Economic Interdependence, Trade and Peace in
South America
Félix E. Martín,
Associate Professor
Department of International Relations, DM 438C
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 348-1858
[email protected]
Working Paper
It should not be quoted without written permission from the author
November 1, 2007
Abstract
Despite the presence of enduring bilateral rivalries, recurrent militarized interstate
disputes, and notoriously violent internal political processes, South American states have
paradoxically avoided a major intra-regional war since the end of the Chaco War in 1935
between Bolivia and Paraguay. Contending that economic liberalism attributes the
absence of war among potential adversaries to higher volumes of bilateral trade and
significant levels of economic interdependence, this study examines whether the long
period of relative peace in South America is the result of this causal nexus. This work
discusses the normative bases of this economic explanation , analyzes its implications, and
examines the empirical evidence to corroborate if in fact significant levels of intraregional
trade and economic interdependence cause the external-peace-and-internal-violence
paradox in South America.
2
The External-Peace-and-Internal-Violence Paradox in South America
The history of Latin American states is replete with instances of internal political violence,
military interventions, dictatorships, counterinsurgency campaigns, and low intensity
warfare. Less evident, however, is the fact that despite several militarized interstate crises,
the region has remained comparatively more peaceful than any other peripheral area in
the world. In a period of 189 years (1816-2005), these nation -states have experienced five
major "interstate wars" and none since the end of the Chaco War in 1935. By interstate
war this work refers to wars between neighboring countries sharing a common border.
Hence, the 1982 South Atlantic conflict is not included in this sample, because it involves
the participation of an extra-continental power.1 Also, the 1969 Soccer War between El
Salvador and Honduras is excluded from this analysis because it involved two Central
American states that were purportedly under a greater U.S. hegemonic control.
The absence of major intraregional interstate war in South America contrasts
sharply with the evidence of at least fifteen different dyads, each involving one or several
serious incident(s).2 Based on the potentiality for crisis and war demonstrated by the
severity and number of militarized interstate disputes in the area, and enduring rivalries
(now ostensibly resolved), the lack of major intra-regional, interstate wars is a significant
and paradoxical historical development. Thus, it is important to analyze why many more
of these episodes did not erupt into war and how the South American nation -states
managed to co -exist in a state of relative peace. One possible explanation is that these
countries had enjoyed such a robust level of intraregional economic interdependence that
3
purportedly made territorial expansion through war unattractive and costly. This study
examines and tests this claim.
Liberal Economic Determinants of Peace
Economic liberalism underscores the influence of system -level variables on the outbreak,
evolution and maintenance of interstate peace. Thus, one key liberal tenet posits that
international trade and economic interdependence foster mutual prosperity, stability, and
international peace.3 This causal connection is established unequivocally by an early
liberal thinker who affirms that:
Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other
become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has
an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities.4
Such a simple reasoning has molded the intellectual and practical projections of a great
number of both analysts and practitioners of world politics. It is, therefore, important at
this juncture to examine this liberal argument: its assumptions, evolution, and
implications for interstate peace.
Two prevailing views pervade the analysis of foreign trade and economic
interdependence as key determinants of interstate peace.5 On the one hand, the
mercantilist conception emphasizes the adverse effects on interstate relations of trade and
economic interdependence. The basic contention of mercantilism is that national security
and survival depend on national power, and this, in turn, derives in great part from
accumulated wealth and national economic prowess. It views foreign trade as a zero -sum
4
game, because, according to its logic, imports weaken the economic base of the state and
foment dependence of vital resources and goods on foreign sources. Moreover, national
reliance on wealth from exports encourages product specialization, underdevelopment of
many national economic sectors, and dependence on foreign markets. In sum, although
mercantilists have not stated it unequivocally, one can extrapolate from their basic
reasoning the following proposition: a weak state invites international predation and war,
while a strong nation -state induces international restraint and peace. Since mercantilism
endorses a policy of economic nationalism in order to keep the nation strong and
independent, then one can infer from it that it regards both free trade and economic
interdependence as sources of international conflict and war. Gilpin corroborates this
argument when he affirms that economic nationalists (i.e., mercantilists) regard
international commerce as "basically conflictual," and economic interdependence as
"never symmetrical," constituting a "source of continuous conflict and insecurity."6
The liberal conception, on the other hand, emphasizes the benign effects of
foreign trade and economic interdependence on international politics. From the time
Adam Smith revolutionized economic thinking to present-day neoclassical thought,
liberals have believed that a natural harmony of interests between states can be
accomplished through a policy of free trade and interdependence. First, Smith argued
against mercantilist trade restrictions on grounds that they limited the functioning of the
market, raising prices and interfering with the international division of labor. A century
later, David Ricardo introduced the law of comparative advantage, demonstrating that two
countries can gain from international trade by specializing in the production of those
goods and services in which they are relatively more productive. And logically, though
5
not historically, one may finally distinguish the thought succession of Montesquieu, Kant,
J.S. Mill, Bentham, and Cobden who decisively advanced the notion that free trade and
interdependence lend a positive influence to the development and maintenance of
interstate peace. Although Kant had asserted in 1795 that "the spirit of trade cannot
coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people,"7 it is John Stuart
Mill, in his defense of international trade, who affirms in a straightforward manner that:
Before, the patriot, unless sufficiently advanced in culture to feel the world his
country, wished all countries weak, poor, and ill-governed, but his own: he now
sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and progress to his own
country. It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by
strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural
opposition to it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent
and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of
the peace of the world , is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted
progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.8
According to this line of argument, war is obviated because international trade,
even if it is not perfectly competitive and free, enables nation -states to acquire needed
resources and goods. The underlying assumption of this reasoning is that states, if
prevented from satisfying their basic demands and needs through trade, will fight each
other over scarce goods and over resource-rich territory. Consistent with this premise,
U.S. planning for the post-World War II international order was infused with the
following slogan: "If goods can't cross borders, soldiers will." The reasoning was clearly
articulated much earlier by Cordell Hull, one of the chief architects of the post-war world
order, when he became convinced that "unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high
tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war."9
6
Based on the reasoning expounded above, the existence of a market mechanism
permitting and facilitating unimpeded access across international boundaries will, first,
diminish significantly the amount of contentious objectives whose quest may cause states
to resort to war. And, second, interstate relations founded on commercial interests will
underscore the mutual dependence of nation -states on key imports and exports. Complex
interdependence, as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have defined such situations, will
help maintain interstate peace, because it incorporates mechanisms for the peaceful
resolution of international conflicts; and because interdependent states across a range of
issues will deem the use of force, on purely self-interesting grounds, totally harmful and
counterproductive. This point is the same as the mutual vulnerability argument developed
in the literature on complex interdependence. As Keohane and Nye assert, "employing
force on one issue against an independent state with which one has a variety of
relationships is likely to rupture mutually profitable relations on other issues. In other
words, the use of force often has costly effects on non-security goals."10
The causal link between interstate peace, on the one hand, and liberal trade and
economic interdependence, on the other, has been found to be theoretically deficient.11
Also, history has discredited somewhat the liberal claim coupling liberal trade and peace.
For example, World War I is frequently cited as a case when neither high trade volume,
nor economic interdependence was able to prevent the outbreak of war. Similarly, the
long peace between the former Soviet Union and the United States from 1945 to 1989 is
often used as a counterargument to the liberal case connecting peace, trade and economic
interdependence.
7
Notwithstanding
these
theoretical
and
historical
shortcomings,
many
contemporary liberal scholars continue to insist that, indeed, trade and economic
interdependence have a pacific and beneficial effect on interstate relations. For instance,
analysts like Richard Rosecrance, utilizing an impressionistic and historical approach,
contend that nation -states can operate either within a military -political world or within a
trading world. Their choice is determined by the costs and benefits involved in operating
in either system. Rosecrance affirms that while the norms of the military -political system
have dominated interstate relations for the most part since 1648, the trading system is
ascending. Fundamentally, this is because war is too costly, and countries have learned to
avoid it and concentrate on trade as an alternate strategy to maximize material gains.12
Still others like Mark Gasiorowski and Salomon Polachek, using sophisticated
econometric techniques, find a positive correlation between high trade volume and the
permanence of interstate peace.13 Therefore, since this causal relation appears to have
withstood the general tests of history and econometrics, it is useful to analyze whether it
holds, also, as a robust explanation for the long period of peace in South America.
Implications of Economic Liberalism for Peace
Economic liberalism posits that free trade, based on comparative advantage and on an
international division of labor, creates economic interdependence. Accordingly, countries
mutually dependent on trade, this variant of the liberal paradigm maintains, will interact
peacefully since they will gain more from foreign trade than from interstate war.
Following this line of reasoning, one can surmise that economically interdependent
nation-states, as measured by the concentration and volume of their foreign and bilateral
8
trade, should interact in peace. In other words, if this argument holds, there should be a
negative correlation between trade volume among two regional nation -states and the
incidence and severity of armed conflict and war among them.
Proceeding from the effect-side or dependent variable of the causal relation borne
out by economic liberalism, one should find that the post-Chaco War peace in South
America is the consequence of a significant concentration and volume of intraregional
trade and economic interdependence among these regional actors. For the moment, at
least, it appears that the long period of peace in South America is the product of factors
other than trade and interdependence. Particularly, since intraregional trade appears to be
negligible, perhaps, almost insignificant compared to the total trade volume of individual
South American states with their main trading partners in Europe and North America.
Hence, this study presents and analyzes next the volume and geographic distribution of
trade of individual South American states. The object of this exegesis is to establish if, in
relative terms, large volumes of intraregional bilateral commerce may have hindered the
outbreak of a major intraregional war and affected the evolution of intraregional peace.
Trade, Economic Interdependence and Interstate Peace
Liberal economic theory establishes that trade and economic interdependence avail
countries with mutually advantageous gains. Moreover, the theory posits, that these
benefits are expected to be positively related to the volume of trade. Based on these
presumptions, many experts on interstate relations have maintained that exponen tially
increasing levels of interstate commerce and economic interdependence lead inevitably to
greater degrees of national prosperity, regional stability, and interstate peace.
9
Although the causal direction between trade and interstate peace is the subject of
much debate in the literature, because it is not entirely clear whether it is peace that
promotes trade or vice versa; this work analyzes only the probable, independent causal
effect of interstate trade and economic interdependence on the absence of interstate wars
in South America. This liberal tenet, also much in accord with neoclassical economic
theory, postulates that interstate commerce and economic interdependence harmonizes
the national interests of territorial states and, ultimately, causes interstate peace.
Operationalization of Trade and Economic Interdependence
Prior to the outbreak of most militarized crises and wars between pairs of countries in the
international state system , there has been always some level, however small, of commerce
and economic interdependence. It is clear, therefore, that not all volumes of trade have a
mitigating effect on the prevention of interstate armed conflict. It is also evident that the
opportunity cost of losing some trade does not solely deter states from engaging in
militarized interstate conflicts.
