African Affairs, 106/425, 611–637
C
doi: 10.1093/afraf/adm058
The Author [2007]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA: POPULIST
POLITICS AND ZAMBIA’S 2006 ELECTION
MILES LARMER AND ALASTAIR FRASER
ABSTRACT
Zambia’s 2006 election was won by incumbent President Levy Mwanawasa
and his Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). However, it is
argued here that the most important outcome of the campaign was the
successful articulation of a new populist politics by Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF), which won a significant majority in urban areas. Sata’s
attacks on foreign investors (particularly from China) for their abuse of
the workforce and their supposedly corrupt relationship with the MMD
resonated with urban Zambians, already angered by the negative impact
of economic liberalization. PF’s campaign injected popular social demands
into what had become a moribund political debate. The MMD government
is now adopting PF policies in an attempt to restore its own urban support
base. The article describes the campaign and its outcomes, contrasting the
political discourse of the MMD and PF and analysing the differences in
voting behaviour between rural and urban Zambians. It argues that recent
relief of 92 percent of Zambia’s international debt, along with the renewed
profitability of the copper mining industry, have created conditions for the
re-emergence of a nationalist-developmental political framework.
IN SEPTEMBER 2006, PRESIDENT LEVY MWANAWASA AND THE MOVEMENT FOR MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY (MMD) WERE RE-ELECTED as
the government of Zambia. Under the first-past-the-post electoral system,
Mwanawasa secured the presidency with 43 percent of the vote, a significantly higher share (in both absolute and percentage terms) than his 29
percent victory in 2001. This time, the MMD also narrowly gained control
of parliament. On the face of it, the election therefore represented an endorsement of Mwanawasa’s policies of “good governance”, which, in recent
years, have secured both steady economic growth and the relief of 92.5
percent of Zambia’s previously crippling external debt.
This article argues, however, that the MMD’s retention of power was not
the most significant outcome of the election. Rather, the rapid and largely
Miles Larmer ([email protected]) is Lecturer in Post-1945 Global History at Sheffield
Hallam University in the UK. Alastair Fraser ([email protected]) is a DPhil
candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford and a research affiliate of the
University of Zambia. The authors are grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Benson
Musuku, Christopher Bickerton and Nicholas Cheeseman.
611
612
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
unanticipated emergence of the Patriotic Front (PF), led by Michael Sata
(popularly known as “King Cobra”), as the leading opposition party represents a significant break in Zambian politics and a new dynamic in urban
society in particular. Sata won 29 percent of the presidential vote; PF MPs
won every urban parliamentary seat in the capital Lusaka and the politically
important Copperbelt region. The party also now controls a majority of
urban municipal councils.1 The PF’s electoral discourse borrowed from urban protest movements that have emerged in Zambia since 2001 in reaction
to the impact of economic liberalization over the past fifteen years of MMD
rule, and also articulated additional popular demands on the state.
Until the late stages of the 2006 campaign, these sentiments found little expression in a party system that reflected (as in much of formally
democratic Africa) personality politics, elite factionalism and ethno-regional
coalition building, rather than a contest of alternative policies. This article
analyses how Sata’s ability to reflect the urban electorate’s concerns in populist language and symbols enabled him to claim the support of Zambia’s
workers, the poor, and the unemployed. PF supporters dominated the public space of urban centres during the campaign, and the party emerged as a
genuine electoral threat.
In addition, the PF’s post-election campaigns have created an unprecedented situation in Zambia: the party that lost the electoral battle is winning
the political war. Media, civil society, and government interpreted the election not as an endorsement of the ruling party but as a rebellion against
it. There was unanimity that the key question now was who could respond
best to the urban mood; indeed, the MMD has sought to suggest that it
has solutions to the problems raised by the PF, including tax, regulation
of multinational companies, labour laws, and the constitution. The PF is
attempting to maintain momentum via a rolling campaign of demonstrations on these issues, establishing democratic party structures and leading
effective local authorities. Success or failure in these areas is likely to decide whether Sata’s populist moment has a lasting transformative effect on
Zambian political culture.
Despite the policy cleavages described here, it is clear that the PF cannot
be understood in traditional “left–right” terms. This article thus argues
that Sata is best understood as a “populist” in the terms set out by Ernesto
Laclau.2 There is of course an alternative, pejorative meaning of the term: as
The Post newspaper’s editorial put it: ‘[Sata] is a populist who will say what
he thinks his audience wants to hear. . . . He has no morals to defend and
1. Electoral Commission of Zambia, ‘General Elections 2006, presidential–national result by
candidate, 2 October 2006’; ‘Parliamentary results summary as at 20:00 hrs, 2 October 2006’
(press releases).
2. Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populism: what’s in a name?’ in F. Panizza (ed.), Populism and the
Mirror of Democracy (Verso, London, 2005) <www.essex.ac.uk/centres/TheoStud/papers/
Populism%20What’s%20in%20a%20name.doc>.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
613
no principles to fight for.’3 This is not the populism we describe, although
there is no doubt much truth in the description of Sata (and many other
politicians). The populism Laclau defends is a political impulse removed
from any particular ideological persuasion or policy programme. Rather,
he argues, ‘a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology
it presents actual contents identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a
particular logic of articulation of those contents.’4
We argue that Sata’s logic of articulation accords with Laclau’s definition,
involving the identification of particular unmet demands of distinct social
groups, and their re-presentation to those groups not only as legitimate but
also as aspects of a wider set of linked and unmet demands, sharing few
characteristics beyond their frustration. The suggestion is then made that
the frustration of these demands results from a disconnection between a
newly imagined “people” (those whose demands are being frustrated) and
“power” (those on whom demands are made). The aim of the populist is
thus to construct a set of symbols and arguments that unify the demands
and construct a popular subjectivity around them. In the Zambian case,
Sata intimates that “power” consists of a corrupt alliance between domestic
political and business networks and a set of international sponsors (including
foreign businesses, foreign states, and international financial institutions).
We consider below the symbols and arguments that Sata has developed to
successfully transform pre-existing popular concerns – such as health and
safety standards in Chinese-owned mines, the shortage of market stalls for
informal traders, inadequate urban housing, and the disorganized nature
of bus stations – into a common set of problems, linked to each other in
the popular urban imagination, from which he can benefit electorally. Sata’s
ability to present himself as the embodiment of this set of connected demands ensured that, despite his background in power, he did not represent
“power”. Notwithstanding his personal role in creating Zambia’s political
and economic status quo, Sata’s sheer rudeness about those in “power” allows supporters to imagine in him potential for subversion and radicalism.
More generally, the article assesses the state of Zambian democracy fifteen
years after the return to multi-party rule. The MMD’s fourth successive
electoral victory may appear to confirm that Zambia’s democracy remains,
as political scientists have variously suggested, partial, “disciplined”, and
intolerant of dissent.5 However, whilst we share the view of Abrahamsen and
3. ‘Don’t allow thieves to govern’, editorial, The Post (Lusaka), 12 September 2006.
4. Laclau, ‘Populism: What’s in a name?’.
5. See C. Baylies and M. Szeftel, ‘The 1996 Zambian elections: still awaiting democratic
consolidation’, Review of African Political Economy 24, 71 (1997), pp. 113–28; P. Burnell, ‘The
politics of poverty and the poverty of politics in Zambia’s Third Republic’, Third World Quarterly
16, 4 (1996), pp. 675–90; R. Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development discourse and
good governance in Africa (Zed Books, London, 2000); J. K. van Donge, ‘Reflections on donors,
opposition parties and political will in the 1996 Zambian general elections’, Journal of Modern
614
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Rakner that Zambia’s government has been disciplined by donor-imposed
conditionality, we suggest that Zambia’s democratic culture – in the form of
the public expression of popular social attitudes towards political, economic,
and social change – is, at least in urban areas, healthily undisciplined. What
has been lacking hitherto is any significant expression of these attitudes in
electoral or legislative forums, something the PF, albeit in problematic ways,
has begun to offer. This article first describes the historical background to
the elections, the emergence of the candidates, the results, and the aftermath
of the election. It then considers in more detail the appeal of the PF and
MMD to different constituencies.
