Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the Last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
Articles of Interest:
The Providence ... of the Largest Cannon
A House Divided: The N.Y. Election of 1813
The Star-Spangled Banner at La Scala
British Major General Robert Ross –
Did he burn the White House?
Features: Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium, Late-Summer Events,
Book Reviews, Maryland Chronology, and More...
Summer 2010
Vol. 13, No. 2
Subscription Rates/
Information Inside
The Journal of the War of 1812
Volume XIII, No. 2, SUMMER 2010
An International Journal Dedicated
to the Last Anglo-American War,
1812-1815
GOVERNANCE
Editor – Harold W. Youmans
Co-Editor – Christopher T. George
Authors should note that the time from receipt of
the submission to its' publication may be up to
six months in this quarterly magazine. Authors
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Footnotes must be numbered using Arabic and
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Editorial Advisors:
Mary Jo Cunningham, Editor Emeritus
Board of Scholastic Advisors:
Rene Chartrand, Hull, Quebec; Donald E.
Graves, Almonte, Ontario; Martin K. Gordon,
American Military University; Donald R. Hickey,
Wayne State College; Michael D. Harris,
Newburg, MO; Kathy Lee Erlandson Liston,
Brookneal, VA; Robert Malcomson, St.
Catherines, Ontario; Gene A. Smith, Texas
Christian University; Joseph A. Whitehorne,
Middletown, VA.
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their submission is unsuitable for publication.
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The Journal of the War of 1812 (ISSN 15241459) is published quarterly by The War of 1812
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All rights reserved.
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
Volume XIII, No. 2, Summer 2010
DEPARTMENTS
2 | Editor's Quoin
The Future of this Journal
3 | Email and Letters
The fate of history in New York State and
other fables of note.
6 | War Leader Profile
Nathan Towson, Baltimore Hero
14-15 | The Documents
Key's “Real” Star-Spangled Banner
16 | Visit 1812
Fort Walburton, Maryland
24 | War of 1812 Chronology
Maryland and the War of 1812
25 | War of 1812 Calendar of Events
Late Summer (August to October)
28 | Subscription Form
A unique Christmas Surprise
NEXT ISSUE: The Battle of Lake Erie
FEATURES
4-5 | FOURTEENTH NATIONAL WAR OF 1812
SYMPOSIUM, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
The schedule, the topics and the speakers
featured at the Maryland Historical Society on
October 2, 2010
7-13 | PROVIDENCE . . . OF THE LONGEST
CANNON (PART I)
by John A. Tures
An examination of the theories behind American
sea victories during the War of 1812
17-23 | A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE NEW YORK
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1813
by Harvey Sturm
Republicans and Federalists battle at the ballot
box in the midst of war
NEWS OF INTEREST AND MORE
3 | The Latest News from Maryland
23 | Great Lakes Hold Planning Meeting
26 | Book Reviews:
Fredriksen, The War of 1812 in Person
Elliott, Strange Fatality: Battle of Stoney Creek
27 | What you should know about the 1814
Washington – Baltimore Campaigns
COVER PHOTO: British Major General Robert Ross: The “Joint Service” Raider
EDITOR'S QUOIN
THE FUTURE OF THE JOURNAL
Deep within the curriculum at the Columbia
University School of Journalism there is an old
adage that holds a news source, itself, should
NEVER be the story. Well, never having attended
that premier institution, your Editor and the
Consortium will make “news” and be thankful
for it.
Our Journal is a small publication by any
measure, and as a result we struggle to make a
profit or even to break even. Thank goodness we
are all volunteers. The present production costs,
postage rates, advertising programs, subscription
solicitations, and even personal entreaties cannot
sustain the Journal. It became clear within the
last six months that something would have to
give.
Members of the production staff (such as it is)
have engaged in wide ranging and hopefully
useful discussions regarding how to proceed.
The primary purpose of this Journal was always
to be a service to the War of 1812 enthusiast and
to
provide thoughtful,
even scholarly,
examinations of the War, its causes and effects on
the American story. In recent years we have
expanded the scope of the Journal to demonstrate
that the war was indeed a national effort. Too, our
co-belligerents north of the international border
and across the Atlantic have many useful insights
and activities that should be honored and
remembered.
Nonetheless,
during
this
enlargement of the Journal's scope, we have been
and will continue to be true to those original
basic purposes.
This issue is the last one to be shipped from a
Baltimore address. There will be no change in
the format or scope for now, but as the
Bicentennial gets ever closer the Consortium will
undertake three mutually supporting production
goals.
First, has been mentioned. Without raising
subscription rates, the costs of printing and
mailing cannot be sustained. The July issue will
be printed and mailed in Baltimore. Funds to
support this are on hand and/or pledged. The
postal shipping point will shift to Florida by
October. Options will be examined to decrease
the cost of printing.
Second, an advertising campaign now in
development will focus on expanding the
subscription base and increasing the advertising
space in the Journal. Look forward to more
“exchange advertising” in October and a gradual
increase in revenue-generating ad space
thereafter. This goal, however, would cap ad
space in the present 28 page format to 15-20%
through the Bicentennial period. This is well
below the distribution of space in other profitable
historical journals.
Third, the subscription base for the Journal is a
bit low. A reasonable goal is to build up to
between 500 and 600 individual subscriptions
and we are far from that. We have considered a
on-line publication only, but for now we will
continue to try to meet our customer's preference
for an in-print format. There are sources of
readers and subscribers that have not been fully
engaged. Look for more, many more,
solicitations going to the heritage societies,
teachers and professors of history at both the K12 and university institutions, university and
public libraries, re-enactor groups, the travel and
tourist industry, and others to increase both the
individual subscriptions and, even, point-of-sale
vending.
None of this is going to be easy. The Consortium has
two very good products. One is this Journal. The
other is the annual symposium in Baltimore. Look for
more information about the October 2, 2010,
Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium in
Baltimore at the Maryland Historical Society in this
issue.
In the meantime the Editor hopes readers will enjoy
this issue. Two new authors have provided articles
matching their reputation and experience. Look, too,
for the low-down on a high-society connection
between Italian opera and our Star-Spangled Banner.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 2.
EMAILS & LETTERS TO
THE EDITOR
May 13, 2010: As reported in the last issue of
the Journal, facing an historic fiscal crises, the
State of New York has closed Fort Ontario State
Park for the season. Scheduled events have been
canceled and the historical artifacts there are
being moved for safe-keeping. The Fort is one of
six historic sites and eighteen parks in the Central
Region administered by the New York Office of
Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation.
New inquires regarding the status of the park can
be referred to state officials at 1.518.486.1868.
June 25, 2010: Although he expressed pessimism
at the lack of political will and money to
commemorate the War in a May 15, 2010 letter,
our outpost picket from Buffalo, New York, John
Pauly, additionally sent in three articles on War of
1812 commemorative activity from western New
York.
The Buffalo News published on June 1st, 11th,
and 21st, articles on period-dressed Boy Scouts
on parade Memorial Day, 2010, cemetery
commemorations and other related activity in
Cheektowaga, and an educational youth-to-youth
1812 campaign from across the border. The
Journal will follow these activities in the coming
months.
Mr. Pauly also alerted us to the publication of
Jeremy Black's The War of 1812 in the Age of
Napoleon (Norman: University of Oklahoma,
2009) and a recent article in The Backwoodsman
Magazine (May/June 2010). Did you know “The
Legend of Mike Severs”? Well, five dollars, a
gallon of whiskey, and participation in the Battle
of New Orleans will fill you in. Email the Editor
if you want a copy of the article. Our thanks to
Mr. Pauley. He is a good source for leads.
One final Editor's Note on the Bicentennial: It is
easy to get “low” as hopes for a vigorous
bicentennial celebration slip away. Do you think
the fine citizens of Rome in 46 AD celebrated the
bicentennial of their victory in the Third Punic
War?
LATEST NEWS FROM MARYLAND
July 23, 2010: As we go to press, the Dundalk
Eagle ran an article about one of our favorites:
Commodore Joshua Barney. Barney was a
phenomenon. Today historians are seeking to
verify the location of Barney's childhood home.
Local historian, Robert Reyes, County Planner
John McGrain, and the Journal's own,
Christopher George, are at work. At the DundalkPatapsco Neck Historical Society, volunteer
Harry Young sees an increase in local historical
research and interest, too.
Barney was a prominent figure in Maryland and a
much-sought-after target of British ire. His
privateering activities and his command of a
navy-manned battery at Bladensburg simply
boosted that ire.
“Solving the mystery of the exact location of
Barney's Inheritance and presenting a clear
picture of Barney's role in the American
[pageant] is part of an effort to prevent another
old soldier [as General Douglas MacArthur said]
from merely fading away.” (Tad Wayne Taborn
wrote this article for the Dundalk Eagle.)
This and other interesting articles on Maryland
and the War of 1812 are found at the Maryland
War of 1812 Bicentennial Commission website at
<www.starspangled200.org>.
The old Commodore, of course, can be found at
the Allegheny Cemetery in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. He died enroute to Kentucky on
December 10, 1818, from complications related
to the wounds received at the Battle of
Bladensburg.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 3.
Tentative Schedule
Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium
Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, MD
Saturday, October 2, 2010
Talks on the pro-war anti-Federalist riots of the summer of 1812, the Battle of Queenston Heights
(1812), Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory in the Battle of Lake Erie (1813), the 1814
Burning of Washington, D.C. by the British under Major General Robert Ross, and on Andrew
Jackson, the Lafitte Brothers, and the Battle of New Orleans will be among the highlights the
Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium to be held at the Maryland Historical Society in
Baltimore, Saturday, October 2, 2009 from 9:00 AM to 4:15 PM.
9:00 a.m. Introductory Remarks by Martin K. Gordon, Ph.D., adjunct professor of history, University
of Maryland University College.
9:10 a.m. Prof. Don Hickey, “The Anti-Federalist Riots in Baltimore in the Summer of 1812.” Dr.
