Brexit? Frexit? Nexit? Considerations on how to measure a member state’s tendency to
leave the European Union
Markus Gastinger (TU Dresden)
Paper prepared for presentation at the EUSA Fifteenth Biennial Conference in Miami, Florida, on
May 4–6, 2017
Corresponding author:
Markus Gastinger
Research Associate
Technische Universität Dresden
Chair of International Politics
von-Gerber-Bau 258
Bergstr. 53
01069 Dresden
Germany
[email protected]
Abstract
On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU) in a popular
referendum colloquially known as ‘Brexit’. While only a few have thought it possible for a member
state to really ever leave the EU, the decision has sparked concern that other member states may
follow suit. We believe that scholars should weigh into the debate by conceptualizing the propen-
sity of member states to leave. We turn to various strands in political science to measure a member state’s central exit tendency across the societal, economic and political dimensions. Our re-
sulting ‘exit index’ suggests that Greece and Italy could be next to leave. While not entirely coun-
ter-intuitive, our article translates ‘exit hunches’ into a systematic measure that can be discussed,
refined and updated. We conclude with a broader reflection on how the EU ought to be reformed
to lower exit propensities across all countries.
2
INTRODUCTION
Which country could be the next to leave the European Union (EU)? Ever since the United
Kingdom (UK) voted leave in a popular referendum on 23 June 2016, speculation is running high. France could start the process of ‘Frexit’ if Marine Le Pen becomes Madame la
présidente. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders could pursue ‘Nexit’ after the upcoming elections. Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement considers taking Italy out of the euro zone and
the EU. In Austria, Heinz-Christian Strache of the Freedom Party is slated to win the general elections on a Eurosceptic platform (e.g. Lyons and Darroch, 2016). Brexit has shown
that the inconceivable can occur and forces scholars to consider new questions. We com-
bine three basic dimensions – societal, economic and political – to gauge the exit propen-
sity of member states. Our index suggests that Denmark, Greece and Italy face the greatest
risk of leaving the EU. While Denmark exhibits a very low exit propensity in societal terms,
both Greece and Italy do ‘well’ across all three dimensions. We thus conclude that Greece
and Italy are closest to the exit door.
Our contribution with this article is threefold. First, while research on Brexit is
picking up (e.g. Butler et al., 2016; Kroll and Leuffen, 2016; Menon and Salter, 2016) we
are the first to systematically measure its impact on other member states. Drawing on
three different strands in political science, we are bringing together disparate literatures
with our attempt to measure exit propensities. Second, while major European integration
theories have been ‘turned on their head’ to distil general factors conducive to disintegration (Webber, 2014; Vollaard, 2014), we tackle the same question in a more applied fash-
ion that ascribes a specific value to each member state. Third, our article has the potential
to inform public debate. Public speculations are often limited to a few states and based on
opinion polls or Eurosceptic parties. We develop a far more comprehensive measure.
3
This article is structured as follows. The ensuing section will develop the exit index
by drawing on generally accepted theories of political science. Section three presents the
results of the exit index and highlights its underlying logic in greater detail by focusing on
selected countries. The final section concludes with a broader reflection on what ought to
be done to reduce exit propensities.
MEASURING EXIT PROPENSITY
We need to begin by clarifying one of our key terms. We use ‘propensity’ throughout this
article to capture a member state’s central tendency to leave the EU. We chose this word
rather than ‘probability’ because in our final exit index four member states display an exit
propensity of over 50 per cent. If we were to interpret this number in a probabilistic sense,
it would mean these countries are more likely to leave the EU than stay in it. This would
take our argument too far. While we argue that some member states face a greater risk of
leaving than others, the UK is the only state where this seems more likely at this point. For
the purpose of our argument, we assume that the UK will eventually leave the EU. If the
UK were to change its mind, this would be a significant chilling effect on other countries’
ambitions. If a major country like the UK finds it impossible to go it alone, other countries
will reconsider their chances. If we accept that the UK will leave – and perhaps even makes
a success of it, as advocates of Brexit believe will happen – the question of how to gauge
the exit propensity of other member states comes to the fore.
