Labor History, 2016
VOL. 57, NO. 5, 606–626
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2016.1239884
Union voucher at the sickbed of French unionism? The CFDT
union confederation and the AXA experiment, 1981–1993
Rémi Bourguignona and Mathieu Floquetb
a
Gregor, Sorbonne Business School and Cevipof Sciences Po (CNRS-UMR 7048), Paris, France; bCerefige,
University of Lorraine, Nancy, France
ABSTRACT
In the 1980s, to address financial difficulties, the CFDT (a French
reformist union) proposed an original solution – the union voucher
– aimed at broadening its membership base and generating new
resources. It affords unions with funding from a company, which
annually distributes vouchers to employees, who can remit the
voucher (or not) to unions of their choice. This mechanism is based
both on company financing and the individual choices of employees.
In the early 1990s, the insurance company AXA experimented with
and then adopted this solution. This article traces the history of the
union voucher and assesses the union’s experience.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 20 June 2016
Accepted 31 August 2016
KEYWORDS
Industrial relations; French
unions; union finance; AXA;
CFDT
1. Introduction
Debates and controversies over legitimate means of financing trade unions are a recurring
matter in France. They are characterized by the fundamentally opposing positions of proponents of subsidization (public or private) and proponents of funding through dues: The
former assert that trade unions act in the general interest of workers and not only for their
members, while the latter consider financing by members as the only way to guarantee
trade union independence. This issue extends beyond the means available to these organisations as it calls into question the relationship between unions and workers. Insistence on
the need to favour union dues means acknowledging that, to obtain funding, trade unions
must make themselves useful to workers and therefore pay attention to their expectations.
The specific characteristics of the French industrial relations system cause this viewpoint to
have little credibility because it is not necessary to be a union member to benefit from union
actions. Starting in the 1990s, an intermediate measure is regularly promoted in public
debate: the union voucher in the form of a payment order issued by the employer that
permits employees to finance the union of their choice. This measure thus combines collective financing – the financial transaction takes place with the company and not the employees – with a market-driven approach as it is actually individual choices that determine the
allocation of the funds.
CONTACT Rémi Bourguignon [email protected]
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Labor History 607
This union voucher occupies a completely paradoxical position in public discourse.
Debated internally since the 1980s within the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique
du Travail) trade union confederation, and implemented by the AXA insurance company
starting in the 1990s, the measure has not been widely adopted. Today it exists in several
organisations, such as oncology institutes and the union of national social security funds,
but it remains completely marginal even though it is regularly highlighted in institutional
reports aimed at renewing French trade unions.1 In his 2006 report, Raphaël Hadas-Lebel2
observed that this measure ‘has not achieved significant success to date’, but nevertheless
proposed to include it in the industrial relations agenda. In October 2015, even the prime
minister envisioned its generalisation. We contend that this paradoxical status constitutes
a symptom of an underlying condition and, as such, represents a fully deserving subject of
study. The coexistence of quasi-ritualistic promotion with the status quo in fact invites us to
review the foundations and history of this measure.
The historical exploration provided in this article shows that the measure was, at its inception, the subject of intense debates within the CFDT, which was far from reaching a consensus. This was because, by drawing attention to the nature of relations between workers and
unions, it called union membership into question. Advocates of the union voucher, at the
highest levels of the CFDT, hoped to use them as leverage for sociological reconstruction of
the membership, with the aim of a less ideological form of unionism. But this aim was stymied
by internal political opposition and by failure to control the experiment under way at AXA.
Due to the requirements of the union’s regular regime, the specific implementation of the
union voucher in that experiment had negated the measure’s underlying philosophy, effectively resulting in a new form of financing but not a new form of membership. Finally, though
the union voucher served as a reference for the debate over the nature of union membership
and the legitimacy of a market-based approach, only a watered-down version remains, which
is more consensual but less ambitious.
To carry out this historical research, we used two types of sources: The first consists of
minutes of meetings, working documents, and draft agreements collected in the CFDT
archives;3 for the second, we conducted interviews with stakeholders involved in the experiment.4 This article then revisits the emergence of debate about union financing to clearly
situate the issue that was to be addressed by the union voucher. We then propose to retrace
the history by dividing it into two phases: the first in which the measure was conceived
within the CFDT confederation, and the second commencing with experimentation and
debates about it within related policy-making bodies. To conclude, we analyse the reasons
for the failure to generalise the use of union vouchers, while showing that they were able
to contribute to the legitimisation of company financing for union organisations during the
1990s.
2. The emergence of a debate: what type of financing for French trade
unions?
The end of the 1970s is considered as a point of rupture in the history of French industrial
relations, marked by the onset of a process of de-unionisation,5 the reasons for which were
both economic, related to changes in production output (industrial crises, especially in the
steel industry), and sociological (the rise of individualism and growth of consumerism).
Therefore, the major unions were worried both about a decrease in financial resources and
608 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
a loss of legitimacy at a time when their role in social democracy was being affirmed. The
issue of union financing progressively gained momentum in public and academic debates.
2.1. Unions under pressure
To fully understand the structural lines of this debate, it is useful to examine certain characteristics of the French system of industrial relations, especially the concept of freedom of
association in French law. As interpreted by the International Labour Organization (ILO),
freedom of association guarantees the possibility for employers and workers to form and
join organizations of their own choosing. This right has figured among the fundamental
principles of the ILO since its inception in 1919. In France, union freedom of association has
been recognized since 1884 by the Waldeck-Rousseau law, but its adoption into the constitution in 1946 opened the way to a more nuanced interpretation. Beyond the right to organise, the freedom of association extends to include individual protection. If an individual is
free to join or not join a union, and to join the union of his choice, no measure may constrain
individuals to join, such as those that existed, for example, in the industrial relations systems
of English-speaking countries with the practice of closed shops, nor may any measure reserve
the benefits of union actions only for union members.6 In other words, the French system is
constituted on a unique basis in which union actions benefit all workers without any possibility to compel or too strongly induce workers to become members.
