SECURITY
AARMS
Vol. 7, No. 1 (2008) 97–115
U.S. foreign policy from Bush to Bush:
Enduring parameters and policy options
Part 2: Bush41–Clinton
ANDREA K. RIEMER
Institute for Strategy and Security Policy, National Defense Academy, Vienna, Austria
1989/90 marked a turning point in the development of the international order. The
decay of the Soviet Union marks a step towards another new world order. The
particularity of this turning point is its real global extension. George H.W. Bush’s New
World Order turned out as a ‘transformation concept’, a concept which was neither
leaning towards Cold War rationale nor towards the post-Cold War. In fact, Bush could
not materialize the concept, since he was caught up with the second Gulf War and the
fact not to be reelected.
Bill Clinton’s approach mirrors the atmosphere of the 1990s. Threats became
challenges, the actors’ spectrum changed, ‘end of history‘-ideas and the assumption
that capitalism is the victorious ideology dominated thinking. Clinton’s approach was a
pragmatic concept, which assumed U.S. primacy and combined it with cooperative
security and selective engagement (engagement and enlargement).
George H. W. Bush:
New world order – lost promises
“Much has been written since the autumn of 1989 about the need to create a new
international order. That the United States must exercise leadership in such a process
appears to be widely accepted in this country and abroad, especially following the Gulf
War. That the United States is the only nation capable of projecting massive military
power in support of a new order is similarly well understood. Less clear is whether
America can satisfy the domestic conditions required to exercise the necessary
international political and economic leadership.”1
The general framework
1989/90 marked a turning point in the development of the international order. From a
long-term point of view, it was not something particular. Similar turning points have
been e.g. the Westphalian Peace Accord (1648), the Utrecht Peace Accord (1713), the
Received: December 12, 2007
Address for correspondence:
ANDREA K. RIEMER
E-mail: [email protected]
A. K. RIEMER: U.S. foreign policy from Bush to Bush, Part 2
French Revolution (1989), the Congress of Vienna (1814/1815), the Accords after
World War I and World War II. Those Accords describe the development of the modern
nation state, the emergence of democracy and the emergence of new patterns of conduct
between states. A new world order was born, although key emphasis was still laid on
Europe (with all its distortions and misunderstandings such as equalizing the ‘West’
with ‘the one and only democratic world’).
The decay of the Soviet Union certainly marks a step towards another new world
order. It displayed a real global extension of certain attitudes, values and perceptions.
The events of 1989 were a windfall profit for American foreign policy. Within six
months the key communist regimes collapsed. Their new leaders committed themselves
step by step to the former Western principles of democracy and market economy. The
Soviet troops’ pull-out from Europe began and led Europe into a new scope and a new
era which transcended in terms of consequences Europe by far.
President Bush’s presidency needs to be divided into two phases:
1. The immediate phase of revolution in the international order, which covered half
a year.
2. The phase of post-revolution in the international order, where the order grappled
to gain new ground and stability.
The immediate phase of revolution in the international order
During the immediate phase of revolution in the international order Bush was rather
silent and passive. The U.S. kept itself in the background not to fuel the situation in an
unnecessary and certainly dangerous manner. At the beginning, no particular rhetoric
was performed. No plan was offered. Passiveness was the perfect approach, since it
supported the situation to move on an appropriate path. As Michael Mandelbaum stated:
“The qualities most characteristic of the Bush presidency – caution, modest public
pronouncements and a fondness for private communications – were admirably suited to
the moment.”2
Finally, Bush struck a middle course between confrontation and cooperation. When
the revolution ended and the order entered into the post-revolution period, the U.S. was
in a new era of foreign policy requirements. Military confrontation had more or less
faded away. Economy started to dominate the stage. National interests needed to be redefined. Much of the required work was not started during Bush’s presidency but during
Clinton’s first term. In fact, Bush41 performed a perfect muddling-through approach,
which certainly was not the worst choice, since any abrupt change could have caused a
collapse of the overall order.
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The key issue in the network of newly emerging events, issues and actors was
certainly the German unification. The unification was not planned but was the result of
spontaneous actions. The U.S. administration did not hamper German unity. The ‘two
plus four’ negotiations provided the appropriate framework.3 Negotiations depended
strongly on the chemistry between the key players Helmut Kohl, Michael Gorbachev
and George H. W. Bush, Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher. The final work
was done in a bilateral meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in Stavropol. German
unity certainly not only closed a political gap, but wiped out a psychological divide in
the center of Europe. Germany as core of the ‘European heartland’ reemerged, thereby
not only causing joy and applause. Historical burdens still weighed heavy and it took at
least another decade to overcome this burden.
The Soviet-German rapprochement was another key, if not the key, to a stable
situation in Europe in its new structure. Accommodation and reconciliation between the
two largest powers in Europe laid the basis for a peaceful and soft landing. The U.S.
provided the framework, including a continuing American presence. The Bush41Administration was instrumental in designing this framework.
The Gulf War (1991)4
Assessing the Gulf War from the U.S. foreign policy point of view it was a half-baked
war, which was not finished (with well-known consequences). Opportunities to stabilize
the region and to insert strategy were missed. The spirit of the international coalition on
the battlefield was not transformed to diplomatic front.
