Santillan 1
Daniel Santillan
Dobson
Engl 20
5 May 2016
Reducing Religious Terrorism Through Understanding
Terrorism has been a consistently present topic within the United States since the
September 11th attacks. With the wars in the Middle East causing casualties for more than a
decade now, there has been little disputation that terrorism has not affected American life
significantly. Nevertheless, as with most things in life, the face of terrorism has changed since its
introduction into modernity and the inability to differentiate between old and new terrorist
motivations and goals has led and will continue to lead to poorly allocated funding as well as
ineffective methods in decreasing or stopping the occurrence of terrorism. Thus, defining
terrorism and acknowledging the change from older, secular based terrorism to the rise in
religious terrorism would be beneficial when developing methods meant to decrease terrorist
activities. Furthermore, since religious terrorist groups arise more often than their secular
counterparts in contemporary times, understanding the motivations that lead to the usage of
terrorist tactics by religious organizations would be more conducive in the effort to reduce the
influx of membership into terrorist groups than would studying the motivations that particularly
pertain to secular terrorist organizations. Moreover, as motivations lead religious terrorist
organizations to act, understanding the goals of the religious terrorist would also help when
developing preventative measures for terrorism. In essence, with an incorrect understanding of
the nature of a particular terrorist group, especially in regard to religious terrorist organizations,
the use of conducive measures meant to prevent or reduce the amount of terrorism within the
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world shall never come to pass.
Defining terrorism provides a foundation for the phenomena and allows for the
recognition of actions that are attributable to terrorism. Therefore, providing a comprehensive
definition of terrorism itself would be prudent prior to distinguishing between secular and
religious terrorism since without a thorough understanding of what determines terrorism, further
distinctions would be insubstantial. Accordingly, the full definition of terrorism, as accounted for
by the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, is, “The systematic use of terror, especially as a
means of coercion.” While this definition of terrorism may be fairly comprehensive with a
proper understanding of each specific word, a definition that explains terrorism with simpler
language may be helpful. One such definition describes terrorism as, “[a tactic of which] the use
or threat of violence [on a target] of civilians, property, or governments [is intended to create]
fear [in the aim of] altering [a] status quo” (Gregg 37). Using this definition, one can note that
since terrorism is a tactic, it can be of the form of “an action or method that is planned and used
[by either individuals or factions] to achieve a particular goal” (“Tactic”). Furthermore, this
definition of terrorism assists in our particular study since it acknowledges that there can be more
than one particular motivation for terrorism by mentioning that it is used to change a status quo.
Differentiating between strands of terrorism based on the aspect of society they are trying
to change emphasizes the distinction between the still broadly defined terrorist group's specific
overarching motivations. A notable distinction among terrorist groups is between secular and
religious terrorist groups with the defining difference being that secular terrorist organizations
focus their efforts on altering aspects of society, e.g. the political, social, and educational spheres,
for non-religious reasons, whereas religious terrorist groups try to change the aforementioned
aspects for primarily religious reasons (Ranstorp 44). For instance, the Palestinian Liberation
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Organization (1964-) is a former secular terrorist group that had the nationalistic goal of
liberating Palestine from Israeli control, whereas the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement (1981-)
is a religious terrorist group whose goal is to constitute an Islamic Palestinian government, a
notably religious goal (Fine). Without the distinction between overarching motivations, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement would both
simply be categorized as terrorist groups that wanted to change the political landscape of
Palestine, rather than providing a more specific definition of the goals that they wish to
accomplish.
Further distinctions between these two strands arise from the fact that secular terrorist
groups are typically older than their religious counterparts, as well as from what sort of
restrictions that a group has on their actions with regard to their target planning and
implementation of terrorist tactics (Fine; Mayer 369). For example, secular terrorist groups
originated more frequently leading to the later half of the twentieth century, e.g. Narodnaya
Volya (People's Will, 1879-81), the Romanian Iron Guard (1927-41), and the Sandinistas
(1961-), and would typically use tactics such as kidnapping, assassination, and hostage-taking,
i.e. pointed actions that would be noted for their political significance rather than for the amount
of bloodshed (Fine). Contrarily, religious terrorist organizations originated more frequently after
the mid-twentieth century, e.g. Lebanese Hizb'allah (1982-), Aum Shinrikyo (1987-), and the
Jewish Kach movement (1971-94) (Ranstorp 41, 43, 45). Furthermore, since religious terrorists
can have a wider understanding of who the enemy is (Fine) and can justify their actions with
doctrinal interpretations (Pech & Slade 12), the indiscriminate use of violence on ambiguous
symbolic targets, such as “'culture[s]', values and norms that do not conform to the religious
ideals of the terrorist group … [through] attacks on movie theaters, […], bars, and other social
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gathering points” (Gregg 45), is more ideologically supportable for religious terrorists than with
secular groups. Since secular terrorist groups account for only 4 of the 29 foreign terrorist
organizations designated by the U.S. Department of State originating after 1990 (Appendix 1),
and since religious terrorist groups are more open to targeting vague targets, focusing on
developing methods to decrease the factors that lead to religious terrorism seems to be the most
conducive path to decrease modern terrorism.
