Chapter 2
Civil Religion and Second Modernity
in Japan: A Sociological Analysis
Carmen Schmidt
Abstract The term “civil religion” was coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the
late eighteenth century. He describes what he regarded as a set of quasi-religious
attitudes essential to making the country, the object of the citizens’ adoration in a
new republican order. The concept of civil religion thus has strong links to nation
building during the period of modernity. The “second modernity”, by contrast, is
characterized by “denationalization”. Increasingly, international or supranational
organizations like the European Union are gaining political importance, and
national civil religions can be seen as a hindrance to new solidarities amongst new
political communities. Japan’s civil religion might also be an obstacle to the creation of meaningful relationships with its neighbouring countries, such as South
Korea or China. By analyzing the establishment of Japan’s civil religion from the
late nineteenth century until the present day, we try to identify its merits and pitfalls
and its applicability to the second modernity. The adopted indigenous Shintôism
was consciously designed by the Meiji leaders and served as a unifying ideology to
mobilize the people for nation building. However, it also led to ultranationalism and
war with neighbouring countries. Immediately after World War II, Shintô religion
and the emperor system provided the basis for fuelling the revival of modern
Japanese civil religion. In this regard, the Yasukuni Shrine plays an important role
in this updated civil religion and serves as a barrier to peaceful relations with
neighbouring countries.
Keywords Civil religion
Second modernity
Nationalism International relations
Nation building
Japan
C. Schmidt (&)
Osnabrueck University, Osnabrueck, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2016
Y. Sugita (ed.), Social Commentary on State and Society in Modern Japan,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2395-8_2
7
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2.1
C. Schmidt
Introduction
The concept of civil religion, which can be traced back to Rousseau (1762), has
strong links to nation building in Europe during the period of modernity that started
with the French Revolution in 1789. It refers to a modern society’s cultural and
traditional foundations that create a feeling of belonging to a nation and help the
people to feel a sense of connection and solidarity. Civil religion can thus be seen as
the core of national identity, and it helps to consolidate the nation state.
Since the late 1960s, the concept has become a major focus in the social sciences, and there have been numerous studies on civil religion. Bellah, for instance,
made it popular with his essay on “Civil religion in America” (1967). Although
scholars have been paying less attention to the concept since the late 1980s, it has
not lost its theoretical significance in the social sciences. This is true specifically
with regard to national civil religions and the process of globalization.
The process of nation building began in Japan in 1868, the year that marks the
beginning of Japan’s rapid modernization during the reign of Emperor Meiji (1852–
1912). The adopted Shintôism played an important role and was used to mobilize
people for nation building and military expansionism. Immediately after the
country’s defeat in World War II, pre-war civil religion was seen as somehow
undemocratic and premodern; however, from the 1960s onwards, we observe a
revitalization movement in Japan’s civil religion mobilizing people for economic
success and the restoration of national identity.
Yet, the “second modernity” (Beck et al. 2001, 13f.) is characterized by “denationalization” (Zürn 1998: 9). Increasingly, international or supranational organizations like the European Union gain political importance, and national civil
religions can be seen as a hindrance of new solidarities amongst new political
communities. Japan’s civil religion might also be an obstacle when it comes to
creating meaningful relationships with neighbouring countries such as South Korea
or China.
The main aim of this chapter is to identify the merits and pitfalls of Japan’s
concept of civil religion and to answer the question whether it can serve as a
spiritual and emotional foundation during times of globalization.
By analyzing Japan’s civil religion that emerged during the period of modernization and was updated after World War II, special emphasis is placed on the
dynamic aspect of nation building. It is intended to reveal the cultural and spiritual
foundations of the modern Japanese nation state and its lingering effects on national
identity, which can help us to deepen and strengthen our understanding of contemporary Japan.
The chapter starts by explaining the term civil religion and its main interpretations by Rousseau and Bellah before analyzing the relationship between civil
religion and nation building in Meiji Japan. Next we will turn our attention to civil
religion in post-war Japan before examining Japan’s “ritual calendar”, i.e. its
national holidays and the meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine within this system of
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
9
rituals, in order to get further insights into the nature of Japan’s civil religion. The
conclusion discusses the effectiveness of Japan’s civil religion during times of
globalization.
2.2
The Concept of Civil Religion
It is maintained that the concept of civil religion embraces two different manifestations, namely civil religion as “ideology”, known as the political approach, and as
“culture”, called the sociological approach. The political approach is represented by
scientists who refer to the writings of Rousseau, whilst Robert N. Bellah popularized
the sociological approach. Let us first turn our attention to the political approach.
2.2.1
The Political Approach: Jean-Jacques Rousseau
The political approach suggests that civil religion is intended to provide emotional
“cement” for the state, helping to unify the new (foreseen) French republic by
providing it with sacred authority. Civil religion thus endows a society with a
common set of unifying ideals that give the overarching political culture cohesiveness and form (Willhoite 1965: 501). Civil religion in this view is a consciously
“designed” religion that leaders have to create and encourage. It is intended to exert
social control over the citizenry (Coleman 1970: 67, 69).
In his chapter on civil religion, Rousseau starts by reflecting upon the unity of
spiritual and secular power in pagan times:
If it is asked how in pagan times, where each State had its cult and its gods, there were no
wars of religion, I answer that it was precisely because each State, having its own cult as
well as its own government, made no distinction between its gods and its laws. Political war
was also theological; the provinces of the gods were, so to speak, fixed by the boundaries of
nations.
In other words, in pagan times, a feeling of harmony prevailed between the
government and its gods, and there were no conflicts between the two powers.
However, this changed with the appearance of the world religions such as
Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. Even though he also reflects upon the latter, his
focus was on Christianity, which was the main religion in Europe at the time.
However, his arguments are also applicable to the other world religions.
Rousseau asserts that the spread of Christianity led to a division between spiritual and secular power in the Christian Age:
It was in these circumstances that Jesus came to set up on earth a spiritual kingdom, which,
by separating the theological from the political system, made the State no longer one, and
brought about the internal divisions which have never ceased to trouble Christian peoples.
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C. Schmidt
Since the Christian religion has no particular relation to the body politic,
Rousseau sees this divide in spiritual and secular power as “evil”. For instance, in
case of war with a neighbouring country, he argues that the people do not know
whom to follow, the government or the priest, since in Christianity it a sin to kill.
Christianity, therefore
… gives men two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two countries, renders them subject
to contradictory duties, and makes it impossible for them to be faithful both to religion and
to citizenship.1
In his view, Christianity cannot be the spiritual basis of a nation state. The
religion of man in pagan times, by contrast, is not characterized by such a divide
and thus might be suitable for nation building; however, in his view, this sort of
religion has vanished and was replaced by one of the world religions. Japan’s native
Shintô religion is a major exception, even though Buddhism also gained importance
in Japan.
