M U N C H 2 0 1 6 Assembly of the
African Union
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Table of Contents
3
Letter from the Director
4
Committee Description
7
History of the African Union
11
Functions of the African Union
13
Topic 1: Democratization And Human Rights
18
Topic 2: Economic Development
23
Topic 3: Reforms To The African Union
27
Conclusion
28 Positions
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LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
Dear Delegates,
My name is Frank Jiang, and I’m currently a junior studying political science and
economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Within the Carolina
International Relations Association, I’ve previously served as Head Delegate, or the
person who leads UNC’s Travel Team to college conferences and crisis simulations
around the country. Last year at MUNCH, I served as the Director of the first-ever Press
Corps, an innovative simulation that introduced public opinion to the conference
dynamic for the first time.
Though this is only my third year of college, this is my tenth year of Model United
Nations—my humble origins as the Honorable Delegate from Zimbabwe in the sixth
grade of a New Jersey middle school soon manifested into a love for debate, negotiation,
and politicking. It is with that same passion that I welcome you, the Assembly of the
African Union, to MUNCH.
One of the unique distinctions of Model UN is its ability to capture and accelerate real
world dynamics, from cooperation to competition to conflict. Rarer still is a backdrop so
perfect for that exploration as the African Union, the intersection of some of the most
diverse cultures, economies, and forms of government in the world. As the heads of state
of over forty different countries, you will at once be subject to both domestic pressures
and international policymaking.
Delegates, I hope you can promise me and the rest of this committee’s staff a
commitment to dedicated research and thought-provoking discussion. In return, we
promise a commitment to innovation, receptiveness, and engagement, to produce what
will hopefully be an extraordinary committee. So, if you ever have any questions,
concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to let me know.
And with that, we’re off-- welcome to the Assembly of the African Union!
See you in March,
Frank Jiang
[email protected]
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COMMITTEE DESCRIPTION
This committee will not be precisely defined by the constraints of a General Assembly or
Crisis style committee. Thus, it will be important for all delegates to read this section.
Over the course of the conference, delegates will primarily be tasked with collaborating
with other delegates to produce international, African Union-wide policy. However,
unlike most GAs, the end product of the committee will not be a resolution; rather, it
will be a series of directives. Because of the quicker nature of directives, delegates
should actually expect to discuss all topics contained within this background guide. For
those of you unfamiliar with directives, the end of this section includes an example.
This committee should seek to pass a substantial directive every two to three hours. In
order to move the simulation forward, the committee staff will provide occasional
updates on news events in our simulated world, which may make different issues more
or less of a priority to discuss. In particular, these updates will also serve as responses to
the committee’s actions.
This committee will abide by all the rules of formal parliamentary procedure. However,
because of the quicker rate of directives and updates, delegates should expect to see
more moderated and unmoderated caucuses, as compared to use of the Speaker’s List.
Finally, delegates should keep in mind that, unlike most GAs, they are not anonymous
representatives of their country; instead, they are those countries’ respective heads of
state in the present day. This means that delegates should especially think about not
only their country’s interests, but also their personal interests, when setting
international policy. Delegates will admittedly have little unilateral control over any
domestic issues that arise over the course of the conference; however, should an update
to the committee be about a specific country, we will ensure that the delegate from that
country is given private access to information.
Position Papers
All delegates will be expected to submit position papers, due at the start of the first
committee session, of at least three pages, double-spaced, in length. The position paper
should address all three topics within this guide, including background research done
independently, and personal goals to achieve in committee. This is particularly
important, because it allows us to get a good sense of what delegates want to see
accomplished.
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Awards
This committee will present awards at the conclusion of the conference to delegates who
displayed notable achievement. In particular, delegates will be evaluated along three
dimensions:
● Quality of research/background knowledge
● Influence on committee’s actions
● Accomplishment of personal objectives
We will award two Verbal Commendations, two Honorable Mentions, two Outstanding
Delegates, and one Best Delegate. In addition, we will also award a Best Position Paper
and a Most Improved Delegate (to the delegate who shows the most growth from the
start of the conference to the end of the conference). These last two awards are not
necessarily exclusive to receipt of another award.
Directive Instructions
As mentioned before, directives are committee-wide actions, typically written in
response to the topic at hand. Because of the different possible scenarios in which a
directive would be written, they can range in length from a few sentences to several
paragraphs. As a reminder, however, this committee should pass a substantial directive
(one that is several paragraphs long) every two to three hours, though it may also pass
shorter directives more frequently.