We capture exit propensity across three dimensions: societal, economic and polit-
ical. Starting from the assumption that cross-country variation can be traced back to de-
lineable factors and measurable units, we identify three indicators in each dimension that
we argue are representative of a member state’s central tendency to leave the EU. This
allows us to propose a more objective and systematic assessment of which countries could
4
leave the EU. The societal dimension approximates the general disposition among citizens
to leave. The economic dimension measures a state’s dependency on the European single
market and foreign investors. The political dimension captures member states constitu-
tional structures, hard Eurosceptic political parties and their status as net contributors or
beneficiaries to the EU budget. The dimensions are unweighted and additive and draw on
one strand in the political science literature, in particular (see Table 1).
[Table 1 about here.]
We conceive of the three dimensions as necessary rather than sufficient conditions. Only
in the case of a ‘perfect storm’ – where societal, economic and political factors uniformly
point towards the exit door – will a country face the risk of leaving the EU. For example,
even if the population of a country is wildly Eurosceptic, if there is no support among political parties then exiting the EU is not on the cards. While these two factors seem natu-
rally correlated – a Eurosceptic electorate will vote for Eurosceptic parties – if voters are
guided in their electoral choices at least partly by factors unrelated to European (dis)integration, issue-specific preferences can diverge between the general population and po-
litical elites (Müller et al., 2012; Hooghe, 2003). Even if citizens and political parties are
united in their wish for pursuing the exit option, economic factors could render this alternative increasingly unattractive the closer a state inches towards it. Citizens and parties
may well be willing to pay a price for realizing preferred policy options, but if the costs
become excessive then the process will be aborted. We thus assume that actors are, at
least partly, rational and will not pursue the exit option against their own short-, mid- and
perhaps even long-term material interests.
5
Societal propensity
While member states maintain a highly diverse set of traditions for direct democratic instruments (Christiansen and Reh, 2009; Hobolt, 2009), the way out of the EU would prob-
ably always pass through a popular referendum. 1 Citizens’ preferences for leaving the EU
are therefore an essential component of the exit index. While neofunctionalists postulated
a ‘permissive consensus’ among citizens for integration, for postfunctionalists this turned
into a ‘constraining dissensus’ in the 1990s (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). But European integration is deepening, particular due to the euro crisis (Jones et al., 2016; Niemann and
Ioannou, 2015, pp. 200–5). With this comes a concurrent dynamic of politicization. Today,
EU politicization is at record heights (Cramme and Hobolt, 2015; Risse, 2015). While some
see in this a welcome step towards a EU polity (Follesdal and Hix, 2006, p. 557; Habermas,
2012, pp. 51–2), others warn about its irreversibility and that it tends to benefit the pop-
ulist right (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 929; Mair, 2007).
We draw on scholarship on public opinion for the societal dimension, which dis-
tinguishes ‘utilitarian’, ‘identity’ and ‘cue-taking’ approaches to measure support for Eu-
ropean integration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016, pp. 420–3). Utilitarian support is based on
individual cost-benefit analyses. Identity support is based on citizens’ attachment to their
nation states. Exclusive attachment to the nation state presumably predates and predicts
support for European integration (Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p. 433). While
the euro crisis may strengthen utilitarian considerations (Hobolt and Wratil, 2015), iden-
tity considerations are only partly offset (Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). Analysing the Brexit
vote, Hobolt (2016, p. 1268) similarly finds identity to be a substantial predictor for leave
1
Referendums in the UK itself are extremely rare and only three UK-wide referendums have been held to
date, two of which on the question of EU membership.
6
votes. Finally, cue-taking approaches contend that decisions on European integration are
too complex for citizens to take alone (Anderson, 1998, pp. 590–591; see also Broockman
and Butler, 2017). Therefore, they rely on proxies such as national news outlets or domestic political parties for their preferences on European integration. 2
We take three questions from the Eurobarometer (EB) survey that capture a coun-
try’s societal propensity to leave. First, the question on whether the country would face a
better future outside the EU captures a forward-looking notion of respondents’ view of
the EU. Moreover, this question combines utility, identity and cue-taking considerations.
While we cannot discriminate among the three, this is ultimately unnecessary to gauge a
state’s exit propensity. Second, we include the typical identity question on whether re-
spondents see themselves as only national, national first and European, European first
and national, or only European to measure the share of exclusive nationalists (Risse, 2010,
p. 41). Finally, we include the question on whether EU immigrants evoke negative feelings
among respondents.