Since both forms of religion seemed to be inapplicable to modern nation
building—Christianity because of its divide between spiritual and political power,
and the native religions because they dissipated, at least in view of Rousseau—he
reflects upon a third form of religion, namely the religion of the citizen, which
… is codified in a single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary patrons; it has its
dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law; outside the single nation that
follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel, foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of
man extend for it only as far as its own altars.
Rousseau was well aware that such a civil religion may appear under different
forms and varieties, such as secular nationalism, patriotism, totalitarianism or
political messianism. Therefore it has its goods and its bads. The religion of the
citizen
… is good in that it unites the divine cult with love of the laws, and, making the country the
object of the citizens’ adoration, teaches them that service done to the State is service done
to its tutelary god. …. To die for one’s country then becomes martyrdom; violation of its
laws, impiety …
However, love for the home county can easily turn into hatred of the “others”:
On the other hand, it is bad in that, being founded on lies and error, it deceives men, makes
them credulous and superstitious, and drowns the true cult of the Divinity in empty ceremonial. It is bad, again, when it becomes tyrannous and exclusive, and makes a people
bloodthirsty and intolerant, so that it breathes fire and slaughter, and regards as a sacred act
the killing of every one who does not believe in its gods. The result is to place such a people
in a natural state of war with all others, so that its security is deeply endangered.
Therefore, the sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas,
but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful
1
Current examples are the Catholic Church’s prohibition on the use of condoms to counter Aids or
its banning of same-sex marriage.
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
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subject. He insists that the principles of a particular civil religion ought to be few,
simple, and exactly worded, so that everybody can understand them without
explanation or commentary. Further he claims that they should be positive and not
intolerant:
The existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent Divinity, possessed of foresight and
providence, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the
sanctity of the social contract and the laws: these are its positive dogmas. Its negative
dogmas I confine to one, intolerance, which is a part of the cults we have rejected.
Having rejected intolerance as the basis for civil religion, and assuming that the
religion of man has dissipated due to Christianity, he concludes:
Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion, tolerance should be
given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary
to the duties of citizenship. But whoever dares to say: Outside the Church is no salvation,
ought to be driven from the State.
2.2.2
The Sociological Approach: Robert N. Bellah
In 1967, Robert N. Bellah, who began his vocation as a scholar of Japan,2 applied
his concept of civil religion, which belongs to the tradition of Durkheim,3 to the US,
specifically with regard to ceremonies and rites. According to Bellah, the public
religious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that he calls
the religion of the “American Way of Life” or “American Shintô” (p. 12).
The inauguration of a president is an important ceremonial event in this religion,
because it reaffirms the religious legitimacy of the highest political authority (p. 3f.).
Starting from an analysis of the inaugural speeches of the US presidents, he found
that all presidents mentioned “God” in their speeches; however, they did not refer to
any religion in particular, neither to Jesus Christ, or to Moses, or to the Christian
church. In fact, their only reference was to the concept of God, a word that almost
all Americans can accept, and “In God we trust” appears on the country’s paper
currency. Even though much is selectively derived from Christianity, this religion is
clearly not itself Christianity.
The God of the civil religion is not only rather “unitarian”, he is also on the austere side,
much more related to order, law, and right than to salvation and love. Even though he is
somewhat deist in cast, he is by no means simply a watchmaker God. He is actively
interested and involved in history, with a special concern for America. (p. 7)
But not only occasions such as the inauguration of a president shape the
American civil religion; it was also formed through history itself. Memorial Day,
In his Ph.D. thesis on “Tokugawa Religion” (1957), he explains how religion in the Tokugawa
period (1603–1868) established the foundation for Japan’s modern industrial economy.
3
As outlined in his book Elementary Forms of Religious Life, published in 1912. See Christi
(2001, p. 7).
2
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C. Schmidt
which grew out of the Civil War, and Thanksgiving Day, which was made a
national holiday under the presidency of Lincoln, serve as tools to integrate the
local community into the national cult. Together with the Fourth of July
(Independence Day), Veterans Day and the birthdays of Washington and Lincoln,
….these two holidays provide an annual ritual calendar for the civil religion. The public
school system serves as a particularly important context for the cultic celebration of the
civil rituals. (p. 11)
Thus, an analysis of the holidays of a particular nation provides meaningful
insights into its civil religion. Bellah further argues that a civil religion must be
based on equality, at least as an ideal: “Indeed, hierarchy or equality may be at the
core of the respective civil religions” (see Bellah and Hammond 1980: 28ff.).
2.3
2.3.1
Civil Religion in Japan
Meiji Restoration and the Making of a Modern Nation
The Meiji Restoration of 1868, which marks the beginning of Japan’s rapid
modernization, has always fascinated social scientists. Eisenstadt (2000), for
instance, views it as a distinct path to modernity that differs markedly from the
West. It was not a social revolution, like the French Revolution; instead, it was
carried out by the governing elite in order to defend Japan from likely colonization
by Western countries, and to amend the unequal treaties with foreign nations.4
Being well aware of the fate of colonized China, the Meiji leaders recognized a
pressing need to modernize politics, society and the economy. Thus, the leaders
decided to turn away from tradition by transforming Japan into a modern nation to
counter Western imperialism. Since the traditional education was based on Chinese
tradition, it made it easier for the Japanese to abandon Chinese learning in favour of
Western education. At the enthronement of Emperor Meiji (1852–1912) on 7 April
1868, the Charter Oath (Gokaijô no goseimon) was promulgated. The Charter,
which Keene (2005) considers as the first constitution of modern Japan, outlined
five main goals of Emperor Meiji’s reign: (1) the establishment of deliberative
assemblies and open discussion; (2) a new social order; (3) the concession of
allowing commoners to bear names; (4) the discontinuation of evil customs from
the past and the establishment of everything on the basis of just laws, i.e. the
rationalization of society and the political system; and, (5) the quest for knowledge
throughout the world, specifically in the West (p. 137ff.).
4
Like other Asian nations, the Japanese were forced to sign unequal treaties with Western powers.
These treaties granted the Westerners one-sided economic and legal advantages in Japan. The first
of a set of treaties was signed in Kanagawa between Japan and the United States (Kanagawa
jôyaku) in 1854. An overview on the treaties is given in Auslin, 2004.
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
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According to the second article, it was the Meiji leaders’ immediate target to
abolish the traditional feudal system and the hereditary rights of the feudal lords and
to design a “modern” state.5 In its quest for a new national and cultural identity, the
Meiji state began to promote indigenous Shintô as a state religion. By adopting
Shintôism, it relied heavily on the idea of ancestors to promote national unity and
patriotism, first in defence against colonization and later to attain equality with the
West.
