CASE NO. A.12.840
NEBRASKA COT]RT OF' APPEALS
D. CALHOI]N,
lant,
v.
.
CALHOUN,
ON APPEAL
L
TITE HON
AI\SWER OF APPELLAI\T TO
AMIE C. MARTII\EZ #20433
ANDERSON, CREAGER & WITTSTRUCK,
*K'Sheet
1630
Lincoln, NE 68508
(402) 477-8800
Attomey for Appellant
P.C., L.L.O.
FILED
IAY 0"?
20t3
'ut[ffilhffimffitry''
tffiilrilrffiffiufllffiilMffilililffi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Charronv. Charuon,
16
Neb. App.724,751 N.W.2d645
(2008)
Farnsworth y. Farnsworth, 257 Neb. 242, 597 N.W.2d 592
Gongwishv. Gangwish,267 Neb. 901, 678 N.W.2d 503
Harder v. Horder,246 Neb. 945,524 N.W.2d 325
Harrisv. Harris,26l Neb.75,621N.W.2d49l
(1999)
........3, 13
.................1
(2004)
,4,6,8
..............10
(1994)
...1,4
(2001)
.....3, 13
746(2004)
.2,13
Keigv. Keig,2O Neb. App. 362,826 N.W.2d 879
(2012)
...2,12
Mamot v. Mamot,283 Neb. 659, 813 N.W.2d 440
(2012)
..2,12
Hosackv. Hosack,267Neb.934,678 N.W.2d
Nygren v. Nygren,14 Neb. App. 1, 704 N.W.2d257
Sitzv. Sitz,275 Neb.832,749N.W.2d470
(2005)
................3, 13
(2008)
Turbines LTD v. Transupport, Lnc.,285 Neb. 129,825 N.W.2d 767
.............2,12
(2013)
.........2,12.
STATUTES
Neb. Rev. S/a/. $ 42-365 (Reissue
2008)
...........2,12
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Nebraska Rules of Appellate Practice, Section
2-109(D)(4)................
lll
.......3
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
L
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLEE'S REQUEST TO
REMOVE THE MINOR CHILDREN F'ROM THE STATE O['NEBRASKA.
il.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CALCULATE APPELLAI\T'S INCOME TOO LOW
FOR PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMOI{Y AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING
$45,OOO
IN HOUSE EQUITY
WAS THE APPELLANT'S PRE.MARITAL ASSET.
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
Pursuant to Farnsworth,the threshold question when presented with a request to remove the
minor children is the legitimacy of the parent's motive for moving. Farnsworth v. Farnsworth,
257 Neb. 242, 597 N.W.2d 592 (1999); Harder v. Harder,246 Neb. 945,524 N.W.2d 325
(tee4)
If a trial court finds the custodial parent's
reasons for moving are legitimate, the trial court
should go on to consider the motives of each parent, in proposing and resisting the move, in its
analysis of the best interests. Id.
In an action for the dissolution of marriage, an appellate court reviews de novo on the record, the
trial court's determination of custody, child support, property division, alimony, and attomey's
fees; these determinations however are initially entrusted to the trial court's discretion and
will
normally be affirmed absent an abuse of that discretion. Mamot v. Mamot,283 Neb. 659, 813
N.W.2d 440 (2012)
A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly
untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right in denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition. Turbines LTD v. Transupport, lnc.,285 Neb. 129,825 N.W.2d 767
(20r3)
When evidence is in conflict, an appellate court considers and may give weight to, the
fact the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another. Keig v. Keig,20 Neb. App. 362,826 N.W.2 d 879 (2012)
Under Neb. Rev. Srar. $ 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a
three step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or non-marital. The
second step is
to value the marital
assets and
liabilities of the parties. The third step is to
calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties and
in
accordance with the
principles contained in $42-365 . Sitz v. Sitz,275 Neb. 832,749 N.W.2d 470 (2008)
The ultimate test in determining the appropriateness of the division of the property's faimess and
reasonableness is determined by the facts
N.W.2d 746 (2004)
of each case. Hosack v. Hosack,267 Neb. 934,678
If
pre-marital property can be identified,
it is typically
set
off to the spouse who brought the
property into the marriage. Chanonv. Charuon, 16 Neb. App.724,751 N.W.2d645 (2008)
The burden of proof to show that property is a non-marital asset remains with the person making
the claim. Harris v. Harris,26l Neb. 75,621N.W.2d 491 (2001); Nygren v. Nygren,14 Neb.
