CONCORDIA
THEOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Volume 46. Numbers 2-3
APRIL
-
JULY 1982
. D.D. ..... ........................................ 97
Henry J. ~ g g ~ l ~d , hD.,
Justification through F a i t h in Article
Four of the Apology ...................... Martim C. Warth
105
e the Old
Justification as a ~ o c t r i n of
Testament ......... ........................ Raymond F. Surburg 129
The Clarity of Scripture and Hermeneutical
Principles in the L u t h e r a n
Confessions .......... ............................. Erling T. Teigen 147
Evangelical Hermeneutics ............. Walter C. Kaiser, Jr. 167
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneut ical Principle? ....................... Horace Hummel 181
T h e Theology of t h e W o r d in John
Gerhard ......................................... ... Bengt Hiigglund 209
Luther and Erasmus .................................. Daniel Preus 219
"The Word of My Patience" in Revelation
3: I0 .....................
.
.
.................... Theodore Mueller 23 1
Ways of Saving T i m e a n d Labor in
Parish Administration ....................... Gary C. Genzen 235
Theological Observer ......................................................... 24 1
Book Reviews .................................................................... 245
Book Comments ............................................................... 255
Books Received .................................................,............... 259
Are Law and Gospel a Valid
Hermeneutical Principle?
Horace Hummel
I. Definitions
Lutherans bandy the phrase "law and Gospel" about so much
that to bother to define the terms in a context like this might
appear to be a classical case of "carrying coals to Newcastle."
Among theologically trained Lutherans this is undoubtedly true,
but among laymen comprehension of the jargon often falls off
very sharply. Even among pastors it is not always self-evident that
the language has really been internalized. Such generalizations
are probably even more true in non-Missourian Lutheranism,
where talk about "law and Gospel" usually does not enjoy nearly
the currency or priority which it gets in the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod. Furthermore, outside of Lutheranism the
terminology is often totally unfamiliar - sometimes because of a
substantially different theology, sometimes merely because of
semantic differences.
When Lutherans say "law" without further qualification, and
especially when the word is contrasted with "Gospel," it is usually
taken for granted that it is the so-called "second" use of the law
which is being referred to (usus elenchthicus). Unless otherwise
specified, that will be true of this paper too. By that "second" use
we mean, of course, God's absolute, holy demand of man, which
man, however, can never satisfy. Thus he is disabused of the
notion that he can in any way prepare for or contribute to his
salvation, and the ground is cleared for the "Gospel" of Christ's
vicarious satisfaction, for sola gratia, solo Christo, solafide.
This primacy of the "second" use of the law has always been a
sort of litmus test for traditional, confessional Lutheranism.
Wherever that usage is current and readily understood, it is a safe
bet that the rest of traditional Lutheran orientation is reasonably
alive and well too. Conversely, among"Lutherans" where there is
no ready resonance to that vocabulary (and where sometimes it is
even scorned as part of the "scholastic" or confessionali is tic^'
baggage which we can or should jettison), it is a good guess that
other confessional principles have also become attenuated or lost
altogether.
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
In contrast to that Lutheran usage, Reformed tradition has
tended to be more comfortable with a "Gospel-law" formulation.
Karl Barth has in recent times championed that formula, and in a
way not essentially different from other heirs of John Calvin.
Here, when "law" is spoken of without further specification, it is
more often the "third" use of the law which is in mind, that is,
God's guidance for the life of sanctification consequent upon the
gift of salvation.
Sometimes, as a result, Lutheran "law-Gospel" talk is scarcely
understood in those circles, just as the "Gospel-law" sequence
tends to raise red flags for Lutherans. And sometimes, no doubt,
the differences are little more than semantic. Classical
Lutheranism, at least, certainly does not deny a "third" use of the
law; an entire article (VI) in the Formula of Concord is devoted to
its defense and proper exposition. Neither do Calvin and his heirs
deny in theory a "second" use, although I think it is safe to say that
in those circles the word "law" is used and heard in that sense
much less frequently.
At the same time, I think only the "ecumenist" who is interested
in sweeping differences under the rug will try to deny that the
different expressions are often pointers toward considerably
different styles and accents in both theology and practice. Not by
accident are there some hyper-Lutherans who not only deny the
third use of the law, but are ready to denounce almost everything
besides 'blaw-Gospel" as "Reformed," "legalistic," etc. If
Lutherans have often appeared antinomian and insufficiently
concerned with the fruits of faith to the Reformed, Lutherans
have returned the compliment by often judging Calvinism
moralistic and guilty of inordinate accent on rules for living, even,
allegedly, to the point of subverting grace. Lutherans, for
example, tend to have a hard time not hearing the Reformed
accent on "covenant" as at least crypto-legalistic, a problem
which they themselves tend to solve by avoiding the common
biblical term almost entirely.
The different orientations are especially apparent in the public
sector. What is often called the "quietism" of the Lutheran "twokingdom" principle (itself only a restatement of the Law-gospel
distinction) stands in obvious contrast to the "activism" of the
Reformed tradition, beginning already with Calvin's own
attempts to establish a "Christian state" in Geneva, and continuing to the present day in a variety of both traditional and
liberal ("prophetic") manifestations.
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
be employed, and we shall, in fact, often do so throughout this
paper. Furthermore, the hyphenated phrase may even be useful to
indicate that, precisely because man remains simul iustus et
peccator throughout this life, both law and Gospel continue to
have their claim on him. At the same time, however, if
philosophical apriori statements take precedence over Scripture,
there is the danger that the hyphenated phrase may imply a real
b'dialectic," almost a dualism of two equal but also opposing antitheses within God's Word. Plainly, however, both Bible and
Confessions wish to stress the triumph of God's love in the Gospel
(in the narrow sense) for those who believe, and, in a way, the
whole point of specifying "law and Gospel" is to highlight the
magnitude of God's grace in achieving vicarious satisfaction
through the gift of His Son? And for this reason we too follow the
common convention of usually capitalizing "Gospel" while
leaving "law" in the lower case.
11. Dogmatics versus Hermeneutics
Our topic, however, is the hermeneutics of "law-Gospel," not
dogmatics as such. The two subjects are closely related, however.
Hermeneutics has to do with valid method, with epistemological
presuppositions. If Scripture really interprets Scripture, then
both method and results, while not coterminous, will nevertheless
overlap in their common rootage in the same inspired source. The
divorce oft he two is one of the major causes of the chaotic malaise
in both dogmatics and exegesis in liberal circles. Even in conservative circles, where "law-Gospel" is common dogmatic usage, it
is often not thought of in hermeneutical light.
One does not have to read the Lutheran confessions too closely,
however, to discover that discussions of law and Gospel there are
often hermeneutical in nature. For example, in Apology IV (5-6),
Melanchthon is very direct (and reduces the discussion to the
most basic applications):
All Scripture should be divided into these two chief
doctrines, the law and the promises. In some places, it
presents the law. In others it presents the promise of Christ;
this is does either when it promises that the Messiah will
come and promises forgiveness of sins, justification, and
eternal life. By "law" in this discussion we mean the
commandments of the Decalogue, wherever they appear in
the Scriptures.