The Sun Goddess Amaterasu (Amaterasu ômikami) was declared the major deity
in the new system of State Shintôism. Amaterasu—according to the legend, the
daughter of the divine couple Izanagi and Izanami, who created the Japanese
islands—is seen as the foremother of the imperial family. Thus, the Japanese emperor, who claimed to be a direct descendant of Amaterasu, was himself sacred, and
all his proclamations had a religious character. In 1869, only one year after his
enthronement, he visited Ise Shrine, which was dedicated to Amaterasu. Hardacre
(1989) proposes that the new regime’s motive in connecting with Shintôism was to
gain “symbolic legitimation” (p. 29). According to Hardacre (ibid.), new imperial
rites in which the emperor performed before audiences of state dignitaries as a kind
of priest-king (saishiô) were “invented”. Unlike the premodern rites, they were
made known to the public. An annual calendar of 13 rites was created and observed
as national holidays (ibid.).
Since the Meiji government intended to establish Shintô as the national religion,
many Buddhist temples were disestablished and the complete removal of Buddhist
influence from Shinto shrines was decreed (shinbutsu bunri).6 This decree set in
motion a nationwide anti-Buddhist movement with the slogan “haibutsu kishaku”,
literally “abolish Buddhism and destroy the Buddha”, and in some areas this policy
resulted in the destruction of many temples, statutes and equipment (Grapard 1984,
esp. pp. 240–41, 245). This movement eventually declined in the course of time and
Buddhism survived, even though with a reduced role.
The Great Doctrine (Taikyô senpu) was issued in 1870, which declared the “way
of the gods” to be the guiding principle of the government, and in the same year
Shintô shrines were hierarchically organized as institutions to promote a state
religion, with Ise Shrine being at the top of this hierarchy. From this time onwards,
it was compulsory for everybody to register at a local Shintô shrine upon birth; after
death, the person was enshrined as a kami (soul or deity) of the respective shrine
5
The samurai lost their special legal privilege and their right to carry swords, and the commoners
were given family names. This created a new, mobile labour force for industrialization. However,
it has to be noted that the daimyô were given financial compensation. The payments to the daimyô
and samurai formed a source of capital for investments in new industries, which is why the former
daimyô became big financiers. See Hall (1994, p. 275).
6
Through the Dual Shintô System (ryôbu shintô) that combined Shintô with the teachings of
Buddhism, Buddhist priests had gained administrative control of a large proportion of Shintô
shrines. The basis of the belief was the concept that Shintô deities were manifestations of Buddhist
divinities. Most important was the identification of the sun goddess Amaterasu with the Buddha
Dainichi Nyorai (“Great Sun Buddha”).
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C. Schmidt
(see Hardacre 1989, pp. 30–3; 101–2). It became official doctrine that Japan was a
God-favoured country and thus superior to all other countries. Bellah (1967) has
argued that the American civil religion, the “American Way of Life” or “American
Shintô”, embraces a comparable concept.
However, the leaders also had the option of progressively transforming Japan
into a modern society based on rationality and law, as Article 4 of the Charter Oath
outlined. This option was represented by the Movement for Freedom and People’s
Rights (Jyiû minken undô), which demanded a parliamentary system in Japan. The
participants submitted petitions and proposals for a national assembly, mostly citing
Article 2 of the Charter Oath, in which the emperor had pledged open public
discussions (Murakami 1984, p. 344; Ikegami 1995, p. 209ff.). The “Toyo
Dai-Nippon National Constitution Proposal”, for instance, was drawn up by Ueki
Emori (1857–1892), a Japanese revolutionary democrat active in the movement.
While positioning the emperor as the head of the military and diplomacy, it also
appreciated regional autonomy, envisioning a nation modelled after a federal system such as that of the United States or Switzerland. It also envisioned the
development of a governing system centred on a national assembly that would
attribute the power of legislation to the entire population. It also demanded people’s
right to freedom, recognizing their right to protest and revolt as a means to guarantee that freedom. Given those characteristics, Ueki’s proposed constitution
demonstrates a liberal and democratic alternative.7
With the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, however, Japan opted
for a more traditional way of modernization. Article 1 stipulated, that “the Empire
of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for
ages eternal”. Because of this nearly mythological element, Murakami (1984) views
it as ultra-traditional (p. 348). Article 4 granted the emperor full executive authority,
and he was the supreme commander of the army and the navy (Art. 11). Art.
3 stated that “the Emperor is sacred and inviolable”. Even though the Emperor of
Japan is the oldest hereditary monarchy in the world, Takayama (1993) views State
Shintôism as “… new, designed as an ideological weapon for controlling the
Japanese population” (p. 107). In contrast to traditional Shintô, where natural
phenomena, such as the sun, mountains, trees or rocks like Mount Fuji were
worshipped, this newly designed State Shintôism centred on the veneration of the
emperor.8
Concurrently, the citizens were given freedom of speech and association, and
there was a special emphasis on education. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), one of
the most outstanding scholars of the Meiji period, emphasized the importance of
7
According to Ikegami (1995), there is no precise definition of this movement, as the term included
all groups promoting citizen rights. Thus, all groups between 1874 and the early 1890s are lumped
together as “Jiyû minken undô” (p. 207).
8
To make Shintôism the only religion in Japan, not only Buddhism but also Christianity was
discarded. Upon pressure from the Western powers, the Meiji state shifted to more tolerant
religious policies and eventually granted freedom of religion by the Meiji Constitution.
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
15
education for all citizens.9 From the 1880s onwards, however, the government
increasingly used education to teach nationalistic ideas and to control the textbooks.
In 1890, it issued the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyôiku chokugo), which
made clear that traditional Shintô values should serve as the basis of moral education. To persuade the people that Japan’s new form of government was based on
a historical bond between the emperor and his loyal subjects, it emphasized that “…
my subjects should show their loyalty to me and show filial love to their parents”.
The fundamental purpose of education was to cultivate virtues, especially “loyalty”
and “filial piety”.10 The public textbooks spread the idea that the emperor was
divine and a “kami in human form” (arahitogami) and the idea of the divine origin
of the nation (Hardacre 1989: 40). The practice of emperor worship was further
spread by veneration of the imperial portrait.
We can conclude that indigenous Shintôism was used to foster national unity
and gave pre-war Japanese nationalism a “tint of mysticism and cultural introversion” (Hall 1994: 321). Kosaku (1992) has argued that nation building in Japan was
characterized by family-like hierarchical structures implemented on the government
level as a major counterweight to popular sovereignty based on equality and
freedom (pp. 65–6).