Directives are typically written in operative form (i.e. command statements), though
there is no mandatory format. Directives will require a minimum number of sponsors
and signatories (to be determined) and a simple majority to pass. A good directive
should answer the following questions, if applicable:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Who/what is taking action?
What is being accomplished?
Where will it happen?
When, or over what duration, will it be accomplished?
Why should this be done?
How should this be accomplished?
How will this be funded?
A sample directive is below.
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Sample Directive
The following directive is a sample from a hypothetical European Union committee.
Sponsors: Germany, Belgium, France
Signatories: Italy, Denmark, Spain, Greece
Title: EASO Expansion
The European Union will centralize coordination of the migrant crisis in the European
Asylum Support Office (EASO) to better provide humanitarian and logistical aid.
Necessary functions from relevant agencies, including Peacekeeping, Europol, and
Eurojust, will be co-opted into EASO. Centralization will occur over six months, so that
staff can be retrained.
EASO will execute three primary functions--migrant rescue, migrant allocation, and
domestic security--over the duration of the migrant crisis.
1. Migrant rescue: EASO will open a major branch in Italy, chosen because it is a
frequent port of entry and for its experience from the Mare Nostrum operations.
From this base, EASO will coordinate sea-traveling migrant search and rescue.
The existing operations budget will be tripled, and aircraft/seacraft will be
doubled. Law enforcement operations will also commence against those shipping
migrants across the sea in unsafe seafaring vehicles.
2. Migrant allocation: Based on the previously passed “Shared Responsibility”
refugee quota system directive, EASO will be in charge of distributing refugees
fairly between EU member states. Documentation and fingerprinting of all
refugees will be stored in a database that EASO will manage.
3. Domestic security: In conjunction with national policies, EASO will be
responsible for ensuring no intra-state refugee migration occurs. All EU member
states have agreed to craft accelerated domestic pathways to citizenship for
productive refugees. Upon receipt of citizenship, migrants will be removed from
the EASO database and allowed all EU citizen rights, including free intra-state
migration.
The budget allocation for this project is 10 billion euro. Funding will be sought from
global, non-EU partners seeking to help mitigate the crisis, including the United States
of America. After all international commitments are accounted for, the difference will be
funded through an increase in GNI-based EU member taxes, up to the amount
necessary. !6
HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN UNION
The African Union was born from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), much like
the UN’s own beginnings as the League of Nations. The OAU, founded on May 25, 1963,
similarly had its own roots stem from a cultural movement over half a century earlier.
Pan-Africanism
During the late 19th century, a global Pan-African movement grew out of the United
States of America.1 African-American intellectuals, including Martin Delany and
Alexander Crummel, argued that black civilization needed to establish an independent
nation with its own identity. Through American missionary work in Africa, this
sentiment began to spread across the continent, manifesting in ideas of independence
and continental unity.
2
A Pan-African symbol
Ultimately, Pan-Africanism began to wane in the Americas and Europe. Despite
increased scholarly work on the issue, major Western countries largely blocked the
attempts of the African diaspora to return to their cultural homes, because they feared
the movement’s potential impact on their colonial holdings. But on the continent, the
movement began to spread. This was helped along by the Pan-African Congresses 1
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau
2
http://blog.freddywill.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/pan-african1.jpg
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meetings between prominent African and African diaspora activists - held in major
Western cities worldwide.3
The Pan-African Congresses called for the “complete independence of the African
continent and total rejection of colonialism and exploitation in all its forms,” the
unification of Africa through regional blocs, and the adoption of democracy. In addition,
the Congresses called for economic development, so that future African nation-states
would not be primarily built on resource extraction, as was their function under colonial
powers. Finally, in terms of mutual security, the Congresses advocated a stance of noninterference and tolerance for national sovereignty.
These principles were increasingly adopted as Africa began to decolonize in the midtwentieth century; Ghana’s post-independence leader Kwame Nkrumah, for example,
felt that Ghana would never truly be free if all of Africa were not independent. Thus, a
major focus of his efforts was assisting colonial nation-states in declaring independence
and building their economies. Despite this, Pan-Africanism fractured into different
blocs. The three largest were 1) the Casablanca Group, led by Ghana, which called for
full continental integration; 2) the Monrovia Group, led by Nigeria, which proposed
incremental unification; and 3) the Brazzaville Group, led by Senegal, which remained
tied to Western (particularly French) interests. Regardless, it became clear that many
national leaders were unwilling to surrender their sovereignty for a continental,
confederate structure. By the early 1960s, calls for unity had been diluted until the
OAU’s ultimate mandate and structure began to take form.
