Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence
Author(s): James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 729-745
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Framing
and
Deliberation: How
ConversationsLimit
Elite
Citizens'
Influence
James N. Druckman Universityof Minnesota
KjerstenR. Nelson Universityof Minnesota
Public opinion researchdemonstratesthat citizens' opinions depend on elite rhetoricand interpersonalconversations.Yet,
we continue to have little idea about how these two forces interactwith one another.In this article, we addressthis issue by
experimentallyexamining how interpersonalconversationsaffect (prior) elite framing effects. Wefind that conversations
that include only commonperspectiveshave no effecton eliteframing, but conversationsthat include conflictingperspectives
eliminate elite framing effects. We also introduce a new individual level moderator of framing effects-called "need to
evaluate"-and we show that framing effects,in general, tend to be short-livedphenomena. In the end, we clarify when
elites can and cannot useframing to influencepublic opinion and how interpersonalconversationsaffect thisprocess.
W hehen forming political opinions, citizens often turn to others for guidance. Indeed, the
last twenty years of public opinion research
demonstrates that citizens base many of their opinions
on what they hear from elites and on what they discuss
with other citizens.1 While some recent work recognizes
the dual and often competing effects of elite rhetoric and
interpersonal conversations on opinion formation,2 virtually no work examines how these two forces interact
with one another. How do interpersonal conversations
affect elite influence on opinions? How does elite influence affect interpersonal conversations?
In this article, we take a step toward filling this gap
by investigating how citizens' conversations affect elite
influence on public opinion. We begin in the next section by discussing framing effects-one of the central
means of elite influence-and how citizens' conversations
might impact elite framing. We then present an experimental test of our hypotheses. Our experiment enhances
the external validity of the typical framing study by allowing participants to communicate with one another,
rather than forcing them to make decisions in a social
vacuum as is common in these studies. We find that, under certain conditions, citizens' conversations vitiate elite
influence-elite influence via framing may not be so robust in a political world where citizens have accessto alternative forms of information. As we discuss, our findings
also have important implications for theoretical work on
deliberation and democracy.
In addition to our focus on conversations and elite
influence, we further test the robustness of framing effects by introducing a novel and fundamental individuallevel moderator (i.e., need to evaluate), and by studying
the longevity of the effects. We also extend the study of
JamesN. Druckmanis AssistantProfessorof PoliticalScience,Universityof Minnesota, 1414SocialSciences;267 19th Ave.S., Minneapolis,
MN 55455-0410 ([email protected]).Kjersten R. Nelson is a graduate student, Maxwell School of Syracuse University
([email protected]).
WethankKatherineBrandt,PaulBrewer,Dennis Chong,JeffreyCohen,MaryDietz,Nicole Druckman,JamesFarr,ChrisFederico,Kimberly
Gross,RobertHuckfeldt,CaseyKlofstad,JonKrosnick,JamesKuklinski,TaliMendelberg,JoanneMiller,Diana Mutz,RyanNagle,Michael
Parkin,GordonSilverstein,VeritySmith,TracySulkin,KathyCramerWalsh,the anonymousreviewers,and seminarparticipantsat UCLA,
the Universityof Illinois,andthe Centerfor BasicResearchin the SocialSciences,HarvardUniversityfor helpfuladvice.Wealsoacknowledge
supportfrom the Office of the Vice Presidentfor Researchand Dean of the GraduateSchool of the Universityof Minnesota,the University
of MinnesotaMcKnightLand-GrantProfessorship,and the Judgeand Mrs. Cecil LarsonUndergraduateHonors Thesis Grant.
'See, for example, Iyengarand Kinder (1987), Huckfeldtand Sprague(1995), Mutz, Sniderman,and Brody (1996), Mendelberg(2002),
Mutz (2002a), and Walsh(2003).
2See,for example,Berelson,Lazarsfeld,and McPhee(1954), Mendelsohn(1996), Mutzand Martin(2001), Becket al. (2002), and McLeod,
Kosicki,and McLeod(2002). These works recognizethe effects of both elites and interpersonaldiscussionson opinions; however,unlike
our study,they do not examine how conversationsimpact elite influence.
AmericanJournal of Political Science,Vol. 47, No. 4, October2003, Pp. 729-745
?2003 by the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
ISSN0092-5853
729
R. NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANANDKJERSTEN
730
framing to a new issue domain-campaign finance reform opinions (also see Grant and Rudolph 2003). In the
end, we clarify when elites can and cannot use framing to
influence public opinion and how interpersonal conversations affect this process.
Framing and Deliberation
Framing effects constitute one of the primary means by
which elites influence citizens' opinions; Chong describes
framing as the "essence of public opinion formation"
(1993, 870). A framing effect occurs when in the course
of describing an issue or event, a speaker'semphasis on a
subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions (Druckman 2001c, 226-31). For example, if a speaker describes a hate-group rally in terms
of free speech, then the audience will subsequently base
their opinions about the rally on free-speech considerations and, perhaps, support the right to rally.In contrast,
if the speakeruses a public-safety frame, the audience will
base their opinions on public-safety considerations and
oppose the rally (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).
Analysts have documented framing effects for numerous issues in various contexts (e.g., Jacoby 2000).
Nearly all of this work uses surveys or laboratory experiments where individuals receive a single frame and then
report their opinions, without any social interaction or
access to alternativesources of information (however, see
Sniderman and Theriault n.d.). Study participants thus
find themselves in a social vacuum, receiving frames and
reporting their opinions with no possibility to discuss the
issue at hand.
We see this as a substantial limitation of previous
studies, since in many political settings people have access
to various forms of political information including conversations with others. Huckfeldt and Sprague explain,
"[p]olitics is a social activity imbedded within structured
patternsof social interaction. Politicalinformation is conveyed not only through speeches and media reports but
also through a variety of informal social mechanismspolitical discussions on the job or on the street... even
casual remarks"(1987, 1197; see also, e.g., Gamson 1992,
179; Just et al. 1996; Mutz and Martin 2001; Beck et al.
2002,61; Walsh2003). Is elite influence via framing robust
to the introduction of other common sources of political information such as interpersonalconversations?How
might elite framing effects be affected by subsequent conversations between citizens?
In addressing these questions, we add to the recent
trend in framing work that, in contrast to earlierresearch,
documents various moderators to the effects (e.g., Brewer
2001; Druckman 2001b, 2001c; Haider-Markeland Joslyn
2001; Gross and Brewer 2002; Sniderman and Theriault
n.d.; however, none of this work explores the impact of
interpersonal conversations). We focus on the situation
where conversations follow an elite framing effect-that
is the initial frame comes from elites. This strikes us as an
important scenario since elites play a substantial role in
setting the agenda for subsequent conversations between
citizens.3
We derive our hypotheses from two distinct, albeit related, researchprograms:psychologically oriented scholarship on interpersonal conversations, and framing and
theoretical work on deliberation. We begin with the formerby drawing on three empiricalfindings. First,we build
on research demonstrating that framing effects can occur via interpersonal discussions (Gamson 1992; Simon
and Xenos 2000; Walsh 2001, 2003). For example, Walsh
(2001, 2003) shows that people embedded in discussion
networks (e.g., in voluntary associations) base various
policy attitudes on their social characteristics (e.g., race,
income) to a greaterextent than those not in the networks.
