John Locke: His Harmony Between
Liberty and Virtue
J
DONALD
Understanding Locke
John Locke is one of the few major philosophers who can be used to provide a theoretical and moral foundation for American
and Western regimes organized around the
concept of liberty. Yet, in recent years, revisionist interpreters from literally every
perspective have maintained either that
Locke is confused and, therefore, not able
to provide a foundation for any culture; or,
that Locke actually was a relativistic hedonist. It will be argued here, however, that
Locke is consistent and nonhedonistic, if
one understands his epistemology.
Since Locke is so central for the legitimacy of these regimes based upon liberty,
it is not surprising to find neo-Marxists like
Macpherson holding that Locke espoused
a “possessive individualism,” which ultimately is destructive for these “capitalist”
societies.’ But when Leo Strauss, who was
dedicated to saving Western civilization
from the fate of Rome, concluded that
“Locke is a hed~nist”~-this is another matter entirely.
As different as Strauss and Macpherson
are, they both interpreted Locke as an
epistemological rationalist. There are problems regarding whether they are describing
the historical Locke or are trying to render
his philosophy more coherent. But if the
historical Locke was not a rationalist as
Strauss and Macpherson understand the
term, then it does not necessarily follow
that he needs to be made more consistent,
or that he was a hedonist.
Modern epistemology-at
least until
quite recently-has
generally demanded
that one choose the single rational, empirical, or traditional method that underlies the
thought of a philosopher and analyze his
J.
DEVINE
ideas on the basis of that method. Locke c m
correctly be identified as a rationalist. Yet,
it is di5cult to classify Loclte as a pure rationalist in view of the fact he is also regarded as the founder of British empiricism.
Moreover, he holds that there are “things
above reason,” that these things above reason are a matter of faith and revelation, and
that “an evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against pr~bability.”~
One, thus, can find rationalistic, empirical
and revelational aspects to Locke‘s epistemology.
The revisionists, however, try to reduce
Locke so that he may be dealt with, on their
grounds, as a simple rationalist. Strauss, for
example, starts with a distinction between
rationaiism and reveiation but then says,
since Locke held that belief in a life after
death comes from revelation, this cannot
be used to understand his rationalistic ethics. He then boldly excludes this aspect of
Locke’s thought.* With this element excluded, he creates a Loclcean “partial law of nature,” finds this construction and Locke’s
revelation in conflict with each other, and
is forced to the conclusion that Locke, as
traditionally interpreted, is confused. But
since he must be rational (how else could
he be so widely respected?) there must be
another, “hidden,” interpretation which is
r a t i ~ n a l .The
~ hidden interpretation which
Strauss finds is that Locke did not take revelation seriously, that he really was a pure
rationalist of hedonism and that he was hiding his true rational philosophy of hedonism so that it could be packaged more
attractively to appeal to a religious society
which held virtue rather than pleasure as
its highest goal.
The entire argument, however, rests
upon the assumption that some aspects of
2%
Summer 1978
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
Locke’s belief can be excluded in the analysis of his philosophy. Another view of
epistemology, though, views reason as a
synthesis of methods. Although one should
distinguish rationalistic, empirical and traditional (i.e. common sense, instinct, faith
and revelation) aspects, reason itself is
conceived as a total means by which one
can understand and evaluate truth. Locke
himself distinguished between what can be
called rationalism and the holistic conception of understanding which can be called
reason.6
If one wishes to understand the historical
Locke, i.e. how Locke saw himself, Strauss’
analysis of Locke must be incomplete. As we
have seen, Strauss made a rigid distinction
between the rationalism and revelation
aspects of Locke’s thought and excluded an
important element of the latter from his
analysis. Strauss even admits his view of
Locke is partial; but he could do this since
he was not a believer and could not take
revelation seriously.’ Strauss also has been
widely recognized for his antagonism to the
empirical aspect of reasons and has been
accused of not making the critical distinction between empirical description and normative prescription-especially in Locke’s
Second Treatise.B Since Strauss excludes
the traditional and empirical aspects of
Locke’s thought, this certainly must influence his interpretation of it. But by viewing
Locke’s epistemology as composed of three
aspects-rationalist,
empirical, and traditional-in one whole where all aspects must
be consistent, rather than as composed of
simple rationalism alone, one can look at
Locke’s ethics and politics as he did bimself. He did not believe that these kinds of
knowledge were obtained solely from rationalism but that one also knew and made
judgments on the basis of empirical evidence, common sense and revelation.
Lockean Ethics
To Strauss, the essence of Locke’s ethics is
that “life is the joyless quest for joy.” This
ethics is even worse than classical
hedonism, since it sought pleasure joyfully.