Organisation of African Unity
From May 22 through May 25, 1963, delegates from thirty-two African countries met
and established the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). While not as radical as many
reformists had previously hoped, the OAU’s charter called for solidarity, continental
improvement, decolonization, and international cooperation.4 It established an
assembly of heads of state and government, who would convene periodically to discuss
issues affecting the OAU. It also established other commissions to address more specific
issues, or serve as neutral third parties in inter-state negotiations. Because of its initial
successes, an additional 21 states joined the OAU.
The central focus for the OAU was decolonization; many of its members provided
significant aid to those trying to overthrow colonial regimes. In addition, it also laid the
3
http://www.blackpast.org/perspectives/pan-african-congresses-1900-1945
4
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf
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groundwork for multilateral economic institutions including the first few Regional
Economic Communities (REC), the building blocks for Africa’s continental economic
integration, which still exist today. Other economic deals, however, have either
underwhelmed or since become defunct.
Ironically as a result of its successes, the OAU gradually weakened. As most countries
became independent by the 1990s, the OAU almost had no mandate toward the end of
the twentieth century. But because it strictly upheld national sovereignty, the OAU had
no plans for conflict resolution as many nations fell under political coups and instability.
Due to economic shortcomings and unsustainable national debts, the OAU was also
underfunded. By the end of its forty-year existence, the OAU came to be viewed as an
institution that was committed only to discussion, and not to action. Given these
shortcomings, it became clear that the OAU needed to be replaced by a new
organization.
The African Union
Spearheaded by ex-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the African Union was born in
2002 as an attempt to strengthen the functions of the OAU. Modeled after the European
Union, the AU currently includes fifty-four active member states. Contrasting the OAU’s
focus on decolonization, the AU’s mandate centers around economic development,
poverty alleviation, and conflict resolution. The African Union is also viewed more as an
action-taking organization; its charter, for example, significantly strengthened the AU’s
ability to intervene in its member states. In fact, it is one of few regional bodies that
explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in another country on humanitarian grounds,
echoing the UN’s Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
On humanitarian intervention grounds, the African Union has seen a mixed record. In
smaller instances, like Burundi and and Anjouan, the AU has capably preserved human
rights, or served as an effective stopgap before the UN was capable of deployment. In
larger instances, like Somalia or Darfur, the AU was either inefficient in deploying or
ineffective upon arrival. These shortcomings, however, are not altogether surprising or
even unusual, given the AU’s young age.
The AU’s other major mandate, economic development, has also fallen short, despite
getting off to a promising start. In fact, this was a major area of agreement even prior to
the synthesis of the African Union; a year before the AU’s inception in 2001, the OAU
adopted the Strategic Policy Framework and New Vision for the Revival and
Development of Africa. Under the African Union, the plan was renamed as the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD’s function, central to the AU’s
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operations, is to help Africa’s Regional Economic Communities in implementing
developmental initiatives through resource mobilization.
5
Since then, however, the AU hasn’t experienced significant economic successes. As a
result of nearly continent-wide poverty, the AU still suffers from limited funding and
lackluster member state contribution. In addition, despite producing legislation to
create a central bank and a universal currency, significant steps toward either of those
goals has yet to be achieved. Finally, though certain Regional Economic Communities
have seen successes, progress toward the economic integration (e.g. free trade) of the
entire continent has been stunted.
5
http://huza.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
Cartoon_AU_African_Union_troops_for_Somalia.jpg
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FUNCTIONS OF THE AFRICAN UNION
This committee, while just a simulation of the Assembly of the African Union, will coopt many of the other functions of the African Union’s other committees. Those
committees as they currently exist are delineated below; please consider all of them as
falling within this committee’s purview.
Key organs of the African Union include6, 7:
● The Assembly is comprised of the heads of state of all member countries. It
typically meets one to two times a year, and is the AU’s main decision-making
body.
8
Assembly of the African Union at the 25th Session
● The Executive Council is comprised of foreign affairs ministers of individual
states. In many ways, the Council focuses on the details while the Assembly
focuses on the general policies. The Council’s tasks include monitoring policy
implementation and referring major issues to the Assembly.
● The Pan-African Parliament is comprised of five delegates from each member
state. Intended as a platform for people from all countries to discuss policies.
6
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/au-handbook-2014.pdf
7
http://www.au.int/en/organs/
8https://mafrsouthernafrica.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/25th-ordinary-session-of-the-
assembly-of-the-african-union-02.jpg
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While it currently exists only as an advisory body, it is designed to ultimately
become a legislative branch.