Following the well-known analysis of the collective action paradox by Mancur Olson, we
quickly realise the limits of such a configuration.7 If we admit that joining a union represents
a cost for workers, who can avoid doing so while still benefiting from union actions, then
they will tend to opt for a ‘free ride’. In addition, being a union member is largely seen as a
risk in France. The survey conducted annually since 2005 by Dialogues on the attitude of
workers towards unionism shows that fear of reprisals serves as a major brake on unionisation. Thus, since the 1980s, the rate of unionisation in France has been below 20%, compared
to 30% for OECD countries. Finally, as pointed out by Visser, the French industrial relations
system is atypical in that it is characterized by one of the highest levels of union coverage
among OECD countries while having the lowest rate of unionisation.8
Financially, this configuration is particularly problematic. Indeed, it entails intense levels
of activity that require increased resources but without the ability to collect more union
dues. And the continued erosion of unionisation rates from the 1950s through the 1970s
only aggravated this problem, which has become glaring and calls into question the operating model of unionism. Trade unions have increasingly sought out alternative forms of
financing such as subsidies, or provision of permanent staff by companies or the public
service. However, according to Rosanvallon, this approach to compensation is not viable
and in the short term poses ‘the question of public and official financing of unions’, even
though this approach does not address the risk of unions losing autonomy.9
2.2. Financing and the unionist model
In seeking to shed light on the opaque resources of unions, Adam and Landier appeared
more critical and worried about the evolution of French unionism. In fact, they noted the
growing influence of subsidies, whether from the public sector or from employers.10 They
viewed them as a cause of institutionalisation, which Adam had already condemned for
Labor History 609
some years.11 By becoming disassociated with workers and financially dependent on the
State and employers, unions had initiated a major change that led them to play the role of
a labour agency rather than the independent countervailing power they have historically
claimed to be. Moreover, continuing in the same direction, Amadieu stressed that alternative
financing to benefit labour organisations is largely based on a logic of piecemeal support,
which fuels the dissipation of French unionism. It would be sufficient for these organisations
to field candidates for professional elections to receive financial benefit,12 because ‘even
modest results suffice to gain an attribution of resources for unions who have presented
candidates’.13 All of these criticisms are fundamentally based on the idea that the financing
of unions is not only a question of means, that is, to know whether the means are proportionate to the unions’ missions, but is equally a question of incentive. The challenge is ultimately to know whom unions depend on: workers, the State, or employers. The increase in
subsidies as a proportion of union resources compared to dues distances the union from its
members and finally contributes to its institutionalisation. The challenge is therefore to
maintain both the legitimacy and independence of unions by making dues the core of their
resources, while acknowledging that unions play a role for all workers, especially when
participating in inter-occupational negotiations or the joint management of certain institutions. The financial equation is therefore not so easy to resolve because it clashes with the
previously mentioned characteristics of the French system, under which there appears to
be no market for membership. The union voucher attempted to address this dilemma by
seeking to reconcile a central role for workers with a source of external financing.
In principle, the union voucher is akin to the vouchers adopted by the United Kingdom
in 1988 to finance the education system, which are quasi-market-oriented.14 They are based
on a separation between the payer and the recipient, with the latter making a choice among
available options. In a company, once a year the employer distributes vouchers of a predetermined amount to its employees, who are then free, if they want, to individually remit a
voucher to the union of their choice. At the end of the collection period, the employer sends
each union the amount corresponding to the total number of union vouchers it collected.
Though it is actually the employer who finances the union, solely the workers determine
the allocation of funds. It is in this sense that the promoters of this measure envisioned a
means to rebuild the relation between workers and unions. This optimistic outlook was
definitely not shared by all. This experiment has been accompanied by many debates both
within and outside of the CFDT.
3. Encouraging reform: focus on experimentation rather than law
The union voucher represented an original mode of financing that takes account of the
specificity of the French industrial relations system and attempted to reconcile financing by
companies with direct control by workers. As such, they were part of efforts to transform
the industrial relations system and would serve as a point of reference in debate on the
future of unionism. Their emergence into public debate did not occur overnight. They owed
their origin to the CFDT’s engagement in revision of its union doctrine since the 1970s. The
assumption of power by a leftist government with the aim of passing major legislation on
unionism provided the opportunity to accelerate deliberation on union financing, leading
eventually to the experiment launched in July, 1990 in the AXA insurance company.
610 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
3.1. Exploration of potential alternatives
Concerned with its financial situation and taking advantage of the election of François
Mitterrand (1981), the CGC15 confederation submitted a plan to the government for mandatory union dues.16 This proposal was unsuccessful as mandatory dues payment made the
solution unconstitutional, but it seems to have furthered debate both within the government
and within the CFDT. Indeed, after having supported the common programme of the left
and adopting a self-management programme, the CFDT sought to bring its members and
organisers together in a form of unionism that was closer to the field. Such an approach ran
counter-current to the de-unionisation trend by restoring focus to the union function, which
in particular implied expanding its membership. This consisted in taking distance from political action and returning to the issue of relations at work and ultimately to more classical
union activities.17
The financial issue was raised starting in 1982, with the first step being to submit the
subject for debate and then to open debate beyond the circle of confederation specialists.
Also in 1982, a call for input in the internal magazine, Nouvelles CFDT, was launched by the
National Office of the CFDT, inviting regional confederation leaders18 and sector-based occupational federations to debate the role of unions in society along with the financial aspect
of that role.19 The means of financing cited were mandatory dues and union vouchers, with
the latter described as a ‘kind of tax paid by companies on its funds or through levies on
salaries that is disbursed for union operations’.20 In reality, this was not the first use of the
term ‘union voucher’, as it had appeared in 1981 in an internal document developed by the
CFDT’s internal research bureau (BRAEC), a body under the direction of the policy department. The principles and functioning of the union voucher were not explained in the document,21 which could indicate that they were already sufficiently familiar to its audience (the
National Office), thus obviating the need to provide details.
In January 1983, following the call for input launched in the magazine, responses were
examined by the National Office, which observed that the debate did not stir up enthusiasm,
since ‘only two regions and one federation responded’.22 The responses did not refer to the
union voucher and were oriented towards financing through provision of means by local
government. No responses referred to companies, workers, or members as providers of new
financial resources. The issue then seemed to become dormant.
In September 1984, the government invited the confederation to consider the question
of union financing,23 providing a signal that François Mitterrand would be ready to act on
this issue.24 More precisely, the government’s objective was to enact legislation to ‘Rehabilitate
the position and the responsibilities of unions in the life of society’.25 Its scope extended
beyond the financial issue and motivated the CFDT to consider the role of unions in social
dialogue. The government’s initiative apparently surprised the confederation’s Executive
Committee, which sent a request to meet soon with the Minister of Labour. When the request
was submitted, Michel Delebarre had only been the Minister of Labour for two months, but
he had very little room for manoeuvre due to the legislative elections scheduled for March
1986, which left him little margin for manoeuvre.
An ad hoc workgroup was set up within CFDT that described the issue as follows: ‘French
unionism engages in, proposes, and contributes to the development of text and provisions
that determine the social status of workers … This function, which requires more and more
resources and knowledge should be formally recognised and officially financed’.26 Indeed, like
Labor History 611
other French unions the CFDT suffered from a decline in membership, but had at the same
time benefited from an increase in votes in its favour in workforce elections. The workgroup
also observed that the union ‘is viewed as an institution, as a means of insurance because
of the many tasks it performs in defence of workers, such as consultation and legal defence’,
and described the phenomenon from the viewpoint of those taking a free ride: ‘for implementation and financing, we are very happy to benefit from the dedication of a few others’.
This assessment seems to be shared at different levels of the organisation. Thus the Lorraine
regional union wrote that,
to benefit from the results of negotiations, the positive impact of conflict, the right of lifelong
training, and wage and social security, which is to say all the results of union action, there is no
need to be a union member and no one takes offence about it.27
Specifically, a new possibility was proposed by François Rogé (former Treasurer): ‘union
financing by all workers based on the union’s contractual role’. What remained to be developed from this principle was a concrete proposal, which was formulated in the debate as
the idea, ‘of union voucher in a similar form to restaurant voucher,28 which workers could
send to the organisation of their choice’.29 In addition, to assure a new, balanced budget, it
would permit ‘an evolution in the behaviour and responsibility of workers in their relations
with unions’.30 This union voucher was not only to be viewed as a means of financing but
also as an approach to broaden the membership base.
