Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties
and Forties in USA and Japan*
Angelo Baracca†
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
The deep reasons of the birth of Big Science are still the object of a
debate. The reconstruction of some aspects of the growth of nuclear
physics with artificially accelerated particles in the 1930s and 1940s
may help to throw light on the roots of large-scale research. On the basis
of the original documents, we compare the attitudes and research styles
of Ernest O. Lawrence and Merle A. Tuve, and their open clash. The
first one was probably the most significant representative of the new
approach, mainly interested in the construction of bigger accelerators.
On the contrary, the latter — who gave fundamental contributions to
nuclear physics, using a relatively small electrostatic accelerator —
expressed the strongest and most explicit opposition towards largescale research trends. Our argument is completed through the analysis
of the effects of the introduction of particle accelerators in Britain and
Japan, where they did not generate large-scale research before the
Second World War.
1
Today we are so accustomed to large-scale research that we tend to consider it
as an almost natural way of organizing and performing this activity. From an
historical point of view, however, we cannot avoid questions such as: what was
the genesis of Big Science? What were the causes and the conditions of its
* This article prosecutes a research presented in Baracca (1993). I wish to thank the Library of
Congress, Washington D.C., the Bancroft Library of the University of Berkeley, California, and the
Carnegie Institution of Washington for their hospitality and the permission to consult their archives
during the completion of this research.
†
Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy.
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011, Vol. 16, 11–31
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Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
birth and development? Which were the steps that prepared its advent?
In fact ―Big Science‖ did not suddenly grow out of war-time emergence and
of such enterprises as the ―Manhattan Project‖. It was instead prepared and
partly anticipated by a series of previous choices and changes that took place in
the leading fields of scientific research. Such innovations developed in
connection with the evolution of the role, the social position, stimuli and
cultural horizon of the scientific community and of the role of science and
technology and their mutual relationships.
In order to get a better understanding of these transformations and to place
them in a historical perspective, I have chosen to investigate the contrasting
attitudes that developed (explicitly or implicitly) against the early trends
towards large-scale research and the alternatives that were proposed to them.
Such an investigation should not give the impression of a nostalgic point of
view, since our purpose is to contribute to the understanding of the objective
historical trends. This approach does show in fact that the road to large-scale
research was not a compulsory choice from a point of view of scientific
investigation in itself: extremely valuable experimental and theoretical physics
was being done by those scientists who did not accept this road; they
sometimes got even more accurate or better results. But Big Science turned
out to be the winning choice because it corresponded to the stream of
historical and social development.
With this purpose in mind, I have studied the growth of nuclear physics
with accelerated particles in the thirties, I have followed the war and postwar
choices in research activity made by some of the leading scientists in this field
and I have compared the developments in different countries, in order to
distinguish and characterize conflicting or divergent roads or styles of
research.
2
Let me start with the U.S. The outburst in this field of research took place here
at the very beginning of the thirties and one is struck by its coincidence with
the worst period of the economic recession: the growing difficulties in the
funding and development of scientific research in general, strongly contrast
with the relative easiness with which atom-smashers found financial support
and started large-scale research. Behind this one recognizes the precocious
interests of the leading industrial sectors toward the emergent fields and the
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
13
new role that scientific and technological innovation had to play in the New
Deal. New features appeared in scientific activity in such fields as particle
accelerators and nuclear physics in the U.S. (in contrast, as we will see, with
other countries): growing costs and dimensions of machines and labs, team
research, competition and rush for the results, growing mean number of
authors for each paper, management as part of scientific activity raising
increasing funds.
Three groups developed early particles accelerators in the United States
(Mc Millan 1979):
1) that of Lawrence in Berkeley;
2) Tuve at the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism (I will call it DTM) of the
Carnegie Institution of Washington;
3) the group of Crane and Lauritsen in Pasadena.
Ernest O. Lawrence was probably the most significant representative of
these new trends, while his friend Merle A. Tuve — another protagonist and
leading scientist — expressed perhaps the strongest and most explicit
opposition toward large-scale research trends.
Some striking features of Lawrence‘s character have already been analyzed
(Davies 1968; Heilbron, Seidel, & Wheaton 1981; Seidel 1978): his
competitive and managerial leadership, his constant trend towards larger
machines and higher energies, his ability in collecting financial support
everywhere, and in this connection his concern with showing the practical
usefulness of his products.
Tuve, on the contrary, had a very different, and in many respects opposite,
attitude. In fact it is striking that he was one of the scientists who made major
fundamental contributions to the progress of nuclear physics during the
thirties (and of other disciplines after the war) but his name and achievements
are almost unknown to the great majority of today‘s physicists. Lawrence
moreover was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1939, while Tuve missed out, even if
he probably would have deserved it more than once. These facts greatly derived
from Tuve‘s particular character and attitude, which led him to dislike the
mechanisms and spirit that were increasingly pervading a research activity of
ever growing dimensions. In this sense Tuve in the end ended up defeated by
the changes taking place.