On the surface, such a statement is very "dogmatic", but it
patently is hermeneutical as well. That one "should" divide all of
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
185
Scripture into these two doctrines plainly implies a hermeneutical
master key.
Other confessional statements on the subject of law and Gospel
are even more explicitly hermeneutical. For example, Solid
Declaration V (1) states: "The distinction between law and Gospel
is an especially brilliant light which serves the purpose that the
Word of God may be rightly divided and the writings of the holy
apostles may be explained and understood correctly."
(Parenthetically, we cannot help but note - although it certainly
is not without hermeneutical significance either - that in this
quotation "Word of God" and "writings of the holy apostlesn are
paralleled; the context is preeminently soteriological, to be sure,
but it is not accident that the Scriptures and a proper method for
expounding them are mentioned in the same breath.)
Also clearly hermeneutical in implication is the later assertion
(FC-SD, V:23-24) that a law-Gospel orientation toward Scripture
is no Lutheran idiosyncracy, but that
Since the beginning of the world these two proclamations
have continually been set forth side by side in the church of
God with the proper distinction. The descendants of the holy
patriarchs, like the patriarchs themselves, constantly
reminded themselves of these two doctrines, which must be
urged constantly and diligently in the church of God until the
end of the world, but with the due distinction . . .
Such an assertion, of course, is not so much one of hermeneutical
theory as a statement of the result of such hermeneutics in Old
Testament interpretation (essentially, the golden thread of
"Messianic prophecy"), but again one notes the parallelism of
method and doctrinal result.
111. Indispensability
These few quotations are, in a real sense, only samplings of
what pervades the entire Book of Concord. The overriding
concern throughout is the proper understanding and proclamation of the Gospel on the basis of Scripture. Precisely the same
ultimate concern is often articulated in terms of b'justificationby
faith," and it scarcely need be pointed out here that Lutheranism
has always considered that doctrine the articulus stantis et
cadentis ecclesiae. But if so indispensable a doctrine is derived
from Scripture, then it must also define the indispensable key for
comprehending those Scriptures. As it must be more than merely
one doctrine among many, so it must be more than merely one
hermeneutical canon among many.
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
That is, by Lutheran confession, "justification by faith" or
"law-Gospel" is a pivot on which all turns, a perspective without
which neither "Gospel" nor Scriptures will ever be understood
correctly. Both church history and the contemporary scene are
studded with examples, both exegetical and homiletical, of how
one may formally be very "biblical," yet ultimately not be
"biblical" at all as far as substance is concerned, that is, in
expounding the Gospel.
IV. No Gospel-Scripture Dichotomy
Nevertheless, the indispensability of "law-Gospel" as a
hermeneutical principle can be asserted onesidedly. We in the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod have become painfully aware
of that fact, because it lay at the very heart oft he bitter theological
dispute from which we have just emerged and whose scars are still
often very visible. There can be no doubt (and, now that the battle
is over, I think few would even bother to deny it) that the hidden
agenda of much of the so-called "moderate" appeal to "lawGospel" was a false dichotomy of Gospel and Scripture.
A "canon within the canon" was commonly championed, not
merely in the sense of a material viewpoint by which all must be
ordered, but as a means of determining what was really inspired
word of God and what was not. Hence, the designation "Gospelreductionism" came into popular usage; it was commonly argued
that "law-Gospel" or b'justification by faith" was all that really
counted in Bible and theology (and sometimes, it would seem,
only "Gospel" in its narrow sense - or "Gospel" in whatever
sense). Everything else, allegedly, was dispensable. To argue
otherwise was a "Reformed" aberration, or maybe even a quite
recent b'fundamentalistic" caricature.
Now, of course, that kind of talk is not unique to liberal
Lutheranism. One may confidently assert that essentially the
same dichotomy is virtually synonymous with theological
liberalism as a whole. Outside of Lutheranism one is perhaps
more likely to hear what is worth keeping described merely as
"Gospel" rather than "law and Gospel," but otherwise it often
takes a microscope to tell the difference (if any).
To demonstrate that the different phraseologies have a
common ancestry, one probably harks back best to Johann
Semler, often regarded as one of the "fathers" of modern biblical
study. In his seminal work, Abhandlung vonfreier Untersuchung
des Canons (179I), Semler made two main points which have long
since become virtual dogma in liberal circles: (1) The Bible merely
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
187
contains the word of God. (2) "Treat the Bible like any other
book."
Hence one is not surprised to note how easily those who
&ampioned that type of reductionistic "law-Gospel"
hermeneutics identified with the reductionistic, least common
denominator "ecumenism" of the liberal Protestant establishment - no doubt, a major part of the agenda all along. We have
no doubt that there are some "ecumenical" Lutherans who retain
some uneasiness about the company they keep, and who, at least
privately, entertain the hope that if they have anything to
contribute to the ecumenical church, it is "law-Gospel" or
"justification by faith." Even those of us who cannot share that
vision of a valid ecumenism may wish them well, but when one
looks at the distaste for almost any kind of doctrinal discipline
and the resulting rampant pluralism (often even explicit glorying
in it) that seems almost inevitably to accompany that posture, it is
hard to see how even that minimal bit of Lutheran "tradition" can
ever have a serious impact upon Christendom at large.
Nor is it coincidental that Semler's work concentrated on the
canon. A fundamentally different Schrifrprinzipis at the heart of
the shift. "Canon" continues to be used as a historical term, of
course, but no longer with the same hermeneutical weight. The
extent to which canonics continues to be pivotal is currently
illustrated by the typical reaction to Brevard Child's accent on
canonical interpretation? Among the kinder things he is being
called is a "sophisticated fundamentalist." Some critics will
acknowledge that they have shortchanged the final (canonical)
stage of the history of biblical (re)interpretation and have
concentrated onesidedly on the alledged ipsissima verba or earlier
layers of tradition as centers of authority. But if there is anything
they are not about to give up, it is their "right" to continue to
dissect the "tradition" and to champion whatever layer happens to
appeal.
To suggest that the process stops with or is limited to the final
canonical form is obviously anathema. As the popular phrase
summarizes it, the modern preacher or theologian may be just as
"inspired" as the canonical writer. In technical terms, "special"
inspiration is simply denied. It is no longer "sola Scriptura," but
at best prima Scriptura -or maybe primasemi-Scriprura, that is,
whatever part of it impresses me most. The Bible becomes merely
the earliest religious "interpretation" of certain historical events, a
classical "witness" to some "encounter" with the numinous. That
kind of jargon well illustrates the extent to which much of the
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Lutheran "law-Gospel" movement was often little more than an
expression in traditional Lutheran categories of the existentialism (and often universalism) of the current academic
theological establishment. (Nor has the more recent popularity in
some circles of some version of "process" immanentalism
contributed to evangelical and confessional clarity or identity.)
