Chronology
Obviously this is a bit idiosyncratic, but the hope is to provide a useful desk
reference for philosophers of mind who require speedy access to a date or title as well
as a bit of context for it. There are a few lines of explanation for each entry – I tried
to encapsulate as much of what matters most in a sentence. Obviously this almost
never works, but a narrative structure really does help think things through. The
narrative ends in 1949 with Ryle‟s Concept of Mind. My excuse for stopping there is
that it‟s difficult to say what the impact or meaning of these books and papers might
be, because we are too close in time to know. Forgive omissions – it is very hard to
know which books and events should be included early on or during unfamiliar
centuries, and it gets extremely difficult as we approach the present.
800 BCE
Homeric poems taking shape between the late 9th and early 8th century – they
characterise the soul thinly, as something lost at death, something which then howls
off to Hades.
600 BCE
Thales (fl. 600) might view psyche as a mover, force, or impetus, something which
initiates the movement of moving things, from animals and people to magnets.
Anaximenes (c. 585 – c. 528) possibly believes that psyche holds a living thing
together and rules or controls it.
Pythagoras (fl. 530) accepts metempsychosis, possibly first to locate the soul in the
head.
500
Anaxagoras (c. 500 – c. 428) seems to argue for a materialist world actuated by a
cosmic intelligence, Mind or Nous.
Heraclitus (fl.500) might believe that psyche is fire, somehow responsible for the
changes attending waking, sleeping and death.
Parmenides (early to mid 5th C) distinguishes between false appearances and reality as
revealed by reason, might flirt with idealism.
400
Empedocles (c. 495 – c. 435) probably formulates the first theory of perception; his
talk of the cosmic psychological principles Love and Strife suggest panpsychism to
some.
Democritus (c. 460 – c. 370) elaborates the atomism of Leucippus, including
materialist conceptions of perception and the soul, might be first to tie soul to
intelligence.
Socrates (c.469 – c. 399), the man not the mouthpiece, might conceive of soul as the
bearer of moral qualities.
Plato (c. 427 – c. 347) distinguishes soul from body, argues for immortality of the
soul, ties soul to reason, Phaedo; divides the soul into three parts: reason, spirit and
appetite, Republic.
Aristotle (c. 384 – c. 322) offers an extended, systematic discussion of psychological
phenomena, De Anima and Parva Naturalia (c. 350); soul characterised as the form of
a living thing.
Epicurus (c. 341 – c. 271) argues for a radical materialism and for the impossibility of
the soul surviving death.
300 BCE
Zeno of Citium (c. 335 – c. 263) founds Stoic School, active until c. 520, which
perpetuates a variety of materialist notions of soul, typically conceived as a breathlike substance diffused throughout the body.
200 BCE
The Septuagint produced between 3rd and 1st centuries BCE; conceptions of the soul
and mental phenomena as depicted in the Hebrew Bible translated into Greek.
100
Lucretius (c. 98 – c. 51) propounds and expands the philosophy of Epicurus,
producing the first philosophical treatment of mind in Latin, De Rerum Natura.
BCE / CE
Philo (c. 20 BCE – c. 50 CE) blends Greek philosophy and Hebrew thought about the
soul.
100
The Church Fathers (end of 1st century to as late as 749 CE) subordinate philosophical
accounts of mind to scriptural ones, raise religious questions, and shape the
intellectual agenda accordingly.
Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 225) advocates traducianism, argues that soul must be somehow
corporeal if it can be tormented in Hell, On the Soul.
200
Origen (c. 185 – c. 254) holds that souls were created by God for contemplation but,
falling away in distraction, became enveloped in bodies, On First Principles.
Plotinus (204/5 – 270/1) founds Neo-Platonism, articulates a conception of soul as
part divine and part entwined with body, as well as an intricate theory of perception,
The Six Enneads.
300
Augustine (354 – 430) offers a detailed description of and reflection on introspected
mental life, Confessions; has thoughts on action theory, On Free Will; might argue by
analogy for other minds, anticipate the cogito, and influence the Cartesian conception
of mind, On the Trinity and City of God.
400
Boethius (c. 480 – c. 524) translates Aristotle and Plato into Latin, emphasizes
rational nature of the soul, Contra Eutychen.
500
600
700
800
900
Avicenna (c. 980 – 1037) integrates Islamic philosophy and Greek thought about
mind and soul, formulates Floating Man thought experiment, On the Soul.
1000
1100
Averroes (1126 – 1198) Latin translations of his commentaries on Aristotle bring
Greek views on mind, through Islamic lenses, back to the West; also develops his own
complex psychology and metaphysics of the soul, Long Commentary on De Anima.