As the potential for a major intraregional interstate war has not materialized in
South America in the last seventy years, it is important to determine whether there exists
a pattern in which particularly significant levels of intraregional bilateral trade and
economic interdependence may have fostered intraregional interstate cooperation and
peace. Consistent with the logic of the liberal hypothesis expounded above, one should
expect to find that seven decades of intraregional interstate peace in South America must
have been predicated on significant levels of intraregional bilateral trade. For that purpose,
10
it will be useful to measure and classify the volume of trade in order to ascertain whether
there is a positive correlation between significantly high levels of trade and the absence of
wars in South America.
In order to eliminate from the data low or insignificant levels of intraregional
bilateral trade, the focus will be only on those countries which figu re as important trading
partners. Since in the economics literature there is no commonly accepted criterion,
benchmark or particular percentage level of trade which can be utilized to classify other
than the top three main trading partners of a country, it is necessary to establish a criterion
to sort out other important trading partners. By definition, a significant trading partner is
any state whose volume of bilateral trade with an individual South American country
exceeds at least one third of the total share of each year's top partner in the group
comprising the principal world and adjacent intraregional trading partners for that
particular
country.
Furthermore,
this
work
defines
the
degree
of economic
interdependence between two countries according to the level of economic activity
between them as measured by trade volume.
The Data: A Caveat on the Compilation of Trade Statistics
Prior to an analysis of the data, several points on its collection and presentation need
clarification. First, the data utilized for this analysis are derived entirely from the United
Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. (The actual monetary figures are
presented in an appendix at the end of this work.) Second, the data reflects only the
bilateral trade of South American nation -states with their main world trading partners in
11
order to facilitate comparison and provide some comparative meaning to the amount of
commerce between intraregional contiguous nation -states in South America. Third, the
data are originally reported in separate figures for exports and imports. Since this work is
interested only in the total volume of bilateral trade, the amounts of imports and exports
with each country have been added and the total reported as the volume of bilateral trade
in the appendix and in Tables 1 to 10 in the text. Fourth, even when the data is reported in
the same type of currency, there are some discrepancies in some figures for the same two
countries which are reported in the tables under the respective states. In such cases the
figures have been left as originally reported under each individual country. Fifth, the
percentage of bilateral trade, presented in Tables 1 to 10, was computed by dividing the
amount of trade between two countries by the total of each country's world trade per
year. Finally, when figures for exports and imports were not reported, the symbol n/a has
been inserted to denote unavailability of data. In cases with zero trade, that is exactly what
the original source reports. Having operationalized the independent variable and clarified
the collection and presentation of the data, one is now in position to turn to a discussion
and analysis of the data and its relation to the prevalence of peace in South America.
Analysis of the Causal Link between Trade and Peace
Based on the information disclosed in Tables 1 through 10 in the text, the most important
general pattern revealed by the data is that the volume of intraregional bilateral trade
among pairs of South American nation -states tends to be below the threshold
distinguishing a significant from and an insignificant trading partner. This general pattern
12
is represented graphically in each of the charts accompanying each table. As shown in
each graph, the curve in solid bold represents the highest percentage for each year's top
trading partner, and the dotted bold curve denotes one third of the highest percentage for
each year's top trading partner of each country in question.
Trade between rival countries that have avoided war remained low consistently
throughout the period of peace in South America. First, as Tables 2 and 7 disclose,
commerce between Bolivia and Paraguay, the most virulent rivals in this century, never
climbed above 0.43% for any of the years for which data was available. Second, as for
Bolivia's trade with Chile, this reached only significant proportions in 1990 when it rose to
7.52% of Bolivia's total trade. By the same token, as Table 4 discloses, the Bolivian share
of Chile's total commerce was never more than a meager 2.87% as was the case in 1985,
an amount considerably lower than the one-third-of-the-highest-percentage-for-each-
year's-top-trading-partner classificatory threshold (hereafter referred only as the one-third
classificatory threshold).
Third, Chile's trade with Peru reached a high of 6.43% in 1948 (see Table 4 below),
still considerably below the one-third classificatory threshold. It fluctuated thereafter
between a high of 3.78% in 1955 and a low of 0.81% in 1990. The same pattern occurred
for the Chilean share of Peru's total trade. Table 8 reveals that Chile's commerce with Peru
represented 10.94% of Peru's total trade in 1948, just a bit lower than the 13.21% share
defining the one-third classificatory threshold for this particular year. Subsequently,
Chile's trade with Peru oscillated between a high of 6.99% in 1955 to a low of 1.07% in
1970. Thus, it never approached remotely the one-third classificatory threshold.
13
Fourth, trade between Colombia and Venezuela remained consistently well below
the one-third classificatory threshold since 1938. It is important to note in Table 5 that
from 1938 to 1970, the Venezuelan share of Colombia's total trade was an insignificant
average share of 0.44%. This average share jumped dramatically to 5.57% between 1975
and 2001. Still, this substantial increase did not even approach the average share of
10.21% representing the one-third classificatory threshold for the same years.14 Such a
trend contrasts sharply with the Colombian share of Venezuela's total trade presented in
Table 10. Although it remained high by its own historical standards in 1938, 1948, and
1955, the Colombian share of Venezuela's total trade plummeted by 1960 to a low of
0.09% and did not recover again until 1995 when it rose to 5.25%. Similarly, as Table 10
also discloses, trade between Venezuela and Guyana has never been above an
insignificant 0.11% share of Venezuela's total trade.
Finally, following the trade pattern of other South American dyads, bilateral trade
between Ecuador and Peru did not even remotely approximate the one-third classificatory
threshold. As one can observe in Table 6, the Peruvian share of Ecuador's total trade
oscillated between a high of 4.46% in 1938 to a low of 0.64% in 1965. This represents an
average share of 2.29% throughout the duration of the long period of peace. This is an
average share quite short of the one-third classificatory threshold. The Ecuadorian share
of Peru's total trade is even smaller. As Table 8 indicates, from 1938 to 2001, the
Ecuadorian share of Peru's total trade has been as low as 0.42% in 1984 and as high as
2.77% in 1990. This is an average share of 1.21% in fifty five years of Ecuadorian -
Peruvian economic relations.
14
Three exceptions break the general pattern of low volumes of intraregional
bilateral trade in South America. First, as Tables 1 and 3 indicate the trend toward greater
commerce and economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been increasing
consistently and continuously since 1948 up until 2001. It is curious to note, however,
that while Brazil's share of trade is very important for Argentina, the percentage of
Argentina's commerce with Brazil appears to be insignificant for the latter. In our
judgment, this is only a "statistical mirage" caused by the fact that Brazil's trade is
overwhelmingly concentrated with the United States, while Argentina's commerce is more
evenly distributed among several major trading partners. Consequently, in the case of
Brazil, states ranking as second, third, or fourth among its main trading partners do not
classify as "significant trading partners," because the one-third classificatory threshold is
set too high by a skewed concentration of trade between the United States and Brazil.
Second, as Tables 1 and 4 reveal commerce between Argentina and Chile is
significant for both countries in 1975 only. This is an interesting finding that correlates
nicely with the economic and political isolation that these countries experienced in the
mid-1970s. During this period, the military governments in Argentina and Chile appeared
to have increased their economic, political, and military cooperation as a bilateral response
to the mounting violent domestic opposition and their heightened international isolation.
Finally, Uruguay's trade with Argentina is significant from 1970 to 2001, and with
Brazil in 1955 and, then, again from 1965 to 2001. By the same token, Uruguay's share of
trade with, both, Argentina and Brazil is negligible for these two latter countries. This is a
finding that should not even surprise a casual observer of South American political
history. As it is well known, Uruguay is a small country, created as a buffer state between
15
these two South American giants, hence its external economic and political environment
is made up mostly by its relations with Argentina and Brazil.
16
Table 1 Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
United States
15.35%
23.72% 12.97%
18.00% 13.68%
16.73% 12.17%
16.68% 14.10%
15.33%
United Kingdom
27.08%
20.67% 13.21%
14.36% 8.39%
6.22%
3.12%
2.95%
0.02%
1.42%
Germany
12.31%
1.34%
5.85%
10.21% 7.79%
8.39%
7.97%
7.50%
5.68%
6.17%
France
5.17%
3.18%
4.84%
4.17%
3.79%
3.85%
3.14%
3.02%
2.70%
2.49%
Spain
0.49%
3.89%
0.05%
0.20%
2.67%
3.43%
2.89%
3.16%
2.30%
2.74%
Italy
4.12%
8.49%
6.48%
5.48%
11.84%
11.34% 7.00%
5.91%
4.38%
4.50%
Japan
1.69%
0.13%
4.50%
2.92%
2.84%
5.63%
9.12%
6.40%
5.13%
3.51%
Bolivia
0.34%
0.32%
0.45%
0.30%
0.33%
0.78%
2.82%
2.08%
3.70%
1.84%
Brazil
4.48%
6.50%
11.36%
6.28%
10.01%
9.37%
8.29%
9.90%
9.07%
13.01%
Chile
0.56%
1.18%
3.75%
2.62%
3.07%
4.82%
4.20%
2.54%
1.60%
3.39%
Paraguay
0.40%
0.58%
1.61%
0.76%
1.12%
1.01%
1.27%
1.48%
0.76%
1.14%
Uruguay
0.42%
0.64%
0.05%
0.64%
0.49%
1.01%
0.91%
1.78%
1.35%
2.08%
Total Percentage
72.41%
70.64% 65.12%
65.94% 66.02%
72.58% 62.90%
63.40% 50.79%
57.62%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 1
Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1938 to 20 01
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
The Highest Percentage for
Each Year's Top Trading
Partner.
