Spring 2012
A Regional Arms Race?
Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory in the Middle East
Rizwan Ladha
In November 2011, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) released a muchanticipated report on the Iranian nuclear
program,1 highlighting the fact that Iran has made
significant progress on research and development
toward a possible nuclear weapons program.
Nonetheless, the report concluded that Iran’s
leaders had yet to make the decision to actively
pursue the bomb.2
Despite this assessment, however, many
world leaders and decision makers have come to
the independent conclusion that Iran is not just
developing the capability, but in fact has made the
political decision, to build a nuclear arsenal. This
judgment is reflected in numerous statements by
heads of state in the Middle East and in the
United States. For example, in a March 2010 press
conference, U.S. President Obama declared: “The
long-term consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran
are unacceptable.” In November 2010, a leaked
diplomatic cable revealed that King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia had privately and repeatedly urged
Rizwan Ladha will be a PhD Candidate at The
Fletcher School beginning September 2012, studying
nuclear nonproliferation and security. He has past
experience at Harvard’s Project on Managing the
Atom and Ploughshares Fund in Washington DC.
During summer 2012, he will intern at Pacific
Northwest National Lab in Seattle. He earned his
graduate degree from The Fletcher School and his
undergraduate degree from Georgia Tech. The views
expressed here are solely his.
the United States to “cut off the head of the
snake” by launching a military strike against
Iran’s nuclear facilities. Similarly, in 2010, the
Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations
declared: “If the
From what is known
Iranian program
about internal Iranian
proves to be a
dynamics, there
military program
. . . [it will] be a
certainly is pressure
threat to . . .
within the bureaucracy
Egypt and to all
to pursue the bomb the countries in
although the evidence
the Arab world.”
that Iran actually has
Certainly, Israel’s
leaders also have
made the unified
been unequivocal
political decision to do
in their rhetoric,
so is inconclusive.
declaring
that
Iran
without
question is pursuing nuclear weapons and that
action must be taken immediately to stop Tehran
3
from doing so.
While these assessments certainly indicate a
genuine fear over the true intentions of the
Iranian nuclear program, they do little to provide
assurances that Iran would be the only state in the
region, aside from Israel, to have nuclear weapons
in the next ten to twenty years. Like the “falling
domino” theory of the Cold War, which was
articulated by then-U.S. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower in April 1954 and which suggested
that Communism would sweep across and
beyond the Soviet sphere of influence, 4 many have
expressed the possibility that a nuclear-armed
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
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al Nakhlah
Iran will spark a nuclear arms race in the region.
This idea is popularly known as the “nuclear
domino” theory.
The notion, however, must be questioned:
Will an Iranian nuclear capability indeed ignite a
regional arms escalation, with other Middle
Eastern states racing to build their own arsenals?
In order to answer this question, this paper will
first explain the basic premise of the Iranian
“nuclear domino” theory. Second, it will articulate
the motivations behind a national nuclear
weapons program. Third, this paper will examine
the motivations, resources and capabilities of key
states in the region. Finally, this paper will put to
the test the nuclear “domino theory” in order to
determine whether an Iranian nuclear bomb will
indeed spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle
East.
THE NUCLEAR DOMINO THEORY EXPLAINED
A multitude of experts and policymakers
have discussed extensively what the implications
of a nuclear-armed Iran would be for the Middle
East. For example, Gerald Steinberg argues that
“if Iran acquires nuclear weapons . . . then Egypt,
Syria, Turkey, Algeria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia
will seek them, too.”5 Similarly, Jeffrey Goldberg
has predicted that an Iranian nuclear bomb would
incite Saudi Arabia and Turkey to seek nuclear
weapons themselves.6 Policymakers tend to agree:
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
predicted in January 2009 that Iran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons would provoke a “nuclear
domino effect” in the region. 7 Most recently,
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned in an
interview that if Iran successfully develops a
nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would
seek the same capability as well.8
These assessments are compelling, but it
must be noted that Israel has been a nucleararmed state for over forty years and has been at
odds with the Arab world, not to mention Iran,
for just as long. Yet it remains the only nuclear
weapons country in the region. Of course, this
phenomenon can be partly explained by Israel’s
proclivity for preemptive unilateral military
strikes on nascent nuclear programs in its
neighborhood, notably on Iraq in 1981 and on
Syria in 2007. Yet this historical record does not
fully account for Israel’s regional nuclear primacy,
and the assessments detailed above do not
satisfactorily explain why countries like Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Turkey would develop nuclear
weapons only now and out of concern over an
Iranian nuclear bomb. A more comprehensive
understanding is needed.