Free movement of workers was a founding principle of the Treaty of Rome, which
was widened to include economically non-active citizens with Maastricht. Today, the free
movement of people has developed into one of the most controversial aspects of the Eu-
ropean project. Immigration from EU member states was one key issue in the Brexit referendum and the EU has made it clear that it is non-negotiable within the EU. This makes
leaving the only viable path to cutting intra-EU immigration. It is unclear whether ‘real’
immigration data count more than attitudes to explain individual behaviour. Toshkov and
Kortenska (2015) find a link between immigration rates and EU support, whereas others
stress the importance of attitudes (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hobolt, 2016, p. 1270)
2
We return to political parties and the national news media in the political dimension below.
7
We take attitudes towards EU immigrants rather than actual rates also because individu-
als typically overestimate real numbers (Sides and Citrin, 2007).
Economic propensity
Economic considerations form another crucial dimension when capturing exit propensity.
After the referendum, the pound slumped to its lowest level in thirty years and Standard
& Poor's (S&P) stripped the UK of its last AAA credit rating. While the stock market was
less impacted (presumably boosted by the lower pound), the effect of actually leaving the
EU after the Art. 50 TEU procedure has been completed is still hanging in the balance. The
extent of the economic disturbances will depend primarily on the follow-up arrangement
negotiated with the EU. We assume that there will be a break in the economic domain and
a state leaving the EU will not stay part of the single market (e.g. by joining the European
Economic Area) since these ties would be ‘too close’ for a member state that has just de-
cided to leave the EU. Under this scenario, member states experience varying economic
adjustment costs flowing from their decision.
The proposition that interdependence between states and firms restricts the scope
of autonomous state action is broadly grounded in international political economy (Katzenstein et al., 1998, pp. 655–7; Keohane and Nye, 1977). The basic premise is that global
market liberalization and transnational actors such as multinational enterprises tie states
together. In the words of Susan Strange (1996, p. 4), ‘[w]here states were once the masters
of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the
governments of states.’ Corporate taxation is a most likely case where global liberalization
should force states to adopt competitive tax rates to lure in foreign investors (and keep
domestic ones). Yet even here there are various other factors that determine taxation levels (Genschel et al., 2011; Plümper et al., 2009; Swank, 2016). Therefore, it is far from
8
undisputed that states are constrained by global markets and mobile investors (Genschel,
2004).
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are another case in point. CRAs constrain govern-
ments through credit assessments, which define a sovereign’s cost of borrowing. Moody’s
even ‘warned’ the UK that it could find its rating downgraded when losing access to ‘core
elements’ of the single market (Moody’s, 2016). While the methodology behind credit ratings are secret, the most comprehensive study to date identified the following indicators:
gross domestic product [GDP] per capita, GDP growth, the country’s debt default history,
market risk premium and institutional investor ratings. Moreover, individual CRAs seem
to incorporate the current account balance, foreign currency debt, inflation and fiscal bal-
ance (Hill et al., 2010, p. 1334). Picking any of these variables seems ill-suited for our index since we are interested in the effect of leaving the EU, which will indirectly affect most
of these variables. We assume that the more a state’s economy is geared towards the sin-
gle market and foreign investment, the higher the adjustment costs and the lower the economic rationale for leaving the EU.
To gauge adjustment costs, we take three indicators. First, we include merchandise
exports to the EU27 (EU28 minus the reporting country) over total exports. We focus on
exports because they would be directly affected by leaving the EU. For imports, the leaving
state could autonomously lower its tariffs (erga omnes) and non-tariff barriers for prod-
ucts it deems vital for the smooth functioning of its economy. Second, services exports to
the EU28 as a share of total exports determine adjustment costs. The rationale for includ-
ing this variable is analogous to trade in goods, but services trade will be even harder to
keep after leaving the EU. Finally, we take a member state’s inward stock of Foreign Direct
9
Investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP. 3 Inward stock is a good measure for adjustment
costs because leaving the EU brings with it the substantial risk of alarming foreign inves-
tors. The more a member state depends on FDI, the greater the potential for divestment.
For all three indicators, the shares are subtracted from 100 to measure the propensity to
leave the Union rather than stay.
Political propensity
After the referendum, it was for the British political system to translate its result into con-
crete actions to exit the EU. Initially, this requires a notification by the UK government to
the European Council to officially trigger Art. 50 TEU. Theresa May was eager to start the
process as quickly as possible and with as little interference from other domestic political
actors. At first, she sought to sidestep the British parliament under the royal prerogative
but this was successfully challenged by a private litigant in the British courts. The House
of Commons overwhelmingly supported the bill for triggering Art. 50. While the vote in
the House of Lords is still pending at the time of writing (March 2017), it cannot block the
bill but just try to extract concessions in the form of amendments. Similarly, the devolved
legislatures of the UK cannot formally block the process. Nevertheless, the specific config-
uration of a country’s political system clearly has a bearing on political outcomes, as scholars of comparative politics have advocated for years.