The Gulf War was the result of a unique blend of circumstances. The following
parameters led to the war and its results:5
1. U.S. leadership (Bush41 was decisive and he could be because he could draw on
still available military capabilities);
2. U.S.-Soviet cooperation (for the first time since the 1956 Suez Crisis the two
superpowers did not support different clients in a Middle East conflict);
3. U.S. military capability (Bush41 was in the fortunate situation of having military
forces available - something, Bush43 did not have);
4. the role of the United Nations (U.N. reclaimed its role in international relations
and acted rather quickly and efficiently);
5. the willingness to burden sharing (across waning ideological lines); and
6. the division of the Arab League and the nonaligned movement and their lack of
resources.
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The Gulf War virtually interrupted the global change, which was already under way.
The war was a pre-cursor for the events to come in the late 1990s. At the same time it
indicated that some features of the Cold War survived – despite the waning rivalry
between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union. The newly charted harmony between
Washington and Moscow made a coalition possible, which had the breath and the depth
to counter Saddam Hussein. In parallel, cooperation opened up new space for the
United Nations. It put an end to the long-lasting paralysis of the Security Council.
Finally, the new cooperation made large-scale military operations in the Middle East
possible, without slipping in the trap of a larger conflict which could have driven the
international order into a Third World War. The U.S. military could profit enormously
from these facts.
From the U.S. point of view, the Gulf War was an unconnected war in the region.
For reason, military and political decision-makers were not that much dependent in their
spectrum of action.
Bush’s lost promises
“For the first time in over half a century, no single great power, or coalition of powers,
poses a «clear and present danger» to the national security of the United States. The end
of the Cold War has left Americans in the fortunate position of being without an
obvious major adversary.”6
The U.S. was in a rather unique position with unique opportunities. The thenpresident was a Cold War person by nature, and at the same time, peering already into a
period of global transformation. He was the ‘president on the edge’ – a little bit a Cold
Warrior – a little bit of something still unknown.7 His conceptual mindset was born out
of the turmoil and the necessity to find new ways of working together, to find peaceful
settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression etc.
“A new partnership of nations has begun ... A new world order ... stronger in the
pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest of peace ...A hundred generations have
searched for this elusive path of peace ... where the rule of law supplants the rule of the
jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and
justice... and where the strong respect for the rights of the weak.... America will support
the rule of the law ... stand up to aggression.”8
Particularly after the First Gulf War (1991) the term ‘New World Order’ became a
catch phrase.9 Bush’s new world order was based on Wilson’s 14 Points and
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms. The key issue was to find a legitimization for a new look
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of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. saw a realistic opportunity to position itself as the only
super-power.
“By the grace of God, America won the Cold War. ... There are those who say that
now we can turn away from the world, that we have no special role, no special place.
But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has become the
leader of the World….”10
The New World Order after 1989/90 covered the following four pillars:11
1. Peaceful conflict resolution
2. International solidarity instead of aggression
3. Reduction of the nuclear sites, weapons and other kinds of WMD
4. Justice for all.
Later, some provisions were added (due to the Gulf War 1991), such as: changes of
the international system require respecting the fundaments of the international law;
respect of human rights etc.12
Bush wanted the UN to assume a larger role in reshaping and stabilizing the
international order consistent with American values and U.S. interests. His concept of a
‘new world order’ governed by the rule of law required effective UN peacekeeping
capabilities.
In January 1992, he asked the new UN Secretary-General to examine ways to
strengthen UN peacekeeping, pledging full American support. In his September 1992
address to the UN General Assembly Bush summarized his new policy in which he urged
delegates to think differently about how to ensure and pay for security in this new era.13
Bush promised full support for the UN – something rather new in U.S. foreign
policy (institutionalism had played a minor role and was applied only in case it served
national interests). Finally, Bush never implemented his policy recommendation since
his presidency expired and he was not reelected.
Bush’s rhetoric on this ‘New World Order’ was bold and seemed visionary. After the
end of Gulf War II, visions waned away and never received the necessary substance. One
reason for lowering the rhetoric on the New World Order was the outcome of the Gulf
War. The result was considered as imperfect – it did not match the visionized ideal. “The
victory lost its luster because of an unfair comparison that the president inadvertently
encouraged, and recession shifted the political agenda to the domestic economy.”14
Bush’s key problem was that he based his concept on Nixon’s ideas, but took his
rhetoric from Carter and Wilson – an incommensurable blend, simply because both
dimensions are incorporated in the international order. Bush and his team did not
recognize this fact. The multi-drive after the Gulf War rather quickly vanished. The
opportunity for change was missed.
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The military and its transformation became another hot issue. Bush41 encountered
numerous difficulties in convincing the public to keep up the U.S. presence overseas
(something Bush43 still was confronted in the 2nd term). Various arms reductions, the
‘peace dividend’-debate, public pressure and the fast development of the international
order towards a more democratic, market-oriented complex of actors required Bush to
rethink the role of the military. Bush was not fond of engaging in the more and more
important economic issues. A fundamental reexamination of the national security
posture which should have resulted in a broadly reshaped, tuned-down military being in
a position to take over new tasks was something he pushed more and more aside. New
power-projections, speedy projections of conventional deterrent forces, tackling lowintensity conflicts and emerging terrorist activities by undemocratic and unpredictable
governments should have been taken far into account, but were more or less neglected.