DRIVERS BEHIND A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROGRAM
Certainly, security concerns have been a
primary motivation for states that seek to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability. 9 However, in his
three-pronged theory to explain a state’s desire to
pursue nuclear weapons, 10 Scott Sagan stresses
that in addition to power concerns there are two
key motivations: international prestige and
domestic politics. The prestige argument is that,
like national airlines and Olympic teams, nuclear
weapons can symbolize a country’s greatness, and
therefore its power, to the international
community. After all, it is no coincidence that the
five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council are all nuclear weapons states.
The domestic politics factor argues that internal
factions competing for power within a country
can influence the outcome of a national decisionmaking process on whether or not to pursue the
bomb. For example, contrary to popular belief,
India did not have a united national response to
China’s first nuclear test in 1964. Rather, internal
bureaucracies were divided over whether India
should build a nuclear deterrent on the one hand,
or renounce nuclear weapons and join the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the
other.11
Writing 10 years after Sagan, Joseph
Cirincione12 builds on this basic model and adds
two tactical factors: technology and economics.
He argues that if a nation has the latent
technological capability to produce nuclear
weapons, political leaders are largely unable to
resist doing so. Further, although nuclear
weapons programs certainly are resourceintensive and very costly, proponents of
developing a nuclear weapons capability can and
do argue that they are still more cost-effective
than building up conventional capabilities.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Spring 2012
These five factors, according to Sagan and
Cirincione, interact with each other to inform
policymakers as they deliberate the option to
build the bomb. That is, although they can serve
to motivate countries to pursue nuclear weapons
programs, these factors can also play a role in
persuading nations not to do so. Cirincione
explains:
… states decide not to build nuclear
weapons—or, in some cases, to give up
weapons they have acquired or
programs that they have started—
because they decide that the security
benefits are greater without nuclear
weapons, that prestige is enhanced by
non-nuclear-weapon status, because
domestic politics convinces leaders not
to pursue these programs, or because
the technological and economic barriers
are too significant to overcome.13
The historical record supports this claim. To
give just one example, South Africa, once a
nuclear power with an arsenal of roughly ten
warheads, decided to discontinue and dismantle
its program after Apartheid because it sought the
prestige of being a respected member of the
international community. Other countries’
experiences, including those of Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Belarus, Japan and more, further
corroborate this argument.
Iran’s Drivers
With regard to Iran specifically, if Tehran is
actually pursuing a nuclear weapons capability,
as many actors contend, then most if not all of
these five driving forces can be found in the
Iranian experience. Certainly, Iran must contend
with Israel, a nuclear-armed and ideologically
polarized neighbor in its immediate vicinity.
Additionally, Iran has witnessed a strong U.S.
military presence to its south and its west—in Iraq
and Afghanistan, respectively—for the past 10
years. Further, after being labeled a member of
the “Axis of Evil” triumvirate by George W. Bush
in January 2002, Iran watched as the Saddam
Hussein regime in non-nuclear Iraq was invaded
and then systematically dismantled, while
nuclear-armed North Korea tested nuclear
weapons and attacked South Korean military
ships
with
complete
impunity.
These
developments may have demonstrated to leaders
in Iran that their nation would be safer and less
likely to be invaded if in possession of nuclear
weapons.
In addition, from what is known about
internal Iranian dynamics, there certainly is
pressure within the bureaucracy to pursue the
bomb, although the evidence that Iran actually
has made the unified political decision to do so is
inconclusive. 14 From a prestige perspective, it is
no secret that Iran is actively seeking to become a
regional hegemon, and although Iranian officials
have publicly denounced the linkage between
nuclear weapons and prestige, 15 acquisition of
nuclear weapons will help secure and reinforce
that objective. Iran certainly has the technological
capability to develop a full indigenous nuclear
fuel cycle, as evidenced by the size and depth of
its program thus far. Finally, Iran has invested
significant resources—time, manpower and
money—to acquire this capability,16 arguably at a
significant national cost.
MOTIVATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF KEY
REGIONAL ACTORS
Thus, should Iran actually make the decision
to acquire nuclear weapons—if it has not already
done so—how might the drivers identified above
resonate with other regional actors? Specifically,
how would Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey be
motivated to react to an Iranian bomb, and what
capabilities do they possess?
Saudi Arabia
Overwhelming regional security concerns
drive the Saudi position on Iran’s nuclear
program. In June 2011, Saudi Prince Turki alFaisal declared that an Iranian nuclear bomb
would “compel Saudi Arabia… to pursue policies
which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic
consequences.” An official close to the prince later
clarified his remarks, saying: “If Iran develops a
nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us
and we will have to follow suit.”17 These
statements echoed the private remarks of Saudi
King Abdullah, who claimed in 2008 that if Iran
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
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developed nuclear weapons, “everyone in the
region would do the same, including Saudi
Arabia.”18
In fact, as far back as 2003, Saudi Arabia
launched an internal strategic review to determine
the feasibility of developing nuclear weapons. To
date, an extended deterrence guarantee by the
United States to Saudi Arabia has provided
reassurances that Washington would come to the
aid of Riyadh, should the latter be attacked with
weapons of mass destruction. The strength of that
guarantee may be strained, however. 19 It was also
revealed in 2003 that Saudi Arabia might have
signed a secret agreement with Pakistan, whereby
Islamabad would provide Saudi Arabia with
nuclear weapons technology in exchange for
cheap Saudi oil.20 This suggests that under duress,
Saudi Arabia might decide to buy, rather than
build, a nuclear weapon.21
Saudi Arabia does maintain an interest in
developing
nuclear
energy22—which
it
theoretically could reroute toward a weapons
program—but to date, Riyadh has demonstrated a
desire to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and
spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, which are the
two channels through which a country can
produce a nuclear weapon.23 Nonetheless, Saudi
Arabia might be motivated to develop a nuclear
program to gain regional prestige, 24 and certainly
has the economic resources to develop the
requisite technologies to produce nuclear
weapons. At the very least, it could build a
nascent nuclear program under the ostensible
justification of generating nuclear power to
diversify its domestic energy mix, with the option
to later weaponize.
Egypt
A country with a long and tumultuous
history in the Middle East, Egypt has seen itself
for generations as the cradle of civilization in the
region and a vanguard of the Arab world. An
Egyptian nuclear capability, therefore, would
demonstrate not only its standing in the
international community, but also its greatness as
an Arab power in the Middle East. 25 The country’s
leaders have long recognized this: In 1955 Gamal
Abdel Nasser established the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Commission, charged with developing an
indigenous nuclear infrastructure. Although the
ultimate purpose or objective of that endeavor
was unclear,26 it highlights Egypt’s demonstrated
and long-standing interest in acquiring some form
of domestic nuclear capability.
Nonetheless, since 1980 Egypt’s leaders have
determined that it is largely in the country’s
security interests to forgo the development of
nuclear weapons, and Egypt has become one of
the staunchest supporters of the international
nonproliferation regime in the Middle East.27 Yet a
constant Egyptian complaint in regional or
international arms control discussions concerns
the exclusivist nature of the NPT, since Israel has
nuclear weapons and yet remains outside the
framework of the treaty, all while suffering no
repercussions for doing so. Furthermore, the
potential for an Iranian nuclear bomb has caused
misgivings amongst Egyptian government
officials, as evidenced by recent diplomatic
statements suggesting that if Iran develops a
nuclear bomb, Egypt and other countries in the
region may be forced to follow suit.28
Egypt would likely feel tremendous internal
pressure to respond to an Iranian nuclear bomb
by building one of its own. Brian Katulis and
Peter Juul write that Egypt’s bureaucratic
structures may perceive the acquisition of nuclear
weapons “as a means to enhance their own
domestic power at the expense of rivals, and
Iran’s acquisition of a bomb would give then [sic]
a plausible security rationale to do so.”29
Technologically, Egypt currently has no latent
nuclear capability, and since the departure of
Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, the future of the
country’s investments in nuclear energy is
uncertain. However, Egypt has demonstrated in
the past a strong interest in researching and
developing nuclear technologies and in 2005 was
found to be in violation of its agreements with the
IAEA for doing so.30 Additionally, Egypt has
refused to forgo enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities,31 demonstrating the potential desire
to develop a nuclear weapon should it feel
threatened by Iran. 32
Turkey
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Spring 2012
With a long history of direct confrontation
with Iran, as well as deep-seated border and
territorial disputes with Tehran, Turkey may feel,
after Israel, the most threatened by an Iranian
nuclear bomb. Already within range of Iran’s
ballistic missile capabilities,33 Turkey has in the
past toyed with nuclear weapons research and
development, including a possible one-time
provision of technological assistance to Islamabad
when Pakistan was in the nascent stages of its
own nuclear program.34 Additionally, there has
been sustained pressure within Turkish political
circles to develop a national nuclear weapons
program. Doing so would bring with it the
prestige Turkey continues to seek not only in the
Middle East, but also in Europe.35
However, Turkey’s participation in the NPT
framework and in NATO, as well as the
maintenance of American nuclear weapons on
Turkish soil, have so far kept Ankara in check by
providing Turkey—like Saudi Arabia—with an
extended deterrence commitment on the part of
the United States and NATO should Turkey ever
be attacked.36 Although it would become far more
difficult for the current or any future U.S.