"Law" and "Gospel" sometimes became simply "bad news" and
"good news" for the human situation of almost any type, with the
Bible only a major source of paradigms and models. And since the
"law" component easily got lost, "Gospel" was frequently
assimilated t o various liberationist currents, especially to romantic and humanistic notions of individual “freedom" and selfexpression, that is, to an antinomianism that was often simply
antipodal to all that "law and Gospel" traditionally implied. Or,
when politicized as it commonly was, that "other Gospel" easily
allied itself with the left-leaning activisms of the liberal establishment. Each church convention ("Lutheran" or not) passed
essentially the same laundry list of social and political resolutions,
which were usually no more self-evidently related to an authentic
"Gospel" than the opposite type of clamor from the religio-political right.
There is something inherently contradictory about that kind of
"law-Gospel" claim to genuine Lutheranism which shows such
disregard for the two-kingdom doctrine. For precisely because
the doctrine of two kingdoms is only a restatement of and
application of the "law-Gospel" principle to the public sector, it is
indeed of the very essence of confessional Lutheranism. One
cannot have his cake and eat it too - or eternally go limping
between two opinions, to use a more biblical metaphor. On its
face, there is something suspicious about ofJicial ecclesiastical
groups ( I underscore the "official") which are almost infinitely
latitudinarian in doctrine, but who seem to know precisely what
God's infallible will is for San Salvador, Namibia, "peace," or
whatever the current cause.
V. "Gospel": Central to Hermeneutics, but Not Exclusive
Hence, we argue that to loosen "law-Gospel" from its
Scriptural anchorage, or to try to define "Gospel" by a n appeal to
"Gospel" without firm anchorage in an infallible Bible is simply to
beg the question. One may argue logically or deductively, as well
as inductively from the chaotic results.
First of all, logic (the ministerial use of reason, that is) excludes
the circular argument of using "Gospel" to determine what
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
189
"Gospel" is. An indeterminate is not determined by another
indeterminate; X times X yields only X2. Unless we know what
"X," that is, the "Gospel," is on some external basis, we get only
confusion confounded by applying that formula. Now this, of
course, assumes that "Gospel" has definite cognitive content,
which may be clearly expressed discursively or propositionally.
"Faith" in the classical definition is assensus andfiducia as well as
notitia, but it emphatically includes notitia, and with definite
perimeters. Such an argument, to be sure, has its own circularity,
or rests on its own "hermeneutical circle," to which we shall return
shortly.
But the point here is that a "law-Gospel" hermeneutics
independent of Scripture inevitably tends in more mystical or
subjectivistic directions. When "Gospel" is no longer normed by a
closed canon with an inerrant text, final authority inevitably
devolves upon each individual interpreter. The content of faith is
swallowed up by the act of faith, thejides quae by thejides qua.
So much accent is put on the experiential and relational that what
one should experience or relate to falls between the cracks.
Programmatically, herrneneutical space is left for input from
modern post-Enlightenment experience, especially from the socalled social "sciences." The so-called "new heremeneutics,"
somewhat as a reaction to the arid historicism of classical
historical-critical method, even attempts to make a virtue out of a
sort of text-interpreter dialectic. Alternatively, the "quest" or the
"journey" becomes such an end in itself that not only the
sufficiency of Scripture but the finality of Christ is condemned as
"triumphalistic" and a "theology of glory" - that is, about as
great a caricature of Luther's use of such language as is
imaginable.
Hence, we argue not only on the basis of reason, but on the
basis of our experience, if you will, of what happens when "lawGospeln is accented reductionistically. "By their fruits shall you
know them." Its impossibility is amply demonstrated by the
latitudinarian subjectivity of liberal definitions and applications.
Down that road lies only theological confusion and confessional
dissolution. Perhaps the best one can say for such hermeneutics is
that, while beginning with something very nearly uniquely
Lutheran, by turning the unique into the totality, it often loses
even the unique. I submit that such one-sided accent on one
doctrine, or one hermeneutical axiom, even when it is so central a
one as "law and Gospel" is of the very essence of heresy (a vocable
which understandably then is usually expunged from the
vocabulary of the heresiarchs).
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Hence, one is not surprised to discover that such "law-Gospel
reductionism" is not the hermeneutical method of the Lutheran
confessions either. Since their overriding concern is with
soteriology (and specifically salvation through the Gospel, not by
works of law), that criterion is indeed prominently employed in
interpreting texts dealing with the relationship of faith and works
(justification and sanctification).
But the main point to be made here is that the confessions
address other questions to the Scriptures as well, propositional or
doctrinal as well as relational. Even "law-Gospel" then emerges as
an "I-It" as well as an "I-Thou" matter. The "authority" of the
Scripture is not limited to God's claim on people's lives, or their
destiny depending on their relationship to Him.4
A major example would be the various sacramentological
issues which the Symbols consider. In one sense, because it deals
with "means of grace," sacramentology is certainly a "lawGospel" issue too. But a purely personalistic or functionalistic
posture would scarcely have delivered the emphatic emphasis
upon the real presence in the Eucharist or upon the baptismal
realism which is so integral to the Lutheran confession (and, of
course, in this case more against Calvinistic and Anabaptist than
against Catholic positions). Other examples, which we need not
detail here, would be the confessional discussions about the
descent into hell, about monasticism, about obedience to civil
government, and so on.
Ifthis were not the procedure, the confessors (and Lutherans who
share their confession) might well be charged with imposing alien
meanings on biblical texts -a charge against dogmatics and confessional exegesis which has generally accompanied higher
criticism and even much "biblical theologyn from their inception.
But the exegetical method of the confessions throughout is not
one of reading "law-Gospel" (or any other doctrine for that
matter) into biblical texts, of some arbitrary proof-texting to
buttress conclusions which have really been reached on some
other basis. The best known instance is again Luther's insistence
upon the literal meaning of "is" in the Words of Institution.
Another good example is Melanchthon's interpretation of James
2:24 in Apology IV (244ff.). The argumentation is not deductive,
from some law-Gospel apriorism, but inductive, from "what
James meant." Many other examples could be cited, of course.
VI. A Valid Hermeneutical Principle, but Not the Only One
Hence, this paper's main thesis is that "Law and Gospel" is,
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
191
indeed, a valid (even indispensable) hermeneutical ~rinciple,but
not the solely valid one (presuming that is meant, as we have seen
it tends to be, in some exclusivistic or reductionistic sense). In
terms of the scholastic jargon with which we in the Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod have become very familiar again in
recent years, both the "formal" and "material" principles of the
Reformation must be upheld. The "material" of the Bible, its
heart, core, hub, pivot, center is "law-Gospel," the power of God
through the Holy Spirit to put to death the old Adam and t o raise
up in baptism a new man. Yet its "form," its structure, means for
defining it, saying what it is and is not, like that of the whole
corpus doctrinae, is an objective entity, true extranos whether we
lcnow it and accept it or not, namely, the Holy Scriptures, the
"inscripturated Word of God."
