme
of 1903. He then defined the self-determination of nations as the political separation of
nations from oppressed bodies, and the formation of an independent state. The marxist
thought, that economic factors give rise to the urge to create new states, means that they
restrict the definition of self-determination to the political field only. Marxists thus argue that
the right to self-determination necessarily involves a claim to territory.
A second argument concerns the thought that state borders among nations are semi fictions
and not seen as fundamental dividing blocks of world politics (Doyle: 392, 393). Classes, by
overarching national discrepancies, challenge the sovereignty of a state. As a reaction to the
resolution of the London International Congress of 1896, Marx advocated the separation of
Ireland from England because after the separation there may come federation (between the
working classes of both England and Ireland). In this order, despite of their scepticism, both
Lenin and Stalin were strong proponents of the principle of self-determination, insofar as its
exercise would promote class struggle:
“The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively the right to independence in the
political sense, the right to free political separation from the oppressor nation. Specifically,
this demand for political democracy implies complete freedom to agitate for secession and for
the decision on secession to be made by a referendum of the seceding nation. This demand,
therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of
small states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national
oppression.” (Lenin quoted in Hannum: 32).
Thus, socialist support for self-determination was rather a tactical than a philosophical
decision.
5
6
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch08.htm
Ibidem.
20
1.2.3 Liberalism
Liberalism is anchored in the idealist tradition in the way that it believes in a constructed
peace. The liberal thought is recognizable by certain characteristics such as individual
freedom, equality of opportunity, political participation, and private property. The premise
that the individual is the core unit in the moral universe leads then to the recognition that
individual liberty implicates moral freedom (Buchanan: 350).
Whereas Realists and Marxists believe that the principle of self-determination in some way or
another promotes a cause of war, the Liberals believe this principle is the key to world peace.
One would think that self-determination is an illustration of the principal element within
liberal theory: “This commitment grounds the liberal mandate that the state must not interfere
with a citizen’s sphere of autonomy (often this sphere is thought to correspond roughly to her
self-regarding behaviour)” (Wellman: 143). Giuseppe Mazzini, who embodied the liberal
nineteenth-century philosophy of nationalism, believed that each nation, by developing its
own nationalism, could make its own special contribution to the international harmony of
interests and thus promote the cause of internationalism and the decline of imperialism (Carr:
46, 47). Most liberal writers continued to believe this perception right down to 1918. Perhaps
one of the most famous advocates was United States president Woodrow Wilson. He outlined
a liberal system of peace and prosperity which rested on free economic relations and
international organizations. At the centre of this system was the ideal that the way towards
peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool their resources and even surrender
some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or
respond to regional problems (Baylis and Smith: 210-212). Self-determination, hence, is a
point of conflict between two values which liberals find fundamental to their philosophy:
universalism on the one hand, and the right to autonomy on the other. Despite their
commitment to individual liberty, liberals think of sovereign states as the equivalent of free
individuals, and like realists they believe a society of equals who form a nation and a state on
a basis of common interests (Shalit: 907). But if individuals have moral rights with which the
state must not interfere then what are the conditions and restrictions of these rights? Liberal
theory frankly has had little to say about this aspect.
1.2.4 Common Grounds
Even though it is hard to turn to leading figures of political philosophy for guidance to
approach the theory of self-determination, the political obligations are virtually used by all
21
theorists in the analogy of individual liberty and community. Both realists and idealists seem
to take the same position on human freedom in terms of the political obligations of selfdetermining individuals. The contradicting streams of international relations come together in
the social contract theory, which is crystallized by Rawls and contemplated by Hobbes,
Rousseau, Locke, and Kant, by means of forming the theoretical groundwork of democracy.
In the social contract theory, individuals in the state of nature agree to a contract that defines
the basic rights and duties of members of a society. Such social contract implies that the
people give up some rights to a government or authority in order to receive or jointly preserve
social order. Rousseau made the crucial move by relating the rational individual will to the
General Will, so that obligations owed to the state were owed by the citizen to him or herself.
(Mayall: 477). His creation of a social contract would liberate citizens from inequality and
subjection (Doyle: 145). John Stuart Mill had an opposing view since he associated the nation
state with individual liberty. In his essay on representative governments, Mill emphasized that
the essence of human freedom is to be able to choose “with which of the various collective
bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves” (Mill: 427). Thus, like stated
above, it is about the right to choose freely by whom to be governed.
Another point of commonality is that the freedom of a political community can be won only
by the members of that community. Members of a political community must seek for their
own freedom, just as the individual must develop his own virtue. Self-determination, then, is
the right of a people to become free by their own efforts. In this regard, Mill believes that
citizens get the government for which they are ‘fit’ (Walzer: 87-88), which is similar to the
marxist thought that liberation can come only through the workers themselves. And, selfdetermination then comes in accordance to the realist premise of ‘a survival of the fittest’.
In the confrontation of Tom Paine with Thomas Burke about the dilemma that governments
arise either out of people or over the people, Carr reacts that they do both: “Coercion and
conscience, enmity and good will, self-assertion and self-subordination, are present in every
political society. The state is built up out of these two conflicting aspects of human nature.
Utopia and reality, the ideal and the institution, morality and power, are from the outset
inextricably blended in it” (Carr: 92).
1.3 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the first sub question, which is: What is the meaning of the concept of
self-determination? The search for a better understanding in political philosophy was also not
22
that sufficient in a way that within many theories, the justification of state borders is being left
out and then all issues relating to the membership. The significant effect of identity on
interests and thus behaviour is being ignored.
All in all, it is yet more relevant to see in what extent the right to self-determination is
operationable in the practice as I shall examine in the following chapter.
23
2 NORMS AND PRACTICES
Political philosophy of any time is, as Hegel said, “nothing but the spirit of that time
contemporary affairs” (quoted in Wilson: 197). He was right as the key premises on the
principle of self-determination were formed and crystallized in the wake of the First World
War, the Second World War and the Cold War (Cassese: 4, 5).
2.1 Self-Determination in Historical Context
The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the French Revolution
(1789), which was applied only to changes in state’s borders. Minorities were not considered
to have a right to self-determination, neither were ethnic or religious groups. The principle did
not refer to the peoples’ right to choose freely by whom to be governed. The concept first
spread from France to Italy, where in the nineteenth century Giuseppe Mazzini invoked it to
realize the unification of Italy. Then, with the advent of the First World War and the
Bolshevik Revolution, self-determination emerged on the international scene (Cassesse: 1113). Lenin and Wilson embraced the concept for different reasons. At the same time as Lenin
was promoting self-determination with an eye towards a worldwide socialist revolution,
Wilson was developing his own thought referring the principle to “those nations and
territories whose destinies had to be resettled in one way or another because they had been
unsettled by the war”. For Wilson it was the key to lasting peace in Europe (Rigo Sureda: 95).
2.1.1 The strange Alliance of Wilson and Lenin
Lenin was the first to insist that the right to self-determination to be established as a general
criterion for the liberation of oppressed peoples. This was, in turn, to contribute to the success
of the socialist revolution. The principle of self-determination was “the political extension of
Lenin’s economic analysis of imperialism” (Cassesse: 15).
Lenin and other Soviet political leaders conceived self-determination as having three
components. First, it could be invoked by ethnic or national groups claiming for the right to
decide their destiny freely and thus all groups, not only those living under colonial rule, were
to have the right to secede from the power to which they were attached to, or, to demand
autonomy while remaining part of the state. Second, it was a principle to be applied during the
aftermath of military conflicts between sovereign states, for the allocation of territories to one
or another power. Third, it was an anti-colonial premise designed to lead to liberation of all
colonial countries (Cassesse: 16, 17).
24
However, the flaw of Lenin’s conception of self-determination was notable when the October
Revolution, as an expression of the people’s will, led to a denial of the right of ethnic and
national groups to choose their destiny. The socialist causes (overthrow of the bourgeois
government and the achievement of socialism) always took priority over the principle.
Ultimately, the principle of self-determination was promoted only in so far as it furthered the
class struggle. The philosophical ideal was employed as a strategic tool, which had nothing to
do with the moral aspect (Cassesse: 18).
For Wilson, self-determination consisted of the right of peoples freely to choose their
government. He advocated a fourth component of self-determination not considered by Lenin,
which concerned the requirement of the peoples of each state to be granted the right freely to
select state authorities and political leaders. Self-rule then implies participation in the
processes of the government. He stated that: “Every people has the right to choose the
sovereignty under which they shall live” (Wilson: 198). Self-determination thus meant selfgovernment. As the First World War progressed, Wilsonian self-determination shifted
towards a more international level: Peoples were to be free to choose their sovereign
(Cassesse: 19). Wilson thus propounded four different variants of self-determination. First, he
advocated the right of each people to choose the government under which it would live.
Second, relating to the restructuring of the states of central Europe in accordance with
national desires, Wilson insisted that self-determination should be the guiding principle in the
creation of independent states out of the remains of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
empires and the reconstruction of Europe. Third, Wilson promoted self-determination as a
criterion governing territorial change. Fourth, he took self-determination into account for the
purpose of settling colonial claims (Cassesse: 19, 20).
The most crucial point, on which Lenin and Wilson differed, was the different way of
implementing self-determination. Whereas Lenin saw self-determination as a revolutionary
principle for radically redistributing power within existing states, Wilson imagined selfdetermination as a principle to be implemented in an orderly, non-violent manner under the
guidance of International Law (in accordance with the League of Nations) (Cassese: 21-23).
2.1.2 The Aftermath of the First World War
The principle of self-determination developed gradually as the central authorities of the
Ottoman, Austrian, German, and Russian empires began to weaken military and politically.
