University of Vermont
ScholarWorks @ UVM
UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors
Theses
Undergraduate Theses
2017
Investigating the Grassroots Activities of
Northeastern State Political Parties
Ruby Forelle LaBrusciano-Carris
University of Vermont
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses
Recommended Citation
LaBrusciano-Carris, Ruby Forelle, "Investigating the Grassroots Activities of Northeastern State Political Parties" (2017). UVM
College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses. 37.
http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses/37
This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for
inclusion in UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more
information, please contact [email protected].
InvestigatingtheGrassrootsActivitiesofNortheasternStatePoliticalParties
Author:RubyLaBrusciano-Carris
Advisor:AnthonyGierzynski
UniversityofVermont
2
ABSTRACT
Inresponsetopopularcriticismthatthemajorpartiesaremoreoligarchicorganizationsthan
democraticones,thisthesisbuildsuponpreviousresearchtoofferamorecurrentandnuanced
understandingofthegrassrootsactivitiesofstatepoliticalpartiesinthenortheasternU.S.
Throughinterviewswithstatepartyexecutiveandcampaigndirectors,theciviccapacityof
politicalpartiestopromoteparticipatorydemocraticactionwillbeassessed.Iwilldetermine
whetherthemajorstatepartiesaresuccessfullyengagingnewvoters/members,including
existingmembersinelectoralactivities,recruitingcandidates,andwhetherthemethods
employedcouldbedescribedasgrassroots.
3
INTRODUCTION
Anunsatisfied,oppositionalatmosphereincurrentpartisanpoliticshaveledsome
punditsandacademicstoreturntoanoldtrope:thattheAmericanpoliticalpartyisfading.
RichardKatzandPeterMairwrite,“’Moderndemocracyisunthinkablesaveintermsofthe
parties,’andifthepartiesarebeingfundamentallytransformed,whathappenstomodern
democracy?”(2009,p.762).In1914FrancesKellorpredictedthedisintegrationoftheparty,
andyetagaininthe1970sDavidBroderdeclaredthepartytobe“dead”.Stillsensingthis
climateinthelate1980s,CorneliusCotter,JamesGibson,JohnBibby,andRobertHuckshorn
embarkedonthemostcomprehensivestudyoftheAmericanpartysystemtodatewiththese
words:
Foratleasttwentyyears,politicalscientistsandjournalistshavebeenconductinga
deathwatchovertheAmericanparties…Someofthemoreimpatientwatchershave
gonesofarastoconducttheobsequieswithoutbenefitofthecorpse,whileothersare
seekingtoapplyresuscitationtechniques.(1989,p.168)
Withtheadditionofanotherfortyyears,thesamestatementcouldbemadetoday.
Apathy,discontent,andevendisgustwithAmerica’smajorpoliticalpartieshasreboundedthis
yearwithformidableprevalence.Intheaftermathofarowdy,populist-driven,2016election
season,therehasonceagainbeenaperceptionofdeclineinthevalueofpartyinfrastructure.
Thecurrentshareofpeoplewhochoosenottoidentifywitheitherpartyisatanall-timehigh.
In2016,aPewpollfoundthat39%ofRepublicansand26%ofDemocratssaidthatneither
partyrepresentedtheirinterestswell(PewResearchCenter,2016a).
4
Aswedecryapathy,polarization,andstricterpartylines,weperpetuatesomeofthe
sametime-wornworriesthatthedividesofthepoliticalpartiesaredetrimentaltoessential
democraticfunctions—namelycompromise.Inmakingthisclaim,itisoftenpositedthat
polarizationandthelackofinter-partycompromisemeansthatpoliticalpartiesare,overall,
badfordemocracy.Yetthisideaignoresanothervitalfacetofthedemocracythatpolitical
partieshavethepotentialtofoster:intra-partydemocracyandcivicculture.AsJonathonRauch
wroteinasummer2016issueofTheAtlantic:
Ourintricate,informalsystemofpoliticalintermediation,whichtookmanydecadesto
build,didnotcommitsuicideordieofoldage;wereformedittodeath.Fordecades,
well-meaningpoliticalreformershaveattackedintermediariesascorrupt,
undemocratic,unnecessary,or(usually)alloftheabove.Americanshavebeenbusy
demonizinganddisempoweringpoliticalprofessionalsandparties,whichislike
spendingdecadesabusingandattackingyourownimmunesystem.Eventually,youwill
getsick.
Thisdissatisfactionwiththepartiesisoftenexpressedthroughdenouncementof“the
establishment.”ThusmanyofthecomplaintslevelledagainstRepublicansandDemocrats
suggestthateliteleadershiphascreatedanoligarchicreign,diminisheddemocratic
participation,andledtopoorerconstituentresponsiveness.Inpoliticaltheoryterms,aparty
thatispartofthe“establishment”mightbecomparedtoKatzandMair’s“cartelparty”which
usesstateresourcestobolsteritsownelectoralsuccessratherthanworkingwithcitizensand
civilsociety(2009).
5
Thenaturalbacklashofthecartelpartycanbecharacterizedbytheriseofpopulists,
drivenbyanti-establishmentcallstoaction.AsKatzandMairputforth,“Onemaydisputethe
interpretationofcartelization,butwhatisbeyonddisputeisthepopularityofwhatisnow
oftenidentifiedasapopulist,anti-cartelrhetoric”(2009,p.760).Certainly,the2016election
cyclesawunprecedentedsurgesofsupportforpopulistcandidatessuchasBernieSandersor
thevictoriousDonaldTrump,bothcandidateswhorancampaignssupposedlyinoppositionto
“theestablishment”(seeRauch,2016orTaibbi,2016).Eveninmyownexperienceinterningfor
astateparty,Iwitnessedsimilarlocalallegationsthataneliteestablishmenthadtoomuch
controlovertheparty’spolitics.Duringarecentelectionforaninterimpartychairforexample,
alocalnewspaperremarkedontheheated“establishment”versus“outsider”accusations
betweensupportersofthetwocandidatesforthepositiononsocialmedia(Walters,2017).
Thesecomplaintsarecertainlylegitimatetosomeextent—weknowforexamplethat
certainDemocraticPartyleadersmockedtheSanderscampaigninprivateduringtheprimaries
whilepubliclyfeigningneutrality(Shear&Rosenberg,2016).Yet,asIbeganthisthesis,I
wonderedtowhatextentthebuzzoverinsidersandoutsiders,elitesandrenegades,was
appropriateatthestatelevel.Howmuchoftheriseofthesepopulistpoliticiansisbuilton
actualoligarchicfactorsormanipulatedalarm?Aretherereallyinsidersandoutsiderstothe
“partyestablishment”?
Inmyownexperience,Ihadseenalittleofbothsides.Ontheonehand,workingforthe
stateDemocraticPartyIwitnessedhowtheirrelianceondataandmicrotargetingduringthe
2016campaignhadinsomewaysdisconnectedthemfrommessagingandinteractingwith
voters.ButIalsoknewthatIhadconversationswithpartystaffersandaffiliateseverydaywho
6
saidthattheywantednothingmorethantoinvolvemorepeopleinthepoliticalprocessanddo
betterworkforthevotersintheircommunities.Thesesupposed“elites”weredesperateto
improvethegrassrootsnatureoftheirparty.YetwhileIheardthosethingsintheoffice,the
peoplethatIwascallinginphonebanksclaimedthatthepartywantednothingtodowith
them,thereforetheywantednothingtodowiththeparty.Thisfeltlikeafundamentalparadox:
howcouldpeopletakeadvantageofthedemocraticsupportthatpartiescanprovideifpolitical
partiesarepaintedaselite?Howcanthepartiesbecomemoregrassrootsandmoredemocratic
withoutthepeopletopowerthatmovement?Asoneofmyintervieweessaid:
Ontheonehand,there’sthisenergyandexcitementof‘weneedtogettoworknow!’
butontheotherhandthere’sthisbacklashagainsttheestablishmentwhichispartially
warranted,butmaybenotasblackandwhiteaspeoplearemakingitseem.
ElizabethSuper,whowroteherUniversityofEdinburghdissertationonpoliticalparty
volunteersinMassachusetts,putitthisway:
Theparadoxisthatwhilepoliticalscientistsmaybedeeplyconcernedaboutthestateof
politicalparticipationinthepresentday,currentresearchagendasdonotalways,or
evenfrequently,addresstheroleofpartyandcampaignorganizationswithrespectto
questionsaboutcivicandpoliticalparticipation.(2016,p.9)
Interestingly,researchersdooftenaddressthisquestioninrelationtothedemocratic
healthofothercountries.Itisnotunusualforcomparativepoliticalscientiststoinvestigatehow
foreignpoliticalpartiesarecontributingtothedemocratichealthofforeigncountries.
Democracybuildingthroughinstitutionbuildinghasbeenawell-exploredmethodof
democraticdevelopment.Yet,whilepitifulvoterturnoutandincreasinglyapatheticpublicleads
7
toassessmentsthatAmericandemocracyisonitsdeathbed,littleisbeingdonetoevaluate
whetherourownpoliticalpartiescanhelpreviveit.LikeSuper’sdissertation,thisthesisseeks
tofillthatgap,thoughIwillbefocusingonhowpartyleadershipisinitiatingthesegrassroots
effortsratherthanthemobilizationfactorsofindividualvolunteers.