Hickey is a professor of history at Wayne State College in Wayne, Nebraska. He is the author of Don't
Give Up the Ship!: Myths of the War of 1812 (2006) and The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (2006)
both published by University of Illinois Press.
10:00 a.m. Dr. Tom Kanon, “Andrew Jackson, the Lafittes, and the Battle of New Orleans." Dr. Kanon,
a frequent presenter in this symposium series, is with the Tennessee State Archives. He recently earned
his Ph.D. and is working on a book on Tennessee and the War of 1812.
Baltimore during the War of 1812
10:50 a.m. to 11:10 a.m. Morning break
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 4.
Jean Lafitte of New Orleans
11:10 a.m. Maria Day, “How to Do War of 1812 Research.” Ms. Day, archivist with the Maryland
State Archives, will discuss how to do research in War of 1812 documents at the Archives and other
institutions in the United States and abroad. The presentation should be of interest in those who are
doing research into ancestors who fought in the war as well as to all those interested in the conflict.
Lunch 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m. Catered lunch, featuring roundtable discussions.
1:00 p.m. Richard V. Barbuto, “The Battle of Queenston Heights, October 1812.” Dr. Barbuto is the
author of Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000).
1:50 p.m. Charles Brodine, “Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry and the Battle of Lake Erie, September
10, 1813.” Mr. Brodine, with The Naval History and Heritage Command (formerly the Naval
Historical Center) in Washington, D.C., is the son of a Naval surgeon and holds a graduate degree from
the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill where he has done work on his Ph.D. He is an expert on
shipboard life in the age of fighting ships of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
2:40 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Afternoon break
3:00 p.m. Christopher T. George, “Major General Robert Ross and the Burning of Washington, 1814.”
Mr. George, author of Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay, and co-editor of the
Journal of the War of 1812, is now working on a biography of General Ross with Northern Ireland
author Dr. John McCavitt who lives in Ross’s home village of Rostrevor, County Down.
3:50 p.m. Bicentennial Panel led by Christopher T. George. Mr. George, co-editor of the Journal of
the War of 1812 and a consultant on the Star-Spangled Banner National Historic Trail, and a
distinguished panel will discuss the latest plans to celebrate the upcoming Bicentennial of the War of
1812.
4:15 p.m. Symposium ends.
The Maryland Historical Society is located at 201 W Monument St, Baltimore, MD 21201. For
Directions go to http://www.mdhs.org/about/directions.html. Note: In writing for tickets, please specify
at which speaker’s roundtable you would like to be seated as well as any special dietary needs, if
applicable.
Price is $50.00 per person with checks made out to the War of 1812 Consortium, Inc., and sent to
Charles P. Ives III, 802 Kingston Road, Baltimore, MD 21212. Note: In order to attend payment is due
by September 23, 2010.
The Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium
is co-sponsored by the Council on America's Military Past (CAMP-USA)
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 5.
WAR LEADER PROFILE
NATHAN TOWSON
1784-1854
Nathan Towson was typical of those men of
energy and enterprise that populated the new
nation at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
Born Nathaniel at Towsonton, Maryland, just
north of Baltimore, on January 22, 1784, he was
raised a farmer. He left Maryland intending to
farm in Kentucky but a land title dispute soon
found him in Natchez, Mississippi Territory. With
a yen for military service he joined a volunteer
artillery company and accompanied Louisiana
Territorial Governor, William C. C. Claiborne, to
New Orleans.
By 1805, he had quelled attempted mutinies,
commanded the Natchez Volunteer Artillery, and
finally found himself back in Baltimore County,
Maryland...farming! He didn't last long in the
fields. His reputation earned him a position in
the Maryland Militia and as Adjutant of the 7th
Regiment thereof.
He continued to study
mathematics, honed his artillery skills, and was
soon an advisor to the Governor during one of the
periodic revisions of the state's militia laws.
With foreign tensions rising, on March 15, 1812,
Towson accepted a commission as Captain in the
U.S. Army, and he never looked back. He was
assigned to Colonel Winfield Scott's Second
Regiment of Artillery. Like all young officers of
the day he had some recruiting duty. From the
beginning he was successful, filling out a full
artillery company before moving to join the
Regiment at Mantua (near Philadelphia),
Pennsylvania.
At the beginning of the war he was stationed on
the Niagara Frontier. Success indeed followed
his flag. In his first engagement with a small
volunteer detachment he led forces to capture the
British ship, Caledonia, from under the guns at
Fort Erie. He was breveted to Major for that
exploit.
Later, he and his command fought in nearly every
major encounter on the border: Queenston
Heights, Fort George, Stoney Creek, Lundy's
Lane, Chippewa, Fort Erie. At Fort Erie his
position was called “Towson's Lighthouse”
because of the accuracy and rate of fire of his few
engaged guns.
He rose in rank quickly and by the war's end he
was a Lieutenant Colonel. After the war, Colonel
Towson commanded at Boston and Newport,
Rhode Island, before being appointed Paymaster
of the Army on August 28, 1819. He moved to
Washington.
As the army moved further west onto the Great
Plains, Cantonment Towson was established in
Oklahoma six miles north of the Red River in
1824. Abandoned and reoccupied, the post was
named Fort Towson on February 8, 1832. It was
finally abandoned by the military in June 8, 1854.
The facility became the capital of the Choctaw
Nation in Oklahoma. It was briefly held by the
Confederate Army during the Civil War.
Meanwhile Towson was promoted to Brigadier
General in 1834, and to Major General in 1848
during the Mexican War. Toward the end of his
career perhaps one of his saddest duties was to
chair the Court of Inquiry into the conduct of his
old commander, General Winfield Scott. Scott's
conduct in Mexico was upheld.
Nathan Towson died in Washington, D.C., on
July 20, 1854. His remains are buried on a slope
in Oak Hill Cemetery, Georgetown.
World War II veterans and some of their
descendants may remember the liberty ship
named SS Nathan Towson.
References:
Youmans, Harold W. Captain Nathan Towson: A
Baltimore Hero on the Niagara Frontier, Part I:
The Taking of the Caledonia (1998).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 6.
"The Providence ... of the Longest Cannon"1
(Part I)
by John A. Tures
"Friends, I agree with you in Providence,
but I believe in the Providence of the most
men, the largest purse, and the longest
cannon." Abraham Lincoln.
Dr. John A. Tures is an Associate Professor of
Political Science at LaGrange College, LaGrange,
Georgia2
The Master and Commander Of The Most Cannons
In the 2003 film "Master and Commander," loosely based upon several Napoleonic War era novels by
Patrick O'Brian, the HMS Surprise is ambushed by the French ship Acheron. Though initially
outclassed by the larger vessel, the captain of the British craft wins by tricking his opponents,
disguising his own ship as a harmless whaler. As the French close to capture their prize, they get more
than they bargained for. Ironically, the USS Essex was able to pull off a similar ruse during the War of
1812, disguising itself as a harmless merchantman to get the HMS Alert into range so that its shortrange carronades could take the British ship. Otherwise, the HMS Alert might have otherwise kept its
distance or applied longer-range guns to great advantage.3
Victories by small ships over their larger foes
were fairly rare at the beginning of the
Nineteenth Century, but not unheard of.
Some scholars have assumed that most
victories in War of 1812 battles between the
British and the Americans were due to the
superiority of firepower by the winning ship.
But is this the case? Would such an event
hold up to empirical scrutiny?
This "superior firepower" theory was used to
explain a number of surprising United States
USS Essex takes the HMS Alert
victories in battles between frigates, as well as the overall record of British supremacy in most contests.
In the case of the American successes, noted historians attributed their frigate victories to have a higher
rated ship. Building slightly bigger warships would have made sense for the United States, given that
they faced a "David and Goliath" situation with their British rivals. They needed to give their ships
every advantage, especially for single combat.
1
2
3
This article has attempted to conduct the same unbiased tone called for in Roosevelt's (1882: 5) book, when he said "It
is impossible that errors, both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; and although I have sought to make it in
character as non-partisan as possible, these errors will probably be in favor of the American side" given my reliance
upon more American sources than British accounts. Yet, where possible, I have noted disparities in cannon armaments
throughout his book. Many deal with omissions, noting the size of the ships and the guns they are rated for (Cross,
1960), not how many were actually mounted (Hickey, 2006).
I am indebted to Derek G. Baldridge for some of the data collection and Lisa Crutchfield for additional edits.
Elting, 1995: 74-75.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 7.
In this article, I examine a variety of theories designed to explain those surprising American victories,
as well as flaws in those arguments, presented by noted War of 1812 historian Donald Hickey. I then
move to test an hypothesis derived from his theory of firepower superiority, examining two sets of data
about confrontations between the American and British boats. In general, there is support for this
hypothesis in both examinations.
But among those cases where the weaker ship won or prevented a victory by the stronger side, an
interesting pattern emerges. The exceptions to this rule of "better firepower" involve confrontations on
lakes or in narrow bays, as well as those moments on the open seas where a large ship-of-the-line and
its escorts were unable to catch a lighter craft with fewer guns. These missed opportunities and defeats
forecast a future jump in technology, where the more powerful vessel is less likely to be laden with
guns, and more likely to be protected by armor. It was another "David and Goliath" tale, where the
smaller power sought to neutralize their numerically superior opponent with a stronger ship, of sorts.
Explaining American Upsets?
As the War of 1812 commenced, the British had a high level of confidence about their chance that their
Navy would easily dispatch their American foes. After all, they had pretty much won consistently
against the French, the next strongest military power. What chance did the United States, a second rate
power with a diminutive navy, have against them? But then, the British High Command suffered a
series of stinging defeats at sea. That included the infamous losses of the HMS Guerrière and HMS
Java to the USS Constitution, as well as witnessing the humiliation of the USS United States bringing
the HMS Macedonian back to America as a captured prize. Other setbacks included the HMS Alert (to
the USS Essex) and the HMS Peacock (to the USS Hornet), and the HMS Cyane and HMS Levant to
"Old Ironsides" in a single battle!4 Add to these the British disasters on Lake Erie5 and Lake
Champlain,6 where an entire squadron of stronger ships was lost in both cases, and the British
government was grasping for any answers.