First, assuming that leaving the EU will proceed in accordance with the rule of law,
we suggest an indicator of constitutional structure based on Huber et al. (1993, p. 728)
and Armingeon et al. (2016, p. 11). We build on the insight that the number of veto players
3
FDI stocks of over 100 percent of GDP are capped at 100.
10
decreases the capacity to change the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002; Tsebelis, 1995). Our in-
dicator consists of three components. The first is whether countries are unitary or federal
states. Constituent sub-units of federal states disagreeing with the leave decision can either formally block the decision or, at least, stage a serious political fight with the central
government. The second component distinguishes parliamentary from (semi-)presiden-
tial systems. Presidential systems add a veto player because legislative majorities can differ from the head of government. The third component is the degree of bicameralism. The
stronger the second electoral chamber, the greater the likelihood that a controversial bill
can be challenged in another legislative arena. 4 Our indicator of constitutional structure
is additive and ranges from zero to two. We rescale it from 100 to zero to fit into the usual
metric of our exit index.
Second, national parties take an intermediary position between voter preferences
and state action. Consequently, Eurosceptic parties increase a state’s exit propensity. To
measure the degree to which a country’s political system accommodates Eurosceptic parties, we rely on the European Parliament (EP) elections held in May 2014. Following the
distinction into hard and soft Eurosceptic parties, whereby the former object to the EU in
principle and the latter only to specific aspects of it (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004, pp. 3–
4), and Treib’s (2014, p. 1544) assessment of parties that qualify as hard Eurosceptics, we
take these parties’ voting shares and multiply them by two. This is not meant to increase
4 We do not
include referendums, which would introduce the population collectively as another veto player.
While the Comparative Political Data Set records nil for all EU member states, we argue that leaving the EU
would always require a referendum. Either way, this component fails to contribute to a measure of variation
across countries. Moreover, the existence of an independent judicial body checking laws for conformity with
the constitution surely is another important component defining constitutional strictures. However, we
would again argue that judicial review varies only to a very limited degree, if at all, across member states.
11
the indicator’s weight. Rather, if a party gains 50 per cent of all votes in the elections, it
could pass most bills without support. This translates into quasi-dictatorial powers in par-
liament (where no supermajorities are required) and provides a single party with ample
opportunities to draw up exit plans.
European elections are held quasi simultaneously, which attenuates confounding
sources of cross-country variation. However, voting shares in EP elections can depart significantly from those at the national level. For example, UKIP and the Front National have
attracted 27 and 25 per cent in EP elections but hold only one and two seats in the House
of Commons and Assemblée nationale, respectively (their shares were 13 and 14 per cent
in the latest national elections). This would seem to make EP elections a highly imperfect
proxy for Euroscepticism in national parliaments. Why do we adopt this approach none-
theless? Again, the case of Brexit is instructive. While UKIP has only one seat, the House
of Commons overwhelmingly supported calling the in-out referendum and triggering Art.
50 TEU. Organized political opposition can place considerable pressure on other parties.
By contrast, if there is no hard Eurosceptic party even in EP elections – where low turnout
rates and the European nature of the election should favour parties with a clear Eurosceptic message – other parties will be under less pressure to exit the EU.
Our final indicator is a country’s budgetary status as net contributor or beneficiary.
In societal terms, the Brexit campaign showed how linking the leave decision to a direct
fiscal advantage (money that would allegedly become available for salient domestic issues
such as health care) is a powerful political message, particularly when emblazoned on the
side of a bus. Hobolt and Wratil (2016) find that costs associated with the EU was among
the top three concerns for leave voters. Similarly, Lubbers and Scheepers (2010, p. 810)
show that the budgetary status increases Euroscepticism and EU media attention for high
12
net contributors and attenuates it for high net beneficiaries. We include this as an indicator in the political dimension for two reasons. First, we are not interested in the effect of
the budgetary status on Euroscepticism among the general public, which is what we capture with the societal dimension. Rather, we adopt a political perspective by arguing that
elected representatives face a lower incentive to leave if it negatively affects their ability
to provide benefits to their constituents. Net beneficiaries leaving the EU would need to
adopt immediate austerity measures; or accept an increase in the budget deficit at a time
when tapping financial markets could be costly due to the uncertainty surrounding the
economic fallout.