Remember that Lawrence and Tuve were born in the same town, were
school-friends and constantly linked by deep friendship all through their lives.
The bitter remarks Tuve had to make about Lawrence‘s research are even more
14
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
significant.
Lawrence‘s group published the first results of experiments in nuclear
physics with charged accelerated particles well before Tuve‘s group (Baracca,
Livi, Piancastelli, & Ruffo 1985): unfortunately the lack of rigour in these
experiments became evident in short time and was recognized and constantly
remarked by Tuve himself. On the other hand it is well known that Lawrence,
working at the cyclotron and disposing of it, really missed some of the main
discoveries, namely artificial disintegration of the nucleus and artificial
radioactivity.
The opposite attitude of Tuve‘s group is striking: a great accuracy in
designing, the machines and the experimental techniques, in testing the
apparatuses, before really entering nuclear physics research.
The first experimental results published by the DIM group (Tuve, Hafstad,
& Dahl 1933) were in fact in clear disagreement with Lawrence‘s previous
results, but Lawrence replied insisting on his own results, even if «there is
always, of course the possibility that these alpha particles are due to
impurities»1 (and Tuve added a note to the letter: ―Impurities?!‖).
In the same letter Lawrence reported the first results on the scattering by
accelerated deutons, obtained in collaboration with the chemist Lewis. It is
interesting to remark that, in spite of the growing divergences, the LawrenceTuve friendship was so deep that the first provided the latter with the heavy
water necessary to perform the experiments with accelerated deuton beams.2
On the other hand these experiments became the major point of
disagreement. In fact, Lawrence, proposed at that time the famous ―deuton
disintegration hypothesis‖ (Lawrence, Livingston, & Lewis 1933), that he
reported at Solvay Conference raising the criticism of the European physicists
(Heilbron et al. 1981; Baracca et al. 1985).
Tuve was already very sceptic on this hypothesis; he had warned Lawrence:
«I am not able to follow your suggestion».3 Lawrence had already replied that, if
the initial evidence was effectively scarce, «I think we have now pretty
conclusive evidence on that point».4
1
E. O. Lawrence to M. A. Tuve, May 3, 1933. Tuve Papers, Manuscript Library, Library of Congress (Box 12, Special Letters 1933).
2
A. Fleming to G. N. Lewis, May 9, 1933, Tuve Papers, loc. cit.
3
M. A. Tuve to E.O. Lawrence, October 2, 1933, Tuve Papers, loc. cit.
4
E. O. Lawrence to M. A. Tuve, October 9, 1933, Lawrence Collection, Bancroft Library,
Berkeley.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
15
After the Solvay Conference, Lawrence had to perform more accurate tests
in order to exclude that his results derived from systematic contaminations
(Lewis, Livingston, Henderson, & Lawrence 1934), as he wrote to Tuve on
December 21, 1933.5
Tuve, significantly conscious of the relevance and the delicacy of the
problem, had answered Lawrence‘s letter on January 6, 1934, specifying that
he had no new result since the whole period was spent in a very rigorous test of
the experimental techniques.6
But when careful experiments were performed by Tuve in the following
weeks, the disagreement exploded. The «preliminary runs» already showed «a
great deal of difficulty in correlating our observations with those you have
published»7 — with the whole set of observation, not only the deuton results! —
and suggested: «that you check over your apparatus very carefully, since at
present [...] there appear to be the basis for suspicion that at least part of your
observations are due to some factor common to all your target, which may be
contamination, slit edges, tar et mountings or some other factor».8
At that point Lawrence‘s reply9 was lengthy but appeared very
embarrassed, and outlined the first autocritical considerations, since in the
meantime his deuton results had been contradicted also by the Pasadena group
(Lauritsen and Crane 1934) and at the Cavendish Laboratory (Cockcroft &
Walton 1934; Oliphant, Harteek, & Lord Rutherford 1934):
You are quite right in surmising that in our preliminary measurements there
have been some errors [...] Rather than continuing experiments we have
decided to embark on a program of careful observations of things already
brought to light and it is our intention to get as accurate measurement as we
can.10
Lawrence finally admitted his mistake in the deuton disintegration
hypothesis (Lewis et al. 1934). But Tuve criticism, as we have remarked, was
5
E. O. Lawrence to M. A. Tuve, December 21, 1933, Lawrence Collection cit.; see also letter of
January 12, 1934, ivi.
6
M. A. Tuve to E. O. Lawrence, January 6, 1934, Lawrence Collection Bancroft Library, Berkeley.
7
M. A. Tuve to E. O. Lawrence, February 28, 1934, Lawrence Collection, Bancroft Library,
Berkeley.
