Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy. Lessons from Poland 1980–1999
ISBN 83-89817-41-1
Assisting Negotiated
Transition to Democracy
Lessons from Poland 1980–1999
Jaros³aw Æwiek-Karpowicz
Piotr Maciej Kaczyñski
Assisting Negotiated
Transition to Democracy
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Assisting Negotiated
Transition to Democracy
Lessons from Poland 1980–1999
Jaros³aw Æwiek-Karpowicz
Piotr Maciej Kaczyñski
Warsaw 2006
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
EUROPEAN PROGRAM
This publication is based on a project financed by the German Marshall Fund
of the United States.
Proofreading by: Holly Bouma
Translation by: Joanna Fomina
© Copyright by the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2006
Reproducton of materials of the Foundation Institute of Public Affairs, in
whole or in part, is permitted only with the source.
ISBN: 83-89817-41-1
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Contens
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Recommendations for Democracy Activists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Useful terms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Political Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. Free Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4. The Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6. Reform of the Police and Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7. Free Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8. Citizen Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Key Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Biographical Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Information about the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Summary
Poland is a widely known example of a successful systemic
transformation in the 20th century. Despite the internal voices of criticism
concerning the lack of completely settling accounts with the communist
period, Poles seem to value the peaceful and negotiatory character of the
1989 transition. Today Poland is well−rooted in the community of democratic
states – being an important member of the European Union and an ally of the
United States – and can share its experience with other countries striving for
democracy. For many countries that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Poland serves a clear illustration of the fact that democratisation is
attainable and that it contributes to modernisation and the prosperity of the
state and its citizens.
Democratic changes in Poland would not have been possible without
considerable Western assistance which – effectively implemented over the
course of many years – has born its fruit at a deciding moment. The support
from Western countries covered such areas as human rights protection,
freedom of the press, political pluralism or citizen participation. The present
report discusses selected mechanisms of the effective implementation of
democracy assistance in Poland in the 1980s and 1990s. It also presents
recommendations for democracy activists which can be adopted in other
places in the world in such a way as to enhance the chances for a successful
negotiated transition to democracy.
Introduction
The promotion of democracy has been one of the most important tasks of
the United States’ foreign policy for a long period of time – not just during
the presidency of George W. Bush.1 These issues became especially
important during the 1980s, the crucial phase of the “Cold War.” The
establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983,
which aimed at supporting democracy in the world, was a step toward the
liberation of many countries from communist oppression and the introduction
of functioning democratic systems. Poland was the largest beneficiary of
American assistance. At the same time Poland is one of the better known
examples of Huntington’s “third wave of democratisation” that started in the
middle of the 1970s and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
There have been numerous studies of the Polish experience in the
transition to democracy highlighting its main characteristics. An important
feature of the Polish transformation was its peaceful character, which can be
traced to the “Solidarity” movement and the Catholic Church teachings.
Another Polish “trademark” is the idea of “round table” talks, in other words,
a specific way of conducting negotiations between regime authorities and the
democratic opposition. As Samuel Huntington noticed, a state where the
initial transformation was conducted in a peaceful way, without bloodshed,
can face further challenges and obstacles associated with the democratisation
process much easier.
The process of democracy consolidation that was taking place in the
1990s was one of the first projects of democracy promotion in the post−Cold
War world.2 This consistent process was possible, first of all, thanks to the
constant support of the United States, but also to the growing support of the
European Union through both closer co−operation and membership
prospects. The issues of democracy promotion from the beginning of the
1990s started to play a more important role in the policy of the European
Union on both the community and intergovernmental level. Respecting and
1
See W. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
World Since 1776, New York 1997; T. Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the
Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century, Princeton 1994; B. Bailyn, To
Begin the World Anew: The Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders, New York
2003.
2
See J. Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” The Washington
Quarterly, Spring 2006, p. 86.
10
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
promoting democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law started to
be regarded as the main priority of the EU’s development and neighbourhood
policy as well as of the Common Foreign and Security Policy subject to
intergovernmental decisions.3 The Polish example shows the significance of
the democratising effect of the European Union on its neighbours. What is
more, it also makes clear that the US and EU can complement each other’s
activities and further co−ordination of their efforts can be very beneficial for
the effective support of democratic processes in different parts of the world.4
The 1990s proved to be the times of democracy.5 Never before did so
many people enjoy the right to vote as well as basic civil liberties as then.
According to the Freedom House reports, at the end of the 20th century two
thirds of the world’s population lived in countries that were partially or fully
free. Democracy became a synonym of the proper and desired regime; and
the idea of human rights – inscribed in the UN charter – turned out to be an
informal world constitution. For many people it became clear that the
international order – the political and economic stabilisation of the world – is
possible only thanks to the existence of democratic states whose authorities
respect human rights. Democracies are less prone to disputes and wars, more
open towards compromise and co−operation, and more engaged in the activity
of international organisations.6
However, making democracy a set of universal principles to be respected
by all the states as well as promoting them in the world is often met with
criticism and accusations of cultural imperialism of the Western states.7 Some
speculate that other cultures may give birth to forms of democratic regimes
that are different from the Western liberal type. Promoters of democracy,
however, draw attention to the fact that their activity has nothing in common
with imposing the Western cultural model and liberal value system. They
3
See M. Emerson (ed.), Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, CEPS, Brussels
2005; T. A. Boerzel, T. Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Workshop of CDDRL, Stanford University, 4−5
October 2004.
4
See R. D. Asmus, L. Diamond, M. Leonard, M. McFaul, “A Transatlantic Strategy to
Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2005; M. McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 2004/2005.
5
Such a thesis is put forward by P. Śpiewak – a sociologist and historian of ideas, who
currently is a Civic Platform politician. See P. Śpiewak, Obietnice demokracji [The Promises
of Democracy], Warsaw 2004, p. 7.
6
See N. Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny
and Terror. Public Affairs, 2004. According to the author of the popular bestseller in
Washington, it is better to be a neighbour of a democracy that hates us than a dictator that
appears to be our ally. The chances are slim that a democratic country will wage a war against
us, whereas a dictator can easily turn us into an enemy, even if just to uphold his power.
7
J. Grey strongly criticises democratic messianism in his book Al Qaeda and What It Means
To Be Modern (in P. Śpiewak, Obietnice demokracji, p. 17).
Introduction
11
claim that it is only dictators who benefit from anti−democratic attitudes that
emphasise cultural differences and their incompatibility with democracy
when they try to justify their power. Democracy promotion does not serve
private interests and strategic goals, but protects people against abuses of
power. There is no hidden imperialism here, because the ultimate aim is to
give the citizens full freedom of decision−making about the fate of their
country.
It goes without saying that Poland’s successful democratisation after 1989
is related to the determination of Poles as well as the country’s cultural
proximity to Western European tradition. Yet, in Polish political discourse
there are numerous voices that question the “round table” philosophy of the
changes in the 1990s. Some Polish politicians and public intellectuals aim to
re−evaluate the efforts of the negotiators from the “Solidarity” camp. They
accuse the main transition architects of consolidating the community of
private interests and of “conspiracy” between parts of the communist
authorities and the democratic opposition. They undermine the heritage of the
round table and demand immediate “settling accounts” with the past – both
before and after 1989.8
There is little likelihood that the radical model of transformation
postulated by them would have achieved its goals. Such a form of
transformation would rather have led to social disorder and a lack of
stabilisation. The model of negotiated transition, as applied in Poland after
1998, introduced a lasting democratic regime characterised by functioning
political pluralism, freedom of expression, lack of discrimination based on
nationality, ethnicity, or religion, a system of protection of human rights, and
the rule of law. For this reason, particular attention in this report is paid to
ways of successfully implementing the assistance coming from Western
countries in Poland, which helped to achieve the aims of negotiated
transition. Thus, the report is not an academic study of the last twenty years.
It is rather meant to illustrate how the West was able to assist in creating a
favourable climate for the Polish negotiated transition, as well as how Poles
rejected revolutionary and radical methods for the benefit of compromise.
The chosen set of good practices can be a Polish export product helpful in
reflecting upon the ways of peaceful systemic transformation and
democratisation of public life in other places in the world.
In order to present examples of the effective implementation of the
Western aid as well as the Polish experience of successful democratisation of
the country, the authors conducted a number of interviews (February−May
2005) with prominent decision−makers, experts, and opinion−makers of the
8
See A. Smolar, “Radykałowie u władzy,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 2−3 September 2006.
12
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
1980s and 1990s. Among these persons there were representatives of the
democratic opposition and the communist regime authorities, the main actors
of the transformation after 1989 as well as social scientists who have
conducted research on the processes of transition (see Biographical Notes).
The answer to the question as to which factors are key to determine the
success of democracy in a given country has been sought for a long time. It
appears that the institutionalist tradition, which has dominated from the
second half of the 20th century and explains the success of the representative
government system by structural and procedural solutions, has failed in the
face of different historical experiences. It suffices to mention the failure of
democratic projects in inter−war Germany and Italy or the unsuccessful
emulating of the US institutional solutions by the Latin American countries
in the 19th century. The establishment of democratic institutions alone will
not ensure a functioning democracy.
On the other hand, the source of success is often attributed to socio−
economic factors (R. Dahl, S.M. Lipset) or socio−cultural factors (A. de
Tocqueville, G. Almond, S. Verba). The proper functioning of representative
democracy depends on the level of affluence, education and the compatible
political tradition of a given society.9 This approach questions/belittles the
significance of effective political changes, bestowing a label of a fixed
inherent capability to life in a democratic system on every society.
With regard to this never−ending dispute led by both theorists and
practitioners of democracy, all possible variables determining the future of a
given democratic system are taken into account. Yet, the experience of
Western organisations long active in democracy promotion around the world
allows one to single out certain areas where development is strictly connected
with the success of democracy in a given country. To name just a few: the
institution of free elections, the rule of law, a functioning system of human
rights protection, civil control of the army, political pluralism, free and
independent media, citizen participation, and economic reforms. In these
particular areas Poland has skilfully employed both its own experience and
the assistance offered by the West. It has become a normal European state,
which – despite the burden of transformation – has thus far managed to
adhere to democratic principles.
9
See R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 1993.
Recommendations for Democracy Activists
The following conclusions and recommendations are aimed to highlight
some key tools from the toolbox of democracy promotion and assistance,
which have proven (in the authors’ opinions) particularly useful in the case
of Poland. They are primarily addressed to both internal and external actors
of the democratisation process. The recommendations have been grouped
into those which might be applied to “pre−1989” types of situations (e.g.
Belarus) as well as “post−1989” situations (e.g. Ukraine). A separate cluster
of recommendations refers to the crucial period of negotiating the transition
from a non−democratic to democratic political regime.
I. Recommendations for democracy activists under
authoritarian regimes
The strategy of promoting democracy under authoritarian regimes should
encompass both the democratic opposition and the authorities with the aim
of creating favourable conditions for negotiated transition. It should aim to
strengthen moderate elements on both sides of the struggle for democracy.
● Poland’s experience in the 1970s (Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe Final Act – 1975) demonstrates the effectiveness of the rhetoric
and policy of universal human rights. Democratic states should pay
renewed attention to the idea of human rights in ideological disputes with
representatives of authoritarian regimes. Efforts should be made to bind
such states by international conventions, such as the International Pact on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Pact on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. At a
given moment oppositional groups may use these kinds of arguments in
their critiques of the authorities. By the same token, only those individuals
and groups should be eligible for pro−democracy assistance who approve of
the idea of universal human rights.
● International organisations, such as the Council of Europe, Organization for
Security and Co−operation in Europe and especially the European Union,
should strengthen their pro−democracy agendas. In particular, there is a
need for further reform and increase of the scope of activity of the already
existing EU programmes, such as the European Initiative for Democracy
●
14
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR), to make them more decentralised and better
adjusted to challenges of a “pre−1989” type of political context.
● European democracy promoters should consider the establishment of the
European Foundation for Democracy, whose mode of operating would be
based on the best practices of the American National Endowment for
Democracy (NED).
● The international community should employ the so−called “conditional
approach” with regard to the “facade” democratic institutions (the
constitutional court, ombudsman) in authoritarian states. When a puppet
court, tribunal or electoral commission issues at least one decision that
shows its independence from the authorities, this act should be followed by
support from corresponding external institutions (e.g. the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts).
● Visits of politicians from democratic countries and the representatives of
international organisations should include meetings with the democratic
opposition. Such meetings enhance the legitimacy of the opposition both
within the international arena as well as in their countrymen’s eyes. They
create an image of a serious political force that can exercise power despite
the lack of a lot of prior experience. Also foreign diplomatic representations
should stay in touch with and invite both members of the ruling regime and
members of the opposition. By doing so, they may become platforms for
informal interaction between both groups.
● Academic scholarships and fellowships as well as study visits for
democracy activists and selected representatives of some government
institutions help to prepare future democratic political and economic elites.
After returning to their countries, such persons will occupy important
positions in the world of business and politics. Their familiarity with the
functioning of a democratic society will have an important influence on the
process of democratic consolidation.
● Assisting independent (clandestine) publishing houses and press is
important for both the society at large and the intelligentsia, who can find
there a public space, free of the influence of authorities. Diaspora
organisations play a similar role, which provide the in−country activists
with a public voice.
● Broad membership in international organisations and other forms of
international recognition by their peers in democratic countries should be
granted to endangered opposition activists, independent writers, academics
and journalists. This would provide them with a form of protection from
repression in the international forum.
● Effective channelling of funds to the democratic opposition and civil
society activists cannot be expected to meet the criteria of transparency of
Recommendations for Democracy Activists
15
grant−making in established democracies. Donor organisations should take
advantage of intermediaries registered in democratic countries, which
should take responsibility for the distribution of funds through more or less
informal networks of activists in the country under a dictatorship.
● The social exclusion of the victims of repression and their families should
be prevented by providing them with alternative sources of income as well
as the establishment of “networks of support.”
● The assistance funds should be donated not only for such charitable aims,
equipment purchase, organisational expenses, but also for research projects
and self−study programmes. These activities will facilitate democracy
activists in facing the future challenges of systemic transformation.
● The international public opinion quickly becomes “saturated” with
information about violations of democratic principles. It is therefore
important for democracy activists to make efforts to sustain the attention of
international public by presenting their struggle as both universal and
exceptional (by “branding” the opposition).
II. Negotiating transition to democracy
A little democracy can open the way to full democracy. The opposition can
seek a compromise with the authorities during negotiations, but in doing so
it cannot considerably retreat from democratic principles. The society as
well as the international public opinion should be able to see clearly which
of the sides is a true guardian of democracy.
● The institution of a mediator respected by both sides is essential during
negotiations. Such mediation can be carried out by religious authorities
(e.g. the Catholic Church as in Poland), the monarch (as in Spain), or
international organisations (as in Ukraine).
● Renouncing universal retribution against the functionaries of the outgoing
authoritarian regime by representatives of the democratic opposition is an
essential condition for negotiated transition. The complete settling of
accounts with the past is not the most important issue when chances for a
peaceful handover of power occur. In some circumstances, it may be
necessary to provide a security guarantee for the outgoing dictatorship
authorities. Both sides should agree that during negotiations and the
preparation of resolutions they will try to respect democratic principles to
the greatest possible extent.