App. l, 704 N.W.2d257 (2005)
ARGUMENT
Anna Calhoun refers to her brief as "Replacement Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant" on
the cover of her brief. Nowhere else in her brief does she make mention of her intention to file a
cross-appeal. However, in her table of contents, Anna identifies the "argument" section of her
brief and identifies the arguments as follows:
l.
The Trial Court Did Not En In Awarding Appellee Sole Physical and Legal
Custody of the Minor Children
II.
The Trial Court Erred in Not Allowing Appellee to Move with the Children to
Alabama (emphasis added)
m.
The Trial Court Erred When
It
Determined the Appellant's Income For
Purposes Of Child Support, Alimony, And Auomey's Fees (emphasis added)
IV.
The Trial Court Ened In Dividing The Marital Estate When
From The House Was The Appellant's Pre-Marital Assets (sic)
It
Found $45,000
Thereafter, Anna does, on Page 3, set forth "Assignments of Error" which repeat verbatim those
arguments delineated in the Arguments Section of her Table of Contents.
It is unclear if
assignments are intended to be responsive arguments Appellant's assigned errors, or
attempting to assign her own errors on a cross-appeal, or
these
if Anna
is
if it is a combination thereof.
Pursuant to the Nebraska Rules of Appellate Practice, Section 2-109(DX4), "Where the
brief of Appellee presents a cross-appeal, it shall be noted on the cover of the brief and it shall
set forth
in a separate division of the brief. This division shall be headed "Brief on Cross-
Appeal" and shall be prepared in the same manner and under the same rules as the brief of
Appellant."
In this case, Anna does not appear to have complied with court rule. If this court
determines she has not, it may be that this court
will not consider any assignments of error she
has made. However, in the event this court were to consider Anna's brief as a properly asserted
cross-appeal, Charlie provides this response.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLEE'S REQUEST TO
REMOYE THE MINOR CHILDREN FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.
At trial, Anna sought permission of the court to remove the minor children from the only
home they have ever known in Lincoln, Nebraska to Fairhope, Alabama. The trial court, after
'opresuming" for purposes of analysis that Anna had legitimate reasons for the move, conducted a
complete analysis as required pursuant to Farnsworth v. Farnsworth,25T Neb. 242,597 N.W.2d
592 (1999) Pursuant to Farnsworth, the threshold question when presented with a request to
remove the minor children is the legitimacy of the parent's motive for moving. Farnsworth Id;
Harder v. Harder,246 Neb. 945, 524 N.W.2d 325 (1994) If a trial court finds the custodial
parent's reasons for moving are legitimate, the trial court should go on to consider the motives
each parent,
in proposing and resisting the move, in its analysis of the best interests.
Id.
of
The
trial judge did exactly that in this case and properly determined that Anna not be allowed to
remove the minor children from the jurisdiction.
A.
Does the parent have
a legitimate reason for the move? Anna testified
she
believed she had a legitimate reason for moving to Alabama. 231:17-19. That reason was that
she had a very loving and supportive and committed family who can help
with all the interests
and needs of her children. 231:21-23. She further testified that there were more opportunities
for her income for employment to be enhanced by
a move
to Alabama. 232:9-17. The trial court
specifically found "while the evidence does not overwhelmingly support a finding that there is a
legitimate reuuon for the move, the court will find, for purposes of this analysis, that Plaintiff has
canied this burden to show there
is
legitimate reason for the move." (T200) Essentially, the
trial court was saying there may not be a legitimate reason for the move, but she intended to offer
the remainder of the analysis to provide Anna with an explanation for the basis for her decision.