Thegoalofmyresearchistoassessthecapacityofpoliticalpartiestopromote
participatorydemocraticactions.Myanalysisofpastresearchshowsthatpoliticalparties
remainmajorforcesincontemporarypolitics.Myownresearchnotonlyobserveswhat
practicesthesepartiesareusingandhowthepartyleadershipconceivesoftheirown
democraticrole,butattemptstoanalyzetheseobservationsthroughaframeworkof
participatoryandgrassrootsdemocracy.
Today’sAmericanpubliccouldbeconsideredhostiletopoliticalpartiesasaresultof
apathy,ideologicaldisagreement,andpopulistanti-partyrhetoric.Althoughmuchofthe
generalcriticismofpartyorganizationsisrestrictedtopublicopinionandpunditry,Ibelieve
thattheacademicworldstillhasaresponsibilitytoofferacontrasttotheseanalysesbecauseof
theintegralrolethatpoliticalpartiescanplayinbuildingparticipatorydemocracyinstatesand
localcommunities.Itiscriticaltoexaminedemocracy-buildingworkintheinterestofproviding
clarityastotheactualextentofthispotential.Ideally,withincreasedclaritywecanhavea
bettersenseofthespecificpracticesthatareoraren’tcontributingtodemocracy.Illuminating
parties’grassrootsactivitiesmighthelptoreducestigmaaroundpartyassociationsothatthe
institutionscanbebetterutilizedbythepublic.Betterunderstandingofthese“bestpractices”
mightevenencouragethemtoincreaseanddevelopwithinthepoliticalparties.
8
LITERATUREREVIEW
Asexplainedpreviously,whatislargelyregardedasthemostseminalworkrelatedto
statepoliticalpartyorganizationsisanimmensestudyundertakenbyCorneliusCotter,John
Bibby,JamesGibson,andRobertHuckshornandpublishedin1989.Whiletheirwork,largely
conductedthroughsurveyinstrumentsandstatisticalanalysis,addressesanincrediblybroad
arrayofsubjects,theirfocusisquiteexplicitlydifferentfrommyown.Astheywrite:
Ourcentralconcerniswhetherthestrengthofpartyorganizationsappearstoinfluence
theirrelationshipswithpartyofficeholders,notwhetherthereisarelationshipbetween
opinionandpolicy.Thusweoperateatoneendofthepublic-governmentlinkage
model,workingwithpartyandgovernmentratherthanpartyandpublic.Wearenot
concernedwithpartyasanagentofgovernmentinlinkageprocessesdirectedtoward
thepublic.(1989,p.107)
Theseresearcherssetouttoinvestigatetheideathatpoliticalpartieswere“inan
advancedstateofdecay.”Throughinvestigatingthestrengthofpartyorganizationsandthe
relationshipsbetweendifferentorganizationallevels,theyconcludedthattherewasno
significantdeclineinpartystrength.
Infact,thesepoliticalscientistssupposedthatpartiesmayinfactbestrengthening.
Despitetheproliferationoffactorsthatappearedtobeworkinginoppositiontoparty
organizations,theauthorsdeterminedthatthepartieswereadaptingratherthandyingout.
Theywrote:
Wereadilyconcedethatanumberofimportantforcesandtrendsrelevanttoparty
change(thedecliningpartisanshipoftheelectorate,thegrowthofamateurismamong
9
partyactivists,thepopularizationofcandidateselection,andtheseparationof
candidatecampaignorganizationsfromtheparty)havematerializedoverthepasttwo
decades…Buttheimplicationsoftheseforcesandtrendsmustbeunderstoodwithinthe
contextofpartyorganizationsthatarecurrentlystrongandnotweakening,”(Cotteret.
al,p.34).
Theirresearchindicatedthatstateandlocalpoliticalpartyactivitywasactually
increasing.
ThoughCotter,Bibby,Gibson,andHuckshornanalyzedtheparty-staterelationship
whereasIaminterestedintheparty-publicrelationship,theirresearchsetthestageformuch
oftheworkthatfollowed.Theirtheorythatpartyinstitutionswerestrengtheningratherthan
decliningcontinuestobeconfirmed.In1989,Cotter,Bibby,GibsonandHuckshornlookedto
thefuture,writing:
Thenewphaseisnotoneofparty-lesspolitics,butofthecontinuingpartysystem
composedofpartieswhichoperatewithinaframeworkofpublicregulationandsupport
whichprotectsmorethanweakenstheexistingparties.(p.168)
In1999,MalcolmJewellandSarahMorehousewrotePoliticalPartiesandElectionsin
AmericanStates,presentingadditionalresearchshowingthatpoliticalpartieswerestillalive
andwellafulldecadeafterthepublishingofPartyOrganizations.TheyelaborateonCotter,
Bibby,Gibson,andHuckshorn’stheorybygivingabroaderhistoricalcontexttotheevolutionof
stateparties.Beginningwiththe“partymachines”oftheearlytwentiethcentury,the
researchersanalyzedchangesinelectoralactivitythatbegantorevealinterestingchangesin
party-publicrelationsaswellasparty-state.Inatransitionawayfromthehighlycentralized
10
“partymachines,”JewellandMorehouseobservedatrendtowardsmoremember-runandless
leader-drivencampaignsinthelaterpartofthetwentiethcentury(1999).
Twoprimaryfactorsrevealedthattrend:theriseofcandidate-centeredcampaignsand
theincreaseinvolunteer-drivencampaigns.JewellandMorehousefoundthattherewasa
distinctchangeinthekindsofincentivesforpartyinvolvementinthesecondhalfofthe
twentiethcentury.SupremeCourtcasessuchasElrodv.Burns(1976)andRutanv.Republican
Party(1990)hadprohibitedhiring,firing,andpromotionbasedonpartisanshipforgovernment
jobs,thereforetheabilityforthepartytousepatronageandmaterialincentivestoattractand
retainpartyworkershaddisappeared(Jewell&Morehouse,1999).Thismadeitnecessaryfor
thepartytoattractactiviststhroughpurposiveandsolidaryincentives.JewellandMorehouse
write:
Asmaterialincentivesdeclineinimportance,itisclearthatthosewhobecomepolitical
activistsareincreasinglymotivatedbypurposiveincentives.Becausetheyhaveastrong
interestinpublicpolicies,theyarewillingtoworkforthepartyandhelpelectthe
candidateswhoarecommittedtothepoliciestheysupportandsharetheirideological
beliefs.”(1999,p.88)
Theendofpatronagesystemshadverypositiveimplicationsfortheimprovementof
grassrootsdemocracywithintheparty.
In2001,MalcolmJewell,thistimeworkingwithPeverillSquireandGaryMoncrief,
continuedtoinvestigatethestrengthofstatepartiesthroughadeepdiveintostatelegislative
campaigns.IntheirbookWhoRunsforLegislature,theauthorsconcludedthatparties
continuedtobestrongforcesinthecandidaterecruitmentprocess.Theyfoundthatwhile
11
partieslessdirectlycontrolledthelegislativecandidaterecruitmentprocessthaninthepast,
partiescontinuedtoprioritizeindirectcandidaterecruitment(p.25).Partyofficialsfromthe
stateandlocalpartiestendedtocontactpotentialcandidatesandencouragethemtorunin
primaries,thoughtheresearchersweresurprisedthatcandidatesdidnotreportbeing
contactedmoreoftenbypartyofficials(2001,p.43).
Notablyformypurposes,theresearchinWhoRunsalsocontinuedtorevealatrend
towardsgreateruseofvolunteersthantraditionaladvertisinginstatelevelcampaigns
(Moncriefetal.,2001,p.77).Theynotedthecriticalrolethatpartyorganizationsplayin
supportingsmallerlegislativecampaigns,usuallythroughprovidingavolunteernetwork.They
write,“Sometimesvolunteersaresuppliedbylocalpartyorganizations.Helpingtofindand
organizevolunteersisprobablythemostimportantsupportthatthelocalpartyorganizations
canprovide,”(Moncriefetal.,2001,p.81).
Theearlypartofthetwenty-firstcenturywitnessedsignificantchangestotheelectoral
landscape.Intheir2014editedvolume,TheStateoftheParties,DanielGreen,JohnCoffey,and
DavidCohendefinedthreebroadfactorsthatsummarizedthesechanges.Thesewere:1)
changesincampaignfinance2)theriseoftheinternetanddigitaltechnologyand3)the
introductionofmorecomplexandsophisticatedcanvassingactivity.Throughtheirownstudies
compiledwithresearchbyothers,Green,Coffey,andCohencontinuedtocontradictthe
pervasiveideathatthepartysystemwasweakening.Theywrote:
[Our]findingschallengethenotionthatthepartiesarelosinginfluenceinthefaceof
growingcompetitionwithmanymorenonpartygroupsandtheparties’relatively
restrictedabilitytoraiseandspendmoneyoncongressionalraces.Partiesarecertainly
12
notthemonolithicpoliticalactorsoftheolddays,buttheyalsoarenotbeingsqueezed
outormarginalizedbyotherpoliticalactors.Theparties’abilitytogetotherstojoin
theminpursuingtheirprimarygoalofmajoritystatusisaclearindicationoftheparties’
capacityforadaptationandoftheircontinuedinfluence.(2014,p.228)
OnechapterinTheStateofthePartieswrittenbyDouglasRoscoeandShannonJenkins
focusedspecificallyonlocalpartyactivity.Theseresearcherscontinuedtowitnessarisein
volunteer-drivenactivitiesandgrassrootsactivitiesinthelowerpartylevels.Whiletheynotea
dipduringthenineties,theyalsowritethat“inthelastseveralelections,therehasbeena
renewedemphasisongrassrootseffortonbothsidesoftheaisle,”(2014,p.289).Theydescribe
howthiseffortwasrealizedthroughincreasesingrassrootscampaignactivitiessuchas:
organizingcampaignevents,organizingfundraisingevents,distributingpostersandlawnsigns,
conductingregistrationdrives,organizingdoortodoorcanvassing,distributingcampaign
literature,andrunningget-out-the-votedrives.Simultaneously,thereweredeclinesforboth
partiesinactivitiesthatrequiredlargemoneyexpendituresandmassmarketingsuchas
contributingmoneytocandidates,buyingnewspaperads,buyingradioandtelevisiontime,
polling,andpurchasingbillboardspace(2014,p.292-293).
