The social trap that might destroy us:
Generalized trust and the link between environmental concern
and civic pro-environmental behavior across 32 countries
Joakim Kulin1 and Ingemar Johansson Sevä2
1
Department of Sociology, Stockholm University
2
Department of Sociology, Umeå University
ABSTRACT
At the present, mankind is struggling to collectively address the looming threat posed by
man-made climate change and global warming. In line with the literature on democratic
citizenship and political representation, we argue that citizens’ orientations and behaviors
are critical in understanding of how societies and the global community collectively can
address this threat. In this study, we investigate cross-national differences in civic proenvironmental behavior, and examine the importance of generalized trust for the translation
of environmental concern into pro-environmental behavior. Sociological and political
science theories of collective action problems and social traps posit that widespread
generalized trust is a crucial prerequisite for individuals to engage in mutual cooperation,
since for individuals to contribute to a collective cause, they have to trust in others to do
the same. We argue that generalized trust, or more specifically the lack of trust, pose a
potential problem for environmentally concerned individuals when deciding on whether
they should act on their concerns. Using cross-country survey data from the International
Social Survey Programme from 32 countries collected in the year 2010, we investigate the
cross-national occurrence of civic pro-environmental behavior – such as membership in
environmental organizations, signing petitions, giving money to an environmental cause,
and participating in demonstrations – and how environmental concern influence these
behaviors cross-nationally. We find that the extent to which environmental concern is
translated into civic pro-environmental behavior is closely related to the level of
generalized trust in a country. Hence, our findings strongly suggest the presence of a social
trap, since environmental concern is less likely to be translated into civic engagement in
low-trust countries. We conclude by elaborating on the prospects of bringing about an
increasingly engaged citizenry (i.e., more effective collective action) in response to
environmental challenges by focusing on the facilitators of generalized trust.
Introduction
By now, the scientific community is in agreement that anthropogenic climate change and
global warming is real and that it poses a severe threat to humanity (Oreskes 2004; Cook et al.
2013). Climate change not only threatens the biological and ecological basis of human
existence; it also has grave social consequences in terms of conflict, crime and violence
(Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2014; see also Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013; Ranson 2014).
Some even claim that there is a non-negligible probability that humanity will be thrown into a
state of social, economic and political destruction as a result of spiraling climate change
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(Schneider 2009). Consequently, one of the most fundamental challenges for mankind is how
to effectively counter the threat of global environmental problems such as climate change (cf.
Nordhaus 1994). A huge body of research addresses these problems, yet the vast majority of
studies focus on technologies and innovations that facilitate transition and adaptation to a
more eco-friendly way of life that would curb CO2 emissions and thereby mitigate global
warming (REF in). As a result, new knowledge is soaring in areas such as green energy and
sustainable modes of production, yet lagging behind when it comes to knowledge about the
social and political prerequisites for effective large-scale implementation of counter-measures
in response to global environmental threats. This is unfortunate, especially considering that
the large-scale implementation of technologies and innovations, that may seriously curb
global warming and prevent the earth’s atmosphere from reaching critical levels, has yet to
occur. Given that both the causes and consequences of global environmental problems, such
as climate change, are to a great extent social in nature, sociological and other social science
perspectives are indeed called for.
Previous social science research on pro-environmental behavior has primarily focused on
identifying the psychological barriers to acting pro-environmentally (see, e.g., Gifford 2011)
or the economic constraints affecting pro-environmental behavior (Hines et al. 1987;
Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). Very few studies exist that systematically examine general
behavioral patterns across societies, and explore more sociologically oriented explanations. In
sociology, and other disciplines that study group behavior, the understanding of how people
act collectively constitutes a key theoretical perspective. Most notably, the potential problems
and pitfalls associated with collective action are by now well documented (see, e.g., Ostrom
1998); in order for groups and societies to successfully organize and take effective collective
action, substantial levels of generalized trust have to be maintained (see also Rothstein 2005).
2
In other words, if individuals are to collectively engage in mutual cooperation for a common
good, they have to trust in the willingness of others to do the same. Meanwhile, trust levels
differ substantially across countries (Bjørnskov 2007; Nannestad 2008), thereby creating
disparate conditions and settings cross-nationally in terms of the potential for collective
action. This general mechanism, of social trust as a prerequisite for collective action,
potentially constitutes a fundamental obstacle for democratic societies in adequately
addressing some of the most pressing global challenges facing humanity, such as climate
change.
