Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace Puzzle
Author(s): Dina A. Zinnes
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 2004), pp. 430-454
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ConstructingPoliticalLogic
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PUZZLE
DINA A. ZINNES
Departmentof Political Science
Universityof Illinois
The statisticalobservationthatwar between democraticstates is exceptionallyrareand the seemingly
contradictoryfindingthatdemocraciesneverthelessdo go to warhaveposed anintriguingpuzzle forthe field
of internationalpolitics. The two explanationsthat have gained the greatestcurrency,the normativeand
structural,have commandedcenter stage for nearly a decade. Recently,however,these explanationshave
come underattack.Using the propositionalcalculus,this studyprovidesa logical constructionof bothargumentsthat(1) explainstheempiricalresultsof why two democraciesdo not go to warwhereasall otherdyads
do go to war, (2) comparesthe normativeand structuraltheories, and (3) facilitates an assessment of the
critiquesleveled at both theories.
Keywords: logic; propositionalcalculus; democraticpeace
The statisticalobservationthat war between democraticstates is exceptionallyrare
and the seemingly contradictoryfinding thatdemocraciesneverthelessdo go to war
have posed an intriguingpuzzle for the field of internationalpolitics (Brecher and
Wilkenfeld 1997; Bremer 1992; Dixon 1994; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz 1998;
Mousseau 1998; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995; Raymond 1994; Russett 1995).
The field's initial reactionwas to challenge the empiricalevidence (Farberand Gowa
1995; Layne 1994; Schwartzand Skinner 1997; Spiro 1994). But the preponderance
of evidence has led to the conclusion that the results are indeed robust.So the next
phase in the evolving paradigmwas to provideexplanations.Whatis the mechanism
that inhibits violence between two democracies, and why is this same mechanism
inoperativewhen a democracy faces a nondemocracy?The two explanationsthat
received the greatest early attention are the normative and structural(Maoz and
Russett 1993; Morganand Schwebach 1992; Russett 1995). The normativeargument
postulatesthatdemocraciespossess a facilitativemechanismthatallows two democraAUTHOR'S NOTE:The algorithmof the computerprogramused here (PropCalc,writtenby Robert
with the proof and outputof the application
Muncaster)is availableat www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm
here.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol.48 No. 3, June 2004 430-454
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704264213
? 2004 Sage Publications
430
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
431
cies to resolve conflicts throughthe sharednormof nonviolenceand bargaining.The
structuralexplanation is based on the inhibitory effect of democratic institutions,
namely,the checks and balances thatmake costly decisions such as war unlikely.
Otherexplanationsstressthe transparencyof democraciesandtheirabilityto signal
reliablyandcommitcredibly(e.g., Fearon1994;Schultz2001; Lipson2003). The earlier structuraland normativeexplanationscontinue to commandattention,however,
and recently the logic behind them has come underattack(Bueno de Mesquitaet al.
1999, 2003; Rosato 2003). Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (1999) point to defects in the two
argumentsbut are principallyconcernedthatneitherargumentis adequateto explain
relatedpieces of evidence about the relationshipbetween regime type and violence.
They proposea new theorybasedon the size of winningcoalitionsin democraciesthat
forces democraciesto work harderat winning wars and thus makes a democracya
more formidableopponent.They then demonstratehow this explanationaccountsfor
the original statisticalresults and more recent relatedempiricalfindings. Less concernedwith providingan alternativeexplanation,Rosato (2003) challenges the logic
thatunderliesboth explanations.In the normativecase, he attemptsto show thatthere
is no evidence thatdemocracies(1) externalizetheirinternalforms of conflict resolution or (2) treatone anotherwith trustand respect, whereasin the structuralcase, he
providesevidence thatsuggests that(1) pacific publics do not constrainpolicy maker
decisions for war and (2) democraciesare not slow to mobilize.
Althoughthe normativeand structuralargumentshaveneverbeen totallyfree from
criticism,the questionsraisedby these recentauthorssuggestthatthe time has come to
carefullyreexaminethese explanations.Before we toss these explanationsaside and/
or proposemodifications,revisions,or totallynew theories,we need to be surethatwe
fully understandthe assumptionsbehindeach theoryand whethereitheror both do or
do not accountfor the empiricalresults. The argumentsare complex and not always
parsimonious.Thus, before we can conclude that the theories are logically fatally
flawed, we need to identify carefully the logical structureof each theory.
The goal of this articleis to illustratea system of logical analysis thatenables the
constructionof a sound representationof the normativeand structuralexplanations.
This will permitan assessmentof whethereitherargumentpredictswhy two democracies do not go to war,but why otherpossible dyads-democracy-nondemocracy and
two nondemocracies-do go to war. These objectives will be pursuedusing formal
logic, namelythe propositionalcalculus.This will requireidentifyingthe key ideas in
each argument,the atomic propositions,and the constructionof the centralpremises
of each theoryby linking atomicpropositionsusing the operationsof not, and, or, and
implies.Using the rulesof the propositionalcalculus, we will thenbe able to ascertain
whetherthese argumentsare sufficientto predictpeace betweendemocraciesandwar
between otherpairsof regimes.
Moreover,the logical constructionof the democraticpeace argumentswill additionallyhelp settle the literature'sambivalenceaboutthem. Some scholarsbelieve the
two explanationsare in competitionwith one another.These researchershave sought
ways to determinewhetherone argumentis betterthan the other (Maoz and Russett
1993;MorganandSchwebach 1992). Othersbelieve thateach explanationplays a role
butunderdifferentconditions(Starr1992), thatis, thatthe two argumentsarenot com-
432
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
petitivebutcomplementary.More recently,Eyermanand Hart(1996) have suggested
that the two argumentsare not independentof one another,and may indeed be one.
Thus, a second goal of this analysis is to compare the two argumentsto determine
whetherthey are differentand, if different,whetherthey are competitiveor complementary.If we aresuccessful in achievingthese goals, we can thenturnto the question
of flaws andreexaminethe critiquesprovidedby Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (1999) and
Rosato (2003).