Soon after the Meiji Restauration, government and industry formed an alliance
in order to foster economic development. The Meiji government began selling off
government-owned enterprises to a few private companies, which became
monopolistic economic giants known as the zaibatsu (financial cliques), including
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo.11 Fukoku kyôhei (“Enrich the country,
strengthen the military”) became the major slogan during the Meiji period,
replacing the former sonnô jôi (“Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians”), which
shows the Japanese ambitions to catch up with the West economically and through
military strength.12
Disputes over Korea and Manchuria led to the first Sino-Japanese War with
China (Nisshin sensô) in 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War (Nichiro sensô)
with Russia in 1904–05, respectively. The victories of the Japanese surprised the
world and left Japan with a sphere of influence extending over southern Manchuria
and Korea, which became a Japanese colony in 1910 (Hall 1994: 293–4).13 In the
For details, see the 17 volumes of “An Encouragement of Learning” (Gakumon no susume),
published between 1872 and 1876, and his “Outline of a Theory of Civilization” (Bunmeiron no
gairyaku), published in 1875.
10
For the full text of the Rescript, see Tsunoda et al. (1964, pp. 139–40). However, many observers
note that the Rescript was of Confucian origin, especially with regard to human hierarchies, which
established a sound basis of proper relationships among people.
11
For the rise of the zaibatsu, see Morikawa (1992).
12
For the genesis of this slogan, see Samuels (1994, p. 35ff).
13
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 17 April 1885, ended the first Sino-Japanese War, while
the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on 5 September 1905, formally ended the Russo-Japanese War.
For the text of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, see Treaty of Shimonoseki online; for the stipulations of
the Treaty of Portsmouth, see New York Times. 17.10.1905.
9
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C. Schmidt
early twentieth century, Japan grew into a major military-industrial power. To use
the argument of Bellah, the victories seemed to suggest that the Shintô gods were
actively interested and involved in history and had a special concern for Japan.
Japan’s civil religion, which did not include foreign citizens and the political
opposition, is illustrated by what was known at the Korean massacre. On 1
September, 1923, the Great Kantô Earthquake shook Tokyo and destroyed large
parts of the city and the neighbouring Kanagawa prefecture. The panic manifested
itself in the gradual belief that Koreans were poisoning wells and that the political
opposition was aiming to overthrow the government. A brutal mob killed thousands
of Koreans in the aftermath of the quake (Ryang 2003: 723). Moreover, the police
and the military used the unrest and the false claims to murder political dissidents,
such as leftists and anarchists.
In 1937 “The Principles of the National Polity” (Kokutai no hongi), the most
important series of publications on the “essence” of the Japanese, were published
by the Ministry of Education to set out the new ideology in detail. It deals with the
mythological origin of Japan and the sacredness of the emperor, and it stresses the
notion of a great family nation, with the Imperial Household as the head family.14
Since the government and the economy were in need of new resources, this
opened the way for further Japanese expansionism. The Manchurian Incident in
1931, engineered by the Japanese military to invade north-eastern China, marked
the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, which can be seen as a milestone
on the road to World War II (Hobsbawm 1994: 37) that formally ended with the
defeat of Japan on 15 August 1945.
As can be seen from the discussion above, Japan’s civil religion was heavily
based on native Shintô religion and traditional hierarchies. Through the Shintô
gods, the government gained a quasi-religious legitimacy, and the emperor and all
of his actions were sacred. This provided the mythic justification for colonialism
and the actions of the Japanese military in the years leading up to World War II and
the defeat of Japan. In the words of Rousseau, the concept of Japan’s civil religion
succeeded in that it united the divine cult with respect for the laws and made the
country the object of citizens’ adoration. However, it was bad in that it became
exclusive and made the people intolerant of neighbouring countries. To die for
Japan became martyrdom, and it was regarded as a sacred act to kill everyone who
did not believe in its gods.
2.3.2
Civil Religion in Post-war Japan
Upon the advice of the Allied Powers, namely the US, Japan’s political system
underwent radical change after the country’s defeat in World War II. During the
war, the emperor was seen as one of the Allies’ main enemies. However, the
14
See The Principles of the National Polity in Hall and Gauntlett (1949, pp. 89–90).
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
17
institution was left untouched, and only his status was altered. At the request of the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the Emperor issued the “Humanity
Declaration” (Ningen sengen) as part of his New Year’s statement. In this declaration, he denied being a living god. In the Constitution of Japan enacted in 1947,
which was drawn up under the Allied Occupation, the emperor is defined as “the
symbol of the State and of the unity of the people” (Chap. 1, Art. 1). He only has
representative functions with no powers related to government (Art. 4). Universal
suffrage was introduced, and human rights were guaranteed. According to Article 9,
the Peace Article of the Constitution, Japan was also forbidden to ever lead a war
again or to maintain an army. Besides, Shintô and the state were clearly separated.
Since the constitution was of foreign origin, it has been a source of controversy
from the beginning.
Furthermore, the General Headquarters (GHQ) carried out a far-ranging purge
and prohibited persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant
nationalism to engage in public service. Allied criminal trials indicted 25 people as
Class A war criminals and several thousand as Class B or Class C war criminals. In
May 1946, the Tokyo Trials began. Six defendants were sentenced to death by
hanging for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace,
amongst them former Prime Minister Tôjô Hideki (1884–1948, PM 1941–44).
Some preferred dying by their own hand.15
The GHQ also intended to dismantle the economic giants, the zaibatsu and other
large companies. As a first step, they established the Holding Company Liquidation
Commission. However, the initial list of more than 300 companies was reduced to
100 by 1 July 1948, and in December 1948 they formally ended the dissolution
policy (Adams and Hoshii 1972: 23ff.; Bisson 1976). This shift in policy can be
explained by the US government’s effort to reindustrialize Japan as a bulwark
against communism in Asia.
The Cold War-inspired “reverse course” of the Allied Occupation led to what is
known as the Red Purge (reddo pâji). The GHQ ordered the Japanese government
to purge all Communist party officials from office. Consequently, thousands of
workers, trade unionists, and public servants were dismissed. Concurrently, suspected Class A war criminals were released.16 The aim of strengthening Japan
against China and North Korea led to the founding of the Self-Defence Forces
(SDF, Jieitai), which was prevention from the democratic ideals of the early
post-war years and enabled the established conservative elite to fortify their ruling
position (Kingston 2010: 13–4). With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
in 1952, the period of occupation ended, and Japan regained full authority.
As it was true for Germany, Japan benefited greatly from the Cold War.
Specifically the Korean War (1950–53) resulted in a recovery of Japan’s economy.
The rapid economic growth during the 1960s, known as the “economic miracle”,
resulted in a rapid increase in the living standards and the rise of a new middle
15
For the tribunal, see International Tribunal for the Far East (1948).
For details, see Takemae (2002, p. 482).