Of course, the British were able to redeem themselves in the 1813 battle between the HMS Shannon
and USS Chesapeake, as well as the capture of several vessels, including the famed USS President, the
USS Essex, and the USS Argus, and a slew of American brigs. But American successes led to years of
British hand-wringing, and debates among historians about the surprising United States success against
the best fleet in the world. And many theories dealt with the quality of the crews that faced each other.
Captain John Carden of the HMS Macedonian blamed the loss of his ship on the belief that the
American ships had special "picked" crews.7 In the meantime, ships like his suffered from having a
lesser crew, the result of his country's greater focus upon the French threat during the Napoleonic Wars.
4
5
6
7
In the final frigate success of the war for the Americans, the USS Constitution captured and defeated the HMS Cyane
(light frigate of 24 guns, mounting 36 guns) and the HMS Levant (a corvette of 18 guns, but mounting more than that).
Both the British ships attacked the Americans at the same time, but were defeated one at a time (Humphreys, 1815;
Roosevelt, 1882: 88, 97 & 100; Toll, 2006: 445-450).
Symonds (2005) labels Perry's fleet a "superior American squadron," but Roosevelt (1882: 99) writes "Perry's force in
guns was 54 to Barclay's 63; yet each presented 34 in broadside."
Roosevelt, 1882: 101; Cross, 1960; Elting, 1995; Hickey, 2006; Toll, 2006: 438.
Hickey, 2006: 103; Toll, 2006: 382-383.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 8.
Captain James Dacres, the luckless leader of the HMS Guerrière, had another theory about the crews.
He and Lieutenant Henry Chads, the surviving senior officer aboard the HMS Java, concluded that the
Americans won because their ships were manned with British deserters, who were more able seamen.8
The argument concludes that only a British sailor could beat a British sailor.
USS Constitution vs. HMS Java
USS United States vs. HMS Macedonian
The British High Command added an additional argument. They felt that the Americans won the naval
confrontations because of England's poor gunnery experience. Given that the United Kingdom had
faced no serious threat since 1805, their crews had "lost their edge." Perhaps a number of them
suspected that the Americans were getting some secret help from the French.
But Hickey pokes holes in their arguments. He points out that the United States Navy hardly had
"picked" crews, given that they had to compete with better paying offers from privateers and the United
States Army, as well as merchant fleets, for the best crew.9 Most British who deserted their ships and
went to the American side preferred shore duty to possible recapture and execution.10
Certainly it would be convenient for the British to assume that the enemy of one's enemy is a friend,
creating a natural alliance between the French and Americans. But France did not directly assist the
United States. Though France did serve as a distraction, forcing the British to keep some of their vast
fleet on guard duty in Europe,11 this should not be seen as a replay of the Revolutionary War, when
many French ships and soldiers fought for the American cause. And while Hickey does agree about the
lack of serious threats to British supremacy in nearly a decade and efforts by admirals to conserve
powder,12 such an explanation fails to account for the victory of the HMS Shannon, which clearly
bested the USS Chesapeake due to the excellent training and gunnery skills demanded by its Captain,
Philip Broke,13 also documented in the excellent History Channel special Battlefield Detectives.
Hickey's Hypothesis: An Explanation Of Victories By Both Sides
In fact, the latter point about the gun crews of cannons and carronades shows a flaw in many of these
8
9
10
11
12
13
Hickey, 2006: 102.
Hickey, 2006: 103-104.
Hickey, 2006: 102-103. In addition, Roosevelt (1882: 66) argues "Like the Constitution, the United States had rid
herself of most of the British subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur‟s remark simply referred to the number of his
American seamen who had been impressed on board British ships…It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an
American victory because there was certain number of Americans in Nelson‟s fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans
were victorious in 1812, because there were a few renegade British on board their ships."
Hickey, 2006: 118-119.
Hickey, 2006: 101.
Elting, 1995; 78; Hickey, 2006: 107. Roosevelt (1882: 68) claims "when the British had been trained for a few years by
such commanders as Broke and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed our best men to equal them."
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 9.
hypotheses, advanced primarily by defeated captains of British frigates. These explanations that focus
upon the crew quality fail to tell the story of English successes on the high seas in a consistent
manner.14 If American ships were manned by "picked crews," teaming with "British deserters, inferior
British gunnery marksmanship, plus French help," how did the British ever win a battle?15 Given that
James' Naval Occurrences (1817)
Hickey's Don't Give Up The Ship (2006)
the record shows (and sometimes overlooks) the quantity and quality of many British victories, each
theory cannot be consistently applied to only those cases where Americans won.16 In other words, we
need a theory that explains all victories on water in the War of 1812, British and American.
Hickey himself provides a simple explanation. It improves upon the belief of "Veritas" that the United
States frigates that won those battles were technically disguised "Ships-of-the-Line," a more powerful
class of warship.17 Hickey torpedoes the disguised "Ship-of-the-Line" myth, pointing out how
undersized their biggest ships were to the 74-gun ships-of-the-line. At best, they resembled the British
14
15
16
17
Roosevelt (1882: 51) chides James, claiming "James' strictures, so far as true, simply show that the average British ship
was very apt to possess comparatively speaking, an incompetent captain or unskillful crew." Clearly, if this were the
case, no British ship could have ever defeated an American vessel, and the historical record and my analysis shows that
these British victories frequently occurred.
James (1817/2004: 13) claims that "it is due to the gallantry of British seamen, and to the honorable character of British
officers, to state that most of the French ships of '44 guns' were larger, and far more numerously manned, than the '38gun frigates' that captured them." Similarly, the American naval propaganda James assails for falsely inflating their foes'
cannon numbers (while minimizing their own firepower) attribute their "upsets" to "undaunted heroism, etc., of the
Yankee sailors (Roosevelt, 1882: 49)." Even Roosevelt (1882: 58-66) frequently devotes too much time to what he
considers the admirable American sailor qualities, which fail to explain U.S. losses. Neither the early American
accounts, nor the British critique, truly offer an unbiased explanation for the victory over, and defeat by, the opposing
power. As Roosevelt (1882: 4) wryly puts it "In short, no full, accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war has ever
been written."
Likewise, Roosevelt (1882: 102) offers several additional theories about American inferiority in confrontations with the
British. One dealt with the quality of guns, which were more likely to burst in combat. The other dealt with the relative
"short weight" of the American shot. We must assume that either these disadvantages were compensated by perceived
British disadvantages in other areas, or the common theme about the number of guns represents a simpler and more
consistent hypothesis to test.
Roosevelt, 1882: 49; Hickey, 2006: 100-101.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 10.
"fifth rate" ships.18 Though two-decked, they still met the technical definition of a frigate (squarerigged, principal ordinance on a single deck).19
Instead, Hickey finds that any advantage would come from larger, thicker hulls, crew size, and more
powerful complement of long guns (24-pounders, as opposed to 18-pounders),20 but most of all, the
number of guns a ship could bring to bear upon its enemy. "The British certainly would have been
justified in claiming that their frigates had been beaten by bigger, more powerful ships. In fact, in
almost every naval engagement in the War of 1812, the more powerful ship won. This was to be
expected and was no disgrace to the loser."21
Of course, Hickey is hardly the only one to make such a suggestion. The assertion that the "bigger
ship" (in terms of size and armaments) won can be traced back to the British reaction to the loss of the
HMS Macedonian, the second frigate to fall to the Americans.22 Additionally, William James
concluded back in 1817 that the superior size of the American ships accounted for their victories. 23 His
work, according to Toll, was an improvement upon that era's American accounts that either ignored this
detail, or even implied that the U.S. ships were actually out-gunned.24
But though it is better known among historians of the War of 1812, James' book has its flaws. First,
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
After the three frigate losses, British Admiral Warren issued special orders prohibiting single frigate combat with the
American frigates, more training, and the creation of a new ship: former 74-gun ships-of-the-line modified to resemble
the size and capabilities of the American ships. Such ships were derisively labeled "mules" by their unhappy British
commanders (Toll, 2006: 383).
Hickey, 2006: 101.
As for the type of cannon, the fact that American ships were sporting 24-pounders did not seem to faze the British ships
mounting 18-pounders. Even though the former fired a larger shot and a longer range, British captains were skeptical of
the bigger guns. At a social occasion before the War of 1812, Captain John Carden lectured Captain Stephen Decatur
about the "dangers of overarming." He told his American counterpart that frigates would be "more effective" with the
18-pounder (Toll, 361). While Carden‟s HMS Macedonian appeared to be faster and more maneuverable than Decatur‟s
USS United States, the latter kept his distance and used the longer-ranged weapon to take apart his opponent from afar
(Toll, 360-365). But the British had been able to use their "inferior" cannons to take foreign ships for years. "The
French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good reason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18pounder‟s (Roosevelt, 1882: 90)." Furthermore, Roosevelt (1882: 93) adds "There had been a strong feeling, especially
in England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in arming a frigate..."
Hickey, 2006: 101.
The loss of the HMS Macedonian generated a wide range of speculation about the "improbable" American victories.
These included a focus upon a common ancestry, the “disguised ship-of-the-line" or "perverted frigate" arguments. A
letter signed "Oceanus" was sent to the Naval Chronicle, criticizing the British government for being unprepared. "The
size and force of the American frigates, with the great number of men they carry, were made known to government long
before any difference took place…Why, therefore, did they not provide against the chance of our ships falling a prey to
the enemy, from inferiority of force (Toll, 2006: 371)?" But Roosevelt (1882: 96) takes issue with the claim. "They
[American Frigates] were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships; but they were superior to any other frigates afloat."