CONSTRUCTING THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT
Both the normativeand structuraltheoriesconcerntwo types of states:democratic
and nondemocratic,and the interactionsbetween possible pairs. Thus, we begin our
constructionby defining two atomic propositions, where an atomic proposition is
defined as a statementthatcan be either true or false:
Al = stateX is a democraticstate.
A2 = state Yis a nondemocraticstate.
If state X is democratic,the first statementis true;if it is nondemocratic,it is false.
Given these two atomic propositions,we can constructcombinationsof interacting
pairs;for example,
(A ^ A2)
is a democratic-nondemocratic
pair,wherethe symbol A standsfor the operator"and,"
(AI A-A2)
is a pair of two democraticstates, where the symbol - standsfor "not,"and
(--A AA2)
is a pair of nondemocratic states. We note that the first type of dyad, democraticnondemocratic, can also be represented by
(-A
l
A- A2),
where X is now the nondemocratic state and Y is the democratic state.
Next, we need to specify the differences between democracies and nondemocracies. Morgan and Schwebach (1992, 306) state that
liberaldemocraciesare ... peaceloving ... because of the normsregardingappropriate
methodsof conflict resolutionthatdevelop withinthe society. Adjudicationandbargaining are viewed as propermethodsof resolving disputes.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
433
Maoz and Russett (1993, 625) write,
Democratic
politicalcomregimesarebasedonpoliticalnormsthatemphasizeregulated
petition through peaceful means....
Political conflicts in democracies are resolved
of "liveandlet live,"
[in]anatmosphere
throughcompromise
whereasin nondemocracies,conflicts are more likely to be seen as zero sum
so conflictsin nondemocratic
regimesare morelikelyto be conductedandresolved
of mistrustandfear.
throughviolenceandcoercion[creating]anatmosphere
Later,Maoz andRussett(1993, 628) providefulleroperationaldefinitionsbasedon
Polity II data(Gurr,Jaggers,andMoore 1989), in which regimetype is determinedas a
function of
of politicalparticipation,
of participation,
(1)competitiveness
(2)regulation
(3)competitivenessof executiverecruitment,
and(5) con(4) opennessof executiverecruitment
straintson thechiefexecutive.
Althoughthese areuseful initialcharacterizationsof democraticstructure,we need
to go further.We need to ask what it is abouta democracythatmakesit willing to bargain andcompromise,andwhataspectof a nondemocracymakesit proneto use force.
Why do democraciessolve conflicts throughadjudicationand bargaining?In On
the Social Contract,Rousseau([1762] 1987, 18) builds an explanationby firstnoting
that"libertyis one consequenceof the natureof man ... all are bornequal and free."
This basic premiseallows him to arguethat"sinceno manhas a naturalauthorityover
his fellow man . . . conventions remain the basis of all legitimate authorityamong
men."The conventionis "a form of association,which defends and protectswith all
common forces the person and goods of each."The significance of this convention,
otherwise known as the social contract,is that it functions in accord with a set of
agreedupon rules, that is, laws. As Rousseau argues,
Thispassagefromthestateof naturetothecivilstate... substitutes
justiceforinstinct....
Whata manlosesthroughthesocialcontractis his naturalliberty.... Whathe gainsis
civil liberty.... Forto be drivenby appetitealoneis slavery,[but]obedienceto thelaw
one has prescribedfor oneself is liberty [italics added]. (p. 18)
Amplifying this in Book II, he notes that"lawsare... the conditionsof civil association [and]the populacethatis subjectedto the laws ... their author"(p. 18).
Men arebornfree. They relinquishfreedomto be partof a civil society. By joining
the civil society, an individualbecomes an equalparticipantin makingits laws, thatis,
an individualbecomes a partof the decision process.Because everyoneis a partyto the
decision process, it is necessarilythe case thatunless everyone agrees on everything,
theremust be bargainingand compromiseto arriveat laws thatall can accept. As one
writeron democracyputs it, the
434
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
democraticprocess should providethe means for everyone's ideas ... to be expressed
[and]given a fairchanceof acceptance.... The policy which emergeswill be the resultof
many compromisesand concessions on all sides. (Goble 1946, 52)
Thus, bargaining and compromise arise naturally within a democracy.
We therefore define the following:
A3 = all decisions made by the state involve the participationof the populationand the institutionsthatrepresentthe population,
and propose,
(NI)AI - A3.
If stateX is a democracy,then all decisions involve the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
Or, alternatively,
(N2) -A2 -> A3.
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions involved the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
Why are conflict situations in nondemocracies resolved through the use of force?
According to Goble (1946, 64),
In authoritarianstates... a decision is reachedby one or a few persons... [thepeople] are
in no sense participants... decisions [aremade]with little use of the implementsof compromise and conciliation ... a dictatorshipresolves differences and reaches decisions
throughsuppressingand liquidatingthe opposition.
There are those empowered to make the decisions, and if others disagree they are
"liquidated."
Similarly, Maoz and Russett (1993,625) argue, "The winner may take all, denying
the loser the power or opportunity to rise again."
We define the following:
A4 = all decisions made by the state are made by a small groupof elite leaders,
and propose,
(N3) A2 -> A4.
If state Yis a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
Or, alternatively,
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
435
(N4) -A1 -> A4.
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
We are now in a position to capture the internal conflict resolution processes of both
types of regimes. By defining
A5 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved throughbargainingand
A6 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved using force,
we state two further assumptions of the argument:
(N5) A3 -> A5.
If all decisions involve the participationof the populationand the institutionsthat represent
the population,then conflicts over societal policies are resolved throughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -> A6.
If all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.
But how do we move from the internal conflict resolution mechanism to an international conflict resolution mechanism? According to Maoz and Russett (1993, 625),
states use the conflict resolution mechanism with which they are familiar:
Normativeassumption1: States,to the extentpossible, externalizethe normsof behavior
that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and
institutions.