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Brazil
5.00%
0.00%
Chile
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ationa l Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
17.18%
1.41%
5.52%
3.17%
3.39%
4.97%
3.80%
0.79%
21.36%
4.33%
1.44%
0.49%
67.85%
2001
14.24%
1,49%
3.23%
2.12%
3.86%
3.60%
2.41%
0.57%
24.47%
7.15%
1.71%
2.29%
67.14%
17
Table 2 Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1984
1990
United States
13.61%
57.49% 49.89%
33.45% 43.17%
31.97% 28.06%
27.72% 19.08%
20.93%
United Kingdom
37.37%
24.17% 21.42%
29.15% 24.76%
24.50% 6.50%
6.65%
4.18%
7.63%
Germany
7.99%
0.06%
4.86%
8.90%
8.05%
6.64%
5.64%
5.99%
4.62%
5.52%
France
0.65%
0.06%
0.82%
0.57%
0.64%
0.62%
1.21%
3.12%
1.14%
1.63%
Spain
0.00%
0.06%
0.05%
0.07%
0.19%
1.50%
0.00%
0.53%
0.38%
0.71%
Italy
0.43%
0.33%
0.22%
1.58%
0.79%
0.65%
1.16%
0.59%
0.31%
1.81%
Japan
3.02%
0.06%
0.11%
4.81%
7.64%
12.30% 9.89%
4.12%
3.02%
4.48%
Argentina
6.26%
6.99%
4.59%
5.89%
3.09%
6.98%
19.43%
18.65% 37.75%
19.18%
Brazil
1.08%
1.21%
1.04%
3.30%
1.28%
1.01%
9.13%
6.61%
7.89%
12.12%
Chile
1.94%
2.26%
0.71%
2.08%
0.90%
1.11%
1.51%
3.96%
1.74%
7.52%
Paraguay
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.43%
0.00%
0.03%
0.08%
0.04%
0.11%
0.39%
Peru
5.40%
3.91%
3.01%
1.94%
0.72%
2.12%
1.49%
3.07%
2.28%
4.66%
Uruguay
0.22%
0.22%
0.49%
0.14%
0.04%
0.05%
0.43%
0.09%
0.14%
0.28%
Total Percentage
77.97%
96.82% 87.21%
92.31% 91.27%
89.48% 84.53%
81.14% 82.64%
86.86%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 2
Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 19 38 to 2001
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
70.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Chile
10.00%
0.00%
Paraguay
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
24.40%
9.56%
4.13%
1.34%
2.28%
1.28%
6.92%
12.73%
9.07%
5.45%
0.34%
0.72%
0.22%
78.44%
2001
15.39%
2.79%
1.39%
0.92%
1.07%
1.38%
1.96%
11.66%
18.83%
5.74%
0.90%
5.72%
0.43%
68.17%
18
Table 3 Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1983
1990
United States
29.22%
47.48% 33.35%
36.87% 31.41%
28.55% 21.21%
18.02% 19.85%
22.72%
United Kingdom
9.58%
9.76%
2.86%
4.24%
3.43%
5.16%
3.14%
2.29%
2.51%
2.61%
Germany
22.05%
0.58%
7.05%
8.27%
8.83%
10.65% 9.71%
6.81%
4.87%
6.69%
France
4.79%
2.46%
4.49%
4.09%
3.33%
3.56%
2.80%
3.42%
3.57%
2.86%
Spain
0.08%
1.43%
2.05%
1.31%
1.16%
2.50%
2.16%
1.64%
1.56%
1.75%
Italy
1.96%
2.27%
3.53%
2.82%
4.11%
4.33%
4.42%
3.09%
3.12%
4.36%
Japan
2.94%
0.04%
3.71%
2.52%
2.48%
5.78%
8.67%
5.38%
5.30%
7.35%
Argentina
8.21%
8.32%
9.22%
5.54%
10.14%
6.61%
2.86%
4.29%
2.66%
4.01%
Bolivia
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.17%
0.07%
0.14%
0.44%
0.50%
0.33%
0.34%
Colombia
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.14%
0.16%
0.14%
0.30%
n/a
0.37%
Paraguay
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.01%
0.10%
0.23%
0.66%
1.13%
0.69%
1.33%
Peru
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.11%
0.90%
0.32%
0.63%
0.58%
0.35%
0.53%
Uruguay
1.06%
1.18%
2.27%
0.63%
0.72%
0.76%
0.70%
1.14%
0.62%
1.65%
Venezuela
0.02%
0.77%
3.42%
4.24%
3.17%
1.20%
1.01%
1.84%
2.55%
1.23%
Total Percentage
79.91%
74.29% 71.95%
70.82% 69.99%
69.95% 58.55%
50.43% 47.98%
57.80%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 3
Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W o rld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1938 to 20 01
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Argentina
10.00%
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1990 1995 2001
Venezuela
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
21.86%
2.56%
6.37%
2.31%
1.40%
3.49%
5.99%
9.74%
0.65%
0.66%
1.86%
0.90%
1.83%
1.20%
60.82%
2001
23.99%
2.88%
6.48%
3.08%
1.95%
3.32%
4.13%
6.69%
0.38%
0.58%
0.86%
0.00%
0.83%
1.34%
56.51%
19
Table 4 Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
United States
20.85%
48.11% 42.67%
42.55% 34.86%
24.11% 20.72%
20.38% 22.46%
17.72%
United Kingdom
16.86%
7.28%
11.82%
12.33% 8.96%
9.81%
6.43%
3.91%
5.29%
4.40%
Germany
16.68%
0.43%
10.65%
13.54% 11.94%
11.57% 10.35%
8.52%
8.95%
9.30%
France
3.44%
4.91%
1.45%
2.71%
2.59%
4.64%
3.12%
3.69%
3.40%
4.50%
Spain
0.18%
0.97%
1.67%
0.67%
1.16%
2.36%
3.06%
2.61%
2.78%
2.82%
Italy
3.47%
3.11%
3.96%
2.58%
2.93%
5.41%
3.00%
3.73%
3.82%
3.92%
Japan
1.95%
0.04%
0.34%
2.09%
6.45%
8.20%
8.22%
10.43% 8.97%
12.65%
Argentina
2.69%
6.61%
9.92%
5.81%
6.01%
7.94%
13.86%
4.93%
2.91%
4.02%
Bolivia
0.32%
0.45%
0.17%
0.20%
0.12%
0.11%
1.17%
0.77%
2.87%
0.62%
Peru
2.88%
6.43%
3.78%
2.58%
2.21%
2.27%
1.44%
1.30%
1.33%
0.81%
Total Percentage
69.32%
78.34% 86.43%
85.06% 77.23%
76.42% 71.37%
60.27% 62.78%
60.76%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 4
Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1938 to 2 00 1
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
60.00%
50.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
40.00%
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
30.00%
Argentina
20.00%
Bolivia
10.00%
0.00%
Peru
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
19.94%
3.55%
5.40%
3.61%
2.66%
3.40%
12.37%
5.96%
0.89%
1.42%
59.20%
2001
18.52%
4.12%
3.53%
3.42%
2.35%
3.63%
8.20%
10.59%
0.47%
2.50%
57.33%
20
Table 5 Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
United States
51.96%
75.95% 67.93%
60.41% 46.74%
41.90% 6.18%
33.79% 34.13%
40.35%
United Kingdom
6.72%
3.26%
2.68%
5.17%
4.41%
3.24%
3.31%
1.79%
2.67%
2.71%
Germany
16.00%
0.09%
8.65%
10.98% 11.53%
11.24% 12.03%
12.49% 10.94%
8.48%
France
3.98%
1.00%
1.87%
1.85%
1.04%
1.57%
3.48%
2.59%
2.75%
2.77%
Spain
0.03%
0.05%
0.72%
0.39%
3.62%
5.24%
3.15%
3.42%
2.68%
1.92%
Italy
1.25%
0.85%
0.84%
1.15%
1.45%
1.76%
2.63%
2.14%
2.17%
1.56%
Japan
0.13%
0.00%
0.70%
1.83%
1.96%
5.07%
5.59%
6.76%
7.53%
6.11%
Brazil
0.10%
0.82%
0.04%
n/a
1.54%
0.43%
1.07%
1.58%
1.76%
1.75%
Ecuador
0.03%
0.60%
0.59%
0.27%
1.05%
1.75%
1.94%
1.80%
1.79%
0.97%
Peru
0.03%
1.58%
0.30%
0.44%
1.00%
2.45%
1.74%
1.47%
1.83%
1.54%
Venezuela
0.46%
0.41%
0.26%
0.32%
0.35%
0.88%
3.68%
5.53%
4.78%
4.25%
Total Percentage
80.69%
84.61% 84.58%
82.81% 74.69%
75.53% 44.80%
73.36% 73.03%
72.41%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 5
Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W o rld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 193 8 to 200 1
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
Highest Percent for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Peru
20.00%
10.00%
Venezuela
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
36.38%
1.86%
6.59%
2.04%
2.00%
2.24%
7.71%
2.99%
2.37%
1.74%
9.60%
75.52%
2001
38.96%
1.86%
3.89%
1.95%
1.54%
2.38%
2.88%
2.98%
4.05%
1.10%
10.07%
71.66%
21
Table 6 Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1984
1990
United States
36.16%
57.00% 56.65%
55.31% 49.48%
42.63% 43.60%
35.52% 50.79%
44.83%
United Kingdom
6.25%
3.56%
3.41%
3.20%
2.74%
0.11%
2.10%
1.38%
0.93%
0.95%
Germany
20.54%
0.13%
10.00%
11.78% 13.31%
3.96%
6.62%
4.13%
3.69%
4.86%
France
6.25%
0.64%
1.79%
2.04%
2.60%
0.77%
1.42%
0.98%
0.74%
1.31%
Spain
0.45%
0.00%
0.50%
0.10%
0.39%
0.23%
0.99%
1.16%
1.05%
2.50%
Italy
2.23%
2.93%
2.63%
2.44%
2.63%
1.42%
2.14%
4.16%
1.13%
3.10%
Japan
4.91%
0.00%
0.67%
2.13%
4.17%
13.02% 7.20%
13.02% 6.03%
4.90%
Colombia
0.89%
3.18%
3.85%
1.50%
3.67%
4.03%
3.15%
3.35%
2.01%
1.99%
Peru
4.46%
2.80%
1.84%
0.82%
0.64%
1.94%
3.96%
1.95%
0.85%
3.71%
Total Percentage
82.14%
70.24% 81.34%
79.32% 79.63%
68.11% 71.18%
65.65% 67.22%
68.15%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 6
Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1938 to 20 01
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
60.00%
50.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
40.00%
30.00%
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
20.00%
Colombia
10.00%
Peru
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ationa l Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
40.25%
0.74%
4.36%
1.90%
4.42%
4.00%
7.03%
2.96%
2.31%
67.97%
2001
30.19%
0.85%
3.61%
0.89%
1.75%
3.10%
4.98%
10.86%
4.33%
60.56%
22
Table 7 Paraguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
((Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1984
1990
United States
10.42%
13.17% 16.22%
25.08% 23.80%
18.86% 10.45%
8.27%
7.41%
9.18%
United Kingdom
11.11%
9.73%
8.27%
8.59%
8.60%
8.05%
9.54%
3.70%
2.61%
2.34%
Germany
11.81%
0.00%
4.68%
8.25%
10.23%
10.58% 10.12%
8.69%
6.22%
4.73%
France
1.39%
0.00%
3.12%
1.01%
2.29%
3.79%
2.90%
2.05%
4.14%
2.09%
Spain
0.00%
0.00%
1.40%
4.88%
3.63%
2.92%
1.63%
1.25%
1.63%
0.89%
Italy
0.69%
0.00%
0.94%
1.01%
1.91%
1.42%
0.80%
1.29%
1.04%
2.23%
Japan
7.64%
0.00%
0.00%
3.54%
3.15%
4.18%
3.45%
6.44%
8.85%
9.15%
Argentina
29.86%
33.21% 44.62%
25.42% 23.42%
24.55% 22.91%
21.83% 15.09%
9.88%
Bolivia
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.17%
0.10%
0.08%
0.14%
0.07%
0.01%
0.27%
Brazil
0.69%
2.67%
0.16%
0.67%
1.53%
2.29%
11.83%
21.84% 25.57%
23.17%
Total Percentage
73.61%
58.78% 79.41%
78.62% 78.66%
76.72% 73.77%
75.43% 72.57%
63.93%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 7
P araguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 19 38 to 2001
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
50.00%
45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
Highe st Pe r ce ntage f or Each
Ye ar 's Top Tr ading Par tne r .
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
One Third of the Highe s t
Pe r ce ntage for Each Ye ar's
Top Trading Par tne r .