Demands for greater autonomy or self-government often led to demands for independence.
25
With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires during World War I,
territory of the former empires required new sovereigns and as Hannum puts it: “the principle
of self-determination became the obvious vehicle for the re-division of Europe by the
victorious powers” (Hannum: 27).
However, when it came to making the peace treaties, the people’s will was to a large extent
subordinated to geopolitical and strategic interests. The arbitrary manner in which the great
powers decided which populations were entitled to the right to self-determination, took away
the trust in the justful application of such a right. Remarkable though, is the fact that the great
powers did not insist that the new emerged states should adopt a democratic government. In
other words, they were not required to rule with the “consent of the governed” (Cassesse: 26,
27). Another flaw was the fact that although Wilson insisted that the principle of selfdetermination be recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations, even a draft did not
come through the adoption of the Covenant (Hannum: 32). Thus, although the right to selfdetermination was an integral part of the political thought in the era of the First World War, it
was not considered an international legal norm. State sovereignty and territorial integrity
remained of more importance.
2.1.3 Becoming an International Standard
During the Second World War US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill affirmed the primacy of the principle of self-determination when they
incorporated it into the 1941 Atlantic Charter (UNPO 1996). With the collapse of imperialism
and the post-World War II movement toward colonial independence, the principle of selfdetermination made its next appearance in the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conversations at which
the current United Nations was formulated. Self-Determination entered the realm of
international law in 1945, when it was proclaimed in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter which
states that:
The purposes of the United States are to develop friendly relations among nations based on the
respect of the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples.
However, this treaty laid down the principle in a rather loose and weak form, which can be
seen in two respects. First, states were unable to define self-determination decently for the
concept of self-determination can only be negatively deduced. In this regard, self-
26
determination did not mean (i) the right of a minority or an ethnic group to secede from a
sovereign country; (ii) the right of a colonial people to achieve political independence; (iii)
the right of the people of a sovereign state freely to choose its rulers through free elections.
This implies that the principle only means self-government and self-government did not mean
independence. Second, since self-determination was conceived primarily as a goal of the
organization, and since the UN Charter neither defined self-determination precisely nor
distinguished between the internal and external self-determination, the Charter did not impose
immediate legal obligations on member states (Cassesse: 42, 43).
However, in the era after the Second World War, things were soon to change as selfdetermination’s emphasis shifted from peaceful relations among sovereign states to
independence from colonial rule. Self-determination lent moral and political support to the
aspirations of colonial countries, especially by socialist states. Moreover, the UN served as an
international forum promoting the gradual crystallization of legal rules concerning this issue
(Cassesse: 44-46).
In 1966, at the legislative level this process resulted in the adoption of Article 1 in both the
UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Cassesse: 66). For the purposes of the discussion in this thesis the relevant
articles 7 are as follows:
Article 1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development.
Article 27. In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language.
Article 1 requires that the people choose their political leaders freely from any manipulation
or influence from domestic authorities. In this regard, in order to understand the exact
meaning of internal self-determination one must refer to other provisions of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Internal self-determination presupposes that all members of a
population are to be allowed to exercise those rights and freedoms which permit the
7
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966
27
expression of the will. Thus, internal self-determination is best explained as the totality of
rights embodied in the Covenant. Only when individuals are afforded these rights can it be
said that the whole people enjoys the right of self-determination. However, the democratic
model as is outlined in the Covenant, is so general and abstract that states can easily pretend
that they live up to it, even when they do not.
In short, the Covenants did not really reflect the political trends (calling for the end to
colonialism) prevailing in the world order. While the majority of member states insisted on
self-determination as a colonial principle, at the legislative level a much broader notion of
self-determination was upheld (Cassesse: 53-55). The loose standard the principle poses, does
not define the units of self-determination or matters to which it applies, neither does it
explains the means or methods of its implementation. In particular, it does not specify
whether self-determination should have an internal or external dimension, nor does it point to
the objective of self-determination (independence, accession to another state, a particular form
of autonomy etc.). The principle simply sets out general guidelines for state behaviour
(Cassesse: 128). Like Cassesse puts it: “Here we find strange bedfellows: ideological
differences and texts which are carefully drafted as not to rattle any skeletons in their
respective cupboards” (Cassese: 6). However, as loose and two folded the text of Article 1
may be, it was the very first time that International Law pronounced a right to be universal in
its application.
2.2 Theory versus Practice
Colonialism has influenced many situations of ethnic conflict, as colonial policies escalated
existing ethnic tensions and introduced new minorities to former nationally homogeneous
territories (Hannum: 456).
Although self-determination primarily was entitled to colonial people, the International
Covenants decided not to limit the right to self-determination to peoples under colonial rule.
However, even though in practice the implementation of this principle to classical colonial
cases liberated a billion people from colonial rule in the post World War II period, applying
the principle to peoples other than those in classical colonial context can be questioned.
28
2.2.1 Self-Determination in the post World War II era
The right has been successfully claimed by the peoples of India, Nigeria, Mozambique,
Algeria, and by the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (UNPO 1996). Singapore’s
secession from the Greater Malaysian Union in 1965, is even a case where a part of a
federated state has peacefully achieved secession outside the realm of law. Another situation
where the question of self-determination has arisen as a result of non colonization is Quebec.
Quebec is interesting not only because it concerns a political claim which is not supported by
law, but because it shows that the international principle of self-determination has such a
broad scope that it can reach out to areas that seem, at first sight, to be totally unrelated to any
international legal regulation. Although in this case international rules do not grant any legal
entitlement to the people concerned, all parties concerned agreed that no solution should be
found that is contrary to the wishes of the relevant population by means of a referendum
(Cassesse: 248-253).
Even though self-determination is to a large extent more accepted in the area of
decolonization, the cases of Western Sahara, Eritrea, and East Timor, show that still a number
of problems arise when the legal rules are applied. How come the peoples of such welldefined colonial cases were put in so much trouble for their claim to self-determination? In
the case of Western Sahara and Eritrea, the conflicting political and economic interests at
stake have impeded the rapid realization of self-determination. In Western Sahara, the
implementation of the right to self-determination was complicated for three reasons. The first
complication concerned the economic considerations on account of the rich deposits of
phosphates. Only when these resources were discovered, Spain did effectively occupy the
whole area (resulting in economic exploitation). The second problem concerned the political
and territorial claims of both Morocco and Mauritania. They claimed that Western Sahara
constituted an integral part of their territory. The last stumbling block was the immigration of
large numbers of Moroccans into the Sahara. In both cases, the holding of a referendum was
the only way of allowing the population to make a free choice (a choice already made in
Eritrea, under UN supervision, resulting in the achievement of independence in 1993)
(Cassesse: 215-222). However, the referendum in Western Sahara, which would allow the
Saharawi people to choose freely between independence and integration with Morocco (who
had occupied the former Spanish colony after Spain’s departure), was not that easy. The
referendum is delayed because of disagreement over the identities of those able to vote.
Morocco insisted that the votes of its own citizens would be included (Heath 2005: 246, 247).
29
The case of East Timor is particularly interesting in a way that the claim to self-determination
under UN supervision was rejected at the time of decolonization, and Indonesia has
incorporated East Timor as part of its territory. Under foreign military occupation, the people
of East Timor were not permitted freely to express their will. Thus, on factual level, the matter
has been resolved purely by the use of force. Moreover, this outcome was to some extent
made possible by the concerns of the US (Cassesse: 223).
2.2.2 Self-Determination in the post Cold War era
Many writers argue that the gap between declared international norms and their application
significantly increased in the post-Cold War era. Applying the principle of self-determination
outside the classical colonial context in this era can be questioned. Robert Falk stated that the
developments of the Balkan crisis in the 1990s have widened the gap between the “coherence
of doctrines and the incoherence of experience” (Falk: 47, 48). The denial of selfdetermination to Kosovars and Bosnian Serbs raised serious questions as it illustrated the gap
between law and fact. However, simultaneously, the implementation of the principle had
contradicting features as it recognised the seceding republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia
(Kovacs: 436).
As Cassesse stated, law is limited to intervening only when political solutions have been
found and there is a need for their ordination in norms and institution. The legal rules do not
grant any right to self-determination, International Law plays only a guiding role in that all
parties concerned agree at least on one issue: any decision as to the future of a state must be
taken by the people by means of a referendum (Cassesse: 253, 254).
2.3 Conclusion
By questioning to what extent the existence of the right to self-determination shape state
behaviour and influence the outcome of complex cases, I examined the second sub question
which deals with the role this principle plays in practice.
It seems that even though the Human Rights Committee of the UN declared that the
implementation of the right to self-determination is an essential condition for the guarantation
of human rights, the correlation between the violation of these rights and the justification of
the right to self-determination in practice is not that self-evident. Practice shows that the
application of the right to self-determination actually depends not only on legal norms. For
example, not all countries value human rights in the same way (Heath: 233, 238).
30
3 HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL TIBET
Tibet was invaded in October 1950 by the army of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter:
PRC), and has been occupied ever since. Mao Zedong replaced the ancient feudal system with
marxist principles and practices. The Chinese administration exercised a harsh authority and
alienated the people. U-Tsang, the central part of Tibet, became the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), with a Communist-led administration and Lhasa remained the capital (Heath:
15).
3.1 Historical Analysis
Tibet’s historical status is difficult for there are two different interpretations on one shared
history. While the Dalai Lama insists that Tibet has always been an independent political
entity, China claims that Tibet has been part of China since the Yuan dynasty of the thirteenth
century (Sautman 2002: 82).