After having met with the Minister in October 1984, the CFDT participants from that
working meeting31 were concerned that the weakening of public support for the government
would block the project. To forestall this, it would be necessary to have the government
work with unions to elaborate the proposed text, to have consensus on it among the five
confederations, and for employers to be neutral about it. The meeting with the Minister left
hope for rapid progress on this issue and the project group indicated that it was now ‘his
major personal project’.32
In September 1985,33 the working group proposed a methodical way to reference all the
conceivable solutions and approaches used abroad, followed by consultation with two university professors (P. Rosanvallon and P. Garnier). The report drawn up in November of the
same year classified financing methods using two principal alternatives: collective financing
or financing by workers.34 The first category included financing by companies (contributions
based on the number of employees), by the State (in the form of an importation tax or a
subsidy), or by union vouchers issued by the employer. The second category included proposals of deductions from wages, solidarity contributions (as in the Swiss model), or union
vouchers, once more, as part of employee compensation. After developing this inventory,
the working group considered the selection criteria that could be compatible with the CFDT’s
definition of unionism. Seven criteria were determined: union independence, worker freedom, membership privileges, the role of members, simplicity of the measure, and the secrecy
of membership from employers. Evaluated against these criteria, only two methods were
retained: the union voucher as a single charge to the company, or the union voucher as an
element of employee compensation.35 The solution that emerged was for companies to
issue a financial instrument to employees together with their pay slips. This instrument could
not be cashed by the employee, who would have to transfer it to one of the five representative union organisations, or to a joint organisation. In addition to the financial resources
provided by the voucher, it was also conceived as a tool for recruitment of new members.
612 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
The title of the memorandum, ‘Transforming our electors into members’ was supported by
an explanation of the status that should be attributed to voucher contributors:
What type of members are those who decide to award the CFDT a financial instrument that
they cannot cash? Are they half-weight, not the real thing, shifty and unacceptable individuals?
Let’s not hide the fact that these questions will be debated: A sufficiently large number of union
branches apply very selective membership tests, so we would not greet these new members
with enthusiasm.
But we must be clear. Strictly speaking, a member is someone who makes the choice to financially support a union organisation…
Once an employee confers the instrument defined above to the CFDT, that person must be
considered as a member.36
3.2. The timidity of political leaders and the preference for experimentation
With this ambitious positioning, the union voucher became a tool for gaining membership,
but it remained necessary to convince external and internal stakeholders before union
voucher could see the light of day. The project had to be approved by a government administration or at least one company, and then it had to gain acceptance within the union
organisation so that voucher contributors would be welcomed as members in their own
right. However, the memorandum concludes pessimistically that the working group considered itself at an impasse, given that ‘this solution has no chance of being implemented
because no political party is willing to take the risk of passing legislation to make it possible’.
Indeed, the project was leaked in the magazine Expansion on 20 September 1985, in which
it was said that ‘the idea is circulating in the Ministry of Labour to provide unions with more
regular financing by inducing workers to accept a levy on their compensation’. At first, the
Minister did not deny this information, and it seemed that the leak was arranged to test the
proposal among employers and other unions. In December 1985, three months before the
national elections, French television Antenne 2 news presented the project as ‘mandatory
union dues’, which quickly made it unpopular. On 19 December 1985, the Minister of Labour
finally announced in a press release that,
no legislative proposal is under discussion or being studied on the issue of union financial
resources, or in particular on creation of mandatory union dues paid by all employees, for this
would be contrary to all the traditions of our democratic life.
Moreover, at the end of 1985, a law was passed aimed at providing new training resources
for elected union officials, without any reference to the issue of union financing. It is easy to
imagine that the original intent of the Minister was the provision of financial means to elected
union officials and to unions as a whole. This rejection of the project at the highest levels of
the State might have led the CFDT to abandon the project, but this did not occur. The project
was passed rapidly by the different levels of the confederation’s management. At the end
of 1985, given the latest developments, the project group questioned whether it was pertinent to keep the subject of union voucher in the agenda of the National Council planned
for January 1986, but the project was retained within the programme of studies.
The CFDT Executive Committee did not lose hope of seeing union vouchers become a
reality: To achieve this goal, the solution chosen was to use a contractual approach. The
document presented in the National Council in January 1986 definitively abandoned the
Labor History 613
possibility of establishing the union voucher through law. To explain this course, in addition
to classical policy arguments, it posed an argument against another union confederation,
the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which followed a hard-line policy that left little
room for negotiation: A law ‘would have the effect of breathing new life into all unions, which
would of course include the CGT. But what government could imagine being happy to give
the CGT back the means of action that it lacks today’.37 The appropriate course was thus ‘to
advance through debate and bargaining’,38 and to negotiate with certain companies within
which ‘there is room for manoeuvre’. In this sense, the Executive Committee envisioned two
cases:
consisting of companies with a long-established mass of members, or otherwise of employers
who prefer to stabilise a CFDT representation that has a majority of votes but low levels of
resources and membership, and as such is a poor guarantee against the return of the CGT.39
In practice, this was a solution requiring case-by-case negotiation to implement union
voucher that would not lead to their generalisation. Meanwhile, an internal document posed
the question: ‘Are there several clearly designated companies in which a minimum of conditions exist for an attempt to obtain an agreement?’40 It then appeared that ‘several CFDT
organisations have started to sound out interlocutors among their employers. Progress looks
possible’.41 In 1987, the first version of an agreement (in the form of articles) was written,42
specifying technical details of the proposal, such as the form the voucher would take, for
which the CFDT requested the Cheque Dejeuner company (a lunch voucher cooperative with
ties to the CFDT) to develop a technical document for a ‘union dues voucher’, following the
model of lunch vouchers or holiday vouchers.43
From April 1987, serious contacts were made with the management of AXA,44 which
accepted to implement union vouchers and had already planned a budget for the programme. The debate was officially launched and AXA allowed the CDFT the time needed to
deal with the issue before its formalisation. Here, it seemed that an oppressive atmosphere
in relations between the CFDT and the CGT did not help progress on the issue.45 During this
period, the deliberation on the status of members continued to evolve. Though early in the
project, the union voucher was viewed as a potential means of addressing the ‘free rider’
phenomenon, by the end of the 1980s, the issue of union vouchers was coupled with the
implementation of offers of service for members. The union voucher programme was
entrusted to the new Treasurer of the confederation, Jean-Marie Spaeth, who created an ad
hoc group to manage three aspects of the programme:
• a feasibility study on implementing a hotline for CFDT members (with the goal of informing workers about their rights);
• development of a media campaign; and
• the union voucher case.46
These three aspects were very much interlinked, consisting in making a concrete service
offer to members of the CFDT, and in using a media campaign to communicate the service
offer to workers who contributed their union vouchers to the CFDT. Regarding the goals
formulated in 1985, the project had backed away from its position on the status of contributors. They were no longer to be considered as members with full rights but rather as beneficiaries of services (primarily for legal counsel on labour rights), thus losing the right to
participate in setting union policy.