Understanding the motivations for why religious organizations turn to terrorism is
relevant since any strategy meant to prevent or decrease the influx of membership in these
groups will likely fail without said insight primarily because the strategy would not directly
address the source of the terrorism itself. While the idea that a certain culture or religion
necessarily engenders religious terrorist organizations might be common, there is a consensus
among academics that there are multiple unique motives based on historical and environmental
contexts that give rise to each terrorist organizations use of terrorism (Mamdani 767-8; Pech &
Slade 10, 13; Ranstorp 47). For example, Jean-François Mayer notes that one motivation for a
group to use terrorist tactics is the desire to garner attention by, “staging a spectacular action
[since it] allows a [relatively] small group to attract the attention of the world and may to some
extent be intended to reach that goal” (365). Since demonstrating power through displaying
weapons or violence does not necessarily require a massive budget to organize, religious terrorist
organizations can use these demonstrations as an economical way to attract attention to their
group that would otherwise be unknown due to its small size. This motivation can be observed
within groups such as Ansar al-Sharia who have had photos of their armaments uploaded on the
internet in the attempt to make the group known (Appendix 2). In addition, groups such as
Hamas and Islamic-Jihad use suicide attacks (Fine), especially when they incorporate women
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into these attacks (Ness 359), to shock members of societies such as the United States, which
brings more attention to the group. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that a single motivating
factor will only add to a religious group's process of moving toward using terrorism and that a
culmination of multiple motivations as well as a triggering event is typically required to elicit the
level of malcontent that inevitably results in terrorism.
In at least one case, the motivation for religious terrorism leads to a clear objective or
goal for their tactics to achieve. In particular, religious groups may try to assuage an intense
sense of crisis that resides within their surrounding environment through terrorist tactics. This
particular use of terrorism primarily appears in areas with sub-par living conditions that come as
a result of poverty and/or underdevelopment of land within a region (Pech & Slade 12-3).
Nevertheless, since a feeling of crisis can stem from a multiple of sources, e.g. “the social,
political, economic, cultural, psychological, or spiritual sphere[s]” (Ranstorp 47) within a group's
environment, the motivation of crisis can help lead to the use of terrorism by any group that
perceives themselves to be alienated from society within any of the aforementioned spheres as
well. When religious groups consider an external force, such as Secularism or Modernism, as an
endangerment to their identity or way of life insofar as they perceive themselves as powerless to
prevent the intrusion of these forces, these religious groups may begin to take defensive
measures in the effort to take control of the situation or “to prevent the extinction of the
distinctive identity of [their] community” (Ranstorp 47; Halafoff and Wright-Neville 926; Pech
and Slade 13). Furthermore, since the defensive measures that a group takes will not necessarily
be seen as justifiable by members of society outside of said group, especially if these measures
include violence, the group's own actions can lead to actual societal opposition and alienation,
which in turn reinforces the group's perception that their actions were warranted (Mayer 364,
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367).