● The international public opinion should be constantly informed about the
developments in the country. Ensuring wide publicity for the negotiations
between the democratic opposition and the regime authorities can advance
the process of democratisation.
●
16
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
III. Democracy assistance in the post-1989 conditions
(democratic consolidation)
Countries undergoing systemic transformation should not be left on their
own. They should be granted membership in the structures of different
international organisations as soon as possible. Moreover, the so−called
democratic clause – which makes membership in a given organisation
subject to respecting democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of
law – should be strictly observed and enforced. This constant external
monitoring should help to prevent emerging democracies from retreating to
authoritarianism.
● Such international organisations as the Council of Europe should play a key
role in providing assistance to consolidating democracy, for instance during
the drafting of a new democratic constitution (Venice Commission).
● The definition of a strategic goal of the transition, even a far−reaching one
(e.g. the EU accession or membership in NATO), is very important for the
success of the democratisation of a country, because it helps to keep the
political elite within the bounds of democratic practices and procedures.
● In the public perception, the aim of transition is often not the
democratisation of a state, but its modernisation and the improvement of
living conditions. It is an important task for the political elites to combine
these two processes and make it clear that there is no modernisation without
democratisation, and no democratisation without modernisation.
● Political parties in established democracies should provide support (mainly
through training) to politicians who are not used to functioning in a
democratic system, since their hitherto activity was based on the struggle
with an anti−democratic regime. Such training should be provided by
organisations such as German political foundations (Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung or Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), American institutions such as the
National Democratic Institute and the National Republican Institute, or the
British Westminster Foundation for Democracy.
● Furthermore, one should consider the establishment of EU−funded political
foundations affiliated with the political factions in the European
Parliament. Such foundations could play a crucial role in “Europeanising”
the political scene, in particular in emerging democracies in the EU
neighbourhood.
● It is necessary to create a transparent mechanism for organising and
controlling the electoral process in order to ensure fair elections. A good
solution is the establishment of an autonomous central electoral
commission composed of independent judges. The political factor in the
electoral process should be limited to local electoral commissions.
●
Recommendations for Democracy Activists
17
It is important to strengthen the foundations of participatory democracy in
a country undergoing systemic transformation, even despite the lack of
initiative from the new authorities. For that it is necessary to do the
following: create mechanisms of pan−national co−operation between non−
governmental organisations, to establish a platform for exchange of
experiences, and teach NGOs to effectively monitor government actions.
New governments should be encouraged to mobilise their societies and
grant them the greatest influence on the process of governing the state
(social consultations, public hearings, civic legislative initiatives, etc).
● Fast economic reforms should be coupled with consistent democratisation
of public life. One should not focus exclusively on technical and financial
assistance aimed at the modernisation of the state; it is important to allocate
a substantial part of foreign aid for the support of democratic education,
pluralism, tolerance, protection of human rights, self−government, anti−
corruption activities, etc.
● Internships in foreign editorial offices and training seminars aimed at
teaching journalistic objectivism and professionalism should be organised
for independent journalists. In particular, the local media have not been
well−prepared for the new reality after the collapse of the regime. Special
attention (internships, training courses) should be paid to them in order to
help them improve journalistic professionalism.
● In the sphere of free media the new authorities should support grass−root
initiatives as well as journalistic self−organisation and self−regulation. Non−
governmental watchdog organisations should be established and supported
in order to monitor threats to journalists’ independence and external
pressures on the media.
● It is necessary to provide substantive (training) and institutional support to
judges who often have to provide “creative interpretation” of the existing
laws during the process of systemic transformation (due to the lack of new
legislation).
●
Useful Terms and Abbreviations
AFL−CIO – American Federation of Labor−Congress of Industrial
Organizations
BBWR – (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform) Non−partisan Reform
Support Block
G−7 – a group of the seven richest countries of the world: the USA, Canada,
Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy
IDEE – Institute of Democracy in Eastern Europe
IMF – International Monetary Fund
CSCE/OSCE – Conference for Security and Co−operation in Europe/
Organization for Security and Co−operation in Europe
KC PZPR – (Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej)
Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party
KOR – (Komitet Obrony Robotników) Workers’ Defence Committee
KPZR – (Komunistyczna Partia Związku Radzieckiego) the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
MoND – Ministry of National Defence
MIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED – National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs – Non−Governmental Organisations
NSZZ “S” – (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”)
the Solidarity Independent Self−governing Trade Union
ODIHR – Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co−operation and Development
OKNO – (Oświata, Kultura, Nauka) Education, Culture, Science
OKP – (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny) Citizens’ Parliamentary Club
UN – the United Nations
OPZZ – (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych) All−Poland
Alliance of Trade Unions
PAFF – Polish−American Freedom Foundation
PAUCI – Poland−America−Ukraine Cooperation Initiative
PHARE – Poland−Hungary Assistance to Restructuring of their Economies
PKW – (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) National Electoral Commission
PRL – (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) Polish People’s Republic
Useful Terms and Abbreviations
19
PZPR – (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) Polish United Workers’
Party
SB – (Służba Bezpieczeństwa) Security Service
SD – (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) Democratic Party
SdRP – (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) Social Democracy of
the Polish Republic
SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency
SLD – (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) the Democratic Left Alliance
TKK NSZZ “S”– (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ
“Solidarność”) Temporary Commission of Coordination NSZZ
“Solidarność”
UKIE – (Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej) Office of the Committee
for European Integration
UOP – (Urząd Ochrony Państwa) the Office of State Protection
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
CIS – the Community of Independent States
WSI – (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne) Military Information Services
ZSL – (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) United People’s Party
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1. Political Pluralism
Political pluralism is fundamental to political systems of democratic
states. One of the most popular definitions shows that the essence of this term
is free competition of groups in exerting influence upon the decisions taken
by the state.10 Political pluralism is thus a constitutive feature of a democratic
regime, and it is manifested in the freedom of association and expression of
opinion. In contrast to totalitarian systems, democracy assumes the existence
of diverse world outlooks. Despite heated debates and conflicts between the
government and the opposition, no one questions the legitimacy of pluralism;
in other words, the authorities do not reach out for repressive practices
towards people with different opinions. Thus, it is one the basic factors
differentiating between a totalitarian state and a democracy.
In post−war Poland, in contrast to other states under the influence of the
Soviet Union and the communist ideology, pluralism survived albeit in a
limited form throughout the whole period of the PRL’s existence. One of the
reasons for this was the huge popularity and relatively large autonomy of the
Catholic Church, around which different intellectual circles – not always
close to the Catholic social thought – could unite.11 The Church’s position
became even more stronger after the Krakow metropolitan bishop, Karol
Wojtyła, was chosen to become the Pope in 1978. Around this period, basic
political currents started to form within the democratic opposition. The first
one was the circle of intellectuals centred around the Workers’ Defence
Committee (KOR), founded after workers’ protests in 1976. The full extent
of differences in world outlooks could be seen during the “explosion” of the
Solidarity social movement, which was also initiated after workers’ strikes in
1980.
Solidarity – the United Self−governing Trade Union registered in
November 1980 – was joined by many oppositionists from the KOR, the
Movement of Young Poland and Znak (the Sign). Thus, this was not a sensu
stricto trade union uniting only workers. Very soon, Solidarity had 10 million
members.
10
For different definitions of democracy see S. M. Lipset (ed.), The Encyclopedia of
Democracy, Washington 1995.
11
For political disputes as well as co−operation between the Church and political movements
during the communist times see the influential book by Adam Michnik Kościół, Lewica,
Dialog [The Church and the Left], Chicago University Press, 1993.
1. Political Pluralism
21
Table 1. The Approximate Number of the PZPR (Communist Party) and
Solidarity Members in 198012
PZPR
3 million
NSZZ Solidarity
10 million
Source: Based on information from the PWN Encyclopaedia.
The Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), the party of the state, was the
real centre of power until 1989. It formed the foundation of the socialist
society exercising full control of the bureaucratised command economy. The
party was organised on the basis of centralism. The smallest unit of the PZPR
was the Basic Party Organisation (POP), which existed in places of
employment, universities, and cultural institutions. The most important role
was played by the Central Committee, its Political Bureau and the Secretariat.
These institutions decided about filling the key posts not only inside the
party, but also in all state structures, from central offices to small state and
co−operative enterprises. The so−called “party activists” (aktyw partyjny) –
people professionally involved in politics and who were recommended for
managing the main state institutions, social organisations, and trade unions –
played the leading role in the PZPR. The different visions of socialism, as
well as varied individual interests of these people, led to growing differences
inside the party. As early as in the 1980s one could speak of the existence of
the “party concrete” (i.e. hardliners−conservatives) and “liberals” who were
open towards economic co−operation with the West and wanted to benefit
from it.
Poland was also different from other socialist states due to the relatively
strong position of its private sector. Despite its attempts at collectivisation, in
most areas of Poland it was possible to maintain private ownership of farms.
As a result, in agriculture and small enterprises the nomenclature system was
controlled by the allies of the PZPR: the United People’s Party (ZSL) and the
Democratic Party (SD). However, to a limited extent, this fact also
contributed to the existence of political pluralism.
Another element that had an impact on maintaining pluralism in Poland
was the agreement for the existence of the Sejm, the chamber of the
Parliament whose name referred to the tradition of Polish constitutionalism.
It has to be added that despite the fact that the Sejm was the highest organ in
the state power system, in practice it was submitted to the principle of the
12
After the establishment of the NSZZ Solidarity in 1980 and the introduction of martial law
on the 13th of December 1981 about 850,000 people left the PZPR.
22
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
steering role of the party and deprived of any political representativeness.
Constitutional rules postulated the concentration of all main power functions
in the Sejm (legislature, appointment, dismissal and control of other state
organs), and defined the Sejm as the highest organ of state power. In reality
the centre of political power was situated outside the Sejm, and its role was
limited. In 1952−55 the Sejm was replaced by the Council of State almost
entirely, as far as its powers were concerned. In the 1970s and 1980s its
character was rather symbolic. The Sejm was more independent in the
periods 1957−61 and 1980−85, although it always remained within the limits
of the political steering of the PZPR.
Despite a rather specific situation in Poland, the communist totalitarian
state employed traditional methods of repression. Martial law in 1981 dealt a
powerful blow to the democratic opposition, one of the main principles of
which was non−violence. The use of force by the state was not limited to the
introduction of martial law, the delegalisation of Solidarity and the arrest of
opposition leaders. Political murders were also committed (e.g. of Grzegorz
Przemyk, Piotr Bartoszcze and priest Jerzy Popiełuszko).
During the long years of the existence of the PRL, the government as well
as the opposition did not manifest much internal diversification of
worldviews. However, the second part of the 1980s witnessed the onset of the
process of the “softening” of communist power. This evolution of the PZPR’s
attitudes was grounded in a deep economic crisis in Poland, as well as the
change of the geopolitical situation. After Mikhail Gorbachev became the
First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the communist
authorities had more freedom of undertaking political initiatives inside the
country. This is why the televised political debate between Solidarity leader
Lech Wałęsa and the leader of the pro−regime All−Poland Alliance of Trade
Unions (OPZZ), Alfred Miodowicz, could take place in 1988. This was the
first moment when the public in Poland could see the legendary leader after
a long period of his absence. From the mid−1980s there was a growing
conviction inside the communist party that the “problems in Poland should be
dealt with in a political way [negotiations with the opposition] and not in an
administrative way [the use of force].”13
External help in the establishment and proper functioning of political
pluralism in Poland was effective on a number of different levels. It meant
the support for the democratic opposition in its disputes with the communist
dictatorship. This assistance was carried out in different ways. First of all,
Western states were an important point of reference for the formation of the
democratic opposition. Secondly, numerous contacts of the opposition
13
Interview with Mieczysław Rakowski.
1. Political Pluralism
23
strengthened the position of Solidarity in respect to the authorities. It is worth
mentioning here the visits of the Polish opposition leaders by Western
leaders, e.g. Margaret Thatcher. Thirdly, there was a recognition of the
“Polish cause” by the Western media and Western societies. In this sense, the
Nobel Peace Prize award for Lech Wałęsa was of great importance: it
promoted the Polish endeavours to gain freedom, as well as strengthened
Wałęsa’s position in respect to the communist authorities and Solidarity.
Fourthly, an important instance of support was the flow of unbiased
information. Finally, Solidarity received financial support from Western
trade unions and other sources.
Among the concrete activities undertaken abroad that supported the
democratic opposition and helped break the ideological monopoly of the
communist authorities in Poland there were:
● John Paul II’s visit to Poland in June 1983 and March 1987;
● Lech Wałęsa’s Nobel Peace Prize in 1983;
● The start of the investigation of the PRL authorities by the International
Labour Organisation in 1984;
● The establishment of the Solidarity Foundation in the US in 1985. It
comprised such people as Edward Kennedy, Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Jerzy
Giedroyć;
● The admission of the NSZZ Solidarity to the World Confederation of
Labour and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1986;
● The meeting of Solidarity leaders with then senator Edward Kennedy and
the US Vice President George Bush in Poland in 1987;
● The appointment of Lech Wałęsa as an honorary member of the American
Constitution’s 200th anniversary celebration committee in 1987;
● The granting of financial aid of 1 million dollars to Solidarity by the US
Congress in 1987;
● The visit of the Solidarity delegation in Paris in December 1988 for the
celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Polish political pluralism proved to be successful at the crucial moment
when the negotiations between the outgoing authorities and the democratic
opposition started. Both forces decided to carry out the negotiations in a
peaceful way. There was a need for a mediator that would be relatively
respected and trusted by both sides. In the case of Spain, after the death of
general Franco, King Juan Carlos14 played such a role. In Poland such a role
was played by the representatives of the Catholic Church. In Ukraine, during
14
Interview with Bronisław Geremek.
24
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
the Orange Revolution – foreign political leaders (Aleksander Kwaśniewski
of Poland and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania) as well as the European Union
took such a position.
The second important factor at the crucial moment of transition was the
lack of external or internal destabilising forces. Even if it appears that the
situation in Poland would have allowed for a peaceful transformation already
in 1981, there were reasons to believe that at that time such forces existed
either in the form of the USSR (according to Wojciech Jaruzelski) or the
PZPR (if information about the Soviet army’s readiness to enter Poland in
1981 served only as a pretext for introducing martial law), or the Polish Army
(if martial law could be seen as a military coup). A threat to the peaceful
transformation in Poland also existed in 1989, yet it was much less
considerable. Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian dictator, called for a military
intervention of the Warsaw Pact states in Poland. Yet, his motion did not find
support from the rest of the leaders of the Eastern bloc, including the leader
of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev.
After 1989 the Polish political scene has been characterised by party
particularisation and instability. Many parties do not last one Parliamentary
term of office and – as a result of considerable loss of support – they dissolve,
split, unite with other parties, or undertake other activities to survive on the
political scene.
One could say that for a long time Polish political pluralism was of a
“methodological” and not of an “ideological” character.15 The main focus of
the political dispute both at the moment of reforms as well as throughout the
period after 1989 was the method of introducing economic reforms. The
origin of the parties – post−Solidarity or post−Communist – also evoked
strong emotions. Throughout the 1990s, Polish political parties did not follow
the classical division into liberals, conservatives, and social−democrats. For
example, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) was exceptionally liberal and
pro−market.