B1. What are the motives of each party for requesting/opposing the move? The trial
court moves then to the three factors to determine the best interests of the children. The first is to
address the motives
of the
parties
for favoring/opposing the move. (T200) The court
summarized Anna's position in one sentence: "The Plaintiff favors the move because she wants
to live nearer to her extended family members in order to have their help and support in raising
the four children." (T201) Anna went on to testifr that she believed she cannot raise the
children without assistance. (T201) Anna testified that for her children to reach their potential,
she needs other family members to help raise her
children. 314: 4-7. Anna testified that if
she
were in Lincoln and working full time, she would be too exhausted to help her children reach
their full potential. 314: 8-11. On the other hand, Charlie's opposition to the move was multifaceted. (T201) He opposed the move because his parenting time and ability to have frequent
contact with his children and participate in their lives would be significantly and detrimentally
affected. (T201) Charlie was further concerned that this would negatively affect the mental
stability of his oldest daughter, Elise. (T201) Charlie was also concerned that at least one
member of Anna's family, her father, is not a good influence, and has caused difficulties when
he has been involved with the
family. Anna testified that her father was under the influence and
was inappropriate with Elyse. 316:l-9. The evidence supported Charlie's concerns and his basis
for objecting to the move.
82. How will this affect the children's quality of life? The second of the three broad
considerations for a trial court is to assess the potential that the move holds for enhancing the
quality of life for the child and custodial parent. Pursuant to Farnsworth,therc are"a number of
factors that may assist trial courts in assessing" this consideration including nine as delineated
therein. Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 257 Neb. 242,597 N.W.2d 592 (1999) Judge Nelson
followed the court's pronouncement in Farnsworth and examined each of the factors delineated
therein.
The court then went on to the nine factors used to analyze the enhancement of the quahty
of life of the children and the custodial parent. The hial court was quite definitive in
its
statement that "on at least four of the nine factors, there was no evidence" to support Anna's
request to move. Despite Anna's argument that the trial court was to use "eight criteria to be
weighed against each other," the three considerations (motives from each parent requesting or
opposing the move, the children's quality of life and impact on non-custodial parent's visitation)
should be viewed in their entirety with no particular hierarchy of factors or any specific weight
assigned to any individual factor.
The trial court specifically found that no evidence was presented that the move would
enhance
The
tial
in any way the emotional, physical and developmental
needs
of the children. (T201)
court found that the opinion of the children who were 13, 10, 8 and 2 is not particularly
relevant to the proceedings. (T201) The trial court found that there was no evidence that the
proposed move holds the potential to enhance Plaintiffs employment.
(T201) The evidence
was that Anna had received no interviews or offers for any jobs in Alabama. (T201) Appellant
presented no evidence that the
job market in Alabama is any better than the job market in
Lincoln, Nebraska. (T201)
The trial court found there was no evidence that Anna's housing or living conditions
would improve
if
she were pennitted to move the children to Alabama.
(T201) The trial court
found there was no evidence that there were any educational advantages for the children if they
were allowed to move to Alabama. (T201) Each parent testified that all of the children were
doing well in school in Nebraska. (T201) There was no evidence presented at all as to what
educational programming might be available for the children in Alabama. (T202)
The trial court specifically found that the children have strong relationships with both
parents. (T202) The trial court determined that a move to Alabama would be contrary to Elise's
therapist, Dr. Shemm's, recommendations that
it is in Elise's best interests to have
equal time
with her father and mother. (T201)
The trial court determined the children have all been born and raised
in
Lincoln,
Nebraska. (T202) The family has traveled to Alabama only a few times and thus all of the
children's ties are in Lincoln, Nebraska. (T202)
The trial court specifically set forth the fact that the hostility between the parties makes
communication very difficult and that a move to Alabama would require greater communication
between the parties, not less.
(T202) The court specifically found that if Anna were permitted to
move with the children, she would naturally acquire the day to day information regarding the
children and that the likelihood that she would keep Charlie apprised of their progress was not
certain. (T202) The court specifically found that the hostility between the parties "simply
exist", and may not be diminished by granting or requesting the move. In summary, of the nine
factors used to examine the children's quality of life
if
allowed to move, the court found that
there was no evidence to support four of the factors.
(T200) The trial court found that one of the
factors (the children's opinion) was not relevant given the age of the children. And of the
remaining four factors, two (ties to the commumty and qualrty of the relationship between the
children and each parent) weighed against the move, while the remaining two factors did not
necessarily weigh one way or the other.