Now this is not the place for a detailed disquisition on the
relationship between these so-called "formal" and "material"
principles. Like other scholastic distinctions, those of us who have
not abandoned the "correspondence theory" of trut h (that is, that
words cannot mean whatever anyone wishes them to mean) often
find them extremely helpful, if not well-nigh indispensable. But
we must remain aware that they easily distinguish too much, and
end up divorcing rather than merely distinguishing. Then we
become guilty of a "reductionism" of sorts ourselves, at least of a
caricaturing compartmentalization of our own. But, short of that
extreme, the fact that those two principles cannot ultimately be
separated is precisely the point. "Gospel" (or "law-Gospel") and
"Scripture" are two sides of one coin. The Gospel is the material
of the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are the "form," the means by
which "Gospel" is defined. The Gospel is thepower of God unto
salvation, but not a mystical, contentless one; the words of
Scripture are not magical incantations, effective apart from the
Word incarnate, but they do give form and shape to that Word
which entered our world of words.
We argue that maintenance of both "Gospel" and "Scripture"
in their proper relationship is of the essence of genuinely
b'confessional" Lutheranism. One would not care t o run it
through a computer, but 1 think the record down to the present
day speaks for itself. Precisely because they are two sides of one
coin, one ends up with something counterfeit or ungenuine if both
sides are not clearly minted. Both principles become skewed if
they are not held together in what I might venture to call a real
sort of "dialectical relationship."
If, on the one hand, the Scripture pole is weakened (as it is in the
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
historical-critical method, that is, with a fundamentally different
hermeneutics), or "Gospel" becomes a sort of free-floating entity
divorced from the sacred text, the inevitable result is some type of
subjectivism or relativism, of which there have been and still are
many varieties. If the Bible no longer defines "Gospel," then other
philosophies or ideologies will rush in to fill the vacuum. The
extent t o which today "Gospel" commonly becomes a cloak for
various countercultural programs makes the problem very clear.
If what we have traditionally known as the Gospel of "Word and
Sacrament" is not simply denied (as, by any measure, it clearly is
sometimes), then at best it is put on the back burner and the
church devotes the bulk of its talk and action to psychological,
sociological, or political schemes. As "Gospel" gets allegorized or
spiritualized into human idealism, even the sacramental realism,
which we have always regarded as one of themarks of the church,
no longer finds a place to stand.
And if, on the other hand, the "law-Gospel" thrust ebbs, then
we run the opposite risk - and it is just as real a one - of what
can rightly be called "biblicism" or "fundamentalism." It goes
without saying that we reject the popular use of these terms by
liberals to denigrate precisely what we are defending. If it were
just a matter of playing with labels, we could even own the terms
as laudable: "Biblicism" has an honorable history (and is still
occasionally so used in Catholicism) of meaning simply
specialization in biblical studies or giving the Bible its due.
"Fundamentalism," as is well known, received its name because of
concern about the fundamentals of the Christian faith, many of
which were - and still are -under attack. But, of course, that is
no longer the way the terms are used.
But, all polemics aside, there is no doubt that confessional
Lutheranism needs to protect its right flank as well as its left.
Precisely because, in the polemical situation, we share a belief in
the verbal inspiration and objective authority of Scripture with
others on the "right," we must be aware of our vulnerability to
undue assimilation to attitudes characteristic of "evangelicalism," but scarcely compatible with Lutheranism.
The proper relation between "Gospel" (or "law-Gospel") and
Scripture thus remains a high-priority item. Over against the
"right" we stress that we do not and cannot first convert people to
the Bible and then move on to the Gospel. Because the Bible is
Spirit-breathed, it is also Christ-given, and without prior
knowledge of enlightenment by Christ and His Spirit, the veil forever remains unlifted (2 Cor. 3: 14contains St. Paul's words about
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
193
the proper reading of the Old Testament versus Jewish biblicists
of his day). Similarly, evangelical Protestantism's tendency
toward a moralistic reading of the Bible, the tendency t o pervert
t o Gospel into a novalex, and the tendency t o read the Sermon on
the Mount or the theocratic prescriptions of the Old Testament as
codes for a Christian commonwealth today belong to a different
ethos.
That is, in a hundred and one ways it is very possible t o be very
visibly 'biblical" and yet t o turn the Bible into an instrument
purely of law, not of Gospel. Already the Reformers were
painfully aware of that fact. An undercurrent of such skirmishng
is especially prominent in Apology IV, where Melanchthon is
countering Roman Catholic arguments. In the preface, he
observes that "our opponents brag that they have refuted our
Confessions from the Scriptures." Of course, the Schwaermer and
Zwinglians knew how t o appeal to Scripture too?
Hence, there is a constant Reformation accent that the Bible
can be made to mean almost anything if the proper key t o its vast
variety of expression and accent is not in hand. And it is in that
light that we must hear Luther's typically picturesque and
hyperbolic words, such as: "If my opponents quote Scripture
against Christ and the Gospel, I fight back with Christ against the
Scriptures." Even better known (partly because so often misquoted and misapplied) are his characterizations of the core of
Scripture as "was Chrktum treibt," of James as a "strawy epistle,"
and so on. If Luther interprets Luther, it is plain that he is not
erecting some canon within the canon, but simply summarizing
the hermeneutical principle toward which all exegetical detail
must be oriented.
VII. General versus Special Hermeneutics
Because our topic is a hermeneutical one, it may be useful to
note the partial congruence of "formal" and 'material" principles
with another time-honored distinction, namely, that between
"general" and "special" hermeneutics. "General" hermeneutics,
one might say, has to d o with the externals, the "form" of the
Bible, with the Bible as literature. "Special" hermeneutics, by
contrast, concerns itself with what is unique in the Bible, with
what it does not have in common with any other literature.
"General" hermeneutics is surely the easier of the two, because
no particular faith-stance is involved. The "method" is primarily
philological, not theological. Hence, the major criterion is simply
whether or not one has done a good job. To a large extent, liberals
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
and conservatives (or those who are neither of the above, that is,
who are not believers at all) can and sometimes do join hands in
common labors. Whether one believes that the Bible is God's
word or simply a record of man's search for God, there are still
such reasonable "objective" or "scientific" pursuits as the original
languages, text-criticism, geography, biblical archaeology, etc.
Even "history" may - and must - be included, because there is
no disagreement, as such, that the Bible is a "historical" book, in a
sense a product of history, shaped by the personalities and
circumstances of its various writers. That is why we label our
met hod historical-grammatical, even if not historical-crit ical. The
only question is of the nature and limits of the historical
categories applicable to the Bible. Theoretically and traditionally, that type of general-hermeneutical investigation should
lay the foundation for subsequent study oft he theological propria
of the Bible. But theory and practice are two different matters.
And I fear that both liberals and conservatives in their own ways
tend to divorce the two, liberals often by design or basic
hermeneutical theory, but conservatives often too by oversight.
As is often the case, the liberal divorce is of various types. The
more liberal the person is, the easier it is simply to "treat the Bible
like any other book." Philology and various types of criticism
may flourish, but "special hermeneutics" is a priori virtually
impossible. That means also an almost total defacto divorce of
systematics and exegesis, with each charting its own path. A more
"moderate" position tends to be characterized by the dichotomy
of faith and fact or of "what it meant" and "what it means" that we
have already described. There is usually a "special hermeneutics''
of sorts here, but very vulnerable to trendiness, and tending also
to be alienated from systematics, unless both have succumbed to
the same trend. A major symptom of the divorce is in the area of
the biblical languages; these may well be available on an elective
basis to students who have such recondite interests, but, in
general, it is no accident at all that mainline seminaries do not
require them.