It was still the Cold War plot, the ideational framework of being threatened by the
Soviet Union and even attacked nuclear which dominated the national security
posture.15 Bush’s national security posture did not reflect the 20th century third grand
transformation of the organizing structure and driving spirit of the global politics.
In wake of the 1990s, the international order remained in flux and transformation.
At the beginning, the multipolar order was assumed. After the Gulf War, a unipolar
order emerged on the politico-military level. In the areas of economy multipolarity
gained more and more ground. The evolution of the international order of the late 20th
century and the beginning 21st century has taken another turn.
It required taking the following key parameters into consideration:
1. globalization (i.e. West and non-West);
2. different forms of the state (post-modern, modern, pre-modern; strong, weak,
dysfunct, failing, failed);
3. non-state actors; and
4. the rise of new power-constellations on different levels of analysis based on
combinations of states and non-state entities.
In the final year of Bush41’s presidency economy pushed more and more into the
forefront on the domestic agenda. Foreign policy became also much entrenched with
economic issue. Fostering market economy was the catch-word. Bush was very interested
in cooperating with reform-minded states on a multilateral basis and through international
organizations. The U.S. received more and more again the role of a drafting horse: It was
the leader of the international economic system and also its biggest member. The 1980s
left the U.S. in a difficult situation – something Bush41 had to tackle, but did not do it
determinedly enough. He was not much interested in economic issues and in bringing
spending in line with resources. His presidency was based on a coalition of forces and
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interests. This basis did not offer a political grounding for economic actions which could
have supported international trends in favor of the U.S.
Joseph Nye suggested five alternative outcomes (he did not indicate whether they
are mutually exclusive or they can exist in ‘parallel worlds’):16
1. return to bipolarity
2. multipolarity
3. three economic blocs
4. unipolar hegemony
5. multilevel interdependence
Bush41 did not have sufficient time to take the swing and tackle the new challenges
adequately. His search of a new geopolitical cartography might have started but
certainly could not be finished. It remains hypothetical and doubtful whether he and his
Administration would have had the ideational flexibility to turn the situation fully
around in a second term.
What the Bush41 administration did was to keep close ties with long-standing
allies.17 Balance with other major powers was maintained through classical diplomacy.
The Administration tended to favor the status quo rather than idealistic adventures and
unpredictable upheavals. It engaged rather selectively and hardly went into unclear
involvements at the periphery of U.S. commitments.
Bush41 treated the falling apart of the Soviet Union with care and not with triumph.
He led the European allies in a determined, successful diplomatic effort that finally
unified Germany (one of the thickest and most difficult tasks because failure could have
shaken up whole Europe and opened up the flank towards a then shaky Soviet Union
and later Russia).
The administration managed in a period of turmoil (pull-out of the Soviet military
out of Eastern Europe and dissolution the Warsaw Pact) to maintain NATO intact. It
reduced the U.S. troop commitment in Europe by one-half and in parallel altered the
status quo and pushed U.S. values peacefully through.
Generally, the Bush41 administration performed a careful path in responding
strategically to the then challenges (Kuwait, Bosnia, and China – Tiananmen).
The Bush41 foreign policy was a ‘transitional policy’, since it blended democratic
progress (Europe) with more realist elements (e.g. in Asia and in the Persian Gulf) with
still existing containment tools. Transition opened up the door for reform and for status
quo. The Bush41 administration was forced to embed its policy into the rapidly
changing geostrategic conditions of that period.
When Bush’s tenure ended, the Cold War was more or less over. Americans had
learned that18
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–
–
–
–
the U.S. cannot withdraw its engagement from world affairs;
it cannot go alone and leave the other players ignorantly aside;
as a great power it has to bear great responsibility;
it is inline with U.S.’s national interests and its value system to promote democracy
and free market economy; and
– the international order still is unstable and a military backup is required.
Parameter
founding history
universal values & exceptionalism
At the beginning
normal relevance
normal relevance
religion& providence
liberalism
normal relevance
normal relevance
vulnerabilities & psychologies
unilateralism&multilateralism
normal relevance
normal relevance
securitization& hypersecuritization
geography
Providence-Manifest DestinyExceptionalism-Mission-CrusadeMessianic Imperialism
normal relevance
normal relevance
normal relevance
At the end
normal relevance
universal values came into implicit
forefront after the fall of the Berlin wall
and during the Gulf War II
normal relevance
liberalism came into implicit forefront
after the fall of the Berlin wall and
during the Gulf War II
normal relevance
multilateralism came into implicit
forefront after the fall of the Berlin wall
and during the Gulf War II
normal relevance
normal relevance
The amalgam emerged slowly but
steadily implicitly after the fall of the
Berlin wall and during the Gulf War II
Bill Clinton:
Engagement and enlargement19
Bill Clinton took over during another transition period. He was entering the end of the
first transition from Cold War to a new normalcy, without of course naming it new
normalcy. Clinton’s mantra was the economy, something Bush41 was not primarily
interested in. Additionally, the concept of security was enhanced and received a new
type of meaning which needed to be framed.