This suggests the following atomic propositions:
A7 = a state uses force to settle interation conflicts and
A8 = a state uses a bargainingstrategyto settle internationconflicts,
and the premise that
(N7) A6 -> A7.
If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle
internationconflicts.
A possible additional premise might be the following:
A5 -
A8.
436
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
If a state uses a bargainingstrategyto settle conflicts over societal polices, then it uses bargaining to settle internationconflicts.
However,Maoz andRussett(1993, 625) arenot satisfiedwith such a premise.Noting the qualificationin normativeassumption1, "tothe extentpossible,"they proceed
to state normativeassumption2:
The anarchicnatureof internationalpolitics implies thata clash betweendemocraticand
nondemocraticnormsis dominatedby the latterratherthanby the former.... In such a
system states put their survivalabove any othervalue.... If states come to believe that
theirapplicationof domesticallydevelopeddemocraticnormswouldendangertheirsurvival they will act in accordancewith the normsestablishedby their rival. Democratic
normscould be more easily exploited thancould nondemocraticones. Hence democracies ... shift norms when confrontedby a nondemocraticrival.
In short, survival is the sine qua non for any state, democracy or nondemocracy.
Hence, if a democracy'ssurvivalis threatened,it mustdo everythingto preserveitself.
If a democracybecomes engaged in a conflict with a nondemocracy,that the nondemocracy uses force necessarily poses a threatfor the democracy.The nondemocracy's use of force is a challenge to the democracy'ssurvival,requiringthatthe democracy abandonits predispositionto use a bargainingstrategyand adopt instead a
policy of force: the norm of force overwhelmsthe normof bargaining.We therefore
define the following:
A9 = a state's securityis threatened,
and note that states thatuse bargainingto solve societal problemscan only affordto
use bargainingto settle internationconflicts if they are not threatened:
(N8) (A5
A
-A9) -> A8.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its security is not threatened,
then it will use bargainingto settle internationconflicts.
Or, alternately,
(N9) (A5
A
A9) -> A7.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis threatened,
then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
We flesh out the argumentby indicatingthe conditionsunderwhich a state'ssecurityis
threatened.We define the following:
A 10 = statesX and Yare in conflict,
and propose,
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
437
(N10) (A10 ^ A7) -> A9.
If statesX and Y are in conflict and one state uses force to settle internationconflicts, then
the other state's securityis threatened.
(N 1) A9 -
A7.
If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
The argument is completed by defining the additional atomic propositions:
Al 1 = states X and Yboth use force to settle theirconflict,
A 12 = statesX and Ygo to war,
and postulating,
(N12) (A10 A A9) -> Al1.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state's securityis threatened,then statesX and Yuse
force to settle the conflict.
(N13) All -- A12.
If statesX and Yuse force to settle intemationconflict, then states X and Y go to war.
We consider next why nations do not opt for force when engaged in an international
conflict. If X and Yare in conflict and X and Y are both democracies, then the argument
proposes that force is not used:
(N14) (A10 AA1 -A2) -> -A7.
If states X and Yare in conflict and state X is a democracyand state Yis a democracy,then
force is not used to settle internationconflicts.
Or alternately,
(N14) (A10 ^ -A9) -> -A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and a state's securityis not threatened,then force is not used
to settle interation conflicts.
Finally, given that X and Y are in conflict and that bargaining is used to settle
interation conflicts, then states X and Y do not go to war:
(N16) (A10 A A8) -> -Al1.
If states X and Yare in conflict and bargainingis used to settle internationconflicts, then
statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
(N17)-All -> -A12.
If statesX andYdo notuse forceto settleinternation
conflict,thenstatesX andYdo notgo
to war.
We now have a plausiblerepresentationof the normativetheoryreadyfor analysis.
The analysis of the theorybringsinto play the rules, thatis, theorems,of the propositionalcalculus.By applyinga given rule (e.g., modusponens, modustollens, or hypothetical syllogism) to the premises, we obtain new propositions,that is, deductions.
These new propositionscan then be combined with the initial premises, and the rule
can be reappliedto producefurtherpropositions(new deductions).Clearly,this can be
done with each rule. Applying a set of rules to the initialpremisesgeneratesa new set
of propositions/deductions.The rulescan now be appliedto the originalpremisesplus
the new output,generatingyet furtherdeductions.Eventually,of course,the continual
applicationof the rules to the previouslygeneratedoutputproducesno new information. The computerprogramknown as PropCalc,developed by Robert Muncaster,
uses this algorithm,greatlysimplifying whatwould be a tediousand time-consuming
task.
Before we assess this theory'scapacityto producethe desiredconclusions regarding war and peace, we need to considerthe possibility of redundancyor, in the terminology of the philosophyof science, the theory'sparsimony.Parsimonyin this context
is assessed by determiningwhetherall the premisesarerequired:if any one premiseis
eliminated,will it be producedby the remainingpremises?This assessmentis accomplished by eliminatingone premise at a time and determiningwhetherthat premise
appearsin the deductions.If a given premiseis generatedby the remainingpremises,
thenthatpremisecan be eliminated.The next step in the redundancyanalysisis to see
whetherany combinationof two of the redundantpremisesis redundant,and so forth.
This tedious and time-consuming task is greatly simplified by PropCalc'sbuilt-in
redundancysubprogram.Using the algorithmoutlinedabove, it can be shown thatthe
following combinationsof premisesare redundant:
Combination1
(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis threatened,
then it will use force to settle interation conflicts.
(N10) (A10 A A7)-
A9.
If statesX andYarein conflictandone stateusesforceto settleinterationconflicts,then
the other state's securityis threatened.
Combination2
(N10) (A10 " A7) -
A9.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
439
If states X and Yare in conflict and one state uses force to settle internmation
conflicts, then
the other state's securityis threatened.
(N1l)A9 -> A7.