● Judicial and Human Rights Institutions include the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
● The Commission is comprised of ten commissioners who functionally serve as the
African Union’s secretariat. Each commissioner oversees a specific department,
like Political Affairs or Infrastructure and Energy.
● The Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) conducts the day-to-day
business of the African Union and reports directly to the Executive Council.
● Specialized Technical Committees (STCs) are ad hoc committees that ensure the
harmonisation of African Union activities. They also can help coordinate between
Regional Economic Communities.
● The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is comprised of fifteen representatives
from different member states who have fixed term lengths. This council can
decide to intervene in conflicts, and is responsible for maintaining a standby,
quick-response security force.
●
The Financial Institutions include the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund,
and the African Investment Bank. The ACB is supposed to set common monetary policy,
the AMF is supposed to assist in monetary integration, and the AIB is supposed to foster
economic growth. None of these institutions have been successfully set up yet. For the
purposes of this committee, the African Development Bank will be included as part of the
AU’s purview. As a multilateral development finance institution that is partially
administered by Western donors, the AfDB finances roughly $15 billion worth of projects
per year. 9
● The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) is comprised of civil
society organizations including social, professional, and cultural organizations.
● Legal Organs include the AU Advisory Board on Corruption and the the AU
Commission on International Law.
Delegates are encouraged to use existing African Union infrastructure when possible.
9http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Budget-Documents/
2015-2017_Rolling_Plan_and_Budget_version_Anglaise.pdf
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TOPIC 1: DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Like the OAU, the African Union has placed a heavy emphasis on democratization and
human rights, specifically including the topic in its Charter’s preamble. This
prioritization was also clear from its early legislation. For example, at the AU’s first
meeting, it adopted the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and
Corporate Governance (DDPECG), which provides the framework for the African PeerReview Mechanism (APRM). The APRM essentially allows AU member states to
voluntarily review each other’s compliance with AU policies and hold each other
accountable. Think of this like a check that the AU built into its reviewing system!
Beyond this, the AU has also adopted multiple additional instruments and treaties to
promote democracy.10
Unlike the OAU, however, the AU has fully embraced intervention to protect human
rights. Most notably, the AU adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
Responsibility to Protect, commonly referred to as R2P, claims there is a responsibility
for states to prevent mass atrocities committed against civilians within its borders. The
failure of the state to protect its citizens is seen as a justification for humanitarian
intervention. However, R2P remains controversial in international affairs, as
discussions revolve around state sovereignty and autonomy, a lack of long term
solutions after intervention, etc. To avoid repeating the inaction by the OAU during
previous humanitarian disasters, the AU explicitly included R2P within its framework, a
unique move among regional bodies worldwide.
10
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09744053.2014.883757
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In order to maintain accountability in pursuing democratization, the AU utilizes a
variety of mechanisms to provide oversight and ensure implementation of democratic
policies. In particular, the AU seeks to ensure free and uncorrupt elections.
Unfortunately, there is little the AU can do to enforce the treaties across all 53 states;
prominent studies found that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance (ACDEG) has received little attention from governments and civil society in
West Africa due to an absence of political will and lack of awareness.
The AU has seen successes, however. In 2009, the AU and the South African
Development Community (SADC), a Regional Economic Community, provided a joint
reaction to a coup in Madagascar. Madagascar’s membership was suspended from both
organizations, and the AU declared itself in control of conflict management in the
country. The AU also convinced foreign institutions to withhold foreign aid and restrict
economic activity with the country until the coup ended.
The AU has also notably intervened in Sudan. Months after the creation of South Sudan
on 9 July 2011, fighting once again erupted along the two nations’ disputed oilproducing border. The AU issued an ultimatum, giving the two states three months to
reach an agreement. The AU then relied on negotiations with the UN, United States, and
China to ensure credible threats of sanctions if the deadline was not met. During the
fighting, the AU also took on additional humanitarian responsibilities. The innovative
response of the AU in leveraging one of the most prominent security bodies to create
11
https://responsibilitytoprotectblog.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/basics-of-rtop-3.png
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pressure on the two countries, while also adhering to the solutions crafted by AU states,
was unprecedented.
In 2012, the AU began to more actively assert itself on topics of democracy within the
Union itself. On March 13 of that year, the AU suspended Mali and its coup leader for
seizing power from an elected government. On April 17, 2012, the AU condemned and
later suspended the Guinea-Bissau military junta that seized power just before a
presidential election.