The critical point is that the frames or considerations on
which people base their political opinions need not come
from elites, but can in fact come from conversations with
others.
Second, research on interpersonal communication
shows that the composition of the discussion group affects the group's impact; of particular importance is the
extent to which the group includes people with opposing views (i.e., a cross-cutting group) (see, e.g., Mutz and
Martin 2001; Mutz 2002a, 2002b). For example, Mutz
(2002a) finds that exposure to different viewpoints in
cross-cutting groups causes individuals to have greater
awareness of rationales for alternative perspectives (also
see Huckfeldt,Morehouse, and Osborn n.d.).4 This can result in changed attitudes or in the strengtheningof existing
attitudes depending on how one cognitively responds to
the contraryinformation (Sieck and Yates1997;Petty and
Wegener 1998, 332-3). In contrast, relatively homogenous groups lead to group polarization where "an initial
tendency of individual group members toward a given
direction is enhanced following group discussion" (Isenberg 1986, 1141; also see Paese, Bieser, and Tubbs 1993;
Mendelberg 2002, 159).
Third, as mentioned, how people treatcontraryinformation they receive from relatively cross-cutting groups
3Itis beyondourscopeto exploretheinternaldynamicsof discussionssuchastheimpactof gender.
4Wegeneralize
Mutz's(2002a)workon thecompositionof discussants to groups.
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
depends on how they cognitively respond. Sniderman
and Theriault (n.d.) provide insight into how people respond in the context of framing effects. Sniderman and
Theriault exposed survey respondents either to one of
two frames (e.g., a free-speech or public-safety frame for
a hate-group rally) or to both frames. They find a classic framing effect for participants exposed to just one
frame (e.g., the free-speech frame causes increased support for the rally). However, they also find that the elite
framing effect disappears among participants exposed to
both frames; these individuals return to their original
(unframed) opinions. This implies that relatively crosscutting conversations, that provide people with rationales
for both frames, will result in the muting of the initial elite
frame. Similarly,Vinokur and Burnstein (1978) find that
when two equal-sized groups with conflicting opinions
interact, the groups' opinions converge toward one another (i.e., their initial conflicting opinions disappear;also
see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 120; Cohen
1997; Huckfeldt, Morehouse, and Osborn n.d.). This is
depolarization.
In sum, the frames on which people base their political opinions not only come from elites but also from interpersonal conversations.When these conversationsinclude
mostly common perspectives, we expect polarization-a
strengthening of the initial elite frames and thus more
extreme opinions. Alternatively, relatively cross-cutting
conversations that include a wider variety of views will
provide individuals with an understanding of alternative
frames resulting in a vitiation of the initial frames, rendering them ineffectual (i.e., depolarization).
Importantly,these hypotheses echo arguments in deliberativetheory that focus on the implications of citizens'
conversationsfor democratic governance. Mendelbergexplains that a "variety of recent developments, political
and academic, have sparked [an] interest in democratic
deliberation... [and while] there is no single definition
[of deliberation] on which all theorists of deliberation
agree... deliberation is expected to produce a variety
of positive democratic outcomes" (2002, 151, 153). One
focus concerns the consequences of deliberation among
conflicting individuals. As Mill argues, "since the general
or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarelyor never the
whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverseopinions
that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being
supplied" (1859, 53; also see Habermas 1989; Benhabib
1992; Kinder and Herzog 1993, 349).5
This highlights our critical distinction between crosscutting and noncross-cutting conversations; it also raises
5Wethankan anonymousreviewerfor referenceto this quote (also
see Mutz 2002a).
731
an intriguing question about what constitutes the "truth"
supposedly produced by cross-cutting conversations. Insofar as elite framing effects suggest manipulation (e.g.,
Zaller 1992, 45; Farr 1993, 386; Parenti 1999; however,
see Druckman 2001c), then cross-cutting conversations
might attenuate the effects, reconstituting relative truth.
While this mimics our cross-cutting hypothesis, it also
raises a host of questions, which we will address, about
the quality of framed versus unframed opinions and the
role of deliberation in producing quality opinions. Indeed, as will become clear, our study has intriguing implications for the burgeoning literature on democratic
deliberation.
Individual Moderators
of Framing Effects
In addition to exploring the effects of interpersonal discussion on framing, we build on prior conflicting results
to clarify which individuals exhibit more susceptibility to
elite framing effects (see Druckman 2001c, 241-5). Webegin by noting that framing effects, like other media effects
such as priming, tend to work through memory-based
processes (Nelson and Willey 2001, 255). In expressing
their opinions, individuals draw on the information that
comes to mind, including the frames to which they were
recentlyexposed. For example, when askedfor their opinions about the Ku Klux Klan's right to rally, individuals
who just received a news-story framing the rally in terms
of free speech will recall and rely on the frame, thereby
attaching increased importance to free-speech considerations (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Nelson and
Willey 2001).6
This contrasts with an on-line process where individuals access and report a previously formed opinion
based on a steady stream of information over-time (instead of constructing the opinion on information in memory at the time of expression). Frames could affect such
an on-line process; yet, most studies, at least implicitly,
presume that the frame individuals just received affects
them to the extent that it does because there is not a
prior on-line opinion waiting to be expressed. Attitudes
formed on-line "have a great deal of inertia... so new
pieces of information [e.g., a recent frame] have only a
small impact on them. Therefore, recent news media content [e.g., a frame] would be expected to have relatively
6Nelson,Clawson,and Oxley (1997) show that framesmainlywork
by causing individualsto deliberatelyadd more weight to the considerations emphasized in the frame, and not by increasingthe
temporaryaccessibilityof those considerations.
732
little effect... [if attitudes were formed on-line instead of
memory-based]" (Krosnickand Brannon 1993, 965).
Based largely on the memory-based model, Nelson,
Oxley, and Clawson (1997) argue that media frames will
have a greater effect on more knowledgeable people because only these individuals can connect the considerations put forth in the frame with their overall opinions
and also weigh the importance of these considerations.
Making an analogous argument about media priming,
Krosnickand Brannon explain that "the more knowledge
one has about politics, the more quickly and easily one
can make sense of a news story and the more efficiently
one can store it in, and retrieve it from, an elaborate
and organized mental filing system" (1993, 966; also see
Miller and Krosnick 2000, 303-4). As McGraw and Ling
state, "knowledge... facilitates the learning and use of
new information..." (n.d., 5).
The potential problem with this theory, however, is
that some studies find the opposite-that frames have
a greater impact on the less knowledgeable (e.g., Kinder
and Sanders 1990; Haider-Markeland Joslyn 2001; also
Jacoby 2000, 758, finds no effect). These authors argue
that less knowledgeablepeople possess fewer stronglyheld
prior opinions (and frames) and thus exhibit increased
susceptibility (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1990, 90).
We believe both arguments are correct-knowledge
facilitatesthe use of new frames, and individuals who possess prior opinions will exhibit less susceptibility to new
frames. The problem with past work is that while individuals with prior opinions may be more knowledgeable, it is
not the knowledge perse that is at work; rather,it is the existence of prior opinions based on other information that
vitiates the impact of a new frame. Thus, we assert that
elite frames will exhibit a greater impact on more knowledgeableindividuals,and a smaller impact on individuals
more likely to have prior opinions. We suspect that previous conflicting results come from a failure to control for
both these moderators (Krosnick and Brannon 1993).
