Keywords: need for affect, need for cognition, information processing, motivated
reasoning, attitude strength
Proposal to Include Need for Affect and Need for
Cognition Questions on the American National
Elections Survey (ANES) 2012 Questionnaire
Kevin Arceneaux & Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Temple University
Introduction
We propose adding questions that tap an individual’s need for affect to the ANES 2012 time series
and to the core set of questions. This battery will complement the need for cognition battery that
has been included on the ANES Time Series since 2000. Because both Need for Affect and Need for
Cognition substantially influence how individuals process information, we believe that the addition
of the Need for Affect items will be of wide interest and applicability.
Proposal
Social psychologists have long noted that individual differences in psychological needs shape how
people process and evaluate information (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Kunda, 1990; Petty and Cacioppo,
1986), and recent work suggests that such individual differences affect political attitudes and evaluations (e.g., Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, n.d.; Bizer et al., 2004; Federico, 2007; Holbrook,
2006; Jost et al., 2003; Leone and Chirumbolo, 2008; Tam, Leung and Chiu, 2008). Of particular
importance to how people process new information are their Need for Cognition (NFC) and Need
for Affect (NFA).1 NFC, which has been included on the NES Time Series since 2000, measures
individual differences in the tendency to enjoy effortful thinking (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cohen,
1957). Individuals who possess a high NFC have a strong motivation to understand the information
that they process, whereas those who possess low NFC generally wish to avoid effortful thinking.
1 In
addition, other scholars have investigated the political effects of the Need to Evaluate (Bizer
et al., 2004; Federico, 2007) and Need for Closure (Jost et al., 2003) – both of which have been
included on previous NES surveys.
1
NFA, which we propose adding to the NES Time Series, is a separate motivational construct that
captures the degree to which people enjoy experiencing strong emotions (Maio and Esses, 2001).
A clear advantage of the NFC and NFA batteries is that they do not reference politics in
an overt way, and therefore can be plausibly viewed as exogenous to political behavior. Indeed
these constructs tap general motivational predispositions. Individuals who possess a high need for
cognition are more likely to scrutinize arguments, political or otherwise, and are less likely to rely on
heuristics, such as party labels, when making decisions (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Although
NFC need not cause people to process information in an unbiased fashion (e.g., individuals may
possess strong prior opinions, see Smith, Haugtvedt and Petty, 1994), individuals who are high
in NFC are more likely to be open to opposing views when they encounter a credible source or a
strong argument (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). As a consequence, individuals who are high in NFC
are more likely to express ambivalence about their political party (Rudolph and Popp, 2007). Many
scholars have successfully used previous ANES surveys to study the political effects of NFC (e.g.,
Bizer et al., 2004; Federico, 2007; Holbrook, 2006; Kam, 2005; Rudolph and Popp, 2007).
NFA is a relatively new concept. Developed by psychologists Maio and Esses (2001), NFA measures individual differences in the motivation to approach or avoid strong emotions. Because these
individuals tend to enjoy experiencing strong emotions, their attitudes possess a strong affective
basis and their emotional responses to information play an important role in guiding the formation
of attitudes (Huskinson and Haddock, 2004). Importantly, Maio and Esses do not argue that those
who are high in NFC are unaffected by emotions. Almost all attitudes carry some affective component (Abelson, 1963). Rather, their argument is that individuals high in NFA possess attitudes
that carry a more intense affective charge, and, while affect may induce “biased reasoning” in most
people (Lodge and Taber, 2005; Redlawsk, 2008), individuals high in NFA should be especially
prone to biased processing. Indeed, individuals with a strong need to experience emotions tend to
view information through the lens of “us versus them” (Maio and Esses, 2001, 586), which may
enhance the desire to reach conclusions that square with their favored side.
Recently, we (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, n.d.) find evidence that inidividual differences in
NFC and NFA affect how people evaluate political parties. In particular, we find that individuals
with high levels of NFA show a strong emotional orientation towards their partisan identification.