“But the making of American foreign policy has changed because the world has
changed. With the Cold War behind us and the global economy encompassing us, there
is no clear dividing line between domestic and international affairs. And on many
issues, the question of where one agency’s responsibility ends and another’s begins is
increasingly blurred.”20
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The general framework
“Protecting our nation’s security – our people, our territory and our way of life – is my
Administration’s foremost mission and constitutional duty. America’s security
imperatives, however, have fundamentally changed. The central security challenge of
the past half century – the threat of communist expansion – is gone. The dangers we
face today are more diverse. … At the same time, we have unprecedented opportunities
to make our nation safer and more prosperous. Our military might is unparalleled. …
Never has American leadership been more essential – to navigate the shoals of the
world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities.”21
The Cold War had waned away when Bill Clinton started to run for the presidency.
The traditional great power struggle had passed into history, and some even believed
that the end of history had arrived (understood in a way that capitalism has triumphed
over communism).22 Nuclear or armed attacks became part of past considerations.
There were no worries about being challenged by a hostile global ideology anymore.
On the other hand, Clinton faced a whole basket of new challenges, such as longdeferred global problems, including environmental issues, ethical conflicts, a dissolving
Eastern Europe and a reintegrating Western Europe, food and water shortages,
population growth, HIV/AIDS etc.
Finally, Clinton quickly found out that the Americans had become much more
inward-looking and tired of foreign policy activities. It was far more difficult to sell
responsibilities abroad after the exhausting period of the transformation of the Soviet
Union, which seemed to be more or less over at the time of Clinton’s campaign.
Clinton received the need and the message quickly and came up with the slogan
“It’s the economy, stupid.” Clinton did not intend to be a foreign policy president.
Instead he pushed domestic issues in the forefront. Clinton was not the first president
standing at a bifurcation. Warren G. Harding (1920) and Harry Truman (after the 1948election) were in similar positions. Focus on the domestic front characterized their
backdrop – at least in their campaign and their first months at work.
Bill Clinton’s approach mirrored the atmosphere of the 1990s. He was elected at a
moment of both triumph and uncertainty. Threats became challenges, the actors’ spectrum
changed, ‘end of history’-ideas and the assumption that capitalism is the victorious
ideology dominated thinking. “To enhance our security with military forces that are ready
to fight and with effective representation abroad; to bolster America’s economic
revitalization; to promote democracy abroad.” (National Security Strategy, 1996).
The new president was confronted with the contradicted environment of having lost
the big enemy, the justification for a global engagement, jeopardized alliances with
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undefined missions and with new threats which were inadequately addressed. “For 50
years, America self-assuredly had defined its leadership in terms of what it was against.
In the years immediately following the victory over communism, America defined its
«post-Cold War» policy in terms of what was ending.”23
Clinton’s foreign policy approach showed how difficult and complicated the
international position of the United States had become. He faced a world which was
much more different than the one his predecessors knew. In fact, containment was not
appropriate anymore, but a new approach was not at hand, yet. Much seemed blurred,
and in parallel, a number of new actors and challenges emerged on the global stage. At
the same time, America’s position was more or less unrivalled. Particularly his first
tenure was full of contradictions and probably even fuller with ‘unknown unknowns’.
This new and unknown room to maneuver offered several paradoxical implications for
foreign policy conduct:24
1. A huge freedom of action, derived from U.S. preponderance;
2. Less could be gained on the international stage, since the U.S. was already a
dominating power;
3. For reason, Americans lost their interest in foreign policy.
4. A gap of interest opened up and gave way and weight to special interest groups.
Clinton’s approach was based on three pillars:25
1. Protect the U.S. by a strong defense and by cooperative security (NATO
enlargement – one of the highly debates issues, since many experts argued that
the expansion extended NATO’s military interests, enlarges its responsibilities
and increased its burdens. Clinton and his National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake saw the expansion as a tool to nurture democracy in young, weak, rather
fragile countries with a history full of sufferings;26 finally, NATO’s new role
was locked in the provision of a vehicle for the application of American power
and vision to the security order in Europe).27
2. Open markets – global economy – globalization as driver of development (Clinton
switched his focus to the then mushrooming and rapidly developing economy; he
could be sure of public support after the Golf War II; additionally, economy
always played a crucial role in public domestic perception of a U.S. president).
3. Democratic peace and liberal interventionism (Clinton clinged on the
democratic peace thesis which is grounded on the belief that democracies form a
zone of peace; this assumption rests on the perceived high correlation between
governmental form and international outcome).28
Clinton’s administrations outlined four goals for their foreign policy agenda:
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1. Dampen global security competition by staying engaged: peace was an enduring
interest since any war/major conflict could have damaged U.S. preponderance.
The masterful enlargement of NATO can be seen as an implication; burden
sharing became a buzzword; it enabled Clinton to reduce U.S.’s direct role, but
still keep control over the overall situation. At the same time relations with
Russia deteriorated but did not end up in a ‘new cold war’. Finally, Clinton
could achieve a solution for Northern Ireland and a part-time solution for the
Middle East (although only little, if anything has remained in 2007).