3.1.1 Priest-Patron Relation
The relations between Tibet and China originated in the Tang dynasty (618-907) when
princess Wen Cheng was given in marriage to Tibetan king Songtsang Gampo. The princess
is seen as a benefactor who brought civilization to the nation-state Tibet. At the end of
China’s Song dynasty (1279), both Tibet and China were conquered by the Mongols. The
Mongol’s Yuan dynasty occupied most of Asia. The Buddhism of Tibet spread to the Mongol
Court, which recognized the authority of Tibet’s lama to act as a spiritual guide of the Mongol
emperor of China. In addition to his religious role, the Mongol emperor gave him also
political power within Tibet (temporal protection). This was the beginning of the special
relation between the two powers, known as the ‘priest-patron relationship’. Thus, the Mongols
did not rule Tibet directly. For the Tibetans, this special relation was to become the basis for
ties between China and Tibet that lasted into the twentieth century. Unrelated to territorial
sovereignty or military conquest, it was essentially a spiritual bond (Donnet: 56-58).
When the Mongol empire fell, it was replaced in China by the Ming dynasty. During this
period Tibet and China had virtually no contact. China’s claim that ‘Tibet has been part of
China historically’ is based largely on the subsequent period of Manchu rule, known as the
Qing dynasty (1644-1911). However, China’s relation with Tibet during the Qing dynasty
was essentially friendly. Unlike the other provinces China had conquered, China treated Tibet
and Mongolia rather differently. Tibet and Mongolia were special administrative divisions,
31
they had total autonomy over their domestic affairs, and thus were not directly subordinate to
the Qing court. Only under circumstances of foreign invasions and in repressing rebellions the
Qing army would be dispatched to Tibet to assist them. Then, taking advantage of the
commotion within the Qing army during the 1911 Chinese revolution, the Tibetans organized
an uprising and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama announced Tibet’s independence. During the forty
years from the revolution through 1950, despite of the great efforts the Chinese government
made to incorporate Tibet into China, Tibet was essentially an independent country
(Changchin: 3-7) (Yung-Chin: 121-123).
3.1.2 Issue of Sovereignty and Independence
By the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Tibet had become the
focus of the rivalry between Britain and Russia in the Central Asian region. In the beginning
Britain accepted Chinese suzerainty and sought to operationalize their interests within Tibet
through China. The British tolerated this situation until they perceived a serious threat to their
security and the Indian empire. Fearing an increase in Russian influence over Tibet, the
British policy towards Tibet took a geopolitical turn: it was now perceived as a buffer zone.
Therefore, after playing with the idea of influencing Tibet through China, Britain decided to
take matters in its own hands. The secretary of state in London stated: “We regard the socalled suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction, as a political affection which
has been maintained because of its convenience to both parties” (quoted in Anand 2006: 292).
Despite the political compulsions of the so-called Great Game as primary motive behind the
British invasion in Tibet (1904), the refusal of Tibet to conduct normal relations with the
British eventually had the upper hand. Tibet was made subservient to British India. (Anand
2006: 290-292). Peking first turned a deaf ear to the Tibetans’ appeal for help. It was not until
Tibet signed a treaty in which it would seek British assent before signing an agreement with
any other foreign power and recognized Tibet’s independent status, that China protested,
declaring that such an agreement would “rob China of its suzerainty”. After long negotiating,
Britain reverted to its old stance when it signed a treaty with China in 1906 declaring that
China was exempted from the list of foreign countries with which Tibet was not to sign an
agreement without London’s permission (Donnet: 60-62). At this time British commercial
interests in China made the pretence of Chinese suzerainty a wise stance. China’s exclusive
rights in Tibet were recognized without naming those rights as sovereignty or suzerainty.
However, it was a treaty between Britain and Russia that the relations between China and
32
Tibet were referred to that China had ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet. Dibesh Anand argues that such
an occurrence “reflects how non-Western people and communities were ‘written over’ by the
Western powers in their own terms and then the victims were forced to use the language of
the powerful” (Anand: 93). In 1912, Britain clarified that while recognizing the Chinese
suzerainty, they were not prepared to admit the right of China to interfere in the internal
administration of Tibet. Hence, Tibet would become an autonomous state under Chinese
suzerainty and British protectorate. The Simla Convention, however, was not ratified by the
Chinese government. As the Chinese learnt modern diplomatic language, they began to assert
their relationship in terms of sovereignty rather than suzerainty. Tibetans on the other hand,
were late in adjusting to the modern world and continued to refuse to comply with any treaties
between British India and China concerning it. Thus, the contemporary claim that Tibet is an
integral part of China arised out of Western influences (Anand 2006: 292, 293). Mao
Zedong’s thinking went from permitting independence to insisting on unification when he
proclaimed the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Under Mao’s leadership, China invaded
Tibet to ‘liberate’ the people from serfdom and slavery under the rule of an oppressive feudal
system and ‘civilize the ignorant barbarians’ (Donnet: 42).
In 1951, when Mao proposed the Seventeen Point Agreement, for the first time in history
Tibet acknowledged Chinese sovereignty. However, according to this agreement Tibetan
people have the right to exercise regional autonomy under the guidance of the central
authority (Article 3). It provides that the position and authority of the Dalai Lama would be
maintained, and the existing political system would not be changed (Article 4). Thus, the
Tibetan delegation signed an agreement through which Tibet was to control its internal affairs
but cede control over external affairs to China: the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement.
This kind of autonomy, however, came to an end with the Lhasa uprising in 1951 (Baogang:
75). Elements of this autonomy were restored at the beginning of the 1980s, but renounced
after demonstrations in Lhasa in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Sautman and Dreyer: 11).
3.2 Tibet under Communist Rule
Many Western writers criticized China’s economic reforms, arguing that development policy
in Tibet benefits Chinese rather than Tibetans. Pierre-Antoine Donnet, for example, states:
“From the point of view of economic performance, after forty years of Chinese Marxism,
Tibet’s situation looks disastrous from any angle” (Donnet: 149). Gabriel Lafitte similarly
33
argues that despite the financial input, Tibet ranks last on the UN list along with countries like
Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Mozambique (Goldstein 2003: 759). The Chinese
government argues otherwise. Although it recognizes that Tibet is one of the poorest areas in
China, it is convinced of the benefits they have brought to the Tibetan people (Dreyer: 129).
However, virtually all publications on development in Tibet are used to substantiate historical
and ideological claims. Contradicting evidence is suppressed and a nationwide survey of Tibet
forbidden. The substantial difference between Chinese reporting of the situation in Tibet and
what Tibetans say themselves, makes it difficult to make statements about the economic and
political realities (Heath: 16).
3.2.1 Chinese Positions and Strategies
China’s claim over Tibet is based on a version of history that sees the contemporary state as a
successor to a longer history of Chinese civilization marked by a number of imperial phases.
Tibet was historically linked with various Chinese empires and therefore as part of China.
What the exact status of Tibet was within the different empires is not considered to be
relevant. Important is that Tibet was subordinate to the Chinese empires. It is this
subservience that underpins the belief of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet forever. A second
contention on which China’s claim is based, is the fact that all of the world’s governments go
along with it, or at any rate, do not seriously challenge China perception for strategic
considerations or economic gain. Finally, there is the indisputable fact that the Chinese
Communists invaded Tibet in 1951 and by 1959 replaced the ancient regime there. Since then,
the Chinese believe they have achieved legitimacy through “quashing the old order of feudal
slavery” (Seymour: xiii).
Mao Zedong’s intentions to replace Tibet’s outdated feudal society with communism, was to
“liberate the serfs and slaves so that they would enjoy a basic human right: individual
freedom” (Mingxu and Feng: 311). 8 This caused much resistance among upper-class monks
8
The pre-communist economy of Tibet was traditional in a way that it was pre-industrial in all sectors of
economic life. The Tibetan economy consisted of three sectors: agriculture, pastoralism, and trade. Agriculture
was dominant. But land ownership was not based on private property for the economic base of Tibetan society
was formed by the practice of feudalism (Norbu: 152, 153). The Tibetan society was divided into three classes
and nine grades. The aristocracy, the grand lamas and the leadership, belonged to the superior class. Monks and
ordinary lamas, lower-ranking government servants and the agents of the landowners constituted a middle class.
The rest made up the lower class, which was called ‘the inferiors’. They were “as a cheap and worthless as a
straw hope” and often molested and humiliated ( Donnet: 44). The economic surplus from the agriculture
production and trade was to a large extent spent on the monastic establishment. The highest ranking Tibetans
owned ninety percent of Tibet. While the Dalai Lama is convinced that the Tibetan community in this order was
34
and aristocrats who did not want to lose their inherited power and privileges in the hierarchy
established and protected by the Tibetan theocracy. As they were oppressed by the People’s
Liberation Army, many of them followed the Dalai Lama to exile in India. Thanks to reforms
introduced in 1959, “Tibet has put an end to centuries of darkness and terror. But this
liberation was accomplished by the Tibetans themselves, the serfs and slaves who wish to
make their contribution to the revolution” (quoted in Donnet: 45).
Whether the invasion was motivated by strategic necessity or a sincere liberation can partially
be deduced from the content and implications of the economic reforms in Tibet as discussed
below.
Development in the beginning During the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), China invested
a large sum on road-building projects in Tibet to ease the integration of Tibetan areas with
China. However, after 1959 China saw a new dimension in the development of Tibet. The
Tibetan economic development would be submitted to the Chinese strategic imperative in
Tibet (Norbu: 154).