In line with previous literature, we argue that collective action problems may be of particular
importance in relation to environmental issues, since people not only influence the state of the
environment directly through their lifestyle choices but also influence the solutions and
counter-measures in response to environmental problems through their political behavior (cf.
Ostrom 2010). Collective action problems may therefore not only produce adverse
environmental outcomes as a result of individuals’ consumption and lifestyle behavior, but
also, perhaps more crucially, constrain individuals’ efforts to collectively make a difference
by political means. Hence, “saving the environment” is not only a matter of ordinary citizens
acting pro-environmentally in their everyday lives, but also contingent upon citizens electing
and influencing political representatives with the mandate to enact effective policies and
regulations to counter global environmental problems on a larger scale. Therefore, the
development of effective solutions to environmental problems highly depend on citizens’
civic engagement.
In this study, we aim to contribute to present knowledge about how to more effectively
counter global environmental problems such as climate change and global warming. In
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contrast to previous research, which has mainly focused either on technological solutions or
psychological barriers, we apply a sociological perspective on the study of environmental
problems and pro-environmental behavior. In doing so, we use a theoretical framework that
has been largely absent in previous research on global environmental problems, namely the
problems and pitfalls associated with collective action (but see Ostrom 2010). We use data
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from the year 2010 to examine civic
pro-environmental behavior cross-nationally, and investigate the role of generalized trust
(measured at the country-level) in translating individuals’ environmental concern into civic
pro-environmental behavior.
Previous research and theoretical framework
Previous research on pro-environmental behavior has identified environmental concern as a
key motivating factor driving people to act pro-environmentally. Several studies have used
Ajzen’s (1985; 1991) theory of planned behavior to theoretically link environmental concern
to pro-environmental behavior. Unsurprisingly, many of these studies find that environmental
concern indeed is a crucial driver of a wide range of pro-environmental behaviors (e.g.,
Guagnano, Stern, and Dietz 1995; Cheung, Chan, and Wong 1999; Stern 2000). For instance,
environmental concern has been found to be related to both environmental citizenship, e.g.
signing a petition or protesting (Oreg and Katz-Gerro 2006) and green consumption behavior
(Pagiaslis and Krontalis 2014).
Meanwhile, a growing body of research point to the fact that people do not always act on their
concerns; there is by now ample evidence that pro-environmental attitudes are not always
translated into pro-environmental behavior (Scott and Willits 1994; Olli, Grendstad, and
Woolebaek 2001; Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002; Bamberg 2003; see also Kraus 1995).
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Moreover, previous research shows that the gap between concern and behavior differs crossnationally. In a meta-analysis of the attitude-behavior link, Kraus (1995) find weak
correlations in many studies (average correlation below .4). Although many explanations have
been proposed—demographic, economic and cultural—none have proven successful in
accounting for the gap between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). However, according to Bamberg (2003), there is no reason to
expect a deterministic relationship between concern and behavior. Instead, he argues that it is
situation specific cognitions rather than general attitudes, such as environmental concern, that
has a direct influence on behavior. This suggests that the relationship between concern and
behavior is highly context-dependent.
In fact, previous research show that the link between attitudes and behaviors is not
generalizable across countries (see e.g., Wright and Klÿn 1998; Aoyagi-Usui, Vinken, and
Kuribayashi 2003). In a cross-national analysis of 22 countries, Wright and Klÿn (1998) find
that perceived danger to the local environment affects green consumption behavior,
meanwhile finding that this relationship differs considerably in strength across countries, with
non-significant correlations in some countries. Similarly, Dalton (2005) demonstrates that
while environmental concern is widespread globally, membership in environmental groups
and associations nevertheless differ cross-nationally. The results show that contextual factors
such as GDP and press freedom are related to membership in environmental organizations.
Dalton thus concludes: “The societal infrastructure of affluent nations substantially stimulates
public involvement in environmental groups. In addition, a democratic political context
facilitates the mobilization of environmental activity” (Dalton 2005: 454).