The problem emerges for different reasons in conservative
quarters. Here one fears that special hermeneutics (and specitlcally "law-Gospel," our topic) is easily left to the dogmaticians and
not really integrated with or applied to exegetical particulars.
Hermeneutical instruction itself spends so much time on literary
matters (the nature of a parable, poetry versus prose, etc.) that
somehow the law-Gospel, Christological heart of the matter
receives remarkably short shrift. Curiously, one ends up with a
Are Lriw and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
195
&facto (even if not a theoretical) dichotomy of systematics and
exegesis almost as total as in liberalism.
Sometimes I think our preparation of exegetical teachers has
contributed to the problem. Partly, no doubt, out of concern to
spare them from fruitless sparring with those of an incompatible
theological persuasion, future teachers are often encouraged to
major in philology rather than theology. That choice certainly has
its pluses, but, on the minus side is the tendency at times to
continue to major in philology in subsequent teaching and never
really to bring theological hermeutical theory to bear.
Hence, it behooves us to concede that there is such a thing as
"triurnphalism." We are all aware that this is another favorite
spitball in the liberal arsenal, and self-evidently we reject its
application there to virtually any confessional certitude ("lawGospel" certainly not excluded) in favor of an "ecumenical"
pluralism and sometimes the crassest universalism. Nor do we
forget how triumphalistic liberalism readily becomes too, a better
example of which can hardly be found than the intolerance
currently manifested in some quarters toward those who cannot
in conscience accept the novelty of the ordination of women. But
conservatism must also confess its tendency toward self-satisfaction with past achievements, and specifically with traditional
articulations, sometimes spilling over into that fractiousness
toward others who do not dot i's and cross t's in precisely the same
way. It is probably even salutary in that connection to recall that
the Book of Concord, as its name indicates, was a product of
precisely that type of situation, perhaps classically represented in
the Majorist ic controversy, where one extreme taught that good
works were "harmful" to salvation, the other that they were
"necessary."
VIII. Hermeneutical Circle
It is especially in the area of special hermeneutics that the idea
of the "hermeneutical circle" is helpful (though, of course, general
hermeneutics will not remain unaffected by one's theological prepossessions). Some liberal theoreticians have urged this idea in
recent years in the sense of a necessary interaction of a given text
and the interpreter's subjectivity, of "exegeting the exegete as
much as the text." The only merit in that accent is its recognition
of the fact that there is no such thing as presuppositionless
exegesis, no way to "prove scientifically" to the uninvolved
observer that one faith stance is correct and another wrong,
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
Various people, with various confessions, may well read the texts
differently (the major example perhaps being Jewish versus
Christian readings of the Old Testament), and if we wait for the
historians and grammarians to decide definitely what the texts
mean, we will without doubt wait until the parousia.
But the conservative does not proceed from that situation to an
exaltation of subjectivity or a relativization of the truth. Our
hermeneutical circle is traditionally expressed in terms of
"Scripture as its own interpreter." We believe, teach, and confess
that the truth revealed there is objectively true, even if only the
Holy Spirit can demonstrate it. Sometimes we say we have "no
official exegesis," and, indeed, when it comes to the welter of
particulars, that is true enough, even up to a point of the exegesis
of passages cited in the Confessions. And, of course, there is the
matter of new discoveries in modern times, which we shall
certainly not disregard. But beyond certain perimeters, different
exegesis simply means a different confession, a different
hermeneutics, at fundamental variance from Lutheranism's
official self-definition.
While we commonly underscore one half of our hermeneutical
circle, namely, that our doctrines are based on Scripture, the
other half often fails to receive equal stress, namely, that they all
double back as hermeneutical guides to the proper understanding of relevant biblical texts. A major part of both halves of
that circle will be, as already stated, the "formal" and "material"
principles. If both principles are legitimately derived from the
Bible, then together they form the major clavis by which alone, in
turn, we can ever hope to expound the sacred texts rightly. The
formal principle is an overarching one, God's own assurance that
His word will not lead us astray, either factually nor soteriologically. But the substance, the materia of that soteriology and of
which all the facts are ultimately an integral part, is evangelium
(or "law-Gos pel"), not lex Christi or philosophia coelestis, but
promissio, as Melanchthon argues already in his Loci
Communes.
The purpose of the "law" component is to force us to ask the
right questions, the real, the ultimate questions of Scripture (as of
ourselves), not those penultimate ones of personal quests and
contemporary culture, which so easily obtrude. "Law"
emphatically squelches any notion of the "world writing the
church's agenda" (hermeneutical or otherwise). Of course, there is
always the matter of contemporary and personal application, but
the two must not be confused, as characteristically happens in
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical pdndple?
liberalism. God's answer to the right questions is the Gospel, and
the "f0rInal principle" is Hisown assurance t h a t we have the right
to learn that answer.
That is, as already argued, ' ' l a ~ - G o s ~ ~ lbecause
;
of its
rnntrality in the Christian faith, will always be preeminent among
those principles derived from Scripture a n d hence in turn
indispensable for expounding Scripture. But
be
others also, as we have already noted; there were in the
writings too- Not only is there the doctrine of
scripture as basic prolegomenon, but, in a way, all the other loci
as well. If these have been validly derived from the Bible to begin
with, we cannot basically contradict them w h e n we turn to paFts
of the Bible relevant t 0 those loci, without expressing a different
confession.
A good example of those others which c a n n o t be developed in
detail here is sacramentology. If both "Wordwand ''Sacrament''
are equal means of grace, as we profess,this cannot help but color
our exegesis at many points. Theoretically, t h i s is one of the major
divergencies between confessional Lutherans and conservative
"evangelicals." Yet it seems obvious to me, at least, that not only
in piety, but also in exegesis, excessive anti-Roman Catholic
reaction has usually tended to push us in a sub-Lutheran direction
that is often barely distinguishable f r o m other conservative
Protestants. In Old Testament studies a m a j o r application would
be to the Old Testament cult, an area where, however, we appear
to be even less at home than most "evangelicals." Of course, "lawGospel" will provide major guidelines to be brought to bear upon
that subject too.
Once, however, the path of those who formulated the doctrines
out of Scripture to begin with has been retraced, and we have
appropriated the fruit of the labors of t h o s e who preceded us in
making the ancient words become t h e viva vox, or, propositionally put, in helping us release revealed information, all the
Parts must be related t o the whole. That is, t h e soteriological or
'yaw-Gospel" center must be brought to b e a r upon every doarine,
every text, every word (in part also because we simultaneously
confess verbal inspiration). That was the element of truth in the
''mderate" accent in recent Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
hi~torythat there is only one "doctrine," the Gospel. We cannot
say that in quite the reductionistic sense t h e y did, as though many
or even most other doctrines were optional. We insist that in
another sense there are many doctrines or "articles of faith" (SO,
moat obviously, in the heading of the orm mu la of Concord, both
tiere
wili
I
I
man;
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
in its Epitome and Solid Declaration). But in a comprehensive
sense it remains profoundly true that the church has no other
message but Jesus Christ and Him crucified. Precisely for conservatives with their concern for all the fpcets of the faith, the
danger of an atomistic, intellectualistic, and hence ultimately
legalistic caricaturing is always at hand. If that is not exactly a
fi&s historica, it is afides doctrinalis (to coin a term), ultimately
just as deficient. Just as it is possible to be very "biblical," yet not
really so, it is also possible to have all the "pure doctrine" in the
world, and yet be only "a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal" (1 Cor.