The example of the SLD, a post−communist party, is very interesting.
From the point of view of efficient systemic transformation in the area of
political pluralism, it is worth drawing attention to the capability of this party
to adapt to the new political reality, to accept democratic principles, and to
share the understanding of the state interests with the former opposition. In
Poland the post−communist left had to “undergo transformation before the
transformation started,” and thus it had started democratisation already
before 1989.16 In this way, the Polish left underwent the long process of
15
16
Interview with Lena Kolarska−Bobińska.
Interview with Mirosława Grabowska.
1. Political Pluralism
25
modernisation within a very short period of time. The fact of a certain “self−
purification” was also important here. In 199017 nobody could believe that
already three years later this party would come back to power. Conformists
left the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland since that was not the
power camp anymore. In this way, the Polish left dismissed the communist
ideology and remained pragmatic and non−ideological.
To conclude, it is necessary to say that the existence of political pluralism
in Poland after 1989 has never been actually threatened. It is true that the
Polish political scene was very unstable for a long time, and the existence of
many parties was a condition of one−time electoral successes. Yet,
stabilisation can be observed too. What is more, Polish political parties –
mainly thanks to the presence of their representatives in the European
Parliament – co−operate with their foreign partners and discover a community
of convictions with them. As a result, political pluralism existing in Poland is
not any different from that in Germany or France.
17
The point of dissolution of the PZPR and the establishment of the first post−communist
formation, the SdRP.
2. Free Elections
Free and honest elections are a fundamental condition for a properly
functioning democratic system. In Poland, for almost fifty years of the
socialist system consolidation, the institution of elections assumed a
distorted, caricatured form. As a result of every election the communists
gained enough votes to rule autonomously. In order to ensure such
considerable support, apart from mass rigging, the communists applied
different mechanisms, one of them being “voting without crossing” – placing
as many candidates on the ballot as there were seats in the Parliament (in the
1952 elections).18 Other parties present on the political scene were entirely
subordinated to the PZPR.
The dialogue between the communist authorities and the democratic
opposition in spring 1989 started from the issue of free and honest elections. The
regime authorities, which were used to the monopoly on political power for fifty
years, had to acknowledge the existence of another independent political force
and to compete with it. For the first time, this confrontation was supposed to be
conducted according to clearly set and honest rules, without rigging.
The way the talks between the authorities and the opposition were
conducted in spring 1989 to some extent was determined by the following:
the support from the West for the democratic forces, the fact that the world
public opinion was watching the situation in Poland very carefully and the
generally favourable international climate. The opposition could count on the
support from the Western press at crucial moments, for example, during the
round table negotiation concerning the Senate election principles.
When Aleksander Kwaśniewski – without prior consultation – suggested
that the elections to the Senate would be fully free, the government
representatives decided to return to that issue the next day. Yet the foreign
media that immediately published that information presented it as a fait
accompli. As a result, the government negotiators did not try to retreat from
this proposal. They accepted that the elections to the Senate would be without
a guaranteed parity. They consoled themselves with the thoughts that the
powers of the second chamber were exceptionally limited in comparison to
the first chamber, as well as that the electoral law was preferential for
candidates from regions, where communists thought they were stronger.19
18
Putting a ballot into a ballot box without crossing off any names meant voting for the persons
at the top of the list, occupied by the communist party activists.
19
Interview with Janusz Reykowski.
2. Free Elections
27
The Round Table – negotiations between the representatives of the communist
regime and the opposition held in Poland between the 6th of February and the 5th
of April 1989, as a result of which the systemic transformation in the country
started. In total 452 people took part in these talks. The name comes from the
round shape of the table that was especially made for this meeting and meant the
equal status of all the participants. There was also a reference to the legend of
King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. The negotiations were
conducted in three groups: the group for economy and social policy (chaired by
Władysław Baka from the PZPR and Witold Trzeciakowski from the NSZZ
Solidarity), the group for political reforms (chaired by Janusz Reykowski from
the PZPR and Bronisław Geremek from the NSZZ Solidarity) and the group for
trade unions’ pluralism (chaired by Aleksander Kwaśniewski from the PZPR,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki from the NSZZ Solidarity and Romuald Sosnowski from
the OPZZ). The main resolutions of the round table talks included: the
establishment of the second chamber of Parliament, the Senate; parity elections
to the Sejm (65% of seats were guaranteed for the ruling PZPR and its satellite
parties, and the independent non−party candidates were supposed to compete for
the remaining 35% of the seats); the establishment of the office of the President
of the Republic of Poland chosen by both chambers of Parliament for six years;
the amendment of the Law on association, which made the registration of
Solidarity possible; and access to the media for the opposition (e.g. a 30−minute
programme on television and the reactivation of the Tygodnik Solidarność
weekly).
The round table made the beginning of the peaceful and evolutionary
democratisation process possible, which avoided the bloodshed of the
revolution in Romania and the fate of Nicolae Ceausescu. This form of
resignation of the regime authorities from the monopoly on power made way
for a systemic transformation with the lowest possible social costs. The
authorities agreed to negotiate with Solidarity after a long period of
hesitation. A range of external factors, especially the situation in the USSR,
influenced this decision. Some internal factors, however, were also
important.
First of all, there was a conviction that the opposition did not want
retaliation, and thus giving away or sharing power with it would not involve
personal repercussion for the members of the regime. The lack of radicalism
of most members of the anti−regime opposition was connected with the wish
to be recognised by the West as a credible and moderate political partner. The
effort of the opposition leaders to convince the West of its stable and
moderate political orientation should be emphasised. Thanks to the visits of
for example Lech Wałęsa and Bronisław Geremek in Paris in winter 1988,
28
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
the Western leaders could see that Solidarity was a serious political force able
to exercise power, and not a radical group that would lead to destabilisation
in their country and the whole region. The foreign recognition of Solidarity
also contributed to its popularity in Poland. During the elections Poles were
not hesitant to trust the new political option and believed that it would be able
to rule the country despite a lack of practical experience.
The resignation from retribution and violence was also connected with the
broad appeal of the teachings of Pope John Paul II. Numerous crimes of the
system functionaries never led to the desire for mass scale retribution on the
regime representatives. One of the important examples is the reaction to the
murder of Father Popiełuszko, the Solidarity chaplain, by a Security Service
official in 1984. Church services commemorating this event never developed
into demonstrations demanding revenge and retaliation on the perpetrators
and on the whole system.20
The fact that the regime authorities made the decision to talk with the
opposition was also connected with a very strong position of the then leaders
of the PZPR, whose attitude could not have been met with any serious
internal opposition.21 This is also true for Solidarity leaders who did
everything to prevent divisions inside the movement. Moreover, foreign
embassies also played a role by supporting only democratic and moderate
representatives of the anti−regime coalition.
Another important factor that helped the negotiations between the regime
and the opposition was the mediatory activity of the Catholic Church
hierarchs in Poland. The Church had the trust of both sides and did not
commit itself to one side of the negotiations. It was also generously
supported, both financially and morally, by Western countries, different non−
governmental organisations, private persons and state institutions.
One of the most recognisable instances of Western influence upon the round
table talks was the fact that the members of the communist apparatus could see
the positive effects of the future systemic transformation in Poland. Fulbright
scholarships for young activists strongly contributed to this situation. In the
1980s, Fulbright scholarships were granted not only to academics but also to
young party activists, and to a lesser extent, to people connected with
Solidarity. Thanks to that experience, during the negotiations both sides, the
government and the opposition, had a similar view on social and economic
20
Interview with Halina Bortnowska.
In the Central Committee of the PZPR there was no real opposition able to take over power
in the party and in the state. The evidence of this fact is the “blackmail” of the resignation of
General Jaruzelski, General Kiszczak, Mieczysław Rakowski and General Siwicki during the
10th Plenary Meeting of the KC PZPR (20−21 December 1988, and 16−17 January 1989) and
a symptomatic reaction of the rest of the Central Committee that gave them a vote of
confidence. See A. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczpospolitej, 1989−2001, Kraków 2002, p. 30.
21
29
2. Free Elections
issues. They were convinced that the socialist system did not have any raison
d’etre and Poland needed a deep systemic transformation. The differences
between the two sides concerned the period of time the changes would take.
The impact of the Fulbright scholarships proved to be even more significant
after 1989. In the 1990s, former Fulbright scholars already occupied important
positions in the world of business and politics. Their pro−market economy and
pro−democratic attitudes, strengthened during several stays abroad, proved to
be very important in the process of democracy consolidation in Poland. Former
Fulbright scholars were often responsible for the shape of Polish foreign policy,
the economy, the EU accession negotiations, or the establishment of the
Warsaw stock exchange. Two of them served as prime ministers (Włodzimierz
Cimoszewicz and Marek Belka).
Table 2. Selected Fulbright Scholars and Their Career Paths after 1989
No.
Name
(year of birth)
Fulbright
After 1989
1. Henryka Bochniarz
(1947)
1985–1987
Minister of Industry and Trade (1991),
President of the Polish Confederation
of Private Employers Lewiatan, Chair of the
Polish Business Council, Presidential
candidate in 2005 elections.
2. Ryszard Bender (1932)
1987–1988
Senator (1989–1990), Chair of the National
Radio and Television Council (1993–1994).
3. Marek Belka (1952)
1978–1979
Minister of Finance (1997 and 2001),
Prime Minister (2005), Secretary General
of the UN Commission for Europe,
President of the Coalition Council for
International Co−ordination in Iraq (2003).
4. Danuta Huebner (1948) 1988–1990
Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of
Industry and Trade (1994–1996),
Polish negotiator at the OECD,
Head of the Chancellery of the President
(1997–1998), Head of the Office of the
Committee for European Integration,
Representative of Poland at the European
Convention, EU Commissioner for
regional policy (from 2004).
5. Tadeusz Iwiński (1944) 1977–1978
Deputy chair of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.
6. Włodzimierz
Cimoszewicz (1950)
Speaker of the Sejm, Minister of Justice
(1993–1995), Prime Minister (1996–1997),
Minister of Freign Affairs (2001–2005).
1980–1981
30
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
7. Tadeusz Sławek (1946) 1979–1980
Chancellor of the Silesian University
(1996–1999).
8. Juliusz Machulski (1955) 1984–1985
Film director and script writer.
9. Andrzej Krajewski
(1949)
Director of the Press Freedom Monitoring
Centre (2003–2005), Deputy editor in chief
of the Polish edition of Forum (2001–2003),
Editor in chief of the Polish edition of
Readers Digest (1994–2001).
1986–1987
10. Andrzej Ceynowa (1951) 1981–1982
1989–1991
Chancellor of Gdańsk University (2005),
Vice President of the Commission for
European Education of the Ministry of
National Education (2001–2002).
11. Bohdan Wyżynkiewicz
1975–1976
1991–1992
President of the Central Statistical Office,
Stock Exchange Expert.
12. Adam Budnikowski
(1948)
1985–1986
Chancellor of the Warsaw School of
Economics (from 2005).
13. Bogusław Liberadzki
(1948)
Minister of Transport and Sea Economy
(1993–1997) Member of the European
Parliament (from 2004).
14. Grzegorz Kołodko
(1949)
1985–1986
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, Consultant to the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, the UN
and OECD.
15. Lesław Paga (1954)
1987–1988
Co−creator of the Warsaw Stock−Exchange,
Chair of the Bonds Commission.
16. Jarosław Pietras (1955)
1989–1990
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance
(2006), Undersecretary of State at the Office
of the Committee for European Integration,
Negotiator of the European Agreement (1991).
17. Dariusz Rosati (1946)
1986–1987
Minister of or Foreign Affairs (1995–1997),
Worked at the UN (1991–1995), Member
of the European Parliament (from 2004).
18. Cezary Stypułkowski
1988–1989
President of the PZU (2003–2006),
President of Bank Handlowy (1991–2003).
19. Marcin Święcicki
(1947)
Minister of Foreign Economic Co−operation
(1989–1991), Warsaw city mayor (1994–1999).
20. Zofia Ratajczak
Vice President of the University Acreditation
Commission (1999–2002), Vice Chancellor
for Education, Silesian University (1996–2002).
Source: IPA research
2. Free Elections
31
At the crucial moment of the round table talks, the opposition agreed to
compromising solutions (e.g. not fully free, but contractual elections), but did
not depart much from democratic principles. Solidarity did not want to just
accept the 35% of seats in Parliament offered by the communists. It preferred
to have free elections for these seats. This was an important step showing the
world and the public opinion in Poland which of the two parties was actually
democratic. The Solidarity camp did not expect full success in winning all the
35% of seats in the Sejm and 100% in the Senate. It was important, however,
to implement democratic principles where possible – in accordance with
Bronisław Geremek’s words that a “little democracy opens way for full
democracy.”22
The later electoral success of Solidarity – winning almost all seats in the
Senate and 35% of seats in the Sejm – provided the opposition with more
legitimacy. Its value came to light when the first non−communist government
was appointed. Despite a formal majority in the Sejm – the chamber that
decided upon the composition of the government – the electoral success of
Solidarity led to further steps towards the transition of power into the hands
of democratic political forces. The communists agreed to establish the first
non−communist government within in the communist bloc, which was headed
by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, keeping the office of the president
for themselves. The position of the president was incomparably weaker,
mainly due to weak social legitimation. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, chosen
by the National Assembly (the Sejm and the Senate combined), was not
elected directly by the society.
The new government soon decided to take further steps in order to ensure
the fairness of the next elections (local government, 1990) and eliminate
rigging. It was decided that independent judges would work in the highest
electoral organs. The National Electoral Commission was established. The
new body was composed of the highest ranking judges and not political
activists. Moreover, judges were to also sit at regional electoral commissions,
and regular citizens could only sit at the lowest level, i.e. in district
commissions.
An important move was the new legislation regulating the Sejm and
Senate elections. The law clearly defined which competences in an electoral
process were granted to the court and which ones were given to the electoral
organ of a lower level. The events in Ukraine in 2004 showed that in some
countries (mainly of the CIS) there is no clear division of competences
between the electoral organ and the court.
22
Interview with Bronisław Geremek.
32
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
Another fact that deserves attention is that the society trusted the results
of all following elections. Despite many instances of very close outcomes (as
in the 1995 second round of presidential elections between Lech Wałęsa and
Aleksander Kwaśniewski), the fairness of the elections was never questioned.
In this respect, much credit should be given to the institutional solutions that
emphasised the independence and non−partisanship of the body responsible
for the electoral process.
The resolution of the round table talks to have contractual elections in
June 1989 was an unusual success for the democratic opposition. After the
fall of the Berlin wall, Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government could shape its
own policy also counting on the support of the PZPR MPs. This comfortable
situation decreased the demand for new free elections. Yet, Poland’s
contention for membership in the Council of Europe was also associated with
satisfying the free elections principle. Fully free elections were held in
September 1991. Just after that Poland became a member of the Council of
Europe.
This example shows that even the most devoted democrats may lose their
sensitivity to the need to satisfy democratic principles. The case of Poland in
the 1980s shows that what was most important for them was the success of
the transformation achieved with the lowest possible social costs. There were
fears that abrupt implementation of the free market rules (the so−called
“shock therapy”) would be faced with much social dissatisfaction, connected
with the rapid worsening of living conditions. However, the pressure from
the Council of Europe and its decision to make fully free elections a condition
for membership was an important motivation for the government in the
democratisation of the state.