While significant, these successes have not come without failures. For example, of the 47
Sub-Saharan states that attempted democratization under the AU’s watch, 42 failed to
transform by 2010.12
The African Union has also had a limited and failing influence in Libya. The AU’s
experience in Libya highlights the difficulties faced by the AU in competing with other
international institutions. Larger, older, and more experienced multilateral institutions
such as the UN overshadow the AU, even when the topics themselves relate to Africa.
When regional conflicts become causes of international attention, regional organizations
lose jurisdiction to the larger intervening entity; in Libya’s case, the regional AU became
subordinate to the larger UN. While this sort of cooptation has its benefits - the UN’s
peacekeeping forces, for example, are more experienced - it detracts from the AU’s
independence. Furthermore, since the AU focuses largely on extracting concessions
through the enactment and enforcement of sanctions from the international
community, it is once again dependent on others.
12
Rupiya, Martin. “A Review of the African Union’s experience in facilitating peaceful
power transfers: Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Libya and Sudan: Are there prospects for
reform?”: 161
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UN-African Union Peacekeeping Forces13
In addition, critics of the AU’s conflict management also point to what they perceive as a
lack of commitment to human rights. Many of these criticisms are directed at the AU’s
membership, which includes heads of state who are not internationally considered
democratic, or even seem to limit the protection of human rights within their own
countries. In many instances, for example, the AU and the International Criminal Court
have butted heads, with the ICC calling for the arrest of a state leader.14
In an effort to address such concerns and demonstrate its commitment to human rights,
the AU has declared 2016 the African Year of Human Rights, with a particular focus on
the Rights of Women. Dr. Khabele Matlosa, the Director for Political Affairs of the
African Union Commission, stated that the celebration of human rights is meant to
“enhance public awareness about human rights; assess the ratification and
implementation of the human rights instruments, in particular, the Maputo
Protocol, and the progress made in advancing the rights of women since the
adoption of the Protocol; encourage Member States to develop policies, plans of
actions and programmes on the promotion and protection of human and
peoples' rights, and specific programmes with the intention of enhancing
women’s empowerment in all spheres of society.”15
13
http://www.un.org/News/dh/photos/large/2012/October/531003unamid.jpg
14
http://theconversation.com/al-bashirs-escape-why-the-african-union-defies-theicc-43226
15http://www.achpr.org/sessions/56th/speeches/dpa_statement/
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It is important to note the differences between the AU and its predecessor, the OAU, in
regards to the significant changes regarding attitudes towards human rights. Unlike the
OAU, the AU explicitly recognized human rights, promoted social and cultural
development through an approach based on human development, and gender equality.16
Yet similar problems continue to plague the AU on compliance, implementation, and
enforcement. Undoubtedly, the African Union has substantial room to improve.
Questions to Consider:
● What, if any, are the distinctions between democratization and human rights?
Are current standards on both issues sufficient, or should they be reformed?
● How can the AU better hold member states accountable to AU standards? What
accountability mechanisms should they devise, if any?
● Does the AU have a right to intervene or interfere in domestic conflicts? If so,
when should the AU opt to intervene, and when should it opt to pursue other
channels?
● Should the AU continue to rely on international institutions for enforcement and
assistance, as it pertains to intervention?
● How should the AU approach disagreements over human rights with
international institutions like the International Criminal Court?
16http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/Human_Rights_in_Africa/
6_Gawanas.pdf
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TOPIC 2: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The ultimate goal of the African Union is complete economic development and
integration, culminating in a Continental Free Trade Area or “Afrozone,” an economic
community akin to the Eurozone. In particular, the community would focus on the
removal of trade barriers between different countries and regions. In its incremental
approach toward this goal, the African Union has used Regional Economic Communities
- localized free-trade agreements - as building blocks.17
There are eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the African
Union:
1. Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
2. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
3. Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
4. East African Community (EAC)
5. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
6. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
7. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
8. Southern African Development Community (SADC)
18
17http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/african-union-aims-for-continental-
free-trade-area-by-2017
18https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4b/
Supranational_African_Bodies-en.svg/640px-Supranational_African_Bodies-en.svg.png
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Some of these RECs, like COMESA, have already begun proposing the establishment of
complete customs unions, where passports and visas would be shared by all member
states, increasing tourism and allowing for greater employment opportunities for
citizens. Doing so would create a Schengen Area-style arrangement for much of Africa, a
proposal that is not universally popular; regardless, implementation on these ideas has
not begun.