Ina2015bookoftheirown,RoscoeandJenkinsusethissameresearchtosupporta
broaderhypothesisthatpartiesareincreasingtheirgrassroots,participatory,andlaborintensiveactivitieswhilemoneyexpenditureactivitiesaredeclining.Theyhypothesizethatthe
impetusforthischangeislargelyduetothelastingeffectsoftheBipartisanCampaignReform
Act(BCRA)of2002.Sinceaccesstolargeamountsofmoneyissomewhatdiminished,the
13
partieshavebeenforcedtoadjusttheireffortsaccordingly.Theybelievethattheresultisa
historicallyunprecedentedsurgein“groundgame”or“field”campaigning(2015,p.55-56).
Intheirconclusion,RoscoeandJenkinsdescribethat:
Thisfocusextendstoalllevels.Localpartiesfocusmorenowonlabor-intensive
electoralactivitiesthaninthepast.Butwealsoseethiswithstateandnationalparties.
Theseorganizations,whichareincreasinglyspendingmoneyontheirownasopposedto
givingittocandidates,arealsoorganizingthegroundgame.(2015,p.120)
Theselabor-intensiveactivitiescouldbeindicativeofgreatermovementtowards
grassrootsdemocracywithinpoliticalparties.ThoughRoscoeandJenkinswereprimarily
concernedwithlocalparties,theyhighlightthatthesamephenomenonisoccurringatthestate
andnationallevels.
Ina2012booktitledThePartiesRespond,MarkBrewerandSandyMaiselprovidean
interestingframeworktoanalyzethesetrends.Theydescribetwomodelsofpartystructure:
responsibleandrational.AccordingtoBrewerandMaisel,partyactorsintherationalparty
modelaresimply“profit-maximizingentrepreneurs”forwhom“thesingulargoalisthecapture
ofpoliticalofficeformaterialgain”.Intherationalmodel,partiesseekonlyefficiencyandthe
expansionofpowerandwilldowhateverpragmaticallymakessensetoachievethosegoals(p.
107).Inthemostextreme,thiscouldpotentiallybeapartymachine.Thesedays,arational
modelmightbemoreakintoapartycontrolledexclusivelybypoliticalelitesthatisunlikelyto
reachbeyonditsbasetobringnewpeopleintopoliticsasitonlyneedsenoughvotestosurvive.
Thealternativetotherational-choicemodelisthe“responsiblepartymodel”,whichis
descriptiveofamoregrassrootsparty.BrewerandMaiselwrite:
14
[Responsibleparties]believethatpoliticalpartiesshouldnotonlyattempttowin
electionsbutfacilitatecitizens’politicalparticipationbymobilizingvoters—especially
newgroupsofvoterssuchasyoungpeopleandnewimmigrants.Further,political
partiesshouldaggregatetheirsupporters’interests,andclearlyarticulatetheirresulting
demands.(2012,p.108)
Itcanbeassumedthattheintra-partydemocracythatpoliticalpartieshavethe
potentialtobuildwouldbemorelikelyinaresponsiblepartysystemthanarationalparty
system.Theirwholestructureisdesignedtobuildengagementfromthegroundup,as“formal
membershipiscriticalandgrassrootscommitteesplayanimportantroleinrecruitingnew
members.Volunteersrisethroughtheranksasloyal,hardworkingactivists,”(2012,p.108).By
notonlybringingnewpeopleintothepoliticalprocessbutattemptingtoengagetheminalong
termandsustainableway,aresponsible-modelpoliticalpartycouldcontributepositivelytothe
politicalengagementofcitizensandthusimproveparticipatorydemocracyinastate.
BrewerandMaisel’sresearchrevealedthatincreaseduseofmoderntechnologywas
havingaprofoundeffectonthenatureofcampaigning.Ononehand,theynotedthatthe
technologiescouldbehavinganegativeimpactonimprovingtheyouthvote.Forexample,until
2008“microtargeting”withvoterdatawasusedtodirectparties’electoraleffortstowardsa
veryselectivegroupof“likelyvoters”—usuallyolderandwealthiervoters.Thismeantthat
youngerandlesswealthyvoterswerebeinglargelyignored.
Partieshavespentlittleoftheirnewlargessetodrawnew(andfromarational
perspective,unreliable)votersintothepoliticalprocess.Despitethedisproportionate
sizeofthemillennialgeneration,thefirstdemographicgrouptochallengethesheer
15
demographicweightofthebabyboomers,mostpartychairsfailtoseeyoungvotersas
animportantsourceoffuturesupport.(BrewerandMaisel,2012,p.113)
Ontheotherhand,alternativenewtechnologies,suchasinternetandmobileapp
campaigning,havehelpedtofacilitatethecoordinationof“decentralized,grassroots
campaigns”,whichmightbeabletoreachmorediversegroupsofpeople(2012,p.240).
BrewerandMaiselalsoproposeathirdframework:thatpartiesaremostlikelytotake
rationalactionsthathappentohaveresponsiblebyproducts.Intheirfinalchapterstheyfocus
onidentifyingthe“mixofcircumstances”underwhichpartiescouldbeencouragedtodo
rationalthingsthatmightresultinresponsiblebyproducts.Theywrite:
Thisknowledgecouldbeusedtoidentifylocalpartiesengagedinbestpractices,andindepthcasestudiesofthesecould,inturn,helpusmoretopreciselyunderstandhow
thesenormativebenefitsfordemocracyareproduced…wehopetodevelopempirically
groundedinsightsintohowbesttorestorelocalparties’performanceofthelinkage
functionattheheartoftheresponsiblepartymodel,”(2012,p.129).
Thoughnotexactlyacasestudy,mythesisaimstobeginthiskindofinvestigation
suggestedbyBrewerandMaisel.Theliteraturehasestablishedthatpoliticalpartiescontinueto
bepowerfulandrelevantforcesincontemporaryelections.Ithasalsoidentifiedotherforces
thatarechangingtherolethatpartiesplayandnotedthatcertainchangesareresultingin
quantitativeevidenceofmore“grassrootsefforts”contrarytothepopularnarrative.Withthe
2016electioncycleasmybackdrop,Iseektoaddqualitativenuancetotheseideasandidentify
those“bestpractices”andtheir“normativebenefitsfordemocracy”.Iassesswhetherandhow
16
statepartiesareusingtheirestablishedpowertopositivelycontributetoagrassroots
democraticculture.
DEFINITIONS
Mydefinitionofgrassrootsdemocracyislargelyinspiredbythe“responsible-party
model”.BrewerandMaisel,inThePartiesRespond,definethemodelasthefollowing:
Politicalpartiesshouldnotonlyattempttowinelectionsbutfacilitatecitizens’political
participationbymobilizingvoters—especiallynewgroupsofvoterssuchasyoung
peopleandnewimmigrants.Further,politicalpartiesshouldaggregatetheirsupporters’
interests,andclearlyarticulatetheirresultingdemands.(2012,p.108)
Theresponsible-partymodelisfurtherdefinedbywhatitisnot:therational-choice
model.Underrational-choice,thepoliticalpartyissolelyconcernedwithwinningelections.
Everythingthatarational-choicepartywoulddoisconsideredthroughthelensofacostbenefitanalysisthatrewardsprofitandefficiencyinachievingthisgoaloveranyother.
Therearethreefactorsinparticularthatcharacterizemydefinitionofgrassroots
democracy.EachisfurtherdefinedbythreedistinctaspectsthatIconsiderevidenceofthe
primaryfactors.ThisisaframeworkthatIdevelopedthroughmyownreflectionand
conversationswithfellowpoliticalsciencestudents.Althoughitisinherentlyinfluencedbythe
literatureIreviewed,thefactorsaremyown:
1) Participatorypotential
a. Volunteerism
b. Long-termsustainability
17
c. Candidaterecruitment
2) Localandcommunitynature
a. Localissuescampaigns
b. Committees
c. Candidaterecruitment
3) Unmediatedvotercontact
a. Person-to-personinteraction
b. Engagingnewvoters
c. Accessibilityofpartyleadership
Because“grassroots”isaratheramorphousconcept,Ifeltthatitwasnecessaryto
clarifymyownconceptionofitwithobservablefactors.Thisdefinitionof“grassroots”isalso
particulartopoliticalinstitutions,thereforeitmightdiffersomewhatfromthedefinitionofa
grassrootssocialmovementorsomeotheruseoftheterm.Myownunderstandingof
grassrootsisbasedontheideathatagrassrootsinstitutionisnotonlyorganicallyconcerned
withissuesinitsconstituent(ratherthantheelite)base,butisalsopoweredbythosesame
peopleinatransparentandwelcomingway.The“participatorypotential”factoraddressesthis
membershipaspect.IfiguredthatIwouldbeabletoobserverobustparticipationinvolunteers
andcandidates.Long-termsustainableopportunitiesformemberstoparticipatethoughwould
beparticularlyevidentofcontributionstoparticipatorydemocraticculture,ratherthanonetimeparticipation.Asforlocalandcommunitynature,Ireasonedthatgrassrootsparties,ifthey
haveabottom-upratherthanatop-downagenda,shouldbeconcernedwithlocalissues,
establishingapresenceinlocalcommunities,andrepresentinglocalcommunitiesintheir
18
candidates.Lastly,theunmediatedvotercontactreferstotheopenness,transparency,and
broadnessofgrassrootsactivities.