Vespasian Homilies (c. 1150) contain possibly the first use in English of a variation
on the word „soul‟ (sawle), meaning life or life-force.
1200
William of Moerbeke (c. 1215 – 86) undertakes a complete translation of Aristotle
into Latin (c. 1250).
Aquinas (c. 1224 – 1274) reinterprets Aristotle in the light of Christian teaching,
articulates full-blooded conceptions of mind, soul, intellect, memory, appetite, selfknowledge, imagination, perception, etc, Summa Theologiae.
1300
William of Shoreham (fl 1330) writes religious poems containing a forerunner of
„mind‟ (mende), which might be the first use in English tied to cognition.
1400
Marsilio Ficiono (1433 – 1499) is the first to translate all of Plato into Latin, and the
Platonic conceptions of soul and mind are rekindled, Theologia Platonica de
Immortalitate Animae, (1474).
Pomponazzi (1462 – 1525) might anticipate property dualism, On the Immortality of
the Soul.
1500
Shakespeare (1564 – 1616) writes Hamlet (c. 1600), some detect Cartesian
presuppositions in certain soliloquies; others hear Hamlet‟s repressed desires.
1600
Descartes (1596 – 1650) articulates Cartesian Dualism, disentangles new thoughts on
mind from Aristotelian, Platonic and Scholastic thinking, thereby ushers in modern
philosophical reflection on the mental, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
Hobbes (1588 – 1679) defends a causal, empiricist, mechanistic and materialist
conception of mental phenomena, Leviathan (1651).
Geulincx (1624 – 1669) (and Géraud de Cordemoy [1626 – 1684]) follows Descartes,
argues for pre-established harmony before Leibniz, Opera Philosophica (c. 1668).
Spinoza (1632 – 1677) rejects Cartesian Dualism in favour of dual-aspect monism:
there is one substance, God, Ethics (1677).
Locke (1632 – 1704) formulates modern conception of self, raises questions about
personal identity, claims that experience is the source of ideas, sets out limits to
understanding, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).
Malebranche (1638 – 1715) largely follows Descartes, but argues for occasionalism,
Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (1688).
1700
Leibniz (1646 – 1716) argues for pre-established harmony, Discourse on Metaphysics
(1686).
Berkeley (1685 – 1753) writes an account of perception, Essay Towards A New
Theory of Vision (1709) and argues that to be is to be perceived, Principles of Human
Knowledge (1710).
Hartley (1705 – 1747) founds associationist school of psychology, Observations on
Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations (1749).
Hume (1711- 1776) brings the experimental method to bear on mind, follows the
sceptical implications of empiricism through, propounds the bundle theory of self,
Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1748).
Adam Smith (1723 – 90) considers the nature of sympathy, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759).
Kant (1724 – 1804) argues that the structuring activity of the mind makes possible a
world of experience; gives an account of reason, perception, judgement, the
understanding, imagination, etc – a Copernican Revolution in the conception of mind,
Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Critique of
Judgement (1790).
Reid (1710 – 96) brings common sense to an account of sensation, conception, and
perception; uses memory to inform a notion of self, An Inquiry into the Human Mind
on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
(1785).
Bentham (1748 – 1832) articulates modern psychological hedonism, Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789),
1800
Hegel (1770 – 1831) gives an account of the evolution of consciousness as it plays out
in human history, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860) sees blind craving, will, at the depressing centre of
human action; our inner experience of it points to the hidden nature of all things, The
World as Will and Representation (1819).
J. S. Mill (1806 – 73) elaborates on the connection between right and wrong and
pleasure and pain; connects social and political reform to psychology, A System of
Logic (1843)
Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855) claims that subjectivity is truth, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846).
Brentano (1838 – 1917) reintroduces the Scholastic conception of intentionality as the
mark of the mental, and his elevation of introspection paves the way for the
phenomenological movement, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874).
Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) calls the subject a „grammatical fiction‟, On the Genealogy
of Morals (1887).
James (1842 – 1910) largely sets the agenda for both the philosophy of mind and
psychology by advancing influential accounts of the brain, the mind-body relation, the
stream of consciousness, memory, sensation, imagination, will, and emotions – all
peppered with compelling introspective reports, The Principles of Psychology (1890).
Bradley (1846 – 1924) leads the turn towards idealism in the English-speaking world,
rejects empiricist psychology, The Principles of Logic (1883), Appearance and
Reality (1893).