The urban factor in Zambian political history
While there is no space here for a detailed historical analysis of postcolonial politics, it is important to stress that the expression of a distinctive
urban-based populist political discourse is not new.6 As generations of social
scientists have identified, Zambia’s early and sustained urbanization, based
around the profits generated by (and economic dependency on) copper mining, made the activities and aspirations of organized workers, and the wider
urban population, an issue of political concern for colonial and post-colonial
governments alike.7 In the early 1970s, the most significant challenge to the
hegemony of President Kenneth Kaunda’s ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) was provided by the breakaway United Progressive
Party (UPP), which received substantial support in urban areas before it
was banned with the introduction of the one-party state in 1972–3.8 Urban discontent surfaced periodically in the 1970s and 1980s, for example
in bread riots against the implementation of structural adjustment.9 PolitiAfrican Studies 38, 1 (1998), pp. 71–99; L. Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in
Zambia, 1991–2001 (Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2003).
6. C. Gertzel and M. Szeftel, ‘Politics in an African urban setting – the role of the Copperbelt
in the transition to the one-party state, 1964–73’ in C. Gertzel (ed.), C. Baylies, and M. Szeftel,
The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester University Press, Manchester,
1984), pp. 118–62.
7. Amongst the copious literature on this topic: A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African
Community (Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia/Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1973); H. S. Meebelo, African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism (Kenneth
Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka, 1986); M. Burawoy, The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines
(University of Zambia Institute of African Studies, Lusaka, 1972); J. Ferguson, Expectations of
Modernity: Myths and meanings of modern life on the Zambian Copperbelt (University of California
Press, Berkeley, CA, 1999); M. Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and political change in
post-colonial Africa, 1964–1991 (I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2007).
8. M. Larmer, ‘“A little bit like a volcano” – The United Progressive Party and resistance to
one-party rule in Zambia, 1964–1980’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 39, 1
(2006), pp. 49–83.
9. R. H. Bates and P. Collier, ‘The politics and economics of policy reform in Zambia’ in
R. H. Bates and A. O. Krueger (eds), Political and Economic Reform: Evidence from eight countries
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1993), p. 429.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
615
cal scientists characterized such events as evidence of the division between
urban and rural interests; Zambia exemplified arguments that urban consumers were exploiting their rural cousins, by holding down the price paid
for crops by national marketing boards.10 However, there is little evidence
to show that Zambians have historically voted along opposed rural–urban
lines. The migratory nature of Zambia’s population has ensured economic,
social, and political interaction between town and village. Workers in urban
areas have been assumed to wield political influence over their extended
rural families through the sending of remittances and their advantageous
access to political information.11 The extent to which this relationship has
now broken down is explored later in this article.
Urban discontent played an important role in the MMD’s successful
challenge to UNIP in 1990–1, in the riots of June 1990, and particularly in
the prominent role of the labour movement, symbolized by the emergence
of Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) Chairman-General Frederick Chiluba as MMD leader and the Movement’s successful presidential
candidate. Initially a pressure group demanding an end to one-party rule,
the MMD evolved into a political party and won an 81 percent landslide
electoral victory in an atmosphere of popular celebration involving strikes,
demonstrations, and large electoral rallies.
The MMD, however, was an uneasy coalition of social forces that made
temporary common cause to oust UNIP.12 The fracturing of the ruling
party began in 1993 with the loss of moderate business-oriented figures,
enabling Chiluba to establish his dominance.13 Further breakaways from
the party continued in the late 1990s and multiplied in 2001 when Chiluba
sought to secure for himself an (unconstitutional) third term as President.14
10. R. H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies
(University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1981); and Rural Responses to Industrialization:
A study of village Zambia (Yale University Press, New Haven, CN, 1976).
11. During the 2001 election, a special edition of the state-controlled Times of Zambia was
sold in Northern and Luapula provinces while voting was still taking place, claiming that
the MMD had won in the Copperbelt. It was expected that this would encourage voters in
these provinces to follow the voting patterns of their supposedly better-informed urban kin.
Respondents claimed that this “urban influence” helped shape voting behaviour in northern
Zambia: see, for example, Albert Chali, interview, Chingola, 4 February 2003.
12. A. Mbikusita-Lewanika, Hour for Reunion, Movement for Multi-Party Democracy: Conception, dissension and reconciliation (African Lineki Courier, Mongu-Lealui, 2003), pp. 80–6.
13. M. Larmer, ‘Zambia: paradoxes of democratic transition’ in L. Whitfield and A. R.
Mustapha (eds), Africa in the Era of Democratization: Turning points in contemporary African
politics (James Currey, Oxford, forthcoming 2008).
14. Useful studies of this period include Burnell, ‘The politics of poverty’; D. J. Simon,
‘Democracy unrealized: Zambia’s Third Republic under Chiluba’ in L. Villalon and P. Von
Depp (eds), The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and institutions (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 2005), pp. 199–220. For the 1996 election, see van Donge,
‘Reflections on donors’ and M. Bratton and D. N. Posner, ‘A first look at second elections
in Africa, with illustrations from Zambia’ in R. Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict and Democracy
in Africa (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1998), pp. 377–407. For the 2001 election, see
616
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
A dual transition?
In the first few years of MMD rule, public goodwill, coupled with significant financial aid from international donors, enabled the implementation
of a sweeping programme of “shock therapy” reform. More than 250 parastatals, representing around 85 percent of the Zambian economy, were listed
for privatisation. The government made significant cuts to tariffs, withdrew agricultural and industrial subsidies, and removed exchange controls.
The coincidence of economic and political liberalization led commentators to claim that Zambia exemplified a “dual transition”, in which both
sets of reforms were mutually reinforcing.15 Deviations from progress towards a “Western” liberal state have typically been interpreted as evidence
of a blocked or partial-reform syndrome awaiting correction.16 However,
Zambian economy, society, and culture have offered a bumpy ride for such
assumptions over the past fifteen years. Zambians clearly hold opinions
about the construction of legitimate political authority and the distribution
of national wealth that are not bounded by the liberal consensus.
Firstly, economic liberalization is now widely recognized as having been
disastrous, leading to the collapse of manufacturing, a significant contraction of the economy, soaring unemployment, and a severe pensions crisis. Once privatized, companies established to provide essential goods in
a closed economy were typically unable to compete against multinational
corporations with unrestricted access to Zambian markets. Formal sector
employment fell by 24 percent between 1992 and 2004.17 Major cuts to
public expenditure led to a marked decline in living standards. Zambia’s
ranking in the Human Development Index slid from 110 of 136 countries
in 1990 (0.462) to 166 of 177 countries in 2005 (0.394).18
Secondly, with this collapse of living standards, the MMD was forced to
choose between maintaining its popular support base and meeting donor
conditions. It has consistently chosen the donors. In order to retain power
the MMD resorted to the suppression of opposition, electoral rigging, and
constitutional changes that enabled it to rule without majority electoral
support. In 1996, a constitutional amendment removed the “fifty percent
hurdle” required to win the presidency. In that year’s elections, UNIP boycotted the polls after the implementation of a further constitutional amendP. Burnell, ‘Zambia’s 2001 Elections: the tyranny of small decisions, “non-decisions” and “not
decisions”, Third World Quarterly 23, 6 (2002), pp. 1103–20.
15. For a useful critique of such assumptions, see N. van de Walle, ‘Economic reform in a
democratizing Africa’, Comparative Politics 32, 1 (1999), pp. 21–41.
16. Rakner argues that reform was flawed in its implementation: Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, p. 14.
17. Government of Zambia, ‘Quarterly employment statistics’ <http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/
qtr/labor.asp> (15 October 2006).
18. United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Index trends’
<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_12_1_1.html> (23 November 2006).
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
617
ment designed to disqualify Kaunda. International observers judged the
2001 polls unfree and unfair.19 The MMD’s retention of power was aided
by the proliferation of opposition parties, particularly those resulting from
splits from the ruling party during the 2001 “Third Term” campaign, when
discontented MMD leaders broke away to form the Forum for Democracy
and Development (FDD) and PF, amongst others. Although corruption
scandals and thwarted leadership ambitions have led to further divisions,
new parties have not offered alternative programmes, proposing instead
“more competent”, “less corrupt” or “more leaderly” leadership. Following electoral losses, many opposition politicians have been bought off by
presidential patronage.