Bolivia
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
12.05%
2.86%
2.67%
1.46%
0.61%
1.59%
8.49%
12.73%
0.22%
24.23%
66.91%
2001
4.99%
1.24%
2.12%
0.88%
1.06%
2.20%
3.41%
18.51%
0.86%
27.76%
63.03%
23
Table 8 Peru’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1984
1990
United States
30.03%
39.63% 43.42%
39.77% 40.82%
32.69% 30.83%
34.33% 39.90%
24.79%
United Kingdom
15.72%
11.45% 9.48%
7.38%
3.75%
3.19%
4.00%
3.65%
3.11%
2.95%
Germany
14.76%
0.19%
7.95%
10.70% 12.17%
13.96% 9.34%
6.79%
4.89%
6.40%
France
4.78%
1.02%
2.62%
2.04%
1.93%
1.85%
2.45%
1.48%
1.94%
1.04%
Spain
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.18%
1.21%
1.95%
1.18%
1.21%
2.02%
1.08%
Italy
1.25%
1.29%
1.32%
2.05%
3.18%
2.59%
2.78%
3.60%
2.11%
3.29%
Japan
1.78%
0.95%
2.68%
4.85%
8.57%
11.45% 9.02%
9.50%
9.24%
6.59%
Bolivia
0.71%
1.89%
1.12%
0.39%
0.10%
0.16%
0.39%
1.81%
0.67%
0.96%
Brazil
1.15%
0.48%
0.12%
0.33%
0.65%
0.80%
2.26%
3.45%
3.42%
4.55%
Chile
4.30%
10.94% 6.99%
2.46%
1.48%
1.07%
2.84%
1.84%
2.13%
2.48%
Ecuador
0.78%
1.17%
0.72%
0.57%
0.43%
0.52%
2.12%
1.65%
0.42%
2.77%
Total Percentage
75.26%
69.01% 76.42%
70.72% 74.29%
70.23% 67.21%
69.31% 69.85%
56.90%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 8
P eru’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1938 to 200 1
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
50.00%
45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Chile
Ecuador
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
25.88%
2.58%
4.90%
1.68%
1.37%
3.11%
8.22%
1.44%
5.12%
3.03%
2.25%
59.58%
2001
23.94%
7.17%
3.05%
1.45%
2.67%
1.93%
5.74%
1.05%
3.92%
5.02%
3.31%
59.25%
24
Table 9 Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
United States
7.42%
31.28% 14.65%
22.84% 15.40%
10.73% 9.00%
8.99%
11.75%
9.66%
United Kingdom
23.59%
15.22% 12.11%
13.33% 13.32%
7.64%
4.78%
3.93%
3.39%
3.63%
Germany
20.44%
1.18%
6.03%
7.95%
9.89%
12.04% 9.73%
9.16%
7.40%
7.17%
France
5.14%
3.02%
5.15%
4.14%
4.98%
2.28%
2.12%
1.62%
1.69%
3.01%
Spain
0.23%
0.24%
0.24%
0.86%
4.57%
2.47%
1.90%
0.97%
1.12%
1.20%
Italy
4.32%
4.84%
6.48%
3.06%
6.00%
6.18%
3.85%
3.42%
2.41%
4.00%
Japan
3.04%
0.24%
1.39%
0.30%
0.70%
1.09%
1.90%
2.85%
2.15%
2.12%
Argentina
7.36%
5.44%
0.32%
3.28%
3.48%
7.47%
8.06%
11.67% 9.57%
9.68%
Brazil
5.43%
7.78%
15.75%
4.19%
5.53%
10.20% 13.62%
17.61% 17.25%
26.88%
Total Percentage
76.97%
69.24% 62.12%
59.95% 63.87%
60.10% 54.96%
60.22% 56.73%
67.35%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 9
Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W o rld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1938 to 200 1
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
Highest Percentage for Each
Year's Top Trading Partner.
One Third of the Highest
Percentage for Each Year's
Top Trading Partner.
Argentina
Brazil
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
So u rce : United Natio ns, Yearboo k of Intern ational Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office o f the United Natio ns). Appendix.
1995
9.08%
2.51%
4.67%
2.55%
1.80%
7.22%
3.52%
18.07%
24.75%
74.17%
2001
8.79%
2.03%
3.72%
2.84%
3.22%
3.34%
1.21%
19.97%
20.84%
65.96%
25
Table 10 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938 to 2001
(Value as Percentage of total trade)
TRADING PARTNERS 1938
1948
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1983
1990
United States
24.45%
49.66% 44.68%
46.21% 39.52%
39.96% 43.02%
34.75% 36.71%
50.28%
United Kingdom
4.24%
3.29%
5.14%
7.09%
6.92%
4.94%
3.77%
1.68%
1.88%
1.49%
Germany
5.48%
0.16%
3.33%
3.35%
3.67%
4.20%
4.11%
2.97%
4.26%
5.33%
France
1.71%
1.64%
1.54%
1.85%
2.20%
2.07%
1.61%
2.16%
2.23%
1.60%
Spain
0.23%
0.34%
0.62%
0.80%
1.28%
1.37%
1.55%
3.23%
1.68%
1.16%
Italy
0.78%
0.93%
1.29%
2.32%
2.03%
2.56%
3.00%
5.06%
5.43%
2.08%
Japan
0.51%
0.02%
0.60%
1.07%
2.24%
3.21%
3.35%
5.17%
3.63%
3.08%
Brazil
0.05%
0.82%
2.61%
2.39%
2.06%
1.40%
1.48%
3.00%
4.28%
2.48%
Colombia
4.48%
6.50%
11.36%
0.09%
0.10%
0.33%
0.72%
1.53%
1.87%
2.13%
Guyana
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.01%
0.03%
0.11%
0.08%
0.05%
Total Percentage
41.93%
63.36% 71.17%
65.17% 60.02%
60.05% 62.64%
59.66% 62.05%
69.68%
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
Figure 10 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1 93 8 to 2001
(Value as P ercentage o f total trade)
60.00%
50.00%
Highe s t Pe rce ntage for Each
Year 's Top Tr ading Par tne r.
40.00%
One Thir d of t he Highes t
Per ce nt age for Each Ye ar 's
Top Tr ading Part ne r .
30.00%
Brazil
20.00%
10.00%
Colom bia
0.00%
1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1990 1995 2001
Guyana
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix.
1995
52.01%
1.38%
3.68%
1.47%
1.07%
2.27%
4.13%
2.95%
5.25%
0.06%
74.27%
2001
47.56%
1.29%
1.90%
1.26%
2.10%
1.75%
2.13%
3.95%
5.18%
0.07%
67.19%
26
Trade and Interstate Peace: A Causal Nexus?
An analysis of the commercial relations between the most conflict-prone dyads in South
America in the last seventy years demonstrates that if these countries did not go to war
during this period, it was not because the loss of high volumes of trade and economic
interdependence would have represented an unbearable cost to their respective national
economies. As it is now clear from the above discussion and the data in the tables in the
text, trade was not significant in most cases and, therefore, should not be considered as a
sufficient condition explaining the origin of the peace in South America. Except for the
bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil and between Argentina and Chile in the mid 1970s only, trade volumes between the rest of all actual and potential conflictual dyads in
the region is marginal at best.
Even considering the high volume of Argentinean -Brazilian trade over the years as
a possible sufficient condition for the absence of war in this important rivalry in the
region, the fact remains that other conflictual dyads, spared from war, lack a significant
volume of trade. In essence, even taking into account the variations in trade volumes
among different dyads (i.e., the independent variable), intraregional peace has been a
constant outcome in South America since the end of the Chaco War in 1935. In sum, the
absence of a significant causal variable, coupled with the lack of co -variation lead to
conclusion that, at least in South America, interstate peace does not appear to be caused
by high volumes of trade and economic interdependence among potential adversaries.
27
Appendix: Volume of Bilateral Trade of Individual South American States in Five - year Intervals from 1 938 to 2001
Table 1
Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1 938 to 200 1
(To p part of table figures in millio n of U.S. dollars, botto m portion value as P ercentage of total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
14 6.1
76 3.1
2 72.6
419.2
368 .4
579 .1
840 .6
3 096.7
1 722 .2
25 1 8.9
5 1 35.4
United Kingdo m
25 7.7
66 5.1
2 77.5
334.4
225 .9
215 .2
215 .4
546.8
2 .0
2 3 3.9
4 20.2
6 9 9.3
Germany
11 7.2
4 3.2
1 23.0
237.8
209 .6
290 .6
550 .3
1 392.1
693 .2
10 1 3.6
1 6 48.6
15 1 5.7
4 9.2
10 2.4
1 01.7
97.0
101 .9
133 .3
217 .1
560.5
330 .0
4 0 8.7
9 47.0
9 9 5.4
4.7
12 5.2
1.1
4.6
71 .8
118 .9
199 .7
586.4
281 .0
4 4 9.9
1 0 14.2
18 1 1.9
Italy
3 9.2
27 3.1
1 36.1
127.5
318 .7
392 .5
483 .7
1 097.1
534 .5
7 3 9.6
1 4 86.0
16 9 1.6
Japan
1 6.1
4.1
94.5
68.1
76 .5
195 .0
629 .7
1 188.1
626 .4
5 7 6.1
1 1 35.2
11 3 1.4
3.2
1 0.2
9.5
6.9
8 .9
27 .1
194 .5