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In order to mitigate the present day global environmental challenges – for instance, to
constrain CO2 emissions sufficiently to prevent global warming from rising above disastrous
thresholds – widespread behavioral change is required. Some scholars argue that this type of
behavioral change is unlikely to happen in the absence of international political agreements
and regulations (see Ostrom 2010), which the present state of affairs illustrates (see also
Brennan 2009). Indebted to theories on democratic citizenship and political representation, we
argue that there are essentially two ways in which citizens can influence political processes in
a pro-environmental direction; voting and civic engagement. When it comes to voting,
citizens support political parties that represent their positions on critical issues (Patulny and
Norris 2005), for instance, parties that attempt to bring about international agreements and
legislations to mitigate environmental problems. However, several obstacles exist for citizens
to successfully influence political processes in a more environmental-friendly direction by
means of voting. First, citizens may have competing concerns that surpass environmental
issues in terms of their relative importance. Voting green may imply the abandonment of
other key political priorities (e.g. the economy, unemployment), which is unlikely in the
absence of a perceived looming catastrophic scenario. Second, the structure of the party
system has crucial consequences for the political alternatives available for citizens at the
ballot box. For example, while single-issue parties, such as environmental parties, can
occasionally be found in multi-party systems they are rarely found in two-party systems such
as the US. However, even in multi-party systems there is no guarantee of an organized
environmental alternative. Third, even if a Green party exist in a given country, such singleissue parties may be un-electable for the majority of voters if it fails to present an overall
political program with credible economic and labor market policies. Given these obstacles it
is reasonable to assume that there are considerable differences across countries regarding the
opportunities to influence environmental politics at the ballot box.
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However, in addition to voting green citizens can also influence politicians and decision
makers by means of civic engagement in relation to environmental issues (Meyer 1997).
Environmental civic engagement is a type of pro-environmental behavior that includes
activities such as signing petitions, protesting, and supporting or participating in an
environmental group/movement. This type of ecological citizenship thus offers a way to
influence environmental politics regardless of party system, competing political concerns, and
lack of political trust. These collective efforts are, however, not without their obstacles. The
research on collective action suggests that a potential problem is how to organize and act
collectively in the absence of widespread generalized trust. As people who trust in others are
more likely to cooperate, and as people who are not trusting are less likely to engage in
cooperation with others, generalized trust seems to be a crucial prerequisite for effective
resolution of many collective action problems (Ostrom 1998). Low trust can therefore be
denoted as a “social trap” (Rothstein 2005), i.e., a situation where individuals and groups lack
the trust and social capital necessary to cooperate, even though it is in their best interest to do
so. In accordance with a prisoner’s dilemma type logic, rational and self-interested individuals
will simply ‘outsmart themselves into sub-optimal equilibrium’ (Hechter 1992).
Several studies have linked generalized trust to environmental civic engagement. For
instance, Sønderskov (2010) demonstrates that higher levels of generalized trust increase the
probability to join associations producing public goods, such as environmental organizations,
i.e. where membership potentially brings collective action problems to the fore. Moreover,
Sønderskov shows that trust levels are not associated with membership in associations that do
not produce public goods, such as professional or religious associations. This supports the
notion that the solution to many collective action problems can be found in maintaining high
7
levels of generalized trust. Based on evidence from small-scale environmental case studies,
Adger (2003) shows that trust and social capital can increase the legitimacy of adaptation
strategies as well as facilitate bottom-up processes that aim to adapt and mitigate
environmental problems. It thus seems that trust is crucial in enabling collective action and
building resilience at the local level, in the face of regional environmental problems.
Recent development in the literature on generalized trust put forward institutionalist
arguments emphasizing the importance of political institutions in maintaining high trust levels
in society. Several studies link high levels of generalized trust to the quality of (national)
government institutions (e.g., Rothstein and Stolle 2008; see also Skocpol 2013). In countries
where government institutions are impartial, transparent and efficacious, citizens are on
average more trusting to the institutions themselves as well as to one another (see also
Rothstein 2011). According to this perspective civic engagement and participation mainly
follows from high levels of generalized trust generated by high-quality government
institutions. Generalized trust does according to this literature not vary primarily across
individuals within countries, but rather across countries, suggesting that trust is mainly a
social, cultural, or even institutional phenomenon (Nannestad 2008). In stark contrast to the
institutionalist perspective, other scholars claim that participation in voluntary organizations
and interest groups is a seedbed for generalized trust (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994;
Fukuyama 2001; Jin and Shriar 2013). According to this perspective, civic engagement and
participation facilitate generalized trust among citizens, which generate community
integration and social capital that can then be used in wider society. This view has been
seriously challenged by studies showing that civic engagement and participation does not lead
to increases in generalized trust, only to more trust and cooperation between in-group
members (e.g., Stolle 2001a). As a result, several scholars have concluded that the voluntary
8
civic participation/engagement explanation of generalized trust does not hold (Delhey and
Newton 2003; Uslaner 2002). Instead, the causality appears to be reversed, as the generally
higher trust levels among the civically engaged can largely be explained by the fact that more
trusting individuals self-select into for instance participation in voluntary associations (Stolle
2001b; Uslaner and Brown 2005).