James (1817/2004: 13) takes a surprisingly dim view of the belief that counting the number of guns alone would decide
the better ship, given his meticulous notes on the subject (James 1817/2004: 7). He concludes that the number of crew
may matter more for manning guns, especially when the pair grapple (James 1817/2004: 7). Roosevelt dismisses this,
pointing out how in battle, more crew do not decide the outcome, unless there is hand-to-hand combat. "The Guerrière
undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor Java would have benefited by the
presence of a hundred additional men (Roosevelt, 1882: 105)." Even then, the larger crew of the USS Chesapeake (by
50 men) did not defeat the HMS Shannon when the two locked horns, owing to the latter's greater discipline (Roosevelt,
1882: 105). All a larger crew does is create more casualties, concludes Roosevelt (1882: 105-106), even though he
makes a point of counting crew members.
Toll, 2006: 461.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 11.
Theodore Roosevelt picks apart many of James' statistics, even as he maintains the central thesis that
the stronger American ships won.25 Too often, James' account does its utmost to adopt the British
side.26 Second, in his attempt to explain away American successes, he adopts arguments, such as the
number of British deserters serving on ships of the United States, refuted effectively by Roosevelt and
Hickey.27 Third, as noted earlier, there is no unified theory of naval success in the War of 1812, at least
as plainly (and effectively) laid out as Hickey's thesis: the stronger ship usually won, regardless of
whether the ship was British or American.28
One may ask "why bother testing such an argument?" After all, it seems logical that the ship with more
guns can bring more firepower to bear against one's opponent, have more guns in reserve in case
several are knocked out, and can more easily cope with a pair of smaller attackers, who might
otherwise outmaneuver the single ship. But not everyone felt that such a disparity was a shortcoming,
when it came to battle.29 Early accounts by Americans indicate a belief that they had prevailed against
superior firepower. And the British felt confident that their ships could defeat larger enemies, based
upon their prior battles with the French. In each of the three frigate losses, the British ship charged into
battle, rather than retreat or be pursued.30
25
26
27
28
29
30
Toll, 2006: 461.
Toll (2006) tells the tale of William James, arrested in Philadelphia as an "enemy alien" during the War of 1812, who
concluded while detained that the HMS Guerrière must have lost to the USS Constitution because she was a weaker
ship. In addition to erring on the British side, his book's tone takes on a "bitterly sarcastic and deeply malevolent attack"
upon the Americans, hardly the unbiased account to base such a thesis upon, even if its central tenets are supported by
future analyses. After praising its attention to detail, Roosevelt (1882: 4) concluded, "it [James's book] is also a piece of
special pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan." Later, Roosevelt (1882: 46) writes of James "he is
unfortunately afflicted with a hatred toward Americans that amounts to a monomania." Additionally, his book fails to
emphasize the role of many British successes in cases where their ships were stronger.
Roosevelt (1882: 51) rebuts these contentions in witty fashion, noting how frequently it seemed that, if true, British
deserters fought harder for American officers than British seamen for their own officers!
Like Captain Dacres of the HMS Guerrière, Captain Philip Broke of the HMS Shannon issued a challenge to an
American frigate, the USS Chesapeake, listing the number of his guns and men, and a dare to engage in combat (Toll,
404-415). Both ships were relatively equal in the type of cannon they employed, though the British seemed to own a
two-gun advantage. At the same time, the Americans had a small advantage in terms of numbers of crew (Roosevelt,
1882; Toll, 2006: 409). Though criticized by some historians, the crew of the American ship fought valiantly (casualties
were high on both sides), but suffered "bad luck," as well as the better-trained gun crews of the British frigate
(Roosevelt, 1882; Toll, 2006: 416). Such a victory would have been inexplicable by earlier accounts about American
crews, British crews, disguised ships-of-the line, or any other excuse offered by defeated captains and historians. But
this great British victory fits quite well with the superior ship hypothesis.
Even after these early defeats, the British did not immediately assume that the ship with bigger armament was
necessarily superior. "It remained an article of faith among naval officer that a 38-gun English frigate, as the Naval
Chronicle put it, 'should undoubtedly (barring extraordinary accidents) cope successfully with a 44-gun ship of any
nation (Toll, 2006: 369).'" James' (1817/2004: 13) accounts of the British 38-gun warships beating the 44-gun French
frigates must also be observed as a rationale for this belief that inferior armament was not of primary concern to the
British, based upon these past successes in the Napoleonic wars.
When the British charged into battle, they did not see the disparity in cannons, either in number or in quality, as a
disadvantage. Captain Dacres of the HMS Guerrière flew a banner stating “Not the „Little Belt,‟” after the previous
incident where the USS President (frigate) opened fire upon the smaller British sloop, the HMS Little Belt. He issued a
challenge to American frigates, listing his ship as possessing 44 guns, for a social tête-à-tête. He predicted his crew
would capture the USS Constitution in less than half an hour, moved to attack the American ship, and prepared a victory
drink for the occasion (Toll, 2006: 348). He even responded, with the benefit of hindsight, that “I‟d do it again” if given
the chance to reenact the battle (Toll, 2006: 369). The HMS Macedonian moved against the USS United States (Toll,
2006: 360-361). The battle of HMS Java and the USS Constitution followed the form of the prior frigate battles.
Despite having fewer guns (a 38-gun ship, mounting 47 against a ship with more than 50 guns), a relatively
inexperienced crew, and a faster ship, the British ship closed for battle with the American frigate (Toll, 2006: 375-379).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 12.
As Hickey has noted, a lot of "myths" exist about the War of 1812. 31 When subjected to greater
scrutiny, support for more than a few of them begins to unravel. One should not take the relationship
between firepower and victory for granted. Additionally, interesting lessons may emerge from the
study by analyzing the exceptions to the rule, which could foreshadow events decades into the future.
In the next half of this paper, I put this hypothesis to the test for the War of 1812, analyzing the
connection between a ship's armaments and whether it prevailed in battle.
Bibliography
Cross, Wilbur, Naval Battles and Heroes (New York, NY: American Heritage/Golden Press, 1960).
Hickey, Donald R., Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812 (Urbana & Chicago, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 2006).
History Channel, "Battlefield Detectives: The War of 1812, The Chesapeake and the Shannon, " DVD,
2005.
Humphreys, Assheton, The USS Constitution's Finest Fight: The Journal of Acting Chaplain Assheton
Humphreys, USN, ed. Tyrone G. Martin (Mt. Pleasant, SC: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of
America, Inc., 1815/2000).
James, William, Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War
Between Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812-1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press,
1817/2004).
Roosevelt, Theodore, The Naval War of 1812: Or, The History of the United States Navy During the
Last War with Great Britain, to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans (New
York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1882).
Symonds, Craig L., Decision at Sea (Oxford: University Press, 2005).
Toll, Ian W., Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York, NY: Norton
Publishers, 2006).
Whipple, A.B.C., The Seafarers: Fighting Sail (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1978).
Editor's Note: Professor Tures' article will
conclude in the next issue of the Journal of the
War of 1812.
24-Pound Cannon
31
Despite the death of Captain Lambert during the battle, the HMS Java did have its chances, but ultimately succumbed
(Toll, 2006: 375-379).
There are so many myths about these unexpected American successes that have yet to be tested. After the loss of the
HMS Macedonian, speculation on the rationale for the defeats ran rampant, including the belief that Americans had used
special cartridges, firing lock, training, and practice (Toll, 2006: 369-370).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 13.
The Documents
KEY'S “REAL” STAR-SPANGLED BANNER
On February 17, 1904, Madama Butterfly, Italian-native Giacomo Puccini's opera premiered at La Scala,
in Milan. It was one of his best works and very popular down through the years. In 1960, the Star
Spangled Banner was played to introduce the American competitors at the Quadrennial Olympics held in
Rome, Italy. Thousands of Italians believed then, and probably believe today, that the United States took
its national anthem from Puccini's opera. Yes, in the 1904 production Puccini had included a musical
passage from the Star Spangled Banner in his score.
This and literally thousands of other stories appear in a now rare book in the Editor's library. The
National Park Service commissioned Dr. George J. Svejda to assemble a monumental History of the Star
Spangled Banner from 1814 to the Present (Washington, D.C, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1969). It's
525 8 ½ x 11-inch pages are full of such stories. Here is Key's Star Spangled Banner:
O! say can you see by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming,
Whose broad stripes and bright stars through the perilous fight,
O'er the ramparts we watched, were so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there;
O! say does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?
Francis Scott Key
On the shore, dimly seen through the mists of the deep,
Where the foe's haughty host in dread silence reposes,
What is that which the breeze, o'er the towering steep,
As it fitfully blows, half conceals, half discloses?
Now it catches the gleam of the morning's first beam,
In full glory reflected now shines in the stream:
'Tis the star-spangled banner, O! long may it wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.
Key's Original Manuscript
And where is that band who so vauntingly swore
That the havoc of war and the battle's confusion,
A home and a country should leave us no more!
Their blood has washed out their foul footsteps' pollution.
No refuge could save the hireling and slave
From the terror of flight, or the gloom of the grave:
And the star-spangled banner in triumph doth wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 14.
O! thus be it ever, when freemen shall stand
Between their loved home and the war's desolation!
Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation.
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto: "In God is our trust."
And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave!
Key Observing the Battle
What few know is the fifth stanza was actually written during the Civil War in 1861 by poet Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr. He, the father of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the American jurist, was an ardent
unionist. This stanza appeared in songbooks of the era and to the present day. It is often not attributed to
Holmes by the publishers.
When our land is illumined with liberty's smile,
If a foe from within strikes a blow at her glory,
Down, down with the traitor that tries to defile
The flag of the stars, and the page of her story!
By the millions unchained,
Who their birthright have gained
We will keep her bright blazon forever unstained;
And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave,
While the land of the free is the home of the brave.
Oliver Wendall Homes, Sr.