385.8
452 .1
3 0 1.6
2 35.9
2 6 5.3
4 2.6
20 9.2
2 38.7
146.2
269 .6
324 .4
572 .3
1 837.3
1 107 .8
21 3 7.8
6 3 82.6
1 14 8 3.4
Chile
5.3
3 8.1
78.7
61.0
82 .6
166 .8
290 .1
471.7
195 .4
5 5 7.7
1 2 93.9
33 5 7.4
P araguay
3.8
1 8.5
33.9
17.6
30 .2
34 .9
87 .4
273.9
92 .3
1 8 7.1
4 30.6
8 0 1.6
Uruguay
4.0
2 0.5
1.0
14.8
13 .2
34 .8
62 .9
330.1
164 .9
3 4 1.1
1 0 82.7
10 7 2.6
95 1.8
321 7.1
21 01.2
2 328.5
2692 .0
3 461 .7
6906 .5
18 560.6
12 210 .0
164 2 8.1
29 8 87.3
4 69 3 1.2
France
Spain
Bolivia
Brazil
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
66 8 1.3
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
1 5.35 %
23 .72 %
12.9 7%
1 8.00%
13.6 8%
1 6.7 3%
12 .1 7%
1 6.68%
1 4 .10 %
15 .33%
1 7.18%
14.24%
United Kingdo m
2 7.08 %
20 .67 %
13.2 1%
1 4.36%
8.3 9%
6.2 2%
3 .1 2%
2.95%
0 .02 %
1 .42%
1.41%
1,49%
Germany
1 2.31 %
1 .34 %
5.8 5%
1 0.21%
7.7 9%
8.3 9%
7 .9 7%
7.50%
5 .68 %
6 .17%
5.52%
3.23%
France
5.17 %
3 .18 %
4.8 4%
4.17%
3.7 9%
3.8 5%
3 .1 4%
3.02%
2 .70 %
2 .49%
3.17%
2.12%
Spain
0.49 %
3 .89 %
0.0 5%
0.20%
2.6 7%
3.4 3%
2 .8 9%
3.16%
2 .30 %
2 .74%
3.39%
3.86%
Italy
4.12 %
8 .49 %
6.4 8%
5.48%
11.8 4%
1 1.3 4%
7 .0 0%
5.91%
4 .38 %
4 .50%
4.97%
3.60%
Japan
1.69 %
0 .13 %
4.5 0%
2.92%
2.8 4%
5.6 3%
9 .1 2%
6.40%
5 .13 %
3 .51%
3.80%
2.41%
Bolivi a
0.34 %
0 .32 %
0.4 5%
0.30%
0.3 3%
0.7 8%
2 .8 2%
2.08%
3 .70 %
1 .84%
0.79%
0.57%
Brazil
4.48 %
6 .50 %
11.3 6%
6.28%
10.0 1%
9.3 7%
8 .2 9%
9.90%
9 .07 %
13 .01%
2 1.36%
24.47%
Chile
0.56 %
1 .18 %
3.7 5%
2.62%
3.0 7%
4.8 2%
4 .2 0%
2.54%
1 .60 %
3 .39%
4.33%
7.15%
P araguay
0.40 %
0 .58 %
1.6 1%
0.76%
1.1 2%
1.0 1%
1 .2 7%
1.48%
0 .76 %
1 .14%
1.44%
1.71%
Uruguay
0.42 %
0 .64 %
0.0 5%
0.64%
0.4 9%
1.0 1%
0 .9 1%
1.78%
1 .35 %
2 .08%
0.49%
2.29%
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
28
Table 2
Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W o rld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 19 38 to 2 001
(Top part of table figures in million o f U.S. do llars, bottom portion value as percentage of total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
6.3
10 4.4
91.3
46.6
114 .7
123 .7
302 .3
468.6
228 .6
3 3 8.4
4 62.7
4 7 0.7
1 7.3
4 3.9
39.2
40.6
65 .8
94 .8
70 .0
112.5
50 .1
1 2 3.4
1 81.4
8 5.3
Germany
3.7
0.1
8.9
12.4
21 .4
25 .7
60 .8
101.2
55 .4
8 9.3
78.3
4 2.6
France
0.3
0.1
1.5
0.8
1 .7
2 .4
13 .0
52.8
13 .7
2 6.3
25.5
2 8.0
Spain
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0 .5
5 .8
0 .0
8.9
4 .6
1 1.5
43.2
3 2.6
Italy
0.2
0.6
0.4
2.2
2 .1
2 .5
12 .5
9.9
3 .7
2 9.3
24.3
4 2.3
Japan
1.4
0.1
0.2
6.7
20 .3
47 .6
106 .6
69.6
36 .2
7 2.4
1 31.2
5 9.9
Argentina
2.9
1 2.7
8.4
8.2
8 .2
27 .0
209 .3
315.3
452 .2
3 1 0.1
2 41.5
3 5 6.6
Brazil
0.5
2.2
1.9
4.6
3 .4
3 .9
98 .4
111.7
94 .5
1 9 6.0
1 72.1
5 7 5.9
Chile
0.9
4.1
1.3
2.9
2 .4
4 .3
16 .3
66.9
20 .8
1 2 1.6
1 03.3
1 7 5.5
P araguay
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.6
0 .0
0 .1
0 .9
0.6
1 .3
6.3
6.4
2 7.6
P eru
2.5
7.1
5.5
2.7
1 .9
8 .2
16 .1
51.9
27 .3
7 5.3
1 33.3
1 7 4.8
Uruguay
0.1
0.4
0.9
0.2
0 .1
0 .2
4 .6
1.5
1 .7
4.5
4.2
1 3.1
4 6.3
18 1.6
183.
139.3
265 .7
386 .9
1077 .4
1 690.7
1 197 .9
16 1 6.7
1 8 96.7
3 058
United Kingdo m
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
United States
1 3.61 %
57 .49 %
49.8 9%
3 3.45%
43.1 7%
3 1.9 7%
28 .0 6%
2 7.72%
1 9 .08 %
20 .93%
2 4.40%
1 5 .39 %
United Kingdo m
3 7.37 %
24 .17 %
21.4 2%
2 9.15%
24.7 6%
2 4.5 0%
6 .5 0%
6.65%
4 .18 %
7 .63%
9.56%
2 .79 %
Germany
7.99 %
0 .06 %
4.8 6%
8.90%
8.0 5%
6.6 4%
5 .6 4%
5.99%
4 .62 %
5 .52%
4.13%
1 .39 %
France
0.65 %
0 .06 %
0.8 2%
0.57%
0.6 4%
0.6 2%
1 .2 1%
3.12%
1 .14 %
1 .63%
1.34%
0 .92 %
Spain
0.00 %
0 .06 %
0.0 5%
0.07%
0.1 9%
1.5 0%
0 .0 0%
0.53%
0 .38 %
0 .71%
2.28%
1 .07 %
Italy
0.43 %
0 .33 %
0.2 2%
1.58%
0.7 9%
0.6 5%
1 .1 6%
0.59%
0 .31 %
1 .81%
1.28%
1 .38 %
Japan
3.02 %
0 .06 %
0.1 1%
4.81%
7.6 4%
1 2.3 0%
9 .8 9%
4.12%
3 .02 %
4 .48%
6.92%
1 .96 %
Argentina
6.26 %
6 .99 %
4.5 9%
5.89%
3.0 9%
6.9 8%
19 .4 3%
1 8.65%
3 7 .75 %
19 .18%
1 2.73%
1 1 .66 %
Brazil
1.08 %
1 .21 %
1.0 4%
3.30%
1.2 8%
1.0 1%
9 .1 3%
6.61%
7 .89 %
12 .12%
9.07%
1 8 .83 %
Chile
1.94 %
2 .26 %
0.7 1%
2.08%
0.9 0%
1.1 1%
1 .5 1%
3.96%
1 .74 %
7 .52%
5.45%
5 .74 %
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.43%
0.0 0%
0.0 3%
0 .0 8%
0.04%
0 .11 %
0 .39%
0.34%
0 .90 %
P eru
5.40 %
3 .91 %
3.0 1%
1.94%
0.7 2%
2.1 2%
1 .4 9%
3.07%
2 .28 %
4 .66%
0.72%
5 .72 %
Uruguay
0.22 %
0 .22 %
0.4 9%
0.14%
0.0 4%
0.0 5%
0 .4 3%
0.09%
0 .14 %
0 .28%
0.22%
0 .43 %
P araguay
2 00 1
29
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
30
Table 3
Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 19 3 8 to 2 001
(Top part of table figures in million of U.S. dollars, except 1938 and 1 94 8 are millio n of cruzeiros, bo ttom portio n value as percentage of to tal trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 83
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
3 00 7.2
2026 3.6
9 10.4
1 006.8
845 .5
1 594 .1
4717 .8
8 122.6
7 678 .8
122 3 7.9
14 5 12.6
2 64 1 6.2
98 6.1
416 4.9
78.0
11 5.7 48
92 .2
288 .1
699 .2
1 032.4
971 .7
14 0 4.8
1 6 99.3
31 6 6.4
2 26 9.9
24 9.5
1 92.4
225.8
237 .8
594 .8
2161 .3
3 072.0
1 885 .2
36 0 3.9
4 2 27.4
71 3 0.3
49 2.9
105 0.0
1 22.7
111.7
89 .7
198 .6
622 .9
1 541.7
1 379 .5
15 3 7.6
1 5 31.3
33 8 5.9
7.9
61 0.0
56.1
35.8
31 .1
139 .4
480 .3
739.8
602 .9
9 4 4.1
9 32.0
21 4 9.2
Italy
20 2.0
96 9.7
96.3
77.1
110 .7
241 .8
982 .8
1 394.6
1 206 .6
23 4 6.8
2 3 17.5
36 5 7.1
Japan
30 2.3
1 6.6
1 01.3
68.7
66 .7
322 .8
1928 .3
2 423.3
2 050 .1
39 5 9.5
3 9 77.2
45 5 0.0
Argentina
84 5.0
355 1.2
2 51.7
151.3
272 .9
369 .0
635 .4
1 932.2
1 027 .8
21 5 9.5
6 4 67.5
73 6 1.8
Bolivia
n/a
n/a
n/a
4.6
1 .8
7 .8
98 .4
227.4
128 .0
1 8 1.9
4 30.6
4 2 0.6
Colombia
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3 .8
9 .1
31 .8
135.6
n/a
1 9 7.0
4 41.2
6 3 6.6
P araguay
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.4
2 .7
12 .6
145 .9
507.6
266 .1
7 1 5.2
1 2 36.1
9 4 8.9
P eru
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.9
24 .2
17 .8
140 .1
260.6
135 .1
2 8 7.5
4 06.5
n/a
10 9.3
50 5.4
61.9
17.1
19 .5
42 .6
154 .7
513.4
237 .9
8 8 8.3
1 2 14.5
9 0 8.9
United Kingdo m
Germany
France
Spain
Uruguay
Venezuela
1.6
32 7.7
93.3
115.8
85 .2
67 .2
225 .1
827.6
987 .7
6 6 4.5
7 94.7
14 7 1.6
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
1 0 29 2.5
4268 1.8
27 30.1
2 730.9
2691 .9
5 583 .4
22247 .8
45 080.9
38 681 .7
538 5 5.0
66 3 79.7
1 100 967
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 83
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
2 9.22 %
47 .48 %
33.3 5%
3 6.87%
31.4 1%
2 8.5 5%
21 .2 1%
1 8.02%
1 9 .85 %
22 .72%
2 1.86%
23.99%
9.58 %
9 .76 %
2.8 6%
4.24%
3.4 3%
5.1 6%
3 .1 4%
2.29%
2 .51 %
2 .61%
2.56%
2.88%
2 2.05 %
0 .58 %
7.0 5%
8.27%
8.8 3%
1 0.6 5%
9 .7 1%
6.81%
4 .87 %
6 .69%
6.37%
6.48%
France
4.79 %
2 .46 %
4.4 9%
4.09%
3.3 3%
3.5 6%
2 .8 0%
3.42%
3 .57 %
2 .86%
2.31%
3.08%
Spain
0.08 %
1 .43 %
2.0 5%
1.31%
1.1 6%
2.5 0%
2 .1 6%
1.64%
1 .56 %
1 .75%
1.40%
1.95%
Italy
1.96 %
2 .27 %
3.5 3%
2.82%
4.1 1%
4.3 3%
4 .4 2%
3.09%
3 .12 %
4 .36%
3.49%
3.32%
Japan
2.94 %
0 .04 %
3.7 1%
2.52%
2.4 8%
5.7 8%
8 .6 7%
5.38%
5 .30 %
7 .35%
5.99%
4.13%
Argentina
8.21 %
8 .32 %
9.2 2%
5.54%
10.1 4%
6.6 1%
2 .8 6%
4.29%
2 .66 %
4 .01%
9.74%
6.69%
Bolivia
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.17%
0.0 7%
0.1 4%
0 .4 4%
0.50%
0 .33 %
0 .34%
0.65%
0.38%
Colombia
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.1 4%