The conditions for membership in different organisations have been
combined with the so−called “democratisation clause” many times. For
countries contending for EU membership such criteria were prepared at the
Copenhagen summit in 1993. This solution has proven to be very successful
for Poland and for many other countries.
3. Economic Reforms
Economic reforms are not directly connected with the process of
democratisation of a state, yet they often indirectly influence or simply
accompany this process. Democracy theorists have been arguing for some
time whether systemic transformation and economic reforms should be
conducted simultaneously or not. As far as the former option is concerned,
there exist many instances of the collapse of the transformation process at the
initial stage due to the social dissatisfaction caused by the burden of
economic reforms. Such a situation took place in many states of Latin
America in the 20th century, when simultaneous economic and political
reforms often led to anti−democratic coups.
The latter option is best illustrated by the example of Russia in 1991.
Many American advisors were convinced that a free market on its own would
trigger democratic transformation. Economic reforms were given priority,
and the democratisation of public life was left for later. As a result, despite
being granted the status of a market economy, Russia has reached the
Western model of democracy, but on the contrary, it has retreated from it.
The fact that the democratisation processes were not bound to economic
changes has led to a peculiar form of authoritarian government – “the steered
democracy” or “the sovereign democracy” – as the phenomenon is described
by Russian political scientists.
The success of “shock therapy” in Poland was based not only on swift
economic reforms, but also on the consistent democratisation of the state.
From the perspective of many years later it is clear how important it was to
have an economic correlation with the West through a system of loans and –
as a consequence – unpaid debts during Edward Gierek’s government.
Paradoxically enough, the loans did not have a political goal of “fighting
communism,” but were invested into the economy. Yet, they led to the
weakening of the economy of the PRL and its authorities. In this way,
granting these loans made the PZPR start talks with the democratic
opposition.23
One might assume that, at least at the initial stage of transformation,
Poland was under the “guardianship” of the Western states. Instances of the
UN supervision of the democratisation processes in Cambodia or East Timor
23
Interview with Krzysztof Bobiński.
34
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
may come to mind. This is also partially true for Poland, since this
guardianship existed as far as economic reforms were concerned. External
experts, both representatives of Western governments and international
institutions, had a strong influence on the shape that the economic reforms
assumed. They took part in the creation of some legal norms as well as
financial institutions from scratch. Such people as Jeffrey Sachs helped in
carrying out “shock therapy.” The economic credibility of Poland was
correlated to a considerable number of external experts shaping the economic
reforms. The economic credibility determined the success of the Polish
economy, whereas the success of the Polish economy determined the success
of the Polish systemic transformation.
It is worth paying attention to the uneven quality of the services provided
by Western advisors. Some experts, popularly known as the “Marriott
brigade,”24 were often unprepared, arrogant, and ignorant of the local
conditions. Their attitude was as if they were saying that “today we are in
Poland, tomorrow – in Georgia or Bolivia.”25 Yet most of the experts,
grouped around serious institutions, presented the required level and
specialist knowledge about Poland. German political foundations can serve a
good example here.26 They came to Poland already in 1989, and thanks to
their continuous and uninterrupted assistance these foundations have
developed a modus operandi that ensures the active and effective presence of
external experts, Western political, social and economic thought, and
institutional solutions in such areas as civil society, the social market
economy, or local government reform.
24
Interview with Krzysztof Bobiński.
Interview with Ryszard Bugaj.
26
The Konrad Adenauer Foundation (CDU), the Heinrich Seidl Foundation (CSU), the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FDP), the Heinrich
Boell Foundation (The Green Party), and Rosa Luxembourg (PDS).
25
4. The Rule of Law
The rule of law is one of the basic principles of any democratic system.
One of the main differences between totalitarian systems and free states is the
lack of respect of the rule of law by the former. The constitutions of
communist countries were full of pompous slogans, yet the everyday reality
was completely different from the ideals to be found in the basic laws of
those totalitarian states.
In the late 1980s the PRL authorities started to copy some institutional
solutions from democratic states. That move was aimed at gaining credibility
in the eyes of external partners. Thus the Constitutional Tribunal was
established in 1986 and the Office of the Ombudsman was founded in 1988.
These institutions were modelled after similar institutions in Italy, Germany
and Sweden.
When the communist dictatorship was establishing these institutions, it
was not planning real power sharing with independent bodies and was filling
the posts according to a political key. The Constitutional Tribunal was thus
comprised of “nomenclature judges,” in other words, those who politically
identified themselves with the communist authorities. Yet, the very fact that
these institutions existed already in 1989 made the transformation and
building of the state ruled by law on the territory of the former PRL much
smoother.
One of the fundamental elements of a rule of law system is an independent
judicial power. In a totalitarian state the judiciary is not an independent
branch of public power, but it is subordinated to the executive power. Poland
was not an exception here, and judges in the PRL were often subservient to
the dictatorship. Yet, Polish lawyers, including judges, were not always
supporters of the regime. The newly established Constitutional Tribunal,
which was comprised of nomenclature judges, quickly made itself unpopular
with the authorities, passing a decision that was not palatable to the regime
already in spring 1986. It turned out that the institution that was expected to
be a fig leaf could lay claims to much more power.
The difficulties connected with dividing judicial power from the rest of
the powers can be illustrated by the very late recognition of the finality of
decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal. The temptation to hand steer the
judiciary is not alien even for democratic politicians, especially during the
period of transformation. The Constitution of 1997, which came into force in
36
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
1999, introduced the finality of the Constitutional Tribunal decisions. Before
that, the Sejm had had the right to overrule the Tribunal’s decisions by two
thirds of voices.
There is a fundamental dilemma whether and in what way the shape of
internal processes of establishing the rule of law in a totalitarian state can be
influenced externally. The question is whether constitutional courts of other
countries should be in contact with their counterparts in totalitarian states, or
whether these court should rather be isolated. In the Polish case, in the 1980s
the Constitutional Tribunal was isolated from the environment of the
European constitutional courts. Only the 1989−1990 changes allowed the
Constitutional Tribunal to join the Confederation of European Constitutional
Courts in 1990.
Either side of this dilemma involves some risk. Contact with the regime−
appointed judges could bring legitimacy to totalitarian authorities; in other
words, the regime would achieve exactly what the PRL authorities desired to
achieve when they established the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme
Administrative Court. On the other hand, such contacts could become a
source of inspiration and support for the judges in totalitarian states. The
solution to this dilemma may be a “conditional approach”: if a puppet court
issues at least one independent decision, at that time the corresponding
external institutions should provide it with support and encouragement.27
The suspiciousness of Western states regarding the issue whether Poland
was a state ruled by law continued for quite a long time. Paradoxically
enough, this was a very positive experience, since the formation of
independent judiciary institutions is a long−term process. The constant
monitoring of the situation in a given country is a beneficial phenomenon,
since all deviations can be corrected immediately. This “watchful eye” was
even more important in Poland, since the old Constitution did not guarantee
the right to trial, the right to the protection of private life, proportionality
principles, accrued rights protection, etc. In fact, there was no catalogue of
fundamental rights as they are understood in the European Convention.28
The first phase of a standard systemic transformation is the passing of a
new democratic Constitution. Yet, in Poland this important element was
divided into phases. Before the Constitution was passed, courts had to start
applying and respecting rules that de iure did not have a constitutional
character. In the context of a very long process of passing the new
Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal exercised a kind of creative
interpretation of general rules, e.g. derived from the principles of the rule of
27
28
Interview with Marek Safjan.
Ibid.
4. The Rule of Law
37
law “lex retro non agit” formula or the principle of the protection of accrued
rights. These rulings de facto created the Constitution step by step.
The development of the Constitution in Poland took eight long years. The
Constitution was passed in 1997. It was not possible to pass the basic law
earlier due to political instability and the lack of a political consensus. Two
transition methods were applied to deal with this situation. First of all, in
December 1989, the definition of the state as “socialist” in the PRL
Constitution of 1952 was replaced by “democratic.” The name of the country
was also changed from the PRL to the Republic of Poland.
As the next step, in 1992 the law on mutual relations between the
legislative power and the executive power of the Republic of Poland as well
as the law on local governments were passed (this was known as the “small
Constitution”). The small Constitution put the basic systemic principles of
the state in order. Yet, the passing of the “small” instead of the “big”
Constitution led to a situation where during the period 1992−1997
constitutional principles were comprised of three different documents: the
PRL Constitution of 1952; the 1992 law on the development and passing of
the Constitution; and the “small” Constitution of October 1992. The new
“big” Constitution was passed in 1997, eight years after the transition. It was
not until the enforcement of the new Constitution that the Sejm lost its right
to veto the Constitutional Tribunal decisions.
It is vital for the societies and elites of states under transformation to
recognise that it is not enough to have the rule of law inscribed in legal acts,
but it should become an essential element of the political culture. Thus, it is
not sufficient to declare the independence of judges. It takes a long time to
educate the society and elites. In this sense, one can agree with those who
believe that the end of transformation is possible only with a generational
change.
The new qualitative change also consisted of the recognition by the
society and political elites that the Constitution can be applied directly and in
a given context. This was a huge difference from the situation in totalitarian
states, where constitutions are just wishful thinking.
The next problem was the issue of the verification of judges who passed
judgements during the PRL and participated in the repression apparatus. With
the benefit of hindsight one might claim that the lack of the vetting of judges
after 1989 was a mistake.29 Yet, such verification was possible only in 1990,
during the “window of opportunity,” the time when many other reforms –
economic, local government, and administrative – were conducted. However,
at that time there had been no positive experience in this area, whereas such
29
See the interview with Wiktor Osiatyński, Tygodnik Powszechny, no 34 (2772), 25 August
2002.
38
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
later verification was not possible. An interesting solution was found in
Germany, where the former DDR judges were replaced by judges from
Western Germany. Such a solution, however, was not possible in Poland.
Communities of lawyers from other European states, mainly from
Germany and France, offered valuable help in regard to the establishment of
a state ruled by law in Poland. Yet, the most considerable assistance came
from the so−called Venice Commission, established in 1990. In the beginning
of 1990s, the Council of Europe experts conducted a detailed review of all
areas of the Polish legislation from the perspective of their conformity with
the European Convention of Human Rights. This was done in such a way that
at the moment of Poland’s accession to the Convention there would not be
any violations of it.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice
Commission) is an advisory body of the Council of Europe. It is comprised of
the most important experts in the area of constitutional law. It was established
in May 1990 after the collapse of communism in the Central and Eastern
European states, at the moment when these states needed assistance in the area
of constitutional law. The popular name of the Commission derives from the
place of its members’ quarterly meetings.
In the beginning, the Venice Commission was comprised of 18 members. Today
all members of the Council of Europe are members of the Commission, and
from 2002 non−European states can also become full members. In 2006 the
Commission was comprised of 50 members, 46 of which were members of the
Council of Europe, plus Montenegro, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Korea and
Chile. Belarus has the status of an associated member. There are also nine
observer states: Argentina, Canada, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, the USA and Uruguay.
The Venice Commission concentrates its work on examining the projects of
constitutions and constitutional amendments. The Commission also deals with
semi−constitutional areas, such as the legislation concerning minority rights or
electoral rights. Opinions produced by the Commission are not binding, but are
highly respected and often implemented.
The Council of Europe finished the review of the Polish legislation
several years before the EU. Poland’s membership in the EU has been also
fundamental for the consolidation of the principles of a democratic state ruled
by law. As a result of its accession to the EU, the European Tribunal of
Justice has become another organ guaranteeing the adherence to the
4. The Rule of Law
39
principles of the rule of law. The deep “rooting” of Poland in pan−European
structures (the Council of Europe and its European Tribunal of Human
Rights; the EU and the European Tribunal of Justice; the OSCE) makes the
retreat to a totalitarian regime practically impossible.
Successful transformation and the formation of an independent judiciary
system in Poland is an example for other countries retreating from
communism. Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Armenians have been learning
from the Polish experience.30
30
Interview with Marek Safjan.
5. Human Rights
The “Cold War” was an ideological confrontation between two blocs of
states. For a long time, the communist group prevailed in this conflict. It was
only in the mid−1970s that the situation changed, and the West started a
campaign to promote and protect human rights, also in communist states.
This was one of the most important ways of bringing democracy back to
Central and Eastern Europe.
The Helsinki Conference Final Act (1975) was a turning point in the
history of the Cold War. For the democratic opposition this was a new
impulse for their activity. For the first time, the communist authorities had to
admit that they had to respect the human rights of their citizens, including
ethnic minorities. The opposition in these countries received a sign that
Western states were not indifferent towards the improvement of human rights
protection in these countries.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act (1975)
lists the areas of interest of the Conference grouped in “baskets”:
The First Basket: The issues of security in Europe. In the first part it covers a
catalogue of ten principles of equal importance that rule the mutual relations
between the participants of the Conference. The second part is a document
defining funds for the building of trust and selected elements of security and
disarmament.
The Second Basket: Co−operation in the economy, science, technical
development, and environmental protection. It comprises recommendations in
these areas.
The Third Basket: Co−operation in humanitarian and related areas. It covers four
basis issues: interpersonal contacts, information, co−operation and exchange in
the areas of culture and education.
The Helsinki conference also started a cycle of Conferences on the
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The events in Poland (i.e. the
introduction of martial law) considerably influenced the decision made
during the second overview CSCE in Madrid (1980–1983). A group of Polish
experts not connected with the communist authorities established the
Helsinki Committee in 1982, whose aim was to monitor the observance of
human rights in Poland. The report prepared by the Committee for the
Conference in Madrid, compared the rules of martial law with international
5. Human Rights
41
standards and legal systems of countries with long democratic traditions, as
well as discussed the ways how laws were exercised by the Polish
authorities.31 This report was smuggled to the West and presented to the
Conference participants. In this way the communist regime lost its monopoly
on information regarding what was occurring in Poland.
The Helsinki Committee worked continuously throughout the 1980s. Its
reports gained considerable recognition at forums of different international
organisations (e.g. the International Labour Organisation, the UN).
Another very important factor influencing the level of human rights
protection was the establishment of the institution of ombudsman. Just as in
the cases of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Administrative
Court, the establishment of the institution of ombudsman was an attempt at
legitimating the dictatorship.
The institution of ombudsman was broadly modelled after the Swedish
example. Yet, in communist Poland the ombudsman had very different tasks
from its Western counterpart. The Supreme Administrative Court and the
Constitutional Tribunal were typical institutions of the judiciary branch of
power, and so the scope of the competences was easy to predict for the
communist authorities. However, the Ombudsman’s Office was “an
institution of an extraordinary power of authority,”32 and thus the tasks in
front if it were complicated and difficult to predict.