8
Ivi.
9
E. O. Lawrence to M. A. Tuve, March 14, 1934, Lawrence Collection, Bancroft Library, Berkeley.
10
E. O. Lawrence to M. A. Tuve, March 14, 1934, cit.
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Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
much deeper and concerned not a single result, but the whole set up and
method of the experiments performed in Berkeley and the hurry and lack of
caution with which they had been published. It is interesting to remark that on
the contrary Tuve, up to the moment, had avoided making public the
controversy, although he was already sure of his own results. At that moment,
he sent on April 14, 1934 a letter to The Physical Review (Tuve & Hafstad
1934) contradicting practically all the results published from Berkeley and he
sent a copy to Lawrence with some bitter notes:
I wrote you at the end of February warning of the direction which our results
were undoubtedly taking. After working up all of our results, we reached the
astounding conclusion that we were unable to check a single one of the
observations which you have reported so far [...] I must say that we were
certainly not enjoyed the position in which we have been placed. Once in a
lifetime is once too often.11
In Tuve‘s action one may recognize a mixture of real embarrassment and
professional ethics, of a kind that probably has progressively disappeared in
subsequent years. In this sense, on one side, evidently pressed by a growing
debate on the issue, he personally pointed to Lauritsen that
The question for many people as to whether we check Lawrence‘s work or not
have became so insistent that there is no way of avoiding the issue and we
decided that a bald statement was far preferable to any evasion of the question
on our part. We have been very circumspect in what we have said even to close
friends visiting the laboratory until the abstracts had to be written. 12
On the other side, however, a harsh press release was emitted by the
Carnegie Institution of Washington after the Meeting of the A.P.S. of April 26,
with the ironic title ―Atom-Smashers Reveal Atomic Masquerade‖, containing
such statements as the following:
Speaking before the American Physical Society meeting here today (April 26),
Drs. Tuve and Hafstad of the DTM, Carnegie Institution of Washington,
dramatically announced that they had succeeded in unmasking the outlaw atoms
which have played havoc with the results of atom-splitting investigations
currently iD progress in various laboratories. The renegade atoms which gave
ley.
11
M. A. Tuve to E. O. Lawrence, April 18, 1934, Lawrence Collection, Bancroft Library, Berke-
12
M. A. Tuve to C. C. Lauritsen, April 18, 1934, Tuve Papers, loc. cit. Box 16, Letters – Special
1934-5-6.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
17
rise to pseudo-transmutations of carbon, oxygen, and other targets when
bombarded by high-speed atoms of heavy hydrogen, are the atoms of heavy
hydrogen itself, sticking in the pores of the solid target after being driven there
by the high-speed beam.13
On August 4, 1934 Tuve himself sent Science – through Fleming – an
official rectification14 since the Journal had reported in «erroneous and
misleading» terms the results obtained at the DTM, had not explicitly referred
of the «contamination effects» and had expressed the opinion that the
experimental results from various laboratories were not in contradiction.
The whole story inspired Tuve with a sense of deep regret that he expressed
to Lauritsen bitterly remarking that such an accident «must occur rarely, if at
all» and, since Lauritsen replied that «that sort of things should never appear in
print», he firmly added that rather «the sort of things that should never appear
in print were what led to the necessity for such a statement by me».15
This course of events reveals not only the early emergence of different
styles in performing research activity.
In the following years Lawrence concentrated on cyclotron building and
insisted mainly on its use in medicine, while Tuve obtained from his rigorous
and careful practice some of the most significant results in nuclear physics
(Baracca et al. 1985), namely, in 1935, the first widths of nuclear resonances
and, with his beautiful experiments on proton-proton scattering, the charge
independence of nuclear forces.
I could note that the cyclotron was perhaps mainly the father of the post-war
new generation of accelerators, while Tuve‘s ―Atomic Observatory‖, built up at
the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, perfected electrostatic machines,
but preserved the familiar atmosphere still existing today in this institution.
Lawrence‘s choices appear instead dictated more by the goal of rising funds
for big enterprises, by a need of guiding or following the stream of advanced
research, than by true scientific motivations. For instance, in 1935 he wrote
Bohr:
In addition to the nuclear investigations, we are carrying on investigations on
the biological effects of the neutrons and various radioactive substances and are
13
Carnegie Institution of Washington archives, folder ―DTM-Miscellaneous 1934-35‖.
A. Fleming to J. Mckeen Cattel, August 4, 1934, Nuclear Physics Symposium: A Correction,
CIW archives, loc. cit.