Editor: This is the same Holmes that wrote the poem “Old Ironsides” that saved the USS Constitution
from the wrecker's hammers in 1830. If you wanted one of the U.S. pennies that thousands of school
children were said to contribute in order to save the ship, be prepared to pay today between $30 and $175
depending on the condition.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 15.
VISIT1812
SEARCHING FOR FORT WARBURTON.
MARYLAND
was renamed Fort Washington, and is now part of
the National Park System. The new fort has had
a long and proud service to the Nation. It is
worth a visit.
In 1807 the capital of the United States was
practically undefended. Relations with Great
Britain was in a slow decline and would
inevitably lead to war. As part of the response to
the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, the nation
embarked on a coastal defense program. In 1808
on the Potomac River's Maryland shore upriver
and across from Mount Vernon, Fort Warburton
began its short life. On December 1, 1809, it was
finished.
Perpendicular earthen walls stood 14 feet above
the bottom of the ditch that surrounded the river
side of the fort. A tower facing the river mounted
six cannon.
In August, 1814, British forces landed at
Benedict, Maryland, routed American forces at
Bladensburg, and entered Washington. The
burning began: the Capitol, the president's palace,
and most other government buildings were
torched.
The next day British warships sailed up the
Potomac heading for Alexandria. In face of
certain destruction of the fort, Captain Samuel T.
Dyson chose to evacuate his men, used the
powder to blow up the fort, and withdrew without
a fight. By November 1814 Dyson had been
dismissed from service.
Within a month a new fort began to rise from the
ashes. Famed engineer, Charles L'Enfant, was
contracted to undertake the work. He never
completed the task. His plans were incomplete
and the old fort was perhaps improperly cleared.
Words were exchanged, insults imagined, and
finally Acting Secretary of War, James Monroe,
removed L'Enfant. He was replaced by U.S.
Army Lt. Colonel Walker Keith Armistead, the
brother of George, the defender of Fort McHenry.
By October 1824 the new fort was ready. So was
it's new name. Don't look for Fort Walburton; it
Fort Walburton, Md., 1808-1814
This past April your Editor re-visited Fort
Washington. There were the same serene and
quiet views, some new and interesting
associations and programs, and memories! One
can almost see Captain Gordon's ships beating
against the current as they moved on Alexandria.
Fort Washington lies in the Maryland, south of
Washington, D.C. From the Capital Beltway (I95/495) follow the signs to Exit 3 (Indian Head
Highway/Md. 210 S). From Md. 210, turn right
onto Fort Washington Road to the park. There is
no public transportation to the park.
There are some inherent dangers when visiting
period forts. Visitors are asked to avoid parapets
and climbing on the batteries Pets should be
leashed and under control. Plants and native
wildflowers should be undisturbed. From the
parking lots paved and unpaved foot trails lead to
the Visitor's Center and batteries. There are
telephones, picnic tables and restrooms on site.
For more information see the National Park
Service website at <www.nps.gov/fowa> or call
301.763.4600.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 16.
A House Divided: The New York Gubernatorial Election of 1813
(Part I)
by
Harvey Strum
The War of 1812 bitterly divided New Yorkers and the 1813 elections for governor
and state legislature demonstrated this split in public opinion. While Republican
Governor Daniel Tompkins won re-election, his majority dropped by half
compared to 1810 and the Federalists retained a majority in the Assembly. The
issues raised in the 1813 campaign were a good reflection of the political divisions in the state in
the middle of the War of 1812 and how the Federalists and Republicans used the issues they
believed would bring victory.
Against the backdrop of the 1813 campaign internal issues led to bitter conflict within the Republican
and Federalist parties in New York. The Federalists fought over political spoils and their alliance with
De Witt Clinton in the 1812 presidential race. They argued over the gubernatorial nomination.
Ironically, Clinton’s presidential bid in 1812 brought him national attention, but the results destroyed
him politically in New York for the duration of the war. His political enemies within the Republican
Party supported James Madison and used their support of the President to undermine Clinton’s political
base. Many of his allies in the Republican Party also deserted him in 1813 and dropped him from the
1813 ticket as lieutenant governor. Clinton’s alliance with the Federalists and his attempt to sabotage
the reelection of Tompkins destroyed his leadership role in the Republican Party. Tompkins replaced
Clinton as the leader of New York Republicans for the remainder of the war. Ironically, while
Tompkins’ public support actually declined in 1813 his position within the Republican Party was
strengthened by the bungling opposition of De Witt Clinton to Tompkins reelection and by Clinton’s
continued flirtation with the Federalists.1
1
The most recent in depth studies of De Witt Clinton only briefly mention the 1813 elections. See Steven Siry, De Witt
Clinton and American Political Economy: Sectionalism, Politics and Republican Ideology, 1787-1828 (New York,
1990), 191, 195 and Evan Cornog, The Birth of Empire: De Witt Clinton and the American Experience (New York,
1998), 102-03. Other works that cover aspects of Clinton’s career include Craig Hanyan with Mary Hanyan, De Witt
Clinton and the Rise of the People’s Men (Montreal and Kingston, 1996) and Craig Hanyan, De Witt Clinton: Years of
Molding, 1769-1807 (New York, 1988). The most recent survey of New York history does not mention the 1813 election
and only briefly discusses the War of 1812, See Milton Klein, editor, The Empire State: A History of New York (Ithaca,
2001), 271-3, 296-99.
For a more detailed analysis of the political impact of the War of 1812 on New York see this author’s articles,
―New York Federalists and Opposition to the War of 1812,‖ World Affairs 142 (Winter, 1980), 169-187; ―New York’s
Antiwar Campaign,‖ Peace and Change 8 (September, 1982), 7-18, and my doctoral dissertation, ―New York and the
War of 1812‖ (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1978). For a brief summary, see my entry on New York in David and
Jeanne Heidler, eds., Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, 1997), 382-383. For another study of New York
during the war see Allan Everett, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley (Syracuse, 1981).
Other state studies that emphasize politics include: Frank Cassell, ―The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,― Maryland
Historical Magazine 70 (Fall, 1975), 241-259; Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 (Lexington, 1970);
James Broussard, The Southern Federalists, 1800-1816 (Baton Rouge, 1978); James Banner, Jr., To the Hartford
Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, 1970); Victor
Sapio, ―Maryland’s Federalist Period, 1808-1812,‖ Maryland Historical Quarterly 64 (Spring, 1969), 1-17; Edward
Bryan, ―Patterns of Dissent: Vermont’s Opposition to the War of 1812,‖ Vermont History 60 (1972), 10-27. Also see this
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 17.
As the 1813 election campaign began several issues divided Federalists. Some party members objected
to nominating Stephen Van Rensselaer for Governor because as a major general he ordered the militia
to invade Canada in October 1812. Others favored the candidacy of the Speaker of the Assembly,
Jutsen R. Van Rensselaer. Any support for the war effort was too much for some Federalists. After
three lean years in opposition, the Federalists obtained a majority on the Council of Appointment.
They began a wholesale removal of Republicans. Party leaders, however, felt obligated to retain De
Witt Clinton as Mayor of New York City because of Clintonian support in the 1812 congressional
elections. As William Price observed ―the Clintonians‖ in New York City ―are our men.‖ Peter W.
Radcliff objected because he wanted his brother, Jacob Radcliff, Mayor in 1810, to get the
appointment. Backed by Hugh Maxwell, Gulian Verplanck, John Anton and other young Federalists in
New York City, the dissidents held a public meeting demanding Clinton’s removal, because ―many of
them wanted their [the Clintonians] offices.‖ Supporters of Radcliff and younger Federalists wanted
Clinton and his allies removed so they could obtain the political appointments held by Clintonian
Republicans. By failing to reappoint Radcliff, party leaders endangered their chances of carrying New
York City, because Radcliff had ―more personal influence with the lower class of voters than any other‖
Federalist. Clinton’s retention antagonized the most active campaign workers and orators in New York
City Federalist ranks.2
author’s articles on New Jersey and Rhode Island: ―New Jersey Politics and the War of 1812,‖ New Jersey History 105
(Fall/Winter, 1987), 37-69; ―Rhode Island and the War of 1812,‖ Rhode Island History 50 (February, 1992), 23-32;
Myron Wehjte, ―Opposition in Virginia to the War of 1812,‖ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 78 (1970), 6586; Reginald Horsman ―Nantucket’s peace treaty with England in 1814,‖ New England Quarterly 54 (1981), 180-98;
Donald Yacovone, ―Connecticut Against the Tide: Federalism and the War of 1812,‖ Connecticut Historical Society
Bulletin 40 (1975), 1-7; and John Talmadge, ―Georgia’s Federal Press and the War of 1812,‖ Journal of Southern History
19 (1953), 488-500.
2
William Price to James Clapp, December 13, 1812, Kernan Family Papers, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.; Abraham
Van Vechten to Harmanus Bleecker, December 26, 1812, Van Vechten Papers, Albany Institute of History and Art.
Albany, New York (AI); Solomon Van Rensselaer to Rufus King, October 22, 1812, February 12, 1813, William
Henderson to Rufus King, February 21, 1813, Rufus King Papers, New York Historical Society, New York City (NYHS); Herman Knickerbocker to Harmanus Bleecker, January 19, 1813, Harmanus Bleecker Papers, Manuscripts
Division, New York State Library Albany, N.Y. (NYSL); Russell Atwater to David Parish, February 25, 1813, Box 17,
Thomas B. Benedict to Davis Parish, April 15, 1813, Box 20, Parish Rosseel Papers, St. Lawrence University; Ambrose
Spencer to William Jones, March 8, 1813, Msc. Autographs, Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City (Morgan);
Binghamton Political Olio, June 1, 1813; Robert Troup to Abraham Van Vechten, April 20, 1813, Abraham Van Vechten
Correspondence, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (HSP); Oliver Wolcott to Frederick Wolcott,
February 11, 1813, Alice Wolcott Collection, Litchfield Historical Society Litchfield, Ct.; John Rodman to Harmanus
Bleecker, February 15, 1813, published in Harriet Rice, Harmanus Bleecker (Albany, 1924), 56-57; William North to
William Eustis, January 29, 1813, William North Papers, NYSL; James Kent to Moss Kent, February 6, 1813, James
Kent Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (LC); John Rodman to Harmanus Bleecker, January 13, 1813
Harmanus Bleecker Papers, NYSL; Peter Jay to John Jay, February 16, 1813, Jay Papers, Columbia University Library,
New York City (Columbia University); New York Evening Post, December 30, 1812; Lansingburgh Gazette, January,
1813; David B. Ogden to Stephen Van Rensselaer, January 24, 1813, Msc. Mss., David B. Ogden, O, N-YHS.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 18.