Professor Ewa Łętowska became the first ombudsman. It was not possible
to copy Western solutions regarding the organisation of the Office. The new
institution with an imprecise status and competences aroused fears among
both communists and oppositionists. The problem of the selection of staff
was solved by employing retired judges and scholars, the two groups least
likely to be corrupted by the authorities.33
The fundamental principles of the initial activity of the Office of
Ombudsman were: (1) avoiding politics; (2) legitimation through
transparency; (3) concern about the media; and (4) grassroot work. Becoming
too political might have threatened the respect bestowed on the ombudsman
and her office. The transparency of activities had to be total, in order to gain
people’s trust as well as a favourable attitude of both the authorities and the
opposition. The newly established media after 1989 started to become very
important sources of information, and good contacts with them were
extremely important. Yet, the most important activity of the ombudsman in
respect to the media was educating the journalists about human rights and
31
The Report is comprised of 1000 pages. See the materials of the Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights available at <http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/index.html> (as of 31/07/2006).
32
Interview with Ewa Łętowska.
33
“People were afraid to co−operate fearing for their careers.” Interview with Ewa Łętowska.
42
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
principles of the rule of law. Well prepared journalists were often becoming
human rights advocates, sometimes unintentionally. Finally, a new standard
of work was established. It was important that the Office replied to all people
who addressed their problems to it, even if nothing could be done about the
problem. In this way ombudsman Łętowska was gaining her authority at the
time of skirmishes on the Polish political scene in the period 1987−1992.
After 1989 the most important goal for the Office (apart from monitoring
the authorities’ activity) was citizen education. The new phenomenon of
integration into Western European structures guaranteed high standards of
human rights protection.
Hungary was the first country of the communist bloc to join the Council
of Europe in November 1990. This organisation started an assistance
programme for all states undergoing systemic transformation, which covered
such areas as local democracy, constitutional principles, the freedom of the
media, and finally human rights. Poland became a full member of the Council
of Europe on the 26th of October 1991, after the first free parliamentary
elections.
The European Convention on Human Rights was in effect in Poland from
1993. The enforcement of the Convention meant a fundamental rebuilding of
the system of human rights protection in Poland. “Appealing to Strasbourg”
became an essential element of the Polish judiciary, and European standards
of human rights protection started to be respected by almost all social and
political groups. The only exception is the issue of the death penalty –
abolished in 1997 – which has considerable support of the society34 and from
time to time is raised by some political parties.
Moreover, EU membership had a fundamental influence on human rights
protection in Poland. It was stated in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria that every
state wishing to become an EU member should protect human rights. Thus,
all attempts of Poland to become a member would have been insufficient if it
did not respect the norms of human rights protection.
Finally the OSCE established the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw in 1992. This was a kind of reward for
Poland as the first country in the region to change the communist regime for
a democratic system. The ODIHR, just like some Polish NGOs, has devoted
much attention to human rights education on the territory of the former
USSR. They share their experience with local organisations there often in co−
operation with other Western organisations.
Poland’s anchoring in the Western system of human rights protection is of
great importance for improving these standards in a real and not only formal
34
The share of people supporting the death penalty in Poland is about 75%. See the CBOS
communication, no 53, March 2004.
5. Human Rights
43
way in respect to Polish citizens. A lot of potential problems were resolved
in Poland after the transition, e.g. ethnic minorities issues. The change of the
system has also brought about a change in the quality of the public debate,
where the language of human rights has been accepted for good. What is
interesting is that the greatest problems concerning human rights dealt with
by non−governmental organisations and successive ombudsmen in the 1990s
did not concern political rights. Most of the cases were about the protection
of privacy and property rights.
During the process of writing the new democratic Polish Constitution,
human rights played a fundamental role. A group of outstanding lawyers
within the Helsinki Foundation developed a document on individual rights.
To a large extent, it was based on the European Convention of Human Rights.
Thanks to the favourable attitude of the Chancellery of the President Lech
Wałęsa the principles comprised in this document were included into the so−
called presidential version of the Constitution. In the works of the
Constitutional Committee almost an entire document on individual rights was
included in the new Polish Constitution of 1997 in the form of Chapter II
“Freedom, Rights and Duties of Persons and Citizens.”
The ideology of human rights has brought democracy to Central and
Eastern Europe by the way of reforms, democratically and without
bloodshed. On the other hand, what Poland and other countries in the region
have accomplished deserves to be called a “revolution.” The combination of
these two phenomena, reform and revolution, is sometimes called
“refolution.”35 This combination can be the only efficient way of transition
from a totalitarian state to a liberal democracy.
35
T. Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin
and Prague, Penguin: Cambridge 1990.
6. Reform of the Police and Army
During systemic transformation, as well as in the further process of the
new system consolidation, much attention is usually paid to the uniformed
services (mainly the police and the military). There exists a threat that the
military can lead an anti−democratic coup. The Polish case of the end of 1980
could confirm such a fear. From the moment when martial law was
introduced in 1981 Poland was governed by the Military Council of National
Salvation, mainly composed of army officers. The position of General
Wojciech Jaruzelski and General Czesław Kiszczak was exceptionally strong
throughout the 1980s.36 However, it was not the military, but the communist
party that exercised real power in Poland. The round table negotiations
showed that in fact the position of the military was very weak.37 General
Wojciech Jaruzelski was informed about new decisions every day, but he did
not take part in the negotiations himself. After the lost elections of the 4th of
June 1989 the military could not become more involved in the political
situation and remained neutral.
The changes of 1989 did not mean immediate changes in the force
structures. The Soviet Union formally existed until the end of 1991, as well
as the Warsaw Pact. Soviet Army forces had their bases in Poland until 1993.
There was a serious fear that any radical movement could have unexpected
consequences. The most important task was to eliminate the military
dependency on Moscow. This was conducted through the introduction of
civil control on the army, which was a clear principle of the democratic rule
of law. A public declaration about Poland’s alliance with Western countries
was not possible at that moment.
The new government was very careful about the possibility of Poland’s
accession to NATO. It was not until the visit of Prime Minister Hanna
Suchocka in Brussels in 1992 that journalists could hear a clear declaration
that Poland wanted to become a NATO member in the future.38 This postulate
did not change after post−communists won parliamentary elections in 1993
and presidential elections in 1995.
36
See A. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczpospolitej 1989–2001 [The First Years of the Third
Republic of Poland 1989–2001], Kraków 2002, p. 30.
37
Interview with Janusz Reykowski.
38
Interview with Janusz Onyszkiewicz.
6. Reform of the Police and Army
45
The Polish Army – thanks to the openness and assistance of the West –
started a swift but gradual integration with Euroatlantic structures. Polish
generals, who were mainly accustomed to training courses and study visits in
Moscow, started going to training sessions in the United States and Western
European states (see Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1. The Number of Polish Generals That Underwent Specialist
Training Courses in the Warsaw Pact States in the Period 1983−1999
Source: Press Office of MoND.
Figure 2. The Number of Polish Generals that Underwent Specialist Training
Courses in the NATO States in the Period 1983−1999
Source: Press Office of MoND.
46
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
The Polish intelligence started co−operating with their American and
Western European counterparts. The first opportunity to co−operate was the
1991 Iraq War. Thanks to the Polish networks of contacts it was possible to
successfully conduct the evacuation of American Embassy employees in
Baghdad. In return, the US cancelled part of Poland’s debt as well as
accelerated the process for Poland’s accession to NATO.
The change of allies was not a problem for Poland’s highest ranking army
officials. What might have been a problem was reviving nationalistic and
authoritarian tendencies in the military as well as the politisation of the
army.39
Some senior army officers had difficulties with accepting the idea of
civilian control of the military and wanted to considerably strengthen the
position of the Chief of Staff, taking the example from the solutions of the
Second Polish Republic (1918−1939), where the Chief of Staff was de facto
the second person in the state. Thanks to the watchfulness of the
parliamentary opposition, and the adequate influence of the Western allies,
this idea was never realised and could not threaten the neutral position of the
army.40
The second problem was the lack of the verification in the military
intelligence staff. The Military Information Services – established after 1989
– was comprised mainly of former employees of the PRL military
intelligence. The dissolution of this institution and the establishment of new
special services remains a problematic and politicised issue even today.
The case of civil intelligence was solved in a different way. The PRL
political police was replaced by the Office of State Protection (UOP). The
especially established Verification Commission let part of the employees
keep their posts (mainly technical workers) as well as recruit many new
young people. This was a different solution from that in the Czech Republic,
where both intelligence and counterintelligence were completely dissolved.
The steps aimed at reforming the milicja (the former name of the police
used in the PRL) were directed towards its depolitisation. The 1990 law
prevented active members of the police force in political parties. Despite
appearing to go against their citizen rights – given the social context of that
period – this solution was adequate.
All ministers responsible for military and internal affairs were too
concentrated on the special services, and thus they neglected other structures.
They had a lot of confidence in all the information and analyses coming from
the intelligence services. They were trying to control their activity to the
39
Interview with Janusz Onyszkiewicz.
“I was afraid of the Latin American style degeneration of the Polish democracy.” Interview
with Bronisław Geremek.
40
6. Reform of the Police and Army
47
largest possible extent.41 It appears that the exaggerated attention paid to
special services on the part of the new elites was an effect of liberation from
the police state (the PRL). As a result of the end of the Cold War,
globalisation processes, informatisation, the role of the intelligence in
democratic societies have undergone significant evolution to adjust to new
challenges. In this field, Poland of the 1990s has few positive lessons to pass
on to other countries.
41
Interview with Jerzy Zimowski.
7. Free Press
Independent and well functioning media are fundamental to any
democratic state. They monitor the government’s activities, possible abuses
of their power and violations of democratic principles. The Polish example
shows that the world of media can also effectively influence politics in a
direct way. Among the opposition activists engaged in the Solidarity
movement there were many representatives of the literary−journalistic circles.
Later some of them became directly engaged in politics.42
Throughout almost the whole period of communism in Poland there
existed the so−called “second circulation.” This meant different publications
on different areas of interest – history, philosophy, literature, economy or
ecology, which were illegally printed in Poland or smuggled from the West.
On one hand, it was important to ensure the widest possible dissemination of
the uncensored information and thus the education of Polish citizens, which
weakened the influence of communist propaganda. On the other, the “second
circulation” was important for the intellectuals themselves. It provided them
with an alternative: to be independent of the only correct ideology and
publish the results of their work. In this way those with intellectual ambitions
were not condemned to co−operation with the regime.
The assistance from the West for underground publishing houses was an
important economic, substantial and educational factor. The support for the
underground press was often organised by Polish immigrants in the United
States, Great Britain, France, Germany and other states. First of all, one
should mention the editor of “Kultura,” Jerzy Giedroyć, based in Paris,
Eugeniusz Smolar in London and Irena Lasota in the United States. Financial
help was also provided by the immigrants in London that left Poland after
WWII and the Polish Government in Exile.43
The most important émigré publishing centre was the Paris−based
“Kultura,” active from the end of WWII, and based first in Rome and then at
Maisons−Laffitte near Paris. Its impact on the cultural, social and political life
during communism is difficult to overestimate. The “Kultura” monthly was
published in France, smuggled to Poland and reprinted there. The magazine
gathered the attention of intellectual elites living outside of Poland, as well as
42
Interview with Andrzej Zarębski.
See A. Friszke, Życie polityczne emigracji [The Political Life of Emigration], Warsaw 1999,
pp. 442−445.
43
7. Free Press
49
published writers and journalists living in Poland who were under censorship.
Jerzy Giedroyć also published “miniatures” – a solution already used by
Ukrainian émigrés in Switzerland at the turn of the 19th century. These were
little booklets banned in the country that were easy to smuggle to Poland.
What is more, there were special points where anyone could get these books
for free in order to smuggle them to Poland. Such points existed not only in
Paris, but also in New York and Rome.
An important move of the Polish emigrant representatives was to make
the “Polish cause” popular not only among people with Polish roots, but also
among people who were ready to support the fight for freedom and
democracy in Poland for ideological reasons. The international committee
called the Appeal for Polish Workers, created in 1976, deserves attention
here. Among its ranks there were many outstanding intellectuals –
journalists, writers, and artists who were gathering money to help the
opposition in Poland. Their activity was co−ordinated by Eugeniusz Smolar
and the secretariat in Poland; the scope of the organisation’s contacts covered
many underground cultural and publishing centres.44
One of the most popular forms of support for Polish underground
journalists was the provision of printing materials and equipment. Taking into
consideration the level of technological development, transport conditions and
lack of service opportunities, the opposition leaders decided to use copiers and
offset printers. A large amount of smuggling was organised by the Co−
ordination Office of the NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels (more in the chapter on
“Citizen Participation”).45 In June 1986 the greatest success in smuggling
printing materials for Solidarity took place: 11 tons of equipment, including
one hundred copiers, large amounts of matrixes, printing inks and books. The
future Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki piloted a lorry loaded with the
equipment for Solidarity from Sweden. An attempt to repeat this success in
November of the same year turned out to be a failure. The Swedish driver was
arrested, and the equipment was confiscated.46
Internships and study visits for Polish journalists in Western editorial
offices – the most effective way of teaching journalistic independence and
professionalism – were organised mainly after 1989 (by the Ford Foundation,
the NED, etc). But some trainings were also organised earlier, by the Italian
Press Union.47 An important and relatively easy way of gaining and
improving professional skills for journalists was reading the foreign press.
44
Interview with Eugeniusz Smolar.
A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna 1981−1989 [Underground Solidarity 1981−1989],
Warszawa 2006, pp. 49 and 118.
46
More in A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna…, pp. 119−120.
47
Interview with Jacek Żakowski.
45
50
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
During the communist period, especially during martial law, Western
embassies and foreign correspondents provided access to it.48
In a totalitarian state journalists are a group that is highly exposed to
danger. Kidnapping, mugging, and murders committed by “unknown
perpetrators” was a common form of fighting the unflattering voices of
criticism by the authorities. Today there are many international specialist
organisations defending the freedom of expression in endangered countries.
A similar instance of corporate solidarity took place in Poland in the 1980s.
Polish underground journalists did not have any documents to prove their
occupation. For that reason they were an easy target for the authorities, which
treated them as a threat to public order. A smart move was to grant an
opportunity for Polish journalists to seek individual membership in the
International Federation of Journalists. Until then the Federation’s members
were only journalist trade unions and organisations from different countries.
The exception made for Polish journalists was dictated by a deep will to
protect their rights. Poles were gaining the title to being defended on the
international arena. The world federation uniting thousands of people
working in the media was defending their rights.
The International Federation of Journalists – the largest journalist
organisation in the world. Established for the first time in 1926, it was
reactivated in 1946, and then again in 1952 to preserve its form up to date. It is
present in 100 states and comprises about 500,000 members. The Federation
defends the freedom of expression and justice through its strong, free and
independent journalist trade unions. It is a politically neutral organisation. It
promotes human rights and principles of democracy and pluralism. It is against
discrimination and all methods of using media in order to propagate intolerance
and hostility. The Federation supports journalists and their trade unions in their
fight for workers’ rights. It has also established the International Security Fund
in order to provide humanitarian help for journalists in need. Its activity is
coordinated by the Secretariat with its headquarters in Brussels under the
leadership of the Executive Committee.
After 1989 many underground journalists became actively involved in
politics and business. Only some of them remained in the media. The situation
was very new for both of these groups – freedom of expression and pluralism
looked exceptionally complicated. Local journalists were used to reprinting
information from national papers, and were not accustomed to working in the
new conditions. There were fears of commercialisation and the inflow of foreign
capital in the media. In this situation, the Western assistance involved teaching
48
Interview with Krzysztof Bobiński.