How can we measure a tendency to have prior opinions? We have a strong theoretical basis that the construct "needto evaluate"(NE) capturesthis process (Jarvis
and Petty 1996). High-NE individuals "more chronically
[evaluate]various aspectsof their lives and environments"
(Bizer et al. 2000, 7). Relativeto low-NE processors, highNE processors form more opinions and base their opinions on a steady flow of information over time ratherthan
recent salient information (Bizer et al. 2000, 21). This is
analogous to the aforementioned discussion of on-line
processing. Tormalaand Petty explain that low-NE individuals "arerelativelymore dependent on the information
they can recall at the time the judgment is required [e.g.,
information just seen in a frame]" (2001, 1609).
NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANAND KJERSTENR.
In short, we hypothesize that, regardlessof politicalknowledge levels, high-NE individuals will be more likely
to possess prior opinions (and frames) based on information over time. As a result, high-NE individualswill be
less affectedby new, recent informationfrom elite frames.
By incorporating NE as an individual-level moderator,we
not only expect to provide clarity to the framing literature, but we also will demonstrate the importance of a
nonpolitical construct to political processing (see Bizer
et al. 2000). Additionally, we introduce what we suspect
to be a fundamental but never before directly examined
moderator of political communication.
The Longevity of Framing Effects
A final issue concerns the longevity of framing effects.
Many studies demonstrate that elite frames can have substantial immediate effects on opinions; however, we have
no idea how long these effects last (Kuklinskiet al. 2000,
811).7 Do these effects reflect anything more than temporary changes in reported opinions? Overall, understanding individual-level moderators and the longevity
of framing effects will further inform us about the robustness of the effects.
Campaign Finance Reform Opinions
We study framing effects by examining opinions about
campaign finance reform. We do so because it is politically
relevant, has received scant academic attention, involves
fundamental democratic values, and is representativeof
a host of issues.
Campaign finance reform persists as a major political issue due in large part to the efforts of Senators
McCain and Feingold. In March, 2002, Congress passed
the McCain-Feingold reform bill; the law prohibits national parties from collecting or using soft money which
is the unrestrictedcontributions by corporations, unions,
and individuals. Despite the new law, debates about campaign finance will undoubtedly continue with a focus
on implementation and other related regulations (Oppel
2002). While descriptive polls consistently show that the
majority of Americans support campaign finance reform
(72% in a February2002 Gallup poll), there continues to
be little scholarshipon the origins and nature of campaign
finance reform opinions (however see Gross and Brewer
2002; Grant and Rudolph 2003).
7Iyengar and Kinder (1987, 25-6, 44) examine the persistence of
agendasetting and priming. Therealso is relatedwork on persuasion (e.g., Hovland and Weiss 1951-52).
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
Aside from political relevance and the need for more
research,we have an interest in campaign finance reform
opinions because the issue pits two basic values against
one another. Since court rulings in the 1970s, reform advocates frame the issue in terms of limiting the power of
special interests (i.e., democratic equality). Opponents of
reform argue that finance laws unconstitutionally restrict
free speech (Grant and Rudolph 2003).8 How citizens settle the clash between values is a fundamental question
for public opinion scholars (Sniderman et al. 1996), and
framing can be a large part of that process (Sniderman
and Theriault n.d.). Moreover, from a framing perspective, campaign finance reform opinions resemble many
other issues that pit basic values/considerations against
one another (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1058; Jacoby2000,
764). We thus expect that our results generalize beyond
campaign finance reform.
Experiment
To investigateframing and interpersonal conversations in
the context of campaign finance reform, we implemented
a laboratory experiment-one of the central modes of
inquiry in the framing literature. We next describe our
experimental design and hypotheses. We then present the
results.
Participants, Design, and Procedure
A total of 261 individuals participated in the experiment
in exchange for a cash payment. We recruited participants from a large public university,inviting them to take
part in a study on learning from the news at the university's Political Psychology Laboratory,during the spring
of 2001.9 We randomly assigned participants to one of
seven conditions. Those assigned to the control condi8Referencesto these two valuesappearin nearlyall media coverage
and legislativedebates.Forexample,afterMcCain-Feingoldpassed
in the Senate,opponent SenatorPhil Gramm stated, "Weare not
takingawaypoliticalinfluence [byspecialinterests]at all... We are
takingit awayfrom the people who arewilling and ableto use their
money to enhancetheirfreespeechguaranteedby the Constitution"
(Berke2002, A30).
9Thebulk of our sample consists of students.While this limits the
generalizabilityof specific levels of reform support, we have confidence in the generalizabilityof any causalrelationshipswe might
uncover.A growingbody of workshowsthatframingandanalogous
processesdo not differ between student and nonstudent samples
(Kuhberger1998, 35; Miller and Krosnick2000, 313). Also, our
main interest lies in uncoveringthe conditions under which elite
framingdoes not impact individuals;and thus, the use of students
who tend to be more easily influenced by persuasivearguments
(Sears1986,522) mightbe a biasagainstour hypotheses.Finally,the
participants'demographicsreveala heterogeneousand fairlyrep-
733
tion neither read an article nor engaged in any discussion;
they simply completed the questionnaire, described below. The treatment participants received either a "freespeech" framed article or a "special-interests" framed
article.
The articles, which appear in the Appendix, both describe the McCain-Feingold reform bill and state that the
bill is pending in the U.S. Senate.They explain that reform
supporters argue that the bill will limit special-interestinfluence while opponents worry about free-speech violations. The articles differ from one another in two ways.
Specifically, the free-speech article uses a title that emphasizes free-speech considerations and includes a quote
from a Harvard law professor who argues for the precedence of free-speech considerations (citing the Supreme
Court's Buckley v. Valeo opinion). The special-interests
article has an analogous title and quote but instead of
free speech, it focuses on limiting special interests (citing
Supreme Court JusticeWhite's opinion).
We went to greatlengths to make these articlesappear
realistic. First, in writing the articles, we drew extensively
on recent similar reports. Second, we presented the articles as if they came from the New YorkTimes' Web site.
We copied an actual article from the site and then replaced the original text with our text-thus, the articles
appeared identical to articles from the site. Third, our experiment began about a week after the Senate introduced
the McCain-Feingoldbill, and we finished the sessions before the Senate debate began. The articles thus accurately
stated that the Senatewould soon be considering McCainFeingold. Moreover, a flurry of media coverage preceded
our sessions but ended just before our first session and
did not begin again until after our last session. Therefore,
the articles nicely followed prior media coverage, and we
did not have to worry about ongoing coveragejeopardizing comparisons across sessions. This greatly enhanced
the externalvalidity of our timing and context (Cook and
Campbell 1979, 71).10
Aside from assigning treatment participants to read
a free-speech or special-interests article, we also assigned
them to one of three conversational conditions-a "nodiscussion" group, an "unmixed" discussion group, or a
"mixed"discussion group. The no-discussion group participants readthe articlesand did not engage in discussion,
while the unmixed and mixed discussion participantstook
part in small group discussions after reading an article.
resentativegroup that comparesfavorablywith the 2000 National
ElectionStudysample. Details are availablefrom the authors.
'0No participantsexpressedsuspicion about the veracityof the articles. The style of the articlesfollows many other framingexperiments (e.g., Nelson and Oxley 1999).
NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANANDKJERSTENR.
734
(We describe the difference between unmixed and mixed
groups below.)