16
18
C. Schmidt
class, interested in stability, which consolidated the ruling position of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyû minshu tô, LDP).17
By the 1970s, the Japanese were living in one of the most rapidly growing
economies in the world. Japan’s political and bureaucratic elite largely guided the
economic development through extensive regulation and planning. For this reason,
Johnston (1982) has called Japan a “developmental state”. Books such as Ezra
Vogel’s “Japan as number one: Lessons for America” (1979) appeared and became
bestsellers, not only in Japan but also in the West. The writings focusing on issues
of Japanese national and cultural identity are subsumed under the term “nihonjinron”, literally theories or discussions on the Japanese (Sugimoto 2003: 4). It was
argued that the specific Japanese social relations are the core of Japan’s economic
success (see e.g. Nakane 1970). These forms of social relations were interpreted as
being “uniquely unique” to Japan and providing the country with an advantage in
building an advanced industrial society (Sugimoto 2003: 15).
It was also asserted that the Japanese management system had successfully
incorporated the social relations of the family system. The sense of belonging to a
certain family was transferred to the lifetime employment system, meaning that the
employee stays at a certain company for the duration of his or her lifetime and has a
seniority-based wage system. In contrast to firms in the West, which attempted to
maintain an individualistic tradition and ability-based wages, Japanese firms tended
to rely on traditional family hierarchies (Murakami 1984: 356–57).
Hobsbawm (1983) has pointed out that the specific characteristics of Japanese
management, although compatible with cultural values, are an “invented tradition”,
meaning a set of practices that represent an “attempt to establish continuity with a
suitable historic past” (p. 1).
The Japanese business enterprises’ relation with Shintô was likewise important
for the post-war update of Japan’s civil religion. Most business shops in Japan have
a small shrine established on their premises. Large enterprise groups revere a local
deity of the place where the company was founded. Famous examples are Hitachi
and Nippon Oil. Hitachi has taken for itself the guardian deity of the Kumano
shrine, named after the tutelary deity of the city of Hitachi. Nippon Oil has had a
special relationship with the local Iyahiko Shrine in Niigata Prefecture since its
foundation. In 1926 the company established its own shrine as a branch of the local
one (Swyngedouw 1993: 57ff.). Since numerous festivals are held at these shrines,
and the employees are expected to participate, religious rites have survived and may
even have increased in both number and variety rather than declining in an
industrial urban context. Because of this religious connection, the companies were
deified and became omnipotent in the lives of their employees (Lewis 1993: 166,
170).18
17
For details, see the respective keywords in Schmidt (2003).
Even though one can observe that the participants take part only out of obligation to the
company because it is part of their job (ibid.).
18
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
19
We can conclude that whilst in pre-war Japan Shintôism was used to mobilize
people for nationalistic goals, it was now being used to mobilize the people for
economic success. This success has further stabilized the LDP’s long-term ruling
position, and at the beginning of the 1980s, Japan entered a period of
neo-traditionalism that stressed the “roots” of Japanese society, in which the media
played a major role in the production and marketing of tradition (Buckley 1993:
368). Simultaneously, however, the economic globalization gradually undermined
the developmental state. As in other countries, neo-liberalism became the guiding
principle in politics, and numerous public corporations, such as Japan Railways,
were sold to private investors. Some large corporations began to adopt new models
of employment, increasingly relying on contract workers instead of regular
employees (Sugimoto 2003: 86ff.). Likewise, the wage system was gradually
undermined, and the ability-based wage system began to exceed the seniority-based
wage system in the mid-1980s (Ishikawa 2002: 286).
Owing to the subsequent penetration of globalization in the Japanese economy,
the companies also underwent significant changes. Many now consider themselves
as global players rather than Japanese, and we observe a trend towards corporate
“de-Japanization” (Japan Times as cited in Ogoura 2009: 28). This trend greatly
erodes Japan’s updated civil religion, with its strong recurrence to the specifics of
the Japaneseness.
With the burst of the “bubbly economy” at the beginning of the 1990, an asset
price bubble collapse, Japan’s economy slowed markedly. The 1990s were therefore called the “lost decade”; recently, however, the decade from 2001 to 2010 is
often included, and the whole period is referred to as the “two lost decades”. Not
only did the country’s GDP fall but so did real wages, and Japan’s economic
growth came to a sudden end. In 2011, China overtook Japan as the world’s
second-largest economy (BBC News 2011).
With the end of economic growth, Japan’s political system fell into turmoil. The
loss of political control and planning on the level of the nation state had severe
political consequences. At the beginning of the 1990s, Japan’s long-ruling LDP was
forced into a coalition government with Japan’s Social Democrats, and Murayama
Tomi’ichi (*1924, PM 1994–96) became Japan’s first non-conservative prime
minister since 1948. Subsequently, Japan’s party system became very fluid and
there was a permanent restructuring of the opposition camp, which benefited the
LDP. In the “historic election” of 2009, however, the oppositional Democratic Party
of Japan (DPJ), which was formed at the end of the 1990s, won the election, ousting
the LDP from power after more than 50 years of conservative rule. It was the 2011
triple catastrophe, when the strongest earthquake ever shook Japan, followed by a
strong tsunami, and specifically, there was the handling of the Fukushima nuclear
accident, which followed the earthquake and the tsunami and brought an end to the
DPJ government. This sequence of events brought the LDP back to power, which,
under the guidance of Prime Minister Abe, insists on going “back to the roots” as a
solution to the current problems (Schmidt 2001, 2011, 2012).
20
C. Schmidt
Takayama (1988) has already argued in the 1980s that the move towards revitalization of Japanese civil religion inevitably meant the emergence of other related
issues, such as a reversal of those parts of the Constitution referring to the symbolic
status of the emperor, a revision of the Peace Article, or a restoration of traditional
moral education (p. 118). This is true for the current situation as well, which is
illustrated by the present discussion on revising Article 9 and an expanded role of
Japan’s SDF forces. With regard to these discussions, the Japanese public has been
deeply divided from the beginning. Polls show that the percentage of those who are
in favour of a constitutional revision has shrunk from 41 % in 2007 to 28 % in
2015, whilst the percentage of those who oppose a revision has been relatively
stable and amounted to 25 % in 2015 (NHK 2015).