Development in the 1960s During the Cold War, security issues became priority in Chinese
policy. To conceal the defence-related development that overshadowed the forced revolution
in Tibet, Communists gave the process an ideological twist. The 1960s began on a positive
scale with significant land reform, wasteland reclamation, and irrigation projects. But soon the
Tibetan economy and peasants were subjected to Zedong’s ideological projects such as
communes, which deprived Tibetans of operational private property land freedom. The
Proletarian Cultural Revolution destroyed Tibetan traditions and brought much human
suffering. In the early 1960s China suffered from famine, which of course affected Tibet as
well. This was the first time in history that Tibetans has experienced famine. However, due to
the land reforms, Tibet was able to overcome the food shortages. In fact, the economic surplus
increased and was even larger than in the pre-Communist economy through improvements in
agricultural techniques. Thus, there was no visible improvement in the living standard during
this period (Norbu: 154-156).
China changes course: Decollectivization and Population Transfer
The decade of 1980s
began with the official dismantling of the radical Maoist economics and politics that had
peaceful and the relation between landowners and servants was not ‘barbaric’, like Chinese argued (Donnet: 4449).
35
affected Tibet. Deng Xiaoping’s introduced the Modernization Programme which focused on
agriculture, industry, science and technology and military defence. The Chinese economy
began to open up to the outside world, particularly to the West. This open door policy
benefited Tibet as well (Donnet: 94) (Norbu: 156). The new political in discourse of Tibet
would contain economic decentralization, and restoring Tibetan property and social freedom.
The new economic policy resulted not only in positive trends in the Tibetan living standard
and general economic situation, but it was also visible in the quality of social freedom.
However, in 1983, just as the Tibetan economy was showing signs of recovery, China
introduced a new economic policy. Donnet calls it the ‘long-term hidden intention’. The
population transfer policy implied the migration of 50.000 Chinese into Tibet, which had a
major impact on the Tibetan economy and called into question the survival of the Tibetan
identity. Moreover, China’s agreement to increase Tibetan participation in the local
administration was limited to three year and this limit was over by 1983. This is why Donnet
speaks of a ‘hidden intention’.
Recent Efforts at Development According to Dawa Norbu, The Chinese Communist practice
of population transfer, the recently announced Golmo-Lhasa railway construction, as well as
the state’s deliberate neglect of Tibetan education, are part of a Chinese-centric economic
vision in the current campaign to ‘develop the western region’. Chen Dongsheng, one of the
key planners of the campaign, confessed that aside from strengthening the PRC’s borders in
the western region, another purpose was to “smash our enemies who want to use the poverty
and the contradictions between races to create a Kosovo-style crisis in Asia” (Norbu: 159).
With the Tibetans ‘internationalizing’ the Tibet issue, Chinese argue that the right to selfdetermination of the Tibetan people, especially since the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989, is
a dream invented by foreign imperialists who seek to weaken China (Donnet: 55).
Of particular urgency to China’s current and future economic needs are oil and natural gas to
be transferred from the resource rich western region, and particularly Tibet, to the rapidly
developing industries in the eastern regions of China. Thus, Chinese claim on the sovereignty
over Tibet do not rest on history only. Tibet is of strategic necessity for China needs the space
and the region’s economic resources. Then there is the matter of security and the memory of
the 1962 war with India (Seymour: xxii). Some Chinese realists stress that Tibet’s
independence would threaten China’s national security. China and India have fought border
wars. Realists argue that India’s army would penetrate an independent Tibet and threaten the
security of China because there would be no buffer between China and Tibet (Seymour: 19).
36
Moreover, Chinese worry that Tibetan independence would be followed by Xinjiang, Inner
Mongolia, and Manchuria, similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore by
increasing the influence of Chinese immigrants, 9 the railway construction will consolidate
national defence and unity of nationalities (Norbu: 159).
Thus, Chinese tend to think of the Tibet question rather in terms of economic, political, and
military imperatives, than what is just and legal. In Deng Xiaoping’s words, “China must
retain Tibet whether doing so is right or wrong” (quoted in Seymour: xxii). Another
grounding argument for this deliberate position is the fact that China signed the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998 but the government still has not
ratified 10 it (TCHRD 2007). China analyzes each covenant carefully to ensure that it fits the
unique history and values that define China (Rempel: 854).
3.2.2 Tibetan Positions and Strategies
Contrary to the Chinese perspective, Tibetans have argued that Tibet was independent when
the armies of the PRC entered it in 1950. For Tibet, evidence of Chinese control in Tibetan
areas is ambiguous for it ‘waxed and waned’. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, legal adviser to
the Dalai Lama, argued that Tibet never lost the attributes of independence. The priest-patron
relationship that defined Tibet and China, was based on the term of suzerainty, which implied
the ‘two systems-one country’ model. With his theory about the dominant Western influence
in the framing and shaping of the contemporary Tibet question, Dibyesh Anand, explains the
different perceptions on the concept of the conflict as follows. Unlike the British, who used
‘suzerainty’ to define the relations between China and Tibet, China exchanged this concept to
the European concept, namely ‘sovereignty’. And even if there is no space for ‘suzerainty’
within modern international law and all the states recognize China’s claim of ‘sovereignty’
over Tibet, the Tibet lobby rejects this by urging on the difference between the two terms
within international law: “Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international
guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally
by the suzerain State” (quoted in Anand 2007: 67).
9
This can be illustrated with the fact that Qinghai’s population increased from 1.3 million in 1949 to nearly 5
million mainly due to the railway connection. Golmo used to be a pastoral land with a few hundred Tibetan
nomads and is now the second largest town in Qinghai. In 1994 Golmo had a population of 88.500, of which
only 4.4 percent Tibetans (Norbu: 159-161).
10
To become binding on a state, international covenants and other legal instruments first have to be signed by an
authorised person and then ratified by the government. Ratification is a commitment by a government, after
which the process of compliance then comes under the rules of the treaty body in the UN (Heath: 236).
37
However, although the historical analysis is a basic starting point in discussing the Tibet
issue, for the Tibetan position on this question I will first consider the current Tibetan
condition by asking whether the Tibetans enjoy basic political rights such as political freedom
and the right to private property. And, as formulated in Article 27, 11 do they have the right to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language? In doing so, I will indirectly answer whether the Chinese Communist rule, for the
past fifty years, brought Tibet either benefit or harm.
Current Tibetan Condition In general, the last twenty years are sufficient to experience the
interpretation of the situation today. During this time some aspects of society have improved
while others have worsened. In his essay, Cao Changching argues that the Tibetans, like all
Chinese, are deprived of their right to vote. The government does not represent the will of the
people, as, since 1959, the highest power in Tibet is the general secretary of the Communist
Party. Like the rest of the PRC, Tibet does not have political freedom. The Chinese military
represses any form of oppression. 12 The Tibetans are also deprived of their right to own
property. Contrary to the Chinese perception on the willingness of the ‘slaves and serfs’ to
contribute to the revolution, the Tibetans argue that the Chinese government forced them to
participate in the socialist movement, a process that left Tibetans more impoverished than
ever according to Changching. Tibet is by far the poorest region within the PRC. 13 Although
Tibet’s standard of living has risen somewhat since the implementation of China’s economic
reforms, the wealthier people in Tibet are merely Chinese. Tibet’s high urban-rural
inequalities implicate that Chinese living in urban areas have much higher incomes in order to
induce them to live in Tibet. Moreover, Tibetans, as eighty percent of them receive rural
income, have to pay high and increasing tax on land (Seymour: 11-14) (Heath: 31). As
Tibetans have to have an adequate command of the Chinese language (Chinese replaced
Tibetan as the official language), it is difficult for them to find work in other sectors.
11
See subparagraph 2.2.1.
According to reports from the Chinese army stationed in Tibet eighty-seven thousand Tibetans were killed in
the suppression of the 1959 rebellion, and ten to fifteen percent of the Tibetans were imprisoned from which
forty percent died as a result. According to Amnesty International, between 1987 and 1992 there were more that
150 occasions in Lhasa when Tibetans were repressed during demonstrations. The Dalai Lama pronounced that
1.2 million Tibetans had died of starvation or persecution during the years of Chinese Communist rule in Tibet.
13
The Statistical Yearbook of China will confirm that the TAR ranks last on virtually every indicator: total
revenue, taxes remitted, per capita income, joint ventures, literacy, and even life expectancy at birth (Dreyer:
129, 130).
12
38
Therefore, it seems that the eighty percent working in the low paid sector will not change that
easily. Particularly not, considering that the quality of education is low in Tibet (Heath: 32)
John Heath ascribes the cause of the present poverty in rural Tibet, to the destruction of the
monasteries in 1954 and the robbery of their wealth. Monasteries were important financial
centres, owners of land, trading organization, and the basis of Tibet’s welfare system. Since
there were no banks, they provided Tibetans of loans, and support for the development of
farms and small business and gave food aid (Heath: 18). However, the destruction did much
more as it dislocated the teaching and practice of Buddhism, which stands at the heart of the
Tibetan people’s belief, culture and every day life. As Chinese communism believes that
religion distracts people from the economic focus, the Communist Party members must swear
an oath of commitment to atheism.
Accompanying the fact that Buddhist higher education was under heavy security and constant
surveillance, in 1994 Chinese-led Democratic Management Committees were set up to
replace the traditional authority of the monasteries. The Chinese have held ‘patriotic reeducation’ campaigns for monks and nuns in support of socialism. The Democratic
Management Committees reduced the number of monks and nuns at each institution (Heath:
19) (TCHRD 2003). Although Chinese government claims otherwise, Chingcheng argues that
the Tibetans still do not enjoy religious freedom as the communist view on religion, ‘a tool of
the ruling classes and the opium of the people’, still dominates over the PRC (Xiaoqiang
1994: 291).