If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle interation conflicts.
Combination 3
(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis threatened,
then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
(N15) (AO1
^AA9)
-> -A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and a state's securityis not threatened,then force is not used
to settle interation conflict.
In other words, elimination of any of the three combinations of premises will produce exactly the same conclusions. Moreover, it can be shown that combinations 1 and
3 are equivalent, that is, that premises (N9) and (N10) together imply premises (N9)
and (N15), and vice versa. We will therefore streamline the argument for the remaining analyses by eliminating combination 1, premises (N9) and (N10), and producing
the following basic normative theory:
(N1)A1 - A3.
If stateX is a democracy,then all decisions involve the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthat representthe population.
(N2) -A2 -> A3.
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions involved the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
(N3) A2 -> A4.
If state Y is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
(N4) -A1 -- A4.
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
(N5) A3 -> A5.
If all decisions involve the participationof the populationand the institutionsthatrepresent
the population,then conflicts over societal policies are resolved throughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -> A6.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
If all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders,then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.
(N7) A6 - A7.
If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle
internationconflicts.
(N8) (A5
A
-A9) -> A8.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis not threatened,
then it will use bargainingto settle internationconflicts.
(NI 1)A9 -> A7.
If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
(N12) (AI0 ^A9) - A 1.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state's securityis threatened,then states X and Yuse
force to settle the conflict.
(N13) A1 - A12.
If statesX and Yuse force to settle internationconflict, then states X and Ygo to war.
(N14) (A 10 AA
A
-A2) -> -A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and stateX is a democracyand state Y is a democracy,then
force is not used to settle internationconflicts.
(N15) (A10
A
-A9) -
-A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and a state's securityis not threatened,then force is not used
to settle internationconflict.
(N16) (AI0 A A8) -- -All.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and bargainingis used to settle internationconflicts, then
statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict.
(N17) -All
-> -A12.
If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict, then states X and Ydo not go
to war.
For clarity, we will retain the original numbering of the premises.
We can now turn to the main questions driving our analysis of this argument: does
the normative argument predict that two democracies will not go to war and predict
that a democracy and nondemocracy or two nondemocracies will go to war? Using the
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
441
rules/theoremsof the propositionalcalculusthroughthe mediumof the PropCalcsoftware, we considerthreesets of conditions.In each of these settings,it is assumedthat
we have two statesin conflict, thatis, we postulateA10 by addingit to the argument.
Thenwe considerthe situationin which the two statesaredemocracies,thatis, the first
analysis requiresfurtherpostulatingAl and -A2. If the argumentis correct,then by
adding the three assumptions,A10, Al, and -A2, we should discover that the two
states in questiondo not go to war,thatis, thatone of the conclusions (deductions)is
the following:
-A 12 = statesX and Ydo not go to war.
Furthermore,if we assume that one state is a democracy and the other is a
nondemocracy,or thatboth states are not democracies,thatis, if, in additionto A10,
we add Al and A2, or -Al and -A2, or -A1 and A2, we should obtainA12.
Runningthe premisesthroughPropCalcunderthese fourconditions,we do indeed
obtainthe desiredresults.The proof andoutputof the PropCalcanalysescan be found
in the Web site appendix.Thus, the normativetheory,as sketchedabove, explainsthe
empiricalresults for the four sets of dyads. But we need to look at the theory more
closely. Are all the premisesused to generatethe desiredconclusionin each of the four
cases? If not, arethe same premisesused to predictthattwo democracieswill not go to
waralso used to find thatthe otherpairswill go to war?PropCalchas a routinethatcan
be used to answer this question:simplification.For any given conclusion, PropCalc
will determinewhich of the originalpremises were requiredto obtainthat result.
Table 1 presentsthe resultsof the simplificationanalysis.The 15 originalpremises
arelisted in the firstcolumn.Eachof the remainingfourcolumnsindicateswhich premises were requiredto obtainthe desiredresultunderthe conditionlisted at the top of
the column. Thus, the second column shows thatwhen two democraciesare in conflict, wardoes not occur as a consequenceof premise(N 1), (N5), (N8), (N 11),(N 14),
(N16), and (N17). Similarly,columns 3, 4, and 5 show that war is obtainedin these
threecases as a consequenceof premise (N3) or (N4), (N6), (N7), (N 10), (N 12), and
(N 13). Foursignificantfeaturesstandout in Table 1. First,not all premisescome into
play in the four cases. The second premise, -A2 -> A3, is not needed in any of the
arguments,suggestingthatthe normativeargumentcan be streamlinedeven furtherto
only 14 premises.
Second, thereis a markedcontrastin the premisesused when two democraciesare
in conflict as opposed to a pairof states in which thereis at least one nondemocracy.
The premisesused when two democraciesareconsideredarecompletelydistinctfrom
the premisesused when at least one stateis a nondemocracy.Third,exactly the same
premises are involved when one state is a nondemocracyas when both states are
nondemocracies.Finally,if one statein the dyadis a nondemocracy,thenthe argument
uses no informationaboutthe democraticstate.
TABLE I
Use of Normative Premises
Premise
(N1) Al -> A3: If stateX is a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(N2) -A2 -> A3: If state Yis a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(N3) A2 -> A4: If state Yis a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(N4) -A 1 -- A4: If stateX is a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(N5) A3 -> A5: If decisions involve the population,then conflicts over societal policies
are resolvedthroughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -- A6: If decisions are made by an elite, then conflicts over societal policies are
resolvedusing force.
(N7) A6 -> A7: If a state uses force to settle societal conflicts, then it uses force to
settle internationconflicts.
(N8) (A5 A -A9) -> A8: If a state uses bargainingin societal conflicts and its security is
not threatened,then it will bargaininternationconflicts.
(N 10) (A10 A A7) -> A9: If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state uses force to
settle internationconflicts, then a state'ssecurity is threatened.
(NI ) A9 -- A7: If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle
internationconflicts.