B3. What would the impact of a move have on other parent's visitation? The trial
court then went on to examine the third of the three general considerations including the impact
on Charlie's parenting time. This consideration focuses on the ability of the non-custodial parent
to maintain a
meaningful parent-child relationship. Farnsworth,
therapist, testified
it was in Elise's best interests that Elise
needed
Id. Dr.
Shemm, Elise's
to have equal time with her
parents (T203), and that all of the children enjoy spending time with their father, and in fact, get
a bit jealous
if
one child appears to get more time with him than they
do. (T202) It is also
obvious that Charlie loves his children and not only enjoys his time with them, loves to spend
time with them. (T203) The court went on to say that putting a 1,000 miles between the
children and their father under the circumstances of this case was not in the children's best
interests. (T203)
In summary, the trial court was not persuaded by the evidence that Anna had a legitimate
reason for the move or that the children's quality
of life would be improved by the
move.
Further, it found that the move would be detrimental to Charlie's relationship with the children.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CALCULATE APPELLAIIT'S INCOME TOO LOW
FOR PURPOSES OF CHTLD SUPPORT, ALrMOtty AND ATTORNEY'S X'EES.
Charlie assigned as elror that the trial court erroneously calculated his income for
purposes of child support, alimony and attomey's fees. In particular, Charlie asserted the trial
court calculated his income too high. Conversely, Anna seemingly assigns as error that the trial
court erred by calculating his income too
low. In the heading of the argument,
she claims his
income is too low for purposes of child support, alimony and attorney's fees. (Appellee's Brief
at 1) In her request for relief, she asked this court to affrrm the award of alimony, but does not
address her claim regarding attomey's
fees. She further only
asks the court
to remand the
directions to include certain items in income that were originally not included and recalculate the
amount of child support. (Appellee's Brief at 28)
Essentially, Anna argued that the trial court erred in not including certain other income
for purposes of child support. In particular, she alleges the reimbursement of expenses charged
to Charlie's personal credit card should have been counted as income. (Appellee's Brief
She further argues that loans to Charlie from the company
at2l)
in an amount equal to his rent should
have been included as income. (Appellee's Brief at 21)
Anna asserts a number of other expenses including country club membership, football
tickets, baseball tickets, basketball tickets, the half of the use of his company vehicle not claimed
as personal, parking spots across from the
passes should have been considered as
football stadium, his cell phone, and Champions Club
income. (Appellee's Brief at 23)
Addressing these arguments individually, the first is the use of the personal credit card
seeking reimbursement of business expenses. There is a process by which Charlie submits an
expense report and obtains reimbursement. Such expenses may include entertainment expenses
for clients, travel and the like. Such expenses properly do not appear on a 1099 or W-2. This is
because they are
not income, but rather expenses associated with the nature of the business.
There was no evidence to the contrary to show that said expenses on the credit card for which he
sought reimbursement, were anything other than legitimate business expenses.
As to the loan taken out monthly, the Chief Financial Officer of Jacob North Printing
testified that such payments were, in fact, booked as loans on the company records. Charlie is
not the only employee to whom money is loaned or advanced. This was evidence incuned by
the trial court and no evidence was produced to the contrary.
Anna's cites Gangwish v. Gangwish,267 Neb. 901, 678 N.W.2d 503 (2004) as the
authority
to include perquisites supplied by a
corporation
to a
shareholder
business
to an employee or a closely
held
to be considered as income for purposes of calculating child
support. ln Gangwish, the court commented that it takes a "flexible approach" in determining a
person's income for purposes of child support.
Id. The real question,
the court said, is deciding
what type of factual scenario justifies casting aside the corporate identity to place corporate
income on the shareholder's side of the ledger.
Id.
The record in Gangwisft addressed the
situation where the husband received a salary of $6,000, but the business entity owned the home
in which the parties lived, paid for many of the costs of home ownership including utilities, real
estate taxes, homeowner's insurance, yard care and pool maintenance.
purchased the family's groceries and a number
system, a washer and dryer, and barstools.
Id.
In addition, the business
of household furnishings, including a theater
None of those circumstances were present in this
case. This was not a situation where the business entity was treated as the "family's corporate
piggy bank'. Rather, these were some luxuries afforded to the business for the both the benefit
of the employees who were entertaining clients and clients directly. There was no evidence that
Charlie was the only employee to use or receive the benefit
of any of
these expenditures.