We put considerable time into determining how to
structurethese discussions. First,to maintain manageably
sized groups that also had a mix of opinions, we included
four participants in nearly all groups. (We used a few
groups of three, but their behavior did not significantly
differ from the groups of four.) Second, we attempted
to balance realistic discussion settings with characteristics of deliberative settings that typically require citizens
"addresseach other as equals and acknowledge this status
by offering reasonable, morally justifiable arguments to
each other" (Sanders 1997, 348). We provided a moderate
degree of structure by offering (in a random order) each
participant, after reading the article, an equal opportunity to state his or her view. We then allowed unfacilitated
open discussion for up to six minutes (see Stasser and
Titus 1985; Tindale, Sheffey,and Scott 1993). We permitted each participantto pass on statinghis or her individual
view and told participants that they could discuss any aspect of the article or anything else.
Participants in the discussion groups read the article and then took part in either an unmixed frame or a
mixed frame discussion. In the unmixed frame discussion
groups, all participants had read the same article-either
the free-speech or special-interests article. The mixed
frame discussions included two participants who had
read the free-speech article and two participants who
had read the special-interests article (see Vinokur and
Burnstein 1978). For the sake of brevity, we hereafter
refer to these as the unmixed and mixed discussants,
respectively.
We expect that, entering the discussions, the unmixed
discussants, on average,will share the same point of view
to a greater extent than the mixed discussants. Indeed,
these participants all received the same elite frame (and,
as we will show, these frames had an impact on the nodiscussion participants). Alternatively,we expect mixed
discussants, on average, to be exposed to a greater variety of views since these groups include participants who
received different frames. The unmixed groups were thus
relativelyhomogenous,while the mixed groups were relatively cross-cutting.
In accordance with our prior discussion, we predict
that the unmixed (relatively homogenous) group will
cause polarization such that the initial elite frames will
be exaggerated,while the mixed (relativelycross-cutting)
groups will depolarize, and the impact of the elite frames
will be squelched.ll
"We emphasize that our unmixed groups were relatively more
homogenous, while our mixed groups were relatively more cross-
To summarize, we assigned each participant to either
the control group or one of six treatment conditionswhich varied the elite frame received (free speech or special interests) and the type of subsequent discussion (nodiscussion, unmixed discussion, or mixed discussion). After completing this part of the study, each participant
received a questionnaire. In addition to common demographic queries-including political knowledge and
need to evaluate (NE) measures-we included three
items to measure elite framing effects (Nelson and Oxley
1999).12
First, we asked participants if they support passage
of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill,
which was the main focus of the article and discussion.
We measured this overall opinion question on a sevenpoint scale with higher scores indicating increased support. Second, participants rated how important the key
ideas of "protectingfree speech rights of individuals and
groups" and "protecting government from excessive influence by special interests" were for them when they
thought about McCain-Feingold.13We measured these
belief-importanceitems on seven-point scales with higher
scores indicating increased perceived importance. Third,
we included belief-content measures that asked participants if they thought the impact of reform would have
a positive or negative effect on "free-speech rights" and
"limiting special-interest influence." Higher scores on a
one-to-seven scale indicate a more positive effect from
reform.
cutting. Some participantsundoubtedlycame into the experiment
unaffectedby the
with strongprioropinions;wereconsequently
article'sframe;and,as a result,mayhaveenteredthe discussion
withan attitudecounterto the articletheyread-therebyrenderorperingtheparticular
groupnotentirelyunmixed/homogenous
Thisis not a problemfor our analfectlymixed/heterogeneous.
yses.Randomassignmentmeansthatthe averageparticipantin
eachconditionwasbasicallythe same,andour focusis on comconditions.Moreover,
paringtheseaveragesacrossexperimental
withineachparticulardiscussiongroup,the averageparticipant
resembledthe averageparticpriorto the discussionpresumably
ipantfromthe no-discussiongroups-sincetheyhadhadexactly
the sameexperienceof readingthe framedarticle.If we findthat
the framesin the no-discussiongroupshad the expectedeffects
framecausedincreased
reformsupport),
(e.g.,thespecial-interests
thenwe canassumethattheaveragediscussiongroupparticipant,
priorto discussionbutafterreadingthe article,reflectsthearticle
theyjustread.Thismeansthat,on average,the groupswilldiffer
orcrossfromoneanotherin termsof beingrelatively
homogenous
cutting,andourfocusis on theeffectsof thesedifferentgroups,on
average.
werepaid,thanked,anddebriefedaftercompleting
'2Participants
the questionnaire.
Detailson all measuresareavailablefromthe
authors.
andthey
mentionthesetwoconsiderations,
'3Thearticlesexplicitly
andOxley
aremostrelevant
toreformdebates(seeNelson,Clawson,
1997, for a similarapproach).
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
735
1 ExperimentalConditions and Predictions
TABLE
No-Discussion
Free
Measure
OverallSupportfor McCain-Feingold
Importanceof Free-SpeechRights
Importanceof Influenceby Special
Interests
Impactof Reformon Free-SpeechRights
(Belief Content)
Impactof Reformon Influenceby Special
Interests(Belief Content)
Speech
Frame
LowerA
HigherA
LowerA
Unmixed Discussion
Mixed Discussion
Special
Interests
Frame
Free
Speech
Frame
Special
Interests
Frame
Free
HigherA
LowerA
LowerB
HigherB
LowerB
HigherA
HigherB
LowerB
HigherB
Speech
Frame
Special
Interests
Frame
No differencec
No differencec
No differencec
No differenceA
No differenceB
No differencec
No differenceA
No differenceB
No differencec
andtheno-discussion
AThesecomparisons
arebetweentheno-discussion
free-speech
participants
special-interests
participants.
BThesecomparisonsare betweenthe unmixeddiscussionfree-speechparticipantsand the unmixeddiscussionspecial-interests
willbe greaterthanthoseamongtheno-discussion
Wealsopredictthatthesedifferences
(i.e.,polarization).
participants
participants.
CThesecomparisonsare betweenthe mixeddiscussionfree-speechparticipantsand the mixeddiscussionspecial-interests
particiwill not significantlydifferfrom the controlgroupparticipants(see Snidermanand
pants.We also predictthat these participants
Theriaultn.d.).
In evaluating elite framing effects, we follow Nelson and his colleagues by focusing on between frame
comparisons of the overall opinion and belief importance measures (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997;
Nelson and Oxley 1999; Nelson and Willey 2001). We
say an elite framing effect occurs if, within a discussion condition (i.e., no-discussion, unmixed, or mixed),
compared to participants who read the free-speech article, participants who read the special-interests article
exhibit significantly greater support for reform; rate influence by special interests as significantly more important; and rate free-speech rights as significantly less important. Moreover, we expect the effect of the frames on
overall opinion to be mediated by the belief-importance
measures. Finally, consistent with Nelson and his colleagues, we predict that elite framing effects will have no
or minimal effect on the belief-content measures (Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1043; Nelson and Willey 2001, 260);
we include content measures to demonstrate that framing works through a mechanism that is distinct from
framing effect experiments), an even greater elite framing effect for the unmixed discussion participants(i.e., the
conversations exaggerate the initial elite frames), and no
elite framing effect for the mixed discussion participants.
We summarize these predictions, by treatment condition,
in Table 1.5 Recall that we also will examine the mediating role of belief importance, the moderating effects of
knowledge and NE, and the longevity of the effects.