METHODOLOGY
FollowingtheNovember9,2016election,Ibeganrequestinginterviewsfromthe
ExecutiveDirectorsandPoliticalDirectorsofthemajorpoliticalpartiesinVermont,New
Hampshire,Massachusetts,andMaine.Theoriginalcontactswereallmadeviaemail,thoughin
manycasesIsentatleastonefollow-upemailaswellasmultiplefollow-upcallsinorderto
reachthepartyleaders.
Itwassurprisinglydifficulttofindcontactinformationformanyofthepartyleaders.
Professionalemailswerenotoftenpostedonlineandgenericcatchallemailaddressesrarely
yieldedaresponse.Phonemessagesonmainofficelineswerealsooftenfruitless.Insome
cases,partywebsitesdidn’tevenlistnamesorbiographiesfortheirprofessionalstaff,making
contactevenmoredifficult.ThoughImayhavesetoutoverlyoptimisticabouttheaccessibility
ofthesepartyleaders,Iwasespeciallysurprisedatthelackoftransparencyandaccessibility
thatthisexperiencerevealed.AfteracompletelackofresponsefromtheMaineDemocratsor
Republicansfollowingtwomonthsofattemptedcontacts,Ichosetodropthemfrommy
researchandbegantocontactpartyleadershipinConnecticutandNewYorkinstead,whereI
wasmetwithlimitedsuccess.
Intotal,Iwasabletoconducteleveninterviewsoutofthetwentyattempted(or
twenty-fourifMaineisincluded).Theinterviewslastedbetweentenminutesatthevery
shortestandfortyminutesatthelongest.Therewerethirteenquestionsthatfocusedonvoter
19
mobilization,volunteerwork,andcandidaterecruitmentandtheywereaskedtoall
participantsfairlyuniformly.Myvotermobilizationquestionswereformulatedtoassessthe
amountofunmediatedvotercontactthatpartieswereparticipatinginandwhethertheywere
reachingouttonewvotingblocs.Thevolunteerquestionsexaminedtheparticipatoryaspectof
thecampaign—bothwhetherandhowvolunteerswerebeingutilized.Lastly,mycandidate
recruitmentquestionsfocusednotonlyontheparticipatoryaspect,butalsowhether
candidateswerecomingorganicallyfromthecommunityorbeingchosenby“partyelite”.
IwasoftendeclinedcitingtimelimitationsormyaffiliationwiththeVermont
DemocraticParty,whichmeansthatmysampleincludesmoreDemocraticleadersthan
Republicans(whoonlyconstitutethreeoftheeleveninterviews).Alloftheinterviewswere
conductedviaphoneexceptingtheinterviewsofthetwoVermontDemocraticPartyLeaders.
Theywereallrecordedandtranscribed.InonecaseaCommitteeChairstoodinforan
ExecutiveDirectorbecausetherolewasintransition.Duetothepositionsheldbymy
interviewees,theiridentitieswillallremainconfidentialasidefromgeographiclocationswhen
pertinent.
Duetothelackofdiversityandthesmallsizeofmysample,theconclusionsdrawnhere
cannotbeconsidereddefinitive.Furthermore,Iamcognizantofthepossibilitythattherewas
subjectivebiasbeingbuiltintothewordingofmyresearchquestions.Inaddition,thehighly
politicalnatureoftheresearchsubjectandjobtitlesoftheintervieweesmayhaveaffectedthe
authenticityoftheresponsessomewhat.Politicalpartyleadershiphaveincentivestotellme
whattheybelieveImightwanttoheartopresentthemselvesandtheirorganizationsinthe
bestpossiblelight,andotherresearchmethodssuchassurveysmightbemoreeffectivein
20
avoidingthatinherentbias.Yet,withthoseconsiderations,Istillbelievethatthisresearchis
valuableinilluminatingtrendsandareaswherefurtherresearchisnecessary.Ingeneral,my
findingscorroboratepreviousresearchthatshowedanincreaseingrassrootsandvolunteerdrivenelectoralactivities.Thefindingsalsolargelysupportmyoriginalhypothesisthatparty
leadershipisactivelyworkingtopromotegrassrootsactionandparticipatorydemocracy.
FINDINGS
Party’sBiggestSuccesses
Whenaskedgenerallywhattheyfeltliketheirgreatestsuccesseswereinthemost
recentelection,thelargestnumberofresponsesreferencedthesheernumberofdirectvoter
contacts.Thesecondmostcommonresponsementionedthelargesizeofthefieldorganization
itself.Therewasnovariationacrosspartylinesonthisaccount—leadersfrombothparties
relayedthisingenerallyequalnumbers.Manyofthesecommentselaboratedthatthispast
year’selectionstoodoutincomparisontopreviouselections.OnepartyleaderfromNew
Hampshiresaidtomeregardingtheirfieldprogram:
Itwasthestrongestit’severbeen.Webrokefundraisingrecords,webrokestaffing
records,webrokevotercontactrecords.Webasicallyshatteredthewholething.
Ononehand,thisinformationmeansthatdirectvotercontact,ratherthanmass
messagingmethods,wasthepreferredstrategyforcampaigns.Ingreatcontrast,“fundraising”
wasonlymentionedonceasoneparty’sgreatestsuccess.Sincedirectvotercontactfacilitates
greaterinteractionbetweenvotersandthepoliticalparty,itisthemoregrassrootsmethodand
itsprevalencemightsignifyashiftawayfromrelianceonmore“hands-off”monetarystrategies
21
suchasprintandmediaadvertising.Furthermore,theothergrassrootseffectofagreater
relianceondirectvotercontactisthatitrequiresmorehandsandfeettomakephonecallsand
godoor-to-door.Thismeansthatpoliticalpartiesaredependentoneither/bothspendingfunds
onalargefieldstafforattractingmanyvolunteers.Bothsituationsexpandthenumberof
availableentry-levelopportunitiesforpartymemberstoeitheramplifytheirpolitical
involvementortakepoliticalactionforthefirsttime.
Infact,thevolunteeroperationitselfwasthethirdmost-mentionedsuccessofthemost
recentelection.Threeintervieweesspecificallytoldmethattheirparty’sengagementofnew
volunteerswasoneoftheirsuccesses.Onepersontoldmeinthisregard:“Ithinkthat
mobilizationmakesallthedifference,”andanothersaidthat“thestrengths[ofthestateparty]
arebeingabletogetfolksinvolvedandengagevolunteerstoconnecttoracesthatreally
matter,”.
RoomforImprovement
Politicalengagementwastheareainwhichmostpartyleadersfeltthattheirpartyhad
roomtoimprove.Thespecificsofengagementvariedalittlebetweeninterviewees,butoverall
manyleadersexplainedthattheywantedtoworktoactivelybringnewpeopleintothepolitical
andelectoralprocess.Forthemostparttheyreferredtovolunteersandactivistswhen
discussingengagementratherthanvoterregistration.Thus,theengagementthattheyare
hopingtoimproveseemstobeclosertothathighercommitmentlevelofengagement,wherein
peoplehaveamorelong-terminvestmentinthepartyinfrastructureratherthanjustbringing
newpeopleinsimplytogetthemtothepolls.Asoneleadersaidtome,
22
Buildingthepartyinfrastructureyear-roundandkeepingpeopleinvolvedandthen
activatingthemduringthecampaigntogetoutandworkisclearlysomethingthatcould
beimproveduponandwewouldbenefitfromthatimprovement.
Oneimportantcaveatwasthatleaderswantedtobecarefulthattheywerebringingin
newvoiceswithoutalienatingthe‘oldguard’oftheparty.Asoneleaderasked,“howdoyou
transformthepartyandbringnewpeopleunderthefoldwhilenotneedingtoostracizethe
folksthathavebuiltupthesystems?”Thisquestionisparticularlypertinentbecausesomanyof
theseleadersarespecificallytryingtotargetyouthandMillennialstoengagethemintheparty.
Thisisanuphillbattleconsideringthatthatgenerationishometothegreatestpercentageof
independentsinrecentAmericanhistory(PewResearchCenter,2016a),butanadmirableone
sincetheengagementofnewvotingblocssuchasyouthandimmigrantsisaparticularly
responsibleactionforapoliticalpartytotake.Engagingthosenewvotersisariskbecausethey
maynotbereliableasthetraditionalbase,butithasdefinitebenefitsforthediversityofthe
democraticcultureatlarge.