Moreover, some of the benefits (including the company vehicle) are claimed by Charlie on his
tax refurns as a personal expense as per federal tax requirements and are included as income.
10
Sometimes the basketball tickets would be sold to third parties and the sale proceeds
would be returned to Jacob North. (443:16-444:1) The football tickets were sometimes used by
Charlie, sometimes
not. @a4:5-10) The parking spot at Champions Club is generally used by
someone else other than Charlie including clients, prospective clients or employees.
(444:ll-
444:6) Football tickets are owned by the company and used by clients, employees and sometimes
used as charity donations for auction. (445:7-10) The company employees and clients getthe
benefits of the tickets. (472:24-25) Charlie does not control to whom the tickets are given away
to or who gets to use them. (473:25-474:2) Charlie had in the past used personal credit cards for
business expenses, but stopped doing so approximately two years before the parties separated.
(476:15-22;
477:l-5) Charlie is taxed through a 1099 for his personal
use of the company
vehicle. (478:6-9; 478:19-21) Charlie does complete expense reports but does not always
necessarily get all of the money back. (480:2-13) Charlie had not been to a Saltdogs baseball
game in five years and therefore has not used the baseball tickets. Rather the employees of the
company have used the baseball tickets. (480:14-22) Charlie gets a portion of his country club
membership paid for by the company. (482:4-6) Charlie does have to have receips with regard
to his reimbursement requests for business expenses. (485:8-16)
In sum, the trial court did not err in excluding certain business expenditures and company
benefits from the being calculated as part of Charlie's income as requested by Anna. If anything,
as previously asserted
in his Brief of Appellant, the trial court erred in including too much
income to Charlie for calculation of child support, alimony and attomey's fees. Charlie reasserts
each of those arguments here as if they were
fully
11
set forth herein.
IIL
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING
$45,OOO
IN HOUSE EQUITY
WAS THE APPELLANT'S PRE.MARITAL ASSET.
Anna claims the trial court erred when
it
set
off $45,000 of the equity in the parties'
marital home as a non-marital asset to Charlie. Charlie submits the trial court did not err in such
a
determination. The record supports the trial court's findings.
In an action for the dissolution of marriage, an appellate court reviews de novo on the
record, the trial court's determination of custody, child support, property division, alimony, and
attomey's fees; these determinations however are initially entrusted to the trial court's discretion
and
will normally be affirmed absent an abuse of that discretion. Mamot v. Mamot,283
Neb.
659, 813 N.W.2d 440 (2012) A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings
of
a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right in denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition. Turbines LTD v. Transupport, 1nc.,285 Neb.
129,825 N.W.2d 767 (2013)
When evidence is in conflict, an appellate court considers and may give weight to, the
fact the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another. Keigv. Keig,20 Neb. App.362,826 N.W.2d879 (2012)
Under Neb. Rev. Srar. $ 42-365 (Reissue 2008), the equitable division of property is a
three step process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or non-marital. The
second step is to value the marital assets and liabilities
of the parties. The third step is to
calculate and divide the net marital estate between the parties and
in
accordance
with the
principles contained in $42-365. Srtz v. Sitz,275 Neb. 832,749 N.w.2d 470 (2008) The ultimate
test
in
determining the appropriateness
of the division of the property's
t2
fairness and
reasonableness is determined by the facts
of each case. Hosack v. Hosack,267 Neb. 934, 678
N.W.2d 746 (2004) If pre-marital property can be identified, it is typically set off to the spouse
who brought the property into the marriage. Charron v. Charron, 16 Neb. App. 724, 751
N.W.2d 645 (2008) The burden of proof to show that property is a non-marital asset remains
with the person making the claim. Harris v. Harris,26l Neb. 75, 621 N.W.2d a91 (2001);
Nygrenv. Nygren,14 Neb. App.