DeWitt Clinton
Bungled Opposition to the War
Daniel D. Tompkins
Fully Supported Madison Administration
While younger Federalists and Radcliff supporters expressed dismay Federalist leaders felt obligated to
Clinton. In addition to the political support in New York City by Clintonians, Federalist leaders
remembered his firm stand against anti-Federalist rioting. New York City Federalists feared that
Tammany Republicans wanted to storm Federalist newspaper offices, but Mayor Clinton warned his
fellow Republicans at the beginning of the war that he would arrest anyone who tried to ―suppress
freedom of opinion and expression.‖ Clinton’s strong support for freedom of the press prevented a
repeat of the attacks on Federalist newspaper offices in New York City by Republican stalwarts as
occurred in Baltimore in June 1812 when Republicans stormed the Federal Republican.
Elsewhere, other local disputes split the Federalist Party. A rather divisive dispute developed in
Westchester over the nomination of an Assembly candidate who supported Clintonian Pierre Van
Cortlandt, Jr., for Congress instead of Federalist Richard V. Morris in December 1812. In Albany the
speed and secrecy by which Harmanus Bleecker obtained the Assembly nomination dismayed party
members who complained such tactics has ―disgraced our public meetings for more than fifteen years.‖
The conflict in Albany represented the conflict between younger Federalists from New England and the
older established Dutch leadership. Older Federalists retained control of the party machinery and
determined nominations in New York City and Albany which endangered the chances for the success of
the Federalists in 1813. It revealed a generational conflict among Federalists and in Albany an ethnocultural clash between Dutch and Yankee Federalists. Ethnic conflict got played out in several ways in
New York politics during the early national period not only between parties but within parties as Dutch
and Yankees fought for control of the Federalist Party nominations in Albany and Irish and AngloAmericans fought for control of the Republican Party apparatus in New York City.3
3
De Witt Clinton to the Grand Jury, July, 1812, De Witt Clinton Papers, N-YHS; R.O. Bennett to Harmanus Bleecker,
March 18, 1813, Reel 4, Lloyd Smith Collection, Morristown National Historic Site, Morristown, N.J. (Morristown);
William Jay to Harmanus Bleecker, May 18, 1813, Harmanus Bleecker Papers, NYSL.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 19.
Younger Federalists fought for democratization of the political process. Internally, the younger men
wanted a more open and democratic system of selecting candidates because they felt the older
Federalist political leaders gave lip service to the public nominations of candidates, but preferred to
select nominees behind closed doors and without wide public participation. While older Federalists,
like John Jay, objected to the Republican efforts to court public opinion, younger Federalists shared
with their Republican opponents a belief in reaching out to the public. Younger Federalists expected to
use their commitment to citizen participation against the Republicans and encouraged expressions of
citizen discontent with the war and Republican rule. Federalist young men rejected the deferential
politics of their elders and believed that greater public participation would lead to Federalist victories
as citizens understood the incompetence and danger of continued Republican rule that led to the
disasters of the Embargo and War of 1812.
The 1813 campaign began with a confrontation between Federalists and Republicans in the state
legislature. When Governor Tompkins and Republican legislators proposed resolutions endorsing the
war, the Federalist majority in the Assembly passed resolutions highly critical of the war, Congress and
the President. A deadlock ensued when the Republican majority in the Senate passed pro-war
resolutions and the Assembly anti-war resolutions. Republicans favored loaning the federal
government $500,000 to prosecute the war but the Federalists killed the loan. This debate epitomized
the deep divisions in New York over the War of 1812 and why the Empire State emerged as most
divided state during the war. Meanwhile, in Congress Harmanus Bleecker, Thomas R. Gold and James
Emott railed against the war on the floor of the House. Federalists consistently attacked the war at the
state and federal level and did their best to prevent any aid from New York to assist the Madison
Administration in the prosecution of the war.4
Federalists campaigned against the war and drafting the militia and for states’ rights. ―Are you willing,
that a system of conscriptions shall be adopted which tears the son from his aged parents?‖ Federalists
asked. They approved of the resistance of the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut to
administration requests for the call out of the militia and denounced Governor Tompkins’ compliance.
Using the militia to invade Canada would lead from ―military conscription to military despotism.‖
Like their New England brethren, New York Federalists saw the invasion of Canada as an offensive act
the militia should not participate in and rejoiced at the resistance of Federalist governors in New
England to President Madison.5
Federalists reported soldiers stealing horses, insulting citizens, impressing men on the roads and
beating civilians. When federal troops arrested and force-marched a group of thirteen civilians for
smuggling at Massena, St. Lawrence County, to Sackett’s Harbor, Federalists reported it as ―Rights of
Citizens of…New York trampled underfoot and Constitution violated by…Military officers.‖
4
New York Spectator, April-May, 1813, carried the speeches of Lorillard. See also the New York Evening Post, MarchApril, 1813, and New York Commercial Advertiser, March-April, 1813; William Coleman to Timothy Pickering, March
14, 1813, Reel 30 Timothy Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Ma., (MHS); Gouverneur Morris
to Le Ray de Chaumont, February 24, 1813, Reel 5, Gouverneur Morris Papers, LC; Annals, 12th Cong., 2nd Sess, 18121813, 163-164, 414-417, 475, 587-600, 619-631, 710-747; William North to William Eustis, February 24, 1813, North
Papers, NYSL; Luther Bradish to Harmanus Bleecker, February 19, 1813, Bleecker Papers, Union College, Schenectady,
N.Y.; Peter Jay to Harmanus Bleecker, February 22, 1813, Harmanus Bleecker Papers, NYSL.
5
New York Spectator, March 13, 1813; Albany Gazette, February 1813.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 20.
Furthermore, ―if martial law is thus suffered to usurp civil authority,‖ an editor from Utica warned,
―this war has reduced‖ New Yorkers ―to the condition of Turkish slaves.‖ To a Canadaigua editor ―it
would seem that war is being carried on against our own citizens.‖ These events proved to the
Federalists that the War of 1812 would produce no positive results and might curtail individual liberties
– a reversal of the Federalist position of the 1790s.6
During the campaign Federalists stressed the foolishness of waging a war ―for the protection of British
aliens.‖ Assemblyman Jacob Lorillard of New York City considered ―a war for the protection of
naturalized foreigners…neither just nor expedient.‖ Judge Nathan Ford objected to Americans dying
―to protect…the renegades of any nation.‖
Federalists
also
specifically
assailed
Governor Tompkins for filling ―the most
important offices‖ with ―every needy Irish
patriot.‖ They claimed Tompkins considered
the Irish ―more attached to our country, and
far
more
trustworthy
than
native
7
Americans.‖
This was not the first time Federalists used
anti-Irish rhetoric for political advantage.
Repeatedly, Federalists used anti-Irish
nativism when they believed they might gain
political advantage. They used it extensively,
for example, in the 1807 gubernatorial and
legislative races. Nativism, especially
Anti-Irish sentiment was not restricted the
War of 1812 era.
hostility towards Irish immigrants, was used by New York Federalists long before the campaigns of the
American Republican Party of the 1840s or the American Party (Know Nothings) of the 1850s.
6
New York Spectator, April 7, May 1, 1813; Ogdensburgh Palladium, April 21, 1813 reprinted in Goshen Orange County
Patriot, May 25, 1813; and Utica Patriot story reprinted in Patriot, April 27, 1813; New York Gazette, April 20, 1813;
Canadaigua Ontario Repository, April 30, 1813; New York Commercial Advertiser, April 1813; New York Evening Post,
April 1813; Alexander Richards to General Dearborn, March 16, 1813, Alexander Richards to Colonel Zebulon Pike,
March 21, 1813, Loring Austin to Zebulon Pike, April 2, 1813, Zebulon Pike to Loring Austin, March 25, 1813, Zebulon
Pike to Alexander Richards, March 23, 1813, Zebulon Pike Papers, Oneida County Historical Society, Utica, New York
(UtHI); ―Hampden,‖ Albany Gazette, April 19, 1813; David Parish to Joseph Rosseel, April 21, 1813, Rosseel Parish
Papers, St. Lawrence.
7
―Justice,‖ Canadaigua Ontario Repository, February 2, 1813, Goshen Orange County Patriot, April 27, 1813; Utica
Patriot, reprinted in the Canadaigua Ontario Repository, April 27, 1813; Plattsburgh Northern Herald, April 10, 1813;
William Coleman to David Dagget, May 22, 1813, Dagget Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Ct. (Yale); Binghamton
Patriot, April 13, 1813; Utica Patriot, January 13, 1813; Gouverneur Morris to David Parish, January 5, 1813, Reel 3,
Gouverneur Morris Papers, LC; ―CATO,‖ Goshen Orange County Patriot, October 13, 1812; ―Sentinel,‖ Canadaigua
Ontario Repository, December 15, 1812; Stephen Van Rensselaer to Ebenezer Foote, December 30, 1812, War of 1812
Mss., Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, In.; Rev. J. M. Mason to Abraham Van Vechten, February 27,
1813, Abraham Van Vechten Correspondence, HSP; William Henderson to Rufus King, February 21, 1813, Rufus King
Papers, N-YHS.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 21.