15
M. A. Tuve to C. C. Lauritsen, September 26, 1934, Tuve Papers, loc. cit. Box 16, LettersSpecial 1934-5-6.
14
18
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
finding interesting things in this direction. I must confess that one reason we
have undertaken this biological work is that we thereby have been able to get
financial support for all of the work in the laboratory. As you well know, it is so
much easier to get funds for medical research.16
A different spirit was really born, anticipating the mechanism of Big
Science.
3
A stronger confirmation of the new features that are appearing may be
obtained following more thoroughly Tuve‘s uncommon choices during and
after the war.
Note that Tuve had made important contributions in more than one field
and that there were in principle many possible fields in which he could have
given relevant contributions to war research. When he and G. Breit had tried as
early as 1925 to determine the ionosphere height observing the echoes of
short radio pulses, «they were troubled by echoes coming from airplanes,
which interfered with the measurements»;17 «this was the first recorded
instance of distance measurements made by the pulse-radar method».18
Tuve made moreover leading contributions to the study of nuclear fission.
With Roberts, Mayer and Hafstad he showed the first fission process at the
DTM accelerator,19 discovered the emission of the ―delayed neutron‖20 and
subsequently they contributed to show the possibility of a chain reaction:21
We have been hard pressed to get some data on uranium fission, largely because
Fermi, Rabi, Szilard, etc. have been afraid of chain reaction possibilities.
Regular ―war secr‖ with secret meetings etc.! Pres. Bush is anxious to see it
settled. All indications now are that no chain can occur but it is pretty close.22
A confidential memorandum of June 1, 1939 to the Director of the DTM by
16
E. O. Lawrence to N. Bohr, November 27, 1935, Lawrence Collection, Cartoon 3, Folder 3,
Bancroft Library, Berkeley.
17
Report of the President, 1952, Carnegie Institution of Washington.
18
Biography of M. A. Tuve (anonymous), p. 4, CIW archives, Folder Tuve 1.
19
M. A. Tuve, Report to the Director of DIM for January 1939, 7.2.1939 , Library of Congress,
Manuscript Library, Tuve Papers, Box 15, ―Monthly reports‖; Roberts, Meyer, & Hafstad (1939);
Stuewer (1985).
20
M. A. Tuve, Report for February 1939, 9.3.1939, loc. cit.; Roberts et al. (1939).
21
CIW, Year Book 1939 (July 1939 - June 1940), 87.
22
M. A. Tuve to G. Breit, 2.8.1939, DTM Office Archive, File ―Archive Uranium‖.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
19
Gunn, Technical Adviser of the Naval Research Laboratory at Anacosta,
explicitly mentions in this respects Tuve‘s availability «to carry on the final
tests at his laboratory»;23 on May 23, 1940 the Carnegie Institution of
Washington appropriated $ 20.000 «for study on uranium fission».24
Tuve was a member of the Uranium Committee called by Roosevelt after
Einstein‘s letter, but his attitude changed at the beginning of 1940. «It all
started in February 1940 [...] At that time, Roberts, Hafstad, Heudemburg and
I simply decided that we would do no more physics research if the likes of
Hitler were to inherit our efforts. We undertook to find a way that we could
contribute to the technology of modern war». 25 While «by May 1940, in talks
with officers in the R and D division of BUORD, U.S. Navy, I had learned
about the ridiculously low effectiveness of antiaircraft fire. I heard the term
―influence fuze‖ (later ―proximity fuze‖), as wistful hope».26
The history of the ―proximity fuze‖ has in part been written (Baldwin
1980). We are here interested in one specific aspect. In organizing and
directing first the ―Section-T‖ and then the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL),
Tuve followed an attitude opposite to that then prevailing and growing in the
other projects, of early Big Science. He started with the ―four indians‖ and
followed the concept of a «local and flexible group to test the feasibility of
various ideas submitted to him».27 In Tuve‘s words:
One of the greatest ―new developments‖ of the war [...] was the rediscovery [...]
of the efficiency of the democratic principle of directing the effort of organized
group of people [...] A boss using the democratic principle does not depend on
just giving order from above [...] Asking people to help with the whole job was
what I used in running the proximity fuze development [...] The democratic
system is more effective, dollar for dollar ad hour for hour, than the autocratic
system [...] The key to the effectiveness of the democratic system is simply that
criticism flows both ways; criticism and ideas come up from workers as well as
down the bosses.28
But, in spite of Tuve‘s subjective wishes and intentions, the Applied Physics
23
R. Gunn, Memorandum for the Director, 1.6.1939, DTM Archive.
Minutes of the Executive Committee, Meeting of May 23, 1940, CIW Archives.
25
Tuve (1982). APL News (Feb.), 8 [questo riferimento manca in bibliografia!].
26
lbidem.