614 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
At the end of October 1989, a draft agreement on union rights was formulated between
the company management of AXA and the CFDT. Other union organisations were not
involved in the discussions, and found out about the agreement only after it was approved
by CFDT management. In its initial version, the agreement provided employees with the
possibility of assigning the voucher to:
• the representative organisation of their individual choice, or
• a fund managed jointly by the signatories of the agreement, or
• a joint association, or
• an endeavour supported by humanitarian philanthropy.47
The archives did not yield records of the exchanges between the CFDT and AXA. However,
in the adopted version of the agreement, the voucher could only be endorsed by a trade
union organisation, and the agreement ruled out the possibility of a distribution for humanitarian endeavours.48 Apart from union vouchers, the agreement introduced the right to
training for elected officials and staff representatives and arbitration by a mediator in case
of disagreement in a negotiation.
On 2 July 1990, the agreement was signed in the presence of the Secretary General, Jean
Kaspar. He defended the project developed by the CFDT not as ‘a form of union financing’
but as ‘a new form of membership’.49 However, the question of the status of the contributors
had not been debated within the CFDT and nothing was planned in this regard. After the
first collection, the union voucher had only financial implications and did not allow for an
increase in the CFDT membership base.
4. From limits of the AXA experiment to the 1992 Paris Congress
Between the initial work on the union voucher and the launch of the first experiment at AXA,
a decade had passed. With the signing of the agreement, a new sequence of events occurred
that would place the union voucher into public debate as well as at the core of CFDT internal
debates. Certainly, the regional union of Brittany had already expressed its rejection of the
union voucher in 1986 by stating that they represented a response that was ‘poorly adapted,
precipitous, and dangerous’, and by explaining that, far from developing membership, these
voucher would create passivity.50 Nevertheless, so far such positions were very rare and the
issue of financing seemed to remain the focus of the upper levels of the CFDT hierarchy. The
questions that were then raised among the union’s organisers expressed the intensity of
internal debate on the subjects of the future of unionism and its financing. These debates
reached their climax at the 1992 Paris Congress.
4.1. An experiment in the midst of euphoria and denunciation
The experiment launched by the CFDT did not go unnoticed. It must be said that the communications plan had been carefully prepared. The press had been invited to the signing of
the agreement and ran headlines on the subject, most in glowing terms, starting the day
after and for several more days. Public debate did not take long to focus on the agreement.
Gérard Adam, a professor at the Cnam institute (Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers),
violently attacked the union voucher, which would, according to him, satisfy only ‘the most
resolute opponents of unionism’. From his viewpoint, instead of blocking the
Labor History 615
institutionalisation taking place in union organisations, this measure would push them even
further in that direction because it confirmed and reinforced their dependence on employers.51 In reply, without denying either the institutionalisation process or the responsibility
of union organisations for it, Nicole Notat, then CFDT Deputy Secretary General, directly
blamed the French industrial relations system for the problem, and attempted to show how
the union voucher could serve as a solution. The challenge, she explained, was to bring
about encounters between workers and unions. The union voucher, while fully respecting
the free and voluntary nature of the choice of beneficiary, offered an opportunity for such
encounters. The exchange taking place at that time between workers and union organisers
was an opportunity to provide an account of the results of union policy. These encounters
were also an opportunity to propose that workers take the step of becoming full members.
In conclusion, she thus seemed to demonstrate a convergence with the analysis of Gérard
Adam but called for a courageous approach aimed at ‘moving beyond analysis to seek solutions to the crisis of unionism’ in the face of those who, clinging too hard to union history,
were preventing engagement in any industrial relations dynamic.52 This controversy reflects
quite clearly the framework that would be used to judge the legitimacy of this hybrid mode
of financing that was situated mid-way between dues and subsidies.
By revealing the discussions with AXA and proposing an experiment, the CFDT had actually forced the other union organisations to take a stand. The CFTC and the CGC thus followed
suit and signed the agreement. As a sign of their full support, the chiefs of those two organisations travelled to be photographed alongside Jean Kaspar, the CFDT Secretary General,
and the charismatic head of AXA, Claude Bébéar. Things played out very differently when
the CGT and the FO (Force Ouvrière – Workers’ Force) confederations were also invited to
explain their stance on this subject. As neither were signatories, their lines of argumentation
were not supportive. Interviewed in the daily newspaper Libération, Louis Viannet, then
number two at the CGT, made a telling critique of the predicament faced by his organisation.
He condemned the measure less on principle than for the potential risks if its terms were
not clear: This voucher ‘leads directly to the possibility of company surveillance of personnel’,
reported the newspaper. In contrast with this qualified criticism, Marc Blondel, General
Secretary of the FO made a more frontal attack on the underlying logic of union vouchers:
‘unionism is not for sale and is not a product in the marketplace’.53
In fact, CGT policy regarding financing was particularly unclear at the time. According to
Alain Brouhmann, then a Federal Secretary at the CGT’s Insurance Bank Federation, the CGT’s
decision not to sign the agreement should not be viewed as a rejection of the union voucher.
The agreement contained several other measures, such as the requirement for negotiated
settlements, solicitation of a mediator in case of impasses, and the establishment – before
any negotiations – of a month-long informational period during which both unions and
employers committed to avoid creating conflict, all of which were clearly disputed by the
CGT. At the end of the experimental period, these objections were dismissed, and the CGT
ended up signing the labour agreement providing for union vouchers.
Essentially, it appears that the union voucher revealed dividing lines within the trade
unions and it appears likely that the ambivalent position of the CGT was a reflection of lack
of consensus. This phenomenon was particularly noticeable during the launch of experiments at other companies. For example, at the insurance company GAN, a year after the
launch at AXA, the CGT and the FO provided their support for the union voucher by signing
a collective agreement. Alain Brouhmann recalls that he had to ‘face harsh criticism at GAN
616 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
from fellow CGT members and the national leadership. This was neither easy for our comrades
at the company nor for us’.54 As for the FO union delegate, his signature led to loss of his
union position following a sanction by the organisation.
4.2. A thwarted evaluation
During the launch of the experiment, the reasoning behind it was clearly communicated:
The union voucher could not be generalised except as a means of increasing membership.