Resentment against the growing political influence of Irish immigrants was well established in New
York during the first two decades of the Nineteenth Century. Within the Republican Party an on going
conflict developed in New York City between Irish and Anglo-American Republicans from 1806-1820
over the growing importance of the Irish in Republican ranks. New York politicians willingly used
ethnicity and race against their opponents and eagerly defined the Irish and African-Americans as the
―other‖ who should remain outside of the political process.8
Did Madison foresee New York City in
flames?
Besides raising their usual charge of French
influence Federalists condemned Tompkins for
―subserviency to the Virginia President.‖ Southern
Republicans hoped the war would impoverish the
North. They would not care if all the seaports north
of Norfolk, Thomas Copley complained, ―were
reduced to ashes, and the Indians massacring and
laying waste our northern frontiers.‖ To counter
Republican charges of secessionism, Federalists
proclaimed their loyalty to the Union. Federalists
argued the war benefited the political interests of the
Virginian President and his political allies that would
bring ruin and destruction on New York. In New
York Federalists used sectionalism and state interests as political tools to sway voters. In private
correspondence between each other and in public speeches Federalists made the same points. 9
Appealing to the fears of voters, Federalists emphasized the cost of the war – $34 in taxes for every
white male over twenty-one. They reminded voters of the thousands of men ―most of them of the
middle and lower class‖ who had to leave their homes to serve in the militia for no useful purpose.
When Republicans tried to promote hostility between Stephen Van Rensselaer and his tenants
Federalists countered by describing Van Rensselaer as a ―mild, liberal and indulgent landlord.‖ As
voters went to the polls, Federalists warned them voting Republican meant voting for ―WAR—Large
Standing Armies—Conscription, Martial Law—Loans—Taxes—Destruction of Commerce and loss of
morale.‖ Responding to Republican charges, Federalists used the class issue against their enemies. 10
8
See this author’s article; ―Federalist Hibernaphobes in New York, 1807,‖ Eire-Ireland 16 (1981), 7-13; Dale Knobel,
America for the Americans: The Nativist Movement in the United States (New York, 1996), 294. Knobel believes that
―historians often overlook the presence of proto-nativism before 1820.‖ Actually, nativism was alive and well in New
York politics and used both by Federalists and anti-Clinton Republicans in New York City.
9
Gouverneur Morris to Harrison G. Otis, April 3, 29, 1813, Gouverneur Morris to Josiah Quincy, May 15, 1813;
Gouverneur Morris to Robert Oliver, February 13, 1813, Reel 3, Gouverneur Morris Papers, LC; Thomas Copley to
Stephen Van Rensselaer, April 10, 1813, Thomas Cooper Single Accessions, #1837, NYSL; Issac Ely, Oration (New
York, 1813) Clement Clark Moore, A Sketch of Our Political Condition (New York, 1813).
10
New York Evening Post, March-April, 1813; New York Commercial Advertiser, March-April, 1813; Buffalo Gazette,
April, 1813; Albany Gazette, February-April, 1813; Lansingburgh Gazette, January-April, 1813.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 22.
During the spring of 1813 rumors spread of possible peace overtures. Federalists hoped it might lead to
peace. Frustrated at the continuation of the war, feminist Susan Sedgwick scolded Congressman
Bleecker, ―you men…suffer your Poor countrymen to fall victims to British Cannon, and‖ however, ―if
you had a few women among you they would very soon settle the matter.‖ While the Federalists hoped
for peace they distrusted the news of a peace mission. ―We caution our readers,‖ warned the editors of
the New York Gazette, ―against giving too much credit to these rumors, as the object of those in power,
is to influence the election.‖11
END OF PART I
Harvey Strum is a professor of history and political science at the Sage College at Albany, and also
teaches for Empire State and Excelsior colleges.. He has written extensively on the politics of the War
of 1812 in New York, New Jersey and Rhode Island. His other research area include the American
reaction to the Great Famine in Ireland and American Jewish history. He is co-president of the Jewish
Historical Society of Northeastern New York and on the executive councils of the New York State and
Northeastern political science associations. His most recent publication is ―A Jersey Ship for Ireland,‖
chapter 1, in David Valone, ed, Ireland's Great Hunger, Vol. 2, 2010.
Great Lakes Hold Planning Meeting
On June 18, 2010, the War of 1812 Bicentennial representatives from eight states, one province, and
the Canadian government gathered at the Dossin Great Lakes Museum on picturesque Belle Isle in the
middle of the Detroit River to build a collaborative regional planning group. Hosted by the Michigan
Commission on the Commemoration of the Bicentennial of the War of 1812, the gathering drew over
50 participants from more than 30 organizations, associations, and historic sites. The name of the Great
Lakes War of 1812 Bicentennial Collaborative was adopted. The Collaborative decided to use
www.visit1812.com for event scheduling. They agreed to meet again to continue the dialog on Friday,
October 1, 2010 at the Perry's Victory & International Peace Monument. On Saturday June 19 a tour
took attendees to key Detroit area 1812 historic sites. For a copy of the meeting summary, visit
www.michigan.gov/war1812. Questions? Please email Jim McConnell at [email protected].
11
Susan Sedgwick to Harmanus Bleecker, December 4, 1812, Reel 50, Morristown; Thomas Cooper to Stephen Van
Rensselaer, April 10, 1813, Thomas Cooper Single Accessions, #1837, NYSL; Killian K. Van Rensselaer to James
Bayard, April 17, 1813, James Bayard to Killian K. Van Rensselaer, April 24, 1813, Reel 1, James Bayard Papers, LC;
New York Gazette, April 14, 1813; New York Spectator, April 3, 1813; New York Evening Post, March, 1813; New
York Commercial Advertiser, March-April, 1813; Anna Payne to John H. Payne, March 17, 1813, Payne Collection,
Columbia University; Jonathan Ogden to Robert Ogden, April 27, 1813, Jonathan Ogden to H & B, April 21, 1813,
Jonathan Ogden to Robert Ogden, May 1, 1813, Jonathan Ogden to H & B, March 18, 1813, Jonathan Ogden
Letterbook, 1810-16, N-YHS; Joseph Rosseel to David Parish, April 30, 1813, Parish Rosseel Papers, St. Lawrence.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 23.
MARYLAND AND THE WAR OF 1812
CHRONOLOGY
Your Editor has seen many different chronologies of
the War of 1812 in Maryland and hopes this summary
outlines the major events. There is detailed and
widely diverse literature on the War in this state and
many more locally important dates can emerge for the
diligent researcher.
Events in 1812:
Apr 15: Maryland's militia quota for U.S. Army
service is 6,000 men
Jun 22: Pro-war Republicans attack Federalist
dissenters in Baltimore
Nov 27: Great Britain blockades Delaware and
Chesapeake Bays
Nov 23: Privateer Rossie (J. Barney, commanding)
completes successful voyage
Events in 1813:
Feb 4: Royal Navy arrives in Chesapeake Bay
Mar 3: George Cockburn arrives on Chesapeake Bay
Mar 12: MG Samuel Smith ordered to prepare the
Maryland militia for defense of Baltimore
Apr 01: Commerce raids begin in Chesapeake Bay
Apr 16: Cockburn's squadron demonstrates before
Baltimore
Apr 23: British forces occupy Specutie Island in
Chesapeake Bay
Apr 29: Frenchtown burned
Apr 29: Militia and British Marines clash near Elkton,
Maryland
May 3: British raid and burn Havre de Grace,
Maryland
May 5-6: Georgetown and Fredericktown burned
May 13: U.S. Marine Corps recruiting at No. 2 Fell's
Point Market
Jun 27: Armistead ordered to command at Ft
McHenry, Baltimore, Maryland
Aug 10: Mary Pickersgill completes Star-Spangled
Banner flag
Events in 1814:
Apr 2: Sir Alexander Cochrane issues proclamation
offering freedom to defecting American slaves
Apr 23: Sir Alexander Cochrane (age 56) celebrates
birthday at war with the U.S.
Apr 22: Sir George Cockburn (age 42) celebrates
birthday
May 12: U.S. Artilleryman Captain Frederick Evans
arrives at Ft. McHenry
May 19: General William H. Winder appointed
Adjutant General of the U.S. Army, to July 2
May 30: U.S. Artillery formations at Ft. McHenry
reorganized within Corps of Artillery
Jun 2: British squadron/troops leave Pauillac, France,
bound for America (Chesapeake Bay)
Jun 7: First Battle of St. Leonard's Creek
Jun 24: British forces depart Azores for Chesapeake
Bay
Jun 26: Second Battle of St. Leonard's Creek
Jul 1: Commodore Joshua Barney called to
Washington
Jul 2: War Department creates Military District No. 10
Jul 4: General William H. Winder named head of
Military District No. 10
Jul 6: Commodore Joshua Barney (age 55) celebrates
birthday
Aug 1: British Major General Robert Ross and Army
depart Bermuda for Chesapeake Bay
Aug 14: British forces arrive at Lynnhaven Bay
Aug 16: British assault forces assemble in
Chesapeake
Aug 18-19: British land near Benedict, Maryland
Aug 18: British Captain Alexander Gordon's squadron
moves up Potomac for Alexandria, VA
Aug 22: Gordon's squadron hit by squall at Maryland
Reach and is delayed
Aug 22: Barney's flotilla destroyed at Pig Point
Aug 23: British army camped at Melwood, near Long
Old Fields, Maryland
Aug 24: Battle of Bladensburg, Maryland
Aug 25: British occupy, then depart Washington
Aug 27: Fort Walburton, Maryland, blown up by
retreating garrison
Aug 28: Alexandria, Virginia, surrenders to Gordon
Aug 31: Gordon ordered to rejoin fleet in Bay
Aug 31: Battle of Caulk's Field; death of Sir Peter
Parker
Sep 12: Battle of North Point (Baltimore)
Sep 13: Bombardment of Fort McHenry, Maryland;
British assault unsuccessful
Sep 15: An ill Major George Armistead turns over
command at Ft. McHenry in Baltimore, Maryland
Sep 22: Armistead receives brevet promotion to LTC
Events in 1815:
Apr 15: Privateer Chasseur (the Pride of Baltimore)
arrives after engagement with St. Lawrence.