Second, since Lubbers and Scheepers find that the budgetary status interacts with
media coverage, we are intrigued by the idea of including the national media landscape in
our index at least indirectly. The media can be viewed as a ‘fourth estate’ in democracies
placing checks and balances on those in power (Donohue et al., 1995). In the absence of
data on Euroscepticism in the media across all 28 member states, we are unable to include
a more immediate indicator, however desirous. Existing studies focus on a subset of mem-
ber states (e.g. Azrout et al., 2012; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge,
the only exception is the Media Study 2009 conducted for the European Elections Survey
(Schuck et al., 2010). While losing Croatia (not a member state in 2009) but gaining an
indicator for Euroscepticism in the national news media for all other member states might
be a worthwhile trade-off, it would exhibit only very limited variation. 5 Since this indica-
tor would be largely constant across member states, it is ill suited to capture variation in
5
The ratio between variable 13 (stories mentioning the EU) and variable 26 (does the story evaluate the EU
‘negative’ or ‘rather negative’) yields an indicator ranging from 0.5 per cent (Slovakia) to 11.8 per cent (Aus-
tria). 15 member states cluster between one and five per cent. The values are indeed tightly correlated with
13
exit propensities. To operationalize the budget indicator, we have allotted 100 for net contributors and zero otherwise.
RESULTS
Which country could be next on its way out of the EU? Figure 1 shows all member states
according to their propensity to leave in descending order, for each dimension and overall. We can now see which member states are potential leavers and stayers – and highlight
the various conditions that place them closer or farther from the exit door. In this section,
we pick some concrete examples to highlight the exit index. While we focus our discussion
on member states with the greatest propensity to leave, we also refer to stayers as points
of comparison.
[Figure 1 about here.]
United Kingdom – so long, farewell
On top of our exit index is the UK with 58.5 per cent. 6 While we would stress – potential –
leavers for all countries here discussed, the UK is the only country that consistently scores
budgetary status. Only the Czech Republic (4.8 per cent as a net beneficiary) and Germany (0.8 per cent as
a net contributor) grossly violate this trend. In 2014, no Media Study has been conducted for the European
Elections Survey.
6
Let us note that we were not actively trying to construct an index with the UK on top. In fact, we construed
this index in a stepwise fashion and only revealed to ourselves the order of countries at the end.
14
above 50 per cent across all three dimensions and will probably leave the EU. In the soci-
etal dimension, the UK is surpassed only by Cyprus. While the UK has the highest share of
exclusive nationalists (63 per cent), Cypriots believe in even greater numbers in a better
future outside the EU and exhibit more negative attitudes towards EU migrants. Econom-
ically, the UK is in second position. It experiences high levels of FDI, but its share of merchandise and services exports to the EU27 is below average. Only 47 per cent of its goods
(the lowest share save Malta) and 31 per cent of its services (only Hungary, Greece and
Cyprus fare lower) go to the EU27. In general, the UK thus faces relatively low economic
adjustment costs. Politically, the UK is in third position. Its constitutional structure is accommodating to change. While some powers have been devolved, the UK is a unitary state
with supreme central governance. Moreover, the UK is headed by a monarch, who is less
likely to support EU membership out of deeply held personal convictions. Only the House
of Lords qualifies as a medium-strength second legislative chamber which – although hav-
ing fewer (asymmetric) legislative rights – is selected by a different (incongruent) method
and thus has a different composition from the House of Commons. Finally, the UK had a
high share of hard Eurosceptics in the latest European elections (26.7 per cent) and is a
net contributor, albeit the one with the highest rebate. While the UK does not top any of
the three dimensions, overall it clearly leads the table.
Denmark – the people paradox
Denmark ranks second with 57.1 per cent. Economically, Denmark has a low share of FDI
(20 per cent lower than the UK), but it exports goods and services extensively to the EU27
(63 and 48 per cent, respectively). Politically, Denmark clearly leads the table. It is a net
contributor and has among the least constraining political systems. Moreover, in the latest
EP elections hard Eurosceptic parties combined a total of 34.7 per cent of the votes. With
15
hard Eurosceptics amassing such a large share of the vote, it emerges as a paradox that in
societal terms Denmark is among the EU-friendliest populations. In fact, it is the fifth most
Europhile country. Only 20 per cent see a better future for Denmark outside the EU and
only 35 per cent are exclusive nationalists. While citizens across Europe feel quite ambiv-
alent about EU migrants, only 30 per cent of Danes hold negative attitudes towards them.