However, even though the rolling out of experimentation caught the CGT and FO off-guard,
it also revealed splits within the CFDT. Some federations quickly took up the cause of the
union voucher, as evidenced, for example, on the front page of the October 1990 union
organiser monthly published by the FGGM Mines and Metalworking Federation, the union
from which Secretary General Jean Kaspar originated. It features a cartoon showing dozens
of workers rushing to the local CFDT branch with union vouchers in hand, and a CFDT organiser, whose only problem is a lack of membership cards to meet the demand.55
Nevertheless, this enthusiasm was not shared by all and voices were quickly raised in
criticism. Even though the principle of experimentation with the union voucher had been
officially approved at the 1988 Strasbourg Congress, the signing of the agreement with AXA
raised criticism about the risk of the merchandising of unionism. On 10 September 1990,
several days after the signing of the agreement, the Secretary General of the CFDT’s STIC
chemical workers’ union56 addressed a letter to the confederation’s Executive Committee57
disputing the idea that the union voucher could increase membership, an idea that Jean
Kaspar had communicated to the media. Two points of dispute were raised. The first, regulatory in nature, reminded the Board that while the Strasbourg Congress had authorised
launching the union voucher experiment, it had in no way opened the door to changes in
the membership system. In passing, the letter from STIC pointed to the risk union voucher
would pose if they were to become the primary source of union funding, a risk of instability
as in general the funding depended on ‘the mood of workers’. The second point of dispute,
by parodying the revolutionary song Ça Ira (It’ll be fine), was even more critical:
Today the company is on edge. Membership vouchers are at the printers, the Union Organisations
are cleaning the store, preparing the display before the big opening day.
Marketing ideas are flourishing and we will soon announce big discounts on membership dues
(Extract from AXA Ira, AXA Ira [AXA will be fine] 10SG7).58
Here it is clearly the commodification of unionism that is being denounced. The debate
seemed to have reached into the CFDT National Office, to the point that Jean Kaspar was
forced to intervene on the subject during the National Office meeting on 18–20 September
1990. He noted that the debate was passionate while wishing that ‘this passion not extend
beyond the National Office’. And the discourse of the Secretary General appeared to be very
much one of appeasement. After orchestrating the signing of the agreement and attendant
media coverage, he downplayed the significance of the experiment, saying that it should
not be taken as a ‘model’. He implied that the limits of the agreement were recognised, with
a reminder that it was a compromise, and did not represent ‘an ideal agreement – it must be
improved’.59 And then posing a very direct question: ‘Is the union voucher defined in the AXA
agreement enough? It’s not certain’. As a way out of this controversy, he therefore proposed
to establish a confederation working group consisting of the development manager, the
Labor History 617
treasurer, and the organisation and communication manager.60 This group was to work with
the federation of services and the AXA union branch. Above all, it proposed to launch other
experiments to improve on the AXA agreement.
The following months provided an opportunity to inject some order into the debate by
proposing an initial assessment of the experiment. The confederation’s governing bodies
met in succession in December 1990 – the Executive Committee on 3 December and the
National Office on 19–20 December – and the union voucher featured prominently in the
agenda. But these meetings appear to have been held too early to be able to draw conclusions, leading to a proposal to delay the debate until a more thorough assessment could be
provided in the second half of 1991. Nevertheless, the initial assessment made for the
National Office in December 1990 showed the limits of the AXA experiment.61
The debate in fact revolved around membership status. Was the employee who remitted
a union voucher to be automatically recognised as a member, based solely on assurance of
that person’s consent? The union voucher measure as formulated in the agreement did not
address this question, and the response to it was up to the union organisations. The CFDT
responded in the affirmative to this question. It wanted the voucher to function as a different
means of gaining membership, thus raising the possibility of segmenting membership status.62 In the case of the AXA experiment, it was not feasible to test this approach because
the voucher amount was significantly lower than the amount of a dues payment. An
employee who remitted a voucher to the CFDT was therefore not a member. If the employee
wanted to become a member, he or she had to voluntarily make the financial commitment
to do so. This situation seriously disturbed the conduct of the experiment and diminished
the confederation’s interest in it, as ‘the AXA voucher does not of itself spontaneously cause
employees to become CFDT members en masse’. To turn this measure into a dynamic for
union expansion, the work to be carried out by the union organisers became even more
demanding, because it became necessary to (1) convince employees to remit their vouchers,
(2) convince those who remitted their vouchers to make themselves known to the union,
and finally (3) engage with those who had waived their anonymity to lead them to become
members.63 Inasmuch as the AXA experiment did not link voucher remittance and membership, the hopes the confederation had placed on the experiment were confounded. The
voucher amount, a detail little discussed until then, radically transformed the nature of the
project.
The disappointment felt at that time would be echoed in the assessment completed a
year later by the confederation working group and presented to the National Office on 24–25
February 1992. Though union vouchers had provided means that were useful to the AXA
union team, the effects in terms of unionisation were modest. The working group noted that
‘at AXA, the teams had great difficulty in promoting unionisation’. Different approaches were
planned and initiated but none met with success. The group confirmed that, within the terms
of the experiment, the union voucher was a potential developmental tool but inadequate
in its own right.64
The working group ultimately found itself embarrassed by this experiment, which did
not produce the hoped-for results, but which also failed to truly test the principle of union
vouchers. This failure was due to the specific arrangements adopted at AXA; other arrangements might have produced different results. In other words, the working group informed
the National Office that it was not possible to draw conclusions and that it was necessary to
undertake other experiments. At that time, above all, the CFDT discovered the
618 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
methodological requirements for experiments aimed at producing labour rights measures.
Indeed, the report actually pointed to a lack of control over experiments, and that, according
to its authors, undertaking new experiments would only be meaningful if they were well
controlled. To address this, the working group proposed to cancel the experiment charter
and to formalise contracts for experimentation between the confederation and its unions.65
It’s easy to see that at this point the AXA experiment appeared to be a lost cause.
In June 1993, the AXA union team attempted to regenerate the confederation’s interest
by taking the initiative to make its own assessment. The union’s central delegates who signed
the report showed that union vouchers had led to an increase in membership, with 20 new
members recruited over four years, a modest result compared to the initial objective, but as
pointed out by the authors, these people were active members. The principal benefit was
ultimately a reinforcement of the CFDT in the company, where the union could count on a
network of 500 employees. Regretting that ‘the CFDT, in fact, was providing little encouragement for such experiments’, they invited their parent organisation to ‘showcase the results
of these experiments and re-engage so that new experiments could take place’.66
4.3. Qualified validation of the policy
The devaluing of the union voucher solution by the AXA experiment and the failure of the
working group to provide a conclusive assessment stymied the confederation’s undertaking,
which had viewed the union voucher as a major change for the CFDT, and even for French
unionism in general. As stated above, the principle of conducting experimentation on this
measure had been approved at the 1988 Congress, from which article 403 of the policy
resolutions stipulated that:
Union development will be the subject of sustained and extensive deliberation. It is necessary
to leave behind the elitist outlook that too often prevails. The search for new ways of recruiting
members, of participating in unionism, and of contribution to its financing must be pursued –
whether with the union voucher or other approaches. All proposals must respect the voluntary
choices of individual workers and guarantee the rights of all members to participate in trade
union life.67
The extremely broad wording of this article, which left room for numerous viewpoints without truly clarifying the status of the union voucher, could not really serve to generate debate.