0.1 6%
0 .1 4%
0.30%
n/a
0 .37%
0.66%
0.58%
P araguay
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.01%
0.1 0%
0.2 3%
0 .6 6%
1.13%
0 .69 %
1 .33%
1.86%
0.86%
P eru
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.11%
0.9 0%
0.3 2%
0 .6 3%
0.58%
0 .35 %
0 .53%
0.90%
0.00%
Uruguay
1.06 %
1 .18 %
2.2 7%
0.63%
0.7 2%
0.7 6%
0 .7 0%
1.14%
0 .62 %
1 .65%
1.83%
0.83%
Venezuela
0.02 %
0 .77 %
3.4 2%
4.24%
3.1 7%
1.2 0%
1 .0 1%
1.84%
2 .55 %
1 .23%
1.20%
1.34%
United Kingdo m
Germany
31
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
32
Table 4
Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1 93 8 to 20 01
(Top part of table figures in million o f U. S. do llars, except fo r 19 38 thro ugh 1 965 in million of Chilean peso s de o ro, bottom po rtio n value as P ercentage o f to tal trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
24 6.4
139 8.6
17 62.9
2 044.0
2185 .2
521 .6
733 .1
2 168.6
1 468 .3
27 1 3.4
3 9 10.0
64 5 9.7
United Kingdo m
19 9.3
21 1.5
4 88.5
592.5
561 .6
212 .2
227 .4
416.4
345 .5
6 7 4.0
6 95.7
14 3 6.6
Germany
19 7.2
1 2.6
4 39.9
650.7
748 .5
250 .4
366 .1
906.5
584 .9
14 2 4.9
1 0 58.3
12 3 1.1
4 0.6
14 2.8
60.0
130.1
162 .2
100 .3
110 .3
392.6
222 .1
6 8 9.0
7 07.6
1 194
2.1
2 8.2
68.9
32.4
73 .0
51 .1
108 .4
278.1
181 .5
4 3 1.7
5 21.7
8 1 8.2
Italy
4 1.0
9 0.4
1 63.5
123.9
183 .5
117 .1
106 .0
397.2
249 .8
5 9 9.9
6 66.0
12 6 5.2
Japan
2 3.1
1.1
13.9
100.4
404 .1
177 .5
290 .9
1 109.3
586 .2
19 3 7.7
2 4 25.5
28 6 0.4
Argentina
3 1.8
19 2.2
4 09.7
278.9
376 .9
171 .8
490 .2
524.6
190 .4
6 1 5.9
1 1 68.6
36 9 2.8
3.8
1 3.2
6.9
9.7
7 .3
2 .3
41 .4
82.4
187 .8
9 4.7
1 75.3
1 6 5.2
3 4.0
18 7.0
1 56.2
124.1
138 .8
49 .2
50 .9
138.3
86 .7
1 2 4.6
2 78.4
8 7 2.0
1 18 1.9
290 7.0
41 31.2
4 804.3
6269 .1
2 163 .7
3537 .5
10 638.6
6 536 .8
153 1 4.3
19 6 10.5
3 48 8 1.6
France
Spain
Bolivia
P eru
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
2 0.85 %
48 .11 %
42.6 7%
4 2.55%
34.8 6%
2 4.1 1%
20 .7 2%
2 0.38%
2 2 .46 %
17 .72%
1 9.94%
18.52%
United Kingdo m
1 6.86 %
7 .28 %
11.8 2%
1 2.33%
8.9 6%
9.8 1%
6 .4 3%
3.91%
5 .29 %
4 .40%
3.55%
4.12%
Germany
1 6.68 %
0 .43 %
10.6 5%
1 3.54%
11.9 4%
1 1.5 7%
10 .3 5%
8.52%
8 .95 %
9 .30%
5.40%
3.53%
France
3.44 %
4 .91 %
1.4 5%
2.71%
2.5 9%
4.6 4%
3 .1 2%
3.69%
3 .40 %
4 .50%
3.61%
3.42%
Spain
0.18 %
0 .97 %
1.6 7%
0.67%
1.1 6%
2.3 6%
3 .0 6%
2.61%
2 .78 %
2 .82%
2.66%
2.35%
Italy
3.47 %
3 .11 %
3.9 6%
2.58%
2.9 3%
5.4 1%
3 .0 0%
3.73%
3 .82 %
3 .92%
3.40%
3.63%
Japan
1.95 %
0 .04 %
0.3 4%
2.09%
6.4 5%
8.2 0%
8 .2 2%
1 0.43%
8 .97 %
12 .65%
1 2.37%
8.20%
Argentina
2.69 %
6 .61 %
9.9 2%
5.81%
6.0 1%
7.9 4%
13 .8 6%
4.93%
2 .91 %
4 .02%
5.96%
10.59%
Bolivia
0.32 %
0 .45 %
0.1 7%
0.20%
0.1 2%
0.1 1%
1 .1 7%
0.77%
2 .87 %
0 .62%
0.89%
0.47%
P eru
2.88 %
6 .43 %
3.7 8%
2.58%
2.2 1%
2.2 7%
1 .4 4%
1.30%
1 .33 %
0 .81%
1.42%
2.50%
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
33
Table 5
Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1 938 to 200 1
(To p part of table figures in million o f U. S. do llars, except for 1938, 1 948, and 19 55 in million o f Colombian pesos, bo tto m po rtio n value as P ercentage of total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
15 7.8
83 0.9
21 28.2
594.0
46 3..9
658 .2
182 .8
2 908.7
2 621 .9
49 8 4.2
6 2 92.8
97 8 7.3
United Kingdo m
2 0.4
3 5.7
83.9
50.8
43 .8
50 .9
98 .1
153.9
205 .0
3 3 5.3
3 21.4
4 6 6.9
Germany
4 8.6
1.0
2 71.1
108.0
114 .4
176 .5
356 .0
1 074.9
840 .3
10 4 7.7
1 1 40.6
9 7 7.0
France
1 2.1
1 0.9
58.7
18.2
10 .3
24 .7
102 .9
222.8
211 .4
3 4 2.8
3 52.6
4 9 0.6
Spain
0.1
0.6
22.6
3.8
35 .9
82 .3
93 .3
294.5
205 .9
2 3 7.8
3 45.4
3 8 7.2
Italy
3.8
9.3
26.4
11.3
14 .4
27 .7
77 .7
184.5
166 .8
1 9 2.3
3 87.8
5 9 7.2
Japan
0.4
0.0
21.8
18.0
19 .5
79 .7
165 .3
581.7
578 .5
7 5 5.2
1 3 34.0
7 2 3.7
Brazil
0.3
9.0
1.4
n/a
15 .3
6 .8
31 .8
136.0
135 .1
2 1 6.8
5 17.3
7 4 8.8
Ecuado r
0.1
6.6
18.4
2.7
10 .4
27 .5
57 .3
154.8
137 .7
1 2 0.0
4 09.4
10 1 8.1
P eru
0.1
1 7.3
9.4
4.3
9 .9
38 .5
51 .6
126.2
140 .3
1 8 9.8
3 00.7
2 7 7.5
Venezuela
1.4
4.5
8.2
3.1
3 .5
13 .9
108 .8
476.2
367 .5
5 2 5.0
1 6 61.1
25 3 0.1
30 3.7
109 4.0
31 32.9
983.2
992 .6
1 570 .7
2959 .7
8 607.6
7 682 .5
123 5 3.5
17 2 95.5
2 51 2 1.9
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
United States
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
5 1.96 %
75 .95 %
67.9 3%
6 0.41%
46.7 4%
4 1.9 0%
6.72 %
3 .26 %
2.6 8%
5.17%
4.4 1%
3.2 4%
6 .1 8%
3 3.79%
3 4 .13 %
40 .35%
3 6.38%
38.96%
3 .3 1%
1.79%
2 .67 %
2 .71%
1.86%
1 6.00 %
0 .09 %
8.6 5%
1 0.98%
11.5 3%
1.86%
1 1.2 4%
12 .0 3%
1 2.49%
1 0 .94 %
8 .48%
6.59%
France
3.98 %
1 .00 %
1.8 7%
1.85%
3.89%
1.0 4%
1.5 7%
3 .4 8%
2.59%
2 .75 %
2 .77%
2.04%
Spain
0.03 %
0 .05 %
0.7 2%
1.95%
0.39%
3.6 2%
5.2 4%
3 .1 5%
3.42%
2 .68 %
1 .92%
2.00%
Italy
1.25 %
0 .85 %
1.54%
0.8 4%
1.15%
1.4 5%
1.7 6%
2 .6 3%
2.14%
2 .17 %
1 .56%
2.24%
Japan
0.13 %
2.38%
0 .00 %
0.7 0%
1.83%
1.9 6%
5.0 7%
5 .5 9%
6.76%
7 .53 %
6 .11%
7.71%
Brazil
2.88%
0.10 %
0 .82 %
0.0 4%
n/a
1.5 4%
0.4 3%
1 .0 7%
1.58%
1 .76 %
1 .75%
2.99%
2.98%
Ecuado r
0.03 %
0 .60 %
0.5 9%
0.27%
1.0 5%
1.7 5%
1 .9 4%
1.80%
1 .79 %
0 .97%
2.37%
4.05%
P eru
0.03 %
1 .58 %
0.3 0%
0.44%
1.0 0%
2.4 5%
1 .7 4%
1.47%
1 .83 %
1 .54%
1.74%
1.10%
Venezuela
0.46 %
0 .41 %
0.2 6%
0.32%
0.3 5%
0.8 8%
3 .6 8%
5.53%
4 .78 %
4 .25%
9.60%
10.07%
United Kingdo m
Germany
19 75
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
34
Table 6
Ecuado r’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 19 38 to 2 00 1
(To p part of table figures in millio n of U.S. dollars, botto m portion value as P ercentage of total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
8.1
4 4.8
1 01.4
114.1
139 .0
189 .3
805 .0
1 667.9
2 183 .1
20 2 5.1
2 2 28.9
United Kingdo m
1.4
2.8
6.1
6.6
7 .7
0 .5
38 .8
64.8
39 .8
4 3.1
41.0
8 4.8
Germany
4.6
0.1
17.9
24.3
37 .4
17 .6
122 .3
193.9
158 .7
2 1 9.5
2 41.4
3 6 1.3
France
1.4
0.5
3.2
4.2
7 .3
3 .4
26 .2
45.8
32 .0
5 9.4
1 05.0
8 9.2
Spain
0.1
0.0
0.9
0.2
1 .1
1 .0
18 .2
54.6
45 .3
1 1 2.8
2 44.5
1 7 4.8
Italy
0.5
2.3
4.7
5.03
7 .4
6 .3
39 .6
195.4
48 .4
1 4 0.2
2 21.4
3 1 0.4
Japan
1.1
0.0
1.2
4.4
11 .7
57 .8
132 .9
611.5
259 .1
2 2 1.3
3 89.1
4 9 8.6
Colombia
0.2
2.5
6.9
3.1
10 .3
17 .9
58 .2
157.1
86 .5
8 9.8
1 63.7
10 8 6.7
P eru
1.0
2.2
3.3
1.7
1 .8
8 .6
73 .2
91.4
36 .4
1 6 7.6
1 28.1
4 3 3.1
2 2.4
7 8.6
1 79.0
206.3
280 .9
444 .1
1846 .3
4 695.5
4 298 .2
45 1 7.2
5 5 37.4
1 00 1 0.4
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
30 2 2.2
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
3 6.16 %
57 .00 %
56.6 5%
5 5.31%
49.4 8%
4 2.6 3%
43 .6 0%
3 5.52%
5 0 .79 %
44 .83%
4 0.25%
30.19%
6.25 %
3 .56 %
3.4 1%
3.20%
2.7 4%
0.1 1%
2 .1 0%
1.38%
0 .93 %
0 .95%
0.74%
0.85%
2 0.54 %
0 .13 %
10.0 0%
1 1.78%
13.3 1%
3.9 6%
6 .6 2%
4.13%
3 .69 %
4 .86%
4.36%
3.61%
France
6.25 %
0 .64 %
1.7 9%
2.04%
2.6 0%
0.7 7%
1 .4 2%
0.98%
0 .74 %
1 .31%
1.90%
0.89%
Spain
0.45 %
0 .00 %
0.5 0%
0.10%
0.3 9%
0.2 3%
0 .9 9%
1.16%
1 .05 %
2 .50%
4.42%
1.75%
Italy
2.23 %
2 .93 %
2.6 3%
2.44%
2.6 3%
1.4 2%
2 .1 4%
4.16%
1 .13 %
3 .10%
4.00%
3.10%
Japan
4.91 %
0 .00 %
0.6 7%
2.13%
4.1 7%
1 3.0 2%
7 .2 0%
1 3.02%
6 .03 %
4 .90%
7.03%
4.98%
Colombia
0.89 %
3 .18 %
3.8 5%
1.50%
3.6 7%
4.0 3%
3 .1 5%
3.35%
2 .01 %
1 .99%
2.96%
10.86%
P eru
4.46 %
2 .80 %
1.8 4%
0.82%
0.6 4%
1.9 4%
3 .9 6%
1.95%
0 .85 %
3 .71%
2.31%
4.33%
United Kingdo m
Germany
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations) .