2. Reduce the threat of WMD: Clinton was rather successful, at least on a small
scale, taking the domestic resistance into account. The ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention falls in this line. The North Korea issue was not
settled; the CTBT was not ratified by Senate in October 1999. Additionally,
neither India nor Pakistan could be dissuaded to enter the ‘nuclear community’.
Finally, National Missile Defense was passed over to Bush43. Clinton
compromised on the issue. His administration was neither courageous nor really
farsighted. What Clinton figured out was that vertical proliferation (i.e. mainly
two nations rally for the top of stock piling nuclear arsenals) is not enough;
horizontal proliferation (i.e. arsenals are spread among additional states with
nuclear capacities and among non-sovereign actors) needs to be taken into
account and to be tackled.
3. Foster an open and productive world economy and spread the benefits of
globalization (then understood as an economic framework of phenomena):
Clinton’s focus on the economy brought the U.S. even more on top. His
achievements cover the completion of NAFTA, of the Uruguay Round and a
number of bilateral trade agreements. Clinton skillfully handled the several
international financial crises, such as the Asia crisis and the Peso crisis. Two key
blunders happened: first the rejections of China’s offer to enter WTO (April
1999) and secondly, the disaster during the WTO summit in Seattle (Dec. 1999).
4. Build a world which is compatible with the U.S. value system (spread
democracy, free society values; apply military force in case of human rights
abuses): Humanitarian operations were one of the key elements in Clinton’s
foreign policy. Despite his efforts to hook up to multilateralism his success
record is rather meager and the picture is ambiguous. Clinton handled Haiti
(1994) rather well, but responded in Bosnia very slow and reluctant. Kosovo was
hardly a model of farsighted statecraft and visionary foreign policy. Much has
not been anticipated (including larger consequences), though the intervention
itself was handled rather skillfully. Kosovo was only a limited success for
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Clinton on its original reasons and on human rights. Two key failures mark
Clinton’s record: Somalia and Rwanda. In both cases, U.S. leadership lacked
foresight and knowledge on the ground. Both were tragedies for the affected
population but also for U.S.’s credibility.
Clinton’s approach was a pragmatic concept, which assumed U.S. primacy and
combined it with cooperative security and selective engagement (engagement and
enlargement).
Engagement referred to an explicit international engagement and for active
internationalism. Enlargement referred to spreading human rights, democracy and open
markets.29 Clinton’s model resulted in a laissez-faire foreign and security policy, which
showed a number of similarities to Harding’s and Coolidge’s policy in the 1920s. It
covered a number of idealist elements (for reason of called‚ Neo-Wilsonianism’).30
“Consistent with the fashion of the 1990s, the preferred metaphor for describing that
order was a web or network – fluid, without formal hierarchy, lacking a fixed structure,
yet all the more supple and resilient as a result. At the very center of that network,
situated so as to play a commanding role, would be the United States.”31
At the very beginning, Clinton’s model was multipolar oriented. He committed
himself to ‘assertive multilateralism’, but abandoned his policy soon in favor of a strong
leadership with unipolar elements – something expected from the leader of the world’s
largest power. Particularly in his final years his strategy heavily depended on military
power. Yet he applied it in a multilateral and liberal manner and was concerned of
international legitimacy. Military power served as underpinning of global activism
(Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross called it selective, but cooperative primacy;
Robert Art called it selective engagement; Christopher Layne plead for offshore
balancing).32
Clinton performed a ‘á la carte multilateralism’, i.e. multilateralism was applied in
case it served U.S. interest better than going alone. The U.S. had little interest in being
squeezed into multilateral agreements which clearly restricted their freedom of action.
The particularities of the U.S. checks and balances make multilateral agreements rather
difficult to be passaged through the Congress. The main practical consequence often
hinges on the necessity for a two-thirds majority in the Senate as a major obstacle to US
ratification of international agreements. No party of the president has ever commanded
a two-thirds majority in the Senate, so all ratifications have to be bipartisan. In itself this
separation of powers poses a severe technical barrier to U.S. participation in
multilateralism.
At the beginning of Clinton’s first term the Administration wanted the United
Nations to play a more assertive security role (‘assertive multilateralism’ became a
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catchword introduced by Madeleine Albright). Peace operations policy engaged a key
dilemma of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War: How could the U.S. articulate
interests and – at the same time – maintain a moral foundation for policy in the absence
of direct threats to U.S. strategic interests. During the Cold War, interests and values
often coincided. During the 1990s, their congruence became less and less apparent,
particularly when the U.S. policy community continued to define interests narrowly.
U.S. officials often tried to satisfy short-term policy goals via the UN, sometimes
regardless of the consequences for the organization or other longer-term U.S. objectives.
Finally, Washington fundamentally underestimated the difficulty of the new ‘peace
enforcement’ operations. Somalia became the poster child and the most negative
experience in U.S. participation in peace keeping operations. Clinton’s response to these
events in Somalia was crucial. He finished the U.S. commitment, sought compromise in
Congress, and implied that the UN was to blame (which turned out to be wrong from an
outsider’s perspective, since they operated under U.S. command and not under U.N.
command).