Only an unsuccessful amendment proposed by the General National Education Union of
Maine and Loire provided a reminder of the key issue: ‘These new forms must always entail
involvement in the unionist efforts of the CFDT’. In the same spirit, the Public Service Union
of Paris pointed out the requirement of associating internal solidarity with CFDT membership.68 Though these provisions did not lead to rejection of the proposed article, they showed
that the unions made a clear distinction between the union voucher as a form of financing
and as a means of gaining membership. Regarding the latter, some feared a dilution of the
union endeavour. This debate resumed, in a much more direct and supported way during
the 1992 Paris Congress. The confederation plan had matured during the interim and the
policy resolution addressed to unions during the Congress indicated in article 322 that:
Our stated objective of achieving a unionist majority among workers organised by the confederation requires an effort of deliberation and experimentation on new forms of membership.
The union voucher experiment, which must be pursued and developed, has opened the door
to its realisation. It is necessary to expand the field of investigation without a priori rejecting
any hypothesis.69
Labor History 619
This new formulation put to the vote clearly delineated the status of the union voucher. It
was not only to be a simple form of financing but a means of gaining membership. Unlike
the arrangement at AXA, the confederation wanted to make all workers who remit union
vouchers to become members who participated in the life of the union. Study of another
document from the Congress, the General Report, provides the best account of this aim. In
fact, though the final version of this document only made a very limited reference to the
union voucher, as one of the potential means of seeking new ways of recruiting members,
the initial draft versions went much further. In a version from March 1991, the union voucher
was presented as holding an ‘intermediate and thus positive position between inactive anonymity and activist membership’ that aimed at a ‘renewal of exchanges between workers
and union organisations’.70 In the fourth version dated 1 April 1992, the confederation’s aim
is explicitly stated:
But speaking of a mass membership unionism among employees does not only require a change
of scale in terms of our results. As CFDT activists, we are also forced to revise our conception of
union membership. We hope to achieve a level of membership that is closer to Europeans norms,
but we continue to think of membership as being political or ideological, instead of being based
on results, and of adherence to leaders more than to practical action.71
This meant increasing the union rank-and-file, based on non-ideological membership, which
would allow broad participation of workers in determining union policy.72 The confederation
wanted to replace the form of unionism based on an activist minority with one of a unionist
majority by ‘demanding less of each member to gain more members’. The union voucher
was thus presented as a means to head in this direction. Though the texts presented to the
Congress – General Report and Policy Resolutions – did not include such a direct explanation,
the unions were well aware of what was at stake here. The article proposing to continue
current union voucher experiments triggered 16 amendment attempts and was the subject
of debate during the Congress. The most radical amendments proposed eliminating references to the union voucher or designating current experiments as a failure and continuing
research in other directions. Other amendments essentially revolved around the idea that
union vouchers should not be a form of gaining membership but rather a form of financing
that could lead to conventional membership.73 This position was brought to the podium by
multiple unions during the Congress. These amendments and debates implicitly proposed
retaining the model implemented at AXA, which had proven disappointing and at odds with
the initial intent of the confederation’s management. Moreover, in his response, Jean Kaspar
carefully avoided references to the AXA experiment while instead referring to another ongoing experiment at Cernay.74 In a more discrete approach, this experiment clearly used the
union voucher as a means of gaining membership, but it was slowly failing. The company
was doing poorly, the number of employees was dropping, and the experiment, which had
barely been implemented, was threatened. Lacking factual arguments, Jean Kaspar’s
response aimed at minimising discord about union voucher. Finally, the article proposed by
the confederation was passed but, with it gaining only 58.6% of votes cast, the newly elected
confederation management acknowledged the internal rift regarding the proposed direction, both in terms of regarding the market as an ‘unavoidable reality’ and the concept of
membership.
620 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
5. Conclusion
The union voucher, beyond being a technical instrument, was the focus of several recurring
debates on the nature of French unionism. The concept arose at the beginning of the 1980s
when the wave of de-unionisation became critical while at the same time there was hope
of using social democracy as leverage for future economic reforms. It was within the CFDT
that the concept matured, to the point of its initial implementation at AXA in 1990. For its
creators, the objective was twofold. It was a response to an increasing resource deficit due
to the decline of union membership dues, while also a way to renew relations between
workers and union organisations. The combination of subsidies from companies and allocation based on the individual decisions of employees created a de facto incentive for unions
to better satisfy the employees, whether in terms of union policy or of services. For French
trade unionism, which was essentially based on an activist and ideological stance, one that
was almost sacrificial in character, the union voucher proposal in fact disturbed the equilibrium within unions as evidenced by the debates it stimulated. During the decade between
the inception of the idea in 1981 and the CFDT 1992 Paris Congress, the debate evolved into
a radical disagreement over the measure’s implementation parameters. While it was rare for
CFDT militants to oppose the principle of union vouchers, there were actually two conflicting
visions of them. For some, including the confederation’s leaders at the time, a worker who
financed the organisation via the union voucher should be considered as a member with
full rights, and would thus participate in the development of union policy and have the right
to vote. For these proponents of ‘voucher–membership’, this constituted a means to enlarge
the union base and make the organisation more representative and more influential. By
contrast, for others, this option would dilute commitment to the union, thus placing the
very identity of the CFDT in danger. The instability of opinions held by workers and their
remote perspective on issues represented a risk that the organisation could not afford to
take. For those with this viewpoint, the union voucher was a means of financing and did not
merit conferral of membership rights to its contributor. A worker who wished to participate
in union life should provide proof of commitment by paying dues. In brief, the debate generated by the union voucher revealed a strongly marked divide between two conceptions
of unionism: one that was very open to workers who play a minimal role in union life, and
the other, more closed, that viewed ideological homogeneity as a source of union power.
Further exploration of the union archives reveals that the debate provoked by the union
voucher was not resolved, and that arbitration between these two approaches did not really
take place within the CFDT. This was obviously due to political reasons, but also to specific
contingencies. Three main conclusions can be drawn from this account: The first relates to
the revision of CFDT doctrine; the second to experimentation as a means of union transformation; and the third to the political dimension of the union’s management tools.