35
Table 7
P araguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1 93 8 to 2 00 1
(To p part of table figures in millio n of U.S. dollars, botto m portion value as P ercentage of total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
1.5
6.9
10.4
14.9
24 .9
23 .9
37 .8
68.4
68 .2
2 1 1.7
2 90.8
1 5 8.2
United Kingdo m
1.6
5.1
5.3
5.1
9 .0
10 .2
34 .5
30.6
24 .0
5 4.1
69.1
3 9.2
Germany
1.7
0.0
3.0
4.9
10 .7
13 .4
36 .6
71.9
57 .2
1 0 9.2
64.5
6 7.3
France
0.2
0.0
2.0
0.6
2 .4
4 .8
10 .5
17.0
38 .1
4 8.3
35.3
2 7.9
Spain
0.0
0.0
0.9
2.9
3 .8
3 .7
5 .9
10.3
15 .0
2 0.5
14.8
3 3.7
Italy
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.6
2 .0
1 .8
2 .9
10.7
9 .6
5 1.4
38.3
6 9.8
Japan
1.1
0.0
0.0
2.1
3 .3
5 .3
12 .5
53.3
81 .4
2 1 1.1
2 04.9
1 0 8.1
Argentina
4.3
1 7.4
28.6
15.1
24 .5
31 .1
82 .9
180.6
138 .9
2 2 7.9
3 07.3
5 8 7.3
Bolivia
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.1
0 .1
0 .1
0 .5
0.6
0 .1
6.3
5.2
2 7.2
Brazil
0.1
1.4
0.1
0.4
1 .6
2 .9
42 .8
180.7
235 .3
5 3 4.7
5 84.6
8 8 0.7
1 4.4
5 2.4
64.1
59.4
104 .6
126 .7
361 .8
827.3
920 .2
23 0 7.3
2 4 13.2
31 7 2.2
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
United States
1 0.42 %
13 .17 %
16.2 2%
2 5.08%
23.8 0%
1 8.8 6%
10 .4 5%
8.27%
7 .41 %
9 .18%
1 2.05%
4.99%
United Kingdo m
1 1.11 %
9 .73 %
8.2 7%
8.59%
8.6 0%
8.0 5%
9 .5 4%
3.70%
2 .61 %
2 .34%
2.86%
1.24%
Germany
1 1.81 %
0 .00 %
4.6 8%
8.25%
10.2 3%
1 0.5 8%
10 .1 2%
8.69%
6 .22 %
4 .73%
2.67%
2.12%
France
1.39 %
0 .00 %
3.1 2%
1.01%
2.2 9%
3.7 9%
2 .9 0%
2.05%
4 .14 %
2 .09%
1.46%
0.88%
Spain
0.00 %
0 .00 %
1.4 0%
4.88%
3.6 3%
2.9 2%
1 .6 3%
1.25%
1 .63 %
0 .89%
0.61%
1.06%
Italy
0.69 %
0 .00 %
0.9 4%
1.01%
1.9 1%
1.4 2%
0 .8 0%
1.29%
1 .04 %
2 .23%
1.59%
2.20%
Japan
7.64 %
0 .00 %
0.0 0%
3.54%
3.1 5%
4.1 8%
3 .4 5%
6.44%
8 .85 %
9 .15%
8.49%
3.41%
2 9.86 %
33 .21 %
44.6 2%
2 5.42%
23.4 2%
2 4.5 5%
22 .9 1%
2 1.83%
1 5 .09 %
9 .88%
1 2.73%
18.51%
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.17%
0.1 0%
0.0 8%
0 .1 4%
0.07%
0 .01 %
0 .27%
0.22%
0.86%
0.69 %
2 .67 %
0.1 6%
0.67%
1.5 3%
2.2 9%
11 .8 3%
2 1.84%
2 5 .57 %
23 .17%
2 4.23%
27.76%
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
36
Table 8
P eru’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 193 8 to 2 0 01
(To p part of table figures in million o f U. S. dollars, except fo r 193 8 tro ugh 195 5 in millio n of P eruvian soles, botto m portion value as P ercentage o f total trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
18 0.9
85 0.7
47 37.4
8 756.6
17307 .1
544 .7
1172 .1
2 004.4
1 732 .5
14 7 4.0
1 9 54.0
33 8 5.1
United Kingdo m
9 4.7
24 5.7
10 34.8
1 625.8
1591 .2
53 .2
152 .0
213.3
134 .9
1 7 5.6
1 94.7
10 1 3.8
Germany
8 8.9
4.1
8 67.4
2 356.7
5159 .4
232 .6
355 .2
396.3
212 .1
3 8 0.4
3 70.1
4 3 0.7
France
2 8.8
2 2.0
2 86.3
449.0
816 .6
30 .8
93 .0
86.3
84 .1
6 1.6
1 27.1
2 0 5.6
Spain
n/a
n/a
n/a
39.8
514 .0
32 .5
45 .0
70.7
87 .6
6 4.5
1 03.8
3 7 7.8
Italy
7.5
2 7.7
1 43.6
450.3
1346 .9
43 .2
105 .8
210.0
91 .6
1 9 5.5
2 35.0
2 7 3.6
1 0.7
2 0.3
2 92.3
1 067.4
3631 .2
190 .8
342 .9
554.8
401 .0
3 9 1.8
6 20.5
8 1 2.1
Bolivia
4.3
4 0.5
1 22.3
85.3
43 .7
2 .7
14 .8
105.4
29 .2
5 7.3
1 08.9
1 4 8.1
Brazil
6.9
1 0.2
13.2
71.7
276 .2
13 .4
86 .0
201.5
148 .6
2 7 0.4
3 86.9
5 5 4.8
2 5.9
23 4.9
7 62.8
541.0
626 .2
17 .8
107 .8
107.7
92 .6
1 4 7.7
2 28.6
7 1 0.4
4.7
2 5.1
78.3
126.4
181 .4
8 .7
80 .5
96.6
18 .4
1 6 5.0
1 69.7
4 6 8.6
60 2.3
214 6.4
1 09 10.4
22 019.1
42394 .2
1 666 .1
3801 .4
5 838.8
4 341 .8
59 4 6.7
7 5 51.1
1 41 4 1.5
Japan
Chile
Ecuado r
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 84
1 99 0
199 5
United States
3 0.03 %
39 .63 %
43.4 2%
3 9.77%
40.8 2%
3 2.6 9%
30 .8 3%
3 4.33%
3 9 .90 %
24 .79%
2 5.88%
2 3 .94 %
United Kingdo m
1 5.72 %
11 .45 %
9.4 8%
7.38%
3.7 5%
3.1 9%
4 .0 0%
3.65%
3 .11 %
2 .95%
2.58%
7 .17 %
Germany
1 4.76 %
0 .19 %
7.9 5%
1 0.70%
12.1 7%
1 3.9 6%
9 .3 4%
6.79%
4 .89 %
6 .40%
4.90%
3 .05 %
4.78 %
1 .02 %
2.6 2%
2.04%
1.9 3%
1.8 5%
2 .4 5%
1.48%
1 .94 %
1 .04%
1.68%
1 .45 %
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.18%
1.2 1%
1.9 5%
1 .1 8%
1.21%
2 .02 %
1 .08%
1.37%
2 .67 %
Italy
1.25 %
1 .29 %
1.3 2%
2.05%
3.1 8%
2.5 9%
2 .7 8%
3.60%
2 .11 %
3 .29%
3.11%
1 .93 %
Japan
1.78 %
0 .95 %
2.6 8%
4.85%
8.5 7%
1 1.4 5%
9 .0 2%
9.50%
9 .24 %
6 .59%
8.22%
5 .74 %
Bolivia
0.71 %
1 .89 %
1.1 2%
0.39%
0.1 0%
0.1 6%
0 .3 9%
1.81%
0 .67 %
0 .96%
1.44%
1 .05 %
Brazil
1.15 %
0 .48 %
0.1 2%
0.33%
0.6 5%
0.8 0%
2 .2 6%
3.45%
3 .42 %
4 .55%
5.12%
3 .92 %
Chile
4.30 %
10 .94 %
6.9 9%
2.46%
1.4 8%
1.0 7%
2 .8 4%
1.84%
2 .13 %
2 .48%
3.03%
5 .02 %
Ecuado r
0.78 %
1 .17 %
0.7 2%
0.57%
0.4 3%
0.5 2%
2 .1 2%
1.65%
0 .42 %
2 .77%
2.25%
3 .31 %
France
Spain
2 00 1
37
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
38
Table 9
Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W orld and Adjacent Intraregio nal Trading P artners, 1 938 to 2 00 1
(Top part o f table figures in million of U.S. do llars, except 1938 is in million o f Uruguayan pesos, bo ttom portio n value as P ercentage o f to tal trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
United States
1 2.7
11 9.0
60.0
85.0
52 .6
50 .0
78 .5
243.6
183 .4
3 0 0.5
3 57.5
4 4 9.8
United Kingdo m
4 0.4
5 7.9
49.6
49.6
45 .5
35 .6
41 .7
106.4
52 .9
1 1 2.8
98.6
1 0 3.9
Germany
3 5.0
4.5
24.7
29.6
33 .8
56 .1
84 .9
248.3
115 .5
2 2 2.9
1 83.8
1 9 0.4
France
8.8
1 1.5
21.1
15.4
17 .0
10 .6
18 .5
44.0
26 .3
9 3.7
1 00.2
1 4 5.4
Spain
0.4
0.9
1.0
3.2
15 .6
11 .5
16 .6
26.4
17 .4
3 7.3
70.8
1 6 5.0
Italy
7.4
1 8.4
16.3
11.4
20 .5
28 .8
33 .6
92.8
37 .6
1 2 4.5
2 84.0
1 7 1.2
Japan
5.2
0.9
5.7
1.1
2 .4
5 .1
16 .6
77.2
33 .6
6 5.9
1 38.6
6 1.8
1 2.6
2 0.7
1.3
12.2
11 .9
34 .8
70 .3
316.4
149 .4
3 0 1.2
7 11.2
10 2 2.2
9.3
2 9.6
64.5
15.6
18 .9
47 .5
118 .8
477.5
269 .1
8 3 6.0
9 74.2
10 6 6.6
1 71 .27
380 .4 1
4 09.6
372.2
341 .6
465 .8
872 .3
2 710.8
1 560 .4
31 1 0.2
3 9 36.1
51 1 8.4
Argentina
Brazil
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 85
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
7.42 %
31 .28 %
14.6 5%
2 2.84%
15.4 0%
1 0.7 3%
9 .0 0%
8.99%
1 1 .75 %
9 .66%
9.08%
8 .79 %
United Kingdo m
2 3.59 %
15 .22 %
12.1 1%
1 3.33%
13.3 2%
7.6 4%
4 .7 8%
3.93%
3 .39 %
3 .63%
2.51%
2 .03 %
Germany
2 0.44 %
1 .18 %
6.0 3%
7.95%
9.8 9%
1 2.0 4%
9 .7 3%
9.16%
7 .40 %
7 .17%
4.67%
3 .72 %
France
5.14 %
3 .02 %
5.1 5%
4.14%
4.9 8%
2.2 8%
2 .1 2%
1.62%
1 .69 %
3 .01%
2.55%
2 .84 %
Spain
0.23 %
0 .24 %
0.2 4%
0.86%
4.5 7%
2.4 7%
1 .9 0%
0.97%
1 .12 %
1 .20%
1.80%
3 .22 %
Italy
4.32 %
4 .84 %
6.4 8%
3.06%
6.0 0%
6.1 8%
3 .8 5%
3.42%
2 .41 %
4 .00%
7.22%
3 .34 %
Japan
3.04 %
0 .24 %
1.3 9%
0.30%
0.7 0%
1.0 9%
1 .9 0%
2.85%
2 .15 %
2 .12%
3.52%
1 .21 %
Argentina
7.36 %
5 .44 %
0.3 2%
3.28%
3.4 8%
7.4 7%
8 .0 6%
1 1.67%
9 .57 %
9 .68%
1 8.07%
1 9 .97 %
Brazil
5.43 %
7 .78 %
15.7 5%
4.19%
5.5 3%
1 0.2 0%
13 .6 2%
1 7.61%
1 7 .25 %
26 .88%
2 4.75%
2 0 .84 %
39
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
40
Table 1 0
Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its P rincipal W o rld and Adjacent Intraregional Trading P artners, 1 9 38 to 200 1
(To p part o f table figures in million o f U. S. do llars, except for 1938 through 1965 in million o f Venezuelan bolivares, botto m portion value as P ercentage o f to tal trade)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
United States
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 83
1 99 0
199 5
2 00 1
29 3.2
312 5.5
41 85.4
5 579.0
7400 .0
1 932 .7
6374 .1
10 411.9
7 579 .6
123 8 7.2
13 6 73.5
1 98 5 2.5
United Kingdo m
5 0.8
20 7.2
4 81.2
856.2
1295 .6
238 .7
558 .6
504.3
387 .8
3 6 6.3
3 64.1
5 3 6.8
Germany
6 5.7
1 0.3
3 12.2
404.7
686 .7
203 .0
608 .7
890.0
878 .8
13 1 2.6
9 68.3
7 9 4.7
France
2 0.5
10 3.2
1 44.6
223.1
411 .8
100 .2
238 .5
646.8
461 .2
3 9 4.6