Tibetan Strategies
Tibetan positions and strategies have gone through many changes since
the Dalai Lama’s exile to India in 1959. Until the late 1970s, the Dalai Lama urged on
regaining the Tibetan’s independence, while stressing the last few years trough international
media that the Tibetans are not “not seeking independence, but some sort of self-rule” (Laird:
370), that is the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement of Hong Kong. A strange fact is the
evolvement of the Tibetan strategy from the “CIA-backed guerrilla movement to a completely
non-violent form of activism” (Topgyal 2008). In Tibet, the Tibetans have employed different
strategies ranging from collaboration with the communist regime to rebellion for national
survival. In this order, Michael Parenti makes efforts to reveal the dark side behind the
idealized image of Tibet what the Dalai Lama called the ‘spiritually oriented kingdom’. In
The Tibet Myth, Parenti stresses that the theocracy of Tibet, like many other religions, have a
close relation not only to violence but also to economic exploitation. The Tibetan government
in exile received millions of dollars from the CIA to send armed squads of exiles into Tibet to
39
undermine the Maoist revolution. While the Dalai Lama had a share in this, the Indian
intelligence also financed him (Parenti: 580, 585-587).
3.3 State Power versus Non-Violence?
It was not until the open-door policy when the dialogue between the Chinese authorities and
the Dalai Lama was conducted. Since 1979 the Tibetan government in exile has had several
discussions with China in order to resolve the Tibet question. In 1987, after sending two
delegations to Beijing, the Dalai Lama offered China the Five-Point Peace Plan in which he
advocated serious dialogue and moderation. 14 During a speech to the US Congress he called
for the demilitarization of Tibet and for recognizing it as an environmentally protected region,
while expressing willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in stead of the full independence
demanded before. Although, in making this proposal, the Dalai Lama disappointed many
Tibetans, he emphasized the advantage of the demilitarization for the security of both India
and China. In this order, if either China or India attempted military actions against the other,
they would first have to go through Tibet. Not only would this be opposed by the Tibetans, it
would also be rejected by the international community as Tibet should not figure as a buffer
zone (Changching: 20) (Addy: 47-49). After Beijing had rejected this plan first, for it would
resemble some type of ‘semi-independence’, Chinese government formally offered to meet
the Dalai Lama but on the condition that “everything is negotiable except Tibet’s
independence” (quoted in Donnet: 192).
All in all, framing the China-Tibet dialogue into a state-power versus non-violence context is
actually a misconception as the Tibetan positions and strategies have gone through many
changes since 1959 when the Dalai Lama escaped to India. The non-violent form of activism
was not completely prevalent during the conflict. China’s policies inside Tibet have also
transformed from oppressive and violent during the Maoist years to the ethnically-sensitive
policies of the Hu Yaobang era in the 1980s and back to hard power integrationist policies
dominant today.
14
i) Tibet would be transformed into a zone of peace; (ii) China would end the transfer policy; (iii) China would
have to respect human rights and freedoms in Tibet by starting to release the thousands political and religious
prisoners it captured. And, the Tibetan people would freely determine their own future in a spirit of
reconciliation and openness; (iv) Tibet’s natural environment would be restored and protected. The production or
storage of nuclear weapons would be stopped; (v) The opening of honest and sincere negotiations on Tibet’s
future and on the relations between Chinese and Tibetan people (Donnet: 108).
40
3.4 Conclusion
While China represents the Tibet question as provoked by external factors only (western
states supporting Tibetan separatists), Tibet argues that the question is shaped only by
Chinese policy for it is an issue of colonial rule. Thus, the Tibet question according to the
exiles contends the repression of Tibet and the resistance to that rule by the people of Tibet.
Both sides insist that negotiations require meeting conditions. China has conditions for
initiating negotiations and Tibet for conducting them. China’s preconditions are that the Dalai
Lama renounce independence and recognize that Tibet is a part of the PRC. The exiles’
conditions are first, that Tibet should be considered as one, and second, the political system of
Tibet should be a democratic one.
The relation between China and Tibet has evolved from a patron-priest relation into an issue
of sovereignty and independence. Western conceptualizations of territoriality, foreign policies
and practices of diplomacy have constructed the Tibet question as it is today. Through a
historical analysis of Tibet and the British role within the framing of the issue in terms of
sovereignty and independence, this chapter showed that the contemporary claim that Tibet is
an integral part of China arised out of Western influences and is constructed through idealistic
practices of various actors involved. The traditional China-Tibet dialogue is being tried to
explain in terms of principles that are not transferable into modern notion of sovereignty. The
symbolic patron-priest relation is ridden over by the modern concept of sovereignty.
41
4 TIBET FROM IR PERSPECTIVE
Although theory is used as a tool primarily to explain and interpret, in this chapter I will use it
to constitute the reality that it seeks to understand. As discussed in the previous chapter, there
is an awkward situation of controversial interests and strategies of all the parties concerned
within the Tibet question. It seems that the China-Tibet dialogue does not fit in the frame of
state power versus non-violence. To understand the discourse of China’s strategies toward
Tibet and Tibet’s strategies toward China, I will transpose the Tibet question to the
philosophical realm through the following three levels.
4.1 Chinese and Tibetan Portrayal of the Question
The Chinese portrayal of the Tibetan question is based on marxist principles implying that
law reflects not an ethical standard, but the policy and interests of the ruling class that govern
international society. In this regard, Lenin said that “the right to self-determination of small
nations is made illusory by the development of the great capitalist powers and by
imperialism.” 15 While China presents the Tibet question as provoked by external factors
supporting Tibet’s independence, Tibetan exiles argue that the question is shaped by Chinese
policy solely for it is an issue of colonial rule. Tibet’s perception on the question therefore is
well clarified by the Gramscian use of hegemony related to its understanding of power as a
matter of repression and resistance (Yeh: 503). In this matter, Tibetan resistance then is the
result of the rule of Chinese repression (containing religious intolerance, oppressing identity
e.g.). Additionally, Wallerstein’s explanation for movements of independence is related to the
objectives of the colonizing power comprising the control on the production process of the
colony, and to ensure that no other relatively strong state in the world-system could have
access to the resources of the colony. As China grows, Tibet becomes of necessity to the
security and development of China. This means that China’s portrayal of the Tibet question
does not rest on communist principles only.
However, Tibet’s autonomy – as China would maintain control over its borders – does not
legitimate China’s security argument but refers its rejection to a different perception on the
term. China’s definition of autonomy is different from the liberal theories in a way that it is
not conceived as fulfilling a right to self-determination and is not being grounded in electoral
politics. China’s conception of autonomy is based on marxist principles, which favours
unitary over federalism. Following marxism, Mao Zedong’s interpretation of the nationality
15
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch08.htm
42
issue was limited to an issue of classes. At the end of the class conflict, difference between
nationalities would wither away. Class division was of much more importance than ethnic
division for the majority of any nationality is peasants and workers (Baogang 2006: 76, 77).
Like Wallerstein implies, working classes across different nationalities should be unified
against their common enemy, the exploiting class.
4.2 The Relation between China and Tibet
Although a first glimpse at the Tibet question would claim that marxist principles dominate in
the understanding of the situation, the following two sub paragraphs will expose that as realist
ends reveal behind marxist means, the marxist theory is not sufficient in its explanatory focus.
4.2.1 The China-Tibet Dialogue
Even though the fact that secular officials often call upon Tibetan religious leaders to settle
range disputes, which is well explained by the Gramscian thought for the subordinated
position in which the Tibetan exile is being put by the Chinese government (Yeh: 503), the
centre periphery systematic approach suits best to explain the relation between China and
Tibet for two reasons. First, the gap between the capitalist driven China (rapid
industrialization) and the primitive market of Tibet recognizes the different zones of
production leading to conflict. As China continues to develop, it needs the resources of the
western region. A possible way of looking at the situation is that this region is deliberately
neglected during the early days of incorporating the new region into world-economy so that it
could be exploited better. As Wallerstein argues, unequal exchange is not the only way of
moving accumulated capital from politically weak region to politically strong regions.
Plunder, he writes, “is killing the goose that lays the golden eggs” (Wallerstein: 28).
Second, Mao’s administration forced Tibet into the revolution. And, as religion according to
Mao, impedes the economic development, nationalism is being pronounced to wither the
differences away. Class differences are favored over ethnic differences. In states where
democracy is not deeply rooted, nationalism often emerges as the new organizing principle
for authoritarian rule (Moore: 908). In this matter, the marxist notion is correct in a way that it
favors unity rather than feudalism and therefore rejects autonomy. However, considering the
marxist thought about the synergy between groups – although in the same class – the Chinese
way of thinking could be a threat not to overthrow the bourgeoisie which is in exile in Tibet,
43
but the cooperation of the minorities of the western region against the central government.
This could lead to the overthrow of the authorities. Yet, this scenario is unlikely as all 55
minorities together make up barely one-tenth the numbers of Han (total population of 1.3
billion) (Lixiong: 108). And, the disparity between their economic and military power makes
the attainability of this idea also diminish.
4.2.2 Motivations and Strategies
The dominance of the marxist principles in Chinese motivations and strategies is questionable
for the following two reasons. First, there is the fact that China signed the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998 but still has not ratified these
covenants. China analyzes each covenant carefully to ensure that it fits the unique history and
values that define China (Rempel: 854), which implies that “presumptions may be overruled
or its consequences modified in favour of a group or unit finding itself excluded from those
positions of authority in which the substance of the rule is determined” (Koksenieni: 248,
249). This interest-led strategy is rather a realist one than it is a marxist one.