Locke’s hedonism is more pessimistic since
it tries to avoid a pain which really cannot
be avoided, as life is not only without virtue
but it is aimless, possessive, hopeless and
miserable.1° As Kendall has put it, the “chief
point about Strauss’ Locke is that he is a
revolutionary against both the biblical
tradition and the great tradition in political
philosophy.”ll But even if he were a revolutionary against the Torah tradition and
Platonic philosophy, this does not necessarily make Locke a hedonist.
To understand Locke one must view him
as a Christian influenced, but not exclusively so, by the later pragmatic and naturalistic neo-scholastics like Hooker, Grotius and
Puffendorf.
The tradition which seems to have had
the most outstanding effect upon Locke’s
ethical philosophy was that which
based morality upon “the law of nature.” This tradition was very old and
widespread. It sprang from the teachings
of the Roman stoics, dominated the
thought of the medieval scholastics and
then found striking expression in several
great moralists of the seventeenth century.12
The closeness of this connection seems especially well illustrated in Locke’s recently
recovered early essays on natural law
where he almost directly quotes Grotius and
Hooker on the Divine origin of a natural
law which can be known to man through the
use of ra30n.l~
Yet, even though Locke’s ethics are based
upon philosophy through the neo-scholastics, Santayana also finds that, in his scientific studies of medicine, Locke found Platonic and neo-scholastic rationalism misleading, and even narrowly dangerous to
his patients’ health when applied to real
world problems. Consequently, Locke always had a high traditional and commonsensical component to his philosophy which
refined his rationalism, which very importantly (Santayana says, most importantly)
included a sincere and confident Christian
faith?* Indeed, it appears that his major
Modem Age
247
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
work on philosophy, his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, was written with
the major purpose of providing “a sound
foundation upon which morality and religion could be based.”15
Indeed, the evidence for Locke’s Christianity seems overwhelming even in the
face of Strauss’ seemingly powerful argument that he is simply hedonistic. In the
first place, Locke himself says that “to give
a man a full knowledge of true morality I
shall send him to no other book but the
New Testament.” How much clearer could
one be? Likewise, he wrote that Jesus was
Messiah and Savior, that this was the center of reasonable religion, and that men
were expected to believe this if they were
to be saved for the happiness of life after
death in heaven.l6 In this way, he spent
many years of writing defending Christianity against both intolerant sectarians
and Deists in his Reasonableness of Christianity and its later elaborations. And as a
result of these efforts, some moderns even
call him a “defender of the faith.”l’ Furthermore, iocke was orthodox erioug’n io
write a discourse defending miracles and
in his last years translated and extensively
commented upon the Epistles of St. Paul.
Moreover, in the latter he specifically noted
that true liberty was not hedonistic but
should be bound by the obligations of goodwill and love.18
The strongest argument against a
scholastic interpretation of Locke, perhaps,
is that he was not an “orthodox Christian”
and that he was strongly opposed by the
orthodox clergy. But this does not mean
that Locke was not a Christian but merely
indicates that he was associated with the
latitudinarian wing of the Anglican
Church.lD In some narrow sense this wing
might not be considered orthodox, but it
certainly was comparatively conservative
between the extremes of narrow sectarianism and liberal deism. Locke also did attack the concept of innate ideas as a proof
of religion but he almost certainly did this
to put religion in a firmer base rather than
to attack religion.20
The revisionist critique, though, seems
to have been most convincing in finding socalled contradictions, and in Locke’s caution and secret writingz1 Yet, the examples Strauss gives seem very weak and result from the simplification of Locke’s
epistemology noted above. For example,
Strauss finds a contradiction when Locke
says that conscience indicates there is
a natural law but also says conscience
cannot prove it.22 Yet all Locke means is
that since all reason-based knowledge is
probabilistic one never can be certain
beyond a shadow of a
Likewise,
the belief that Locke used secret writing,
was cautious, and feared to offend the
Christian powers in England does not lead
to the belief that he did not really believe
in natural law and Christianity. Thus, his
secret writing seems restricted to “love
notes” in his amatory corresponden~e.~~
The model of caution Strauss refers to in
his citation for Locke is none other than
Jesus!25 And there is a better argument
to be made that Locke feared the long term
---- .,.I&
!.-a __-._-_
-f
ne:-*-
I l l l l U C l l G l ; U l L11G U C l D L J 1 l l U l ~U l a l .
I
.,. L,~~,J
IIb I C . U L C . . U
the waning influence of the orthodox wing
of the Anglican Church.z6
In one sense, Strauss is correct in seeing
that Locke did not have the same conception of “natural law” as did the ancients.
If the ancients are thought to have found
truth from a single reality of nature, Locke
did use two realms-an empirical nature
of how man tended to act and a moral nature related to how God expected man to
act. Indeed, it is from this distinction that
the charge that Locke was hedonistic can
be seen to have a basis in fact. For Locke
did hold that as man actually acted he did
so mainly from motivations of self interest.