Deliberation Results
In Table2, we report the results for overall opinion, belief
importance, and belief content (i.e., the impact measures)
for each condition. Within each discussion (treatment)
condition, we use asterisks to indicate the significance
levels between statisticallysignificant results.16
We also include the control group results as
a point of comparison. Our main analyses do not
involve comparisons with the control group, however, since our focus-like that of virtually all prior
research-is on how alternative elite communications
persuasion.14
We thus expect an elite framing effect for the nodiscussion participants (i.e., this would replicate prior
15Dueto our focuson how conversations
affecteliteframingefwithfects,wedo notincludeconditionsthatinvolveconversations
outpriorframing.Weexpectthatsuchconditionswouldresemble
'4Nelson,Oxley,and Clawson(1997,223) explainthat framing ourdiscussionconditions,
dependingon the extentof conflicting
"differsboth theoreticallyandempiricallyfrom... persuasion"(emTheseconditionswouldbe normativelyintriguing
perspectives.
phasisin original).Framingworksby alteringthe considerations sincetheywouldrevealthe impactof deliberation
on unaffected
seenasimportant(beliefimportance;
e.g.,whenthinkingof a new
opinions.
considerations
housingproject,are economicor environmental
moreimportant?)
whereaspersuasion
involveschangesin theeval'6Weuse one-tailedtests since we havedirectionalpredictions
uationsbasedon thoseconsiderations
(beliefcontent;e.g.,willthe
(Blalock1979, 163).When appropriate,we also carriedout planned
economicimpactbe positiveor negative?).
comparisonsand found consistentresults.
R. NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANANDKJERSTEN
736
TABLE2
Overall Support Opinion, Belief Importance,
No-Discussion
Mean (Standard Deviation) for:
Overall Support for
McCain-Feingolda
Importanceof Free-SpeechRightsb
Importanceof Influenceby Special
Interestsb
Impactof Reformon Free-Speech
Rightsc(BeliefContent)
Impactof Reformon Influenceby
SpecialInterestsc(Belief Content)
Free
Speech
Frame
Special
Interests
Frame
(N = 38)
(N = 40)
4.53**
and Belief Content Measures by Condition
Unmixed Discussion
Free
Mixed Discussion
Speech
Frame
Special
Interests
Frame
Free
Speech
Frame
Special
Interests
Frame
Control
Group
(N = 35)
(N = 34)
(N = 32)
(N = 32)
(N = 49)
5.28**
4.57*
5.24*
4.66
4.81
4.52
(1.94)
5.26**
(1.67)
5.24*
(1.30)
4.58**
(1.50)
5.75*
(1.70)
4.34
(1.70)
5.06**
(1.76)
4.68
(1.63)
5.74**
(1.72)
4.69
(1.67)
5.34
(1.86)
4.69
(1.55)
5.28
(.92)
4.84
(1.45)
5.46
(1.78)
(1.15)
(1.71)
(1.64)
(1.56)
(1.75)
(1.50)
3.74**
(1.74)
5.05
(1.69)
4.33**
(1.29)
4.93
(1.29)
4.20
(1.57)
4.71
(1.60)
4.38
(1.60)
5.21
(1.55)
4.44
(1.54)
4.59
(1.01)
4.56
(1.63)
4.59
(1.74)
4.33
(1.41)
4.94
(1.31)
Note:Tableentriesare mean 7-point scores.**p< .05; *p < .10.
aHigherscoresindicateincreasedsupport for McCain-Feingold.
bHigherscoresindicateincreasedperceivedimportance.
'Higher scoresindicatea more positive impact from reform.
affect opinions (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981;
Kinder and Sanders 1990; Nelson and Kinder 1996;
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997, 578-9). We will, nevertheless, note comparisons with the control group as it
serves as an alternative and underappreciated evaluative
standard that reveals the impact of frames on unadulterated opinions (Druckman 2001a, 2001b, 1048).
As expected, we find strong evidence for an elite
framing effect for the no-discussion group participantscompared to free-speech participants, special-interests
participants displayed significantly more support for
McCain-Feingold, and rated special interests as a significantly more important and free speech as a significantly
less important consideration (t76 = 2.01, p < .03; t76 =
1.53, p < .07; t76= 1.92, p < .03, respectively). The freespeech article also persuaded participants to believe the
impact on free speech would be significantly more negative; this belief-content effect does not mitigate the more
substantial framing effects, but rather it suggests that the
articleshave multiple effects (i.e., framing and persuasion;
see Nelson and Oxley 1999).
We also see an elite framing effect for the unmixed
discussion group with the special-interests participants
expressing more support for McCain-Feingold and rating special interests as more important, than the freespeech participants (t67 = 1.59, p < .06; t67 = 1.68,
p < .05, respectively).We find no significant effects on the
free-speech consideration or the belief-content measures.
Counter to the polarization hypothesis, we find no evidence of an exaggeratedelite framing effect-an ANOVA
shows no significant frame x discussion interaction (in
the expected direction) that would indicate an exaggerated effect.17This analysisalso revealsthat the discussions
themselves did not have significant effects on how the elite
frameswere processed (i.e., there areno significant discussion main effects). In short, elite framing persists largely
unchanged in the face of discussions that include mostly
common perspectives.
We suspect that the lack of a polarization effect stems
from the fact that, as discussed (see note 11), while
these groups were presumably homogenous relative to
the mixed groups, they may not have been perfectly homogenous. The occasional participant could have been
unaffected by the article and entered the discussion with
17Forboth McCain-Feingoldopinion and special-interestsimportance, the frame main effect is significant (F1,143= 6.43, p < .02;
F1,143= 5.20, p < .03, respectively)but both the discussion main
effect (F1,143= 0, p < .99; F1,143= .14, p < .72) and the interaction
(F 1,143= .02, p < .88; F 1,143= .10, p < .76) are not significant. For
the importanceof free speech, the main effects are not significant
(F1,143 = .44, p < .51 for frame; F1,143 = 2.33, p < .13 for dis-
cussion). The interactionis marginallysignificant (F 1,43 = 3.63,
p < .06), however,the means in Table2 revealthat this is not in
the directionpredictedby the polarizationhypothesis.Indeed, for
the importance of free speech, we find a larger elite framing effect for the no-discussion group than for the unmixed-discussion
group. ANOVAanalysesfor the belief content measuresshow no
significanteffects.
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
an opposing view that was sufficient to prevent further
polarization, but not sufficient to generate the depolarization predicted with the relatively more cross-cutting
mixed groups. It also may be that the measurement delay
due to the discussions even caused a slight waning of a
short-lived framing effect.
The story changes when we look at the mixed discussion participants. Table 2 shows no significant framing
effects for these participants; as predicted, these crosscutting conversations eliminate elite framing effects.18In
fact, the mixed discussion participants'level of support for
McCain-Feingold and their belief-importance responses
do not differ significantly from the control groups' responses.19 This corroborates Sniderman and Theriault's
(n.d.) claim that, when exposed to conflicting frames,
people return to their original or unaffected positions
as reflected by the control group (also see Huckfeldt,
Morehouse, and Osborn n.d.).20 This finding also resonates with the aforementioned theoreticalwork on deliberation. The "collision of adverse opinions" in the mixed
group altered opinions by eliminating the elite framing
effect. The question of whether this is akin to restoring "truth" (Mill 1859) is something to which we will
return.