Anotherinterestingcommentmadebyaleaderregardingengagementwasthatthey
veryspecificallywantedtodecreasethenumberofpaidworkersdoingdirectvotercontactand
increasethenumberofvolunteersworkingonit.Theybelievedthatvolunteer-votercontact
was“superior”tocontactbyapaidworkerfromtheparty.Thiscouldbeconstruedasbeing
positiveornegativeforgrassrootspartyactivism.Ononehand,increasingthenumberof
volunteersmeansthattheyaremoregenuinelyinvolvedinthepartycommunityforideological
reasonsratherthanmaterialortangiblerewards.Ontheotherhand,entry-levelpaidpolitical
23
positionssuchasinternsandfieldorganizersareanimportantwayforpeoplethatcan’tafford
tovolunteerforthepartytogettheirfootinthedoorofthepoliticalprocess.
Thisemphasisonimprovingengagementdoeshavepositiveramificationsforthe
hypothesisthatleaderswanttoimprovethegrassrootsnatureandparticipatorydemocratic
cultureoftheparties.Althoughtheintervieweeslargelyacknowledgethattheymightnothave
engagedpeopleassuccessfullyorasbroadlyastheyaspiredtoduringthelastelection,there
appearstobeamovementtokeepdoingsointhefuture.Bringingnewpeopleintothepolitical
processandengagingthemlongtermisacriticalmeansofensuringthatthemembershipbase
isdiverseandnon-elite,andthereforeapositivecounter-forcetopowerconsolidationwithin
theparty.
VolunteerRecruitment
Asoneintervieweetoldme,“Volunteerismisthelifebloodofthestateparty.”But
wheredothosevolunteerscomefrom?Interestingly,whilemanyleadersmentionedthatthey
wouldpullnewrecruitsoffinternetsignupsorfromdatatargetingandphonebanks,even
moresaidthattheyreliedonlocalcommitteestoconnectthestatepartywithnewvolunteers.
Onepersonsaid,“Ideally,it’sthecountychairs,whoarerecruitingatthegrassrootslevel,”and
anotherelaboratedthatthey
activelyrecruitvolunteersintothesecommitteesandletourincredibletownandcounty
chairsdotheworkforus.Me,hereatthepartyasthepoliticaldirector,Ikindof
overseethelocalandcountycommittees.Reallyit’smorelikeI’mworkingforthem.
Similarsentimentswererepeatedacrosspartiesandstatesthroughoutthenortheast.
24
Whilethereareobviousreasonsthatthepersonalnetworksofthekindsofpeoplewho
fillthesecommitteeseatswouldbehelpfulforrecruitingmorevolunteers,itisinterestingthat
committeeswerestillmentionedmoreoftenthanmicrotargeting.Thismightbeanexampleof
arationalactionwitharesponsiblebyproduct.AsBrewerandMaiselwrite:
Fromarationalvantage,newrecruitsaresoughtinordertosecureanelectoral
advantage,andfromtheresponsiblemodel,theyareessentialformaintaining
intrapartydemocracy.Asnotedinthe1950APSAreport,‘Widespreadpolitical
participationthusfosterresponsibilityaswellasdemocraticcontrolintheconductof
partyaffairsandthepursuitofpartypolicies.(2012,p.125)
Relyingonpersonalnetworksmightbegenuinelymoreeffectivethancold-callingmicrotargetedlists,buttheeffectisthatitislikelytobuildamorecommunalvolunteerteam.Local
andcommunitynatureaswellasunmediated,person-to-personinteractionaretwocritical
aspectsofgrassrootsdemocracy,whichthisutilizationofcommitteenetworkstorecruit
volunteerswouldfulfill.
First-TimeandReturningVolunteers
Whilepartyleadersgenerallysaidthattheirvolunteersweremorelikelytobereturning
facesthannewcomers,fourpeopleexplicitlysaidthattheysaidthattheyfeltliketherewerean
unusualnumberoffirst-timevolunteersduringthemostrecentelectioncycle.Havingmore
first-timevolunteersduringpresidentialelectionsismorecommonthanduringmidterms
becauseofthevisibility,butleadersseemedtofeelasthoughthisyearwasevenmoreunusual.
Mosttheorizedthatthisriseinfirst-timevolunteerswasafunctionofparticularlypopular
25
candidateswhowereappealingtonewgroupsofvoters,aswellasparticularlyunpopular
candidateswhoweremotivatingpreviouslyunengagedpeopletoworkinoppositiontothem.
Thelatterwasrealizedevenmorestronglyaftertheelection.Inmanycases,partiessaw
asurgeinvolunteerapplicationsandsubmissionsinthedaysdirectlyfollowingtheelection.An
intervieweesaid:
Wehaveseensincetheelectionalotmorevolunteersandpeoplewhoarefirst-timers,
whohavenevergotteninvolveduntilnowandareunderstandingthat‘Icanmakea
differenceandIcan’tjustsitbackandwatchbehindacomputerscreen.Ineedtogoout
anddosomethingandtalktopeople’.
Anotherexplainedthat,“Peoplewerefeelingnervousandthebestwaytocombatthosenerves
istogetinvolved.”Thisphenomenoncouldbodewellforpartymemberengagementoutsideof
theelectioncycle,thoughsinceitisaprettyuniqueoccurrence,fewconclusionscanbemade
aboutthelong-termimpactyet.
Leaderswerealsoparticularlyoptimisticaboutthenumberofyouthvolunteersthat
theywereabletoengage.Althoughtheyacknowledgedthattheystillhadroomtoimproveas
farasattractingyoungpeopletotheparties,asonepersonsaid,“it’sstilltooold,butit’s
movingintherightdirection.”Again,specificallytargetingandengagingyouthisapositive
indicatorthatthepartiesarenotonlytryingtoengagenewreliablevolunteers,butengagenew
votingblocswhomayneverhaveparticipatedinthepoliticalprocessbefore.Thiswouldbe
anothercounter-exampletotheideathatpartiesareconsolidatingpowerandnarrowingtheir
reach,ratherthandecentralizinganddiversifying.
26
AccesstoPartyLeadership
Inanattempttogaugehowmuchaccessordinaryvolunteersandpartymembershadto
partyleadership,Iaskedintervieweeswhatkindsofpartystaffvolunteersinteractwithduring
thecampaign.Myideawasthatgrassrootsorganizationswouldhavelessisolatedstaffand
leadershipwhowouldbemoreaccessibletovolunteersandmembers.Overall,itwasreported
thatmostvolunteersjustinteractwithfieldcoordinatorsandfieldorganizers—theindividuals
thatarepaidbythepartytodirecttheregionallevelsofpartycampaigns.Nearlyeveryone
expressedthatvolunteerswouldendupinteractingwithafieldorganizerorlower-levelparty
associateatsomepoint.
Variationsseemedtobemoredependentonthesizeofthestatethananythingelse.
Largestatesweremorelikelytobedecentralizedandthusvolunteerswouldhavelesscontact
withhigher-upsandpartyleadership.Apartyofficialfromthemostpopulousstateinthestudy
said,
Thisiswhereyouhavetothinkofitasbeingprettydecentralized.Wedon’tdoalotin
thecentralofficesoindividualcountychairswillhavepeopleintheirofficeoroutonthe
street.Thecampaignsmanagethesefolks.Youwouldn’thavethecandidatebutyou’d
havetheircampaignmanagerorthefielddirectoroftheindividualcampaignmanage
people.Oryouwouldhavethecountychairsdotheirvolunteeroperation.
Theoppositewasthecaseinsmallerstates,whereinpartyleadershipwasmorelikelyto
travelbetweenfieldofficesortheleadership’sofficewasmorelikelytobeavailablefor
volunteeruse.Forcontrast,apartyleaderfromtheleastpopulousstatetoldme:
27
WehavesuchasmallstaffthatItellthemthateveryonesortofhastobeanorganizer
duringthecampaign.You’reafinancedirector,you’reanorganizer.You’rethedata
director,you’reanorganizer.Communicationsdirector,etc…We’renotdoingourjobsif
we’rejustsittinginanofficeinfrontofthecomputerorsomething.Wehavetobeout
theretalkingtopeople.
Thisinformationisnotparticularlyrevealing,althoughitconfirmsthegeneral
assumptionthatlargestatepartieswillbemoredecentralized,givingvolunteerslessaccessto
leadership,andthattheoppositewilllargelybetrueinsmallerstateparties.
ElectoralVolunteerActivities
EveryintervieweethatIspokewithsaidthatvolunteersweremostlyinvolvedindoing
directvotercontactwork.Themostcommonactivityseemstobephone-bankingforget-outthe-vote,candidatesurveys,orvolunteerrecruitment—thoughdoor-to-doorcanvassingwasa
closesecond.
Thisevidenceconcurswithpreviousresearchindicatingincreasinglevelsoflaborintensivevolunteeractivity.Again,thismaybeanotherexampleofaresponsiblebyproductofa
rationalactivity.AlthoughIcannotconcludefrommyresearchalonethatthepartiesareoverall
conductingmoredirectvotercontactthanmassmessagingorfundraisinginitiatives,thistrend
hasbeenestablishedinliteraturesuchasThePartiesRespond(Brewer&Maisel,2012)and
LocalPartyOrganizations(Roscoe&Jenkins,2016).Changestocampaignfinancelawsand
declininguseoftelevisionandradiolikelymakedirectvotercontactamorerationallyeffective
28
marketingoption.“Fundraising”wasonlymentionedonceasapotentialvolunteeractivity,
comparedtotheelevencommentsaboutdirectvotercontact.