Yet, this hedonistic aspect of Locke’s
thought was recognized long before the revisionists popularized it, although in the
past it had always been balanced by the understanding that he was also a pious and
believing Christian.
As early as 1914 Lamprecht had noted
Locke’s hedonism but balanced this with
the belief that:
Summer 1978
248
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
Locke’s hedonistic ideas cannot be said
ever to have constituted an independent
and self-s&cient ethical system.
Though he seems to have started by accepting Hobbes’ general psychological
background for ethics, he departed from
Hobbes at many points. He was too
much devoted to the interests of religion
to admit much of the materialistic and
worldly emphasis of Hobbes. He not only
insisted on pleasure of the mind as well
as of the body, as if the former had no
physiological basis, but also upheld the
rewards in heaven so completely outweighing all other pleasures as to be
alone worth considering.27
...
Consequently, Locke merely reemphasized a “hedonismyy which had always
existed in Christian thought. Thus, in its
earliest years the subject of Locke’s extensive study, St. Paul, clearly had taught
that one should obey the moral law not only
for conscience sake but also for fear of
God‘s wrath.28 By introducing the idea of
CL
Christian hedoni~m’~~~-i.e.that present
pains and pleasures should be measured
against eternal punishment and rewardsinto his philosophy, Locke did break with
classical philosophy and the testament of
the Torah, as the revisionists have held; but
it was a break implicit in the idea of a life
after death. Locke’s radicalism, therefore,
was not introduced by Locke but by Christianity.
Locke, like the classical philosophers, believed that acting for the sake of virtue was
the highest good. But like traditional Christianity, John Locke also held that acting
virtuously out of fear of future punishment from God was better than acting unvirtuously. To Locke, as with Christians
generally, Christ was not important because
he proclaimed virtue for the first time since
Locke knew that virtue was proclaimed
both through the Old Testament and by the
classical philosophers. What Christ did was
to separate Caesar from virtue and to weigh
the calculus of free human decision more
in the favor of virtue by making men take
into account the rewards and punishments
of heaven and hell in an afterlife.
To Locke, the resurrection of Jesus and
this proof that there was a life after death
changed the nature of things in the
world and gave the advantage to piety
over all that could tempt it. The philosophers, indeed, showed the beauty of virtue; they set her off so as drew men’s
eyes and approbation to her; but leaving her unendowed, very few were willing to espouse her. The generality could
not refuse her their esteem; but still
turned their backs on her, and forsook
her. . . But now there being put into
scales on her side, “an exceeding and
immortal weight of glory”: interest is
come about to her and virtue is now visibly the most enriching purpose, and by
much the best bargain?O
.
Indeed, Locke held that the “mere probability” of an afterlife should move reasonable men to follow God’s law so that they
could enjoy the “infinite eternal joys of
heaven” rather than try “to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing
trifles” on earth.31
With Aarnsleff, however, I must agree
that “if this is called a utilitarian ethic
based upon hedonism, the almost certain
result will be needless confusion.yy32The
most one could say was that Locke’s “partial law of nature” as abstracted by Strauss
was hedonistic (and this may have been
Strauss’ meaning) ;33 but when one considers Locke as a whole the charge of hedonism is mi~leading.~‘One might as easily
call St. Paul or St. Thomas hedonistic.36
Indeed, Strauss considers St. Thomas’
scholasticism dualistic and, therefore, epistemologically unsati~factory.~~
Yet the
scholastic epistemology used by Locke
which encompasses several harmonious aspects is not inherently invalid and if it is
to be challenged, it should be on its merits
and not by mere assertion. As long as this
is not done, it is reasonable to use the more
complex epistemology outlined above; and
249
Modem Age
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
using this it is possible to defend Locke’s
ethics from the charge of hedonism.
Since Locke himself used this epistemology, it can minimally be held that he did not
see his own philosophy as hedonistic. In his
Essay on Human Understanding and his
Second Treatise on Civil Government he
surely saw himself mainly describing how
men acted, not so much how they should
act. In a letter to a friend he specifically
stated that, “I did not design to treat of the
grounds of true morality
., it had been
impertinent if I had so designed; my business was only to show whence men had
moral ideas and what they were.”37That is,
these were empirical studies of how men
actually acted and in the case of the Second Treatise how a government could best
be devised to constructively utilize the
hedonistic tendencies in mankind. In T h e
Reasonableness of Christianity and in his
essays on education, however, Locke does
deal with how man should act and these are
clearly Christian ethical prescriptions. True
morality to Locke was not hedonistic
- _..._
selfishness;
___.it_w~
_ cot even
Cllristian
selfishness of acting well to save one’s soul;
but true virtue only resulted from freely following God‘s law.38But, since most men did
not consistently keep their minds on God’s
law, it was necessary to create a governmental regime which recognized this fact
of human nature while still allowing for the
free pursuit of virtue.