7. Free Press
51
professional skills and journalistic objectivism. The BBC organised a 6−week
study visit to its editorial offices for 36 journalists from Poland. Similar visits
were organised by other French and American editorial offices or foundations.
There have been many bad decisions and instances of negligence in the
sphere of the free media after 1989. Censorship was abolished relatively late
– at the end of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government. No deep reforms or new
institutional solutions independent from the ruling political option were
carried out in the public electronic media. The successive government did not
support useful grassroot initiatives, e.g. the dialogue of the electronic media
services’ providers on the establishment of the Advertisement Code or Code
of Good Practices. The authorities were not interested in studying the
experiences or analyses of other countries regarding the questions of how the
electronic media could work on commercial principles without
simultaneously resigning from the public mission. Too much attention was
paid to external pressure on the media, but not much was done to support
journalistic independence in respect to editorial offices.
An example of success in the area of the press was the establishment of
two independent opinion−making daily national newspapers: Rzeczpospolita
and Gazeta Wyborcza. The former was established during martial law as
a government newspaper, in a way autonomous of the communist party. The
first issue of Rzeczpospolita, published in 1982, was in any consideration
a regime newspaper. Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s new government decided to
change this situation as early as in 1989 and allowed a foreign majority
shareholder to take over. In this way, Rzeczpospolita became an independent
newspaper, with a moderate and pro−market political line, which was very
popular among officials, managers, experts, etc. Gazeta Wyborcza was
established on the basis of the round table talks resolutions, as a daily
representing the Solidarity opposition during the election campaign of 1989.
Most of its staff members were previously connected with the underground
daily Tygodnik Mazowsze. It is one of the most popular newspapers: it has an
average circulation of about 450,000 copies and about 5.5 million readers.
From the beginning its editor in chief has been Adam Michnik.
The media in Poland are often accused of being partisan and expressing
tacit and not so tacit support for particular political options. Yet, it has to be
remembered that they have been guarding democracy and alarming the public
opinion about its violations and abuses. Journalist investigations aimed at
discovering different political pathologies, regardless of the political party
involved, have been a very positive phenomenon. The event that consolidated
this process beneficial for democracy consolidation was the disclosure of the
so−called Rywin affair by Gazeta Wyborcza journalists – the scandal that
involved many of the then ruling party politicians.
8. Citizen Participation
The success of the Polish transformation was possible mainly thanks to
the agreement that the PZPR elite and the Solidarity opposition were able to
reach with regard to the principles and fundamental values of the new Poland.
The formation of a strong oppositional elite able to make a partner−like
compromise with the communist authorities in 1989 was possible thanks to
the huge citizen participation of Poles in 1980−1981, which was gradually
declining throughout the years of martial law.
For a year and a half, Poles had an opportunity to learn democracy in
practice as part of the Solidarity movement. In every large place of
employment employees were choosing democratic representative authorities,
creating the structures of the NSZZ Solidarity, choosing delegates for
regional meetings, and holding internal discussions.49 Solidarity was learning
how to be a non−violent movement. The teachings of the Catholic Church and
many non−violent movement leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi or Martin
Luther King, were very helpful examples for Solidarity members.
Martial law introduced on the 13th of December 1981 and the subsequent
delegalisation of Solidarity had a negative impact on Polish citizens’
awareness. The military took over the power in the country.
The main centre co−ordinating the aid from the West was the Co−
ordinating Office of the NSZZ Solidarity, established in July 1982 in
Brussels. It soon became accredited by the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions and by the World Labour Confederation. These
organisations also provided organisational and legal help for and funded the
activity of the Office, headed by Jerzy Milewski. The Office kept in contact
with underground Solidarity structures as well as with many foreign trade
union headquarters. The Office’s contacts with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Political Refugees, the International Red Cross, Amnesty
International, etc. were very important. The Office was a source of
information about the situation in Poland, published appeals and statements,
organised actions and demonstrations in support of Solidarity, and what is
more, transferred financial help to the country (see Table 3). One of its
49
Interview with Henryk Wujec.
53
8. Citizen Participation
successes was helping to work out a common strategy with regard to the
delegalisation of the NSZZ Solidarity among trade unions united in the main
international confederations.
Table 3. Financial Aid for Poland Channelled through the Co−ordinating
Office of the NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels (in thousands of US dollars)
Years
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Income
Expenses
109.8
10.0
348.7
61.9
49.5
256.7
554.4
614.8
589.7
571.8
669.0
487.3
Source: A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna…, p. 110. In Hoover Institution. Poland. Dep. III,
box 5. the Office Report titled “Financial Aid for the NSZZ Solidarity” from 3 August 1987.
The Office played one more important function. It supervised the activity
of the Solidarity committees present in other countries. It tried to ensure that
the contacts were limited to trade union activity and Solidarity
representatives did not engage in official political activity. In this field only
informal activities were allowed. As Bronisław Geremek noted in his letter to
Zbigniew Bujak in 1985, the stronger the image of Solidarity as a trade union
organisation was, the better its international position was. “When they hear
report on martyrology, they are bored, when they hear about imprisonments,
they compare it with Turkey, but when they learn that membership fees were
collected and financial help was distributed, or that there was a protest
against bad working conditions – then the TKK [Provisional Coordination
Commission of the NSZZ Solidarity, the representative organ of the
underground Solidarity] becomes their partner.”50
The next issues to which Bronisław Geremek paid attention to was
the creation of the sense of difference and even exceptionality of the situation
in Poland in comparison to other states of the socialist bloc. “I believe that
the strengthening of the Polish particularity, one of the elements of which is
Solidarity, is the most fundamental element of any Polish foreign
policy.…there is a common view among the international public that what
happened on the 13th of December had to happen, and that Poland just came
back to the Eastern European standard. And this is the function of my
interview: to explain that it all could have been different, that Solidarity still
exists, that Solidarity can be a political partner, and that Poland is and will be
different from all others.”51
50
Archive of W. Kulerski 7/237. Letter from Gustaw [Bronisław Geremek] to Bogdan
[Zbigniew Bujak] from 13 June 1985. In A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna...,
p. 103.
51
Ibid.
54
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
Thus, it appears that the sources of international success of
Solidarity, and later the support of the West for the systemic changes in 1989,
were strong connotations with the workers’ issues and the particularity of the
Polish case against the background of the rest of the socialist bloc. Other
opposition movements should act in a similar way – emphasise their
particularity, and not just inform the world public opinion of human rights
violations and democratic principles abuses. For such information public
opinions are simply used. Another useful solution is the international
institutionalisation of the opposition, in other words, entering international
structures, getting special membership, etc.
During martial law, Solidarity implemented assistance from the
West in an effective way. It was devoted to publishing activity, to
supporting oppositionists who were fired because of their activity, and
families of the interned activists. Polish historian Andrzej Friszke has
noticed that “no widespread and active conspiracy can survive without
external support. All great independence actions starting from the 19th
century hoped for financial support from foreign friends, and often
received it.52
Financial support for Solidarity during martial law came mainly from
Western trade unions or through their intermediation. Annually it amounted
to 450,000 US dollars. The largest share went through the American
Federation of Labor−Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL−CIO).
According to different calculations, in 1983 and 1984 the AFL−CIO
channelled about 200,000 US dollars each year to Solidarity, and 300,000 in
1985 and in 1986.53
An important source of assistance from the mid−1980s was the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) established by the US Congress on the
initiative of President Ronald Reagan. The aim of the NED was to support
democratic movements in the world, but the direct cause for its
establishment was the wish to increase the support for Solidarity. It was
mainly the money from the NED that the AFL−CIO was channelling to the
underground Solidarity movement. According to different calculations the
NED allocated about half a million US dollars for Solidarity in 1985−1986
(see Table 4).54
52
A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna..., p. 109.
Ibid, p. 110. In Hoover Institution. Poland. Dep. III, box 5. The Office Report titled
“Financial Aid for the NSZZ Solidarity” from 3 August 1987. IPN 0582/261, t.1. Letter from
Jurek [Milewski] to Adam [B. Lis] from 25 May 1984.
54
Ibid, p. 111. To give an examples, Jerzy Milewski estimated that in total the NED donations
to Solidarity channelled via the AFL−CIO amounted to 540,000 dollars.
53
8. Citizen Participation
55
Table 4. Funds Allocated for Solidarity by the NED, Selected Years
(in US dollars)
Year Amount
Main beneficiaries
1985 800,000
Co−ordination Office in Brussels, (300,000 via the AFL−CIO)
1986 842,000
Co−ordination Office in Brussels, (300,000 via the AFL−CIO)
Polish American Congress (205,000)
OKNO (100,000) and Helsinki Committee (5,000)
Aurora Foundation (92,400)
Freedom House (96,400)
Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (123,200)
Polish Institute of Arts and Science of America (25,000)
Source: A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna 1981 – 1989, ISP PAN, Warszawa 2006, p. 111
The assistance coming from Western European trade unions was relatively
modest. The French headquarters provided equipment worth from several to
several thousand US dollars annually, sent humanitarian escorts, organised
assistance for those under repressions, and funded internships for several people
from year to year. They signed contracts with many regions of Solidarity.
The Brussels Office was trying to co−ordinate and centralise the assistance
granted by the West. It was important to keep Solidarity consolidated.
Uncoordinated attempts to seek assistance by individual members of the
Solidarity might, in the eyes of the leaders, strengthen tendencies to split.
“Treating Solidarity just or predominantly as an idea will weaken the chances
for the future for both the trade union and the society” – the Office advisors
wrote. In a letter to Lech Wałęsa, Solidarity advisors wrote that
People grouped in the union have more opportunities to influence the course of
events, than when they are scattered.…Other groups, teams and independent
centres may benefit from the existence of a union which, as the most important
socio−political power, will cover them and pave the way for them.…Activities
which seem to be accidental, uncoordinated, unprepared harm the reputation of
Solidarity abroad. All actions that show ideological−organisational cohesion, on
the other hand, considerably increase the authority of the trade union....If the
inflow of equipment and especially financial help is centrally coordinated, it will
be an instrument of cementing the loose, out of necessity, organisational forms
of the union. If, on the contrary, the present state of affairs is continued, when
different persons, centres, and groups gain equipment and money for Solidarity
and manage them without consulting the central authorities of Solidarity – there
may emerge disintegration tendencies.55
55
Ibid, p. 113. In IPN 0582/264, t. 15, k.100. Letter from B. Cywiński, Z. Najder i K. Pomian
to L. Wałęsa and the TKK, January 1986.
56
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
The Brussels Office decided that the couriers who transported money had
to be foreign and not Polish citizens. One person carried from 5,000 to 10,000
US dollars. It was too dangerous to send a larger amount of money by one
person. The system of money transfers was not always very efficient and
confirmations from Poland came with delay. The coding of correspondence
between the underground and Brussels never succeeded on a larger scale.
The Provisional Co−ordinating Commission tried to send money
proportionally to all regions without concentrating too much in the capital.
The largest amounts of money were allocated to charitable help and to
purchase equipment (see Table 5). It is worth pointing out the fact that the
underground Solidarity authorities were trying to undertake long−term
activities that would bear fruit in the future. For example, they initiated
scientific research on the state of the economy, the level of life, social issues,
work security and hygiene, or environmental protection. They also planned
to develop the local press and independent publishing houses. Self−education
programmes were to be funded by the underground structures and
participants themselves.
Table 5. Expenses of the Provisional Co−ordination Commission of the
NSZZ Solidarity in 1986 (in US dollars).
No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Aim
Subsidization of the regions (mainly cities)
Purchase of equipment
Funding Lech Wałęsa Office’s activity
Subsidisation of 30 smaller towns
Assistance to farmers
Charity (the interned)
Support for external structures (workers’ self−governments,
school and student youth organisations)
Reserve
Total
Amount
90,000
150,000
30,000
90,000
10,000
100,000
30,000
30,000
530,000
Source: A. Friszke, Solidarność podziemna 1981−1989, ISP PAN, Warsaw 2006, pp. 115−116.
An important element of the activisation of the Polish society during
martial law and counteraction to social apathy was the activity of the
Catholic Church. The Church was trying to prevent isolation or exclusion of
the interned persons or victims of repressions. It was important to prevent
the situation known from the Stalinist era, when people were afraid to
contact the regime victims. These people were considered to be
“condemned,” and any contact with them might have led to becoming
8. Citizen Participation
57
another victim. This fear also strengthened the authorities’ conviction that
repressions were effective and achieved the intended goal. The Catholic
Church, through help for victims and interned persons tried first of all not to
allow their exclusion. Political prisoners were not considered by the society
as criminals, but as heroes, in a sense. They did not evoke negative feelings.
The communist authorities soon noticed that the regime victims were not
excluded from the society. There was no point in having more martyrs or in
increasing their popularity.56
Martial law played a considerable role in weakening citizen participation
in Poland. Many people decided to emigrate to the West because they did not
see any prospects in their country. It was in the 1980s when there emerged a
negative stereotype of Poles, who were contriving and earning their living in
not entirely legal ways in the West. The changing political situation in the
Soviet Union, as well as the strikes in 1988 did not inspire civic mobilisation
of the same intensity as in 1980−1981.
Paradoxically enough, citizen participation, which had enabled the
formation of the opposition elite that was strong enough to start a dialogue
with the communist regime, was not needed anymore at the time of reforms.
Citizens’ passivity, in a way, suited the new government. The newly formed
political parties were based on ideological differences and did not have the
capacity to represent the interests of their electorates. As a result, after 1989
in Poland there was no major anti−modernisation backlash, which the
architects of the reforms had anticipated.57
The absence of an active civil society obviously had a negative impact on
the success of the ongoing processes during the successive phases of
democratisation. Such a situation is well described in scientific literature –
elites alone, without an active civil society, are not able to consolidate
democracy.58 It is only the civil society that can effectively limit abuses of
power, as well as function as an arena for the formation of democratic
participation skills and conflict mediations. It can mobilise citizens,
aggregate and articulate their interests, provide future political leaders, give
legitimacy to the political system, and monitor the truthfulness of the
information presented by the media.59 Poland, as well as other countries of the
former socialist bloc, started to be corroded by the problems following from
the absence of an active civil society, such as corruption, clientelism and
apathy.
56
Interview with Halina Bortnowska.
Interview with Professor Aleksander Smolar.
See. L. Diamond, Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation, Baltimore and London:
Johns Hopkins University Press 1999, p. 218.
59
Ibid, pp. 239−250.
57
58
58
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
Throughout the 1990s institutions from the United States, the European
Union and its member states played an immense role in improving this
situation. Thanks to external support, the emerging civil society in Poland
had an opportunity to engage in various state issues and remain financially
independent from it. The most important sources of funding were the
USAID, George Soros’ Foundation and the NED. The PHARE programme –
started at the initiative of the G−7 states and co−ordinated by the EC
Commission – from the very beginning has had special programmes for non−
governmental organisations.60
This programme, like many other forms of assistance from the EU
member−states, the United States or Canada, started to mobilise the Polish
non−governmental sector. When comparing the assistance provided to Poland
by the US and the EU, one could argue that the US aid was more focused on
promoting democracy, whereas the EU assistance was rather aimed at
technical issues and helping Poland meet the membership requirements.61
Thanks to foreign grants Polish institutions started to carry out projects on
citizen awareness, self−government, and a sense of tolerance; in other words,
projects that help Poles respect the principles of democracy and the rule of
law. Nonetheless, the development of civil society in Poland had been
negatively affected by low social capital, which is not only directly correlated
with the socio−economic development of the state, but also influences
democratic consolidation, as many studies have shown.62
As time was passing, American programmes and institutions promoting
democracy started to withdraw from Poland due to the satisfactory results of
their activity. However, despite the advancement of the integration between
Poland and the EU, non−governmental organisations found it difficult to fill
the void and keep up their activity. Re−adjustment to the EU support required
time and investment in professional staff, which not all NGOs could afford.