By working with RECs, the African Union hopes to increasingly integrate the economic
and trade policies of the continent until it creates an economic community similar to
that of the European Economic Community and Eurozone. This was originally intended
to be accomplished by the mid-2010s, but has since been pushed back into the 2020s.
These delays were caused by difficulties in implementation, as well as internal crises
such as the outbreak of ebola in West Africa. However, with stability gradually returning
to many turmoil-filled regions, it is hoped that this goal can ultimately be achieved.
Before these aspirations can be reached, there are short-term issues the African Union
has to address first. Chief among these is a problem that affects many of the developing
economies within Africa - the “resource curse,” whereby a country that is rich in natural
resources counterintuitively experiences low levels of economic growth. This is
primarily caused by a lack of development in other economic sectors; in other words, a
state economy that is focused on extracting natural resources may not develop its
manufacturing sector as much.
19
19http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/081ef0ae-a4aa-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.img?
width=705&height=380&title=Regional%20riches&desc=Regional%20riches
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The particular mechanics of the resource curse are varied; a leading theory attributes its
effect to currency appreciation - the idea that, as natural resource revenues flow into a
country, the relative value of that nation’s currency appreciates. This makes imports
cheaper and exports more expensive for the country; as a result, foreign products
become preferred both domestically and internationally, causing that country’s
economic sectors to become less competitive. This explanation is widely known as
“Dutch disease.”20
Other mechanisms are likely at work as well. For example, because natural resources are
limited by geography, many countries with abundant resources experience conflicts or
corruption as rival groups compete for access. Unfortunately, most scholars anticipate
that the resource curse only continues to get worse with inaction; because the rate of
technological advancement is often exponential, countries that do not have rich
resources and had to diversify their economy earlier have a significant and increasingly
insurmountable head start.
The particular mechanics of the resource curse within Africa are unclear, and indeed,
different countries may be affected by different causes. Regardless, its impact is clear many African countries, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are among the
richest in natural resources and the least developed overall in the world.
Another major challenge confronting the AU is the unemployment of Africa’s youth. Due
to comparatively shorter average life expectancies, youth can account for as much as
three-quarters of the labor force in some countries.21 Despite this, levels of
unemployment among youth are high and continuing to rise, a particularly concerning
sign given the importance of youth labor in driving economic development (one of the
main drivers in Asia’s economic success stories).
In order to combat these issues, the AU has tentatively expanded foreign direct
investment (FDI)22, in an effort to import foreign capital, technology, and jobs. The US
and other Western powers have traditionally invested or provided loans to the African
continent, and China’s presence is growing as well. In fact, the very headquarters of the
African Union itself, a beautiful complex in Addis Ababa, was a multi-million dollar gift
from China. This investment is not without concern, however - foreign interests
20
http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/beating-resource-curse-africa-global-effort/
p28780
21
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/expertcomment/the_african_union/
22
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79ee41b6-fd84-11e4b824-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3wljJsQbb
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ultimately will not prioritize the concerns of African citizens, and many view FDI as a
form of neocolonialism. In any case, on this and the other aforementioned issues, the
African Union has a lot of work to be done on laying out a sustainable path of
development into the future.
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Questions to Consider:
● In terms of economic development, what priorities should the African Union set?
What problems should it tackle first?
● How can the African Union better facilitate the implementation of free trade
between countries/RECs? Is free trade an important step in development?
● For the national leaders who benefit from the resource curse, what tradeoffs need
to occur before reform can be adopted? For the institution of the AU, what
reforms should be implemented?
● Speaking purely economically, is foreign direct investment the best avenue for
growth? If so, does it remain the best avenue when other factors like foreign
dependence, neo-colonialism, and Western-Chinese competition are considered?
● What steps can the African Union take to develop independently?
23https://www.eoi.es/blogs/alvarohernandez/files/2014/01/
africa_china_invest_map4161.gif
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TOPIC 3: REFORMS TO THE AFRICAN UNION
As a young organization, the African Union faces continuous calls for reforms from its
members. Discussions on operation and structure, which revolve around greater
integration and centralization against a looser federation and increased national
sovereignty, impact both the perceived authority of the organization and its future
trajectory and world position. As a guiding force in the region, the African Union must
be prepared to address continental changes in economic, military, and social spheres.
Economic integration similar to the Eurozone has been a plan for the continent since the
Abuja Treaty of 1991. Since then, the creation of a new pan-African currency and the
establishment of a single African Economic Community have both been delayed to the
late 2020s. This pan-African currency, known by the proposed name of the afro, would
replace all African currencies.24 Notably, this reform is more serious than the
aforementioned economic development proposals; rather than simply having free trade
between all countries, the entire continent would instead be setting one common
monetary policy.