Our results extend the study of framing effects into
a new issue domain by showing the conventional effect
in the no-discussion group. We also find that conver'8Wefocus on within-group comparisonsbecause our prediction
is that there should be no framingeffect among mixed discussion
participants,and, as discussed, the conventionalway to measure
elite framingeffectsinvolvescomparisonsbetween frames.In contrast to our polarization hypothesis, our predictions here do not
involverelativecomparisonsacrossdiscussionconditions-for example, we do not predict a relativelysmalleror a reverseframing
effect in this group (see Blalock 1979, 347-8).
19Thisis true regardlessof if we compare the control group to
each framed mixed-discussion group or to all mixed-discussion
participants(averaged).Therelevantaveragestatisticsfor allmixeddiscussion participants,for McCain-Feingold,speech importance,
and special-interestsimportance, respectively,are:4.73 (1.78, 64;
comparedwith the control group, tllo = .76, p < .25); 4.69 (1.60,
64; comparedwith the control group,to10= .51, p < .35); and 5.31
(1.64, 64; comparedwith the control group, t10o= .48, p < .35).
20Wealso find that the control group significantlydiffersfrom the
followingconditions:for McCain-Feingold,no-discussionand unmixed discussion special interestsframe participants(p < .05 for
both); and for speechimportance,no-discussion and unmixeddiscussion free-speechframeparticipants(p < .10 for both). (Details
are availablefrom the authors.) Manywidely cited framingeffects
do not include comparisonswith a control group, and it is unclear
if such comparisonswould be significant.While we do not question the relevanceof comparisonsbetween framedconditions, we
emphasizethe importanceof recognizingwhat is and is not being
measured (e.g., the impact of frames on unadulteratedopinions
requirescomparisonswith a control group).
737
sations that include common perspectives (with people
who were exposed to the same frame) do little to the
initial elite effect. However, conversations that include
conflicting perspectives (with people who received different frames) eliminate elite influence via framing. In
sum, in the political world where people receive and
then discuss elite information, conversations can limit
elite influence-but only if those conversations involve
cross-cutting groups or individuals exposed to alternative
arguments.21
We next examine the mediational process of elite
framing by using the same path-analytic approach as
Nelson and his colleagues (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley
1997;Nelson and Oxley 1999). In Figure 1, we present separate path analyses for the no-discussion, unmixed, and
mixed discussion groups.22 For both the no-discussion
and unmixed discussion groups, the frame shaped the
belief importance ratings, which in turn substantially affected overall opinions. In contrast, the frames had minimal impact on the content measures and even when
they did (in the no-discussion condition), this effect did
not carry through to overall opinions. In both groups,
the frame had no direct effect on overall opinions suggesting that elite framing works by affecting belief importance (and not content) that in turn drives overall
opinions.
Figure Ic shows that for the mixed group, the frame
had no effect on any of the measures;overall opinion was
shaped by the belief importance and content measures,
but the frame played no role. These results corroborate
Nelson and his colleagues' researchthat shows that framing works through belief importance and as such constitutes a unique psychological process (see note 14). The
results also confirm our finding that cross-cutting conversations limit the impact of elite frames, highlighting
the importance of moving the study of elite influence out
of a social vacuum and into settings with informational
competition.
In so doing, future work would benefit from examining information flows more acutely. For example,
Figure 1 shows that in the no-discussion conditions,
21Examiningthe absolute differences between opinions across
frames accentuatesthe distinction between the no-discussion and
unmixed-discussion conditions, and the mixed-discussion conditions. For example, for overall McCain-Feingoldopinions, the
frames caused total shifts in opinion of .75 and .67 for the nodiscussion and unmixed-discussionconditions, respectively,and
only .15 for the mixed discussionconditions. The analogousshifts
for the importanceof specialinterestsare .51, .68, and .06.
22Wefirst regressthe belief importanceand content measureson
the frame, and then we regressoverallopinion on the frame, and
the importanceand content measures.
JAMESN. DRUCKMANANDKJERSTENR.NELSON
738
1
FIGURE
Mediational Analyses
A. No-Discussion Conditions
-.22**
\4
Supportfor
McCain00
Feingold
.06
19**
Impactof
reformon
free speech
i
04
-*4.04
.06
.07
Impactof /
reformon
special
interests
B. Unmixed Discussion Conditions
.10
Supportfor
McCainFeingold
*
Impactof
reformon
free speech
.33"*
.19*
Impactof
reformon
special
interests
the frames affected belief content, which in turn had
no impact on McCain-Feingold opinions. In contrast,
in both discussion groups, the frames did not influence belief content but belief content shaped McCain-
Feingold opinions. While this does not have consequences
for our framing results, it suggests that the conversations introduced distinct dynamics. It may also further
explain our failure to find polarization-that is, the
FRAMING
ANDDELIBERATION
FIGURE1
739
(Continued)
C. Mixed Discussion Conditions
0
-.02
Supportfor
ainMcC
0
Feingold
.05
Impactof
>A
reform on
freespeech
.17**
17
/
.35**
Impactof
reformon
special
interests
Note:Asin Nelson,Clawson,andOxley(1997)andNelsonandOxley(1999),coefficients
are standardizedordinaryleast-squares(beta) coefficients. **p< .05; *p 5 .1. Frameis
itemsarecodedso
codedso that0 = Freespeechand1= Specialinterests.
Theimportance
Thebeliefcontentitemsare
thathighervaluesindicateincreasedperceivedimportance.
codedso thathighervaluesindicatea morepositiveeffect.SupportforMcCain-Feingold
is codedso thathighervaluesindicateincreasedsupport.
conversations did not appear to simply reiterate the elite
frames.23
fundamental moderator-need to evaluate (NE); we expect high-NE individuals to be less susceptible to framing
effects. We also examine the role of political knowledge,
hypothesizing that increased knowledge facilitates framIndividual ModeratorResults
ing effects (once controlling for NE).
We took three steps to investigate the impact of these
We next examine individual moderators of framing effects. As discussed, we introduce a new and potentially
moderators. First,we merged data from the no-discussion
and unmixed discussion groups since the aforementioned
23Reformadvocates
aboutequatingmoney
oftenexpressincredulity
(ANOVA) results suggest no significant differences beto freespeech,seeingthelinkasnonsensical(e.g.,Stevens'opinion tween the two groups (see note 17). Moreover, when we
in Nixon v. ShrinkMissouri GovernmentPAC, January24, 2000;
separate out these conditions and run the analyses (beSilverstein
similardif2003).If uninitiatedindividuals
experience
low) separately,we find that the results for each condificultyin graspingthe moneyand speechconnection,then they
be
and
more
less
the
critical
of
tion generally mimic the results for the conditions run
speechargument
may
swayedby
thosewho espouseit. Ourresultssupportboththeseconjectures.
together. We do not include the mixed discussion groups
First,in contrastto the special-interests
frame,for no- and unmixeddiscussionparticipants,
thespeechframedidlittleto change since we neither expected nor found (in analyses not refrom
whattheywouldhavebeenabsent ported here) moderating effects-indeed, there were no
opinions
McCain-Feingold
the frame(i.e.,the controlgroup).Second,participants
who read
effects to moderate.