administration to eventually remove those
weapons from Turkey, keeping them close to Iran
provides some assurance that if Tehran does
acquire the bomb, Turkey will not feel the acute
desire to do likewise in order to guarantee its
survival and security.
Nonetheless, Turkey has invested for
decades in a domestic nuclear program, and like
Egypt has indicated in the past its intentions not
to
forgo
enrichment
and
reprocessing
technologies. However, at present it does not
actually have these two particular capabilities, nor
does it possess any functioning nuclear power
reactors.37 Moreover, its past attempts at
developing these capacities have fallen short,
largely for political and economic reasons, 38 and
the current government’s desire to develop an
indigenous nuclear power infrastructure has met
with fierce and sustained domestic resistance. 39
Without these critical capacities, therefore, Turkey
will need to rely on the international community
to provide it with the requisite nuclear fuel to
either generate energy or build a bomb.
CONCLUSION: TESTING THE THEORY
Given the interests and capabilities of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, what will be the future
of the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
bomb? While attempting to predict the future
with any degree of confidence would be an
exercise in futility, not to mention potentially
dangerous, some general insights emerge that
may inform what path the region will take in the
next five to 10 years.
First, it is clear that without the requisite
technologies to create nuclear weapons—namely,
uranium
enrichment
and
spent
fuel
reprocessing—any country would have an
exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, time
building the bomb. This simple fact highlights
again the significant technological complexity of
developing nuclear weapons, the enormous
investment such programs require, and the
magnitude of resources they demand from
national governments. In fact, even if Iran might
be two to three years away from successfully
building a nuclear weapon, any other country in
the region would need at least ten years to catch
up.40
Second, the combination of extended
deterrence guarantees and participation in the
international nonproliferation regime carries a
weight that cannot be overstressed. Even if Saudi
Arabia and Turkey one day develop full-cycle
nuclear power programs with enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities, they will be extremely
reluctant to break out of the NPT framework,
reject the security assurances of the United States
and/or
NATO,
and
develop
nuclear
counterweights to the Iranian bomb. The same
can be said of Egypt.
Third, the historical record indicates that if
Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, other countries
will most likely decide not to do so in response.
After North Korea tested its first nuclear device in
2006 and its second in 2009, neither Japan nor
South Korea—both countries with robust nuclear
power programs and latent nuclear weapons
capabilities—made the political decision to
develop the bomb.41 Similarly, the worst that may
happen in the Middle East is that regional
neighbors would decide to invest further in
domestic nuclear programs, conduct additional
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
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nuclear-related research and development and
it is in the best security interests of the Sunni
continue training nuclear scientists and engineers,
contingent to have its own nuclear capability, in
while they wait and see how the international
order to stabilize the triangular balance of power
community—and the UN Security Council in
in the region. 43
particular—respond to Iran.