Second, Tibet is of strategic necessity for China needs the region’s economic resources for its
economical development and the space for the matter of security and the memory of the 1962
border war with India (Seymour: xxii). The realists therefore stress that Tibet’s independence
would threaten China’s national security. Realists argue that India’s army would penetrate an
independent Tibet and threaten the security of China because there would be no buffer
between China and Tibet (Seymour: 19). The security issues are also being fulfilled with the
railway construction increasing Chinese control on the region. In Deng Xiaoping’s words,
China must retain Tibet whether doing so is right or wrong (Seymour: xxii). Hence, as
national security and international community are the basic for political decisions, the realist
paradigm- the idea that states are motivated by self-interest and that morality does not fit in
international relations- seems to overshadow the marxist principles.
4.3 The Role of the West within the Tibet Question
Many writers argue that the international community has laid the foundation for the ideologies
behind the issue of sovereignty and independence in which the Tibet question has evolved.
Aside from the substantial influence of the internationalization of the Westphalian order,
based on sovereignty statehood – whereas it allowed the regional hegemon China to assert
44
and exercise control over Tibet – as discussed in paragraph 3.1.2, the West has also a direct
influence on the present day situation of Tibet. Among the states involved in the Tibet
question, Russia and the United States stand out. The former as an ideological example for
China’s strategies, and the latter as a quite ambiguous stirring wheel. Since the 1950s, US
policy toward Tibet has gone through many changes as it operated on two levels. At strategic
level it has supported China’s thought that Tibet is part of the PRC, while at tactical level it
provided military aid to Tibetan independence movements and financial support to the Dalai
Lama (Goldstein 2006: 145). Despite the urge on promoting freedom and democracy, the US
was unwilling in this case as “Tibet’s quest for independence ran up against the pragmatic
side of US foreign policy” (Goldstein 2006: 154). The other side of the international system
was headed by the SU-led socialism. The socialist and imperialist camps competed for the
allegiance – seeking for expanding their spheres of influence in the Cold War - of the peoples
in Mao’s ‘intermediate zone’ (Shambaugh: 152).
The situation resembles the realistic course on scenario in which the winners and losers are
determined by the political calculations and needs of the powerful ones, rather than on the
basis of which peoples had the strongest claims to independence. It seems like all parties are
driven by their own interests acting opportunistic. In this order, both realists and marxists
seem to agree on the assumption that it puts a justifiable question mark on the effectiveness of
international law in complex cases as this one. Accompanying, according to the definition of
Wallerstein, we can perceive the powerful actors in the Tibet question as a virtual alliance
(i.e. hegemony) as they establish the rules of the game in the interstate system, which
overshadow the norms of international law (Wallerstein: 58). And, like Krasner puts it,
“‘organized hypocrisy’ is the norm of the international system” (quoted in Anand 2006: 288).
4.4 Conclusion
As hidden agenda’s reveal behind ideal pretentions of the involved actors, in this chapter I
argued that even though marxism is correct in its explanatory focus on the motives of the
concerning actors, an all-embracing guide to the understanding of the Tibet question would be
a combination between realist and marxist political theory.
45
5 TOWARDS A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION
The legal case of Tibet’s right to self-determination rests on three pillars. However, given that
the Tibetans are entitled to this right, the next question then contains the possible methods and
outcomes as to a future political status. It is important to note that self-determination is not an
option for Tibet’s political status, such as independence or autonomy. Rather, it is one of the
underlying rights on the basis of which Tibetans are legally justified to seek independence or
autonomy. Thus, self-determination is the right to choose freely whether or not to be
independent (Herzer 1998).
5.1 The Case for Self-Determination
Since its invasion and continued occupation of Tibet, China has denied the Tibetan people
many rights recognized under international law. One such right is the right to selfdetermination. The use of force and the imposition of a new government by China, has
prevented Tibetans from exercising control over their lives in many spheres, from the political
and economic to the cultural and religious. As mentioned above, the legal case of Tibet’s right
to self-determination rests on three pillars. These pillars are divided into the following three
subparagraphs.
5.1.1 Tibetans as a People
The demographics in Tibet are manipulated by purposefully placing Chinese settlers in order
to undermine any possible exercise of self-determination by Tibetans even in the future. The
population transfer in Tibet threatens not only the culture and way of life of the Tibetan
people, but also the existence of Tibetans as a people. The systematic assimilation continues
even though Tibetans possess identifiable criteria of a distinct people, including a distinct
language, religion, culture, traditions and customs, history, and territory. They also meet all
other criteria, such as shared preferences, values and common destiny. In 1961, the U.N.
General Assembly recognized this right and passed a resolution calling for “the cessation of
practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms,
including their right to self-determination” (UNPO 1996).
Thus, following UNESCO’s definition of ‘people’ 16 there is no dispute that Tibetans are a
people and as a people they have the right to self-determination. By repressing Tibet, China
16
See paragraph 1.1.2.
46
has not conducted itself as a legitimate government of all of its citizens. China has not
allowed Tibetans to freely select their political representative.
Additionally, the moral justification of the constitution of an independent state declared by
Beitz and Gutman and French, as discussed in paragraph 1.1.2, is related to the existence of
significant positive consequences like an increase in individual freedom, economic wealth or
opportunities for self-realization through cultural autonomy (good reasons). As Tibet’s natural
resources are being decimated without benefiting Tibetans, and they are deemed to work in
the low paid rural sector, the complete control over the development of their country will
increase the economic wealth of the individuals. An increase in individual freedom will also
be realized as the Tibetans will be free to enjoy their culture and religion.
A final argument on the side of this pillar is Wallerstein’s claim that reciprocal recognition
legitimates sovereignty. As the Dalai Lama is being recognized and invited by many chiefs of
state and cabinet members of foreign governments, this means that the others states recognize
Tibet as a sovereign.
5.1.2 Historical Claim
Questions about whether Tibet was independent or part of China in the past, and whether it
should now have the right to self-determination, have produced contradictory versions of
history. Contrary to China’s side of the story, the Tibetan government in exile insists that
Tibet was independent when the armies of the PRC entered Tibet in 1950. At that time Tibet
performed all the attributes of statehood. It has been said that once a state exists, it is legally
presumed to continue as an independent state unless proved otherwise (TPPRC 1998). In
addition, there exists an expression in Irish which can be used as an easy mean as it states that
“this place is ours, for we were here first” (quoted in UNPO 1996). The people from Tibet
were there from the beginning.
Additionally, there is the difference in the portrayal of the issue in terms of independence and
sovereignty. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, legal adviser to the Dalai Lama, argued that
Tibet never lost the attributes of independence. The priest-patron relationship that defined
Tibet and China, was based on the term of suzerainty, which implied the ‘two systems-one
country’ model. With his theory about the dominant Western influence in the framing and
shaping of the contemporary Tibet question, Dibyesh Anand, explains the different
perceptions on the concept of the conflict as follows. Unlike the British, who used
‘suzerainty’ to define the relations between China and Tibet, China exchanged this concept to
47
the European concept, namely ‘sovereignty’. And even if there is no space for ‘suzerainty’
within modern international law and all the states recognize China’s claim of ‘sovereignty’
over Tibet, the Tibet lobby rejects this by urging on the difference between the two terms
within international law: “Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international
guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally
by the suzerain State” (quoted in Anand 2007: 67).
5.1.3 Aggression of an Inadequate Government
Another ground on which a compelling case fort Tibet’s right to self-determination can be
made is China’s deliberate policymaking to destroy the Tibet’s distinct religious and cultural
heritage. In the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide, of
which China is a signatory, genocide is defined as:
‘..acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group as such, and [is] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’ (quoted in UNPO 1996).
In 1960, the International Commission of jurists found that “acts of genocide had been
committed in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group”.
The repression in Tibet has known less bounds. In 1960, the International Commission of
jurists found that “acts of genocide had been committed in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the
Tibetans as a religious group”. The UNPO even compares the happenings in Tibet with the
excesses of Hitler and Nazi Germany. According to China’s statistics, 87.000 Tibetans were
executed in during the period following the uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 (UNPO 1996:
46). In 1966, in a period of a little more than two weeks, 69.000 Tibetans were executed in
and around Lhasa. Moreover, the horror continued where the world’s correspondents are not
allowed and where TV cameras cannot reach.
A second argument would be the fact that the PRC has not acted as a legitimate government
as legitimacy is a necessary precondition of a state’s claim of territorial integrity. The Vienna
Declaration (1993) declares that a government’s legitimacy derives from a people’s exercise
of the right to self-determination and from the government’s obligation to protect and promote
the fundamental human rights of its entire people, without discrimination (Herzer 1999: 3,
55). The Communist principles of the PRC were forcefully exposed on Tibet –despite their
48
right intentions to liberate the lower classes- nevertheless not by an exercise of selfdetermination.
5.2 Future Political Status
In seeking an approach that may recognise the interests of Tibet and China, communication is
a necessary variable in the formula of peace. A negotiation between China and Tibet would
tempt to resolve the meaning of autonomy. The Dalai Lama’s perspective since 1988 has been
political autonomy, which implies that Tibet has full control of all domestic matters except for
its defence and foreign relations. However, it has not yet led to a meaningful dialogue and
negotiation. The ‘one country, two systems’ of Hong Kong is an absolute possibility for Tibet.
However, even if increased autonomy is perhaps the most realistic outcome for Tibet, other
outcomes must also be considered in the realm of the possible.