(N 12) (A10 A A9) -> A 11: If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state's security
is threatened,then statesX and Yuse force to settle the conflict.
(N 13) A 11 - A 12: If statesX and Yuse force to settle internationconflict, then
statesX and Ygo to war.
(N 14) (A10 ^ Al A AAlA A2) -> -A7: If states X and Yare in conflict and stateX is
a democracyand state Yis a democracy,then force is not used to settle internationconflicts.
A 1: If statesX and Yare in conflict and bargainingis used, then
(N16) (A 10 A8) - -A
statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict.
(N 17) A 1 - -> A 12: If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict,
then statesX and Ydo not go to war.
Two
Democracies
Democ
Nondem
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
443
CONSTRUCTING THE STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT
The structural theory, like the normative theory, rests on the institutional differences between democracies and nondemocracies. Thus, Maoz and Russett (1993,
626) begin the construction of this argument by noting the following in their structural
assumption 1:
Internationalchallenges requirepolitical leaders to mobilize domestic supportto their
policies. Such supportmust be mobilized from those groupsthatprovidethe leadership
the kind of legitimacy thatis requiredfor internationalaction. [Consequently],a democraticpolitical system requiresthe mobilizationof both generalpublic opinion and of a
varietyof institutionsthatmakeup the system of government,such as the legislature,the
politicalbureaucraciesandkey interestgroups.This implies thatvery few goals could be
presented to justify fighting wars in democracies. It also implies that the process of
nationalmobilizationfor warin democraciesis bothdifficultandcumbersome... therefore ... due to the complexityof the democraticprocessandthe requirementof securinga
broadbase of supportforriskypolicies, democraticleadersarereluctantto wage wars....
The time requiredfor a democraticstate to preparefor war is far longer than for nondemocracies.
Because legitimacy in a democracy comes from the general public, that is, a large
number of individuals have decision-making authority, agreement on difficult and potentially costly issues is cumbersome and slow. Our propositional calculus construction thus begins with several of the already defined atomic propositions and premises
used in the normative argument:
(S1)Al -> A3.
If stateX is a democracy,then all decisions made by the state involve the participationof the
populationand the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
(S2) -A2 -
A3.
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions made by the state involve the participationof the
populationand the institutionsthatrepresentthe population,
to which we add two new atomic propositions:
Al 3 = the policy decision is costly and risky,and
A 14 = the policy-makingdecision process is cumbersomeand slow,
and the new premise:
(S3) (A3
A
A13) -
A14.
If the decisions made by the state involve the participationof the populationand the institutions thatrepresentthe populationand the policy decision is costly and risky,then the policymaking decision process is cumbersomeand slow.
444
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
On the other hand, the authors note, "in nondemocratic societies, once the support of
the key legitimizing groups is secured the government can launch its policy with little
regard to public opinion" (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626). In other words, because the
legitimizing group is small and cohesive, the decision process, even on difficult and
costly decisions, such as war, is quick and straightforward. Thus, we can reuse additional atomic propositions and premises from the normative argument:
(S4) A2 -- A4.
If state Y is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders.
(S5) -AI -> A4.
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
We further define the following:
A 15 = the policy-makingdecision process is rapid,
and add
(S6) A4 -> A15.
If decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then the policy-makingdecision
process is rapid.
Moreover, argue Maoz and Russett (1993, 626), in nondemocracies, "Because, in
many cases, the legitimizing groups may benefit from the use of force in foreign affairs, the leadership may feel little restraint in its dealing with other states." Although it
is not entirely clear why or how the legitimizing groups "benefit from the use of force,"
we define
A16 = the use of force in foreign affairsmay be beneficial,
and, using the above quote, postulate the following:
(S7) A4 -> A16.
If decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then the use of force in foreign affairs
may be beneficial.
(S8) A16 - A7.
If the use of force in foreign affairscould be beneficial, then force will be used to settle internationalconflicts.
The other important pieces of the structural argument include the following:
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
445
The time required for a democratic state to prepare for war is far longer than for
nondemocracies.Thus, in a conflict between democracies,by the time the two states are
militarilyreadyfor war,diplomatshave the opportunityto find a nonmiltarysolution to
the conflict (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626).
Using previously defined atomic propositions, we capture these points with the premises:
(S9) (A10
A
Al ^ -A2) -> A14.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and state X is a democracyand state Y is a democracy,then
the policy decision process is cumbersomeand slow.
(S10) A14 -> A8.
If the policy decision process is cumbersomeand slow, then bargainingis used to settle
internationconflicts.
(S11) A8 -> -AI 1.
If bargainingis used to settle internationalconflicts, then states X and Ydo not use force to
settle theirconflict.
(S12) -A11 -
-A12.
If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle theirconflict, then X and Ydo not go to war.
Moreover, Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) argue that
conflicts between a democracyand a nondemocracy... are drivenby the lack of structuralconstraintson the mobilizationandescalationprocesssof the latter.The democratic
state finds itself in a no-choice situation.Leadersare forced to find ways to circumvent
the due politicalprocess.Thus,in such a conflict, the nondemocracyimposes on the democraticpolitical system emergencyconditionsenablingthe [democratic]governmentto
rally supportratherrapidly.
This leads the authors to their second structural assumption:
Shortcutsto political mobilizationof relevantpoliticalsupportcan be accomplishedonly
in situationsthatcan be appropriatelydescribedas emergencies.
This last point is sufficiently similar to a premise in the normative argument that we
will reuse that premise here:
(S13) (A10 AA7) - A9.
If states X and Yare in conflict and force is used to settle internationconflicts, then a state's
securityis threatened,
adding the clarification:
446
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
(S14) A9 -> A15.
If a state's securityis threatened,then the policy-makingdecision process is rapid,
and completingthe argumentwith:
(S15) (A9
A
A15) -> Al .
If a state's securityis threatenedand the policy-makingdecision process is rapid,then states
X and Yuse force to settle theirconflict.