13:l).
IX. Corollaries
As there are many doctrines fanning out from the evangelical
center, so there are also many hermeneutical correlaries. This is
not the place to attempt to detail, or even list, all of them. But two
at least appear to deserve passing attention. First of all, we will
underscore the corollary of the unity of Scripture. Again, that
unity will be both formal and material. It simultaneously involves the confession of the ultimate relatability of every detail to
the cross (that is, to "law-Gospel") as well as that of the total
reliability of the Bible. Used in that way, bblaw-Gospel"is again
seen as a fundamental part of our hermeneutics. But as urged by
some, it emerges again as reductionistic, resulting in what in any
ordinary sense can only be called the disunity of Scripture. Then
the "law-Gospel" emphasis easily fades away into the general
liberal blur too. Now, when we say "unity," we do not mean
"uniformity." There was a time in the history of the church when
dogmatic prooftexting easily eclipsed nearly all historical variety
and human individuality, thus "reading into" passages meanings
which were not exegetically supportable. And, no doubt, if one
looks long enough under all the back pews, we can still find
remnants of that tradition.
But one fights windmills if. he imagines that the enemy is
amassing his major forces on that front today. The lock of unity in
the Bible, yes, the contradictoriness of the Bible (in any ordinary
sense of those terms) has long since been virtual dogma in
establishment circles. Even the most tentative efforts t o harmonize different accents and idioms are immediately suspect as
"fundamentalistic." Following Enlightenment canons, conservative exegetes are often even charged with "dishonesty" in their
readings.6 Obviously, then, if the biblical canon is itself a product
of politically and philosophically inspired harmonizations, that
I
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
199
is, if one cannot go home again because there is no canonical
home-base in any traditional sense, it follows unarguably that
contemporary pluralism and "ecumenism" is not only to be
approved, but applauded. And both logic and experience indicate
that "law-Gospel" itself, even in its reductionistic sense, will not
long be able to sustain itself, except perhaps as one glob in the
stew, and it certainly cannot be hermeneutically defended except
on the basis of some Lutheran "tradition" -on its face, of course,
as un-Lutheran a hermeneutics as is imaginable.
Somewhat similar points can be made about unus sensw
literalis. Again, it is not simply a formal philological rule (and
basically a rule of all language), but also a Christological or lawGospel rule. But that is just the point: as already stressed, the
Word made flesh becomes indistinct apart from the "words made
flesh," if you will -that is, inscripturated in the ordinary units of
human communication. The ancient usages, applying "Torah" or
"Gospel" to literary units as well as to their contents, spoke more
truly than they realized. And various liturgical customs honoring
the holy book are, indeed, idolatrous if the book does not
represent, indeed, sacramentalize Christ, as the Sacraments in the
strict sense also do in parallel fashion.
The original antithesis of unus semus literalis, of course, was
allegory. And while virtually no one can be found today to defend
either literalism or allegorism, both are demonstrably alive and
well today in that allegedly "scientific" exegesis, which knows
neither formal nor material principles. I have long argued that
there is no one so literalistic as the liberal on the make, magnifying
every minor variation into different theologies and disparate
traditions, almost anything to demonstrate that he is no "fundy"
(and, hence, there is no good reason why we should not return
with interest the common charge of literalism regularly hurled at
conservatives).
Furthermore, unus sewus assumes that meaning is to be found
in the sacred text, not behind it or under it -anymore than above
it, as allegory attempted. Meaning adheres to words in their
normal usus bquendi in the original historico-theological context. Hermeneutically, I fail to see much ultimate difference
between, on the one hand, the higher-critical game of ferreting out
all sorts of early layers of tradition (usually accorded more
authority than the canonical level), and, on the other hand, the
artificial spiritualizations of formal allegory or of officially
pneumatic exegesis.
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
X. Applications
As far as specific applications go, we have time to consider only
a few critical cases. First of all, a major area where both "lawGospel" and "verbal inspiration" principles must be brought to
bear are the many passages in both testaments which speak in
terms of "reward," or which seem to condition God's gifts upon
human behavior. As noted earlier, this problem figured prominently already in the Reformation. If Scripture ultimately has
no common Author, then there is no ultimate hermeneutical
problem either; there may well then be a fundamental contradiction at the very heart of Scripture, and we simply erect our
own canon on the alternative that suits. But, then, neither does
Lutheranism have any biblical basis for insisting upon even "lawGospel" or "justification by faith" as a minimum precondition for
ecclesiastical unity. But if it is axiomatic that the Bible does not
contradict itself, and if that non-contradiction may be summarized under the caption of bblaw-Gospel,"then it is no great
trick to harmonizethe twoaccents, anymore thanit is to fit James
and Paul together. God, indeed, "rewards" but according to His
grace, essentially in the realm of sanctification rather than of
justification. We cannot earn our "reward," but we can forfeit it.
We are saved by grace through faith alone, but faith is not alone
(to repeat some tried and tested formulae).
In the Old Testament a major bloc of material requiring that
kind of treatment is the Wisdom literature. Not only in moralistic
popular piety, but explicitly and hermeneutically in most critical
literature, Proverbs (to cite the major example) is commonly
treated as an alien element in the canon. Even the flurry of
attention to Wisdom in the past decade has scarcely confronted
the question of its canonical meaning. Here, then, "law-Gospel" is
indispensable. We believe, leach, and confess that Wisdom is not
an alien universalism and humanism at odds with much oft he rest
of the canon, but an alternate expression of an application to
more private, personal circumstances of the "third use of the law,"
essentially parallel to the "legal" form.ulationsof the Pentateuch.
Hence, the moral aspects of both are assumed and restated in the
New Testament; both Torah and Wisdom are embodied in Christ.
A second major example concerns Lutheran interpretation of
the prophets. Liberal activism characteristically wraps it self in a
cloak of the "prophetic." The prophets'challenge to the establishment of that day becomes a major model of what church life, yes,
even the "Gospel," is all about. Never mind, of course, that the
New Testament does not so quote and use the prophets. Never
Are ~~w and Gospel a Valid Hermencuticd p,.ineiple?
that the prophets spoke t o a theocracy or union of "church"
and state, which otherwise the ACLU and ADA would be most
vigorous in OP posing in any m odern dress. Never mind even that
the socalled "prophetic" often retains only the most tenuous sub
Stantial ~onnectionwith the Bible, but becomes a universalistic
sociological term, in practice often filled with leftist,
Marxist, content, which is defended ''biblicallyWon the basis of
the flimsiest of analoges. Obviously, neither verbal inspiration
"law-Gospel" is being upheld.
or a full-orbed Reformation hermeneutics, such a posture is
impossible. From the formal standpoint of inspiration, it simply
will not do to highlight t h e prophetic canon read historicistically
and literalistically apart from the whole canon o f both
testaments. A distinction between the "two kingdoms" defines
bbchurch,"the ''Israel according to the Spirit," in a way whichwas
not true of ancient Israel. TO confuse the two again is not only
subversive ecclesiologically, but implies a renunciation of the
finality and ephapax quality of the revelation of Christ.