5.2.1 Possible Solutions
Although theory predicts many possible outcomes to conflicts, in reality the many options are
much harder to come by. Beyond the immediate conflict, any possible outcome must rely on a
number of factors such as, world and domestic politics, economies, and social movements, as
well as the unpredictable interests of other parties concerned (McGranahan: 146). Building on
the ethnographic, historic, and political details outlined in the former chapters, I will review a
series of possible outcomes and methods of conflict resolution for the case of Tibet.
Integration into China This scenario is not preferable as the current situation involves human
rights violations, as well as the ongoing exile of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government.
The overall presence of the Chinese military limits freedom of cultural expression and even
rejects freedom of political expression. As China plans to force Tibet in the development
program of the West region, including the current construction of the railway to Lhasa, the
status quo for Tibetans is likely to decrease with the influence of Chinese settlers
(McGranahan: 169, 170)
More Autonomy/Power Sharing
This might be the most likely scenario for the reason that
Tibet already has some formal degree of autonomy within their state system through its name
as an autonomous region (Tibet Autonomous Region). Yet, this autonomy is foremost in
name only (McGranahan: 170). Programs to strengthen autonomy, including the delegation of
49
power from the central government to regional governments (power sharing), would solve
many local concerns. (Jeong: 92). The ‘one country, two systems’ model of Hong Kong is a
well conceptualized illustration of an absolute possibility for Tibet. Autonomy within a nation
state offers the best of both worlds, combining the benefits of being part of a large state in
terms of defence, foreign relations and economic opportunity, with preservation of local laws,
customs and culture (Harris 2008). In this order, in accordance with the Dalai Lama’s wish for
political control over domestic affairs, the Tibetans would control their political, economic,
social, and cultural life, and would control their land and resources. Safeguarding China’s
interests, the PRC then would remain in control of Tibet’s defence and foreign affairs, and
thus preserving its territorial integrity. This would mean that sovereignty would be divided
between power over people and power over territory. However, while this arrangement might
appeal to many peoples within the PRC, it accompanies pressure for reduced control of the
leaders in Beijing (McGranahan: 170) (TPPRC 1998).
Accession to a Different State The accession of Tibet to India would most likely worsen an
already bad situation (McGranahan: 170).
Independence Was Tibet to gain independence, relations between state, nation, and territory
in China would have to be modified from their present forms. Independence is what the
Tibetan guerrilla’s fought for through 1974, and remains what many Tibetans still desire,
although in nuanced terms out respect for the Dalai Lama’s wish for political autonomy
(Mcgranahan: 171). Full independence is not a realistic option for two reasons. First, it is
unlikely for the Chinese government to agree in this matter as the independency of Tibet
would threaten China’s security, and would lead to a similar situation as the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, this option is not in favour to the Tibetan government either
as they would be forced to manage their own defence and foreign affairs.
5.2.2 Possible Methods of Conflict Resolution
Regardless of the conflict setting, there are different approaches to deal with the
incompatibilities that exist. The method that is taken to approach the conflict, determines the
fact whether a conflict results in destructive outcomes or peaceful ones as it mutually satisfies
both parties. Below, there are seven general methods identified that the parties may take
toward dealing with the conflict.
50
Unilateral State Decision While China has the option of assigning more autonomy any form,
the chances of them doing so seem very unlikely without outside incentive.
Domestically Negotiated Settlement
This method again seems unlikely given the political
organization of China. Without place for disagreement, or even representation outside the
bounds of the Communist Party, a domestically negotiated settlement would be difficult to
compose. Incentives for state action would require the sympathy of the Chinese people in
general (McGranahan: 171).
Bilateral/Multilateral Negotiated Settlement
This would be the most appealing method
towards a peaceful resolution. China reopened discussions with the Dalai Lama’s exile
government in the fall of 2002 after a two-decade break. While these discussions are not quite
at the level of conflict resolution negotiations, they nevertheless hold the promise of bringing
about positive change in Tibet (McGranahan: 172).
International Mediation Whether through the UN or a third party, mediation may work as a
means of conflict resolution. Any form of planning, financing, and monitoring can be
supported by the international community’s involvement to varying degrees (Jeong: 108).
Bringing in an international presence, however, must be agreed to by all parties concerned.
This can be the hardest part as, for example, the Chinese government decisively rejects
international mediation in the Tibet conflict, while Tibet invites it. Former Tibetan
experiences with British efforts to mediate boundary disputes between China and Tibet were
not positive, as the British were neither neutral nor interested in actually achieving resolution.
For such mediation to work, a true neutral party must serve as mediator, and a system needs
be established to monitor the process towards the settlement (McGranahan: 172).
International Intervention Contrary to mediation, intervention can be less friendly, involving
more facets of pressure. Even though the violation of Human Rights in the Tibet question
assure international intervention, military initiatives are rather unlikely in present Tibet.
Although diplomatic and economic initiatives are taken, they are certainly not on a scale
designed to achieve a resolution. The international pressure is muted as the stability of the
international community has precedence (McGranahan: 172).
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Military Battle
Military solutions are the least desirable of the possible means to an end.
Conflict-related deaths and suffering in Tibet need to be stopped, not escalated. The Dalai
Lama wants Tibetan engagement to the conflict to be non-violent. Therefore, even if Tibet is
highly militarized, any recommencement of military battle there would be one-sided, in
favour of the Chinese army. Military solutions are also the methods that have brought the
status quo in Tibet to its current unacceptable state. Thus, even though it could be a definitive
solution, a military battle does not meet the larger goal of meeting the peoples’ interests
(McGranahan: 173).
Referendum
Holding a referendum functions as a legal basis for creating new government
structures, while responding to the disputative issues of political legitimacy (Jeong: 114).
Even though the UN resolutions on Tibet did not go so far, the Tibetan people have called for
a referendum in 1924. At that time, the British were trying to mediate a settlement to a
boundary dispute in eastern Tibet. They suggested a referendum by putting a vote to the
Tibetan people who lived in the area to determine whether or not they wished to be under
Tibet or China, with the counting to be done by a group of British, Chinese, and Tibetan
officials. The plan, however, was never implemented, the boundary dispute never solved, and
thirty-five years later the Dalai Lama went into exile. Whether monitored by the UN or other
international actors, the holding of a referendum, as in East Timor, offers the only solution in
which the Tibetan people, and the Tibetan people alone, can individually participate.
In Tibet, where coercive rather than democratic principles dominate the political culture,
preparatory work needs to be done in order to hold a referendum at all. While Chinese
government is rather unlikely to agree in such a referendum in Tibet, the actual
implementation can be neither predicted nor discounted, given the fact that specific political
features do change, as for the transformation of hard power policies into ethnically-sensitive
ones (McGranahan: 173) (Heath: 202).
5.3 The Role of the International Community
Holding a referendum is only the first step towards the establishment of a functioning political
system. Political stability is not automatically achieved by a plebiscite without stable political
institutional relations and the rules need to be accepted by all political actors involved. The
role of the international community is a relevant one towards political stability.
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The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights
in 1993 urged on the universality of human rights:
‘All Human Rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The
international community must treat Human Rights globally in a fair and equal manner on the
same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (UNPO 1996).
Thus, the first duty of the international community ought to be the condemnation of the
violation of human rights on the part of China. Why is the international community not
reacting in a way it supposed to according to their moral right and practical duty to intervene,
to prevent, and shorten conflicts? The international community should take adequate steps to
ensure the restoration of the rights of the Tibetan people. The international response to the
events in Tibet was muted by the changing tides of international politics (decolonization in
the 1950s and the war on terror in the 2000s). The 9/11 terrorist attacks has changed some of
the rules of state security and the ensuing urge for power has resulted in a global weakening
of individual and cultural rights (McGranahan: 146). Although the international community
did not actively become involved in Tibet, they recognized the Tibetan people’s right to selfdetermination. In 1959, 1961 and 1965, the United Nations General Assembly passed three
resolutions that strongly condemned China for its actions in Tibet and a number of
governments repeated their view of Tibetan independence during the debates. As the members
of the international community are under a duty not to recognise a situation brought about by
a violation of international law, they should not limit theirselves merely to condemnation. The
international community must take collective action by expressing its disapproval by means
of sanctions, boycott and embargo. They ought to prevent their corporations and agencies
from approving and supporting the destruction of the Tibetan people and the degradation of
their environment (UNPO 1996).
How come the international community, led by the United States took action when Iraq
invaded Kuwait? Despite its recognition of equality for all sovereign states, for all people,
hypocrisy and double standards seem to be the norm of the international system. Even if an
issue like this will influence international instability, does this legitimate the continuation of
the violation of human rights? What does this mean for the meaning of justice and peace, for
53
the effectiveness of international organizations? There should be a court representing the
world’s conscience, the world’s sense of morality, which makes the decisions. In his book
International Law and Human Rights, Professor Hersh Lauterpacht pleaded for such a Human
Rights Council, which had to report to the General Assembly of the United Nations and an
International Court of Human Rights to provide judicial enforcement (UNPO 1996).
5.4 Conclusion
As I come to the end of my research I am starting to believe that the Tibet question can be
better understand in a cultural context rather than interpreting it from a political view by
referring to the words of Xiaoqiang: “A cultural conflict is reflected in national dignity. The
essence of national dignity is to seek equality. Equality between nationalities, and equality
within the administration. National dignity is also dependent on economic development and
social improvement. If society is left behind both socially and economically, there is no real
dignity to speak of (Xiaoqiang: 290).
54
55
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Self-determination was introduced as a means to the end of justice as today’s state borders
were drawn on yesterday’s injustices. As a result of the fortunes of war and colonialism,
diverse people were put together through cuts across ethnic lines, ignoring identities, and
devaluating the individual within the nation. While the pronouncements on the principle of
self-determination respected the individual, Wilson’s Fourteen Points do not resolve today,
any more than they did in the beginning of its emergence.