l,
704 N.W.2d257 (2005)
Charlie requested the trial court grant him credit for the contribution made to the equity
of the home from the life insurance policy he used as a down payment. (441:10-21) Charlie's
testimony was undisputed. The trial court heard Charlie's testimony and made a determination
as to the credibility
of that testimony on this issue. The court also saw three pieces of
documentary evidence which corroborated Charlie's testimony
-
the Policy Loan Statement
(Exhibit 68), the Settlement Statement (Exhibit 69) and the Portfolio Account Review (Exhibit
70). The court then made a specific finding that the $45,000
he testified that came from the
life
insurance policy was used as a down payment on the house. (Exhibit 69)
A
Settlement Statement dated
April I1,2003 shows a contract
sales price
of $260,000
with a principal amount of new loan of $208,000 of the parties' marital home. (Exhibit 69)
There was also a $2,000 deposit or earnest money reduction reflected on that same document.
By inference, this supports the claim that approximately $50,000 would have been paid by the
parties in cash at the time of closing. Additionally, the Policy Loan Summary from Mass Mutual
Life Insurance Company dated April 10, 2003 showing a $45,000 cash loan against the life
insurance policy held prior to marriage which was used for the down payment on the Hillside
Circle home. (410:6-2l,4ll:2-3; Exhibit 68)
13
Finally, the loan information is also set forth on Page
4
showing the principle of
$39,295.60 with a policy annual dividend of $13,036.00 being applied to reduce the loan interest.
This leaves a net cash value of the non-marital asset in the amount of $10,435.00. (Exhibit 70)
as demonstrated on
ExhibitT0, there is an entry as to the face amount of the paid up premium
showing that no premium is billed. (Exhibit 70,Page 4)
There was no evidence to contradict Charlie's testimony that the dividends paid over time
have been applied toward the premium and then applied toward the principal owed on that
original loan. There was no evidence presented to support Anna's claim that any marital monies
were ever used toward the premium on this non-marital life insurance policy.
The trial court did not err in setting off $45,000 of equity in the home to Charlie as non-
marital.
CONCLUSION
Though
it is unknown whether this court will
determine that Anna has complied with
court rules and properly set forth a cross-appeal, Charlie has responded to the same in the event
the court is inclined to consider them. Charlie does ask that Anna's the Assignments of Error not
be considered as a cross-appeal.
In the event, the court does consider Anna's claims as a proper cross-appeal, Charlie
respectfully requests that this court find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any regard
and affrrm each of the specific findings of the court as it relates to denying her request to remove
the minor children from the State of Nebraska and its finding that $45,000 of the equity in the
marital home be satisfied as Charlie's non-marital property. As to the issue of calculating
Charlie's income for purposes of the child support, Charlie requests this court consider the
arguments made
in his Brief of Appellant wherein he argued that the trial court
t4
abused its
discretion in setting his income at an amount too high and therefore abusing its discretion in
establishing child support, alimony and attomey's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES D. CALHOUN, Appellant
THOMAS R LAMB, #15103 for
AMIE C. MARTINEZ, #20433
ANDERSON, CREAGER &
WITTSTRUCK, P.C., L.L.O.
1630
"K'Street
Lincoln, NE 68508
(402) 477-8800
15
IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF'APPEALS
CHARLES D.
CALHOUN,
)
)
)
)
Appellee,
vs.
)
ANNA W.
NEBRASKA
COUNTYOF
LANCASTER
PROOF OF SERVICE
)
)
)
)
)
)
CALHOUN,
Appellant.
STATE OF
CASE NO. A-12-840
)
)
)
ss.
Thomas R. Lamb, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows:
1.
I am a member of the Bar of the State of Nebraska.
2.
On May 7,2013,I caused the original and one
(l)
copy of the Answer
of
Appellant to Brief on Cross-Appeal to be hand-delivered, to the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals for the State of Nebraska.
3.
On May 7,2013,I caused one
(l)
hard copy of the Answer of Appellant to
Brief on Cross-Appeal to be delivered by First Class United States mail, sufficient
postage prepaid, to the following:
Angelica McClure
2935Pine Lake Rd. #E
Lincoln, NE 68516
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
AS R. LAMB, #15103
rlvL
I duy
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, on the
of May,2013.
GEilEnA il0TARY - Stde of t&braslo
ANGIES. HYSTBOM
ily
Comm. Ep.
Atgt6tq
2016