the speecharticle-whichlinksthe SupremeCourtto the speech framing
we created measures of political knowlSecond,
lessfaith,trust,andapproval
of the
relatively
argument-displayed
Court(seeNicholsonandHowardn.d.).Detailsareavailable
from edge and NE. In creating a knowledge measure, we foltheauthors.
lowed Miller and Krosnick's (2000, 304-5) approach
R. NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANANDKJERSTEN
740
of combining five general-knowledge items with five
domain-specific knowledge questions about campaign finance reform. We summed correct answersto these questions and then used a median split to assign respondents to
a low (0) or a high (1) knowledge group. Our NE measure
comes from Bizer et al.'s (2000, 14-5) three-item scale.24
We aggregatedthe three questions and then used a median
split to create a low (0) and a high (1) NE group.25
Third, to analyze the moderating effects, we focused
on our three key framing variables-overall opinion
about McCain-Feingold, free-speech importance, and
special-interests importance. We regressed each measure
on a dummy variable indicating if the participants
receivedthe free-speech article (0) or the special-interests
article (1). We then added dummy variables for knowledge and NE; these coefficients reveal if those with high
knowledge or high NE differed in their opinions (regardless of the frame) from those in the low groups. More
importantly, we added interactions between the frame
and the knowledge and NE measures. Significant coefficients here indicate if the framing effect differed based on
levels of knowledge and/or NE. We present the results in
Table 3.
Consistent with our expectations, the results show
that it is those with higher levels of knowledge who
exhibit relatively more susceptibility to elite framing
effects. Specifically,significant and positive frame x political knowledge interactions for McCain-Feingold and
special-interests importance show that the frame exercised its effect particularlyon those with high knowledge.
This supports the argument that political knowledge facilitates the use of frames by allowing individuals to make
sense of and connect the framed information to their
opinions. It also suggests that, although elites may attempt to use framing to manipulate an unknowing and
naive populace, it is knowledgeable people who are relatively more apt to use the frames (see Miller and Krosnick
2000, 312).
24While
ourknowledgeandNEmeasuresarecorrelated(r = .23,
suggests
p < .01, n = 257),the moderatelevelof the correlation
distinctconstructs(seeBizeret al.2000).
TABLE3
FramingEffectModerators (OLS)
Dependent Variable
McCain-
Independent
Variable
Feingold
Support
FreeSpeech
Importance
SpecialInter.
Importance
Frame
1.11**
Political
(.47)
.18
(.49)
.39
(.45)
.17
(.38)
(.39)
-.36
(.36)
(.39)
(.36)
.78*
Knowledge
Need to
Evaluate(NE)
Frame x
Pol. Know.
Frame x NE
Constant
R2
Number of
Observations
1.18**
(.38)
.93**
(.55)
-1.65**
-.40
-.48
(.57)
.89*
(.57)
.76*
.86**
(.53)
-1.14**
(.55)
3.79**
4.80**
(.53)
4.57**
(.34)
.15
145
(.35)
.04
145
(.33)
.12
145
Note: Entriesare unstandardized
regressioncoefficientswith
standard
errorsin parentheses.
**p< .05;*p < .10.
More importantly, we find strong evidence that NE
plays a substantial role in moderating framing effects.
The frame x NE interaction is significant across all three
regressions, indicating, in each case, that high-NE individuals move (relatively) against the elite framing effect
(i.e., recall that the frame variable is coded 1 for special
interests). Elite frames have considerably more influence
on low-NE individuals; that is, individuals who engage
in less chronic evaluation and who are less likely to possess prior opinions (and frames) display relatively more
reliance on the recently received frames.
We do not see our NE result as adding yet another
variable to the list of potential moderators; rather,we believe NE constitutes a fundamental moderator of framing
and media effects more generally. High-NE individuals
who engage in frequent evaluation will form more opinions on which they can draw. As a result, new information contained in elite messages will not have as large an
effect on their opinions-relative to low-NE individuals
who will be more reliant on the messages in constructing
their opinions. We also believe that previous conflicting
results on the role of knowledge stem, in large part, from
a failure to measure NE.26We hope that future work will
similarresearch(e.g., Kinderand Sanders1990;
25Following
Krosnickand Brannon1993;Nelson,Oxley,andClawson1997),
error.Despitereliweusemediansplitsto minimizemeasurement
andNE,
.60forbothknowledge
ablealphascores(ofapproximately
whichexceedsBizeret al.'s2000finding),we expectthatthemeascales
surescontainerrorsuchthatslightchangeson therespective
In contrast,a median
capturerealdifferences.
maynot accurately
splitallowsus to focuson whataremorelikelyto be qualitatively
wefindconsistent,
but
26Whenwe exclude NE and the frame x NE interaction from
distinctgroups.Withcontinuousmeasures,
2000,305,in theirprim- the McCain-Feingoldregression,we find no significantknowledge
weaker,results(asdo MillerandKrosnick
effect.
ing study).
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
741
4 Longevity of Framing Effects
TABLE
Mean (Standard
Deviation) for:
Free-Speech Special-Interests
Frame (N = 36) Frame (N = 34)
OverallSupportfor
McCain-Feingolda
Importanceof FreeSpeechRightsb
Importanceof
Influenceby Special
Interestsb
4.94
(1.71)
4.61
(1.76)
5.03
(1.86)
5.35
(1.30)
4.24
(1.56)
5.32
(1.45)
aHigherscoresindicateincreasedsupportforMcCain-Feingold.
bHigherscoresindicateincreasedperceivedimportance.
include the NE measure, examining it along with knowledge across various issues and types of effects.
Longevity Results
We also examine the longevity of framing effects. We
implemented a follow-up survey ten days after the initial experiment-over which time the major local newspapers made no mention of campaign finance reform.
We focus exclusively on the no-discussion and unmixeddiscussion participants since these participants exhibited
initial effects-do these initial effects endure? We again
combine these two groups, as treating them separately
yields the same results.
In Table 4, we display the results for our three main
framing measures for the participants who responded to
the follow-up.27 The results for each measure move in
the direction of a framing effect, but none are significant.
The elite framing effect disappeared after ten days even
in the virtual absence of other elite information. This is
intriguing insofar as no other study has examined the
longevity of framing effects, and these results suggest that
the effects-at least when it comes to certain issues-may
be fleeting. Not only does this bring the robustness of
framing effects into question, but it also adds an interesting dynamic to debates about the nature of attitudes.
Do short-lived framing effects suggest slight blips in enduring initial attitudes, or do the effects reflect extreme
instability?
Conclusion
Most previous work on framing effects involves exposing experimental or survey participants to a single frame
27Approximately50% of the participantsresponded in exchange
for entry in a lottery.More than 75% of the respondentsreported
being exposed to reform information fewerthan three times since
the experiment(and we suspect some counted the experiment).
and then immediately gauging their response with no alternative forms of information available. Using this approach, scholars have documented numerous framing
effects, leading some to view the effects as highly robust and pervasive (e.g., Zaller 1992; Entman and Herbst
2001). In this article, we have enhanced the external validity of the typical framing study by incorporating three
dynamics common to many political settings: (1) interpersonal conversations, (2) individual heterogeneity, and
(3) over-time change. We also have extended the study of
framing effects to the hotly contested issue of campaign
finance reform.