27
F. R. Roberts, ―Development of the Proximity Fuze‖, manuscript required quickly by Abelson
on Oct. 20, 1977, CIW Archives, Folder DTM Misc., p. 65.
28
Ivi., p. 5.
24
20
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
Laboratory evolved into a model of advanced large-scale research. This
happened not only under the pressure of emergence in the war-period, but
mainly because the force of things — in this case of the Big Science mechanism
— was stronger than subjective intentions.
Tuve‘s post-war choices were an attempt to react concretely against Big
Science and to follow a different path. In a research program he proposed in
the spring of 194629 a preliminary choice was discussed in the initial
General comments […] It is pertinent to question whether the Institution should
have any postwar program at all in nuclear physics, with large-scale government
support assured in many countries and with this field of scientific effort sure to
be tied up with political power-struggIes, certainly for many years to come. The
conclusion was reached, however, that work in this field should be continued at
the Department.30
The end of war-time emergency thus no longer justified ―large-scale
government support‖. As a matter of fact, Tuve - coherently with his positions had come back to the DTM (his pupil Hafstad had succeeded him as Director
of the Applied Physics Laboratory and fully entered the Big Science
mechanism). When Jewett submitted to Lawrence himself and other members
of the Committee on Terrestrial Sciences of the Carnegie Institution on March
18, 1946 Bush‘s suggestion that Tuve be appointed to the Directorship of the
DTM, he underlined Tuve‘s qualities, but raised doubts because «he has at
times in the past shown a tendency to rub men the wrong way» (even adding
that he «has matured very considerably in the last few years») and concluded
that «both Bush and I are agreed that Tuve will be either a great success or a
very great failure as Director».31
Tuve, on his part, presented the already mentioned suggestions,32 and a
29
―Suggestions for Postwar Laboratory program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism‖
prepared by M. A. Tuve; March 19, 1946; revised May 9, 1946, Lawrence Collection, cartoon 32,
Folder 32. Bancroft Library, Berkeley.
30
Ibidem.
31
Frank B. Jewett to Dr. Homer L. Ferguson, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Dr. Alfred L. Loomis, Dr.
Frederic W. Walcott, March 18, 1946, Lawrence Collection, cartoon 3, Folder 32, Bancroft Library,
Berkeley.
32
―Suggestions for Postwar Laboratory program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism‖,
cit.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
21
subsequent more official statement33 concerning the future research program
of the DTM. In the official report the premise on «General objectives», an
emphasis specifies the connection between the choice of continuing the
research activity in a Department of limited possibilities and the kind of
research that can be performed:
Bearing in mind the special character of the opportunity presented by the
Carnegie Institution of Washington, with its unusually great freedom of
objectives, since there are no external groups whose interests limit the
program, and viewing the corresponding obligations which go along with this
freedom, it is agreed that we must make every possible effort to emphasize
creative work, work with new potentialities, and work which lies on the front
lines of knowledge. There are serious restrictions as to possible size of staff and
annual expenditures, and accordingly our program must be chosen with regard
to its effectiveness as a stimulus or catalyst to the work of all other groups
concerned with a given field. These considerations lead naturally to a major
emphasis on cooperative endeavours, in which the Institution and the
Department can be of great influence and value if we are capable of vigorous
leadership in fresh and significant directions.34
In this connection, Tuve proposed that work in nuclear physics should be
continued anyway by a «recognized and well qualified group quietly working
on private funds at an agency of high standing and very wide connections, such
as the Carnegie Institution».35 More precisely
True research — creative research — is always done in very small groups, rarely
exceeding five or seven individuals, and hence this separation of the
Department‘s staff into very small discreet groups, with reasonable fluidity for
shifts between groups, is regarded as both realistic and healthy; [...] creative
research is never carried on by groups larger than seven members - usually four
is a better size. Larger groups invariably concern themselves with engineering
or development, not with the painful carving out of really new ideas or
directions of progress. Several groups of three to seven members, each with one
or two strong men (age difference is valuable), can be loosely associated but
creative research is not carried out by large teams who are coordinated (that is,
33
―Statement Concerning the Scientific Program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism for
the Immediate Future‖, by M. A. Tuve, June 22, 1946, Lawrence Collection, Cartoon 3, Folder 32,
Bancroft Library, Berkeley.
34
Ibidem.
35
―Suggestions for Postwar Laboratory program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism‖,
cit.