Butdirectvotercontactisalsoamoregrassrootsoptioninthreeways.First,itforces
thepartytorecruitmorevolunteersandgetthemengagedintheelectoralprocessatahigher
levelofcommitmentthangoingtothepolls.Thisaddressesthe“participatorypotential”that
characterizesgrassrootsdemocracy.Second,itbringspartyassociatesandvolunteersinto
unmediatedcontactwithvotersfarmoreoftenthanifpartiesrelyontraditionaladvertising.
Third,whilevolunteersmayoccasionallygotoothertownsandstatestovolunteer,itis
probablymorelikelythattheyworkintheirowncommunities,thusreaffirmingthelocaland
communitynatureoftheparty’scampaign.
Astothelocalandcommunitynatureofgrassrootsdemocracy,Iwasparticularly
interestedandsurprisedtofindthatpartyleadersfromtwodifferentstatesmentioned
communityserviceasavolunteeractivity.Thoughotherelectoralsupportactivitieslike
administrativetasks,communications,andattendingeventscameupmoreoften,Ihadnot
expectedtohearthatpartieswerehavingvolunteersdocommunityservice.Thisissomewhat
reminiscentofpartymachinedayswhenpartiesprovidedsupportiveservicesfortheir
membersinexchangeforelectoralloyalty(Jewell&Morehouse,2001).Oneleadersaidthat
theyhadvolunteersmake“blanketsandtoiletrykits”forlocalserviceorganizations,while
anothersuggestedconductingafooddriveatthedoorsduringregularelectoralcanvassing.
Thoughitdoesn’tseemtobeparticularlypervasiveyet,thesecommentsdidhavepromising
potentialforincreasingtheamountthatpartiesareinvolvedinlocalcommunitiesand
diversifyingrolesavailableforvolunteers.
29
Non-electoralVolunteerActivities
Partyleaderswereaskedtoidentifyinwhatwaysthestatepoliticalpartycontinuedto
engagetheirmembersandvolunteersoutsideoftheregularelectioncycle.Abouthalfofall
interviewedpartyleaderssaidthattheyencouragedpeopletojointheirlocaltownand/or
countypartycommittees.WhilethiswasmorecommonamongDemocraticleaders,one
Republicanleaderalsomentionedthattheywoulddirectpeopletothecommitteestokeep
theminvolved.InThePartiesRespond,BrewerandMaisel’sdefinitionofaresponsibleparty
modelspecificallymentionstheimportanceoflocalcommitteesincreatingaparticipatory
politicalinstitution.Theywrite:“Responsible(party-democratic)parties…maintainahighly
integratedstructure.Formalmembershipiscriticalandgrassrootscommitteesplayan
importantroleinrecruitingnewmembers”(2012,p.108).
Consideringaresponsible-partymodelastheidealofaparticipatory,grassrootspolitical
party,theprevalenceofcommitteesshouldbeconsideredanextraordinarilypositivesignalin
thisregard.Townandcountycommitteesareavolunteerpositionwithinthepartywithample
roomforvolunteerleadershipandindependentaction.Asonepartyleadersaidtome:“Our
townandcountycommitteesshouldhavesomeautonomy…thecountycommitteesshouldbe
empoweredtopassresolutionstodoworkatthelocallevel...”Anothersaid:
Wetrytoreferpeopletotheircountybecausethat’sthemoregrassrootslevel.It’s
reallydependentonmetogivetheresourcestocountychairstodothegrassrootswork
thattheydoasopposedtomanagingitallcentrallyfromouroffice.
Thesesortsofcommentsdisplayawillingnessforstatepartyleadershiptoallow
dispersionofpower.Ratherthancentralizingcontrol,empoweringcommitteesand
30
encouragingvolunteerstoparticipateinthembroadensthepowerbase,expandstheparty’s
participatorypotential,andamplifiestheirlocalandcommunity-basednature.
Thenextmostcommonresponsetothisquestionwasthatthepartyencouraged
memberstoparticipateineventsandralliesforthepartyoraffiliatedorganizations.Though
eventattendanceislesscommitmentthanjoiningalocalcommitteeandisthereforealower
levelofparticipation,itisstillevidenceofleadershipencouragingparticipation.Eventandrally
attendanceisalsoaformofcommunity-buildingandprovidesspaceforpartyleadershipto
interactwithmembersinalessformalsetting.
CandidateSupportVersusLong-TermEngagement
WhenBrewerandMaiselconductedasurveyofpartycommitteechairsin2011,one
aspectwasmeanttoassessthechairs’perceptionsofpartygoalsandfunctionsviathe
rational/responsiblepartymodels.Sincemyresearchwasfocusedonaverysimilargoal,Ichose
toreuseoneoftheirquestionsanddirectittostatepartyleadersinstead.Thequestionposed
was:“Isitmoreimportantforthepartytohelpcandidateswinelectionsortohelpthevoters
developalong-termattachmenttotheparty?”
SinceBrewerandMaisel’ssurveyinstrumentonlyallowedforabinarychoice,theywere
abletoconcludethat,“In2003,61percent[ofpartychairs]thoughthelpingtheircandidatewin
wasmoreimportant,and37percentsuggestedconnectingwithvoterswasmorecentral.By
2011thispatternhadshifted,53percentsuggestedhelpingcandidateswasmoreimportant
and35percentconnectingwithvoters,”(2012,p.121).
31
Myinterviewontheotherhandgavesubjectsmorefreedomtoopenlyrespondtothe
question,butthismeantthatsubjectsweremorelikelytoavoidadirectanswertowhatis
admittedlyadifficultchoice.Thisisaquestionthatmightbebetterclarifiedwithaclearer
understandingofparties’resourceallocations.Anexaminationofpartyexpenditurescould
revealtheratiosthatpartiesfundeachoftheseactivities.Notunsurprisingly,thevastmajority
ofrespondentssaidthatbothhelpingcandidateswinelectionsandhelpingvotersdevelop
long-termattachmentswereequallyimportant.Thismakesitdifficulttodrawclearconclusions
abouttheresultsofthisquestion,sincetheywereeffectivelynull.
Thespecificmetaphorsofhand-in-handorhand-in-glovewerefrequentlymentioned.
Partyaffiliationmadenodifference.OneDemocrattoldme,“Idothinkit’ssortofahandin
glovesortofthing.Thewaywecanbesthelpourcountryistoget[ourcandidates]elected.The
waytodothatistokeepfolksengaged,keepfolksinvolved,tocontinuesortofthatpushingof
ouridealsandourvalues.”WhereasanotherRepublicanechoed,“Ithinkthatthosekindofgo
handinhandthough.Ifthey’reexcitedandreallyengagedbytheircandidate,thenthey’re
goingtobeinvestedlong-terminthepartyandkindofvice-versa.”
Inacouplecases,certainrespondentsacknowledgedthatalthoughthetwogoalsare
intricatelyrelated,theydidfeelthatonewasamorefundamentalobjectiveoftheparty.Two
leadersdeterminedthathelpingcandidateswinelectionswasmoreimportant.Asoneperson
stated,“ThegoalofthestatecommitteeistogetRepublicanselected,everythingafterthatis
secondary.”Yettwootherleadersdefinitivelysaidthattheythoughtthelong-term
attachmentsweremoreimportant:
32
ItisinourbestinterestsandtheinterestofthecandidateiftheinterestofthePartyis
activelybuildingtheserelationshipsandmanagingtheserelationshipssothatyou’re
keepingtheminvolvedandactiveandhappy.
VoterRegistration
WhileIhadoriginallyfiguredthathavingarobustvoterregistrationoperationwouldbe
asuresignofgrassrootsefforts,theprevalenceofsame-dayandautomaticvoterregistration
lawsmadethisdifficulttoassess.Manyleaderssaidthattheirget-out-the-voteeffortswere
intrinsicallytiedtovoterregistrationbecausesame-dayvoterregistrationlawsmadeitpossible
forpeopletoregisterwhiletheycasttheirfirstballot.Withautomaticvoterregistration,people
wouldhavetooptoutofbeingregisteredwhentheygotstateIDsratherthanoptin.Therefore,
althoughmanypartyleaderssaidthatvoterregistrationwasnotapriority,itdidn’tseemlike
thiswasadefinitivelybadsigninrelationtoparties’newvoterengagement.
Onthecontrary,partyleadersonbothsidesoftheaislewereactiveintryingtoeducate
votersaboutbothsame-dayandautomaticvoterregistrationlaws,aswellasearlyvotingin
certainstates.TheselawsarefairlynewinmostofthestatesthatIresearched.Furthermore,a
fewleadersspecificallymentionedthatwhentheydidholdtraditionalvoterregistrationdrives,
theydidsoatcollegesoruniversitiestotargetyounger,possiblyfirst-timevoters,orelsein
partnershipwithotherorganizations.Onepersonalsosaidthattheypartneredwithlocal
committeestoconductregistrationdrives.So,whilevoterregistrationitselfdoesnotseemto
beapriority,thepartyleadersstillappeartobeworkingtomaketheballotmoreaccessible
andtakingadvantageoftheselawsthatfacilitateaccesstothevotingbooth.