Husserl (1859 – 1938) rejects psychologism and formulates the phenomenological
method, Logical Investigations (1900/1); the method of epoché and transcendental
phenomenology itself appear, Ideas (1913).
Wundt (1832 – 1920) investigates the self-examination of experience, Principles of
Physiological Psychology (1873/4), establishes a laboratory of experimental
psychology in 1879.
Bergson (1859 – 1941) offers an alternative to phenomenology, finds multiplicity in
consciousness, regards intuition as method, Time and Free Will (1889), Matter and
Memory (1896).
T. H. Huxley (1825 – 1895) memorably couches a version of epiphenomenalism in
terms of whistles and steam engines, „On the hypothesis that animals are automata,
and its history‟ (1874).
Peirce (1839 – 1914) raises objections to Cartesian methods and suggests
panpsychism, along with further thoughts on signs and representation, The Fixation of
Belief (1877), The Monist series (1891-1893).
1900
Freud (1856 – 1939), father of psychoanalysis, formulates such concepts as
repression, psychosexual motivation, unconscious desire, as well as the id, ego and
super ego, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Ego and the Id (1923),
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis
Moore (1873 – 1958) brings commonsense realism to metaphysics and epistemology,
„Refutation of Idealism‟ (1903), „Proof of an External World‟ (1939).
Watson (1878 – 1958) gives the boot to consciousness in general and introspection in
particular, „Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It‟ (1913).
Whitehead 1861 – 1947 rejects materialism for the view that nature is a structure of
evolving processes, Process and Reality (1929).
Russell (1872 – 1970) champions analytic method, moves from reflection on sense
data to neutral monism, rejects idealism and psychologism, „Knowledge by
Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description‟, (1910), The Analysis of Matter (1927),
The Analysis of Mind (1929).
Broad (1887 – 1971) argues for emergent vitalism, considers the possibility of
survival after death, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925).
Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) early picture theory of meaning gives way to therapeutic
treatments of problems associated with mental phenomena; private language
argument makes trouble for Cartesian reflection and solipsism, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1922), Philosophical Investigations (1953), The Blue and Brown
Books (1958), On Certainty (1969)
Dewey (1859 – 1952) brings pragmatism to bear on mind, rejects dualisms in favour
of naturalism and evolution; mind emerges socially; founds the functional approach to
psychology, „The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology‟ (1896), Experience and Nature
(1925).
Heidegger (1889 – 1976) urges reflection on Dasein, instead of a misunderstood
conception of Being, reorients numerous mental concepts, Being and Time (1927).
Carnap (1891 – 1970) ties meaning to phenomenalistic language, argues that
metaphysics is meaningless, The Logical Structure of the World (1928),
Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (1928).
Price (1899 – 1984) reflects on perceptual consciousness, sense data, and the role of
concepts in thought, Perception (1932), Thinking and Experience (1953).
Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961) perception takes centre stage, phenomenology meets
scientific psychology, The Structure of Behavior (1942), Phenomenology of
Perception (1945), The Visible and the Invisible, (1964).
Sartre (1905 – 1980) the father of existentialism distinguishes between being-in-itself
and being-for-itself; we‟re both, The Psychology of Imagination (1940), Being and
Nothingness (1943), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) Sketch for a Theory of the
Emotions.
Ayer (1910 – 1989) applies the verification principle to claims about the mind, offers
an analysis of sense data, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), The Problem of
Knowledge (1956), The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (1963).
Ryle (1900 – 1976) ushers in contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing against
Descartes‟ ghost in the machine and for logical behaviourism, The Concept of Mind
(1949).
Turing (1912 – 1954) „Computing Machinery and Intelligence‟ (1950).
Quine (1908 – 2000) „Two Dogmas of Empiricism‟ (1951), „Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes‟, (1956), „Epistemology Naturalized‟, (1969), Word and
Object (1960)
Sellars (1912 – 1989) „Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind‟ (1956), Science and
Metaphysics (1968), „Meaning as Functional Classification‟ (1974)
Place (1924 – 2000) „Is Consciousness a Brian Process?‟ (1956).
Anscombe (1919 – 2001) Intention (1957), „The First Person‟ (1975), Metaphysics
and the Philosophy of Mind (1981).
Chisholm (1916 – 1999) Perceiving (1957), Person and Object (1976), The First
Person (1981), Brentano and Intrinsic Value (1986).
Chomsky (1928) Syntactic Structures (1957), Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965).
Geach (1916) Mental Acts (1957).
Malcolm (1911 – 1990) „Our Knowledge of Other Minds‟ (1958).