When individuals who are high in NFA are presented with negative information about the party
2
they affiliate with, evaluations of their party are either unaffected or strengthened. In contrast,
negative information about the opposing party causes individuals high in NFA to evaluate the party
they affiliate with more positively and the opposing party significantly more negatively. Conversely,
individuals with high levels of NFC demonstrate a predilection toward rational updating of their
assessments of parties. When presented with negative information about a party (either the party
they affiliate with or oppose), individuals who are high in NFC are more likely rate that party
negatively.
Our research speaks to the ongoing debate surrounding how partisans update their attitudes in
light of new information. At the risk of oversimplifying the debate, two loosely defined perspective
dominate the debate. The social psychological school contends that because partisanship is rooted
in social identities, party identities form a “perceptual screen” through which political information
is viewed (Campbell et al., 1960; but see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). In contrast, the
rational, or Bayesian, school views partisanship as a running tally heuristic that results in updating
about party performance in government, and assumes that individuals use new information to
update their party evaluations in accordance with Bayes’ Rule (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; but
see Bullock, 2009). In sum, our work finds evidence that the applicability of the stylized models
of partisanship is conditioned on individuals’ NFA and NFC, such that the social psychological
model is most applicable to individuals with a high NFA and the rational model most applicable to
those with a high NFC. We believe that the manner in which individuals process information is of
considerable importance to understanding the implications of partisan identities on voter behavior.
Our study is based on a survey of 1,006 adults living in the United States who identified with
either of the major political parties. However, the study is somewhat limited in scope and warrants
a larger sample. Given that breadth of questions already asked in the ANES and the vast sample of
individuals surveyed, it would be particularly useful to examine how responses to ANES questions
are conditioned on the respondents’ levels of NFC and NFA. More important, we think that the
inclusion of the NFA battery and maintaining the NFC battery could promote numerous research
projects, especially those central to the ANES’s core mission: strength of partisanship, assessments
of political figures, political activity (e.g., campaign contributions and participation, turnout, etc.),
the prioritization of policy issues, issue voting, media use, and ideological sophistication.
For instance, the inclusion of the NFA battery will allow scholars to study whether partisans
3
who score high on the NFC scale are more likely to vote based on issue positions and government
performance (e.g., the economy), while those who score high on NFA are more likely to vote on
the basis of their partisan identities – irrespective of candidates and short-term forces. Given the
growing interest in how emotions affect political behavior (e.g., Brader, 2005; Marcus, Neuman
and MacKuen, 2000), we also anticipate that NFA may bolster the connection between emotional
experiences and political decisions. In particular, we suspect that those who are high on the NFA
scale may be more likely to convert strong negative approach emotions, like anger, into political
action (e.g., voting in elections). We could sketch out many other testable hypotheses, and are
confident that a broad swath of scholars, studying diverse areas of political and voting behavior,
would find NFA and NFC a useful addition to the ANES.
Validity and List of Questions
The original NFC battery developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) consists of 18 items (a later
version often used by psychologists consists of 16 (Cacioppo, Petty and Kao, 1984)). The NFC
battery on the ANES time series consists of two items that loaded highest in a factor analysis of
the original larger battery (Bizer et al., 2000). We propose keeping these items on the 2012 Time
Series. These items are:
• Some people like to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking,
and other people don’t like to have responsibility for situations like that. What about you?
Do you like having responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking, do you
dislike it, or do you neither like nor dislike it? Respondents who report “like” or “dislike”
were then asked if they like or dislike it “a lot” or “somewhat.”
• Some people prefer to solve simple problems instead of complex ones, whereas other people
prefer to solve more complex problems. Which type of problem do you prefer to solve: simple
or complex? Respondents are not given a follow up intensity question.
In addition, we propose adding items that tap NFA. The NFA battery developed by Maio and
Esses (2001) consists of 26 items. Of course, we appreciate that this is too many items to include
on the ANES. According to Maio and Esses (2001), the NFA scale consists of two weakly correlated
subscales: Need to Approach strong emotions and Need to Avoid strong emotions. Like the NFC,
4
the NFA battery asks respondents to respond to statements that describe themselves using a 7point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). We, of course, would be completely open
to work with the ANES team to formulate question wording and response sets that best fit the
ANES survey environment.