Against this backdrop, it is hardly conceivable that an exit referendum would be successful. Denmark is likely to stick to its strategy of partial exits but not withdraw altogether.
Greece – an economy apart
Greece would face the relatively lowest economic adjustment costs from leaving the EU.
Greece has a limited stock of FDI (10 per cent of its GDP) fairly low shares for merchandise
and services exports (49 and 26 per cent, respectively). This is little surprising given its
geographic position at the periphery of the EU. On the societal side, 40 per cent of Greeks
could consider a better future outside the EU and the share of exclusive nationalists is the
third highest (after the UK and Cyprus). Moreover, Greeks hold EU immigrants in low regard. From a political perspective, Greece’s constitutional structure puts little in the way
of Grexit and Golden Dawn (9.39 per cent), the Communist Party (6.11 per cent) and the
Independent Greeks (3.46 per cent) together secured almost a fifth of the votes in the Eu-
ropean elections. The only ‘upside’ is that Greece is a huge net beneficiary of the EU budget
and would lose substantial transfers upon leaving. However, if its debt crisis spirals out
of control and more Greeks would become convinced that leaving the euro and EU would
offset the loss in transfers, it could be the next country to leave.
16
Italy – the divine comedian
Italy is the fourth country with an exit score of over 50 per cent. In societal terms, 39 per
cent of Italians think that their future would improve outside the EU and 52 per cent have
a negative attitude towards EU immigrants. The silver lining is that, relative to the UK and
Greece, the share of exclusive nationalists (42 per cent) is substantially lower. Economi-
cally, Italy has the lowest stock of FDI (17 per cent of GDP) after Greece. However, it does
trade more with other member states, particularly services, and hence economic adjust-
ment costs would outweigh those of Greece. Politically, Italy has a strong second legisla-
tive chamber and leading Italy out would probably require a majority in both houses. Nevertheless, Italy is a net contributor and its political landscape is explosive. Following Treib
(2014, p. 1545) we only included the Lega Nord as a hard Eurosceptic party. If one were
to add the Five Star Movement, which secured over one fifth of the votes in the latest EP
elections, Italy would move past Greece to third position. If Beppe Grillo’s party would
come out forcefully against the euro and EU membership, this could tip Italy over and out
of the bloc.
France, Austria and the Netherlands
Since France, Austria and the Netherlands are among the most frequently cited examples
of potential leavers, we include them in this discussion. Economically, France would face
relatively low adjustment costs as its FDI levels and merchandise and services exports to
the EU27 are all below average. Politically, the Front National is an established party that
would, however, face high constitutional hurdles to leave the EU. It would need to win the
presidential race and both houses of parliament. Moreover, France is quite EU friendly in
societal terms (34.4 per cent; twelfth position). By contrast, Austria displays a higher so17
cietal exit propensity (39.2 per cent) but is economically more tightly woven into the single market. 70 per cent of its goods exports go to the EU27, mainly Germany. Politically,
its constitutional structure makes leaving difficult. It is a federal state and the second legislative chamber, the Bundesrat, could block the process if the competences of its Länder
are negatively affected. Moreover, the Austrian president could refuse to sign the exit bill.
Finally, the Netherlands are politically less constrained but would face huge economic ad-
justment costs and has the third most EU-friendly citizens. In sum, the exit index yields no
acute exit propensities for these countries and we consider this result largely plausible.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have broken new ground by constructing an index measuring member
states central tendency to leave the EU based on indicators drawn from different political
science literatures. Although boiling down a highly complex question to three dimensions
and nine indicators carries the risk of oversimplification, our approach is a valuable con-
tribution by developing a systematic measure that can be discussed, refined and updated.
Specifically, we find no acute case of leaving other than the UK. The two countries closest
to a potential exit are Greece and Italy, which however show no ‘innate tendency’ to leave
but could be forced out because of their prolonged economic malaise and the (real or perceived) degree to which their economic underperformance is linked to membership in the
euro zone.