Some Polish NGOs re−orientated their activities towards programmes
promoting democracy in the post−Soviet zone and/or Balkans, successfully
applying skills developed during the early days of democratic consolidation
60
See Klon/Jawor Association, Trzeci Sektor w Unii Europejskiej. Przewodnik dla organizacji
pozarządowych [The Third Sector in the European Union. A Guidebook for NGOs], Warsaw
2003, p. 349.
61
Special attention should be paid to the unrepayable assistance provided to the Polish
government by the governments of the EU member states, the US, Canada and other countries
as well as international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund). Repayable assistance was granted by the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, the European Investment Bank and the World Bank. Both forms of assistance
covered humanitarian aims (until 1993) and EU integration support. More in T. Schimanek,
Wybrane aspekty bezzwrotnej pomocy zagranicznej dla Polski [Selected Aspects of the
Foreign Unrepayable Assistance for Poland] the IPA Report, Warsaw 2003.
62
P. Norris, Democratic Phoenix. Reinventing Political Activism, Cambridge University Press
2002, p. 164.
8. Citizen Participation
59
or even as democratic opposition. Some donors (e.g. PAUCI, the British
government) developed grant programmes to support such a reorientation.
Another adjustment strategy of Polish NGOs has been the organisation of co−
operation networks with international partners with the support of the
Council of Europe, the European Union and other international organisations.
The creation of strong supra−national advocacy groups supporting the
European integration process and the watchdog organisations monitoring the
activities of national authorities helps to consolidate democracy in the new
member states, including Poland.
Key Conclusions
The widespread international appeal of the Solidarity movement was
related to its combination of the struggle for democracy and human rights
with its defence of social justice and workers’ rights. This helped Solidarity
activists to elicit support from across the entire political spectrum from left
to right as well as gain sympathy of intellectuals and artists who are
otherwise reluctant to be involved in “politics.”
● The economic correlations of the Polish People’s Republic with the West
economically – through a system of loans – proved to be very important.
The unpaid debts led to the weakening of the Polish economy and
consequently of the authorities. In this way, paradoxically enough, the
granting of loans by Western countries forced the PZPR to open
negotiations with the democratic opposition.
● The Catholic Church had a generally positive impact on the attitudes of the
Polish society both prior to and during the transition negotiations. It served
as a mediator trusted by both sides as well as promoted peaceful and
conciliatory attitudes and resisted calls for retribution upon the communist
regime representatives.
● Pro−democratic attitudes among the Polish political elites (both post−
Solidarity and post−communist) were rooted in their positive attitude
towards the Western democratic system and market economy. The Fulbright
scholarships granted to young party activists, academics and experts were an
important factor in creating this favourable image of the West .
● The meetings of Polish opposition leaders with Western politicians and foreign
embassy representatives contributed to the legitimacy of the former on the
international political arena. Such attention from the West also increased their
visibility both at home and abroad and helped to marginalise radical attitudes.
● The establishment by the communist authorities of ‘façade” institutions
meant to give legitimacy to the PRL, such as the Constitutional Tribunal
and the Office of Ombudsman, had unexpected positive consequences for
the development of democracy and rule of law. In 1986, well before the
round table agreement, the Constitutional Tribunal issued its first decision
that went against the expectations of the communist government.
● Polish underground publishing houses and independent press were not only
a source of information for the public at large, but also “a living space” for
many intellectuals, who did not have to collaborate with the regime in order
to publish their artistic or scientific works.
●
Key Conclusions
61
During martial law, underground Solidarity members used foreign financial
assistance not only for everyday needs (support for the families of the
interned, charitable help), but also for long−term projects, such as research
or self−study programmes. This experience turned out to be exceptionally
useful at the time of systemic transformation.
● The legality of Polish elections after 1989 has never been questioned. This
was possible thanks to institutional solutions – such as the establishment of
the National Electoral Commission or the engagement of judges into the
electoral process – which guaranteed independence and an apolitical
character of the electoral process.
● Thanks to the openness and assistance from the West, the Polish Army
started a gradual integration into the Euroatlantic structures. The United
States and Europe began to invite Polish generals for study visits. This
helped to avoid a possible revival of nationalistic tendencies and
politisation of the Army. As a result, the apolitical character of the Army
was not threatened thanks to the watchful attitude of the parliamentary
opposition and the influence of Western allies.
● The activities aimed at the police reform were focused mainly on its
depolitisation. The 1990 law prevented active members of the police force
from being members in political parties. Despite apparently going against
their citizen rights – given the social context of that period – this solution
proved adequate.
● All ministers responsible for the military and internal affairs were
excessively focused on gaining full control of the special services, while
neglecting reforms of other structures. It appears that this exaggerated
attention from the side of the new elites was the effect of the syndrome of
liberation from the communist police state.
● The role of the Constitutional Court was very important in the process of
the democratisation of the state. Since the process of the development and
passing of the new Constitution was very long, in the meantime the
Constitutional Tribunal exercised a kind of “creative” interpretation of the
existing general rules, adopting them to the new democratic reality.
● The relative weakness of the civil society and low citizen participation after
1989 remain as one of the greatest setbacks of the Polish democratic
transformation. Until today the problems of corruption, clientelism, and
low electoral turnout corrode the public life in Poland. In this respect,
Poland is no different from other Central and Eastern European states. It
seems that the decision of major international donors to withdraw from
Central Europe prior to EU enlargement had been premature. It will take
some time before these countries develop fully mature democratic regimes
impervious to populist and authoritarian backlash.
●
Biographical Notes
Krzysztof Bobiński is an expert at the Polish Institute for International Affairs
(PISM). He was the Financial Times correspondent during martial law.
Halina Bortnowska is a journalist and human rights activist, connected with
many Catholic movements and organisations. She was the secretary of the
editorial office of Znak monthly in the period 1960−1983, an animator of religious
education for adults in Nowa Huta (1970−1983), an advisor to Solidarity (1980−
1989), a member of the Citizens Committee with Lech Wałęsa, and co−founder
of ROAD (Ruch Obywatelski Akcja Demokratyczna – Democratic Action Civic
Movement) and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.
Ryszard Bugaj is a founding member and leader of the Union of Labour
(initially the Labour Party). He was a Solidarity activist. In 1968 he took part
in student protests against the banning of the “Dziady” theatre production.
From 1980 he was engaged in Solidarity’s activities. After 1989 he was a
member of the Sejm for many years.
Jerzy Eisler is a professor of history at the Institute of History of the Polish
Academy of Sciences, lecturer of the University of Warsaw, and an expert on
contemporary French history. He is a researcher at the Institute for National
Remembrance and the director of the Warsaw department of the INR.
Bronisław Geremek is a professor of history and member of the EP. He was
an opposition activist, advisor to Solidarity, and a participant of the round
table negotiations. He became involved in the social protest of Gdańsk
workers in August 1980 and was one of the experts of the emerging NSZZ
Solidarity. After the introduction of martial law he was interned to be
released the same year. He co−operated closely with Lech Wałęsa and was an
adviser to the delegalised Solidarity. He was a foreign affairs minister from
1997 to 2000, and a member of the Sejm from 1989. Professor Geremek was
a founding member and leader of the Democratic Union (later the Freedom
Union) for many years. He has been awarded with the Order of White Eagle.
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
63
Mirosława Grabowska is a sociologist and a researcher at the Institute of
Sociology of Warsaw University and the Institute of Political Studies of the
Polish Academy of Sciences. She is a founding member of the Institute for the
Study on the Foundations of Democracy and editor of the underground Political
Quarterly Krytyka (1982−1989). She is the author of many books and articles.
Lena Kolarska−Bobińska is a professor of sociology and director of the
Institute of Public Affairs. From 1970 to 1991 she was a researcher at the
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences,
and from 1991 to 1997 she was a member of many Polish and international
professional organisations and advisory bodies including the Advisory
Committee on Social and Human Sciences of the European Commission.
From 2001 to 2005 she was a member of the Council for Socio−economic
Strategy, Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Reflection Group.
Ewa Łętowska is a professor of law and a Constitutional Tribunal judge. She
was the first Ombudsman (1987−1992). From 1999 to 2002 she was a
Supreme Administrative Court judge; a correspondent member of the Polish
Academy of Skills, Académie de Droit Comparé in Paris as well as the
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva). Professor Łętowska was
awarded with the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Restitution of Poland.
She is the author of 19 books on civil and constitutional law and more than
300 articles and studies.
Janusz Onyszkiewicz is Deputy President of the European Parliament and
also a mountaineer. He was an opposition activist, an active participant of the
demonstration in support of the freedom of speech and science, and one of
the co−founders of Solidarity in the Mazowsze region. He received his PhD
in Mathematics from Warsaw University. In 1981−1989 he was a member of
the presidium of the National Committee of the NSZZ Solidarity and the
press spokesman for the Solidarity. During martial law he was arrested. He
took part in the round table talks. After 1989 he was a member of the Sejm
and the Minister for National Defence (1992−1993 and 1997−2000).
Mieczysław Rakowski is a journalist and historian. He was Prime Minister
from 1988 to 1989 and the last secretary of the KC PZPR. He was the editor
in chief of Polityka weekly from 1958 to 1982. He also co−organised the
round table negotiations.
Janusz Reykowski is a professor of psychology and the founder of the
Institute of the Polish Psychology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He co−
64
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
chaired the “political table” during the round table talks from the side of the
government. He won (as the second in history European) the Nevitt Stanford
Award for International Society of Political Psychology (2000). From 2003
he has been the chair of the Programme Council of the Warsaw School of
Social Psychology.
Adam Rotfeld is a professor of human sciences, an expert in international
relations, and former minister of foreign affairs (2005). He worked at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs (1961−1989) and took part in the
works of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as
a member of the Polish delegation. In 1991 he became the director of the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In 2000 he
became a member of the National Security Council. He is the author of more
than 300 scientific publications.
Ferdynand Rymarz is a lawyer, a retired judge of the Constitutional
Tribunal and the chair of the National Electoral Commission. He was a
deputy prosecutor general of the Polish Republic from 1992 to 1993. He is
the author of many publications on law and history of the region. He was
awarded with the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Restitution of Poland.
Marek Safjan is a professor of law, judge, the chair of the Constitutional
Tribunal, and member of the Helsinki Committee in Poland. He was the
director of the Institute of Civil Law of the University of Warsaw (1993−
1996). He is the author of about 200 scientific publications on civil law,
medical law, European law and constitutional law.
Aleksander Smolar is a political scientist and journalist. In 1971−1989 as a
political emigrant he lived in Italy, Great Britain and France. He was co−
founder and editor in chief of Aneks, a political quarterly from 1974 to 1990.
From 1989 to1990 he was a political advisor to Prime Minister Mazowiecki
and a foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Suchocka from 1992 to 1993.
Since 1990 he has been the Chair of the Board of Stefan Batory Foundation
(George Soros’ network). He is also a senior research fellow of the French
National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS).
Eugeniusz Smolar is a journalist. As an opposition activist, during his
emigration years he supported the activity of the KOR, Solidarity, and other
circles of the democratic opposition, as well as underground publishing
houses. He was a co−founder of Aneks, a political quarterly. For many years
he was the director of the Polish section of the BBC radio station in London.
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
65
After returning to Poland, he became the Director for Programming of the
Polish Radio (2002−2004). Today he is the chair of a Polish think−tank called
the Centre for International Relations.
Andrzej Wielowieyski is a former Senator. In the 1980s he was
a secretary of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK) in Warsaw, a participant
of the round table negotiations, and adviser to Solidarity. He was a deputy
speaker of the Senate from 1989 to 1991 and a Member of the Sejm from
1991 to 2000 (Democratic Union, later the Freedom Union). Today he is
a member of the national authorities of the Democratic Party – democraci.pl
and the Euro−Atlantic Association.
Henryk Wujec is a member of the national authorities of the Democratic
Party – democraci.pl. He was an opposition activist (Catholic Intelligentsia
Club – from 1962, the Workers’ Defence Committee, and Solidarity). During
martial law he was interned and later imprisoned. He was a member and a
secretary of the Citizens’ Committee with the Chair of the NSZZ Solidarity
Lech Wałęsa (1987−1990), and he took part in the round table negotiations in
the trade unions’ pluralism team. After 1989 he was a member of the Sejm
for many years and a member of the political council of the Freedom Union.
Andrzej Zarębski is a journalist and media expert. He was a journalist in
Gdańsk and an opposition activist involved in the activity of the Press
Information Office of the NSZZ Solidarity. After the end of the round table
talks he was a journalist of Tygodnik Powszechny in Gdańsk and the head of
the political section of Tygodnik Gdański. In 1991 he was a press spokesman
for Jan Krzysztof Bielecki’s government, a member of the Sejm from 1991
to 1993, and a member of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting
Council from 1993 to 1999.
Jerzy Zimowski is a lawyer. He was a Solidarity activist. After 1989 he was the
secretary of state at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for the reform
of the police. From 1990 to 1996 he was a deputy minister for internal affairs.
Jacek Żakowski is a journalist. During martial law he worked at the Press
Information Office of the NSZZ Solidarity, for Na Przełaj weekly and Tygodnik
Powszechny. After 1989 he was a spokesperson for the Citizens’ Parliamentary
Club (OKP) and the first president of the Polish Information Agency. He was
also a co−founder and a journalist of the Gazeta Wyborcza. He is the author of
television and radio programmes as well as books, and he has won many awards
and honours. Today he is a commentator for Polityka weekly.
Information about the Authors
Jarosław Ćwiek−Karpowicz (1981) – a political scientist and analyst at the
Institute of Public Affair. He graduated from the Department of Journalism
and Political Science of Warsaw University. He also studied at Lomonosov
University in Moscow and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Science−Po) in
Strasbourg. He is now a PhD student at the Institute of Political Sciences of
Warsaw University. His book “Europejskie oblicze Rosji. Stosunek
rosyjskiej elity politycznej do Unii Europejskiej” [European Faces of Russia.
The Attitude of Russian Elites Towards the European Union] will be
published soon.
Piotr Maciej Kaczyński (1978) – political scientist, researcher and analyst
at the Institute of Public Affairs. He graduated from the Department of
Journalism and Political Science of Warsaw Univerity and the College of
Europe. His scientific interests include the foreign and external policy of the
EU and the member states, the political integration of the EU, trans−Atlantic
co−operation and human rights issues. As a co−editor, he has recently
published a book entitled “Bridges across the Atlantic? Attitudes of Poles,
Czechs and Slovaks towards the United States”. He is also a member of the
steering committee of Babel International and a commentator on
contemporary political and social issues for the Polish and foreign media.