33
VoterMobilizationMethods
Todeterminetheamountofunmediatedvotercontactthatpartiesareparticipatingin,I
askedsubjectsinwhatwaystheirpartiesweremobilizingvoterstovote.Myinterviewees
reportedthattheirpartieswereusingvolunteerstododirectvotercontactmorethanany
othermobilizationtactic.Manypartiessaidthattheyhadsubstantiallylarger“fieldprograms”
forcanvassingandphonebankingin2016thaninpreviousyears.Thisisanopportunityfor
unmediatedcontactbetweenthevolunteers(whoareeffectivelypartyrepresentatives)and
voters.Althoughvolunteersarelikelyworkingoffscripts,theperson-to-personinteractionthat
directvotercontactfacilitatesisasignofgrassrootsorganizingatwork.
Anotherpositivesignfortheprevalenceofgrassrootsmobilizationseffortswasthata
couplepartyleadersexplainedthattheyweredeliberatelyeducatingvotersaboutearlyvoting.
Oneintervieweetoldme:
Ithinkacrucialelementisjustgettingtothemeitheronthephoneoratthedoorand
lettingthemknowthattheycanvoteattheschooltoday,oriftheyplanonvotingthis
weekendtheyhavetogotothetownhallandit’sopenuntilfour.That’ssomethingthat
townandcityclerksalsotriedtogetout,butthepeopleneedtoknowandgettingthat
messageacrossasmuchaspossibleseemedtoreallyhelpwithturnout.
Earlyvotingisgenerallythoughttobeagoodopeningforengagingnewvotersand
unreliablevoterswhomaynotbeabletogettothepollsonelectionday.Earlyvotingallows
morepeoplewithalternativelifestylesorunusualschedulestohavealongerwindowof
opportunitytocasttheirballots.
34
Onthenegativeside,thenextmostmentionedmeansofmobilizingvoterswasthrough
digitalandinternetadvertising.Whiledigitalappsandtoolscanhelpfacilitategrassroots
organizingandeaseparticipation,onlineadvertisingishighlytargetedandthereforemightbe
lesslikelytoreachtheneworunusualvoters(Brewer&Maisel,2012,p.240).Furthermore,itis
amonetaryexpenditureratherthanalabor-driveneffort.Thatsaid,oneintervieweedidtellme
thattheirpartywastryingtousesocialmediaadvertisingspecificallytotargetthose“low
propensityvoters”andyoungpeople,provingthatsomepartyorganizationsmaybeshifting
towardsthismore“responsibleparty”method.
NewVotersVersusBaseVoters
Veryslightlymorepartyleaderstoldmethatengagingnewvoterswasmoreimportant
thanmobilizingtheirbase.Engagingnewvotersshouldbeevidenceofgrassrootsefforts,since
focusingonthealready-engagedbasetheoreticallylimitsaparty’sreachtothe“politicalclass”.
Theseleaderstoldmethatexpandingtheelectoratewasapriorityforthem,butalsothatthis
growthwasnecessarytotheirsurvival.Afewspecifiedthattheytriedtofocusthisexpansionof
theelectorateonparticulargroups:
Ithinkwhatismoreimportantisengagingthatnewvoter,engagingthatyoungperson
whomaynotbeapartofthepartyyetormaynotwanttoidentifyeverwithapolitical
party—justshowingthemthatthesearetheissuesthattheycareabout.
Itisimportanttonotethoughthatafewofthemsaidthatthereasontheywereableto
prioritizeengagingnewvoterswasbecausetheyfeltliketheyhadanespeciallyreliablebase,
implyingthatitmaynotbethecaseotherwise.Forexample:“Wedon’treallyhavetoworry
35
aboutourbase,oneofthethingsthatwedoknowfrompoliticalscienceisthatRepublican
voterstendtobebettervoters.”
Ontheotherhand,equalnumbersofrespondentseithersaidthatbothwereimportant
orprioritizedmobilizingthebase.Thosewhowentwiththelatteralmostallsaidthatitwas
becauseitwas“easier”sincethosebasevotersarereliableandalreadyinvolved,butnobody
madetheargumentthatitwasthebetteroptionfromamoralstandpoint.
CandidateRecruitment
Mylastareaofinterestwascandidaterecruitment.Iaskedbothwhetherpartieswere
activelyrecruitingcandidatesaswellaswhatkindsofcriteriatheywerelookingforinpotential
candidates.ForthemostpartIfoundthatstatepartystaffwereanactivepartofcandidate
recruitment,oratleastworkedinconjunctionwithlocalcommitteesorlegislativecaucusesand
stafftodorecruitment.Onlytwoleaderstoldmethattheirstaffweren’tatallinvolvedin
recruitment.ThisreinforcesSquireandMoncrief’sfindingsthatpartiescontinuetobestrong
forcesinthecandidaterecruitmentprocess.Itwasparticularlyinterestingtohearabouthow
thepartystaffwasworkingwithlocalcommitteestodorecruitment.Onesubjectdescribedto
me:
AstheExecutiveDirector,I’mnotgoingtoknownecessarilyallthegoodcandidatesthat
areupin[thenortherncounties],butmycountychairwill.Inallofthesecounties,we
relyonthemtotalktousaboutgoodcandidatesthattheywanttoputforth.Wethink
throughstrategy,howtosupportthem,howtogivethempollingsupport,messaging
36
support,financialsupport.Wetrytobeveryorganicinthatregard,andletitcomefrom
thegroundup,asopposedtouscentrallydictatingwhoshouldrun.
Whenaskedhowtheydecidedwhotorecruit,orwhattheypersonallyfoundtobethe
mostattractivequalitiesinapotentialcandidate,mostrespondentstoldmethattheypreferred
someonewhohadbeenacommunityleaderorsomehowinvolvedinlocalleadership.This
seemslikeagoodthingforthegrassrootsaspectofcandidaterecruitmentbecauseitreinforces
thelocalandcommunalnatureoftheparty.Asonepersontoldme:
Wewantsomebodywhoknowswhattheircommunitywantsandcanrepresenttheir
communitythebestandhasthosekindsofnetworkingconnectionstoreallystartand
launchagreatcampaign.
Pullingfromthoselocalnetworksalsohaspracticalrationalbenefitsfortheparty’s
successaswell.Oneleadertoldmeastoryabouthowthosecommunitynetworkshelpedthe
partytoelectsomeoneinaveryunexpectedpartofthestate:
Wehada[candidate]inatownwhichisaratherleft-leaningtownwhereit’susually
prettytoughforustowin.Buthewasabusinessmanandhefoundedthefarmer’s
marketintown—everybodyknowshimandeverybodylikeshim.Whenhewas
recruitedtowinfourorsixyearsago,hewonprettyhandilyeventhoughhewasa
RepublicanrunninginoneofthemoreDemocraticdistrictsinthestate.So,ifyoucan
findsomeonethat’salreadywellknownandalreadywellliked,you’reaheadofthe
game.Youknowthesaying,‘allpoliticsislocal?’Thatisespeciallytrueforourstate
representatives.
37
Whilemorepeoplealsosaidthattheylookedforapotentialcandidatewhocouldspeak
genuinelyaboutthepoliticalissuesathand,twosubjectsalsoexplainedthattheyhadtotake
fundraisingabilityintoconsiderationwhendeterminingwhotorecruit.
Thisiskindofarealitynowadays;candidatesneedtobeabletoraisemoney.Andthey
needtobeabletohavesomesortofnetworktopullfrominthataspect,Imean,you
can’trunacampaignwithnothing.
Sincefewpeoplehaveanespeciallywealthynetworkoffriends,thesesortsofconsiderations
limitthekindsofpeoplethatapartymightrecruit,negativelyimpactingthediversityand
breadthoftheirpotentialpool.Luckily,relativelyfewleadersidentifiedthisasamajorfactorin
recruitmentdecisions.
CONCLUSION
Withoutabroadersetofsubjects,itisdifficulttogeneralizethesefindings.Yet,it
appearsthatatleastaccordingtothissample,northeasternstatepartiesareusingtheir
institutionalpowertotakeactionswithresponsiblebyproductsthatarecontributingto
grassroots,democraticculture.Thesepartiesarecontinuingtofocustheireffortsonlaborintensiveandvolunteer-drivenactivities,prioritizingdirectvotercontact,andfocusingon
utilizingandempoweringlocalcommittees.Ifweconsiderthethreecharacteristicsof
grassrootsdemocracytobeparticipatorypotential,unmediatedvotercontact,and
local/communitynature,theneachofthesehasbeengenerallyconfirmedbymyinterviews.
Participatorypotentialisapparentinthenumberofopportunitiesforvolunteerstobeinvolved,
notonlyinelectioncampaignsthatseemmorevolunteer-orientedthaneverbefore,butinlong
38
termandsustainablewayslargelythroughlocalcommittees.Theprevalenceofunmediated
votercontactisclearthroughthereportedlyunprecedentedsizeoffieldoperationsandthe
raritywithwhichmassmessagingtechniquesarementionedincontrasttophonebanksand
canvassing.Localandcommunitynatureisevidencedbynotonlythefocusonlocal
committees,butalsotheemphasisonrecruitingcandidateswhoarecommunityleadersabove
anythingelse.Furthermore,partiesappeartobeexplicitlytargetingyouthandattemptingto
encouragenewvotingblocsinthepoliticalprocess,aswellasemphasizingearlyvotingand
samedayregistrationtoopenuptheprocessfurther.