The party system has thus failed to reflect discontent with the devastating
results of liberalization, which was instead expressed by civil society. In
2001, an energetic civil society campaign, co-ordinated by The Oasis
Forum, emerged to challenge President Chiluba’s attempt to attain an
unconstitutional third term in office. While the leadership of The Oasis
Forum focused on the anti-democratic nature of Chiluba’s government,
and the corruption that flowed from its unaccountability, a significant part
of the popular anger that fuelled the campaign stemmed from the failure
of liberalization to arrest economic decline. The Oasis Forum’s success in
blocking Chiluba’s third term bid emboldened civil society and sparked a
resurgence of autonomous social forces. Since Chiluba’s chosen successor
Levy Mwanawasa took over in 2001, partially successful campaigns have
taken place against the privatization of remaining state assets, particularly
the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB).20 There has also been a
significant increase in industrial unrest in public and private sectors.
The privatization of the strategic Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM) between 1997 and 2000 epitomized the problems of liberalization
in a society with a weak domestic business class, a corrupt government negotiating team, and a lack of effective popular oversight. The sale of ZCCM,
in which the state held a 60.7 percent share, was shaped by Zambia’s dependent relationship with the international financial institutions (IFIs) and
international mining capital. As a result, mine privatization breached legal
requirements for transparency in bidding processes, stakeholder consultation, and social and environmental impact.21
19. For example, reports of the ‘European Union Election Observation Mission’,
<www.eueu-Zambia.org> (15 June 2002).
20. M. Larmer, ‘Reaction and resistance to neo-liberalism in Zambia’, Review of African
Political Economy 32, 103 (2005), pp. 29–45.
21. See Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development (Afronet), Citizens for
a Better Environment (CBE) and Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID), ‘Zambia: deregulation and the denial of human rights’ (submission to the OECD Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Lusaka, 2000). For more detail, see Larmer, ‘Reaction
and resistance’.
618
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Popular resentment regarding liberalization has been strengthened by
visible signs of rising inequality. Zambian businessmen, many of whom accumulated their initial wealth through links to state capitalism in the 1970s,
used these links to acquire smaller parastatals through the opaque processes
of the Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA).22 Liberalization’s winners ostentatiously display their wealth in Lusaka’s new shopping centres, their car
parks full of luxury vehicles.
Economic recovery and its political consequences
From a nadir in the late 1990s, Zambia has made a modest economic
recovery, with an average growth rate of 5 percent in the last three years, and
an inflation rate of 8.1 percent in 2005. However, only modest growth has
been recorded in agriculture and tourism. The recovery is predominantly
attributable to the fact that since 2003 the international copper price has
quadrupled, peaking in May 2006 at US$8,825 per tonne; this has made
Zambian copper profitable for the first time in thirty years. New mines are
opening and significant exploratory development is under way in NorthWestern Province. Sustained demand for metals, particularly from China,
is likely to ensure industry profitability for some time.
Rather than vindicating privatization, the recovery has served to highlight
the historically low proportion of mine profits that now accrues to workers,
communities, and the state; Zambia’s foreign-owned mining companies pay
just 0.6 percent of their profits as royalties. The profits of the largest mining
group, Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), increased by 171 percent between
2004 and 2005. KCM’s main shareholder, Vedanta Resources, recouped
the $25 million it paid for KCM in its first three months of operations.23
The value of this share has increased 54-fold to $1.321 billion.24 In July
2005, KCM workers demanded a 100 percent pay rise, explicitly linked to
the company’s profits, and took unofficial strike action in support of their
claim.25 On the Copperbelt, frustration that mining wealth is leaving the
country before Zambians see any benefits is heightened by the perception
that new investors have tacit permission to ignore labour, health and safety,
environmental, and immigration legislation.26
Zambia’s partial recovery has not only thrown into relief the failure of
growth to alleviate poverty, but also provided a basis for a new populist
politics. While the mining industry was making losses and debt-related
22. Afronet/RAID/CBE, ‘Zambia’, p. 54.
23. ‘Sikota Wina’ column, The Post, 26 April 2005.
24. The Post, 27 June 2006, p. 5.
25. Zambia Daily Mail, 18 August 2005, p.1.
26. A. Fraser and J. Lungu, ‘For whom the windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s copper mines’ (report, Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia (CSTNZ)
and Catholic Commission for Justice Development and Peace (CCJDP), Lusaka, 2007)
<www.minewatchzambia.com>.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
619
conditionality pre-empted domestic policy making, widespread anger at the
effects of adjustment was coupled with a sense of impotence and inevitability. Since the late 1990s, the promise of debt relief has tied the government
to implementation of further liberalization under Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP). Although protests led to a more hesitant
implementation of liberalization, Zambia became one of the first countries
to complete its PRSP in 2005.27 The consequent reduction of Zambia’s
international debt from $6.7 billion to $502 million, whilst undoubtedly a
significant achievement of the Mwanawasa government, also made it possible to envisage a policy debate which, for the first time in twenty years, was
not dominated by donor conditionality. Thus, the MMD’s continued cooperation with donors now appears to be more of a strategic choice than an unavoidable necessity; as such, it is more open to challenge.28 The achievement
of debt relief through the imposition of swingeing economic orthodoxy, far
from encouraging support for such policies, has provided the opportunity
for Zambians to throw off their conditional chains, just at the time when
mine profitability apparently presents a feasible path to a neo-nationalist
model of development. How then did this context affect the 2006 election?
Pre-election coalition building
In 2001, the MMD narrowly retained power in part because of the proliferation of new opposition parties, each typically attracting support only
in its candidates’ home provinces. Zambia’s electoral history demonstrates
the futility of fighting an election from one of the country’s four or five large
ethno-regional bases.29 Criticism of the failure of opposition politicians to
unite was finally heeded in 2006, with the formation in March 2006 of
the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) by three major opposition parties –
UNIP, the United Party for National Development (UPND), and the FDD.
The UDA’s hopes were set back severely, however, by the death of its presidential candidate, Anderson Mazoka, two months later. Following a divisive
succession debate that severely damaged both the UDA and his own UPND,
Hakainde Hichilema was eventually selected as Mazoka’s replacement.
The PF was the one significant opposition group that refused to join the
UDA, reinforcing Sata’s reputation as an egotistical loose cannon.30 Sata,
a political veteran who held important government positions in UNIP and
the MMD in the 1980s and 1990s (and whose political career is described
27. For hesitant implementation, see Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation, p. 16.
28. A. Fraser, ‘Zambia: back to the future?’ (Working Paper 2007/30, Global Economic Governance Programme, Managing Aid Dependency Project, 2007) <http://www.
globaleconomicgovernance.org/docs/Fraser_Zambia_2007–30.pdf>.
29. J. R. Scarritt, ‘The strategic choices of multiethnic parties in Zambia’s dominant and
personalist party system’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44, 2 (2006),
pp. 234–56.
30. Sunday Post (Lusaka), 5 March 2006, p. 1.
620
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
in more detail below), hoped to win power from his base on the Copperbelt
and in Northern and Luapula provinces. These hopes were dented by the
election of Northern allies of Chiluba to senior MMD positions at the
party’s 2005 convention. The National Democratic Focus, a grouping of
small Northern-based parties, which many assumed would ally with PF,
also endorsed Mwanawasa.
Amidst the manoeuvring, and in continuity with Zambia’s post-1991
politics, initially there was an almost total absence of substantive political
choice. The main parties’ manifestos presented strikingly similar technocratic proposals. Although it changed radically in the last weeks of the poll,
at first the election was understood as a race between three alternative leaders: Mwanawasa, Sata, and Hichilema, each backed by different regional
supporters and offering different styles of leadership, but with essentially
similar policies. They were typically presented by their backers as an experienced statesman (Mwanawasa), a straight-talking “Mr Fix-it” (Sata) and
a fresh, young professional (Hichilema).