Understandably, many states oppose the creation of a single-currency customs union in
Africa, primarily in West Africa. This is largely the case because, in setting a common
monetary policy, smaller states may have their interests excluded, doing damage to their
domestic economies. 25 In addition, it is unclear what sort of international support
outside of Africa would exist for a common currency, or how a unified monetary policy
organization (i.e. African Central Bank) would make its decisions. If disproportionately
sized countries like Nigeria gain too much agency, smaller countries with significantly
different economies (e.g. countries that do not export oil) could suffer.
In terms of military reform, the African Union recently established the 25,000-strong
African Standby Force. A peacekeeping force created by a coalition of African states, it is
comprised entirely of African troops. The ASF has most notably been utilized for the
African Union Mission in Somalia, which seeks to provide humanitarian aid for the
Somali people and support the recognized Federal Government of Somalia against the
forces of Al-Shabaab. This ongoing joint mission with Somalia and the United States has
since expanded into a push against the militants in the countryside during what has
24
http://www.cislacnigeria.net/2013/02/the-treaty-establishing-the-african-economiccommunity/
25http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21591246-continent-mulls-
merging-currencies-ever-closer
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been named Operation Indian Ocean. Currently, the African Union has 22,000 troops
serving in this mission in Somalia.26
27
African Union Mission in Somalia: Operation Indian Ocean
As the AU seeks to continue expanding the ASF, it will encounter economic and political
issues. For example, North Africa also has delayed African military integration, mostly
due to the Arab Spring revolts that occurred throughout the region. Further, the Arab
Maghreb Union had been effectively filling the role of international peacekeeping force
in the region prior to the creation of the ASF. The recent outbreak of ebola in West
Africa limited West African contributions to the ASF, as many countries were unable to
provide healthy soldiers for operations. Furthermore, interventionism still faces
backlash from some members; in particular, the president and government of Togo
maintain strained relations with many other governments of the African Union due to
political intervention after the death of the previous president/father of the current
president.
Ultimately, some states, notably Libya when it was under Gaddafi, have encouraged full
integration into a “United States of Africa,” a complete pan-Africanist ideal that would
26
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34570755
27
http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Early-Oct2014.jpg
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see complete economic, military, and political integration of the continent on an
unmatched scale. This proposal began with the Gaddafi chairmanship of the Union,
during which he suggested a Schengen Area-inspired African community, with a single
passport and complete freedom of travel between African states. While many African
leaders criticized the idea, it did receive support from others who agreed to re-address
the idea at a later date.28 In any case, it is interesting to consider the implications of a
fully integrated military, and how the African Standby Force contributes, or doesn’t
contribute, to that ideal.
Since the death of Gaddafi, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has taken up leadership as
head of the African Integrationist idea, much to the chagrin of Jacob Zuma of South
Africa.29 Others have instead supported regional integrationism, such as the proposed
East African Federation of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.30 This
integration would essentially be an expanded version of the current East African
Community REC. This idea has been well-received by the governments of the potential
member states, though slight disputes remain over the degree of federalism and the
timing of implementation. A formal constitution is expected to be drafted in 2016, and
the union between the states would make it the second most populous in Africa, behind
only Nigeria.
28
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7864604.stm
29
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/AU-will-work-better-without-GaddafiZuma-20111013
30http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/04/30-east-african-
community-drummond-williams
!24
31
East African Community Heads of State
The topic of continental integration has also made diaspora states an issue. Countries in
the Caribbean, including Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, are majority
African diaspora. Whether or not these states should be included within the African
Union, and perhaps even within a continental state of Africa, is a topic of debate. This
issue was previously relevant with Cape Verde, as its position within the African and
European world placed it in a position of ambiguity. While it previously supported
African integration, it has now begun to align increasingly toward European integration.
In any case, continent-wide integration within Africa still remains a highly contentious
point. Currently, poorer and less-developed states are typically more in favor of panAfrican Integration, while Arab states and the more developed nations of Africa are
opposed to the creation of a single African nation. Egypt, for example, has taken a stance
against pan-African statism, preferring regional cooperation over continentalism. These
sentiments have been supported by other developed economies within the continent and
the Union - Morocco has already left the Union due to territorial disputes over West
Sahara, and much of North Africa has been only semi-compliant with many African
Union policies. Similarly, though a member state, South Sudan has not ratified the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, placing them in an unknown category that
currently appears to be leaning away from any form of integration due to their history of
unity with the Sudanese state. Because of this, there remains a strong anti-integration
bloc within the generally pro-cooperation Union. Many countries also lack a firm
31http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2014/Nov/87159/
east_africa_leaders_meet_to_decide_on_constitution_of_federation.aspx
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position regarding continentalism altogether, making this general issue one that needs
serious discussion.