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● Newton, Kenneth and Norris, Pippa. Disaffected Democracies. What’s
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● Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern
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● Raik, Kristi. Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step Up
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Document 237, February 2006.
● Schimanek, Tomasz. Wybrane aspekty bezzwrotnej pomocy zagranicznej
dla Polski [Selected Aspects of the Unrepayable Foreign Assistance for
Poland], the IPA Report, Warsaw 2003.
● Sharansky, Natan. The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to
Overcome Tyranny and Terror, Public Affairs, 2004.
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● Smolar, Aleksander. “Radykałowie u władzy” [“Radicals in Power”],
Gazeta Wyborcza, 2−3 September 2006.
● Śpiewak, Paweł. Obietnice demokracji [The Promises of Democracy],
Warsaw 2004.
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Institute of Public Affairs
list of publications − years 2000 − 2006
Language versions: PL – Polish, EN – English, RU – Russian, UKR –
Ukrainian, D – German
Forthcoming:
1. Collective work: Towards polish model of social economy.
2006
Books
1. Anna Kwak (ed.) From vicarious protection to adult life. PL
2. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz (ed.) EU Accesion Prospects for Turkey and
Ukraine. Debates in New Member States, EN
3. Mateusz Błaszczyk, Jacek Sroka (ed.) Networks or structures? Social
dialogue at the regional level, PL
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska, Jacek Kucharczyk, Jarosław Zbieranek (ed.),
Active citizen, modern electoral system
2005
Books
1. Magdalena Arczewska, Not only one act. Low about the non−govenment
organizations, PL
2. Elżbieta Putkiewicz, Private tutoring – grey zone of education, PL
3. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz (ed.), The Visegrad States Between Schengen and
Neigbourhood Warszawa 2005, EN
4. Marcin Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland, EN
5. Dominik Antonowicz, The university of tomorrow: challenges and policy
models, PL
6. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska, Jacek Kucharczyk, Piotr Maciej Kaczyński
(eds.) Bridges across Atlantic? Attitudes of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks
towards the United States, PL, EN
7. Jacek Kucharczyk, Mateusz Fałkowski (eds.), Citizens of Europe.
European integration in Polish public life, PL
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Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Barbara Fedyszak−Radziejowska (ed.),The process of de−marginalisation
of Polish countryside: aid programmes, leaders, elites and NGOs, PL
2. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse (ed.), Analysis of the possibility of introducing a
regional system of implementation of EU structural funds between 2007
and 2013, PL
3. Joanna Korczyńska, Maciej Duszczyk, The demand for foreign labour
force in Poland, PL
4. Roman Dolata, Barbara Murawska, Elżbieta Putkiewicz, The support of
career development and needs of teachers in the field, PL
5. Andrzej Olechowski, The Polish agenda in Europe, PL
6. The Polish European policy: objectives and possibilities, PL
7. Anna Wiłkowska, Assessment of teachers` educations in Poland, PL
2004
Books
1. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), Economic consciousness of society and
image of business, PL
2. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, The EU regional policy. Examples of Greece,
Italy, Ireland and Poland, PL
3. Krzysztof Konarzewski, Educational system under reform. Program basis
and circumstances of education, PL
4. Marek Rymsza (ed.), Social reforms. Balance of decade, PL
5. Eleonora Zielińska (ed), International Criminal Court, PL
6. Andras Sajo, Freedom of expression, RU, EN
7. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz (ed.) Neighbourhood Across a Divide, EN
8. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse (ed.), Poland and the new EU cohesion policy, PL
9. Elżbieta Putkiewicz, Anna Wiłkomirska, Public and private schools:
comparative study of different environments, PL
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Mateusz Fałkowski, Kai−Olaf Lang, Common task. Poland, Germany and
Ukraine in the changing Europe. Gemeinsame Aufgabe. Deuchland, Polen
und die Ukraine im sich wandelen Europa. PL, D
2. Polish political scene in 2004. Continuation or change?
3. Mateusz Fałkowski (ed.), First Steps in the EU. Polish policy in the
European press, PL
4. Ewa Giermanowska, Mariola Racław−Rarkowska (ed.), Morbid absence in
Poland, PL
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
71
5. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz (ed.), Securing Europe and America, EN
6. Tomasz G. Grosse (ed.), Poland and the new EU cohesion policy, EN
7. Małgorzata Żytko (ed.), Small child in educational and social security
system, PL
8. Roman Dolata, Elżbieta Putkiewicz, Anna Wiłkomirska, Reform of the
secondary school certificate. Opinions and recommendations, PL
9. Marek Rymsza (ed.), Cooperation of the civil sector with the public
administration, PL
10. Krzysztof Konarzewski, Education in primary school and gymnasium in
2002/ 2003, PL
11. Ryszard Herbut, Jacek Sroka, Piotr Sula, Social dialog on regional level, PL
12. Mariola Racław−Markowska, Sławomir Legat, Vicarious protection of
child, PL
13. Barbara Murawska, Segregation at the doorstep of primary school, PL
14. Krystyna Kamińska, Local governments role in the education duty of the
six–year old, PL
15. Artur Nowak−Far, Arkadiusz Michoński, National administration in the
EU process of minding, PL
16. Jan Barcz (ed.), Constitutional aspects of Polish membership in the EU,
PL
2003
Books
1. Teodor Bulenda, Ryszard Musidłowski (eds.) Penitentiary and post−
penitentiary system in Poland, PL
2. Piotr Mazurkiewicz (ed.), The Catholic Church on the eve of Poland’s
accession to the European Union, PL
3. Bogusława Budrowska, Anna Titkow, Danuta Duch, The Glass Ceiling−
Barriers and Limitations in the Careers of Polish Women, PL
4. Tomasz Kazimierczak, Marek Rymsza (eds.) Towards active social policy,
PL
5. Ewa Giermanowska, Mariola Racław−Markowska, Local communities
against youth unemployment, PL
6. Krystyna Iglicka (ed.) Integration or discrimination? Polish challenges
and dilemmas at the doorstep of multiculturalism, PL
7. Krystyna Iglicka (ed.) Migration and its impact on labour markets in
Poland and Ukraine, EN and UKR
8. Marek Zubik (ed.) Preventing conflict of interest in contemporary Poland, PL
9. Mariusz−Jan Radło, Challenge of competitiveness. Lisbon Strategy in
European Union after enlargement, PL
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10. Beata Łaciak (ed.) The child in contemporar media culture, PL
11. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.) The image of Poland and the Poles in
Europe, PL
12. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, The EU regional policy at the voivodeship
level, PL
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Jan Barcz (ed.), The consequences of EU membership for the Polish legal
and administrative system, PL
2. Artur Nowak−Far, Arkadiusz Michoński, The national administration in
the EU decision making process, PL
3. Teodor Bulenda, Ryszard Musidłowski (ed), Prison policy in 1989−2002, PL
4. Jan Barcz, Cezary Mik, Artur Nowak Far Review of the EU Constitutional
Treaty: challenges for Poland, PL
5. Krzysztof Pankowski, European Parliament, PL, EN
6. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz (ed.) Turning threats into opportunities, EN
7. Tomasz Szlendak, Neglected playground. Styles of childbearing and
problems of educational inequalities, PL
8. Krystyna Iglicka, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Monika Mazur−Rafał Managing
Immigration – the case and experience of Poland in the contexts of
relevant directives of the European Commission, (in co−operation with
CSM), PL
9. Mirosław Grewiński, The Role of European Social Fund in Policy to
Combat Unemployment. Conclusions for Poland, PL
10. Ewa Giermanowska, Mariola Racław−Markowska, Local Communities
Against Youth Unemployment, PL
11. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska, (ed.), Before the European Referendum,
absence, resistance, support, PL
12. Tomasz Schimanek An Overview of Foreign Aid for Poland, PL
13. Jakub Biernat, Katarzyna Gmaj, Małgorzata Wokacz, Not Only Visas.
Kaliningrad Region and EU Enlargement, PL
14. Marta Zahorska, (ed.), The Pre−School Education− Barriers and
Opportunities, PL
15. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska, (ed.), Parish Clergy on Integration with the
European Union, PL
2002
Books
1. Urszula Kurczewska, Małgorzata Molęda−Zdziech, Lobbying in the
European Union, PL
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
73
2. Changes in the educational system. Results of the empirical research, PL
3. Krystyna Iglicka (ed.), Re−migration of the Poles – sad or successful
returns?, PL
4. Barbara Fatyga, Jolanta Rogala−Obłękowska, Lifestyles of the youth and
the drugs. The results of the empirical research, PL
5. Małgorzata Fuszara (ed.), Women in Poland at the turn of the century. New
gender contract?, PL
6. Jacek Kucharczyk (ed.), Europe – America. Transatlantic dimension of
reforms in the European Union, PL
7. Marcin Walecki (ed.), Financing politics – behind the scenes, PL
8. Protection of the refugees in Poland (in co−operation with MFA and
UNHCR), PL
9. Jan Barcz (ed.), Does the Constitution need to be realigned? Systemic and
constitutional aspects of Poland’s accession to the European Union, PL
10. Adam Zieliński, Marek Zubik (ed.), The future of Polish system of justice,
PL
11. Henryk Domański, The poverty in the post−communist societies, PL
12. Janusz Halik (ed.), The elderly in Poland. Social and health
consequences of the ageing of the society, PL
13. Józefina Hryniewicz (ed.), Against Poverty and Unemployment: Local
Grassroots Initiatives, PL
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), Before the European referendum –
absence, resistance, support, PL
2. Hanna Bojar, Joanna Kurczewska, Consequences of the Schengen Treaty
– the results of the research conducted in the communities from the
Eastern borderland, PL
3. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), Inhabitants of rural areas and European
integration: opinions, knowledge, level of being informed, PL and EN
4. Mariusz−Jan Radło, Lisbon strategy of the European Union. Conclusions
for Poland, PL
5. Beata Roguska, Michał Strzeszewski, Social interest, knowledge and
informing about Poland’s integration with European Union, PL
6. Elżbieta Tarkowska, Katarzyna Korzeniewska, The youth from the former
collective farms
7. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), The future of Polish political scene
following the parliamentary elections of 2001, PL
8. Michał Warchala (ed.), Poland’s press image in the EU member states, PL
9. Irena Boruta, The strategies of fighting unemployment in international
organisations: UE, MOP, OECD, PL
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Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
2001
Books
1. Janusz Borkowski, The citizen vis−ŕ−vis public administration after the
systemic reforms
2. Władysław Czapliński, Anna Wyrozumska Judge and the international law
3. Ryszard Chruściak, Wiktor Osiatyński Constitution−making process in
1989−1997
4. Juliusz Gardawski, Trade unions at a crossroads
5. Barbara Gąciarz, Włodzimierz Pańków, Social dialogue in Poland –
fiction or chance?
6. Józefina Hrynkiewicz (ed.), The measures and indicators in the health
care system
7. Józefina Hrynkiewicz (ed.), The decentralization of the social services of
the State
8. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska, Andrzej Rosner, Jerzy Wilkin (eds.), The future
of rural areas in Poland – visions, strategies, concepts
9. Krzysztof Konarzewski (ed.), Schooling during the first year of the
educational system reform
10. Antonina Ostrowska, The disabled in Poland in the 1990s
11. Ewa Popławska (ed.), The Constitution for the enlarged Europe
12. Marek Rymsza (ed.), Lone motherhood and the social policy
13. Jan Widacki, Marek Mączyński, Janina Czapska, Local community,
public security. Central and Eastern Countries under transformation.
14. Mirosław Wyrzykowski (ed.), Constitutional basis for the system of law
15. Andrzej Zoll (ed.), Rational reform of the penal law
16. Polish road to Schengen. Experts’ opinions
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Xymena Dolińska, Mateusz Fałkowski, Poland – Germany. Mutual
perceptions during the enlargement of the European Union (also in
German)
2. Marzenna Guz−Vette,r Phare 2000 for Eastern Poland and Silesia.
Assessment of the administrative preparedness
3. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), The Poles and the great change. The
European integration, PL, EN
4. Joanna Konieczna, Poland – Ukraine. Mutual perceptions, PL, EN, UKR
5. Elżbieta Putkiewicz, Marta Zahorska, Social inequalities in education.
A study of six gminas
6. Beata Roguska, Jacek Kucharczyk, The parliamentary elections of 2001
and Poland’s integration into the European Union
Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
75
7. Mirosław Stec (ed.), Public Administration Reform of 1999 – dilemmas
and achievements
8. Michał Warchala, Poland–France. Mutual perceptions during the
European enlargement (also in French)
9. Marek Zubik (ed.), Deficiencies of the system of justice
10. Common Europe. Opinion of Polish non−governmental analytic centres,
PL, EN
2000
Books
1. Kate Hansen Bundt, Norway says ‘no’
2. A peasant, an agricultural worker or a farmer? Poland’s accession to the
European Union – hopes and fears of Polish rural areas
3. Janina Czapska, Local security. Social aspect of criminal prevention
4. Henryk Domański, Social hierarchies and barriers in the 1990s
5. Mirosław Granat (ed.), Non−governmental organisations in Poland. Legal
and financial basis
6. Mirosław Wyrzykowski (ed.), Constitutional cultures
7. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, The EU regional policy and its influence on the
economic development. The study of Greece, Italy, and Ireland –
conclusions for Poland
8. Jacek Klich (ed.), The hope for the labour market. Small and medium
enterprises in economy
9. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), Four reforms – from the concept to the
realisation, PL, RUS
10. Lena Kolarska−Bobińska (ed.), The second wave of Polish reforms, PL,
RUS
11. Mark Leonard, The solution for Europe. Between federalism and the
Europe of nations
12. Beata Łaciak, Jacek Kurczewski (eds.), Corruption in social life
13. Marcin Walecki (ed.), Financing politics. Elections, money, political parties
Experts’ opinions, research reports, recommendations
1. Xymena Dolińska, Michał Warchala (eds.), The press image of Poland in
the EU member states (quarterly reports)
2. Maciej Duszczyk, Dorota Poprzęcki, The opinion of the trade unions and
the employers’ organisations on the EU enlargement
3. Janusz Grzelak, Dominika Maison, Grażyna Wąsowicz−Kiryło, The Polish
way of negotiating in the context of Poland’s integration into the European
Union
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Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy
4. Dariusz Ryszard Kijowski (ed.), Two degrees of administrative
jurisdiction
5. Adam Mielczarek, Małgorzata Sikorska, Poland – Spain, Poland –
Sweden. Mutual perception during the EU enlargement
6. Przemysław Mielczarek, The entrepreneurs’ opinions on the chances and
threats for the sector of small and medium enterprises
7. Małgorzata Sikorska, Poland – Austria. Mutual perception during the EU
enlargement
8. Jadwiga Staniszkis, Post−communist state: in search for identity
9. Mirosław Wyrzykowski (ed.), The accountability of public authorities for
the damage in the light of Art. 77 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland
10. Mirosław Wyrzykowski (ed.), The systemic model of the public
prosecutor’s office. Discussion on the project of the Ministry of Justice of
15th March 1999
11. Janusz Zaleski (ed.), Effective methods of management in public
administration