The election results
The 2006 elections marked a high water mark for the expression of democratic opinion in Zambia. A new electoral roll significantly increased the
number of registered voters to 3,941,229. There was also a particularly
high turnout of 71 percent. This reflected a continued steady increase in
voter registration and turnout seen since democratization. Data from 1991
are unreliable. However, using as a baseline the earliest set of reliable data,
in 1996, the voters’ roll increased from 2.2 million then to 3.9 million in
2006, with the total number of votes cast more than doubling over the same
period. The percentage of registered voters that turned out also increased
from 58 to 71 percent.
Secondly, whilst the 1996 and 2001 elections were marked by significant
rigging, much of it organized from State House, the 2006 poll was widely
recognized as free and fair. Although the verification process revealed some
anomalies, and a few parliamentary results have since been nullified by the
courts, for the first time since 1991 defeated presidential candidates did not
dispute the results in the courts. At the same time, considerable variation
in voter registration did raise suspicions, with areas seen as likely to support
the MMD achieving high figures, whilst Northern Province areas expected
to support the PF had the lowest levels of registration.31 The results are
presented below.32
31. Interview, Elijah Rubvuta, Executive Director, Foundation for Democratic Process
(FODEP), Lusaka, 6 April 2006.
32. The source for all of the tables and figures presented is the Electoral Commission of
Zambia website, <www.electionszambia.org>. Where 2006 results are referred to these are
from the statistics released by the Commission (2 October 2006).
621
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
Table 1. Results of the presidential poll, 2006
Candidate
Levy Mwanawasa
Michael Sata
Hakainde Hichilema
Godfrey Miyanda
Winright Ngondo
Turnout
Party
Total vote
Percentage of
presidential vote
MMD
PF
UDA
HP
APC
1,177,846
804,748
693,772
42,891
20,921
2,740,178
42.98
29.37
25.32
1.57
0.76
70.77
Three main trends emerge from Table 1 and Figures 1–3: the collapse of
the UDA vote into a narrow ethno-regional bloc, the dramatic emergence
of the PF as the dominant urban force and main opposition party, and the
consolidation of a rural vote that left the MMD as the only “national” party
capable of competing for seats across the country. We discuss each of these
below.
The failure of the UDA
Although the inexperienced and (until recently) largely unknown
Hichilema performed relatively impressively in the presidential poll
(Table 1), all three UDA parties did worse in the parliamentary elections
as a coalition than they had done separately in 2001 (Figure 3). They lost
ground in every province, mostly to the MMD. The UDA lost virtually all
Figure 1. Regional division of seats won in 2006 parliamentary elections
622
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Figure 2. Shifting regional basis of MMD parliamentay seats,
2001–2006
Figure 3. Comparison of regional basis of parliamentary seats won by
UNIP, UPND, and FDD in 2001 with those won by UDA coalition
in 2006
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
623
the UPND’s support in Western and North-Western provinces, probably
because Hichilema’s campaign to be UDA’s presidential candidate was perceived, particularly by supporters of rival candidate Sakwiba Sikota, as an
ethno-regional victory for Southern Province Tongas. In former FDD areas, UDA support evaporated, and the coalition also lost in UNIP’s Eastern
Province heartland, the only area where the former ruling party had hitherto retained significant support. UNIP’s distinctive identity was lost in the
UDA, in which it was a decidedly junior partner. Thus, the UDA proved in
practice not to be the opposition coalition that the Zambian people wanted,
perhaps because it offered no substantive policy difference to the MMD.
The fall in “UDA” support was a victory for the MMD, which won significant new ground in what had been the UDA parties’ rural heartlands. At
the same time, it lost substantial ground to PF. While the capital Lusaka
again voted against the MMD, it was PF rather than the FDD that received
support in 2006.
The rise of the PF and the new populism
The PF campaigned, ran, and won in the areas where it concentrated
efforts – the Bemba-speaking areas of Northern and Luapula provinces,
the Bemba-speaking Copperbelt Province, and the capital Lusaka, to which
large numbers of Copperbelt residents have moved in recent years (see Figure 1). The PF ran few candidates in North-Western, Western and Southern
provinces. The UDA, in contrast, put up candidates in virtually every seat
nationwide. The PF’s domination of urban areas owed much to its articulation of a distinct populist agenda during the latter part of the campaign.
Populism is hardly new in Zambian politics, nor is it alien to the MMD.
Notwithstanding his implementation of economic liberalization, President
Chiluba was not averse to opportunist attacks on “international interference”, for example during the 1996 election.33 Mwanawasa’s administration
has similarly sought to shift the blame for financial austerity onto external
agencies. In the midst of 2004’s public sector strikes, prompted by pay
restrictions arising from the PRSP, Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande
publicly stated, ‘We are running the country but the budget is controlled by
donors.’34
Before the election, the Mwanawasa administration had instituted a
rhetorical shift towards an “economic nationalism”, symbolized by the publication in 2006 of Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan (NDP).35 In
the mid-1980s, post-independence development planning was abandoned
33. van Donge, ‘Reflections on donors’, p. 85.
34. The Post, 18 July 2003, p. 1.
35. The full final draft of the National Development Plan is
<http://www.cspr.org.zm/Reports&Updates/FNDP.pdf> (3 November 2006).
available
at
624
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
in favour of reform-oriented agreements with the IFIs. Although the Fifth
NDP is still constructed on a neo-liberal macro-economic framework, the
reversion to the language of planning is partly a response to disillusionment
with liberalization.
However, in a country in which (despite spasmodic outbreaks of populism) the elite has usually been happy to leave the polis out of politics,
Michael Sata has long been a leading exponent of ‘populism’ of a more
substantial sort. His skill is consistently to identify the popular mood (or
prejudice) of the day, to ally himself with it to his advantage, and to associate himself with mobilizations that demonstrate popular engagement with
the issue. This modus operandi has positioned him well to benefit from contemporary frustrations, but it is a mode he has developed throughout his
career.
Having joined UNIP shortly after independence, Sata rose to become
District Governor of Lusaka from 1985 to 1988; his administration of a
major World Bank-funded housing scheme initially bolstered his reputation
as a practical, problem-solving politician, but the scheme became enmeshed
in financial problems. In 1987, he led semi-official marches denouncing
the IMF as “the architect of neo-colonialism”, following UNIP’s break
with donor collaboration after popular urban unrest.36 He then became the
public face of UNIP’s attempts to “clean up” the city through organized
vigilante attacks on street vendors and their deportation to rural areas. In
fieldwork interviews during the 2006 election campaign, Lusaka residents
consistently recalled, ‘people didn’t urinate on the streets of Lusaka when
Sata was in charge’.
Sata was also one of the first UNIP MPs to align himself with the prodemocracy movement that became the MMD. His reputation as a fixer
was reinforced in an alliance with Chiluba, whose election as MMD leader
Sata had helped secure through the mobilization of unemployed youths as
enforcers.37 In the MMD, Sata filled various ministerial positions before
taking on the powerful role of Minister without Portfolio in 1995, serving
simultaneously as MMD National Secretary. In 2000–1, however, Sata was
a leading advocate of the President’s failed bid for an unconstitutional third
term. Chiluba’s nomination of Mwanawasa as his successor angered Sata,
who established the Patriotic Front and stood for the presidency in 2001;
Sata won just 2 percent of the vote and the PF won one parliamentary seat.
Since 2001, when he was regarded by respectable metropolitan opinion
as an unelectable demagogue closely associated with corruption and unpopular economic policies, Sata has built the PF into a significant political
force on the Copperbelt and in parts of northern Zambia, partly by taking
36. Times of Zambia, 5 May 1987, p. 1.
37. Mbikusita-Lewanika, Hour for Reunion, p. 86.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
625
wholesale control of MMD branch structures in these areas.38 Research suggests this support was built on the still significant network of mineworkers
(both retired and still employed) and the local structures of the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ), reinforced in some cases by the preaching of
local Catholic priests, a highly influential constituency in mostly Catholic
Bemba-speaking areas.39 These were precisely the networks through which
the MMD had been built in 1990–1. The PF was able to gain from the
widespread sense of disillusionment at the MMD’s failure to meet the expectations of the pro-democracy period, as well as localized discontent
at Mwanawasa’s support for the drawn-out prosecution of his predecessor, President Chiluba, on corruption charges. A former miner in Kitwe
recalled:
If you remember in 1990 there was a general reaction of people. You know the economy
was very biting. So mainly people wanted change in order to have a better kind of life.