..
Lockean Political Philosophy
Revisionist scholarship must hold that
there is no virtue in Lockean civil society
but only the brutish pursuit of self interest.30 If the preceeding understanding of
Locke’s epistemology and ethics is correct,
though, it is possible to understand his
political philosophy in the Second Treatise
as based upon natural law values. Locke’s
political philosophy simply starts with his
ethical view of man, morally equal because
created by God, each having an obligation
to choose the good. Each, accordingly, is
created free but he is expected by God to
use that freedom responsibly by following
God’s law so that he will merit eternal reward.1°
This view of freedom makes only the individual ultimately valuable as all human
institutions were simply created by individuals and, therefore, are inferior to them.
Some social institutions-and especially the
family-are created immediately because
of a strong need to live in society. Yet,
since they are formed with other free individuals, in the forming of the institutions
both parties accept further responsibilities.
They are still fully free since individuals
themselves choose institutions so that life
may have order and a means to sustain itself materially. As the institutions tend to
solve these problems, moreover, they become valued and individual freedom becomes freely more limited by the “communion of interest” in these groups.ll
This society with full freedom to choose,
though, is “very unsafe, very insecure” because not all will accept their responsibility; and this makes the individual very
quickly “willing to quit this condition
which, however freej i q fnll of f e a m and
continual
As society, therefore,
is potential because of the existence of
choosing individuals, the state is latent in
the existence of society as a means to control the violence, force and fraud which
take place with enough regularity in society
to make it unsafe.
Paradoxically, then, Lockean society is
immediately not free but only has what can
be called liberty-which is not a situation
where everyone is “to live as he pleases”;
but is where there is only freedom to live
within rules of behavior: first given by divine and natural law and which, when instituted in the state, have been devised
with one’s own c0nsent.4~
Lockean societies, however, do not follow
a single form: the people are free to choose
which governmental regime-rules they
will live under?* But, to obtain agreement,
Locke assumes (1) that these people must
have cCsomeacquaintance and friendship
together and some trust in one another,”4s
(2) that this trust will then allow them to
250
Summer 1978
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
come together and make a common agreement as to the type of regime d “think
and (3) that the type they think
good must be defined by the value principles they hold which specify the good.
The Lockean society which has a government, therefore, is not one which is valuefree or without virtue as held by the revisionists. Rather, Lockean society assumes
values and is distinguished from others only
in the locus of its values and virtue, which
are placed in individuals within society as
opposed to the state. This distinction between society as the repository of virtue and
the state as only a means to regulate coercion, indeed, is what defines Lockean society:? Hence, in this type of regime, the government is given the very limited, though
important, function of only defining and
regulating coercion. Otherwise, it is to allow
virtue to develop spontaneously in society as
the result of free decisions of individuals,
since society is the higher repository of
virtue, honor, esteem, reverence, etc. which
a r e the ends of life.
Revisionist scholarship, however, maintains that Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil
Government does not contain the language
of virtue-or that it “barely”
Yet,
the present perspective can explain both
why there is little discussion of virtue
and why it does appear where it does. To
Locke, this treatise is on government and
not on ethics or morality. He did write
works on these latter subjects and these
clearly dealt with values. But this one was
primarily about a government which was
conceived as different from society, where
society was the repository of virtue and
government merely the protector of society
from coercion. Therefore, virtue would only
be considered in the Second Treatise where
society came into contact with government.
As the revisionists have noted, this is a
radical break with the Greek conception
which viewed state and society as one and
virtue, therefore, intimately related to government. The essentially Christian idea of
separating Caesar from society did not
really enter political philosophy until the
Middle Ages with St. Thomas and did not
take its developed form until Locke and the
American Federalist Papers.51
Given this, the Second Treatise is comprehensible. After an introductory section
which merely recounts the argument of the
First Treatise, section 2 immediately says
that this treatise will deal with political
power and the very next phrase makes the
major distinction between state and society
-Le. “that the power of a magistrate over
a subject may be distinguished from that
of a father over his children, a master over
his servant, a husband over his wife, and
a lord over his
The difference between these is that political power involves
coercion and these other relations legitimately do not or, if so, it is of a very restrictive character.53
Before the establishment of government
men are under the authority of God,
“whose workmanship they are,” to follow
the “great maxims of justice and charity.”
Yet, because they have been given freedom
cc
from any superior power on earth,” men
do not necessarily follow this law-although God has given reason so that man
is not without some guidance even when not
following His law. Since the interpretation
of reason is equally given to all, though,
“the execution of the law of nature is .
put into every man’s hands, whereby every
one has a right to punish the transgressors
of that law.’754
Since all can use the political power of
coercion in the state of nature, this state becomes unsafe. But in civil society government is only given the power to regulate
this coercion through the construction of
rules of law.