(S16)All ->A12.
If statesX and Yuse force to settle theirconflict, then statesX and Ygo to war.
Given this propositionalcalculusconstructionof the structuralargument,the analysis
proceedsin a mannerparallelto the analysisof the normativeargument.First,we discover thatthese 16 premisescontainno redundancies,thatis, no single premisecan be
logically inferredfrom the remaining15 premises.Second, we inputthe cases of two
democracies,one democracyand one nondemocracy,and two nondemocraciesand
find thatwe obtain the desired conclusion in each case, namely two democraciesdo
not go to war,whereasthe othercombinationsof regimetypes do go to war.The structuraltheory,like the normativetheory,producesthe necessaryoutcomesin all cases.
The thirdissue for considerationis the set of premises used to obtain the desired
conclusionin each of the threecases. Table2 providesthese results.Note thatthereare
four premises in the structuraltheory thatare never used: (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S6).
Thus, the structuraltheorycan be made moreparsimoniouswith respectto these conclusions by deleting these premises.Note thatthis is a differentconcept of parsimony
from thatdiscussed above. Earlierwe examinedthe parsimonyof the entiretheoryby
determiningwhetherany one or morepremises,if deleted, would be found in the conclusions generatedby the remainingpremises. Here, we have found thatcertainpremises have no function with respect to a particularconclusion being sought.
Table2 illustratesanothersimilaritybetweenthe normativeand structuraltheories:
thereis no overlapin the premisesused to drawthe no-war/warconclusion in the two
democraciesversusone or morenondemocracies.As before,the structuraltheoryconsists of two distinctsubtheories,one for two democraciesand anotherfor one or more
nondemocracies.Finally, as in the normativetheory,the democracy-nondemocracy
case uses exactly the same premises as the two nondemocracies.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN? PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
Surprisesare only surprisesonce; when you see it, you realize it was obvious all
along. For me, the "obvious"surprisewas discoveringthatregardlessof theory,normative or structural,the explanationfor peace between democracieshas no overlap
TABLE 2
t
uN^~~~~~~~
Premise
1~~~Use
of StructuralPremises
Two
Democracies
(S ) Al -- A3: If stateX is a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(S2) -A2 -> A3: If state Yis a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(S3) (A3 A A13) -> A14: If decisions involve the populationand the policy decision is
costly and risky,then the decision process is slow.
(S4) A2 -> A4: If state Yis a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(S5) -A1 -> A4: If state Yis a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(S6) A4 -> A 15: If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the policymakingdecision process is rapid.
(S7) A4 -> A16: If decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders, then the use of
force in foreign affairsis beneficial.
(S8) A16 -> A7: If the use of force in foreign affairsis beneficial, then force will be used
to settle internationalconflicts.
(S9) (A 10 A1 a ~A2) -> A14: If states X and Yare in conflict and stateX is a democracy
and state Yis a democracy,then the decision process is slow.
(S10) A14 -> A8: If the decision process is slow, then bargainingis used to settle
internationconflicts.
(S 11) A8 -> -A 11: If bargainingis used to settle internationalconflicts, then statesX and Y
do not use force to settle their conflict.
(S 12) -A 1l - - A 12: If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle their conflict, thenX and Ydo
not go to war.
(S 13) (A 10 A A7) -> A9: If states X and Yare in conflict and force is used to settle international
conflicts, then a state'ssecurity is threatened.
(S14) A9 -> A15: If a state's security is threatenedthen the policy-makingdecision process
is rapid.
(S15) (A9 ^ A15) -> A 11: If a state's security is threatenedand the decision process is rapid,
then statesX and Yuse force to settle their conflict.
(S 16) A 11 -> A 12: If statesX and Y use force to settle their conflict, then states X and Y go
to war.
Democr
Nondem
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
448
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
with the argumentfor why other dyadic combinationscan lead to war. These two
explanationsdo not share any common premises. Moreover,as soon as there is one
nondemocracy,you need no furtherinformationaboutthe otherstatein the dyad. It is
the existence of the nondemocracythatproducesthe waroutcome.This is becausethe
existence of the nondemocracyleads to a threatto the securityof the other state, and
any threatto a state's security brings into play, for whateverreason, a response of
force.
The literatureon the democratic peace has frequently alluded to the contrast
betweenthe monadicanddyadicarguments:if two democraciesdo not fight, thenhow
does one explain that democraciesare no more peaceful than nondemocracies?The
answerlies in thata monad,like a democracy,is in a dyadicenvironmentin the context
of a conflict. If a democraticstate is involved in a conflict with anotherdemocratic
state,thereis no threatanddemocraticnormscan function.But if you puta democratic
stateinto a conflict with a nondemocraticstate,the environmentis completely different. Indeed, the analyses suggest that there is no difference between a democraticnondemocraticdyad and a dyad composed of two nondemocracies.Threatexists in
both cases; hence, the prospectsfor war are the same.
This seems to suggest that we have been paying too much attentionto the democraticside of the argument.Orperhapsthe betterway to put it is thatwe have not paid
enough attentionto the nondemocraticpartof the argument.According to the argument,democraciesdo use theirbargainingnormto solve internationalcrises if theyare
permittedto do so by an absence of threatto their survival.The issue then is notjust
whethermoredemocraciesin the internationalsystem makewarless likely. The other
side of the coin is that the greaterthe numberof nondemocraciesin the system, the
greaterthe amountof threatin the system and consequentlythe higherthe likelihood
of war.Assumingthatthe numberof statesin the systemis moreor less fixed, it is obvious thatas more statesbecome democracies,fewer stateswill be nondemocracies.But
it is not sufficientto consideronly the numberof democraticstatesin the system. The
other part of the picture is that as the number of nondemocracies in the system
increases,the numberof dyads involving at least one nondemocracyincreases.From
thisperspective,for each additionalnondemocracyin the system, the numberof dyads
thatexperiencethreatincreases,therebyincreasingthe prospectsfor war.