2.4
2.4.1
Japan’s “Ritual Calendar”
The National Holiday’s System
As mentioned earlier, Bellah regards national holidays as the ritual calendar of each
nation’s civil religion, which gives us insights into the nature of a given civil
religion. Prior to 1873, when the Gregorian calendar was introduced by the Meiji
government, the dates of the holidays had been based on the ancient Chinese
calendar, which is why New Year’s Day, for example, moved to 1 January. After
the war, the national holiday system was subject to new regulation. According to
Article 2 of the post-war Public Holiday Law (Kokumin no shukujitsu ni kan suru
hôritsu), which was passed in 1948 but has been amended several times, Japan
today has 16 national holidays, more than many industrialized societies.19 In 1998,
the Happy Monday System (Happî mandê seido) was passed, and several holidays
were moved to Monday, thus creating a three-day weekend.20
As is true for most nations, Japan’s ritual calendar starts with New Year’s Day
(Ganjitsu), established in 1948. It marks the beginning of Japan’s New Year’s
Season (Shôgatsu). Prior to 1948, New Year’s Day had been a national holiday on
which the imperial worship ceremony known as Shihôhai (Worship of the Four
Quarters) took place, during which the emperor prayed for peace and prosperity in
Japan.21
19
Except for German Unity Day on 3 October, public holidays are determined by the federal states.
For example, in 2015, Lower Saxony had nine public holidays.
20
See Revision of the Public Holiday Law, Act No. 141 as of October 21, 1998. Another
amendment was made in 2001. See Revision of the Public Holiday Law, Act, No. 59 as of June 22,
2001.
21
For the religious ceremonies performed by the emperor see Shillony (2008, p. 222f).
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
21
The Coming of Age Day (Seijin no hi) was established in 1948 and is meant to
congratulate and encourage people who have reached the age of maturity (20 years)
during the year. Originally held on 15 January, it was changed to the second
Monday in January due to the Happy Monday System.
Foundation Day (Kenkoku kinen no hi) is a holiday that commemorates the day
when the mythical first emperor, Jinmu (according to the Nihon no shoki22), was
enthroned in 660 BC. From 1872 to 1948, 11 February was known as Kigensetsu
sai (Festival of the Imperial Area’s Origin). The holiday was (re-)established in
1966.
Vernal Equinox Day (Shunbun no hi) is held on 21 March, officially for the
admiration of nature. However, before it was established in post-war Japan, the
vernal equinox was an imperial ancestor worship festival called Shunki kôrei sai
(Vernal Ancestor Worship Festival). In spring and autumn, past emperors and
imperial family members were worshipped. It began in 1878 and occurred on the
spring and autumn equinoxes of the anniversary of the person’s death. The
autumnal Equinox Day (Shûbun no hi) is held on 23 September. In ancient China,
the equinoxes were also the days of ancestor veneration.
Shôwa Memorial Day (Shôwa no hi), the birthday of Emperor Shôwa, was held
on April 29, which was celebrated until his death in 1989. After his death, it
continued to be a national holiday under the new name “Greenery Day” (Midori no
hi). In 2007, Greenery Day was moved to 4 May, and Shôwa Memorial Day was
established in honour of the late emperor. Today it marks the beginning of the
“Golden Week” (gôruden wîku). Constitution Memorial Day (Kenpô no hi) on 3
May was established in 1948 to commemorate the day when Japan’s post-war
constitution took effect. The last holiday of the Golden Week is Children’s Day
(Kodomo no hi) on 5 May to pray for the happiness of children. The day was
originally called Tango no sekku (Feast of Banners) and was traditionally celebrated
on the fifth day of the fifth moon according to the ancient Chinese calendar.23 After
Japan switched to the Gregorian calendar, the date was moved to 5 May. Girls’ Day
(Hinamatsuri) was celebrated on 3 March. After the war, the government decided to
merge both days and rename it Children’s Day.
Marine Day (Umi no hi) is now held on the third Monday of July as gratitude to
the blessings of the ocean and to pray for the prosperity of the maritime nation of
Japan. Before the end of World War II, the day was known as Marine Memorial
Day (Umi no kinenbi). It was introduced in 1941 by then Communications Minister
Murata Shôzô (1878–1957) to commemorate the Meiji emperor and his 1876
voyage in the “Meiji Maru”, an iron steamship constructed in Scotland.24
The book was finished in 720 AD, thereby making it the second oldest book on Japanese history.
It is a Japanese tradition for families of boys to hang up carp streamers (koinobori) outside their
houses around this holiday, since carps are believed to symbolize success in children’s lives.
24
See the homepage of Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology.
22
23
22
C. Schmidt
Mountain Day (Yama no hi), held in mid-August, was established in 2014 to
appreciate Japanese mountains. However, it coincides with the traditional O-Bon
festival, a Japanese Buddhist custom to honour the spirit of the ancestors.
Respect for the Aged Day (Keirô no hi, formerly Rôjin no hi) is now held on the
third Monday of September to respect the elderly. Its origins can be traced back to
1947, when in Hyôgô prefecture such a holiday was introduced to honour elderly
citizens. It became a national holiday in 1966.
Health and Sports Day (Taiiku no hi) is held on the second Monday in October
to commemorate the opening of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. However, during the
Meiji period, in mid-October the Kan’namesai (Festival of the God’s Tasting) was
celebrated, in which the first fruits were offered to Sun Goddess Amaterasu.
Culture Day (Bunka no hi) is held on 3 November to commemorate the
announcement of the post-war constitution. Coincidently, it is the birthday of the
late Emperor Meiji. The present Emperor Akihito’s birthday (Tennô tanjôbi) is
celebrated on 23 December.
Labour Thanksgiving Day (Kinrô kansha no hi) was established in 1948 to
praise labour and celebrate production on 23 November. Prior to 1948, it was
celebrated as an imperial harvest festival called Niinamesai (Festival of the First
Tasting), in which the emperor offered the newly harvested rice to the gods (see
Table 2.1).
In addition to these holidays, certain events of celebration or mourning related to
the imperial family are also treated as national holidays in the year in which they
occur.25
It is clear that the vast majority of national holidays in Japan either can be traced
back to traditional rites or were originally introduced by the Meiji government and
had been inaugurated at the beginning of the Meiji period, the start of Japan’s civil
religion. After passing the National Holiday Act in 1948, these days were marked in
a non-religious manner as national holidays (Shillony 2008: 222f.). Four emperors
are honoured: the present Emperor Akihito, as well as emperors Shôwa, Meiji, and
the mythical first emperor, Jinmu. We can classify just three purely secular holidays: Coming of Age Day, Constitution Memorial Day and Respect for the Aged
Day. Mountain Day can be seen as a Buddhist holiday. Greenery Day was initially a
replacement for the birthday of Emperor Shôwa, when he passed away and his
successor’s birthday became a holiday. After officially restoring this day, it was
added to the Golden Week as another holiday. Thus, most holidays stem from
Japan’s indigenous Shintô religion, which still dominates Japan’s ritual calendar,
even if the origins have been somewhat obscured by the holidays being renamed.
However, it is noteworthy that even in Japan the “consumerization of holidays”26 is under way, and many Japanese, specifically the young, neither know
25
Namely 10 April 1959: marriage of Crown Prince Akihito; 24 February 1989: state funeral of
Emperor Shôwa; 12 November 1990: official enthronement ceremony of Emperor Akihito; and 9
June 1993: the marriage of Crown Prince Naruhito.