In the understanding of the right to self-determination, this thesis reviewed the developments
in terms of its applicability and potential for resolving the Tibetan question. In order to come
up with a complete and comprehensive answer to the main question, whether Tibetans are
qualified to make a legitimate claim to the right to self-determination, I formulated the
following four questions:
1) What is the meaning of the concept of self-determination?
In abstract terms this principle can be formulated as the right of a people to determine their
own destiny, allowing them to choose their own political status and to be involved in their
economic, social, and cultural development, rather than being compelled into a system chosen
by a dominant group. However, this principle is at least explainable in four different ways.
First, the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’ refers to the members of a state. The principle is a
collective right vested in a group of individuals, not in a state. It is in fact a right against the
state which administers or controls that people. Second, for the reason that political
philosophy was not sufficiently able in identifying the ‘peoples’, I will follow UNESCO’s
interpretation which is expressed through referring it to a group of individuals linked by some
or all of the following common features: (i) historical tradition, (ii) racial or ethnic identity;
(iii) cultural homogeneity; (iv) linguistic unity; (v) religious or ideological affinity; (vi)
territorial connection; (vii) common economic life. Third, following the Vienna Declaration,
states have the legal duty to fulfil three fundamental tasks. If a state fails to fulfil its obligation
towards its members, and instead represses the people it is supposed to protect, than that state
lacks legitimacy in respect of the people it oppresses and simultaneously looses its legitimacy
on territorial integrity. Therefore, it is not always the case that the demand for autonomy
encourages states to suppress their people in the name of territorial integrity or sovereignty. It
can also be the other way around. Last, the right to self-determination can result in a wide
range of outcomes. Although in some cases demands for autonomy may be satisfied only by
the emergence of a new independent state in which sovereign authority can be exercised, in
56
other cases successful autonomy may imply no more than the demand of a national entity to
protect its identity and its members ability to ‘enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, or to use their own language’. This means that the self-determination claim
does not have a territorial component necessarily, and thus need not mean independence. The
importance lies within the right to choose.
2) To what extent are the rules on self-determination operational in the post-cold war era?
Since it was first formulated around the second half of the eighteenth century, the
interpretations on the principle of self-determination had three different dimensions. First, the
principle was used to ground unification within the state. Second, as self-determination
emerged on the international scene, and its emphasis shifted from peaceful relations among
sovereign states to independence from colonial rule, self-determination was embraced for
different ideologies taken priority over the principle. The principle was used in the event of
territorial changes justifying disintegration. Third, self-determination entered the realm of
international law, it was the first time that international law pronounced a right to be universal
in its application. The principle now represented the exercise of political freedom in which the
individual expressed its identity by choosing its own government. As loose and two folded the
text of Article 1 may be, it was the very first time that international law pronounced a right to
be universal in its application.
It is important to note that the principle simply sets out general guidelines for state behaviour
and therefore is limited in actual constitutive determinations. That is, self-determination in
fact can not change, it only acts as a sort of overarching standard for international politics.
Outside the context of a colonial case, there is no real international mechanism under the UN
for conciliating, controlling, and if necessary arbitrating claims by peoples within a state.
Most importantly, like the utilitarian rule of the ‘greatest number’, in resolving a situation one
would not want to create a worse one.
Concluding, it is just to assume that the rules on self-determination are ambiguous as the
diverse interpretations on the concept make it difficult to apply the principle, and they do not
provide clear indications as to the resolution of the crucial conflict between self-determination
and the territorial integrity of state. The historical evolvement of the concept of selfdetermination exposes that, when it comes to making the peace treaties, the people’s will, at
the beginning of the principle’s emergence, was to a large extent subordinated to geopolitical
and strategic interests. The arbitrary manner in which the great powers decided which
populations were entitled to the right to self-determination, took away the trust in the adequate
57
application of such a right. However, even today these words are still significant considering
certain cases. Another component the historical evolvement of the concept of selfdetermination shows is that the different interpretations are related to a conflict between two
competing implications. In the next chapter I will come back to the meaning of this issue in
the context of the dialogue between China and Tibet.
3) Has Tibet belonged to China historically? And, perhaps more important, has the PRC
acted as a legitimate government of the Tibetan people?
The question whether Tibet belonged to China historically is a difficult one to answer as there
are two different interpretations on the historical status of Tibet. While the Dalai Lama insists
that Tibet has always been an independent political entity, China claims that Tibet has been
part of China since the Yuan dynasty of the thirteenth century.
The next question that rises out of the primer, concerns whether the invasion in the twenty
first century was motivated by strategic necessity or a sincere liberation, which can partially
be deduced from the content and implications of the economic reforms in Tibet as discussed
in the second paragraph. This concern encloses the following sub question: Has the PRC acted
as a legitimate government of the Tibetan people? In other words, for the past fifty years, has
the Chinese Communist government brought Tibetans benefit or harm?
Chinese point out that Tibet used to have a feudal system with backwardness and poverty.
Through their financial aid Tibet’s standard of living has risen. However, as China does not
have freedom of the press and if the figures are not subject to independent auditing and the
government does not allow room for discussion, then how reliable can such figures be?
Virtually all publications on development in Tibet are used to substantiate historical and
ideological claims. Contradicting evidence is suppressed and a nationwide survey of Tibet
forbidden. The substantial difference between Chinese reporting of the situation in Tibet and
what Tibetans say themselves, makes it difficult to make statements about economic and
political realities. Second, even though Tibet’s earlier system of serfdom was backward, does
this justify enforced reform by military intervention?
4) Which IR tradition suits best to explain the China-Tibet dialogue?
As hidden agenda’s reveal behind ideal pretentions of the involved actors, I argue that a
combination between the marxist and realist perspective suits best to explain the Tibet
question. The centre periphery systematic approach is realistic as it describes an unequal
world and puts a justifiable question mark on the effectiveness of international law in
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contemporary cases. Marxism distinguishes the historical and philosophical relevance from
the even more important practice. By emphasizing the gap between the capitalist driven China
and the primitive market of Tibet, and by recognizing different unit of analysis and different
zones (of production) leading to conflict, the economic focus in marxist theory suits well in
explaining the policies of China towards Tibet. Although on a different level, liberals prior the
economic developments in their explanation too, only this view has contradicting values.
Despite their commitment to individual liberty, the individual is being devaluated in the name
of the collective. Therefore, in the case of Tibet, liberals would argue that China’s relevance,
as ‘the greatest number’, stands above Tibet’s. Furthermore, according to the liberal
perspective, Tibet even impedes China from their economic development, which is an
important aspect of liberalism.
The third main tradition within International Relations, realism, does not have an allembracing answer on the case of Tibet as well. The exclusive focus upon certain key actors in
world politics limits their perspective on several fields. Realists underestimate the role of nonstate actors because of their focus on interstate activity, which implies that the realist
explanation for Tibet’s motives would enclose the grip on power only. The realist course on
scenario then would be that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak
accept what they have to accept” (Baylis and Smith: 167). Thus, according to realist thought,
the winners and losers are determined more by the political calculations and needs of the
powerful ones, than on the basis of which peoples had the strongest claims to selfdeterminations.
As self-determination is the right to choose whether or not to be independent, it is not an
option for Tibet’s political status. Therefore, having outlined the legal case of Tibet’s right to
self-determination, the question that follows is:
5) What kind of political system should Tibet have and what should its relation to China be
like?
Stable political relations derive from negotiating a transition from delegitimized authoritarian
rule to new political arrangements and with the participation of all parties involved.
From the list of possible methods and outcomes outlined in paragraph 5.2, the most
favourable would be more autonomy through a referendum. However, holding a referendum
is only the first step towards the establishment of a functioning political system. Political
stability is not automatically achieved by a plebiscite without stable political institutional
59
relations and the rules need to be accepted by all political actors involved. How is this conflict
likely to play out as we move? Even when change will come to China, and the peaceful
settlements are implemented, will Chinese and Tibetan live harmoniously together? Will the
problem of ethnicity be solved? I seriously question whether the dispute between Chinese and
Tibetans can be resolved by adjusting economic and political interests (if it can be solved at
al).
Implications as for the Main Question
The Tibet question is a dispute over the political status of Tibet between the Chinese
government and the Tibetan government in exile: A battle for control. In this matter, Tibet
extends far beyond the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity as it raises questions about
the controversy between international law and the universality of human rights, the classic
nation-state paradigm and the modern conceptualizations of terms underlying the issue. Both
sides are written through a different lens, defined by an ambiguous relationship between the
traditional periphery and core paradigm on one side, and a modern nation-state system
conception on the other.
From a legal point of view, Tibetans are qualified to make a legitimate claim to the right to
self-determination, that is, to freely choose their future political status. Consequently, they are
entitled to choose more autonomy, independence, or, theoretically, integration into the
Chinese state. What option they choose and which method they use, whether through a
referendum or, less democratic, through their officials in exile, is up to them. However, even
though the Tibetan people are entitled to the right to self-determination, this right is restrained
by the political realities within the existing state borders of China. Successful resolution, in
the end, depends on the level of genuine international concern as well as the extent to which
the Chinese government is willing to consider more flexible notions of sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The process towards resolving the Tibet question is a well defined
illustration of international norms being subordinated to unwritten rules and modified in
favour of the powerful ones in the game. I seriously question whether the dispute between
Chinese and Tibetans can be resolved within the framework of the system of which the
difficulties are part, instead, we should go beyond that by constructing a new system in which
international legal norms and universal human rights overshadow domestic parameters.
60
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