..
Freedom of men under government is
to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society and
made by the legislative power erected
in it. A liberty to follow my own will in
all things where the rule prescribes not,
not to be subject to the inconsistent, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of
another man, as freedom of nature is to
251
Modern Age
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
be under no other restraint but the law
of nature.55
Government remains limited in civil society
because God gave man the ability, through
work and reason, to subdue the earth and
thereby improve his life by the use of private property. Once given this right man
would not freely choose to enter society unless his property were secure from expropriation from government. He obtains this
security by turning the power of decision
over to a type of government to which all
have consented. Once consented to, the majority, in some sense, is given the right to
act for all.56
It may be objected that turning the right
of decision over to the majority would not
protect liberty or property. Yet, it is a measure of the importance of values in the
Lockean regime that it assumes that the
majority will act virtuo~sly.~‘Locke does
not emphasize structural restraints-though
he does mention separation of powers as an
assistance-but mainly relies upon the virtue of the ppcple & &e -=ir:uc Gf & !ea&
ers they consent to. The civil magistrate is
not to enter into family relations nor to expropriate life, liberty, or property. But the
only real protection of these basic rights is
the “trust” that the authorities will not
abuse them, or that if they do, the majority will correct the
The argument that Locke was not interested in obligation, seems no more valid
than the one which says he was uninterested in virtue. But with his distinction between state and society and his assumption
that society would be good, a discussion of
government need not deal with obligation
to any great extent. Yet to argue against
Filmer’s position that the power of the
monarch was equivalent and based upon
the authority of the father over his children, it was necessary for the Second
Treatise to consider the social institution
of the family.
When Locke did talk at length about the
societal institution of the family, he used
all of the language of virtue which the re-
visionists wish he would use-although,
even in Chapter VI (“Of Paternal Power”), most of the sections deal with power.
Yet in the middle section of this discussion
he distinguished between power and obligation and here he clearly holds that obligation and virtue belong in society; and that
-although the father has power alsopower is not the basis for reverence from
his children but merely for their obedience to him after
The reverence due to parents, however,
is differentfrom power. Even in maturity:
freedom exempts not a son from that
honor which he ought, by the law of God
and nature, to pay his parents, God
having made the parents instruments in
his great design of continuing the race
of mankind and the occasions of life to
their children. As he laid upon them an
obligation to nourish, preserve, and
bring up their offspring, so he has laid
on the children a perpetual obligation
of honoring their parents which, containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shown by all outward expressions, ties up the child from anything that may ever injure or affront,
disturb, or endanger the happiness of
the life of those from whom he received
his, and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance, and comfort of
those by whose means he entered into being and has been made capable of
any enjoyments of life. From this obligation no state, no freedom, can absolve
children.BO
A government of the Lockean type simply is one which leaves the question of virtue to individuals in society. The state only
exists to control the brutish tendencies
where one attempts to coerce his neighbor.
Government’s only morality is to conduct
its own affairs morally and otherwise virtue
rests in society.61 There it exists to control
the state (normally through democratic
means) 62 and to regulate the non-coercive
relations among men-at best for brotherhood or at least for enough respect to allow
Summer 1978
252
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
others to freely pursue self interest as long
as it does not involve coercion. As such,
Lockean civil society allows virtue but it also allows society to sustain itself as long as
men merely peacefully seek their own interests and government only guarantees this
peace.
The Lockean Harmony
’
I
When one looks at Locke from this perspective, the problem of values in the Lockean
regime begins to make sense. Those in the
classical tradition view society and state as
an undifferentiated whole and do not necessarily believe in an afterlife. With this view,
justice must reside in the state and virtue
must be worked out in politics. But in a
Lockean society which sees society as separate from the state and which sees the
former as the source of virtue and, in addition believes in an afterlife which provides
for real ultimate justice, politics is a very
limited pursuit and has little to do with virtue. With this realization, the problems
posed by the revisionists can be solved.
Virtue is not treated extensively in the
Second Treatise because this work deals
with politics, not virtue.
The basic political assumption of Lockean theory is that virtue can exist spontaneously among the people of society without
government direction, as long as there is
civil peace. What seems to the classical
tradition to be a callous disregard of virtue
by Locke is in actuality a radically different conception of it. Locke believed that
society could be virtuous if it only allowed
individuals to choose the good and, therefore, it did not need the state to direct its
virtue. A treatise of government, thus, did
not have to deal very extensively with virtue since virtue was beyond the bounds of
government itself and resided in the people.
All that was necessary to achieve virtue was
to make government responsible to the people, and they would see that society remained virtuous. The political question,
therefore, was how to control and limit government, so that it would only restrain pd-
vate coercion, not how it was to achieve
virtue directly.