26
For this discussion, see French (2003).
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
23
Table 2.1 Overview of Japanese national holidays (as of 2015)
Date
Name
Origin
1
1 January
Shihôhai (Worship of the Four Quarters)
2
3
13 January
(second
Monday)
11 February
New Year’s Day
(Ganjitsu)
Coming of Age Day
(Seijin no hi)
4
21 March
5
29 April
6
3 May
7
4 May
8
5 May
9
21 July (third
Monday)
11 August
10
11
12
15 September
(third
Monday)
23 September
13
13 October
14
3 November
15
23 November
16
23 December
Foundation Day
(Kenkoku kinen no hi)
Vernal Equinox Day
(Shunbun no hi)
Shōwa Day (Shôwa no
hi)
Constitution Memorial
Day (Kenpô no hi)
Greenery Day (Midori
no hi)
Children’s Day
(Kodomo no hi)
Marine Day (Umi no hi)
Mountain Day (Yama no
hi)
Respect for the Aged
Day (Keirô no hi)
Autumnal Equinox Day
(Shûbun no hi)
Health and Sports Day
(Taiiku no hi)
Culture Day (Bunka no
hi)
Labour Thanksgiving
Day (Kinrô kansha no
hi)
The Emperor’s Birthday
(Tennô tanjôbi)
Introduced in 1948
Kigensetsu sai (Festival of the Imperial
Area’s Origin)
Shunki kôrei sai (Vernal Ancestor
Worship Festival)
Birthday of Emperor Shôwa
Day when Japan’s post-war constitution
took effect
Initial replacement for the birthday of
Emperor Shôwa
Tango no sekku/Hinamatsuri
Umi no kinenbi (commemorates Meiji
emperor’s voyage on the Meiji Maru)
O-Bon festival
Introduced 1966 as Old Folks’ Day
(Rôjin no hi), renamed in 2003
Shûbun no hi; also Shôki kôrei sai
(Autumn Ancestor Worship Festival)
Opening of the Tôkyô Olympics/
Kan’namesai (Festival of the God’s
Tasting)
Announcement of the
Constitution/Birthday of Emperor Meiji
Niinamesai (Festival of the First
Tasting)
Birthday of Emperor Akihito
Source Own compilation
about the origins of the particular holidays nor celebrate it in the traditional way.
Rather, they take it as an opportunity to travel or simply enjoy the free day.
Contemporary surveys show that Japanese workers were least likely to take
vacation time out of 13 developed countries,27 which is why the national holidays
27
See Ministry of Labour as cited in Japan Today, 15 December 2013.
24
C. Schmidt
provide the opportunity for the workers to have some time off. During the Golden
Week, many Japanese firms close for about one week, and many Japanese take the
chance to travel around Japan or abroad.28
The consumerization and individualization of the use of the holidays add up to
the holidays decreasingly serving as “the cultic celebration of the civil rituals” in the
sense of Bellah. We therefore might suspect that they provide the “annual ritual
calendar” of Japan’s civil religion less and less during times of cultural
globalization.
2.4.2
Civil Religion and the Yasukuni Shrine
The Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni jinja) plays a vital role in the promotion of modern
Japanese civil religion. Even though it has no place in the official calendar, i.e. the
national holiday’s system, official politicians’ visits to the shrine constitute a major
ritual in Japan’s updated civil religion.
The shrine, first named “Tôkyô Shôkonsha” (shrine to summon the souls) in
order to honour those who had died for the royalist cause at the time of the Meiji
Restoration, was founded in 1869. In line with Shintô belief, it hosts the souls of the
war dead, who are enshrined here as kami. The Allied Occupation Forces made the
shrine independent from the state, which is why it has been funded privately since
then. Since 1959, deceased war veterans have been enshrined there; at first, however, war criminals were excluded. After the occupation, a renewed conservatism
grew significantly, and in the late 1960s, the movement to nationalize Yasukuni
Shrine intensified. On 15 August 1975, the 30-year anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, Prime Minister Miki Takeo (1907–1988; PM 1974–76)
visited Yasukuni Shrine, which was the first post-war visit by a prime minister,
even though he insisted he had visited as an individual and not as prime minister.
On 9 April 1979, a surprising announcement was made that the most prominent 14
Class A war criminals had been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine on 17 October 1978,
along with 2,450,000 other war dead (Takayama 1988: 331ff.). Yasukuni also runs
a war museum located within the shrine, the Yûshûkan, which has been criticized
for presenting a revisionist interpretation of the war and glorifying the war dead,
specifically the Kamikaze pilots.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the major festivals at the Yasukuni Shrine. As
can be seen from the list, they include all the national holidays of State Shintôism
that date back to the Meiji period. Religious holidays in the common sense are not
found. Besides these festivities, festivals are held to commemorate the birthdays of
the Meiji and Shôwa emperors, current Emperor Akihito, as well as mythical
Emperor Jinmu on 11 February, which illustrates the close relationship and overlap
between worldly and religious powers in Shintô religion. It further highlights that
28
For the Golden Week, see e.g. Japan Guide.
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
25
Table 2.2 List of major festivals held at the Yasukuni Shrine
Date
Name
Japanese
1
3
1 January
11 February
Shin’nensai
Kenkoku kinen sai
4
5
8
9
17 February
21–23 April
29 April
29 June
New Year’s Festival
Foundation Day (Festival of the Imperial Area’s
Origin)
Spring Festival for Harvest
Vernal Equinox Day
Emperor Shôwa’s birthday
Founding Day; commemoration of the founding
of the Yasukuni Shrine
Festival to honour the dead
Annual Autumn Festival
Emperor Meiji’s Birthday
Festival of the First Tasting
The present emperor’s birthday
Kinensai
Shunki reitai sai
Shôwasai
Go sôritsu kinenbi
sai
10 13–16 July
Mitama matsuri
11 17–20 October
Shûki reitai sai
12 3 November
Meijisai
13 23 November
Niinamesai
14 23 December
Tennô go tanshin
hôshuku sai
Source Own compilation based on the official homepage of the Yasukuni Shrine
this form of Shintô is a consciously designed religion, formed by the Meiji leaders,
with the emperor being a god king, i.e. the highest authority in the spiritual and
secular sphere. Moreover, it reveals that in its self-perception, the Yasukuni Shrine
is still dedicated to State Shintôism and the pre-war role of the emperor.
The first prime minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in an official capacity was
Nakasone Yasuhiro (born 1918; PM 1982–87), who made the visit along with his
cabinet on 15 August 1985 (ibid. 335). Others, such as Koizumi Jun’ichirô (born
1942; PM 2001–2006) followed, which has led to severe criticism from China and
South Korea, the main victims of Japanese aggression during World War II, who
consider the shrine a glorification of Japan’s past military aggression.