Clinton was elected to focus on domestic politics using the campaign’s mantra: “It’s
the economy, stupid.” The president rarely emphasized foreign policy issues.
Advancing U.S. support for UN peacekeeping required comprehensive support from the
top. Yet, there were only very few bureaucratic impulses to alter the president’s view.
The issue as a matter of overarching policy was not anyone’s highest priority. The
biggest push to promote the administration’s overall foreign policy occurred in
September 1993, but the Somalia debacle followed shortly thereafter, and debate about
peace operations became a deep team-up with the parties to the conflict.
Briefly after the tragic events in Somalia the then U.S. Ambassador to the UN,
Madeleine Albright testified to the Congress and told that a sustainable peacekeeping
policy was necessary. Ultimately, the administration compromised on the principle that
the U.S. owed its UN dues unconditionally. Clinton drew the line only around the
president’s commander-in-chief prerogative to stage U.S. forces. Instead, a tacit
bargaining process developed during the mid-1990s. The administration purchased from
Congress the freedom for the U.S. to conduct important operations abroad, at the price
of giving up its support for new UN peace operations.
Slowly but steadily Clinton’s foreign policy developed into a politically and
militarily unipolar approach. “President Clinton’s handling of international institutions
and multilateralism, namely, the degree to which he departed from his initial idealism
and embraced realpolitik.”33
Several events such as the increasing number of large-scale terrorist attacks34 forced
him into a ‘going-alone road’. He had to secure his position at home and could not
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violate his highest duties (e.g. protect the home territory and his people) by deviating
from the multilateral road to a unilateral exercise of sovereign power.
Power calculations had been disguised by this type of policy. Americans do not like
to act on the basis of realpolitik. They want to be number one – this is the driver, and
not theoretical concepts. At the same time, Americans are not interested in shedding
blood for a meager outcome.
Clinton’s foreign policy was a rather ‘low-budget and cost foreign policy’. His
hegemonic ambitions were performed on a cheap scale. This was the only foreign
policy supported at that time. Clinton’s presidency clearly shows the temptations and
constraints in a new period, a period of transformation with a narrowing ideology
behind and with no clear vision ahead.
At the same time, hegemony and preponderance caused permanent distrust by
Russia, India and China. The European allies joined this ‘club of distrusters’. All of
them went into alliances to counter-balance the U.S.’s rise. Multipolarity,
diversification of power and multilateralism seemed the appropriate counter-measures
to the overwhelmingly perceived U.S. power.35 This blend was perceived as solution to
counter an overwhelming hegemon.
One of Clinton’s final steps was the release of his National Security Strategy in
December 2000.36 The NSS is a continuation of his key foreign policy principles and
probably one of the beacons in strategic thought. There is hardly a more appropriate and
foreseeing strategy paper than the NSS 2000. Unfortunately, it was never applied, since
it was published at the very end of Clinton’s second tenure. Yet, it could have been at
least an ideational plot for the following administration.
It covers the following structure:
I. Fundamentals of the strategy
Goals of the Engagement Strategy (provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity;
enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting
democracy and human rights)
Elements of the Strategy (Enhancing Security at Home and Abroad, Shaping the
International Environment; Responding to Threats and Crises; Preparing for an
Uncertain Future)
Guiding Principles of Engagement (Protecting our National Interests; Advancing
American Values; Where Interests Meet Values)
The Efficacy of Engagement
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II. Implementing the strategy
Enhancing security at home and abroad
Shaping the international environment (diplomacy; public diplomacy;
international assistance; arms control and non-proliferation; military activities;
international law enforcement cooperation; environmental and health initiatives)
Responding to threats and crises (protecting the homeland; national missile
defense; countering foreign intelligence collection; combating terrorism; domestic
preparedness against weapons of mass destruction; critical infrastructure protection;
national security emergency preparedness, fighting drug trafficking and other
international crime; smaller-scale contingencies, major theatre warfare; the decision
to employ military forces
Preparing for an uncertain future
Promoting prosperity (strengthening financial coordination; promoting an open
trading system; enhancing american competitiveness; providing for energy security;
promoting sustainable development)
Promoting democracy and human rights (emerging democracies; adherence to
universal human rights and democratic principles; humanitarian activities)
III. Integrated regional approaches
Europe and Eurasia
East Asia and the Pacific
The Western Hemisphere
Middle East, North Africa, Southwest and South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
“Our strategy for engagement is comprised of many different policies, the key
elements of which include:
• Adapting our alliances
• Encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries
• Encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development
• Preventing conflict
• Countering potential regional aggressors
• Confronting new threats
• Steering international peace and stability operations.
These elements are building blocks within a strategic architecture that describe a
foreign policy for a global age.”37
Summing up Clinton’s double tenure the following issues need to be taken into
account:38
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The Cold War had ended; there were no major power rivalries and most regions
were rather stable (with the exemption of the Balkans which was considered a
European matter, at least at the beginning).
Democratic peace theory regained ground in the academic and the political debate
(Francis Fukuyama; Samuel Huntington)
National interests and liberal values led to a foreign policy called ‘assertive
multilateralism’. It referred to a combination of enlargement (in terms of enlarging
values and interests) and of an employment of soft power, diplomacy, and
institution-building.