Because virtue is seen as residing in SOciety, individuals and the voluntary associations they form must be protected SO that
virtue is protected. In the Lockean paradigm, therefore, the problem of virtue and
the problem of liberty are one and the
same. Although it is expected that most people usually will pursue short-term goals,
rather than the highest virtue, even this has
beneficial results as the search for self interest leads to increased wealth and satisfaction for all. But, most importantly, by allowing liberty the way is open for all to live
virtuously and for some to pursue the highest virtue. That is, in both these instances,
the Lockean does not see individual liberty
and virtue to be in fundamental conflict.
Rather, liberty and virtue are perceived to
be in harmony when coercion is controlled
and the people are good enough to have
“some trust in one another.”
It is not so much that those in the classical tradition find Locke inconsistent as that
they reject this harmony. To Strauss,
..
. no alternative is more fundamental
than this : human guidance or divine
guidance. The first possibility is characteristic of philosophy or science in the
original sense of the term, the second is
presented in the Bible. The dilemma
cannot be evaded by any harmonization
or synthesis. For both philosophy and
the Bible proclaim something as the
one thing needful, as the only thing that
ultimately counts, and the one thing
needful proclaimed by the Bible is the
opposite of that proclaimed by philosophy: a life of obedient love versus a life
of free insight. In every attempt at harmonization, in every synthesis however
impressive, one of the two opposed elements is sacrificed. . .‘33
.
Locke attempted a synthesis. To Strauss,
Locke could not have been successful.
When Locke found knowledge without conclusive proof, this must show confusion (although Locke would call it probabilistic
253
Modern Age
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
knowledge). To Strauss, this problem
traced back to Locke’s epistemologically uncertain choice between revelation and rationalism. It is an attempt by Locke to
reconcile the unreconcilable. To Strauss,
either philosophy or revelation must be
<<
It is not primarily that Locke
uses secret writing (neither Strauss nor
Goldwin make specific charges here), nor
that Locke is as cautious as Christ, nor that
Locke feared the power of the religiously
orthodox, which is critical. These are very
subsidiary to the charge of epistemological
fallacy.
There are, of course, other epistemological views of this matter. Rather than see
the Torah and Greek philosophy in fundamental conflict, they may be viewed as ultimately in harmony. St. Paul taught that
Christ was that harmony (1Cor. 1:20-24) :
Hath not God made foolish the wisdom
of this world? For seeing that in the
wisdom of God the world, by wisdom,
knew not God, it pleased God, by the
foolishness of our preaching, to save
them that b d i ~ F~o r~ bo&
.
die Jews
require signs, and the Grccks seek after
wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified,
unto the Jews indeed a stumbling bloc,
and unto the Gentiles foolishness: but
unto them that are called, both Jews and
Greeks, Christ is the power and wisdom. .
..
this perceived ha’mony was only implicit in Western philosophy*
Thomas attempted an
‘Ynthesis
Of
and the Greek
philosophers. As shOWIl by John Courtney
Murray,
”*
. . . scholasticism in the Thomist
style
did indeed authorize a mode of rational
inquiry, philosophical or scientific, that
was methodologically atheist. It did not
start with God but only with experience.
This inquiry, however
was not the
only mode of inquiry; the kind of truth
it sought was not the only kind of truth;
its techniques of certification were not
...
the only ones available. Truth was a
many sided edifice.
I should say
rather that there was one universe of
truth, within which different kinds of
truth, and correspondingly different
methodologies lor heir pursuit, existed
in distinction and in unity. Moreover,
. . . there prevailed the robust belief
that between the valid conclusions of rational thought and the doctrines of faith
no unresolved clash could or should occur.G5
...
Strauss, of course, knew the Thomist
synthesis. Yet, he rejected it as a “dualism.”6GIndeed, he rejected, in gencral, attempts to use different methodologies for
what he viewed as undifferentiated reality.
So, Strauss found the fact-value distinction
epistemologically
Likewise, he rejected the modern philosophy-science and
philosophy-political philosophy field distinction and viewed political philosophy as
the master epistemology.68 Finally, he rejected the state-society distinction, so central to Western free societies as they have
devdupd uver time.sc
To St. Paul and St. Thomas, it was necessary to separate Caesar from God and, then,
the state from society, so that the Church
and its members might be free.?O St. Paul
even would have the Church arbitrate conflicts rather than have them settled by the
state courts (1 Cor. 6: 1-7). It is significant, so far as St. Thomas’ solution of freedom is concerned, that in his great History
of Political Philosophy Strauss himself
writes the section fo]]owing that on St.
Thomas. In this, Strauss presents the doctrine of Marsilius of Padua, that the
Church should be subsidiary to the state.71
It is a measure of the importance given to
this that Strauss wrote the section for only
one other philosopher in this work-his
greatest of political philosophers, Plato. In
such a work Strauss must write on Plato
but why also on Marsilius, unless he also
is of central importance?