3 87.6
5 2 6.7
Spain
2.8
2 1.6
57.9
96.2
239 .7
66 .5
229 .4
966.7
347 .6
2 8 6.5
2 82.6
8 7 4.5
Italy
9.3
5 8.4
1 21.1
279.7
379 .9
123 .7
443 .9
1 517.2
1 121 .4
5 1 2.4
5 97.9
7 2 9.4
Japan
6.1
1.5
56.4
129.7
420 .1
155 .5
496 .4
1 547.7
748 .5
7 5 8.9
1 0 84.5
8 8 8.7
Brazil
0.6
5 1.8
2 44.1
288.6
385 .8
67 .8
218 .6
897.4
883 .7
6 1 0.9
7 75.1
16 4 9.9
Colombia
2.3
1 1.3
2.1
11.2
18 .2
16 .0
107 .0
459.7
385 .2
5 2 4.2
1 3 79.6
2 163
Guyana
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0 .2
4 .5
34.1
17 .5
1 3.5
15.7
3 0.1
1 19 9.2
629 4.2
93 68.3
12 072.9
18726 .2
4 836 .8
14817 .0
29 962.0
20 647 .2
246 3 7.9
26 2 89.3
4 17 6 9.9
2 00 1
To tal Trade
(Including all Trading
P artners)
TRADING
P ARTNERS
1 938
1 948
1955
1960
19 65
19 70
19 75
1980
19 83
1 99 0
199 5
United States
2 4.45 %
49 .66 %
44.6 8%
4 6.21%
39.5 2%
3 9.9 6%
43 .0 2%
3 4.75%
3 6 .71 %
50 .28%
5 2.01%
4 7 .56 %
United Kingdo m
4.24 %
3 .29 %
5.1 4%
7.09%
6.9 2%
4.9 4%
3 .7 7%
1.68%
1 .88 %
1 .49%
1.38%
1 .29 %
Germany
5.48 %
0 .16 %
3.3 3%
3.35%
3.6 7%
4.2 0%
4 .1 1%
2.97%
4 .26 %
5 .33%
3.68%
1 .90 %
France
1.71 %
1 .64 %
1.5 4%
1.85%
2.2 0%
2.0 7%
1 .6 1%
2.16%
2 .23 %
1 .60%
1.47%
1 .26 %
Spain
0.23 %
0 .34 %
0.6 2%
0.80%
1.2 8%
1.3 7%
1 .5 5%
3.23%
1 .68 %
1 .16%
1.07%
2 .10 %
Italy
0.78 %
0 .93 %
1.2 9%
2.32%
2.0 3%
2.5 6%
3 .0 0%
5.06%
5 .43 %
2 .08%
2.27%
1 .75 %
Japan
0.51 %
0 .02 %
0.6 0%
1.07%
2.2 4%
3.2 1%
3 .3 5%
5.17%
3 .63 %
3 .08%
4.13%
2 .13 %
Brazil
0.05 %
0 .82 %
2.6 1%
2.39%
2.0 6%
1.4 0%
1 .4 8%
3.00%
4 .28 %
2 .48%
2.95%
3 .95 %
Colombia
4.48 %
6 .50 %
11.3 6%
0.09%
0.1 0%
0.3 3%
0 .7 2%
1.53%
1 .87 %
2 .13%
5.25%
5 .18 %
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.0 0%
0 .0 3%
0.11%
0 .08 %
0 .05%
0.06%
0 .07 %
Guyana
So urce: United Nations, Yearbook o f In tern atio na l Tra de Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations).
41
Endnotes
1
This study follows the classification advanced by Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms:
International and Civil Wars, 1816 -1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 82 -99. Other
compilers, utilizing less stringent criteria, have counted seven and eleven wars respectively. See, Robert
Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830 -1905 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1965), p. 1; and Luard, War in International Society: A Study in
International Sociology.
2
Jack Child, "Conflicts in Latin America: Present and Potential," (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1980); Jorge I.
Domínguez, "Ghosts From the Past: War, Territorial and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South
America Since 1960," Unpublished Manuscript, Harvard University, May 1977 as cited by Gregory F.
Treverton, "Interstate Conflict in Latin America," in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, The United
States and Latin America in the 1980 's (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), pp. 565 591; Jorge I. Domínguez, "Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra," Foro
Internacional Vol. 25, No. 97 (Julio 1984), pp. 1 -13; Wolf Grabendorff, "Interstate Conflict Behavior and
Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America," Working Papers, No. 116, Latin American Program, The
Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1982; and Kenneth Nolde, "Arms and Security in South America:
Towards an Alternate View," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Miami, 1980, pp. 285-287.
3
For essentially two versions of the same study analyzing and modeling the opposite causal direction, that is,
the effect of international political relations on foreign trade flows, see Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still
Follow the Flag?," American Political Science Review , Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465 -480; and
Idem., "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral
Trade Flows," American Jo urnal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737-761.
4
Baron de Montesquieu, translated by Thomas Nugent The Spirit of the Laws, Book XX, Chapt. II (New
York: Hafner Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1949), p. 316. The original text in
French is more direct in establishing the connection between commerce and interstate peace; hence it is
included it here: "L'effet naturel du commerce est de porter à la paix. Deux nations qui négocient
ensemble se rendent réciproquement dépendantes: si l'une a intérêt d'acheter, l'autre a intérêt de vendre;
et toutes les unions sont fondées sur des besoins mutuels." Baron de Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois,
Tome II, Livre XX, Chapitre II (Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1956), pp. 8-9.
5
To understand, both, the mercantilist and liberal positions on foreign trade and economic interdependence,
this work has benefited from the following works. J.B. Condliffe, The Commerce of Nations (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Idem., GlobalPolitical Economy: Understanding the
International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Albert O. Hirschman,
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded edition (Los Angeles, CA.: University of
California Press, 1980); Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1937); Idem., International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, Ill.: Free
Press, 1952); Idem., The Long View and The Short One: Studies in Economic Theory and Policy (New
York: Free Press, 1958); Idem., "Power Versus Plenty As Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics Vol. I, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 1 -29; and Charles Wilson,
Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (New York: Longmans, Green, 1957).
6
Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 34.
7
Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 125.
8
John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy,
From the 5th London ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864), Vol. II, Book III, Chap. XVII, p.
136. Emphasis added.
9
Quoted by Richard N. Garner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our
International Economic Order (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 8-9.
10
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 24-29 for entire argument, and p. 29 for quotation.
42
11
See, for an example of a theoretical critique, Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International
Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization , Vol. 38 No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp.
597-624.
12
Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World
(New York: Basic Books, 1986).
13
Salomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 24 No. 1 (March
1980), pp. 55 -78; Idem., "Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International
Interactions," in Walter Isard and C. Anderton, eds. Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process
(Amsterdant: North-Holland, 1992), pp. 89 -120; Mark Gasiorowski and S. Polachek, "Conflict and
Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Detente," Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol.
26 No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 709-729.
14
This work establishes the "average share" by adding yearly shares, in this case of Venezuela's trade with
Colombia, and dividing the total by the number of data entries. Similarly, the "average share of the one-third
classificatory threshold" for several years is computed by finding, first, the percentage establishing one-third
of the total of each year's top trading partner. Then, all these yearly one-third shares are added and their sum
divided by the number of yearly entries.