Feigl (1902 – 1988) „The “Mental” and the “Physical”‟ (1958, as a book with
Postscript and Preface, 1967).
Smart (1920) „Sensations and Brain Processes‟ (1959), Philosophy and Scientific
Realism (1963)
Strawson (1919 – 2006) Individuals (1959), Freedom and Resentment and Other
Essays (1974) Scepticism and Naturalism (1985).
Austin (1911 – 1960) Sense and Sensibilia (1959)
Armstrong (1926) Perception and the Physical World (1961), Bodily Sensations
(1962), A Materialist Theory of the Mind (1968), The Nature of Mind and Other
Essays (1980), Consciousness and Causality (1984), The Mind-Body Problem (1999).
Davidson (1917 – 2003) „Actions, Reasons and Causes‟ (1963), „Mental Events‟
(1970), Essays on Actions and Events (1980).
Shoemaker (1931) Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (1963), Identity, Cause and
Mind: Philosophical Essays (1984), The First-Person Perspective, and other Essays
(1996).
Lewis (1941 – 2001) „An Argument for Identity Theory‟ (1966), „Psychophysical and
Theoretical Identifications‟ (1972), „Mad Pain and Martian Pain‟ (1980),
Philosophical Papers, Volume II (1986)
Putnam (1926) „The Nature of Mental States‟ (1967), Mind, Language and Reality
(1975) „The Meaning of „Meaning‟‟ (1975)
Dretske (1932) Seeing and Knowing (1969), Knowledge and the Flow of Information
(1981), Naturalising the Mind (1995), Perception, Knowledge and Belief (2000)
Kripke (1940) Naming and Necessity (1972), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language (1982).
Williams (1929 – 2003) Problems of the Self (1973).
Nagel (1937) „What is it Like to be a Bat?‟ (1974), Mortal Questions (1979), View
from Nowhere (1986)
Fodor (1935) The Language of Thought (1975), Propositional Attitudes (1978),
Representations (1979), The Modularity of Mind (1983), Psychosemantics (1987), A
Theory of Content (1990).
Jackson (1943) Perception (1977), „Epiphenomenal Qualia‟ (1982), „What Mary
Didn‟t Know‟ (1986).
Rorty (1931 – 2007) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (1979).
Paul Churchland (1942) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), Matter
and Consciousness (1988), A Neurocomputational Perspective (1989)
Burge (1946) „Individualism and the Mental‟ (1979), Foundations of Mind (2007)
O‟Shaughnessy (?) The Will (1980), Consciousness and the World (2000).
Searle (1932) ‘Minds, Brains and Programs‟ (1980), Intentionality (1983), Minds,
Brains and Science (1984), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992).
Block (1942) „Psychologism and Behaviorism‟ (1981), „On a Confusion about the
Function of Consciousness‟ (1995), Consciousness, Function and Representation
(2007)
Dennett (1942) Brainstorms (1981), Content and Consciousness (1986), The
Intentional Stance (1989), Consciousness Explained (1992), Kinds of Minds (1996),
Brainchildren (1998), Sweet Dreams (2005), Neuroscience and Philosophy (2007)
McGinn (1950) The Character of Mind (1982), Mental Content (1989), The Problem
of Consciousness (1991), The Mysterious Flame (1999), Consciousness and Its
Objects (2004)
Jackson (1943) „Epiphenomenal Qualia‟ (1982), „What Mary Did Not Know‟ (1986)
Peacocke (1950) Sense and Content (1983), A Study of Concepts (1992), Truly
Understood (2008).
Parfit (1942) Reasons and Persons (1984)
Millikan (1933) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984), White
Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (1993)
Patricia Churchland (1943) Neurophilosophy (1986), The Computational Brain
(1992), Brain-Wise (2002)
Honderich (1933) A Theory of Determinism (1988), On Consciousness (2004).
Kim (1934) Supervenience and Mind (1993)
Rosenthal (1939) „Two Concepts of Consciousness‟ (1986), Consciousness and Mind
(2005), „Consciousness and Its Function‟ (2008)
Papineau (1947) Philosophical Naturalism (1993), Thinking About Consciousness
(2002)
McDowell (1941) Mind and World (1994), Mind, Value and Reality (1998).
McCulloch (1951 - 01) The Mind and It’s World (1995), The Life of the Mind (2003)
Tye (1950) Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995), Consciousness, Color and
Content (2000), Consciousness and Persons (2003).
Chalmers (1966) The Conscious Mind (1996)
Clark (1957) Being There (1997), Supersizing the Mind (2008)