The key question was not whether but how the U.S. should engage. Clinton focused
a traditional Wilsonianism. His world view was “how to build a world order based
on the rule of law”?
During the second term the Administration was forced to recognize increasingly
dangerous trends abroad as being part of strategic considerations (e.g. growing
terrorism, concern about WMD proliferation, and tensed relations with Iraq and
Iran). The strategic concept shifted towards engagement in areas where failing states
might disrupt Western stability.
Clinton preserved – though publicly hardly noticed – the right to act unilaterally and
to strike preemptively.39 Vital interests such as the territorial security of the
American homeland and the physical security of American citizens could not be
protected differently.
When the twenty-first century dawned, some conditions in the international order
had changed substantially for the worse. A new administration entered office with
different strategic views in mind.
Additionally, the new government had to confront with the new empowerment that
technology can give to small groups of individuals. The ‘Age of Empowerment’ was
highlighted by the events of September 11, 2001.
References
1. HORMATS, Robert D.: The Roots of American Power, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1991, online, entry
12.4.2007.
2. MANDELBAUM, Michael: The Bush Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, online, entry 14.4.2007.
3. I.e. the two Germanys plus France, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.
4. The Gulf War II or Persian Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991) was a conflict between Iraq
and a coalition force from 35 nations based on UN mandate and led primarily by the United States in
order to liberate Kuwait. The conflict developed in the context of the Iran-Iraq War (sometimes called
Gulf War I). The entry by Iraqi troops in Kuwait was met with immediate economic sanctions by some
members of the UN Security Council against Iraq. The expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait began in
112
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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January 1991 and was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which liberated Kuwait and penetrated
Iraqi territory.
RUBENSTEIN, Alvin Z.: New World Order or Hollow Victory? Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, online, 12.4.2007.
GADDIS, John Lewis: Toward the Post-Cold War World, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991, online, 13.3.2007.
MANDELBAUM, Michael: The Bush Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, online, entry 14.4.2007.
Address to Congress, President George Bush, Sept. 11. 1990; U.S. Information Service.
HALFORD, John: The New World Order. The Plain Truth, 3/1991, pp. 20–21. Additionally see KORKISCH,
Friedrich: Die neue Weltordnung, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Heft 4/1992, pp. 299–307.
State of The Union Message, Jan. 29, 1992. U.S. Information Service.
NYE, Joseph S. Jr.: What New World Order? Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, online (entry 13.4.2007).
FALK, Richard: In Search of a New World Model, Current History, April 1993, Vol. 92, No. 537, pp.
145–149. FALK, Richard: World Orders, Old and New, Current History, January 1999, pp. 29–34.
HALFORD, John: The New World Order. The Plain Truth, 3/1991, pp. 20–21. KORKISCH, Friedrich: Die
neue Weltordnung, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Heft 4/1992, pp. 299–307. KORKISCH,
Friedrich: Das politisch-militärische Führungssystem der USA: Grundlagen, Strukturen und
Entscheidungsprozesse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der ideologischen Grundlagen, des
Nationalen Sicherheitsrats und der Eliten, unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, Wien 2005 – the author
permitted the used of the source. KORKISCH, Friedrich: Die neue Weltordnung, Österreichische
Militärische Zeitschrift, Heft 4/1992, pp. 299–307. NYE, Joseph S.: What New World Order? Foreign
Affairs, 2/1992, pp. 83–96. SCHROEDER, Paul W.: The New World Order: A Historical Perspective, The
Washington Quarterly, 1994, 17:2, pp. 25–43.
NSS 1991, available http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm (entry 23.7.2007). Additionally, see
the National Security Reviews http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php (entry 8.11.2007) and the
National Security Directives http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd.php (entry 8.11.2007).
BUSH, George: Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 21 September 1992,
Public Papers, George Bush Presidential Library, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92092100.html
(entry 21.6.2007).
NYE, Joseph S. Jr.: What New World Order? Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, online, entry 13.4.2007.
SORENSEN, Theodore C.: Rethinking National Security, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1990, online, entry
19.4.2007. BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew: Selective Global Commitment, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, online,
entry 20.4.2007.
NYE, Joseph S. Jr.: What New World Order? Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, online, entry 13.4.2007.
KUGLER, Richard, BINNENDIJK, Hans: Status Quo Power or Revolutionary Power: Can a proper Balance
be struck in U.S. Foreign Policy? CTNSP/NDU, March 2007, p. 7 of the print.
YANKELOVICH, Daniel: Foreign Policy after the Election, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, online, entry 14.4.2007.
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 1994 (1995 and 1996): The White House, A National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, D.C.,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm (entry 7. 2.2004).
Clinton submitted almost every year during his double-tenure National Security Strategy Reports. See A
National Security Strategy For A Global Age, Submitted to Congress by President William Jefferson
Clinton, December 2000. A National Security Strategy For A New Century, Submitted to Congress by
President William Jefferson Clinton, December 1999. A National Security Strategy For A New Century,
Submitted to Congress by President William Jefferson Clinton, October 1998. A National Security
Strategy For A New Century, Submitted to Congress by President William Jefferson Clinton, May 1997.