In separating state from society and in
placing virtue mainly in society (which inSummer 1978
254
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
cludes the Church), rather than in the state,
Locke is merely elaborating upon St.
Thomas and the predominant political
philosophy of the West for many centuries.
Likewise, in making a distinction between
rationalism and revelation and holding
these to be different but complementary
methods towards the truth, Locke is following in the same tradition. Again, to Locke
(as in Thomism generally) both virtue and
freedom are needed. It is not a choice between opposites but a harmony. This synthesis may be invalid, simply faulty or even
just unable to meet modern needs; but its
failure-if
it be such-is not a unique
problem for Locke.
If the criticism be true for Locke, it is
likewise a problem for all Western society
as we have known it. To make such a fundamental critique, a philosopher of the
stature of Leo Strauss was necessary. To answer the challenge as great a philosopher
must be called upon. This philosopher may
well be John Locke himself. If so, this
would justify a close rereading of what
Locke has written in the light of Strauss’
marvelous critique. It is my hope that this
article has contributed in a modest way to
the discussion of this “basic problem” of
political philosophy72 by suggesting that
epistemology must be part of its solution.’
*This article is partially based upon a paper
delivered a t a conference sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies a t the University of
Maryland on November 20, 1976. I would like to
thank Francis Canavan, S.J., for his helpful comments.
American Political Science Review (September,
1968), pp. 898-915. “Strauss, Natural Right and
History, pp. 250-251. Note that the term virtue is
used in Strauss’ sense rather than in Locke’s of
the Essay. This will be followed below. uWill-
‘C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1962), ch. V. ’Leo Strauss, Natural
Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19531, p. 249. ‘John Locke. An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by A. D.
Woozley (Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian, 19691, IV,
18, 2-9; and “The Reasonableness of Christianity,” in The Works of John Locke (London:
Tegg, et. al., 18231, VII, p. 135. On the probabilistic nature of undertsanding for Locke, see
Essay, IV; 11 and 15. Note that Michael P. Zuckert, “The Recent Literature on Locke’s Political
Philosophy,” The Political Science Reviewer
(Fall, 19751, p. 280 might better refer to Essay, IV, 18, 9 than 11, 21, 47 and 70. ‘Strauss,
p, 212. Ybid., p. 220. ‘“Reasonableness of Christianity,’’ p. 149; Essay, IV, 17, 4-8, 14; and 21,
1-4. Esp. see, F. A. Hayek, “Kinds of Rationalism,” in his Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 19671, p. 84; and; Peter Laslett, “Introduction,” in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 2nd ed. (Cambridge a t the University
Press, 19671, p. 99, for Locke’s complex epistemology involving several aspects of reason. ‘See
Milton Himmelfarb, “On Leo Strauss,” Commentary (August, 19741, p.,!4; Strauss, p. 214. ‘Leo
Strauss, “An Epilogue, in Herbert J. Storing,
ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962),
esp. pp. 326-327. ‘Richard Ashcraft, “Locke’s State
of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?”
moore Kendall, “John Locke Revisited,” in
rill-
more Kendall, Contra Mundum (New Rochelle,
N. Y.: Arlington House, 1971), p. 433. “Sterling
Power Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1962; originally published, 1914), p. 9.
Also see “Some Thoughts Concerning Education,” The Works of John Locke, IX, 186, where
these are the only works recommended on politics. ”W. von Lyden, ed., John Locke, Essays on
the Law of Nature (Oxford at the Clarendon
Press, 1958), esp. p. 109. Yet reason, again, is
used in the scholastic sense, where it can be
aided by revelation; Essay, IV, 18, 9. ”George
Santsyana, Some Turns of Thought in Modern
Philosophy (Cambridge at the University Press,
19331, pp. 13-15. ”Lamprecht, p. 4; and, Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s
Philosophy,” in John W. Yolton, ed., John Locke:
Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge a t the
University Press, 1969 1, p. 197. ““Some Thoughts
Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman,”
T h e V o r k s of John Locke, 111, p. 296; “Some
Thoughts Concerning Education,” 185, p. 176;
“Reasonableness of Christianity,” pp. 150-151.