Regarding the revision of CFDT doctrine, the union voucher experiments and their accompanying debates should be seen in the larger context of the CFDT’s evolution from a self-managed union clearly anchored in the left to a reformist union asserting its independence in
terms of policy. This evolution, referred to as a refocusing strategy, had been initiated by
Edmond Maire in 1976 and was inspired by the 1978 Moreau report. Though it is common
to point out that this change was based on a union agenda independent of the political
agenda and on a demand to transform capitalism through negotiation rather than solely
through legislation and political power, the union voucher experience permitted insistence
Labor History 621
on another dimension of the doctrinal revision under way. Like the academic debates at the
time on the sociology of activism, it appears that the 1978 translation of the book by Mancur
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, had considerable influence.75 As previously highlighted
in this paper, the fact that the book was used as a reference by the union voucher stakeholders fuels this interpretation. Recognising that engagement in a union is not driven solely by
ideology but also by a logic of recompense invites review of the terms of membership. In
the same way, a doctrinal inflection is evident when union leaders attempt to downplay the
gap between the mass of inactive workers and active union members. For these leaders, the
transition from one to the other would not occur in a mechanical fashion but would instead
result from a process of repeated encounters that serve as opportunities for unionist dialogue.76 When Jean Kaspar proposed that joining a union should not be viewed as being
ideological but rather as engagement in results and practical action, and when Nicole Notat,
in defending the union voucher, proposed that increased contact between workers and
unionists would permit union development, they were clearly making an intellectual and
doctrinal break with the notion that joining a union was an ideological act. Specifically, the
original form of the union voucher could have been a means for a new type of less committed
union membership compared to classic membership and motivated by union actions in the
company and not by ideology. That the union voucher experiments did not meet with the
success anticipated did not signify that that this movement to de-ideologise unionism had
been defeated. This is evidenced in a survey conducted by the Cevipof political science
research centre, which showed that ideological motivation was the primary factor in joining
unions for 46% of workers between 1964 and 1981, but that this has since steadily decreased
to a level of 20% today.77
Regarding the CFDT leadership’s choice of experimentation as a response to the timidity
of government officials at the time, this approach encountered a major limitation as the
confederation’s leaders seemed to have underestimated the influence of the environment
on its experiments. Consequently, when the CFDT-AXA union team implemented union
vouchers with the management of the company, they chose not to grant full membership
to employees who remitted a union voucher. The argument for this was the difficulty of
coordinating an atypical membership scheme with the standard membership system. On
one hand, the amount of the union voucher was less than that for membership dues, which
would have introduced an imbalance among members. On the other, granting membership
would have caused a massive influx of new members, all AXA employees, who would have
had undue political weight within union bodies such as the regional union or the occupational federation. In other words the method of experimentation chosen due to the difficulty
of imposing reform from above encountered a problem, which was the integration of experimental model with the normal functioning of the rest of the union organisation. In the
union voucher experiment, the CFDT experienced the limits or exigencies of this method
for reform of the industrial relations system. The confederation’s lack of control over the
parameters of experimentation had the consequence of depriving its advocates of all assessments that might have addressed the fears expressed by its opponents or by perplexed
union activists. This was because denying membership status to employees who remitted
a union voucher went against the spirit of the initial project. At AXA, union vouchers became
simply an incentive for union teams to regularly attend meetings with employees to conduct
a more classical union recruitment campaign, and ultimately more resembled a simple means
of financing than a new form of membership. From this point of view, union vouchers could
622 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
be seen as a disappointment, as they did not trigger massive union recruitment among the
employees.
The final conclusion that can be drawn from this case relates to the political dimension
of the union’s management tools. Throughout this account, we observed that the union
voucher was seized on by different stakeholders who sought to mould them to further a
political agenda. For some a simple means of financing, for others a means for union development or even a new form of membership, it is evident that the union voucher instrument
could be a manifestation of different and even incompatible conceptions of unionism.
Indeed, the political content of management tools is found in the implementation of their
details. Here, as long as we retain a vague notion of the union voucher, it works for all. But
as soon as its technical implementation parameters are specified, radical disagreement and
discord arise. From this perspective, we regard this management tool as filling a function
beyond its initial purpose – a function of framing political debate within the organisation.
Essentially, the union voucher played a political role within the CFDT, by serving as a
framework for discussion of the concept of membership, even though the debate did not
gain enough momentum to achieve a resolution. In French industrial relations, the media
coverage of this experiment definitely participated in lifting the taboo against company
financing of unions. In fact, several agreements on union rights were signed in 1991–92;78
in a new development they included a funding component. This model was easier to implement, as it consisted of a global subsidy divided in terms of election results among company
employees. Though this approach managed to avoid the membership issue, it embodied a
new conception of the company, which had become a common resource for employees and
shareholders. As such, receiving a subsidy from a company was no longer considered as
employer financing per se but rather as a stakeholder right that enables more harmonious
industrial relations.
Notes
1. Barthélémy and Cette, Refondation du droit du travail; Cheuvreux and Darmaillacq, "La
syndicalisation en France: paradoxes, enjeux et perspectives"; Institut de l’entreprise, Dialogue
social: l’âge de raison; Institut Montaigne, Reconstruire le dialogue social; Institut Montaigne,
Sauver le dialogue social; Terra Nova, Renforcer la négociation collective et la démocratie sociale.
2. Hadas-Lebel, Pour un dialogue social efficace et légitime.
3. The CFDT archives web site provides database search tools: http://portail.nosarchives.cfdt.fr.
4. These consisted primarily of the AXA CEO and HR Director, the Confederation Secretary General,
the heads of CFDT Service Federations, and the Secretary General of the CGT Banks and Services
Federation.
5. 1977 for Mouriaux, Le syndicalisme en France depuis 1945; 1978 for Andolfatto and Labbé,
Histoire des syndicats: 1906–2006; 1975 for Bevort and Jobert, Sociologie du travail: les relations
professionnelles; The middle of the 1970s for Karila-Cohen and Wilfert, Leçon d'histoire sur le
syndicalisme en France…
6. Closed shops are marginal in France and only implemented by printers and dockers. Lefrancq,
Le mouvement syndical de la libération aux événements de mai-juin 1968.
7. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.
8. Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries.
9. Rosanvallon, La question syndicale, 92.
10. Adam and Landier, Le coût de fonctionnement des instances représentatives du personnel.
11. Adam, Le pouvoir syndical.
Labor History 623
12. From the Parodi circular of 28 May 1945 until the 2008 law redefining the rules of representation,
five trade union organisations benefited from a legal status that guaranteed them exclusive
access to negotiations and a monopoly in presenting candidates for the first round of labour
elections conducted within companies.
13. Amadieu, Les syndicats en miettes, 103.
14. Glennerster, “Quasi-markets for Education?”
15. Confédération générale des cadres [General Confederation of Management Staff ].
16. Briefing note on mandatory union dues: proposal from the CGC, 10 July 1981, 5OBS15.
17. In 1976, Edmond Maire, then CFDT Secretary General, initiated a refocusing strategy by
emphasising the independence of his organisation regarding political agenda. He rejected
waiting for social change through political power even with the prospect of a leftist victory
in the 1978 elections. The report prepared by Jacques Moreau, leader of the CFDT, in 1978
detailed this new CFDT strategy. It proposed in particular to give greater priority to negotiation
for reform of the economic system rather than to law. This approach is still evident in CFDT
union policy. In this regard, see Guy Groux “Regards sur le passé. Quelles ruptures? Quelles
permanences?”, 66.
18. From regional cross-occupational units.
19. Call for input: “Union Responsibilities and Financing”, Nouvelles CFDT, 19 February 1982, 5OBS15.
20. Ibid., 25.
21. BRAEC, December 1981, 5OBS15.
22. National Council, the financing of union organisations, 27–28 January 1983, 5OBS15.
23. Government projects for unionism, 28 September 1984, 5OBS15.
24. The 1991 programme of presidential candidate François Mitterrand did not address the issue
of union functioning. However, it planned to increase financial support for the representative
bodies of personnel, which was enacted in the Auroux laws of 1982.
25. Briefing note from the “Union Financing” working group, 2 November 1984, 5OBS15.
26. Briefing note from the “Union Financing” working group, 2 November 1984, 5OBS15. The
underlined phrase was in the original text.
27. “Pour une CFDT plus forte”, opinion column by the Lorraine regional union (URI) in Nouvelles
CFDT, 10/1982, 5OBS15.