22
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
ordered) or closely directed by a single head man. A leader can stimulate several
groups to productive activity, but real creative research is not carried out toward
goals which are defined in advance too specifically or in too limited a way. At
best, its limitations can only amount to a positive encouragement or emphasis in
a selected broad area of interest, and valuable offshoots are sure to occur in
other related but rather unexpected directions. A single over-all leader,
stimulating and guiding toward general goals, is, however, most valuable and
even necessary, to insure cooperation and integration in place of fragmentation
into separate compartments and unrelated interests.36
[…] It is our conviction that investigators can be stimulated and led to
creative contributions, but they cannot be driven; hence we must evolve leaders
in our small groups, but we cannot use authoritarian procedures. Individual
professional responsibility, however, also means that individuals should be
judged by their creative research contributions; steady or devoted work is almost
irrelevant as a criterion of accomplishment or virtue. Since individuals differ in
their capacity to contribute creatively, however, they will be expected to
recognize this and to invest their energies willingly in directions which are
pointed out by other members of the group working in their field of interest,
after group consideration indicates that these suggested directions for effort
give promise of creative fruitfulness.
One picture should always be kept in mind by the professional research
staff: it must surely be evident to everyone that the Founder of the Institution
had no thought whatever that his great free endowment should be used to keep
150 people simply busy six hours per day! In fact, he must have intended just
the opposite; his endowment was intended to free a certain creative group of
men from the necessity of having to be busy, and their success in measuring up
to their opportunity can only be measured in term of their creative output. 37
What kind of research did Tuve suggest in this context?
The chief aim of the suggested program as for any research program,
appropriate to the Institution, may be stated as an effort to underwrite and
support the vigorous personal activities of modest number of competent
research men, associated in a congenial and cooperative group with a variety of
different and related interests, who are pushing forward the front-line
boundaries of knowledge. To be appropriate, their objectives should be to
establish basic principles, or the materials on which such generalizations may be
36
Ibidem.
―Statement Concerning the Scientific Program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism for
the Immediate Future‖, cit.
37
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
23
expected to be formulated, the work should be directed toward major unknowns
or big unanswered questions, and it should lie in areas of learning in which such
new knowledge, if attained, would have importance, in the sense that it could be
expected to have considerable significance to many human beings, other than
the specialists directly concerned. The specialized laboratory work in nuclear
physics at the Department before the war — resulting, for example, in the
demonstration and measurement of the proton-proton and proton-neutron
interactions — and the biophysical work with radioactive tracers during the war
— concerned with fundamental physical processes in physiology — has met these
criteria. Much more work of this fundamental kind remains invitingly open to
immediate postwar attack. This is one appropriate goal for the laboratory
program.38
But the research work «in government and private research institutes,
contrasted with those of similar groups in various universities, also public and
private» poses, in Tuve‘s opinion, a fundamental problem.
The impact of young minds has long been recognized as a major factor in
keeping university staff members productive and creative in fresh directions [...]
In the course of ten years a (lively) professor will give half a dozen different
courses, each of which requires him to work over a different area of his broad
professional field. He will also be obliged many times to take charge of research
students who select problems which lie more or less outside of his own special
field of current interest and work; this, too, requires him to study, think,
discuss, and even create new ideas in various different areas of his broad
professional field. [...] Contrast this with staff members of specialized research
institutes; in the same ten years, working all of his time in a narrow field, the
specialist dries up many of the channels by which he should receive nutrition
from his own broad professional field. [It follows that] the prewar program
should go forward, but it should be modified to become something other than
just a specialist group-activity in nuclear physics or biophysics. The dangers of
over-specialisation in these fields may be a great as in many others. [Instead] a
research specialist should actually work at least a fifth of his time outside of his
speciality and in some other area of his broad professional field. [More
precisely] it seems reasonable that an investigator might be required to ―work‖
one-fifth of his time on problems which lie outside of his speciality, and that an
actual output in this other area should be expected (that is, some arrangement is
needed which requires him to face critical judgments of others) and furthermore
that, although he may be a lifelong specialist in some one field, this second or
38
cit.
―Suggestions for Postwar Laboratory program of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism‖,
24
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
minor area of his work should not remain the same subject for a number of years
(this would just make him a bifurcated specialist).39
In the same context, «as before the war, the laboratory program in nuclear
physics should again be concerned with ―philosophical‖ problems relating to
the primary particles of matter and the laws governing their interactions with
each other and with radiation [...] (The Manhattan Project work was not
directed toward these problems of nuclear physics; they were really concerned
with nuclear ―chemistry‖)».40
In the following years Tuve‘s positions explicitly clashed with many choices
of scientific community. Allan Needell of the Smithsonian Institution has
thoroughly reconstructed Tuve‘s struggle against Lloyd Berkner concerning
the establishment and operation of a national radio astronomy facility in Green
Bank (Needel 1987). Tube in fact had left nuclear physics since «it changed
from a sport into a business». In the struggle with Berkner he expressed the
conviction that the new, expensive tools of research were «subsidiary and
peripheral» when compared with the support of individual researchers. He
insisted that those tools, in his words «did not serve appreciably to produce or
develop creative thinkers and productive investigators. [...] At best they serve
them, often in a brief and incidental way, and at worse they devour them».