Taken together, previous research has shown that there is a clear link between environmental
concern and pro-environmental behavior, since individuals holding greater concerns are more
likely to also act pro-environmentally. Previous research has also shown that this relationship
varies considerably in strength across countries. This indicates that the concern-behavior link
is susceptible to contextual influence and there might exist a collective action problem since
environmentally concerned individuals are less likely to act on their concerns in certain
countries. Meanwhile, both theoretical and scattered empirical evidence emphasize the
importance of generalized trust in alleviating collective action problems. In line with the
literature on collective action problems and social dilemmas we therefore argue that
environmentally concerned individuals should be more likely to engage in civic proenvironmental behavior in high-trust contexts. In the following sections we present the data
and measures as well as the methodological approach used to disentangle the relationships
between environmental concern, civic pro-environmental behavior and generalized trust
across countries. We then proceed with the empirical analyses and results. Lastly, we
conclude with a discussion about the results and the implications of our findings for future
research and society at large.
9
Data and Method
In our analyses, we use International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data from 32 countries
collected in the year 2010. The countries included are (abbreviation and n in parenthesis):
Argentina (AR, n=1100), Austria (AT, n=1000), Belgium (BE-FLA, n=1097), Bulgaria, (BG,
n=983), Canada (CA, n=967), Chile (CL, n=1408), Taiwan (TW, n=2207), Croatia (HR,
n=1190), Czech Republic (CZ, n=1419), Denmark (DK, n=1267), Finland (FI, n=1123),
France (FR, n=2127), West Germany (DE-W, n=944), East Germany (DE-E, n=400), Israel
Jews (IL-J, n=992) Israel Arabs (IL-A, n=191), Japan (JP, n=1252), Korea (KR, n=1553),
Latvia (LV, n=947), Lithuania (LT, n=985), Mexico (MX, n=1598), New Zealand (NZ,
n=1153), Norway (NO, n=1358), Philippines (PH, n=1188), Russia (RU, n=1582), Slovak
republic (SK, n=1120), Slovenia (SI, n=1067), South Africa (ZA, n=3053), Spain (ES,
n=2505), Sweden (SE, n=1162), Switzerland (CH, n=1205), Turkey (TR, n=1638), Great
Britain (GB, n=896), and United States (US, n=1400).
To measure environmental concern we use an item asking respondents: “Generally speaking,
how concerned are you about environmental issues?”, with response alternatives ranging from
“Not at all concerned” (1) to “Very concerned” (5). In this type of analysis, where overall
concern for the environment is hypothesized to correlate with civic pro-environmental
behavior, it is preferable to use this type of more general question compared to alternative
measures that conflate concern with other related aspects.
To measure civic pro-environmental behavior, we use four indicators: If the respondent (i) is
a member of an environmental organization or group, or if the respondent within the last 5
years have (ii) signed a petition about an environmental issue, (iii) given money to an
environmental group, (iv) taken part in a protest or demonstration about an environmental
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issue. A principal component analysis (PCA) shows that all manifest indicators load on a
single dimension, with factor loadings around or above 0.6 (0.72, 0.67, 0.72, and 0.59,
respectively). The latent factor explains 45.7 % of the overall variance in the indicators (0.52,
0.44, 0.51, and 0.35, respectively). In the subsequent analyses, however, we are primarily
interested in the question of whether respondents have engaged in any form of civic proenvironmental behavior or whether they have not. The reason for this is because the range of
options available for citizens to influence politicians and decision makers might be highly
country-specific. We therefore construct a measurement instrument that distinguishes
respondents who answered “yes” on one or more of the indicators from those who answered
“no” on all of them. It should therefore be noted that we do not distinguish between
individuals engaging in only one form of behavior from those engaging in several. As the
measure for pro-environmental civic engagement has been coded as 0 for “no” and 1 for
“yes”, the scores for each country indicate the share of respondents that have engaged in one
or more forms of civic pro-environmental behavior.
Finally, we measure the level of generalized trust in each country by using an item asking
respondents: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, with responses ranging from “You can’t be too
careful” (1) to “Most people can be trusted” (5). This item has been widely used in the
literature on generalized trust.