So this is why the MMD came in. And it’s the same reaction towards PF. . . . People
have been waiting for changes to be done by MMD but there wasn’t anything.40
Notwithstanding his role in the Chiluba administration, Sata quickly recognized the importance of popular discontent with economic liberalization,
supporting the campaign against ZNCB privatization, for example.41 In
2005, when striking Copperbelt mineworkers rioted, Sata boasted that he
had incited their action, complaining that workers were worse off than at
Independence.42
PF policy and practice
In spite of this, the PF’s official policies hitherto have been relatively orthodox on economic issues. The party’s mission statement is suggestive of
the familiar trope of “competence”.43 According to Sata’s right-hand man,
38. Interviews with former mineworkers, for example, Albert Chali, the former Branch Chairman of the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, Chingola, 4 February 2003.
39. Interview, Guy Scott, PF General Secretary, Lusaka, 26 April 2007; interview, Newton
Nguni, former MMD Deputy Finance Minister and now FDD Chairman, Lusaka, 27 April
2007.
40. Interview, Cosmas Bwalya, PF Acting Chairman for Elections, Misenga Ward,
Chimwemwe Constituency, Kitwe, 15 January 2007.
41. ‘Privatization will be over Zambians’ dead bodies, Sata warns IMF’, The Post, 9 December
2002.
42. The Post, 23 July 2005, p. 1.
43. ‘Patriotic Front, whose leaders have strong reputations for “getting the job done” . . .
is committed to [inter alia] the separation of powers . . . free market principles in economic
management . . . tax and interest rate reductions to spur economic growth . . . reduced Government spending, particularly at the political level . . . rooting out corruption, torture and other
violations of Zambian citizens’ and other human beings’ rights . . . strengthening the health
and education policy to improve fallen standards . . . rebuilding Zambian and non Zambian
investor confidence.’ <www.pf-zambia.com> (15 September 2006)
626
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
PF General Secretary Guy Scott, ‘We are not actually Kaunda-style scientific socialists at all. In fact a load of the deregulation, I did it, and Michael
did it. And I don’t think deregulation is what we’re worried about.’44 However, the 2006 PF manifesto struck a different note, claiming that structural
adjustment had not benefited Zambians:
The main beneficiaries of the MMD regime, apart from relatives and friends, are
mostly foreigners. . . . [The MMD’s] leaders seem to have no conscience, because they
have not been moved by the plight and suffering of the Zambian workers, who have
been reduced to daily casual employees in their own land, while foreign firms and
consultants feast on their sweat and diminishing natural resources.45
Although the manifesto maintained that the PF would ‘maintain an open,
liberal macro-economic environment’ designed to attract investment, it also
made “progressive” commitments to lower taxes, create jobs, and deliver
basic services including expanding universal education and healthcare; how
this would be paid for was not explained with the same conviction.
The PF also stressed labour protection, increasing minimum wages and
revitalizing tripartite consultations. PF would strengthen the safety and
environmental regulation of mining companies; renegotiate mine company
contracts to secure greater benefits from the price boom; and renegotiate
employment terms and conditions to include services miners received in
the past, including free water and electricity. The PF supported legal and
constitutional reforms, endorsing the draft constitution produced by the
2003–5 Mung’omba Constitutional Reform Commission and calling for its
implementation via a Constitutional Assembly.
However, these were issues that the MMD and UDA also partially addressed. The Mwanawasa administration responded to concerns about mine
privatization. Finance Minister Magande repeatedly declared his intention
to renegotiate the terms of privatization with the mining companies (he
may now be making hesitant progress towards doing so).46 Mwanawasa
declared he had directed the Ministry of Labour to ensure that mine managers who flouted the law were prosecuted. However, he also told miners
that they were being “hysterical” in thinking that government was doing
nothing to improve their plight.47 Mwanawasa’s approach proved electorally
ineffective on the Copperbelt. Whilst Chiluba had implemented mine privatization, Mwanawasa’s failure to address the ongoing social and economic
44. Interview, Guy Scott, PF General Secretary, Lusaka, 26 April 2007.
45. Ibid.
46. In his 2007 Budget speech, Magande confirmed that royalties levied on copper and
cobalt would rise from 0.6 to 3 percent: <http://metalsplace.com/metalsnews/?a = 10108>
(13 February 2007). While this applies only to new investors and not to the major mining
houses that control the vast majority of mines, faltering progress also appears to be occurring
in renegotiating terms with these groups.
47. ‘Don’t waste time, says Mwanawasa’, The Post, 25 September 2006.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
627
consequences of this corrupt process continues to fuel discontent with the
MMD.
In contrast, the PF managed to harness this discontent. This was not
achieved by its written promises, only marginally different from other parties. Indeed, its formal campaign suggested the “disciplined democracy”
we have come to expect in Zambia, in which all parties are hemmed in by
the “liberal” economic and political consensus. What was different was the
complementary and dynamic relationship that developed between emergent
PF cadres, who dominated Zambia’s urban spaces during the campaign, and
the rhetorical content of Sata’s speeches. In the twelve months before the
election, Sata’s frequent media performances, typically on independent urban radio stations, had strengthened his public profile. In these interviews
and on national tours he developed ad hoc policy positions in relation to news
developments and local conditions. He was able to do this because of the
informal nature of PF structures and his dominance of a party established
as a vehicle for his personal ambitions.
In particular, Sata used these performances to respond to and encourage
the increasingly critical attitude of Zambians towards foreign investment,
declaring that ‘Zambians are paying high taxes while the mines pay little tax.
This will change when we come to power because the mines must also pay
tax. . . .’48 Sata proposed that 49 percent of any privatized companies would
remain in Zambian hands, with 25 percent shared amongst workers and
only 24 percent floated on the Lusaka Stock Exchange.49 However, Sata’s
“Zambia for Zambians” rhetoric became particularly controversial when he
attacked the country’s new investors, particularly those from China.
The Chinese question
Two incidents inform popular Zambian concerns about Chinese investment. In April 2005, around 52 workers were killed in an explosion at the
Beijing General Research Institute for Mining and Metallurgy (BGRIMM)
explosives plant in Chambishi, the country’s worst industrial disaster for
30 years.50 There was widespread anger that casual workers, paid the minimum wage of $15–$30 per month, could be employed in such a hazardous
environment.51 Government ministers criticized the company and the Ministry of Mines froze the issue of new mining licences. It is widely suspected
that new mine owners evade safety legislation by bribing low-paid government inspectors. Further allegations of collusion between officials and
48.
49.
50.
51.
‘Miners warn of Zambia meltdown’, The Post, 19 September 2006.
Ibid.
The exact number killed continues to vary in reports, between 46 and 54 workers.
Times of Zambia, 23 April 2005, p. 1.
628
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
investors were made following a disturbance at the Chinese-owned NonFerrous Metals Corporation (NFC) in July 2005, in which four workers
were shot and wounded in an incident for which responsibility has never
been established.52
Whilst most politicians ignored these concerns, they became a central
part of Sata’s discourse. Three weeks before the election, Sata raised the
issues of BGRIMM, safety in the mines, low wages, and late payment of
wages by Chinese-owned companies. He also criticized the allocation of
government-built markets to Chinese traders. Lusaka’s Kamwala market,
for example, has been leased to Chinese management for 65 years, bringing
local traders into competition with Chinese counterparts. Sata declared, ‘I
am not going to allow fake traders who arrive at the airport, and are given a
temporary permit. . . . Why should I give them shops at Kamwala? . . . Why
should I allow Chinese to come and sell salaula [second-hand clothes] and
sell chickens and sell nshima [Zambia’s staple food]?’ At his Mandevu rally,
Sata told the crowd, ‘The markets are for Zambians. No foreigner shall be
allowed to sell chickens in the market. Foreigners must bring investment. . . .