The doctrine of the "two kingdoms" thus becomes a prime
example of a formulation derived from Scripture in turn
becoming indispensable hermeneutics for "rightly dividing the
Word of truth." And if one recalls again that the doctrine of the
"two kingdoms" is little m or. than a variant of "Law-Gospel," it
becomes apparent also from the material standpoint of Reformation hermeneutics, t hat ein anderer Geist pervades the common
Protestant notion of the "prop hetic." Political and social action
under such auspices has nothing t o do with the coming-of God's
kingdom. Now, in all fairness, we must also stress that the
alternative is not the privatism and quietism of much traditional
Protestantism, including much classical Lutheranism. In terms of
individual or group initiatives, it must also be stressed t h a t the
believer still exists in the ''kingdom of power" on God's "lefthand," and political "activism," like the life of sanctification in
general, in that context has much to learn from prophetic
examples.
,
XI. Symbolics versus ~ogrnatifs
we need t 0 explore the difference between symbolics
and dogmatics, or, somewhat similarly, between dogmatic
and "bi blicalW- exegetical theology. ASnoted earlier, a
persistent charge of critical hermeneutics a g m t traditional
exegesis has been that it imposes dogmatic meanings
Scripture. "Law-Gospel"
On
auld, of course, be a major example*
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CONCORDlA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERL.Y
wherever the Bible itself does not express itself in that terminology. Hence, a major plank in the critical program has
always been to "free" the Bible to be heard "on its own terms." We
have already sketched the two different universes of
hermeneut ical discourse which often makes communication itself
across the canyon difficult, if not impossible, and we need not
repeat. And, as we have tried to illustrate, "Law-Gospel" is also a
particularly good illustration of the confessional convictions that
it is not a matter of artificially harmonizing or of imposing
anything upon Scriptures, but of a modality which enables all the
voices in the choir to sing in harmony.
But confessionalists easily protest too much or too soon. First,
it needs to be emphasized that our Symbols pretend t o offer
neither a comprehensive exposition of dogma nor a complete
hermeneutical hand book. What they do provide for those who
subscribe t o them is chart and compass for exegetical labors, a
major symbolic system by which one "does theology." The
specific issues they address are largely those which were in dispute
at the time - but these, of course, were largely ones involving the
very asence of the Christian message. Furthermore, the Symbols
speak largely in proto-dogmatic terms upon which the later
systems build, not exegetical ones as such. However, the faithfulness of a subsequent doctrinal system to the primary symbol
system cannot be measured mechanically by use of the same
language, any more than whether a theology is truly "biblical" can
be determined merely by how much actual biblical language is
employed.
The necessary distinction between symbolics and systematics
overlaps somewhat with that between symbolics-systematics, on
the one hand, and biblical-exegetical theobgy, on the other.
"Biblical theology" (in the academic sense) arose in the early years
of historical-critical approaches as a more or less explicit protest
against what was regarded as the dogmatic-ecclesiastical tyranny
over the ancient texts, which needed t o be freed and heard in their
original accents. If it were not for the fundamentally different
hermeneutics involved, it might have been a trend hard t o buck.
Yet the subsequent history of the "biblical theology" movement
itself amply illustrates the fact that, when you throw away keys
and chase after a will-of-the-wisp notion of "freedom," the results
inevitably are about as variegated and often mutually contradictory as could possibly be. The movement has always had a
hard time distinguishing itself from a study of the "history of
Israel's religion," thus faithfully reproducing the presuppositions
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
203
and limitations of its historical-critical parents.For a time neoOrthodoxy gave it a sense of purpose and unity, and often nudged
it in relatively traditional directions. But the old nemesis of the
unity of Scripture (certainly not of both testaments, and often not
even of either testament by itself) continued to haunt it, and
eventually the ship broke up precisely on that reef of the "center"
(or lack of it) in Scripture, Today, if the movement is not simply
dead, as many pronounce it, it is undeniably moribund.
Confessional movements made various efforts t o tune into the
biblical-theology movement, perhaps even to claim it, but, at best,
the alliance was very uneasy. At the risk of gross oversimplification, one may assert that the Lutheran wing (Eissfeldt,
Bultmann, etc.) tended in the more existentialist direction of a
dichotomy of faith and fact, while those with a Reformed background found more congenial some version of their historic
accent on the covenant (Eichrodt, Vos, and much of the
Heilrgeschichte accent).7
"Exegetical theology," of course, is a much older term. Since it
never was, as such, caught up in the ebb and flow of academic
fashions, it appears to have weathered the storms quite well and
still to be a very serviceable term. In fact, we can and should even
thank historical-critical efforts for often providing raw materials
and insights for exegesis which presumably would never have
been available otherwise. A fair amount of sifting and culling is
usually necessary to determine whet her or not the results are
really compatible with our confessional stance. But as our very
term "hbtoricaE.grammatica1" indicates (over against the Reformation's merely "grammatica1"a pproach), not even the most conservative exegete is able to do exegesis as was possible in the p r c
critical world. While maintaining the unity of Scripture, we are
much more aware of the variety, and surely the richer for it. The
'historical" inevitably bulks much larger in our consciousness,
but, of course, the question of what "historical" means and does
not mean remains in many ways the question. The whole
environment requires constant attention t o boundary patrol or
fence-mending if confessional identity is to be maintained.
The other side of that coin is overprotection of one's tradition.
Recent Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod history, as everyqne
knows, has been characterized by reinstatement of the centrality
of our confessional and dogmatic traditions, both their "formal"
and "material" principles. Since the "historical-critical'' method
lay at the heart of the dispute, it is no accident that the exegetical
departments were at the eye of the storm. As I have indicated
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CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
elsewhere, I believe that, although the theoretical principle has
been established, the implementation of our sola Scriptura and
sola gratia principles on the exegetical (and probably also
homiletical) level has not been resuscitated to the same degree.
Our recent graduates, by and large, know their confessional and
dogmatic principles as well as can reasonably be expected. But a
comparable familiarity with the Bible, with "exegetical theology,"
is far from having been achieved. Hence, confessional Lutherans,
somewhat like other conservatives, often operate (curiously)
more on the basis of a confessional tradition than a sola
Scriptura.