Aug 26: Baltimore's Battle Monument dedicated
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 24.
Weekend. Ft. McHenry National Military Park,
2400 E. Fort Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland
21230. Contact Vince Vaise at 401.962.4290.
War of 1812 Events Calendar
August - October 2010
Aug 1-31:
Discover the Battlefield. Chateauguay National
Historic Site of Canada, Howick, Quebec,
Canada. Daily programs on the Battle. Contact
450.829.2003 or [email protected].
Aug 1-31:
Battle of New Orleans Talk (daily at 2:30 pm) at
Chalmette Battlefield, 8606 West St. Bernard
Highway,
Chalmette,
Louisiana.
Call:
504.381.0510.
Aug 4 and 7:
Ghastly Mackinac: Murder, Mystery and
Mayhem. Fort Mackinac, Michigan. Contact
Mackinac Island Visitors Center at 906.847.3328.
Aug 21:
11th Annual Muster on the Tallapoosa. Horseshoe
Bend National Military Park, 11288 Horseshoe
Bend Road, Daviston, Alabama. The Editor,
Journal of the War of 1812, is on the program.
Call 256.234.7111.
Aug 28-29:
Battle of Fort Mims, Fort Mims State Park,
Highway 59 North, Sensaw, AL.
Drilling,
camping, dinner. Sat. and Sun., 9am-5pm.
Contact Dave Saint Germain, 815.544.9315,
[email protected].
Aug 28-29:
1812 Canadian Fencibles Weekend, Fort Henry,
Kingston,
Ontario,
Canada.
Contact
613.542.7388 or visit forthenry.com.
Aug 28-29:
Frontier Skills Weekend. Fort Meigs, Ohio,
29100 W. River Road, Perrysburg, Ohio. Call
419.874.4121 or 1.800.283.8916.
Sep 10-12:
Defenders Day – The Star-Spangled Banner
Sep 17-18:
Fort Willow Depot Historic Site, Barrie, Ontario,
Canada. Looking for 19th century talent. Contact
David J. Brunelle at 705.716.7124 or
[email protected].
Oct 2:
Fourteenth National War of 1812 Symposium,
Maryland Historical Society, 201 W. Monument
Street, Baltimore, Maryland. Contact The War of
1812 Consortium, or this Journal's Editor at
813.671.8852 or [email protected].
Oct 8-10:
Mississinewa 1812, Mississinewa Battlefield,
Marion, Indiana. Largest War of 1812 event in
North America. Juried. Contact coordinators at
1.800.822.1812 or [email protected].
Oct 22-23/29-30:
Garrison Ghost Walk. (Proceeds go to the Old
Northwest Military History Association. Fort
Meigs, Ohio, 29100 W. River Road, Perrysburg,
Ohio. Call 419.874.4121 or 1.800.283.8916.
Oct 23:
Fall Festival (A Visit with Lt. Ostrander, Old Fort
Wayne's Resident Ghost), Old Fort Wayne, 1201
Spy Run Avenue, Fort Wayne, IN. Call:
260.460.4763.
Oct 23:
Walking through Arkansas History. Ft.
McHenry's George Armistead commanded at
Arkansas Post. Program runs 5:30pm to 8:00pm.
Arkansas Post National Memorial, 1741 Old Post
Road, Gillett, AR. Call 870.548.2207.
EVENT SPONSORS:
The Journal of the War of 1812 will list your
event free of charge. For a listing, contact the
Editor at: [email protected]
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 25.
BOOK REVIEWS
Strange Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek,
1813 by James E. Elliott. Quebec, Canada:
Robin Brass Studio, Inc, 2009, 311 pp.,
endnotes, bibliography, index, illustrations,
softcover. Reviewed by Harold W. Youmans.
A night attack on an American bivouac deep in
British territory. Confusion and terror! The
British advance without flints in their muskets.
There was to be no preliminary warning. The
screams of a sentry pierces the night as he is
tomahawked. Surprise is lost, but the attack goes
in. Confusion in the American ranks. Terror as
they try to recover and return fire. The battle may
just be a turning point in America's 1813
campaign in Canada.
That is the backdrop of an exhaustive study by
Canadian author James E. Elliott in Strange
Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek, 1813
(Quebec, Canada: Robin Brass Studio, 2009).
Mr. Elliott does an excellent job pulling the battle
from historical obscurity, placing it within the
context of the larger wartime scene, and detailing
the events of that night and the following day.
The British were reeling; 6,000 Americans had
passed into Upper Canada; the time for timidity
had passed. Here, and no further!
Bringing the story to life, Mr. Elliott examines
primary sources from more than 20 Canadian and
American repositories, bolstered by that many
more period newspapers and 100s of collected
and contemporary documents to describe how the
British were able to “win” at Stoney Creek and
turn back the invasion.
The battle itself was hard-fought by both sides
with a casualty count roughly equal for the
participants. But two American generals, one
wounded, are captured. John Chandler and
William Winder, the rising American stars, are
prisoners. British Brigadier General John Vincent
is injured, dazed and wandering around the
battlefield. American General Henry Dearborn,
past his prime, will soon be gone.
The Battle of Stoney Creek is the story of how
mid-ranked and junior officers take the initiative
on the battlefield. Generals control campaigns;
colonels, majors and captains control battlefields.
Here is the story of how 45 minutes of confusion
and terror can change the face of a battle and, at
the same time, change the face of a campaign.
A good read!.
The War of 1812 In Person: Fifteen Accounts by
United States Army Regulars, Volunteers and
Militiamen by John C. Fredriksen. Jefferson,
North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.,
2010, 324 pp., introduction by Donald R.
Hickey, bibliography, index, illustrations,
softcover. Reviewed by Harold W. Youmans.
John C. Fredriksen continues his decades-long
contribution to the study of the War of 1812 with
his The War of 1812 in Person (Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2010).
This reviewer has always been impressed with
Mr. Fredriksen's ability to place in the reader's
hands more detailed and factual information than
believed possible. Primary sources are the
historian's fuel and this book lights the wonder of
history for every reader.
“Fifteen Accounts” from U.S. Army soldiers
bring the war into perspective. These are the
fighters, mostly officers in their first combat
commands or citizen-soldiers observing the
battlefield from the ground up. They are, in
today's parlance, the “guys” on the front lines,
weapons in hand, almost grasping their enemy's
throat. These are the men who make things
happen on the battlefields.
George McFeely is on the Canadian border at
Fort Niagara and Fort George. Jonathan Kearsley
is at Stoney Creek and Fort Erie. He went on to
Detroit where he served at the city's third mayor.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 26.
William Clay Cumming, from Georgia, serves
along the Georgia-Florida line and on the
Canadian border.
He wrote his father in
Savannah throughout his service. Georgia was a
strong proponent of American war aims.
Private William Greathouse, from Kentucky, is at
the Battle of the Thames. In New Hampshire,
state politics was the major War of 1812 story,
however, Private Charles Fairbanks provides a
“rambling recital of deeply etched personal
experiences.” This is a fitting backdrop to other
New-Hampshire-men-turned-soldiers: Brigadier
Generals Eleazar Wheelock Ripley and James
Miller and Colonel John McNeil. And don't
forget “Private Anonymous,” from Pennsylvania,
who, day-to-day, follows orders and executes on
the ground the military mission of a nation at
war.
Yes, these are fifteen stories from men at war:
the documents, transcribed most often in the
writer's own hand, the diaries, the battle reports,
the facts, the “sources” from which the historic
fabric is woven. Read it, and weave your own
conclusions.
____________________
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
THE 1814 WASHINGTON – BALTIMORE
CAMPAIGNS
At the beginning of the War Baltimore was fast
becoming the nation's third-largest city with a
population of 50,000 by 1815.
The British foreign and military policy to
“chastise the savages” was aimed primarily at the
Chesapeake Bay region in 1814.
The Baltimore merchants outfitted over 100
privateering vessels that took about 1/3 of all
British vessels lost during the War.
It is said that the success of the privateers
unleashed British wrath on Maryland and brought
British fleets to the Bay in both 1813 and 1814.
A contrary view holds that the British were hardpressed in Canada and chose Bay operations to
divert US resources from the northern campaigns.
It was probably both.
Admiral Sir George Cockburn and Major General
Robert Ross were the precursors of the 20th
century “amphibious raiders.”
No other “battle” brought forward the folly of full
reliance on militia defense forces during the War
of 1812 as the encounter at Bladensburg, MD.
The success of the British raid on Washington in
August 1814 was a surprise to both sides.
Ross hoped to replicate the Washington raid at
Baltimore, but discounted Major General Samuel
Smith and the militia he led, and led well.
Before his death near North Point, Ross was
slated to command the New Orleans expedition
later in 1814.
The American defense at Fort McHenry was very
complex in execution. The defenders of the post,
including Major George Armistead, were
Baltimore heroes, but auxiliary posts and
batteries played a much larger role than generally
known.
Approximately 3,000 slaves were enticed by the
British to run away from their masters in
Maryland. Only 300 ended up enlisting in the
British Army.
One side effect of the War, and its attendant
blockade,
was
to
stimulate
industrial
development in the U.S. and at Baltimore. The
city grew to be both a commercial and an
industrial power center.
Some claim that Baltimore, looking and acting
more like Boston or New York commercially,
drew the slave state of Maryland away from
secession in 1861.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 27.
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Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 2, Page 28.
Next Issue of the Journal of the War of 1812:
The Battle of Lake Erie, September 1813
Oliver Hazard Perry shifts his Flag, September 10, 1813
Did you know that the King's West India Regiment rendered the honors at Perry's funeral?
Also next Quarter:
New York State's view of Perry's Victory Centenary (1913)
The Elliott Controversy
Perry's Victory and International Peace Memorial
Send your questions on the Battle of Lake Erie
to the Editor at [email protected]
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