More formally,if we define
N = numberof statesin theinternational
systemand
M = numberof nondemocracies
in theinternational
system,
then the numberof dyads involving at least one nondemocracyis given by
(M[N - M] + M[M - 1])/2 = threatlevel in the internationalsystem.
When M = 0, thatis, all the statesin the system are democracies,the threatlevel is 0,
and the probabilityof war is 0. Plottingthis functionagainstM producesFigure 1, a
parabolathatincreasesat a decreasingrate.Thus, as the numberof nondemocraciesin
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
449
N = Numberof Nations
M = Numberof Nondemocracies
D = SystemicThreat
D
D=F(M)= M(M-1) + M(N-M)
-N(N-I ) -------------------------
N
M
Figure 1: Systemic Propensity for War
the system increases, holding the system size constant, the threatlevel and consequently the probabilityof war increase at a decreasingrate. This result is consistent
with the analyses of Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), although their model allows for
changes in the size of the system (N) and only examines democratic-nondemocratic
dyads as a functionof increasingthe numberof democracies.It is also consistentwith
a comparableanalysisby Cederman(2001) thatshows a decayingtrendin the conflict
propensitiesof democraticand nondemocraticdyads since the 19th century.
But what is the relationshipbetween the normativeand structuraltheories? Are
these two independent,complementary,or competing theories? There are several
ways these questions might be answered.First, as alreadynoted, the normativeand
structuraltheoriesproducevery similarresults.In both theories,thereis a disconnect
between the set of premisesthatpredictno warbetweentwo democraciesandthe premises thatlead to the conclusion of warbetween a dyad in which at least one stateis a
nondemocracy.Moreover,in both theories,the predictionof warwhen thereis at least
one democracyin the dyaduses only the informationthatone stateis a nondemocracy.
However,we can examine this questionfurtherin Figures 2 and 3, which provide
diagrammaticcomparisonsof the normative(solid arrows)and structuralarguments
(dashed arrows). Figure 2 considers two democracies, whereas Figure 3 examines
dyads involving at least one nondemocracy.Each arrowrepresentsa premiseused in
obtainingthe no-waror wardeduction.The partiallydashedarrowat the top of Figure
3 indicatesthatyou only need one of those two premises,butnotboth,in the normative
argumentinvolving at least one nondemocracy.Thus, Figures 2 and 3 illustratethe
linkages between the atomic propositions,that is, the premises, requiredto obtain
either the no-waror war conclusion for each theory.When more than a single arrow
points to (or from) an atomic proposition,the interpretationis thatit is the combined
set of atomic propositionsthatproducesthe conclusion. However,the figures do not
discriminatebetween "and"and"or."Forexample,in Figure2, all threeatomicpropositions, Al, -A2, andA10, areconnectedto -A7, butit is not clearwhethereach link is
an "and"or "or."
450
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
-A2
Al
State Y is a democracy
State X is a democracy
AIO
States X and Y are in conflict
/
A3
Decisions are made^
by the population
/ 14
Decision
process is slow
-A7
Internationalconflicts
are not resolved with force
A5
-A9
Bargaining is used to
settle societal conflicts a
A state's security
is not threatened
A8
A state uses bargainingto
settle internationalconflicts
-All
States X and Y do not use force
to settle theirconflict
?
I,n I.iE
NormativeTheory
Structural Theory
-A12
States X and Y do not go to war
Figure 2: Two Democracies
Figures2 and3 demonstratethe differencesandsimilaritiesbetweenthe normative
and structuralargumentsby highlighting the differentatomic propositionsused. In
Figure2, the structuralargumenttakesone fromthe two democraticstatesin conflict,
to A14 ("thedecision processis slow"),andfromtheredirectlyinto A8 ("bargainingis
used to solve internationalconflicts"), whereasthe more complex normativetheory
uses fouratomicpremisesto arriveat A8. Thus,the two theoriesdifferin thatdifferent
premisesare used to arriveat A8, "a stateuses bargainingto settle internationalconflict."On the otherhand,whetherin the structuralargumentone goes from A 14 to A8
or,in the normativeargument,fromA3, A5, A7, andA9 to A8, the destinationremains
the same. In this sense, the two argumentsappearvery similar.Moreover,it could be
arguedthatA3, A5, A7, andA9 imply A 14-when the populationis involved,thereis
a societal norm of nonviolence and no threat,and then the decision process is very
likely to be slow. To determinewhetherthe two theories are indeed distinct would
requirean analysisof all conflicts between democracies.If therearetwo theories,not
one, it shouldbe the case thatA3, A5, A7, andA9 arepresent,butA 14 is not. Are there
conflicts between democraciesthatwere resolved with speed, where speed might be
definedas being shorterthanthe time betweenthe onset of conflict andthe declaration
of war in dyads thatdid go to war?Similarly,in Figure 3, it could be arguedthat A6
("societalconflicts are resolved by force") and A16 ("use of force in foreign affairs
may be beneficial")aredifferentmanifestationsof the same phenomenonof belief in
PEACEPUZZLE 451
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATIC
A10
-A1
A2
StateY is nondemocratic StateX is nondemocratic StatesX andY arein conflict
A4~
Decisionsaremadeby aneliete
A6
Useofc6
Societalconflicts
//
foreignaffairsi
resolved
byforce
/
beneficial
/
A7
conflicts
International
f
resolvedby force
ACAb
A state'ssecut
/
a
is threatened
A15
Thedecisionprocess
is rapid
All
StatesX andY use force
to settle their conflict
>
!Y
X
goto
NormativeTheory
StructuralTheory
12aY
,a..r
Y go to war
States X and
-......
Normative Alternate
Figure 3: At Least One Nondemocracy
force. Here, however, it would be far more difficult to construct an empirical test to
determine whether the theories are indeed different.