In conclusion, the nuclear domino theory
Finally, countries such as Egypt, Saudi
does not hold up well under scrutiny. This
Arabia and Turkey that may feel threatened by an
conclusion should not, however, be conflated
Iranian nuclear bomb
have
nonetheless
with a suggestion that regional players become
demonstrated that the Israeli bomb has not caused
complacent in their desire to prevent an Iranian
regional insecurity and upheaval.42 None of these
nuclear capability. Indeed, a world with only nine
countries has ever made the full-fledged
nuclear weapons states would certainly be safer
commitment to develop nuclear
than a world in which there are ten.
Given the interests
weapons in explicit response to
However,
the
international
Israel’s acquisition in the 1960s.
community’s
automatic
assumption
and capabilities of
There is little reason, then, to
that a nuclear-armed Iran will create
Saudi Arabia, Egypt
conclude that the mere existence
a cascade of proliferation will,
and Turkey, what will
of the Iranian bomb would
paradoxically, convince Tehran’s
be the future of the
incite its neighbors to respond
leaders that it is in the best interests
Middle East should
in kind.
of the country to go nuclear, which
There is one exception to
Iran acquire a nuclear in turn will reinforce the initial
this argument, however. The
assumption. The result, then, may
bomb?
political and social dynamics of
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
the Middle East of the past
century
have
created
a
trifurcated geopolitical environment, in which
The views and opinions expressed in articles are
Arab Sunnis, predominantly Persian Shias and
strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily
Israeli Jews are in constant conflict with each
represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and
other. Therefore, the precise combination of an
Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia
Iranian bomb and an Israeli bomb may ultimately
and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher
persuade one or a number of Arab countries that
School.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Spring 2012
Works Cited
1
International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011,
<http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/bog112011-65.pdf> (accessed February 3, 2012).
2
This report was largely in line with the 2007 United States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which
determined, based on reliable intelligence and evidence, that although Iran was still “keeping open the
option to develop” nuclear weapons, it had deliberately halted its pursuit of those weapons in 2003. See
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Loehrke, “Chain reaction: How the media has misread the IAEA’s report
on Iran,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2011, <http://thebulletin.org/webedition/features/chain-reaction-how-the-media-has-misread-the-iaeas-report-iran> (accessed February 3,
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3
See “Remarks by President Obama and President Sarkozy of France during Joint Press Availability,” The
White House, March 30, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obamaand-president-sarkozy-white-house#transcript> (accessed February 3, 2012); Ross Colvin, “‘Cut off head
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(accessed February 3, 2012); Elaine M. Grossman, “Egypt Plays Key Nonproliferation Role, But Keeps
Nuclear Options Open,” Global Security Newswire, June 10, 2010, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/egyptplays-key-nonproliferation-role-but-keeps-nuclear-options-open/> (accessed February 3, 2012) and
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4
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Service, 1960), 383.
5
Judith S. Yaphe and Charles. D. Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” McNair
Paper 69 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005),
17.
6
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Why Obama Might Save Israel From Nuclear Iran,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2011,
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-08/why-obama-might-save-israel-from-nuclear-iran-jeffreygoldberg.html> (accessed February 3, 2012).
7
David Brunnstrom, “NATO warns of Iran nuclear domino,” Reuters, January 26, 2009,
<http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKTRE50P5AB20090126> (accessed February 3, 2012).
8
“‘Saudis, Egypt will seek nukes if Iran gets them,’” The Jerusalem Post, November 16, 2011,
<http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=245861> (accessed February 3, 2012).
9
The dominant theory throughout the Cold War era was that nations set out to develop nuclear weapons
in response to overwhelming security concerns. The rise of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power was a
reaction to the threat posed by the United States, embodied in the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in
1945. France and the United Kingdom developed their own nuclear weapons in response to the Soviet
Union. China launched its nuclear weapons program under threat of attack by the United States during
the Korean War. Later, India, witnessing China’s first nuclear test, pursued its own nuclear weapons in
response, and Pakistan in turn set out to develop its own weapons once India had acquired the bomb.
10
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,”
International Security 21 (3) (Winter 1996-1997): 54-86.
11
Ultimately, however, it was the combination of security concerns, prestige and domestic political
pressure that pushed India’s leaders to decide to develop nuclear weapons.
12
Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), 47-83.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
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al Nakhlah
13
Ibid, 48.