Results
In the subsequent analysis, we now aim to study whether there are cross-national differences
in the relationship between environmental concern and engagement in civic proenvironmental behavior, and whether generalized trust levels act as contextual factors that can
11
explain potential differences in the link between environmental concern and civic
engagement. The analysis is divided into three steps. First, we examine the cross-country
patterns of engagement in different types of civic pro-environmental behavior. Second, we
study how levels of environmental concern and civic pro-environmental behavior vary across
countries. Finally, in the third step we study the extent to which the national context, in terms
of the level of generalized trust, moderates the relationship between environmental concern
and civic pro-environmental behavior.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of respondents in each country that engage in different forms
of civic pro-environmental behavior. The figure shows that there are indeed substantial
within-country differences in terms of which forms of civic pro-environmental behavior
respondents tend to engage in. More importantly, the figure also indicates that there are crossnational differences in the types of behavior that respondents engage in, and that the overall
level of civic engagement differs considerably across countries. In countries such as New
Zealand, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Germany (west), the share of respondents that
engage in civic pro-environmental behavior ranges between about 25 to 35 %. Meanwhile, in
countries such as Taiwan, South Africa, Latvia, and the Philippines, the corresponding share
of respondents only amounts to about 5 %. There are thus substantial cross-national
differences in terms of civic pro-environmental behavior, where about one in three
respondents in many western countries are engaged in some form of civic pro-environmental
behavior, whereas only a small share of respondents in non-western countries are engaged.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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Based on the previous studies that link environmental concern to pro-environmental behavior,
it is reasonable to expect that the observed cross-national differences in civic proenvironmental behavior can be (at least partly) attributed to cross-national differences in
environmental concern. Indeed, in countries with higher levels of environmental concern, one
should expect higher levels of civic pro-environmental behaviors. Meanwhile, the literature
suggests that environmental concern is widespread in most countries while pro-environmental
behavior often varies cross-nationally. In order to assess whether the cross-national
differences in civic pro-environmental behavior are related to national levels of environmental
concern there are thus good reasons to study them alongside each other across countries.
In Figure 2, country estimates are presented for environmental concern and the measure for
civic pro-environmental behavior (i.e. the share of respondents that have engaged in one or
more forms of civic pro-environmental behavior). In stark contrast to the expectation that
lower levels of environmental concern would be found in countries where pro-environmental
behavior is low, we find that environmental concern generally is high in most countries.
When it comes to civic pro-environmental behavior particularly low levels are found in
countries such as Russia, Turkey, Lithuania, South Africa, and Latvia, where less than 10 %
of respondents have engaged in at least one form of civic pro-environmental behavior. In
countries such as New Zealand, Switzerland, Canada, France, Austria, Sweden, Finland,
Germany (west), and Norway, more than 30 % of respondents have engaged in at least one
form of civic pro-environmental behavior. Moreover, the cross-national differences in
environmental concern found in Figure 2 appear to be unrelated to civic pro-environmental
behavior. For instance, while the lowest levels of civic pro-environmental behavior is found
in Russia and Turkey, the levels of concern in these countries are similar, and in some cases,
even higher than those found in countries like Sweden, Norway and Denmark where
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engagement in civic pro-environmental behavior is considerably more prevalent. Indeed, it
appears as environmental concern have few behavioral consequences in many countries, at
least in terms of civic engagement. A crucial task is therefore to explain why environmentally
concerned individuals do not act on their concerns in many countries.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In line with the literature on collective action problems, we propose, as discussed above, that
a lack of generalized trust might serve as a poor seedbed for the translation of environmental
concern into civic engagement. This may thus undermine the ability of societies to effectively
address common challenges, in particular when it comes to eliciting an environmentally
engaged citizenry with the potential to influence politicians and decision makers. We
therefore proceed with our analysis focusing on generalized trust as a country level
moderating factor affecting the relationship between concern and civic engagement.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between levels of generalized trust at the country-level on the
one hand, and the individual-level correlation between environmental concern and civic proenvironmental behavior on the other. The diagram provides strong support for the notion that
generalized trust is an important factor affecting the link between concern and behavior.