We turn, finally, to the recent critiques of the normative and structural theories. To
what extent do recent critiques undermine either or both theories as they have been
constructed here? Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 792) make the following challenges, with my comments after each one in italics:
1. Providingdemocraticleaders can escape public scrutiny,they often undertakeviolent
acts againstotherdemocracies.
But both theories are designed to explain war,not all violent acts.
2. It may be correctto arguethatdemocraticstatesresortto realiststrategiesin the face of a
powerfulnondemocraticopponentwho threatenstheir existence, but too many democraticwarshave been againstsignificantlyweakerstatesto be sustainedas an explanation for the democraticpeace.
Thisinterestingobservationshouldbe the basisforfurther refinementof the theories to
incorporatepower Butfor the critique to be damaging,it must be shown that relative
power is the onlyfactor that makesone state a threatto another.
3. The institutional-constraintsargument holds that democracies are more deliberate
[which raises] the costs of violence... This suggests ... thatdemocraciesshouldbe unlikely to wage war generally,not just againstotherdemocracies.The empiricalrecord
does not supportsuch a conclusion.
The link between "deliberation"and the costs of violence is not clear, but even if accepted, high costs do not necessarily negate war decisions. Both the normativeand
452
RESOLUTION
OFCONFLICT
JOURNAL
structuraltheories suggest that whenthe threatis high, costs become a lesser consideration.
4. Most importantfrom a theoreticalposition, none of the institutional-constraintsargumentshas a sufficientlywell-developedtheory... thatproducesthe [other]eight [empirical] regularitiesobserved (p. 793).
Thismay indeed suggest that these authors'theoryis superior.But before rejectingthe
normativeand/or structuraltheories,we need to explorethe extentto whichthe normative and structuraltheories are indeed distinctfromand at variance with the one being
proposed.
Thus, Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (1999) show ways in which the normativeand structuraltheoriesmightprofitablybe furtherdeveloped,buttheircritiquedoes not provide
grounds,at this stage, to rejecteither theory.
Rosato's (2003) argumentsare as follows, with my commentsagain in italics:
1. The historicalrecordindicatesthatdemocracieshave often failed to adopttheirinternal
normsof conflict resolutionin an internationalcontext(p. 588). Thereareseveralexamples of liberalstatesviolatingliberalnormsin theirconductof foreignpolicy (p. 589).
Thenormativeargumentdoes not say that democraticstates will always use their internal nonviolentconflict resolutionnorm, only that they do so vis-a-vis each other.
2. Proponentsof the democraticpeace [claim] thatdemocraciesremainat peace because
they trust and respect one another (p. 589). The available evidence suggests that
democracies do not have a powerful inclination to treateach other with trustand respect (p. 590).
Neithertrustnor respectare necessary to the constructionspresentedhere.
3. Democratic peace theoristshave tried to repairthe logic by introducing... perceptions ... availableevidence suggests, however,thatpolicymakers'personalbeliefs ...
precludecoherent ... assessmentsof regime type (p. 592).
Neither construction here incorporatesperceptions. However, Rosato's observation
does suggest that the theories could use additionalworkto explainhow two conflicting
states identifytheir respectiveregimetypes.
4. Each variantof the institutionallogic rests on the claim that democraticinstitutions
makeleadersaccountableto variousgroupsthatmay... oppose the use of force. I do not
disputethis claim but, instead,questionwhetherdemocraticleadersare more accountable thantheirautocraticcounterparts.Since we know thatdemocraciesdo not fight one
anotherandautocraciesdo fight one another,democratsmustbe more accountablethan
autocratsif accountabilityis a key mechanismin explainingthe separatepeace between
democracies.On the otherhand,if autocrats... are more accountablethandemocrats,
then there are good reasons to believe that accountabilitydoes exert the effect. ...
[A]ccountabilityis determinedby the consequences ... for adoptingan unpopularpolicy.... Losing autocratsaremorelikely to sufferseverepunishment..." (pp.593-94)
Thiscritiqueasserts that if accountabilityis the mechanismthatpreventsleadersfrom
makingthe decision to go to war,and if accountabilityis definedin termsof the consequencesfor choosing an unpopularpolicy and it can be shown thatautocratssufferfar
moreserious consequencesfrom makingunpopulardecisions thando democraticleaders, then autocratic leaders should be even more hesitant to go to war Whileconsequencesare surelya componentof "accountability"the moresignificantaspects of accountabilityare (I) the groupsto whomthe leaders are accountableand (2) the wishes
and desires of those groups.A critical characteristicof a democracyis that the leaders
are accountableto the greaterpopulationand the desires of thepopulationoppose war
Theabove critique is valid only if Rosato can show that the groups to whomautocratic
leaders are accountable oppose war.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
453
Thus, Rosato's (2003) critiqueof the normativeand structuraltheories,like thatof
Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (1999), containssuggestionsfor how the argumentsmightbe
improvedand extended,but the criticismsdo not yet providea basis for rejectingthe
logics thathave been constructedhere.
CONCLUSION
Propositionalcalculus providesa mediumfor obtaininga betterunderstandingof
the normativeand structuraltheories,makingit possible to evaluatecriticisms.However,untanglingthe democraticpeace puzzle remainsa workin progress.As Bueno de
Mesquitaet al. (1999) noted 5 years ago, and is even more truenow, many new findings relatedto the democraticpeace need betterexplanation.Canthey be incorporated
into the currentlyconstructednormative/structural
arguments,or must we move to
explanationssuch as the winning coalition theory of Bueno de Mesquitaet al. or the
audiencecosts argumentpresentedby Fearon(1994)? Indeed,what,if any,is the relationshipbetween the winningcoalition argumentandthe audiencecosts explanation?
Are they competitiveor complementaryexplanations?Just as we moved from initial
democratic-peacestatisticalresults to explanationsfor them and then to critiquesof
those explanations,we now need to takethe next step andexpandandrevise the logics
to betterincorporatesuch observationsas the war initiationbehaviorand war victory
rateby democracies(Reiterand Stam 2002).
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