He repeatedly expressed himself against Big Science. In 1959 he published
on the Saturday Review a long paper with the title: «Is Science too Big for the
Scientist?» (Tuve 1959). He repeated this concept in a meeting in which
President Eisenhower announced the appropriation of $ 100 million for the
future Stanford linear accelerator: Tuve made such a bald statement that his
colleagues publicly reprimanded him that «this was neither the time nor the
place» for it (Lear 1959).
Since I started my analysis with a comparison between Tuve and Lawrence
in their early research activities, I may just recall here the very different road
followed by the latter, which remained most representative of the choices made
by the scientific community and of the radication of Big Science. Lawrence
collaborated with the National Defense Research Committee on microwave
research and submarine detection, took part in the Manhattan Project, actively
gave advice on the construction and the use of the bomb. After the war the
Radiation Laboratory was financed with funds from the Manhattan District. In
39
40
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
25
1952, on request of the AEC, Lawrence founded a new laboratory at
Livermore for military research, a prototype of large-scale specialized
structure.
4
I have dwelt on Tuve‘s personality in order to single out, in contrast, the
changes in American nuclear physics in the thirties that anticipated and led to
Big Science.
But, instead of looking at specific personalities, one may study and
compare the developments of nuclear physics in the same period in different
national contexts. Such comparison shows the peculiarity of the conditions that
led the U.S. to play an original role of absolute leadership in introducing and
guiding the transformation of science and research.
It is not the task of this paper to perform a thorough analysis, but I would
like to try to give some ideas.
The French, British and Italian physicists brought major contributions to
nuclear physics in the thirties. Trends towards large scale research may
undoubtedly be individuated also in these countries, but a careful analysis,
which does not stop at superficial events, shows that these remained isolated
examples and did not turn into a general and deep transformation of science
involving its methods, structure, role and connection with technological
change and with society in general.
In 1937 Hafstad, Tuve‘s most strict collaborator, visited Joliot‘s laboratory
in Paris, where work was being done on a program of cyclotrons, high voltage
and electrostatic accelerators. Hafstad noted that «no apparatus was in
condition for the making of observations […], in the U.S. this state of
development was passed about three years ago [and] it was evident that Paris
was far behind the United States».41 A final judgement included also the Italian
group in Rome:
Nearly all European laboratories are at present engaged in a building program.
This perhaps accounts for a rather surprising exchange of positions between
American and European laboratories. A few years ago it was being said that,
whereas much work on apparatus was being done in the U.S., practically all
scientific results had been obtained in Europe using radium technique. The
41
L. R. Hafstad, ―Report on Laboratory Visits in Europe during the Summer of 1937‖, December 10, 1937, CIW Archives, Folder DTM-Miscellaneous 1930-37.
26
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
situation is reversed as scientific results are being obtained from the perfected
apparatus in the U.S., whereas the possibilities of the old radium technique in
Europe are now practically exhausted. It is of the utmost significance that, for
perhaps the first time, Europe is definitely behind the U.S. in experimental
physics and that they now find it necessary to send men to this country to
acquire techniques which can be carried back to Europe.42
It seems evident that large-scale apparatuses and new techniques in
American nuclear physics were not in themselves a step towards Big Science;
they were only the exterior events, induced by much deeper processes. The
better confirmation is perhaps given by a comparison with the British situation,
where accelerating machines had been built and used for the first time.
In 1930 British nuclear science had already a sound tradition. It however
identified itself with Rutherford‘s personality, which had a very strong
ascendancy on his pupils. The prevailing spirit was extremely different from
that of the Americans. It was marked by the ethics of pure science as a
disinterested academic activity. There was no interest in the possible
technological value of the investigations (Cockcroft was in some sense an
exception and a special figure: he was an electrical engineer; in 1935 he
abandoned active research for some years and, after Rutherford‘s retirement,
started the building of new machines). The figure of the British scientist
seemed more eighteenth century-fashioned than similar to the American one.
He had faith in the cognitive value of the experimental result in itself. The
experimental groups hardly ever exceeded the number of a couple of scientists
and had substantially distinct fields of interest, avoiding consequently
competition. Direct interaction between experimenters and theoreticians was
rare.
After 1935 there was a sensible decline in British nuclear physics, deeply
contrasting with the growth of Americans physics. Chadwick had found in
Rutherford opposition in following an advanced research program. It was not
chance that, after Rutherford‘s retirement and death in 1937, only Chadwick
and Cockcroft undertook a program of building new machines and they were
among the British scientists most directly involved in war-time collaboration on
the main projects with the Americans (Cockcroft on radar and Chadwick as the
leader of the British team in the Manhattan Project).