That being said, it also becomes apparent from our exit index that the situation can
change rather rapidly. While the economic dimension and most indicators in the political
dimension can be regarded as constant, the societal dimension can change in a matter of
days and hard Eurosceptic parties can rise to power quickly. If hard Eurosceptics manage
18
to call a referendum on membership in the EU or even just the euro zone, all other con-
straints could be unhinged. A popular referendum framed as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity with a fierce campaign during which the EU is blamed for all of the country’s woes
and the future outside it portrayed as the land of milk and honey is the most realistic path
to victory for hard Eurosceptics.
Above all, our article hopefully propels the debate on how exit propensities can be
better conceptualized and measured. The result of our index – or variations that may follow – could also be used as independent variables in other research projects. For example,
member states could strategically employ high levels of exit propensity in EU-level nego-
tiations to move policy outcomes in the direction of their ideal point. Indeed, David Cameron trying to extract concessions from other member states during the ‘new settlement’
negotiations at the European Council summit in February 2016 has employed exactly that
strategy. Furthermore, our index also has the potential to inform a public debate that haphazardly singles out individual countries and factors without a comprehensive consideration of the sort that we are offering in this article.
Constructing an exit index has the added value of yielding policy recommendations
as to what could be done to avoid the collapse of the EU. Following our own operationalization, the EU must promote greater understanding among Europeans and help them to
(partly) develop a European identity. In our opinion, exchange programs are best suited
to achieve this objective and their funding and participation rates must be increased, drastically. Importantly, the programs must not, de facto, be limited to highly educated citizens
such as university students but reach out to citizens of all stripes (cf. Kuhn, 2012). While
some might strike this as hopelessly naïve, Brexit is a stark reminder of the consequences
of not taking societal support more seriously. Instead of granting the UK a rebate, it should
have been offered a dividend for exchange and other programs. Relying on transnational
19
economic interactions to work their way through European society (Fligstein, 2008) or a
very optimistic notion of Verfassungspatriotismus (Habermas, 1990, pp. 147–174) could
precipitate the EU’s demise. Moreover, the EU should consider focusing efforts on Eurosceptic societies even at the expense of EU-friendly ones.
Economically, the European single market has removed a great many obstacles to
the free flow of goods and capital already. Services liberalization has proven more difficult
to achieve (e.g. Crespy and Gajewska, 2010). Other areas where the single market is currently under construction are the digital single market, the capital markets union and the
energy union. Increased economic interdependence will increase adjustment costs from
leaving the EU and provide the economic glue between member states. Politically, we see
the greatest potential in moving to a system of truly own resources, which would decrease
the potential for political controversy. The focus should be on resources that cannot be
reproduced easily on a purely national level, for example in form of a financial transaction
tax or taxing carbon emissions (cf. Heinemann et al., 2009). If leaving the EU would erode
the fiscal position of all states and not only net beneficiaries, the divisive rhetoric of stopping payments to Brussels would become more shallow. Rather than portraying the EU as
a zero-sum game with winners and losers, these reforms would illustrate that integration
results in joint gains and can benefit everyone.
Finally, if the UK should decide to stay in the EU after all, the risk of other countries
leaving will dramatically recede and an exit index in the form that we conceive here may
become irrelevant. One scenario is that the UK triggers Art. 50 TEU, negotiates an agree-
ment with the EU in a process that will be excruciating for both sides, and then puts this
outcome before the people in another referendum (e.g. before the parliament votes on the
final deal). If this referendum goes the other way, other member states will bring the UK
back into the fold. This ‘near-Brexit’ experience would then stand as a shining example for
20
all other states contemplating leaving the EU. With the risk of other states leaving dimin-
ishing, the EU would face fewer incentives to address the issues we have just discussed.
In this sense, the suspense of a UK halfway out the door may prove to have been a crucial
impulse for the EU to reform beyond what would have been possible absent this ‘external’
shock.
21
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Table 1. The dimensions, indicators, sources and theoretical foundations of the exit
index
DimenTheoretical
Indicator
Source
sion
foundation
Societal
Better future outside the EU
Eurobarometer
Public
Identity (exclusive nationalists) Eurobarometer
opinion
Attitudes towards EU migrants Eurobarometer
Economic Merchandise exports to EU27
Services exports to EU27
FDI stock
Political
Eurostat
Eurostat
UNCTAD
International
Political
Economy
Constitutional structure
Armingeon et al. (2016)
Comparative
Hard Eurosceptic parties
EP elections
politics
Budget contributor/beneficiary European Commission
29
Figure 1. The exit index and its three dimensions viewed for all EU member states.
30