28. Payment voucher for restaurant meals benefiting from an employer contribution. Under certain
conditions this form of remuneration was advantageous both in terms of tax and industrial
relations.
29. “Projets du gouvernement sur le syndicalisme” [Government plans for unionism] meeting on
18 September 1984, 5OBS15.
30. Briefing note from the “Financement du syndicalisme” [Union Financing] working group, 2
November 1984, 5OBS15.
31. Pierre Hureau, François Rogé, Jean-Paul Jacquier, Noël Mandray, and Daniel Remond, members
of the working group, of which three were also members of the CFDT Executive Committee.
32. Briefing note from the “Financement du syndicalisme” [Union Financing] working group, 2
November 1984, 5OBS15.
33. Handwritten note from the meeting of the union financing working group, 30 September
1985, 5OBS15.
34. Executive Committee, “Transformer nos électeurs en adhérents” [Transforming Our Constituents
into Members], 16 December 1985, 10SG7.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 12.
37. National Council, “Pour un développement de l’adhésion” [For development in membership],
22– 24 January 1986, 10SG7.
38. Ibid.
39. Executive Committee, “Transformer nos électeurs en adhérents” [Transforming our constituents
into members], 16 December 1985, 10SG7.
40. Financement syndicalisme [Financing Unionism], 1986, 10SG7.
624 R. Bourguignon and M. Floquet
41. National Council, “Pour un développement de l’adhésion” [For Development in Membership],
22– 24 January 1986, 10SG7.
42. “Instauration d’un bon de financement d’intérêt collectif” [Establishment of a Financing Voucher
in the Collective Interest], 13 April 1987, 5OBS15.
43. Technical note on union voucher, 6 March 1987, 15P41.
44. The AXA insurance company was formed as a result of a wave of sector consolidation in the
early 1980s, and was personified by its charismatic founding president, Claude Bébéar. The
sector was to experience major upheavals between 1980 and 1990: consolidation, privatisation
of some companies in 1986 (AGF and GAN), internationalisation, and deregulation (1994). To
facilitate the quasi-perpetual restructuring of AXA, Claude Bébéar took the view that motivating
employees was a pre-condition for competitiveness, to the point that AXA has often been
described as an innovator in industrial relations. The company was in favour of promoting
dialogue with labour and thus seeking to strengthen union organisations. The union voucher
was aimed at furthering this strategy. For more information on the establishment of the AXA
Group and consolidation in the insurance sector, in particular see: Strauss, “La concentration
des entreprises d’assurance en France”.
45. “Instauration d’un bon de financement d’intérêt collectif” [Establishment of a Financing Voucher
in the Collective Interest], 13 April 1987, 5OBS15.
46. Meeting of the ad hoc group, 12 October 1989, 10CG7.
47. Draft agreement on union rights, 31 October 1989, 10SG7.
48. AXA agreement on the exercise of union rights, 1990, 10SG7.
49. Speech by Jean Kaspar during signing of the agreement on the exercise of union rights, 2 July
1990, 10CG7.
50. “Financement du syndicalisme” [Union Financing] by the CFDT’s regional union of Brittany, 16
January 1986, 10SG7.
51. Adam, “Les syndicats sous perfusion”.
52. Notat, “A propos de l’accord AXA. Pour une nouvelle relation syndicats-salariés”.
53. Libération, 4 July 1990.
54. Interview with Alain Brouhmann in July 2015.
55. Union members bulletin No. 341, October 1990, 29DOF6.
56. STIC: Syndicat des Travailleurs des Industries Chimiques of the Paris region.
57. The CFDT National Office consists of 38 members responsible for implementing the decisions
of the confederation Congress. The Executive Committee is drawn from the National Office
and is responsible for the ongoing activity of the CFDT. It also controls the conduct and
implementation of decisions taken by the National Office. The Executive Committee is the
highest body within the CFDT hierarchy and represents the confederation in national meetings
with government, employers, and national institutions.
58. Letter from STIC to the confederation’s Executive Committee, 10 September 1990, 10SG7.
59. Underlining is from the original document.
60. Response of Jean Kaspar to the union voucher problems, not dated, 10SG7.
61. National Office session of 19–20 December 1990, agenda point No. 5, 19 December 1990, 10SG7.
62. Effectively evoking the status of a ‘voucher-member’ and a conventional member.
63. National Office session of 19–20 December 1990, agenda point No. 5, 19 December 1990, 10SG7.
64. National Office session of 24–25 February 1992, agenda point No. 2, 24 February 1992, 29DOF6.
65. Ibid.
66. Letter from CFDT branch at AXA Assurances, 14 June 1993, CDOF378.
67. Text debated at the 41st. Congress, 1G98.
68. Amendments to policy resolutions, October 1988, 1G98.
69. Text debated at the 41st Congress, 19 December 1991, 1G104.
70. National Office session of 13–14 March 1991, agenda point No. 3, 13 March 1991, 1G104.
71. Presentation of General Report, Project No. 4, 1 April 1992, 1G104.
72. This analysis seems to be derived directly from the report by IRES-CFDT research institute
in May 1987 titled “Conceptions of membership in the CFTC-CFDT (1919–1979)”. This study
distinguished two conceptions of membership: ‘ideological unionism’, in which the act of
Labor History 625
joining the union reflects agreement with its ideology; and ‘unionism for services’, based on
the quality of services for the individual. The study showed that the two conceptions coexist
across all French unions but that ideological unionism is dominant. This would be particularly
the case for the CFTC/CFDT due to its social-Christian heritage, which calls for dedication and
a spirit of sacrifice. Furthermore, the authors pointed out that prior to the Second World War,
a prospective member had to be presented by a sponsoring member to be accepted. On this
issue, see Bevort, “Le syndicalisme français et la logique du recrutement sélectif”, 169.
73. Policy resolution – the amendments, 11 February 1992, 1G101.
74. Response of Jean Kaspar to attendees on the General Report, 10 April 1992, 1G104.
75. On this subject, see Sawicki and Siméant, “Décloisonner la sociologie de l’engagement militant”.
76. In the academic domain, it is the analyses of Olivier Fillieule that have formalised this approach.
For example, Fillieule, “Propositions pour une analyse processuelle de l'engagement individuel”.
77. Barthélémy and Groux, “Dans l’entreprise, une démarche résolument pragmatique,” 66.
78. This was the case at the major Casino supermarket chain (3 October 1991), and at two insurance
companies, Gan (7 February 1992) and Gmf (30 April 1992). See Grevy, “Les accords de droit
syndical”.
Disclosure statement
This work was supported by Dialogues.
Funding
This work was supported by Dialogues.
Notes on contributors
Rémi Bourguignon is an assistant professor at Sorbonne Business School – IAE de Paris and an associate
researcher at Cevipof – Sciences Po (CNRS-UMR7048). His research focus is on employment relations,
trade-unions and organizational democracy.
Mathieu Floquet is an assistant professor at the University of Lorraine (ISAM-IAE Nancy). His research
focus is on management history with a special interest in French labor history.
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