If you want to remain poor and if you want good things to go to foreigners,
vote for Mwanawasa.’53
Sata’s attacks provoked Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong to claim that PF
was funded by Taiwanese businessmen and planned to recognize Taiwan.54
He threatened to sever diplomatic ties and withdraw investment if Sata
won.55 Sata retorted, ‘Zambia is not a province of any other foreign
country and therefore the Chinese Ambassador cannot threaten investment
to enable people to say they are going to vote for Levy Mwanawasa.’56 The
Ambassador’s clumsy intervention and Mwanawasa’s subsequent apology to
him for Sata’s comments only reinforced the public perception that Chinese
investment is linked to private influence with the MMD.
Chinese investment is of course a major subject of interest to Africa
watchers. The November 2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation saw
a record number of African leaders gather in Beijing to discuss China’s increasing economic investment. That Chinese investment may enable African
governments to evade conditionalities makes Western aid donors anxious.
However, little research has been carried out into popular attitudes towards
52. Fraser and Lungu, ‘For whom the windfalls?’ details further incidents that have increased
popular discontent regarding Chinese investment in Zambia.
53. ‘Zambia needs a new order – Sata’, The Post, 28 September 2006.
54. Allegations that Chiluba and the MMD were funded by the Taiwanese date back to the
1991 campaign: Mbikusita-Lewanika, Hour for Reunion, pp. 201–5.
55. ‘China to sever ties with Zambia if pro-Taiwan leader wins election’, China
Economic Net, 6 September 2006 <http://en.ce.cn/National/Government/200609/06/
t20060906_8441320.shtml> (7 September 2006).
56. Michael Sata, interviewed on Radio Phoenix (Lusaka), ‘Let the People Talk’ programme,
5 September 2006.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
629
the new Chinese presence.57 Zambian experience suggests that the optimism of African governments regarding Chinese cooperation may not be
shared by African populations. At the Summit, it was announced that Zambia’s Chambishi area would be one of China’s new economic cooperation
zones in Africa.58 However, when President Hu Jintao visited Zambia in
February 2007, he was forced to cancel a planned visit to Chambishi for
fear of violent protests by residents, workers, and PF supporters.59
Sata understood well the mood amongst miners and market traders, and
was able to exploit it. Other opposition politicians such as FDD’s Newton
Nguni recognize that, in the Zambian context, Sata has a gift few others
possess:
President Mwanawasa has annoyed too many people. He doesn’t want to listen even
to small things. He doesn’t want to bend even a small bit. . . . So that frustration that
people have, they express it through Sata who is able to . . . use any language against
the President. . . . Sata will use anything including insults to get the audience. And
that’s why you see even now, he can go out to talk about Mwanawasa because people
want someone who can go out and hit this person who is incorrigible.60
The mood on the street
Reflecting and feeding off Sata’s abrasive rhetoric, the PF’s political symbols, slogans, and songs also allowed an angry and disenfranchised urban
constituency to share this confrontational stand. PF’s spatial domination
of urban areas manifested itself in various ways during the campaign. The
commuter minibuses that dominate city streets were overwhelmingly and
visibly supportive, playing pro-Sata songs and displaying PF slogans, flyers,
and posters. At times when they carried PF supporters to events, they represented a threatening, lawless presence, with cadres singing, dancing, and
riding on the roofs of the buses. When MMD cadres attempted to increase
their visibility in cities they were soundly chased from the streets. Indeed,
on one occasion the President was unable to travel through the capital as
PF cadres blocked various routes with minibuses and threatened to stone
his motorcade.
Most importantly, Sata’s political rallies in the poorest urban compounds
were far larger than those of other parties. Zambians attending these rallies
57. One early exception is F. Manji and S. Marks (eds), African Perspectives on China in Africa
(Fahamu, London, 2007). See also I. Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and compromise,
(Routledge, London, 2006).
58. ‘Zambia: Levy, Jintao unveil new economic zone’, The Times of Zambia, 5 February 2007.
59. ‘Africa discovers dark side of Chinese master‘, The Daily Telegraph (London), 4 February
2007 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/04/wzambia04.xml
(4 February 2007).
60. Interview, Newton Nguni, former MMD Deputy Finance Minister and now FDD Chairman, Lusaka, 27 April 2007.
630
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
were amazed by their size and mood. Rather than the typical election rally,
which many participants attend to receive free food, t-shirts and chitenge
material, these gatherings resembled, more than anything since, the MMD’s
1991 rallies, when Chiluba, Mwanawasa, and Sata spoke together at rallies
of 100,000 or more.
In common with many parties in Southern Africa, most Zambian parties
have a hand signal. The MMD’s clock symbol indicates “the hour” of
change and can be reproduced by supporters raising a thumb and forefinger
to represent the hands of the clock. Disillusioned former MMD supporters
mocked this symbol. PF’s most popular song, circulated on cassettes and
played at rallies and in minibuses contained the following lyrics (this is a
translation):
We have totally refused,
To put on this wrist-watch,
That is not working,
A dead watch,
We have refused to work,
With the watch which is dead.
The PF’s own symbol is a boat. Groups of minibus passengers on their
way to rallies would place their arms out of the windows, mimicking the
collective actions of a group of paddlers rowing a boat forward. At PF’s
huge final rally in the Mandevu compound in Lusaka, a party cadre in a
bath tub with a paddle was borne on the shoulders of the crowd, giving
the impression that PF was being carried forward by the people.61 Sata’s
supporters also highlighted Mwanawasa’s ongoing health problems arising
from a serious road accident in 1991, which resulted in his nickname of “the
Cabbage”. Sata supporters carried cabbages on sticks or kicked cabbages
like footballs until they disintegrated.
Civil society during and after the election
Metropolitan civil society remained suspicious of Sata. Activists criticized
Sata’s promise to end the prosecution of corruption cases against Chiluba
and his circle, claiming he was undermining legal process.62 The Post newspaper, a prominent champion of progressive reform, specifically warned
Zambians not to vote for Sata.63 Zambia’s trade unions, historically important political actors, refused to endorse any presidential candidate, despite
61. For video footage of these rallies, see <http://www.youtube.com/profile?user =
alinzambia>.
62. ‘Withdrawing plunder cases will cause chaos – Ndhlovu’, The Post, 25 September 2006.
63. ‘Don’t allow thieves to govern’, The Post, 12 September 2006.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
631
the “pro-worker” positions of the PF. The Zambian Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU) emphasized the dangers of alienating members by endorsing a specific party.64 Instead, it released a position paper on policy issues to
be considered in the election, declaring that it would hold whoever won the
election “accountable”.65 Joyce Nonde of the separate Federation of Free
Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ), who organized the initial demonstrations against the sale of ZNCB, offered her personal support to Sata, but
was careful to distance the FFTUZ from any formal affiliation to the PF:
‘He hasn’t got any structure, and we are not affiliated to any party although
he [sic] is the most popular political party by our members. And for me
the reason is Sata generally is a grassroots person – he gets to the ordinary
person . . . the grassroots love him because . . . he talks to them and he talks
about their plight.’66
More generally, civil society faces a dilemma in how it relates to the PF.
Whilst sharing much of his anti-neo-liberal rhetoric, senior civil society figures remain sceptical of Sata, given his record whilst in power. It is also the
case, however, that most of Zambia’s major civil society organizations, in
participating in Zambia’s PRSP, tacitly accepted significant aspects of the
“good governance” agenda promoted by the government and the IFIs, including elements of economic reform that have created discontent amongst
the urban poor.67 Comfortable with their recent incorporation into elite
decision-making processes, they are distrustful of the street politics utilized
by Sata.68
Sata and Bemba populism?
Sata’s critics also accused him of mobilizing support through a chauvinistic Bemba-speaking base. During the campaign, Sata claimed he would wind
up the Anti-Corruption Task Force established by Mwanawasa, which (Sata
claimed) had specifically targeted Bemba politicians including Chiluba. Sata
was consequently accused of playing the “tribal card” by The Post.69 Many
64. Interview, Ian Mkandawire, Deputy General Secretary, ZCTU, Kitwe, 10 October 2006.
65. For the history of the labour movement’s support of the MMD and subsequent reaction
to this, see Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia and ‘Reaction and resistance’.