42
Ibidem.
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
27
5
There is however another national situation whose careful analysis would be
extremely interesting and meaningful. I refer to nuclear physics in Japan. There
is, in fact, a very interesting, peculiar feature of this situation: the Japanese
nuclear physicists did build up ad use with a very short delay the new machines
and instruments introduced by the Americans and the other western scientists
but followed an original line of thought, linked to the Japanese philosophical
tradition, that led to physical ideas different from and incompatible with the
framework emerging from nuclear investigations of the western physicists.
In spite of the choice of machines and instruments and of their use in the
laboratories, no large-scale style of research at all was induced in pre-war
Japan, and the previous philosophical tradition had a much stronger influence
on the programs and the results than the above mentioned material choices and
the experimental results and programs.
A thorough analysis of this case-study would then throw light on the
complex of factors that created the conditions for the birth of large-scale
research and the premises of Big Science.
I will not actually develop in detail this suggestion and I refer to important
contributions by Takabayashi (1983), Takeda & Yamagouchi (1982), Brown,
Konuma & Maki (1980), Hayakawa (1981). I will limit myself to adding some
brief comments.
Japanese physicists acquired the new quantum concepts between the end of
the twenties and the beginning of the thirties. Some of them came back after
stays in Western countries: Nishina in particular visited Bohr and Rutherford
and played a very important role in orienting the activities in nuclear physics
and cosmic-ray physics. These activities grew rapidly: the first cloud chamber
was built in 1933 and coincidence methods and automatic operation were
realized soon after Blackett and Occhialini and quite independently from them;
in 1934 three Cockcroft-Walton accelerators started working (one of 200
KeV, and successively another of 600 KeV at Riken in Tokio; another of 600
KeV at Osaka); after 1935 Watase and Itoh started building a cyclotron. But
the experimental activity, although intense, did not play a leading role, since
the Japanese physicists were not so much interested in applied or technical
aspects, as rather in elaborating a unifying scientific conception, having its
roots in the Japanese philosophical tradition. Thus it was that they strictly
linked together the problems of the nucleus and of cosmic rays and
28
Humana.Mente — Issue 16 — May 2011
fundamental particles, which on the contrary were kept separated for a long
period in Western physics.
They managed to build for this whole field a comprehensive, unifying
conception very different from the set of theories and models that were
elaborated by Western scientists.
In short, let‘s refer to Yukawa‘s meson theory. The meson was not only the
agent of nuclear forces — as it was accepted in Western physics — but was a
central element of a much more general and complex conception, that never
was fully perceived in Western countries.
Apart from the easiness with which Japanese physicists introduced new
particles (as contrasted to the early hesitations of Western physicists, for
instance of Pauli for the neutrino hypothesis), Yukawa‘s meson was supposed
to decay into an electron and to be consequently responsible for β-decay as for
nuclear forces: contrary to Fermi‘s theory of β-decay, deriving from an
interaction different from the nuclear interaction — the weak interaction — the
conception proposed by the Japanese scientists had a unifying character. (We
may recall that previously, in 1933, under the influence of Heisenberg‘s model
of nuclear structure, and before Fermi‘s paper, Yukawa had proposed to
attribute β-decay to a transmutation of the proton: at that time he considered
the electron as a field mediating the nuclear force. In that occasion Nishina had
suggested that the exchange of a boson between two nucleons would have
preserved spin and statistic).
Starting from the previous comments, it could be very interesting to follow
the further developments of the views of the Japanese scientists in the following
years, in a condition of substantial isolation and independence from the
evolution of the lines of thought of Western particle physics. It will suffice here
to mention, apart from important contributions by Tomonaga and Yukawa
himself, the evolution of meson theory with contributions of Taketani and
Sakata. Their motivations were again not primarily experimental, but mainly
ideological. The two scientists were working in the framework of Marxist
philosophy.
A further development, stemming from the problems posed by the mean life
of the meson, was the ―two-meson theory‖. Only later this theory proved to be
wrong when compared with the experimental data that were accumulating.
In 1952, finally, Sakata proposed a theory with tree fermions as the
fundamental constituents of matter (the ―sakatons‖) linked together by an
unknown ―B-matter‖. Sakata‘s theory anticipated in some sense the unitary
Too Big or so Little? Nuclear Physics in the Thirties and Forties in USA and Japan
29
approach, but was in fact quite independent from it and had moreover
completely different origin and motivations. One may also perceive an analogy
with actual gauge theories in terms of quarks and gluons, and probably such an
analysis has become sounder, having a unifying proposal at its basis.
I hope to have given, from the perspective I have chosen, a modest
contribution toward the individuation of the specific factors that created the
conditions for the birth of large-scale research and of the features that really
characterize a turning point in the development of science and research
activity.
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