Following the strategy adopted by Bizer et al. (2000), we propose the inclusion of two of the
highest loading items from the approach subscale and two of the highest loading items from the
avoidance subscale. If there is not sufficient room for four items, we propose including only the two
items from the approach subscale, since our research suggests that this may be of more relevance
to biased processing. Including only items from the approach subscale would also better mirror
the NFC items in the ANES, which are both pro-trait items. Maio and Esses (2001) find that the
following questions are the highest loading items on their respective subscales. We include a table
of the factor loadings Maio and Esses (2001) obtain for the NFA questions (see appendix).
NFA Approach Questions:
1. It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings.
2. I think that it is important to explore my feelings.
NFA Avoidance Questions:
1. I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them.
2. I do not know how to handle my emotions, so I avoid them.
Analysis of our data (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen, n.d.) confirms Maio and Esses’ findings.
We find that these questions dominate the total NFA scale (scale comprised of all NFA questions),
as well as the approach and avoidance subscales. For the total NFA scale, the approach questions
identified above have the strongest effects on the first dimension scaling of any of the approach
questions (approach question 1 has a factor loading of -.5611 and approach question 2 has a factor
loading of -.5512). The avoidance questions identified above likewise have the strongest effects on
the first dimension scaling of any of the avoidance questions (avoidance question 1 has a factor
loading of .6968 and avoidance question 2 has a factor loading of .6705).
5
When looking at the individual subscales, we find evidence consistent with our finding for the
total NFA scale. Specifically, we find that the approach questions again have the highest factor
loadings for the approach subscale (.7006 and .6948 for approach questions 1 and 2, respectively).
Their factor loadings are approximately 24.91% and 23.87% higher than the average factor loading
for the approach subscale, respectively. For the avoidance subscale, avoidance question 1 again has
the highest factor loading of any avoidance question (with a factor loading of .759), and avoidance
question 2 has the second highest factor loading (with a factor loading of .731). Avoidance questions
1 and 2 are approximately 24.81% and 20.21% higher than the average factor loading for the
avoidance subscale, respectively. Therefore, we find evidence that corroborates Maio and Esses’
assessment of the most powerful NFA approach and avoidance questions.
6
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Appendix
Item
(18). It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings.
(6). I think that it is important to explore my feelings.
(5). I am a very emotional person.
(19). It is important for me to know how others are feeling.
(4). Emotions help people get along in life.
(15). Strong emotions are generally beneficial.
(3). I feel that I need to experience strong emotions regularly.
(7). I approach situations in which I expect to experience
strong emotions.
(24). I feel like I need a good cry every now and then.
(20). I like to dwell on my emotions.
(13). We should indulge our emotions.
(26). I like decorating my bedroom with a lot of pictures
and posters of things emotionally significant to me.
(17). The experience of emotions promotes human survival.
(10). I do not know how to handle my emotions, so I avoid
them.
(8). I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try
to avoid them.
(11). Emotions are dangerous – they tend to get me into
situations that I would rather avoid.
(9). I would prefer not to experience either the lows or
highs of emotion.
(1). If I reflect on my past, I see that I tend to be afraid of
feeling emotions.
(25). I would love to be like “Mr. Spock,” who is totally
logical and experiences little emotion.
(2). I have trouble telling the people close to me that I love
them.
(14). Displays of emotions are embarrassing.
(12). Acting on one’s emotions is always a mistake.
(23). I am sometimes afraid of how I might act if I become
too emotional.
(22). Avoiding emotional events helps me sleep better at night.
(21). I wish I could feel less emotion.
(16). People can function most effectively when they are not
experiencing strong emotions.
Approach
.75
.74
.60
.58
.57
.55
.53
.51
.49
.47
.46
.45
.44
Table 1: Maio and Esses’ (2001) Factor Loadings for the Need for
Affect Questionnaire. Notes: See Table 1 on page 591. Maio and
Esses note that “The numbers in parentheses represent the item
numbers in the questionnaire. The factor loadings were obtained
from the confirmatory factor analysis of participants’ responses
across all of [their] samples. In [their] analysis, the loadings of
the approach items on the avoidance factor and the loadings of the
avoidance items on the approach factor are constrained to zero.”
10
Avoidance
.72
.69
.64
.60
.51
.50
.49
.48
.47
.45
.43
.39
.32