66. Interview, Joyce Nonde, General Secretary, FFTUZ, Lusaka, 3 May 2007.
67. For a critique of civil society participation in PRSP processes, see J. Gould (ed.), The
New Conditionality: The politics of poverty reduction strategies (Zed Books, London and New
York, 2005).
68. The question of how PRSP processes affect the political orientation of civil society groups
and their relationship to popular constituencies is explored in A. Fraser, ‘PRSPs: now who
calls the shots?’ Review of African Political Economy 32, 104/5 (2005), pp. 317–40. Fraser’s
forthcoming doctoral thesis considers whether the theoretical speculations laid out in the
article apply to Zambia. See: http://oxford.academia.edu/AlastairFraser.
69. ‘Dangerous Bemba tribalism’ (editorial), The Post, 13 September 2006.
632
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
observers concluded that a deal had been done in which Chiluba endorsed
Sata in the hope of a subsequent presidential pardon.70
There is little doubt that until 2006 Scarritt’s description of PF as a ‘potentially ethnic party’ was accurate.71 Sata sought to lay claim to Chiluba’s
base in Northern, Luapula and (primarily Bemba-speaking) Copperbelt
provinces. However, as this article has suggested, this changed substantially
during the campaign, as Sata responded to the growing articulation of discontent in Zambia’s urban areas. The fact that PF won so many votes and
seats in Lusaka undermines claims that his success rested primarily on an
ethnically based appeal; the influx of Bemba speakers into the capital in the
last decade has only made Lusaka a more multi-ethnic city. PF’s success
in Lusaka rested in part on a popular memory (not necessarily an accurate
one) of Sata’s success as a city administrator in the 1980s, but also, more importantly, on discontent with the perceived imbalance of power and wealth
described above. On the other hand, our initial understanding is that the
pattern of voting in Northern and Luapula Provinces may have followed
an ethno-linguistic profile. More research is needed, but whilst a significant part of Sata’s appeal in Bemba-speaking areas may utilize discourses
of ethnic exclusion, the election appears to provide additional evidence that
politics in Zambia is, as it has always been, about much more than narrow
ethnic mobilization.72
Why vote MMD?
Notwithstanding the MMD’s limited populism noted above, the ruling
party generally campaigned on a platform of continuity with its existing
economic policies, highlighting the achievement of debt relief and suggesting
that, even after it had been received, Zambia must work with, not against,
the grain of donor and foreign investor preferences. In his first major postelection speech, Mwanawasa stated:
Let me take this opportunity to thank our co-operating partners . . . their role . . . is
based on the environment that we create for them. In the last year our partners assisted
Zambia by writing-off a large part of our debt because they recognized our own efforts
and sacrifices. They will continue to assist us, if we the Zambians continue to work
hard . . . and are transparent and accountable in our work. These are tenets of good
governance which we must observe not because they please our co-operating partners,
but because they are good for our economic, political and democratic development
70. As The Post editorial put it, ‘Sata’s promise to free Chiluba and all other plunderers from
the corruption charges they are facing is a dishonest and corrupt approach to public affairs.’
‘Twachula Pafula’ (editorial), The Post, 21 September 2006.
71. Scarritt, ‘Strategic choices of multiethnic parties’.
72. The centrality of ethnicity to electoral mobilization is the central assertion of D. N. Posner,
Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005).
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
633
. . . we should continue to create an attractive environment for foreign direct investment. The kind of laws we make, and what we say or do to those already in the country
can have either positive or negative effect on future investments . . . in attracting foreign
investment the ultimate beneficiary should be the Zambians. So we must always strive
to find a way to harmonize the two without antagonizing one against the other.73
Despite the PF’s urban successes, it was ultimately the MMD which
won the election. What is suggested by this outcome, and by the provincial
voting profile depicted in Figures 1 and 2, is that a longstanding “urban
influence” over rural voters may have broken down. This may result from
the increasing inability of urban Zambians to send remittances to rural areas.
The reduction in and casualization of urban employment, and the decline
in real wages, also prevents urban Zambians from retiring to rural areas as
they once did.74 Demographic evidence indicates that the collapse of urban
economic opportunities has led to an out-migration from the Copperbelt in
the last two decades.75 The result appears to be a reduction in the influence
of urban workers over rural kin.
The MMD retained power because it substantially increased its vote in
rural areas: people were actively attracted to the party, even in areas that
had previously supported opposition parties. What then lies behind the increase in rural support for the MMD? Without detailed polling data, we
cannot provide a definitive answer. However, two possibilities emerge from
the literature. Firstly, political scientists note that incumbents usually hold
rural areas in Africa on the strength of greater campaign and information resources and the distribution of government-funded largesse.76 Senior MMD
leaders did promise to “reward” constituencies for voting MMD77 and VicePresident Lupando Mwape argued that, since the MMD would win the election, voters who voted for opposition MPs would see no new roads or other
developments.78 However, this approach seems to have been less influential in 2006 than previously; increased scrutiny and Mwanawasa’s personal
distaste for crude clientelism appear to have reduced overt vote buying.
Secondly, early advocates of adjustment argued that a “countervailing
coalition” of interest groups that benefited from liberalization was necessary to buttress adjustment against the protests of an “urban coalition”
73. ‘42nd Independence anniversary speech’, 25 October 2006 <http://www.statehouse.
gov.zm/index.php?option = com_content&task = view&id = 212&Itemid = 45> (28 October
2006).
74. The increasing inability of urban Zambians to secure their rural retirement because of
declining incomes was first identified in Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity.
75. D. Potts, ‘Counter-urbanization on the Zambian Copperbelt? Interpretations and implications’, Urban Studies 42, 4 (2005), pp. 583–609.
76. Bratton and Posner, ‘A first look at second elections’.
77. Harrison refers to this as ‘development conditionality’: G. Harrison, Contemporary Politics
of Sub-Saharan Africa: The dynamics of struggle and resistance (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke,
2002), p. 92.
78. ‘Mwape 90 per cent sure MMD will win elections’, The Post, 25 September 2006.
634
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
which physically resisted reforms (as in the 1986 and 1990 food riots in
Zambia).79 More recently, donors have sought to identify “pro-poor” reform coalitions.80 Might the pro-liberalization MMD have constructed such
a coalition in rural Zambia? The evidence suggests the exact opposite. The
literature assumes that farmers will come to support free market policies because they are good for them in the medium term. However, when the state
withdraws direct support, improvements in farmers’ livelihoods, resultant
or incidental, tend not to be credited by those farmers to the government
implementing reformist policies. The MMD understands this and, ironically, in 2006 a pro-liberalization party appears to have been returned to
power partly because of improved provision of state agricultural support of
precisely the type opposed by donors.
In the early 1990s, the state’s agricultural support infrastructure was dismantled by the MMD as part of liberalization. The unpopularity of this
with rural farmers led to the restoration of some agricultural support.81
Mwanawasa’s government further expanded such assistance – by subsidizing fertilizer production in the face of IFI criticism, for example. At an
election rally in Eastern Province, Mwanawasa openly expressed the electoral benefits he expected to result: ‘Have you forgotten that UNIP was not
capable to generate funds to buy your maize? . . . Our people . . . are choosing the MMD because we have introduced good agriculture policies.’ He
announced: ‘So far we have spent K50 billion beyond our budget for the
next procurement . . . we will disburse a lot of money to FRA [Food Reserve
Agency] to buy maize.’82 These policies, combined with a successful harvest
in 2005–6, seem to have boosted MMD support.
Since the election
Historically, victory has been everything in Zambian politics. Following Mwanawasa’s narrow victory in 2001, the opposition’s parliamentary
majority suggested a genuine challenge to the ruling party. In practice,
Mwanawasa used presidential powers and state resources to buy a working
parliamentary majority, thus revealing the impotence of opposition politicians. After 2006, the contrast could not be clearer. Mwanawasa has been
on the defensive since polling day, while the PF has maintained momentum
amongst party activists by continuing to hold large rallies. The MMD’s initial response played into PF hands; rattled by Sata’s continued campaigning,
79. Bates, Markets and States.
80. See, for example, A. Duncan, H. Macmillan and N. Simutanyi, ‘Zambia: drivers of
pro-poor change’ (Oxford Policy Management report to Department for International Development, Oxford, 2003).
81. Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation, p. 76.
82. ‘Levy likens Sata to Idi Amin’, The Post, 15 September 2006.
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
635
the MMD imprisoned Sata on charges that were quickly dropped, banned
political gatherings, and threatened to dismiss the Attorney General for
overturning the ban.83 Mwanawasa’s cabinet selection demonstrated no
reconciliation with opposition areas, its members drawn almost exclusively
from regions that voted for the MMD. The President was explicit that cabinet posts were being distributed as electoral rewards and punishments.84
There is evident anxiety in the MMD about its ability to govern effectively in the unprecedented situation where it lacks majority support in
urban areas. Mwanawasa has now retreated from the direct repression of
PF activities, and distanced himself from the IFIs. When the IMF call for
the government to introduce Value Added Tax (VAT) on food and agricultural products brought a highly critical reaction from church groups and
trade unions, Mwanwasa rebuked the IMF, declaring he would prioritize
rapid economic growth and ruling out higher domestic taxes, reinforcing
the perception that he is following the PF’s agenda.85 Interference by the
IFIs in Zambia’s economic decision making, until recently a normal part of
the policy process, is increasingly regarded as illegitimate.
Meanwhile, the PF’s preparedness to initiate mass actions is successfully
opening up the public space available to opposition voices. In the past the
Public Order Act has been widely used by government to prevent public
demonstrations. In January 2007, however, PF organized a “mass procession” in Lusaka to protest the privatization of ZNCB and the IMF’s tax
proposals. The police allowed the protesters to block the streets of the capital. When the march arrived at the Ministry of Finance, Minister Magande
was heckled when he vainly attempted to argue the government’s position
to the demonstrators, a display of “undisciplined” public accountability unprecedented in recent Zambian history. Magande’s subsequent decision to
reduce income tax rates in the 2007 budget is a further sign of the MMD
responding to the PF’s campaign.86
In stark contrast to the PF, the UDA leadership disappeared from the
public sphere soon after the election, surfacing mainly to criticize each
other. It remains unclear whether the coalition will continue to exist, let
alone maintain its unsuccessful electoral candidate as leader.
83. ‘Zambia opposition leader Sata arrested’, Mail and Guardian (South Africa),
5 December 2006 <http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_
news__africa/&amp;articleid = 292475> (6 December 2006); ‘Zambia president outlaws opponent’s rallies’, The Jurist, 6 December 2006 <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2006_12_06_indexarch.php#116545317636905228> (6 December 2006).
84. Mwanawasa declared: ‘I am frustrated with the people of Lukashya, Mr Mwape was
efficient and hardworking. Since you don’t want the position of Vice-President, I will take it
away from you.’ ‘Levy unveils new cabinet’, Times of Zambia, 10 October 2006.
85. ‘Mwanawasa rejects IMF tax directives’, IOL, 1 January 2007 <http://www.iol.co.
za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=iol1167660364318B251> (2 January 2007).
86. The upper and lower tax rates were reduced from 37.5 to 35 percent and from 30 to 25
percent respectively: Times of Zambia, 10 February 2007, p. 1.
636
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Local Council politics
The PF’s control of local urban authorities led the party to establish a
committee of new councillors to coordinate the rapid implementation of
new policies at municipal level. Sata boasted that the local authorities could
act as a “parallel government”, with local authorities “empowered” by,
amongst other options, a fuel duty on filling stations.87 PF-controlled local
authorities would reduce rates, build housing to replace shanty settlements,
decentralize control of bus stations and review the allocation of market plots.
These locations are understood as important sites of political allegiance,
often controlled by MMD cadres. The policy also reflects Sata’s electoral
promise to chase “non-Zambian” traders out of markets. The contestation
of effective control of urban areas between central government and PFcontrolled local authorities may well be the next site of struggle in Zambia.
However, the PF’s ability to take advantage of its unexpected advance in
the election is questionable. Established as the vehicle for Sata’s ambitions,
the party is being transformed by its electoral success into a party of local government and parliamentary opposition. Despite its evident popular
strength in some areas, PF did not issue membership cards nor establish formal organizational structures until recently. Efforts are now under
way to establish more formal and transparent party structures at its forthcoming conference. Sata recently issued a challenge to all members of the
party’s central committee to challenge him for the party presidency at the
conference.88 It remains to be seen if Sata is prepared to reduce his personal domination in the interests of building a more effective opposition
party with credible (and younger) alternative leaders.
Conclusion: Neither Mugabe nor Morales
How then should we understand PF’s 2006 campaign and assess the
importance of its populist agenda? Opponents expressed fears that Sata
might follow in the authoritarian footsteps of Robert Mugabe, seizing on
his reported remark that he intended to invite the Zimbabwean President
to his inauguration. During the election, international financial observers
feared that Sata would institute large-scale re-nationalizations. Partly as a
result, some investments were put on hold and the Kwacha fell on international markets.89 Mining investment advisers imagined they might be
witnessing the arrival of an African Evo Morales, a potential leader of an
aid-dependent nation aiming to use the commodities boom to renegotiate
87. ‘PF forms municipality policies’, Zambia Daily Mail, 5 October 2006.
88. ‘Challenge me at convention, Sata urges PF members’, The Post, 21 June 2007.
89. ‘Zambia’s economy to regain losses after election: expert’, People’s Daily Online (Beijing),
6 October 2006 <http://english.people.com.cn/200610/06/eng20061006_309347.html>
(6 October 2006).
OF CABBAGES AND KING COBRA
637
domestic economic arrangements and relations with international investors
and donors.90
Sata is the product of specifically Zambian conditions. He lacks the social
movement base that propelled Morales (and other Latin American leftwing leaders) into power, and his record is that of an opportunist rather
than an ideologue. Nonetheless, Sata has emerged from the elections as the
kind of populist that (as Laclau argues) places legitimate social demands at
the centre of democratic life, helping to generate a newly mobilized polity
able to challenge the unequal distribution of wealth and material goods
within Zambia and between Zambia and the wider world. This analysis
suggests that accusations against Sata of “populism” are primarily reflective
of a political environment in which liberal metropolitan opinion, influenced
by decades of donor dependency, is fearful of politicians who prioritize
popular demands over external conditionality and who prefer street politics
to technocratic planning.
The election also demonstrated that, despite the apparently disciplined
nature of the country’s democracy and the correlation between political
liberalization and the decline of living standards, Zambia’s democratic culture may be relatively healthy. As the recent Afrobarometer report makes
clear, whilst 75 percent of Zambians prefer democracy over other political
systems, 60 percent of Zambians are satisfied with the democracy they have
and only 25 percent believe they have a “full democracy”. The report also
finds that Zambians do not closely associate political and economic liberalization: only 18 percent are satisfied with economic reform programmes,
whilst 72 percent believe that structural adjustment policies have hurt most
people, associating them with rising inequality.91
In this context, there is evidence of increased “indiscipline” amongst both
Zambian politicians and populace, and more particularly of its expression
at electoral level. Whilst Sata’s critics claim his (undoubted) authoritarian
tendencies pose a threat to the consolidation of democracy, he may also
represent an antidote to the danger that a formal electoral system that
fails to reflect the aspirations of Zambia’s people will create disillusionment
with democracy itself. The 2006 election appears to suggest that this threat
is diminishing. High mineral prices and drastically reduced international
debt create the potential for a renewed nationalist-developmental path that,
whatever its strengths and weaknesses, is clearly a more accurate reflection
of the sort of political and economic system that the majority of Zambians
seek than the one they currently have.
90. ‘Resources nationalism and Africa: distant thunder or looming storm?’, Mining Weekly
Online (South Africa), 26 January 2007 <http://www.miningweekly.co.za/?show=100207>
(28 January 2007).
91. M Bratton, R. Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market
Reform in Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 6–95.