Questions to Consider:
● Should full continental integration be adopted as the ultimate goal of the African
Union? What are the benefits? What are the consequences?
● What policies should the African Union put in place to ensure member
compliance with continental cooperation (e.g. ensuring states contribute
soldiers)? What allowances should be made for states with domestic instability?
● Are there varying levels of integration that should be considered as feasible
alternatives (e.g. regional integration, solely economic integration, etc.)? If so,
what would the governance structure look like in such unions?
● What role, if any, should the African diaspora have?
● In any form of integration, how will policymaking responsibility be determined?
Should political agency be determined as a function of population or some other
metric?
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CONCLUSION
I hope this guide has provided useful information and insight into your understanding
of the African Union. It summarizes some of the general issues confronting the AU
today, which we will explore more in depth in committee.
It’s now time for you to begin conducting background research! An excellent place to
start are the Questions to Consider listed at the end of each topic, as well as the cited
footnotes for more thorough explanations. In addition, some useful websites to consult
to gather more information include:
● CIA World Factbook: lists basic data on all countries
● Biography.com: provides biographies on most national leaders
● AU.int: the official website of the African Union; describes the organization
structure and major agenda topics
● summits.au.int: catalogues past summits of the AU; of particular importance are
the “Documents” and “Speeches” sections under each summit
● Organizational websites: any other organizations included within this
background guide that you are unfamiliar with, such as the International
Criminal Court, will be useful to research
● Images/maps: I find that looking through a few maps really helps me understand
the placement of a topic, especially one with a regional focus like this committee.
It will be useful to understand where countries, resources, ethnic groups, etc. are
geographically. Infographics also help summarize information quickly for recall.
Overall, your research should help you gain background knowledge, understand your
position’s stance on the issues, and devise potential solutions. Preparing your position
paper as you research will help you organize your thoughts.
To assist you in your preparation, we also have the positions within this committee
included on the next couple pages. Please use that list to plan ahead, in terms of who
you can potentially work with (or against).
Finally, I’d like to thank Rachel Desch and Turner Gilbert for their contributions to this
background guide. They will be serving alongside me as this committee’s staff, and we’re
all excited to meet you soon!
Best of luck,
Frank
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POSITIONS
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
State of Eritrea
President Isaias Afewerki
Republic of Angola
President José Eduardo dos Santos
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegne
Republic of Botswana
President Ian Khama
Republic of Gambia
President Yahya Jammeh
Republic of Burundi
President Pierre Nkurunziza
Republic of Ghana
President John Dramani Mahama
Republic of Cameroon
President Paul Biya
Republic of Guinea
President Alpha Condé
The Republic of Chad
President Idriss Déby
Republic of Guinea-Bissau
President José Mário Vaz
Republic of the Congo
President Denis Sassou Nguesso
Republic of Kenya
President Uhuru Kenyatta
Democratic Republic of the Congo
President Jesph Kaliba
Republic of Liberia
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Republic of Cote d'lvoire
President Alassane Ouattara
Libya
President Abdullah al-Thani
Republic of Djibouti
President Ismail Omar Guelleh
Republic of Madagascar
President Hery Rajaonarimampianina
Arab Republic of Egypt
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Republic of Malawi
President Peter Mutharika
Republic of Equatorial Guinea
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo
Republic of Mali
President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
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Republic of South Africa
President Jacob Zuma
Republic of Mauritius
Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth
Republic of South Sudan
President Salva Kiir Mayardit
Republic of Mozambique
President Filipe Nyusi
Republic of The Sudan
President Omar al-Bashir
Republic of Namibia
President Hage Geingob
Kingdom of Swaziland
King Mswati III
Republic of Niger
President Mahamadou Issoufou
United Republic of Tanzania
President John Magufuli
Federal Republic of Nigeria
President Muhammadu Buhari
Tunisian Republic
President Beji Caid Essebsi
Republic of Rwanda
President Paul Kagame
Republic of Uganda
President Yoweri Museveni
Republic of Senegal
President Macky Sall
Republic of Zambia
President Edgar Lungu
Republic of Sierra Leone
President Ernest Bai Koroma
Republic of Zimbabwe
President Robert Mugabe
Somali Republic
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
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