Our results highlight the conditional and potentially
short-lived impact of elite framing. Our most important
finding concerns the role of cross-cutting interpersonal
discussions in limiting framing effects. Interpersonalconversations permeate the political world, and a failure to
consider their moderating impact can lead to misleading conclusions about unilateral elite influence (also see
Mendelsohn 1996). We also document individual heterogeneity in elite framing effects by introducing a new and
potentially powerful moderator-need to evaluate. LowNE individuals and those who are highly knowledgeable
appear more susceptible to elite framing effects. Finally,
we offer evidence about the short time horizon of elite influence. All of this suggestsa more limited impactfor elites
than is often thought.
We believe, however, that elite framing effects do regularly occur and have important consequences-as we
have shown, they are simply conditional. We find that
conversations that include mostly common perspectives
do not moderate elite framing effects, and individuals
tend to engage in such conversations to a greater extent
than cross-cutting discussions (Mutz and Martin 2001;
Mutz 2002a, 115;Walsh2003; however,also see Huckfeldt,
Morehouse, and Osborn n.d.). Moreover, we continue
to have little idea about the impact of alternative discussion formats-including more informal discussions,
discussions that include various mixes of opinions, and
discussions that both precede and then follow elite framing attempts on different issues (see Huckfeldt, Johnson,
and Sprague 2002). We need a deeper understanding of
the processes by which different forms of influence work
(e.g., how adept are individuals at judging the credibility
of elites and other citizens?) (see Huckfeldt 2001; Lupia
2002b).28 The important point is that future work on
preference formation should consider the simultaneous
28Italso is presumablynot the case that competing frameswill alwayscancelout-it might depend on the strengthof the arguments
as well as other factors.Moreover,this will not alwaysbe predictable
(e.g., Chong 200, 123-4).
NELSON
JAMESN. DRUCKMANAND KJERSTENR.
742
and competing effects of elite rhetoric and interpersonal
discussions.
Finally, what do our results reveal about deliberation and democracy? As discussed, theorists often emphasizethe salubriouseffects of cross-cutting deliberation
(e.g., Mill 1859, 53). Deliberation is said, for example, to
increase engagement, tolerance, and justification for individuals' opinions (Mendelberg 2002, 153). Ultimately,
opinions formed via deliberation with conflicting perspectives should better capture the "will of the people"
by ensuring quality opinions that approximatetruth, reasonableness, and rationality (Mill 1859, 23; Dewey 1927,
208; Kinder and Herzog 1993, 349; Benhabib 1996, 71;
Bohman 1998, 401; Fishkin 1999, 283; Dryzek 2000, 55;
Mendelberg 2002, 180; however, also see, e.g., Sanders
1997).
While our deliberative setting may not have been
ideal, our mixed discussion results could be construed
as showing that deliberation enhances opinion qualityit eliminates elite framing influence that some see as akin
to manipulation (Zaller 1992,45; Farr1993;Parenti 1999;
Entman and Herbst 2001, 207). In our case, then, deliberation enhances opinion quality if opinions affected by
elite frames are indeed of lower quality than unaffected
opinions (i.e., since the mixed discussion opinions resemble unaffected control-group opinions). However,we
have no basis for assuming relatively higher quality of
unaffected opinions, especially since they seem so easily
moved by elite frames (Kuklinskiet al. 2000, 811). On the
flip side, one could argue that deliberation has negative
consequences with the framed opinions possessing higher
quality (Druckman 2001c); yet, this begs the question of
why these opinions also do not last (i.e., our longevity
analysis;although is stability even desirable?).
A deliberativetheorist might arguethat the appropriate standardwould have been the opinions of participants
who deliberated without prior exposure to elite frames.
While we agreefuture work should include this condition,
we also recognize the circularity of arguing that deliberative processes enhance opinion quality where opinion
quality is defined as the product of deliberation (Bohman
1998).29In sum, our results accentuatethe importance of
developing an independent standard by which to evaluate the quality or truthfulness of opinions. While this is
certainly challenging, it also is necessary if we are to assess the democratic consequences of elite influence and
deliberation.
thatdeliberation
29Criteria
maypromoteincludemoreinformaforone'sopinions,
increased
tion,rationalpreferences,
justification
andreflectionupona greaternumberof considerations
(Benhabib
1996;Mansbridge
1999).Whiletheseserveasusefulstartingpoints,
thereis no consensuson theirdesirability
(e.g.,Lupia2002aon
information).
Appendix
Free-Speechand Special-Interests
Experimental Articles
Senate to consider free speech implications
of campaign finance reform
by Jonathan Pratt
WASHINGTON,Jan.25 - Next week the U.S. Senate
will consider the bi-partisan McCain-Feingold campaign
finance reform bill which would ban soft money contributions to political parties. Under current law, there is no
limit to these "soft" contributions made by individuals,
businesses, and labor unions to political parties. The parties typically use soft money during federal elections to
purchase issue ads and fund "get-out-the-vote" activities. A similar version of the McCain-Feingold reform bill
failed in the last Congress, and its prospects for passage
this time are unclear.
In last year'selection, the two parties raised over $400
million in soft money, much of it coming from special interests.Supportersof the reform bill say it would go a long
way toward limiting the influence of special interests and
lobbyists in Washington. Opinion about the bill, however,
is mixed. In addition to political opposition, the reform
bill faces a serious constitutional challenge as well. Since
money given to the political parties is used for advertising and to promote different political ideas and policies,
opponents of the bill argue that limiting these contributions violates free speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
While many people worry about the power of special interests, they also do not want to limit free speech.
Dr. Susan Baker, a law Professor from Harvard University, points to the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v.
Valeo that "[Financial] advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to
protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally. .." Dr. Bakerherself adds
that "protecting free speech takes precedence over limiting special interestsbecause the FirstAmendment ensures
that citizens can spend money to promote their political
views... any spending limits create a dangerous slippery
slope with regard to our fundamental First Amendment
rights."
Senate to consider campaign finance reform
that could limit influence of special interests
by Jonathan Pratt
WASHINGTON, Jan.25 - Next week the U.S. Senate
will consider the bi-partisan McCain-Feingold campaign
FRAMINGAND DELIBERATION
finance reform bill which would ban soft money contributions to political parties. Under current law, there is
no limit to these "soft" contributions made by individuals, businesses, and labor unions to political parties. The
parties typically use soft money during federal elections
to purchase issue ads and fund "get-out-the vote" activities. A similar version of the McCain-Feingold reform bill
failed in the last Congress, and its prospects for passage
this time are unclear.
In last year'selection, the two parties raised over $400
million in soft money, much of it coming from special interests. Supportersof the reform bill say it would go a long
way toward limiting the influence of special interests and
lobbyists in Washington. Opinion about the bill, however,
is mixed. In addition to political opposition, the reform
bill faces a serious constitutional challenge as well. Since
money given to the political parties is used for advertising and to promote different political ideas and policies,
opponents of the bill argue that limiting these contributions violates free speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
While many people worry about limiting free speech,
they also want to limit the power of special interests.
Dr. Susan Baker,a law Professor from HarvardUniversity,
points to former Supreme Court JusticeByron White's argument that "the evils of unlimited contributions are sufficiently threatening to warrant restriction regardless of
the impact of the limits on the contributor's opportunity
for effective speech." Dr. Bakerherself adds that "limiting
special interests takes precedence over free speech because
the possibility of corruption from special interests can directly erode the political process and also undermine the
public's confidence in it."
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