Generalized trust is clearly related to the strength of the correlation between environmental
concern and civic pro-environmental behavior (R2=0.41). Indeed, over 40 % of the crossnational variation in the correlation between concern and behavior can be attributed to
national levels of generalized trust. In high-trust countries, such as Norway, New Zealand and
Canada, environmentally concerned individuals are more likely to act on their concerns
compared to in countries with moderate or low levels of generalized trust. In low-trust
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countries, such as Mexico, Taiwan and the Philippines, environmental concern is considerably
less likely to translate into civic pro-environmental behavior. These findings thus represent
clear support for the notion that collective action problems persist in relation to environmental
problems and challenges. The findings also suggest that the full potential for civic
environmental engagement is not fully realized in many countries, and that this is (at least
partly) due to relatively low levels of generalized trust.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
While Figure 3 has shown that the concern-behavior gap increase in low-trust countries it is
still an open question to what extent this seemingly trust-induced gap between environmental
concern and civic engagement can explain national levels of civic pro-environmental
behavior. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates that the concern-behavior link is closely related to
national levels of pro-environmental behavior (R2=0.56). In countries where concern has a
greater influence on behavior, people are also more likely to engage in civic proenvironmental behavior. In countries such as New Zealand, Norway and Canada, where the
correlation between concern and behavior is comparatively strong, civic pro-environmental
behavior is more widespread.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Our results thus suggest that generalized trust is essential for translating environmental
concern into civic pro-environmental behavior. Furthermore, the cross-national differences in
the relationship between concern and behavior are very likely partly responsible for national
levels of civic pro-environmental behavior. This lends clear support for our argument that
15
while environmental concern is high in most countries, citizens are more likely to act on their
concerns in countries where people in general are more trusting. Therefore, generalized trust
appear to be a crucial prerequisite for civic pro-environmental behavior.
Discussion
In this study, we have examined civic pro-environmental behavior cross-nationally, and
investigated the impact of environmental concern on behavior across national contexts. Based
on theories of collective action problems and social dilemmas or traps, we argued that
generalized trust might be a prerequisite for engagement in civic pro-environmental behavior,
in particular regarding the extent to which environmentally concerned individuals act on their
concerns. Our results strongly supported this argument; the higher levels of generalized trust
in a country, the more likely environmentally concerned citizens are to engage in civic proenvironmental behavior. Moreover, national levels of engagement in civic pro-environmental
behavior is highly dependent on the extent to which concern is translated into behavior. Our
results strongly suggest that collective action problems are highly present in relation to
environmental challenges in general, and civic pro-environmental behavior, in particular.
We argue that the low-trust-induced gap between concern and behavior in many countries is a
crucial obstacle for democratic citizenship and democratic representation, since citizens in
many countries apparently have grievances that remain unrepresented in the democratic
process. Therefore, this trust-behavior mechanism constitutes not only a fundamental obstacle
in addressing the global environmental problems facing humanity but also embodies a more
general problem of democracy and democratic representation. Our assessment is that in order
to foster civic engagement among citizens, it is crucial for societies and the global community
to promote the factors that produce generalized trust and increase trust levels, especially in
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low-trust national contexts. Future studies should focus on identifying the specific trustgenerating institutional (and other contextual) factors, as well as the more intricate causal
linkages that bring about more civically engaged citizens. If environmental issues are to be
prioritized on the political agenda, citizens of democratic societies have to, among other
things, increasingly engage in civic pro-environmental behavior. In other words, in order to
more effectively mitigate environmental problems there is a need for the public to put
pressure on politicians and the political system to enact more effective measures to counter
these problems.
In this study we have presented evidence suggesting that generalized trust is a crucial
prerequisite for civic pro-environmental behavior. This means that democratic societies are
facing a challenging task in increasing trust-levels in order to facilitate effective large-scale
collective action in response to global environmental problems. We would, however, like to
emphasize that trust alone might not be a sufficient precondition for effective collective
action. Yet, given the exceptionally low levels of civic pro-environmental behavior and the
weak association between concern and behavior in low-trust countries, trust certainly appears
to be a necessary precondition. We believe that our contribution is significant, since it shows
that the problem of democratic societies to effectively address environmental problems lies
not mainly in a quiescent and indifferent demos, but rather in shaping the social circumstances
necessary for environmentally concerned citizens to act on their concern. Therefore, a crucial
challenge for the scientific community is to increase knowledge about the interplay between
collective action dilemmas, generalized trust, and environmental problems. In contrast to
much of previous research on pro-environmental behavior which has focused on
psychological barriers and economic constraints, our study demonstrates the necessity of also
17
adopting sociological perspectives in the study of pro-environmental behavior. Indeed, it
certainly is a task worth pursuing, in order to steer clear of a social trap that might destroy us.
18
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1. Indicators for civic pro-environmental behavior.
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Figure 2. Environmental concern (left vertical axis) and civic pro-environmental behavior.
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Figure 3. Generalized trust and the correlation between environmental concern and civic proenvironmental behavior.
Figure 4. Civic pro-environmental behavior and the concern–behavior correlation.
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