Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security Studies
Conference Report
A European Net Assessment
of the People’s Liberation
Army (Navy)
Prepared by Peter Roberts
A European Net Assessment
of the People’s Liberation
Army (Navy)
Prepared by Peter Roberts
Conference Report, May 2017
Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security Studies
ii
A European Net Assessment of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy)
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Conference Report, May 2017.
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R
USI CONVENED a conference on 23 February 2017 to consider the rise of China’s naval
forces, both conventional, in the form of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)),
and the maritime militia. The event took place at the Institute’s Whitehall building with
more than 100 attendees from academia, industry, the military and various parliamentarians.
Speakers from across Europe, Asia and the US examined the growth of capability and the
ambition of China through the prisms of international relations, global politics and economics,
and military balance.
The conference found that there were contradictions between China’s foreign policy statements
and financial investment in its naval forces. Beijing’s statements about peaceful coexistence,
mutually beneficial growth and belief in the global system seem at odds with its current approach
towards the rule of law, intellectual property rights, human rights and ecological damage. It is
little wonder, therefore, that many are concerned about the future direction of Chinese foreign
and security policy, given that Beijing is starting to amass the systems and tools necessary to
challenge the global order from a military perspective.
The shift in manpower and investment within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is most
significant as a statement of intent, since Beijing has not made its ambitions in foreign affairs
public. In 1980, the PLA changed direction on force design and capability development – shifting
from a land-centric view to one that largely became centred on the PLA(N). China is moving
away from having a naval force designed for policing and deterring within its own territorial
and coastal waters to one that has deep water military vessels capable of projecting national
power on a global scale. It is a radical and deliberate step that will, by 2020, create the world’s
second-biggest ocean going navy, with policy aspirations to ‘dominate the oceans’ (including
the Atlantic), and ‘counter US hegemony at sea’.
Evidence for PLA(N)’s Growth
China’s naval power is vested within the PLA(N), coast guard, border force and fisheries
enforcement agencies. The last three were classified as forming a maritime militia (CMM). The
conference was briefed on the development of a 500-ship navy within the PLA(N) by 2050,
against a US aspiration of 355 ships. The CMM is also projected to consist of the same number
of assets within the same timeframe. In addition, the conference was updated on Chinese naval
port facility expansion in the South China Sea (including the basing of radars, missiles and fighter
aircraft), Africa, South East Asia and – potentially – South America.
Two theories of the PLA(N)’s development were outlined. The first centred on the conceptual
development of the force, detailing the expansion of the PLA(N) through the use of naval theories
about sea denial and control to explain the acquisition of warfare capabilities and future growth
strategy. The second covered the material expansion of the PLA(N), demonstrating the shift
from coastal warfare vessels, adaptation for active defence and finally into a transformation era
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A European Net Assessment of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy)
for a true power projection force. Both theories of naval development acknowledged the key
roles played by General Liu Huaqing (also known as the father of the modern Chinese navy) and,
later, Admiral Wu Shengli (Commander of the PLA(N) 2006–2017) – both of whom continue to
exert a significant influence on the growth plans for the PLA(N) and in the wider development
of national strategy.
Explaining Chinese Force Design
Participants debated why the Chinese wanted to develop this kind of force design. What
challenge, threat or context were triggering this move? Few satisfactory answers emerged,
except for the stated Chinese ambition of retaking Taiwan, by force if necessary. Other
explanations included China’s Six War doctrine1 (in which the areas identified in the 1938 ‘map
of shame’ are recaptured), and the popular Island Chain theory2 of Chinese foreign policy (that
sees the gradual ability to exercise sea control over areas bounded by island chains; Taiwan
first, Guam later, and Hawaii a distant dream). Both these explanations forecast that by 2035,
China will be the dominant force in the Pacific and, by 2050, the top global maritime power with
the ability to re-craft international law and norms at will. Notable within this analysis and the
subsequent discussions was the theory of a neo-Mahanian approach to President Xi Jinping’s
foreign policy. The research paper for the conference outlined the theory that – departing from
the maritime policies of previous Chinese President Hu Jintao – Xi appeared to see a greater role
for the PLA(N), with a lesser role for the CMM, fishing and merchant marine fleets. In doing so,
the rational deduction (following the strategy espoused by naval theorist Alfred Mahan) was a
future large-scale decisive engagement between Chinese forces and the US Navy at a time and
place of Beijing’s choosing. Considering the scale of forces alone, no outright victory for either
side was the best the US could hope for.
Challenges to China’s Naval Capability Development
Yet the conference also heard that China’s naval forces faced a series of serious challenges in
meeting its goals to become a global military power, capable of deterring and coercing others.
While it will achieve quantitative superiority, and burgeoning capabilities in air power, space,
technical systems and spread of capabilities, the Chinese naval forces still represent three
navies: a coastal force; a land-based strike force; and a blue-water capability.
Before 2025, China’s naval leadership faces serious challenges in achieving the potential of that
force due to a shortfall in adequate doctrine, the delivery of anti-ship cruise missiles in sufficient
numbers against manoeuvring targets, kill chain decision cycle coherence. and training.
1.
2.
Geoff Wade, ‘China’s Six Wars in the Next 50 Years’, The Strategist, blog of the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 26 November 2013.
Bernard D Cole, ‘Reflections on China’s Maritime Strategy: Island Chains and the Classics’, paper
presented to the Maritime Security, Seapower, and Trade Conference, US Naval College, Newport,
RI, 24–26 March 2014.
Peter Roberts
3
After 2025, when the PLA(N) is due to have shifted to a doctrine of sea control, the main
challenges are likely to emanate from coordinating the sheer number of vessels, the lack of a
central operating concept and doctrine (the philosophy of the force), ill-equipped commanders
from unit level to high command, a lack of understanding for their own rules of combat, and an
institutional lack of experience in combat.
Common to these challenges will be both the leadership of the PLA(N) over the coming decade
and the planned shift to a force that relies on shared information which enables rapid decisionmaking. This could become a key vulnerability for the Chinese military, given its current reliance
on a centrally driven command and approval process.
Conclusions
Given the evidence outlined at the conference, delegates were left with the question of
what Europe might do, or be expected to do, in response. While the conference found that
the rise of China’s naval power was much larger than many had appreciated, it left several
questions unanswered.
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How will China use its newfound power?
Does the arrival of a 500-ship Chinese navy pose a direct threat to Europe?
Is the CMM likely to form the core of an indirect warfare challenge to global free-trade
shipping, on which Europe relies?
How could future Alliance constructs be strengthened in order to build a coherent
challenge to China’s naval forces?
Would Russia be an ally for the West, a Chinese partner or an opportunistic neutral
player in the Pacific over the coming decades?
What constitutes a Chinese definition of militarisation and does it differ from
a Western view?
To what end might this be helpful in explaining military deployments across the China
Seas and throughout the One Belt, One Road/Maritime Silk Road plans?
Peter Roberts is the Director of Military Sciences at RUSI.