As there can be a multitude of motivations that may lead religious groups to use
terrorism, there are also several ways to go about reducing religious terrorism during the
different stages of a group's progression toward using terrorism. Groups who have the motivation
to use terrorism to alleviate a sense of crisis are no exception. While the use of state-enforced
“hard” strategies, or forceful means that are effective at stopping terrorism during its
implementation, are becoming increasingly demanded within the United States to reduce
religious terrorism in general, the consensus among scholars is that the use of force alone will
not counter religious terrorism (Gregg 46; Halafoff & Wright-Neville 922, 928; Mamdani 773;
Pech & Slade 18). In fact, the idea of treating religious terrorism, or even terrorism in general,
with a one-size-fits-all approach of suppressing their efforts through conventional or
unconventional military or political means, e.g. nullifying the possessions or membership of a
group through assassination or destruction using various methods, is seen as insufficient since
these methods do not address the underlying issues that motivate individual religious groups to
commit terrorism (Halafoff & Wright-Neville 922; Ranstorp 62). With regard to religious groups
who are motivated by a sense of crisis to use terrorism in the effort of alleviating the stress that
arises from a threatening situation, the use of forceful tactics will fail in the stages leading up to
the use of terrorism since these tactics will only reinforce their sense of persecution from the
surrounding environment. Therefore, the use of alternative, unforced “soft” methods prior to a
group using terrorism, such as conducting open forums within a community that allow for groups
to voice their concerns, along with early identification of a religious group's motivation to use
terrorism due to a sense of crisis and alienation from the surrounding community, will be far
more effective in reducing the intensity of a group's perceived crisis over time (Halafoff &
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Wright-Neville 925, 929). A reduction in the intensity of a group's perceived crises should
alleviate tension between the group and the community.
Providing a definition of terrorism helped form a foundation for studying and
understanding the phenomena and made a concrete identification of what terrorism.
Distinguishing between strands of terrorism, specifically between religious and secular terrorism
based on the aspects of society that they try to alter, introduced the identification of differences
among terrorist groups with regard to their overarching motivations, targeting methods, and
frequency. Recognizing that there are a multitude of motivations and goals for religious terrorism
led to the acknowledgment that there is not a single way to prevent terrorism from developing,
which in turn elicited a need to differentiate between methods for reducing terrorism with regard
to when they would be most effective. Keeping all of these points in mind creates a foundation
on which governing bodies and individuals can be better prepared to prevent, mitigate, or reduce
terrorism within the world.
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Works Cited
Fine, Jonathan. “Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism” Middle East Quarterly 15.1
(2008): n. pag. Web. 20 April 2016.
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. United States Department of
State, n.d. Web. 8 May 2016.
Gregg, Heather S. “Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism” Perspectives
on Terrorism 8.2 (2014): 36-50. Print.
Halafoff, Anna and Wright-Neville, David. “A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in
Countering Terrorism” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32.11 (2009): 921-932. Print.
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and
Terrorism” American Anthropologist 104.3 (2002): 766-775. Print.
Mayer, Jean-François. “Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24.5 (2001): 361-376. Print.
Ness, Cindy D. “In the Name of the Cause: Women's Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28.5 (2005): 353-373. Print.
Pech, Richard J. and Slade, Bret W. “Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism: Why do they do
it and what do they want?” Foresight 8.1 (2006): 8-20. Print.
Ranstorp, Magnus. “Terrorism in the Name of Religion.” Journal of International Affairs 50.1
(1996): 41-62. Print.
“Tactic” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster Incorporated, n.d. Web. 5 May 2016
“Terrorism” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster Incorporated, n.d. Web. 5 May 2016
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Appendix 1
Currently Recognized Terrorist Organizations by the U.S.
This table is derived from the information given from “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”
Secular Terrorism Groups
Religious Terrorist Groups
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (1959-2011)
Abu Sayyaf Group (1991-)
Kurdistan Workers Party (1978-)
Aum Shinrikyo (1987-)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (1976-2009) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (1992-8)
National Liberation Army (1964-)
Hamas (1987-)
Palestine Liberation Front (1961-)
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (1985-)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(1967-)
Hizb’al1ah (1985-)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(1964-)
Kach (1971-1994)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front Palestinian Islamic Jihad (1987-)
(1994-)
Shining Path (1980-)
Al-Qaeda (1988-)
Real Irish Republican Army (1997-)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (1998-)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (2000-)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (2000-)
New People's Army (1969-)
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (1986-)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (1994-)
Osbat al-Ansar (1994-)
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (2002-)
Jemaah Islamiyah (1993-)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (1996-)
Ansar al-Islam (2001-2014)
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (1999-)
Islamic Jihad Union (2002-)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (1984-)
Al-Shabaab (2006-)
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2009-)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (2007-)
Jundallah (2003-)
Army of Islam (2006-)
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Indian Mujahedeen (2008-)
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (2009-)
Haqqani Network (1980-)
Ansar al-Dine (2012-)
Boko Haram (2002-)
Ansaru (2012-)
Ansar al-Shari'a in Libya (2012-)
al-Nusrah Front (2012-)
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (2006-)
Appendix 2
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/ansar-al-sharia-libya-relaunches-social-media-sites.php