Thesignificanceofthesefindingsisthatstatepoliticalpartieshavethepotentialtobe
importantdemocracy-buildinginstitutionsintheU.S.Wemightwanttobewaryofdemonizing
theseinstitutionssincetheyofferavaluableoutlettoengagepeoplepoliticallyandserveasa
sortofactivisttrainingground.Ifoneascribestoaparticipatoryorgrassrootsidealof
democracy,asIdo,evidenceofgreaterparticipation,morevotercontact,andresponsiveness
tocommunitiesshouldappeartohavepositivepotentialramifications.ThoughIcannotsay
howwelltheinstitutionisactuallybeingutilizedinthisregard,theopeningsseemtoexist.I
mustalsoconcedethatitisnotauniversallyheldbeliefthatgrassrootsparticipationis
necessarilyanormativegood,andwhileIcertainlyagreethattherearelimitationstoits
positiveimpact,IhopethattheresearchI’vepresentedhereshowsthatitmightatleastbea
firststeptowardsimprovingtheAmericanpoliticalclimate.
Onefinallineofquestioningremainsthough:ifpartyleadershipreallyareworkingto
improvegrassrootsparticipation,whydoestheperceptionofelitismstillexistamongthe
regularvoters?Inresponsetothisfundamentalparadox,Iwouldpositthatthisgapbetween
39
realityandperceptionstemsfromthefactthatmyresearchfocusedonstateparties,whileitis
nationalpartiesthataffectthemajormedianarratives.Frommycursoryconversationsonthis
subjectwithmyinterviewees,therelationshipbetweenstateandnationalpartiesseemstobe
shifting,andpossiblygrowingfartherapart.Therefore,theon-the-groundactionofthestate
partiesisnotvisibleenoughtoattractmediaattention,allowingfortheconsiderablyless
grassrootsactionsofthenationalpartytocontrolthemediaconversation.
Therearefourdistinctareasforfutureresearchthatwouldhelptosolidifyandexpand
thisconclusion.First,moreinvestigationintolocalpartyactivitywouldhelptorevealhow
activeorbeneficialthesecommunityinstitutionsare.WhileRoscoeandJenkins’research
determinedtheirrelativestrengthening,wecoulddomoretolearnaboutwhatthisactivity
lookslikeinpractice.Similarly,furthervolunteerprofilingandlong-termassessmentlike
ElizabethSuper’sthatcouldbeexpandedtoencompassotherstateswouldhelptorevealthe
sustainabilityofthegreaterpoliticalengagementthatgrowingvolunteeroperationsimply.Do
thesevolunteerscontinuetobeengagedinlong-termandmeaningfulways?Further,abetter
understandingofhowmuchandinwhatwaysthestatepartiesareintegratedwithnational
partiescouldoffermoreinsightsaswell.Arethenationalorganizationssupportiveofthese
grassrootsefforts?Last,detailedexaminationofthestateparties’expenditurescouldclarify
whethertheflowoffundingtellsthesamestorythattheleadershiphashere.
Whilethereisstillmuchworktobedonetoexpanduponthistheory,thisthesis
presentspreliminaryevidencethatifwecanharnessthedemocracy-buildingpotentialofthe
institutionsavailabletous,perhapsnotonlyisthedeathofthepartynotquitesoimminent,
butneitherthedeathofgrassrootsdemocracyitself.
40
REFERENCES
AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation.(1950).CommitteeonPoliticalParties.“TowardaMore
ResponsibleTwo-PartySystem.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview44:Supplement.
Beck,PaulA.,andErikHeidemann.(2014).“ChangingStrategiesinGrassrootsCampaigning:
1956to2012”.PartyPolitics.
Brewer,M.D.,&Maisel,L.S.(2012).ThePartiesRespond:ChangesinAmericanPartiesand
Campaigns.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
Burnnham,WalterDean(1976).RevitalizationandDecay:LookingTowardtheThirdCenturyof
AmericanElectoralPolitics.JournalofPolitics,August,146-72.
Broder,David.(1971).TheParty’sOver:TheFailureofPoliticsinAmerica.NewYork:Harperand
Row.
Cotter,C.P.,Bibby,J.,Gibson,J.,&Huckshorn,R.(1989).PartyOrganizationsinAmerican
Politics.Pittsburgh,PA:UniversityofPittsburghPress.
Dwyre,Diana.(2007).“527s:TheNewBadGuysofCampaignFinance.”InAllanJ.Ciglerand
BurdettA.Loomis,eds.InterestGroupPolitics,7thEd.Washington,D.C.:CQPress.
Frendreis,JohnP.,andAlanR.Gitelson.(1999).“LocalPartiesinthe1990s:Spokesina
Candidate-CenteredWheel.”InTheStateoftheParties:TheChangingRoleofContemporary
AmericanParties,3rd,ed.,editedbyJohnC.GreenandDanielM.Shea,135-154.Lanham,MD:
RowmanandLittlefieldPublishers.
Green,J.C.,Coffey,D.J.,&Cohen,D.B.(2014).TheStateoftheParties:theChangingRoleof
ContemporaryAmericanParties(7thed.).Rowman&Littlefield.
Jewell,M.,&Morehouse,S.(2001).PoliticalPartiesandElectionsinAmericanStates.
Washington,DC:CQPress.
Katz,R.S.,&Mair,P.(2009).TheCartelPartyThesis:ARestatement.Perspectiveson
Politics,7(04),753.
LaRaja,RaymondJ.2003.“StatePartiesandSoftMoney:HowMuchPartyBuilding?”InThe
StateoftheParties:TheChangingRoleofContemporaryAmericanParties,4thed.,editedby
JohnC.GreenandRickFarmer,132-150.Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield.
Mesrobian,Shant.2004.“CoveringtheBases:HowthePartiesMakeSureTheirMostLoyal
SupportersVoteonElectionDay.”CampaignsandElections25:18-21.
41
Moncrief,G.F.,Squire,P.,&Jewell,M.E.(2001).WhoRunsfortheLegislature?PrenticeHall.
PewResearchCenter.(2016a).PartisanshipandPoliticalAnimosityin2016.PewResearch
Center:U.S.PoliticsandPolicy.Retrievedfromhttp://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/2the-roots-of-partisanship/
PewResearchCenter.(2016b).ThePartiesontheEveofthe2016Election:TwoCoalitions,
MovingFurtherApart.PewResearchCenter:U.S.PoliticsandPolicy.Retrievedfrom
http://www.people-press.org/2016/09/13/the-parties-on-the-eve-of-the-2016-election-twocoalitions-moving-further-apart/
Rauch,J.(2016,July).HowAmericanPoliticsWentInsane.TheAtlantic.
Roscoe,D.D.,&Jenkins,S.(2016).LocalPartyOrganizationsintheTwenty-FirstCentury.
Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.
Sabato,Larry.TheParty'sJustBegun:ShapingPoliticalPartiesforAmerica'sFuture.Glenview,
IL:Scott,Foresman/Little,BrownCollegeDivision,1988.Print.
Schattschneider,E.E(1942).PartyGovernment.NewYork:Rhinehart.
Shea,DanielM.,andJohnC.Green.(2007).TheFountainofYouth:StrategiesandTacticsfor
MobilizingAmerica’sYoungAmericans.Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield.
Shear,M.D.,&Rosenberg,M.(2016,July22).ReleasedEmailsSuggesttheD.N.C.Deridedthe
SandersCampaign.NewYorkTimes.Retrievedfrom
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/23/us/politics/dnc-emails-sandersclinton.html?ref=politics&_r=0
Schier,S.(2000).ByInvitationOnly:TheRiseofExclusivePoliticsintheUnitedStates.
Pittsburgh,PA:UniversityofPittsburghPress.
Super,E.H.(2016,September23).EverydayPartyPolitics:LocalVolunteersandProfessional
OrganizersinGrassrootsCampaigns(Dissertation,UniversityofEdinburgh,2016).
Taibbi,M.(2016,May18).R.I.P.,GOP:HowTrumpIsKillingtheRepublicanParty.RollingStone.
Walters,J.(2017,March5).Walters:StateDemsTapFaisalGillforPartyChair.SevenDays.
Retrievedfromhttp://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2017/03/05/walters-statedems-tap-gill-for-party-chair
42
APPENDIXA–SURVEYQUESTIONS
Name/Date/State/Phone/Email/Position/Party
Introduction
Whatarethestrengthsoftheparty’selectoralfieldcampaign?
Wheredoyouseeroomforimprovementintermsoftheparty’selectoralfieldcampaign?
VolunteerRecruitment
Inwhatwaysisthepartyrecruitingvolunteersandwhoisresponsibleforrecruitingthem?
Arevolunteersmorelikelytobefirst-timersorreturningvolunteersfrompastyears?
Whatkindsofpartystaffwillthevolunteersinteractwithduringthecampaign?
Whatkindsofactivitiesdovolunteersdoandwhatkindsofrolesdotheyhave?
Inwhatcapacitiescanvolunteerscontinuetoworkwiththepartyaftertheelection?
Isitmoreimportantforthepartytohelpcandidateswinelectionsortohelpthevotersdevelop
along-termattachmenttotheparty?
VoterMobilization
Inwhatwaysdoesthepartyworktoregisternewvoters?
Inwhatwaysisthepartymobilizingvoterstovote?
Isitmoreimportantforthepartytoengagenewvotersandvolunteersormobilizeitsbase?
CandidateRecruitment
Isthepartyactivelyrecruitingcandidates?Ifso,how?
Whointhepartyworkstorecruitnewcandidates?
Inwhatwaysdoesthepartydecidewhotorecruit?
Whatarethecriteriathatthepartyislookingforinapotentialcandidate?