A good share of the problem is simple unfamiliarity with
biblical vocabulary and idiom, or with the variety of biblical
"theologies" (in the sense of varying formulations and accents,
which on the surface, no doubt, sometimes appear mutually contradictory or appear to contradict the dogmatic dicta). Either the
biblical usages are confused with the dogmatic ones, or the
preacher exhibits simple helplessness when the familiar dogmatic
terms and distinctions do not appear in his text. The upshot is that
either he preaches a sermon which is magnificently "textual" but
which contains no "law-Gospel" (i.e., moralistic, legalistic "inspirational" diatribes of various sorts) or, as one of my students
recently observed sagely, no matter what the text, the sermon
simply proclaims, "You are a sinner, but God has forgiven your
sin" (i.e.., law-Gospel, but quite innocent of any grappling with
the particulars of the text).
At every point the Old Testament suffers much more than the
New, ahd, especially in this respect, it remains to be demonstrated
that the church is really serious about its confession of the Old
Testament writers "ut limpidissimos purissimosque Israelis
fontes." The common unwillingness or inability to preach on the
Old Testament at all is one of the major symptoms of the malaise.
And here especially our very accent on ulaw-Gospel~y
is, undoubtedly, often a major hurdle. "Law" and "Gospel" provide
parade examples of the different usages of dogmatic and
exegetical theology: "Gospel" scarcely appears in the Old
Testament at all, and until the demon of hearing the Old
Testament's Torah as a simple synonym of the Pauline nomos is
exorcised, we shall never do more than spin our wheels. Perhaps
not unrelated is the traditional tendency to employ the criterion of
"Messianic prophecy," not as, in effect, an indispensable "lawGospel" center but defacto in a sort of "Gospel reductionistic"
fashion (i.e., the only part of the Old Testament deemed worthy of
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
205
much attention). Add to that the budding dogrnatician's unfamiliarity with the theological import of key words like
"covenant," "righteousness," "justice," bbglory,""name," and
sometimes even with a functional "law-Gospel" hermeneutics to
add to his subscription to "inerrancy," and the practical
dimensions of the two sides of the "law-Gospel" hermeneutical
issue which this paper has addressed comes into bold relief.
Before I close, let me append yet an observation that the extent
to which familiarity with dogmatic-confessional usages tends to
outdistance that with biblical-exegetical ones finds a close parallel
in our problems with liturgical (and hymnological) language, as
some of our controversies in connection with the new hymnal
have illustrated again. Especially our traditional liturgies are
often but mosaics of biblical quotations. Properly used, as a
pedagogical tool (among other things) they may be as close to the
actual world of the Bible as most worshippers ever come.
Apparently the shape of our recent controversy has fixed in the
minds of many a sort of 'bliturgical-liberal" association. But that
association forgets the extent to which liturgical revival and
confessional revival have often gone hand in glove in the history
of the church, perhaps most notably that in Germany some one
hundred and fifty years ago, of which the Lutheran Church-Miss o u i Synod is a direct beneficiary.
As I have argued elsewhere, the suspicion of "high-church"
ceremonial is, in my judgment, inseparable from our defacto subordination of the Sacraments to the "Word." "Word" or "lawGospel" then tends to be defined sub-biblically in a verbalistic,
fideistic, intellectualistic, almost "Gospel-reductionistic" fashion.
The inevitable sequel of that stance is an unguardedness toward
non-sacramental or sub-sacramental practices and mentalities for
which "Reformed" might well be the kindest label. Here, too, if we
had space, we could explore the failure t o integrate law-Gospel
with our sacramentology and our sacramentology with "lawGospel."
But, of course, the real antithesis in all of this is the specter of
Roman Catholic associations, that is, a confusion of the "lawGospel" heart of the Reformation struggle with what explicitly
were labelled "adiaphora." To the extent that the Sitz im Leben of
the adiaphoristic controversy (cf. FC, X) still holds, we might be
justified on confessional grounds to continue rejecting practices
with false associations. But since, in the main, our antitheses are
different, I believe, it is our hermeneutical imperative t o "search
the Scripturesn also for the "catholic" elements which are very
206
CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
prominent there (especially the lengthy cultic sections of the Old
Testament) as well as to recall the high regard for catholicity and
patristic tradition everywhere exhibited in our symbolical
This is to say, in conclusion, the task of claiming and proclaiming the "law-Gospel" heart of the biblical message, as well as
appropriating all the other facets of a total hermeneutics and
properly integrating them with law-Gospel," is an ongoing,
perennial challenge to the church.8 In fact, it is a task of such
consummate urgency that it cannot be left to any one department,
or even to all of them working in isolation. If all, dogmaticians,
exegetes, historians, specialists in the confessions, liturgists,
homileticians (even administrators), maintain the common vision, then, by God's grace, St. Paul's predicate may become true
for us, namely, that we are "built upon the foundation of the
apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief
cornerstone, in whom the whole structure, fitly framed together,
grows into a holy temple in the Lord, in whom you also are built
into it for a dwelling place of God in the Spirit" (Eph. 2:20-22).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
FOOTNOTES
All confessional quotations follow The Book of Concord, trans. Theodore
Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959). It has not been deemed
necessary to include page references.
Similar points are made by Ralph Bohlmann, Principles of Biblical
Interpretation in the Lutheran Confessions (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1968), esp. pp. 72-73, and by Edmund Schlink, Theology
of the Lutheran Confessions, trans. P.F. Koehneke and H.J.A. Bouman
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961), esp. pp. 136-37.
Brevard Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament As Scripture
(Philadelphia, 1979). In this work Childs draws together and applies to the
whole Old Testament a viewpoint he has long been urging in a variety of
writings.
Cf.the similar arguments of Bohlmann, op. cit., esp. chapter 7, and of
Holsten Fagerberg, A New Look at the Lutheran Confessions, trans. Gene
J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House I972), esp, chapter 1. On
this point Schlink (op. cit.), however, is less than clear.
Thie point is made emphatically, but with typical "moderate" one-sidedness
in Edwakd H. Schroeder, "Is There a Lutheran Hermeneutics?" pp. 82-97, in
M. Bertram, ed., The Lively Function of the Gospel (St. Louis, 1966).
A recent, unusually offensive presentation of the liberal case in terms of
"honesty" is James A. Sanders, "The Bible as Canon," The Christian
Century, 98: 39 (December 2, 198l), pp. 1250-5. This article makes it crystal
clear that Sanders' "canonical criticism" is worlds removed from Childs'
method (cf. note 3, above), with which it is often compared, and is really
only "classical" higher criticism in new dress. The dilemma which
indebtedness to the Enlightenment poses for the liberal is rather classically
presented by Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the ~ e l i e w(~hiladelphia,
r
a
6.
Are Law and Gospel a Valid Hermeneutical Principle?
207
1966, rep. 1981). Significantly, it is subtitled "The Morality of Historical
Knowledge and Christian Belief." And just as significantly, after
demolishing all the liberal attempts to solve the problem, Harvey really has
no solution of his own to offer.
7. A major review of the extent to which classical Heilsgeschichte (especially
as presented by von Hofmann) was at explicit odds with Orthodoxy's
understanding of "law-Gospel" is offered by Gerhard 0 . Forde, The LawGospel Debate (Minneapolis, 1969).
8 . The classic presentation of the imperative, especially in its pastoral
dimensions, remains C. F. W. Walther, The Proper Distinction Between Low
and Gospel, trans. by W. H.T. Dau (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1928).