A National Security Strategy For A New Century, Submitted to Congress by President William Jefferson
Clinton, February 1996. A National Security Strategy For A New Century, Submitted to Congress by
President William Jefferson Clinton, February 1995. Additionally, he submitted a Military Strategy,
entitled “Engagement & Enlargement”.
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20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
114
See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm
(Abfrage 1.3.2005). It was added-up in 1997, 1998 and 1999 and renamed to A National Security
Strategy for A New Century.
ALBRIGHT, Madeleine: U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, An Electronic
Journal of the U.S. Department of State Vol. 5 • No. 1 • March 2000, Introduction.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/spp/military/
docops/national/1996stra.htm (Abfrage 1.3.2005) – Einleitung aus dem Preface.
FUKUYMA, Francis: The End of History? The National Interest, Summer 1989.
FUKUYMA, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man, New York 1992.
BERGER, Samuel R.: A Foreign Policy for the Global Age, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2000, online, entry
22.6.2007.
WALT, Steven M.: Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2000, online,
entry 22.6.2007.
National Security Strategy 1996: “To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and
with effective representation abroad; to bolster America’s economic revitalization; to promote
democracy abroad.”
See a very critical point of view: WALTZ, Kenneth N.: Structural Realism after the Cold War,
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1. (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41, part. pp. 22–23.
KORNBLUM, John: NATO’s Second half Century – Tasks for an Alliance, NATO on Track for the 21st
Century, Conference Report, Netherlands Atlantic Commission, The Hague 1994, p. 14.
It was Michael Doyle’s rediscovery of the peaceful behaviour of liberal democratic states, which
contribute to a decline of belief in wars as means of necessity among industrialized and highly developed
states. Ralf Dahrendorf added fuel into the discussion with his “Third Way Concept”.
Liberal interventionism was one of Clinton’s core concepts, much critized by the Bush43 administration,
though it did much of the same, but under a different heading at the very beginning.
GADDIS, John Lewis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, Cambridge, MA and London,
Harvard University Press 2004, pp. 76–78.
KAPLAN, Lawrence F.: Springtime for Realism, The New Republic, June 21, 2004.
BACEVITCH, Andrew J.: American Empire. The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge,
MA, London, Harvard University Press 2002, S. 113.
Neo-Wilsonianism is considered a standpoint that views the US laying the foundation for a stable world order
while maintaining a grip on the internal social order. Contemporary neo-Wilsonianism focuses on political
and economic liberalization as means to build viable democracies. Contemporary neo-Wilsonianism does not
take enough into account the specific nature of identity conflicts and the stateness problem (i.e. institutions
become the heart of groups’ struggle) they give rise to. See BELLONI, Roberto: Rethinking “Nation-Building:”
The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion, The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2007, pp. 97–109.
POSEN, Barry R., ROSS, Andrew L.: Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy, International Security,
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 5–53, part. 44–50 on selective/cooperative primacy.
ART, Robert J.: A Defensible Defense. America’s Grand Strategy After the Cold War, International
Security, Spring 1991 (Vol. 15, No. 4), pp. 5–53. ART, Robert J.: A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaca,
London: Cornell University Press 2003.
POSEN, Barry R.: Commands of the Commons. The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,
International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46.
LAYNE, Christopher: America as European Hegemon, The National Interest, Summer 2003, pp. 17–29. LAYNE,
Christopher: From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer
1997), pp. 86–124. LAYNE, Christopher: The Unipolar Illusion. Why New Great Powers Will Rise,
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51. LAYNE, Christopher: Offshore Balancing
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Revisited, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002, pp. 233–248. LAYNE, Christopher: The Poster child for
offensive Realism: America as a global hegemon, Security Studies 12 (Winter 2002/3), pp. 120–164.
WALT, Steven M.: Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2000, online,
entry 22.6.2007.
World Trade Centre (1993), Oklahoma City (1995), Khobar Towers (1996), U.S.-embassies in Kenya
und Tanzania (1998), Aden-USS Cole (2000).
Ironically, it was the U.S. who played the draft horse in the Kosovo intervention because the Europeans
were unable to act. The U.S. used NATO to pacify the Balkans and, in parallel, fuelled fears of U.S.
hegemony. Kosovo showed the capability gap between the two sides of the Atlantic in a dramatic manner.
See http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_dec2000_contents.htm (entry 23.2.2004). A National
Security Strategy for a Global Age.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_dec2000_conclusions.htm (entry 23.2.2004)
KUGLER, Richard, BINNENDIJK, Hans: Status Quo Power or Revolutionary Power: Can a proper Balance
be struck in U.S. Foreign Policy? CTNSP/NDU, March 2007, pp. 7–9 of the print.
LEFFLER, Melvyn: 9/11 and American Foreign Policy, Diplomatic History 29, June 2005, pp. 403.
In fact, Clinton had approved preemptive strikes. In June 1995 he signed the PDD 39 to act with
counterterrorism measures. See http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (entry 23.7.2007):
“It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our
territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or
airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to
national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so,
the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other
governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.”
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