Another important factor is the various Yasukuni supporter groups, amongst
them the “Izokukai”, (Japan War-Bereaved Families Association), the main organization for families of war dead in Japan, which has strong links to the LDP,
because their chairmen like the incumbent, Mizuochi Toshiei (born 1943), a LDP
Upper House member, used to be well-known LDP politicians.29
The current Prime Minister, Abe Shinzô (born 1954, PM 2006–07, 2012–),
visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. In February 2015, he said: “It is
natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit Yasukuni Shrine to pay their respects
to those who died for the country”.30 Even though Abe kept away from visiting the
See: Nihon Izokukai’s homepage. One of its first chairmen was Okinori Kaya (1889–1977),
Minister of Finance from 1941 to 44, a Class A war criminal, who was sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment by the Allied occupation. However, he was paroled in 1955 and later served as LDP
Minister of Justice. Kaya led the organization between 1962 and 1977.
30
See The Japan Times 18.2.2015a.
29
26
C. Schmidt
shrine at Yasukuni’s annual Spring Festival in 2015 to avoid diplomatic embarrassment and instead sent a ritual offering, a total of 106 lawmakers, from both the
government and the opposition, visited the shrine, including three cabinet ministers,
which again infuriated South Korea and China.31 On 15 August 2015, the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II, Abe again decided not to visit because of
diplomatic tensions; however, despite severe criticism from China and South Korea,
60 politicians, including several ministers, visited the shrine.32
The issue also frequently provokes big domestic dispute, and the Japanese public
is deeply divided on this topic. In January 2014, for instance, 41 percent of
respondents in an Asahi Shinbun poll had no problem with Abe’s visit at Yasukuni,
whilst 46 percent said he should not have gone.33 In the past, proposals have been
made to create a separate secular memorial where the prime minister can make
official state visits for memorial purposes; however, such proposals are often
blocked by the conservative elite and organizations like the “Izokukai”.34
Therefore, the shrine remains a subject of political debate in Japan and an obstacle
to meaningful relationships between Japan and its neighbours.
2.5
Conclusion: Japan’s Civil Religion in Times
of Globalization
During the period of modernity, national civil religions served as a major force for
nation building in all advanced societies. Since the second modernity is characterized by denationalization, national civil religions might be an obstacle in the
building of new solidarities within supra- or international political communities and
serve as a hindrance to creating peaceful relationships with neighbouring countries.
Since this is true for Japan as well, we sought to discuss the impediment posed by
Japan’s civil religion with regard to the second modernity and Japan’s relationship
with other Asian counties. We started by examining the establishment of Japan’s
civil religion during the Meiji period.
The newly formed Meiji government was well aware of the need to rapidly
modernize the polity and economy of Japan as well as the need of a strong sense of
national and cultural unity. By choosing indigenous Shintôism instead of the
imported Buddhism or Christianity, they could avoid the pitfalls (the “evil”, in the
words of Rousseau) of the world religions, namely the division into spiritual and
secular power, and “the provinces of the gods” were fixed by the boundary of the
Japanese islands.
Japan Times 23.4.2015b. The visits came just one day after Prime Minister Abe had held his first
substantial talks with China’s President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a summit in Jakarta.
32
See Japan Times 15.8.2015c, and Yahoo News (2015).
33
See Asahi Shinbun (2014).
34
For an overview of this topic, see Mochizuki (2010).
31
2 Civil Religion and Second Modernity in Japan …
27
Japan’s civil religion succeeded in making the country the object of its citizens’
adoration, and by choosing Amaterasu as the principle deity within the newly
formed kokutai system, service done to the state became service done to its tutelary
god. To die for Japan became martyrdom, which greatly supported military
aggression and placed Japan in a natural state of war with neighbouring countries.
After the country’s defeat in World War II, traditional Japanese values were seen
as the basis for Japan’s economic success, and we observe a revitalization of
Japan’s civil religion from the 1960s onwards. Japanese values and tradition, i.e. the
unique form of Japaneseness, were seen as prior as Western values. This updated
civil religion, however, had the same defects as the civil religion of the Meiji
period: By defining the Japanese nation by ethnicity and religion, here native
Shintôism, it excluded all non-ethnic Japanese, as well as those with a reserved
relationship to religion.
With globalization increasingly penetrating the Japanese economy and society
from the 1980s onwards, and the sudden end of economic growth starting in the
1990s, Japan’s updated civil religion came under severe pressure. Japan, its companies and labour relations underwent significant changes, and many of the economical giants now consider themselves as international companies rather than
Japanese.
Since a civil religion finds its expression in national holidays, we further
examined the nature of Japan’s ritual calendar. Most of the holidays are of Shintô
origin, even if they were renamed after the war to “cover” their origins. Most of
them came from the Meiji period and thus were introduced by the leaders in order to
promote the new civil religion. The globalization of the economy, the process of
individualization and pluralization of society, and the tendency to consumerize
national holidays are also weakening the viability of Japan’s civil religion, which is
why it requires a reformulation of its spiritual foundation.
The Yasukuni Shrine plays a vital role in Japan’s civil religion. It honours those
who died for Japan and its civil religion and thus treats them as martyrs who died as
a sacrifice for the nation. Since Class A war criminals are also enshrined, official
visits by Japan’s prime ministers and cabinet members always provoke severe
criticism from China and South Korea, the main victims of Japans aggression
during World War II. As the ritual annual calendar of the shrine reveals, it is still
dedicated to the main principles of State Shintôism, which is why many Japanese
are reluctant to accept the shrine’s role and oppose official visits by the government.
As was discussed in the first chapter, a religion always fails to be the basis of a
particular civil religion; even so, in the case of Japan, there was no division between
spiritual and secular power. Japan can take pride in the fact that it is one of the most
democratic and developed countries in Asia and values human rights, individualism, pluralism, and pacifism. Nonetheless, Japan’s civil religion is still based on
native Shintô tradition, which excludes not only second or third generations of
Koreans or Chinese from Japanese society but also foreign husbands, wives and
their children, and all those Japanese who have a more distant relationship to
Shintôism, nationalism and revisionism. It is also bad in that it serves as a barrier
for Japan’s relations with other Asian countries. Instead of simply trying to
28
C. Schmidt
revitalize an outdated civil religion, as the established conservative elite wants it to
be a solution to current problems, it needs to be adjusted to the processes of
economic, cultural and political globalization. As Rousseau put it, it should be
positive and not intolerant. Thus, it should change from closed nationalism to open
global pacifism in order to create friendly relations with its neighbours and to shape
the process of globalization in a positive way.
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