Patrick Disney, “Is Iran Really After a Nuclear Bomb?” The Atlantic, August 2, 2011,
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/is-iran-really-after-a-nuclear-bomb/242900/>
(accessed February 3, 2012).
15
Ali Akhbar Salehi, Iran’s former Ambassador to the IAEA, once remarked, “I am not among those who
believe that nuclear weapons bring prestige… A country like Iran cannot have prestige by acquiring
nuclear weapons.” Quoted in Michael Friend, “Counterproliferation versus Nonproliferation in the
Middle East after Saddam: Lessons from Iraq and Libya,” in James A. Russell, ed., Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2006), 191.
16
Ibid.
17
Jason Burke, “Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns,” The Guardian,
June 29, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran>
(accessed February 3, 2012).
18
Ray Moseley, “Saudi prince warns Iran on nuclear weapons,” Al Arabiya, June 30, 2011,
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/30/155487.html> (accessed February 3, 2012).
19
Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, “Saudis consider nuclear bomb,” The Guardian, September 18, 2003,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/sep/18/nuclear.saudiarabia> (accessed February 3, 2012).
20
“Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact,” Washington Times, October 21, 2003,
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/oct/21/20031021-112804-8451r/?page=all> (accessed
February 3, 2012).
21
Pervez Hoodbhoy, “What next: A Sunni bomb?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 8, 2011,
<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/what-next-sunni-bomb> (accessed February 3, 2012).
22
“Saudi plans to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030,” Reuters, June 1, 2011,
<http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE75004Q20110601> (accessed February 3, 2012).
23
Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report RL33533
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 4.
24
Glen M. Segell, “Saudi Arabia: The Nuclear Conundrum,” in James A. Russell, ed., Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 135.
25
Brian Katulis and Peter Juul, “Questioning the Conventional Wisdom on a Middle East Nuclear Arms
Race,” Center for American Progress, May 6, 2010,
<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/middle_east_nuclear_race.html/print.html (accessed
February 3, 2012).
26
“Egypt Profile: Nuclear Overview,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2011, <http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/egypt/nuclear/> (accessed February 3, 2012).
27
Ibid.
28
Grossman.
29
Katulis and Juul.
30
International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic
of Egypt: Report by the Director General, GOV/2005/9, February 14, 2005,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/egypt_iaea_gov-2005-9_14feb2005.pdf>
(accessed February 3, 2012).
31
David Albright and Andrea Scheel, “Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East:
Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation,” Institute for Science and International Security,
November 12, 2008, <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis14
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Spring 2012
reports/documents/Unprecedented_Projected_Nuclear_Growth_Middle_East_12Nov2008.pdf> (accessed
February 3, 2012), 3.
32
Tariq Khaitous, “Why Arab leaders worry about Iran's nuclear program,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, May 23, 2008, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/why-arab-leaders-worryabout-irans-nuclear-program> (accessed February 3, 2012).
33
Yaphe and Lutes, 26.
34
Gregory R. Copley, “Turkey exploits ‘window of opportunity,’ moving rapidly to acquire nuclear
weapons,” World Tribune, January 16, 2011, <http://www.worldnewstribune.com/2011/01/16/turkeyexploits-window-of-opportunity-moving-rapidly-to-acquire-nuclear-weapons/> (accessed February 3,
2012).
35
Ibid.
36
Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, “The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2009, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-usnuclear-weapons-turkey> (accessed February 3, 2012).
37
“Turkey Profile: Nuclear Facilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2011, <http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/turkey/facilities/> (accessed February 3, 2012).
38
Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (3)
(Spring/Summer 1997): 33-44.
39
Erisa Dautaj Şenerdem, “Turkish experts split in atomic debate,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 19, 2011,
<http://archive.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-experts-disagree-on-turkeys-nuclear-plansfuture-2011-03-18> (accessed February 3, 2012).
40
Johan Bergenas, “The Nuclear Domino Myth,” Foreign Affairs, August 31, 2010,
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66700> (accessed February 3, 2012).
41
Katulis and Juul.
42
Robert M. Farley, “Not the End of the World As We Know It: Nuclear-Armed Iran and the Mid-East
Balance of Power,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, November 10, 2011,
<http://yalejournal.org/2011/11/nuclear-armed-iran-and-mid-east-balance-of-power/> (accessed February
3, 2012).
43
Khaitous.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
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