“Sidney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the
American People (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 19721, p. 353. m‘‘A Discourse of Miracles,”
IX, pp. 256-265; and “A Paraphrase and Notes
on the Epistles of St. Paul,” VIII, p. 65 both in
T h e Works of John Locke. On the obligation to
charity: “Some Thoughts Concerning Education,”
110, p. 100. -Alexander Campbell Fraser, Locke
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons,
Modem Age
255
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
18901, p. 253. 20Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge
should do good “if it be possible, as much as in
in Locke’s Philosophy,” p. 198. ”Kendall, pp. 435you.” John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Gov437; Zuckert, pp. 280-287. =Leo Strauss, “Locke’s
ernment, in Sir Ernest Barker, ed., Social ConDoctrine of Natural Law,” The American Polititract (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),
cal Science Review (June, 19581, p. 493. 2aSee,
sec. 6, p. 6 ; and Romans 12:18. “Strauss, Natural
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human UnderstandRight and History, p. 8. “Quoted in Lamprecht,
ing, W, 3, 6 and IV, 15, 2. Also see, Ashcraft,
p. 93. *“Reasonableness of Christianity,” pp. 148“Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,”
151. T h e importance of liberty in moral decisions
pp. 209, 210. ”Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A
is perhaps illustrated by the fact that Locke
Biography (London: Longmans Green, 19571, p.
changed an earlier, misleading section in the Es98. 2JSirauss, Natural Right and History, p. 208.
say to more clearly read in this manner; see
mFor example, Strauss, Natural Right and HisLamprecht, pp. 100-101. sRobert A. Goldwin,
tory, p. 215 is surprised that Locke refers to
“John Locke,” in Leo Strauss and Joseph CropHooker rather than to St. Paul. But if Locke
sey, eds., History of Political Philosophy (Chithought he needed more caution before Deists
cago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 433-468. “Raythan Anglicans, Hooker would be more effective
mond Polin, “John Locke’s Conception of Freeas he was “judicious” enough to give a natural
dom,” in John W. Yolton, John Locke, pp. 1-18.
rather than a supernatural argument. See espe“Second Treatise, esp. secs. 2, 4, 77-78 and 95.
cially, “A Vindication of the Reasonableness of
ulbia!., sec. 123. %id., sec. 95. “Ibid., sec. 132.
Christianity,” in The lBorks of john Locke, VII,
S b i d . , sec. 107. I b i d . , sec. 132. “lbid., secs. 2
pp. 164-165 where Locke could be talking to
and 77-78. “Ibid., sec. 22. ‘“Ibid., sec. 66. 60GoldStrauss as well as to Edwards; and, “A Second
win, p. 441. “See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Vindication of the Reasonableness of ChristianiTheologica, trans. by Fathers of the English DOty,” VII, p. 265 where he says “I chiefly designed
minican Province (New York: Benziger Broa.,
my book” for Deists. Also see ibid., p. 188.
1947), 1-11, Q. 95, A. 4. On The Federalist Pa“Lamprecht, p. 101. Also see, Frederick Coplespers, see Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture
ton, A History of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.:
of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown,
Image, 1964; originally published, 19591, V, pp.
1972). ch. 4. Also see, Lord Acton, The History
135-137, 152. ”Romans 13:5. For a one-sided and
of Freedom and Other Essays (London: Macmilunsympathetic but also a clear demonstration of
Ian, 1909), pp. 33-37; and, F. A. Hayek, The
“hedonism” in Christianity, see Friedrich NietzConstitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of
sche. The Anti-Christ trans. by R. 1- Hollingrlalo
Chicegn Prpgq, 1960); rh. 11: esp. 9. 163 and p.
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1968). ZgFor Locke’s asso457 n. 4. “Second Treatise, sec. 2, pp. 3-4. Also
ciation with Christian hedonistic ideas, see Rich.
see sec. 77. “lbid., sec. 3, p. 4. *Ibid., secs. 4, 5,
ard I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd ed. (Oxford at
6, 7-15, 19, 22. allbid., sec. 22. I b i d . , secs. 25,
the Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 257. aLocke, “The
131, 87, 95-99. “For Locke’s view of the common
Reasonableness of Christianity,” p. 150. =Locke,
people, see esp. his “A Vindication of the ReasonAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 11,
ableness of Christianity,” The Works of John
21, 38-53. =Hans Aarnsleff, “The State of Nature
Locke, VII, pp. 176-177. Also see Willmoore Kenand the Nature of Man in Locke,” in Yolton,
dall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority
John Locke, p. 111. Robert Horwitz, “John Locke
Rule (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959;
and the Preservation of Liberty,” The Political
originally published, 1941), p. 135. *Second
Science Reviewer (Fall, 1976), pp. 348-349 goes
Treatise, secs. 83, 135.142, 212-243. ”On obedito the length of quoting Locke’s advice in “Some
ence see ibid., sec. 67. @lbid., sec. 66. Also see,
Thoughts Concerning Education” for small chil‘‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education,” 41, p.
dren not to read the Bible, without giving weight
34. Compare this with Hobbes; see Richard AIto Locke’s belief that they should not do this so
len Chapman, “Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas
they do not become confused. Rather, Locke sugHobbes on the Family,” The American Political
gests that children learn the Bible from a cateScience Review (March 19751, pp. 76-90. ?%cchism, “to learn a question every day or every
ond Treatise, secs. 159-168, 124. *lbid., see. 154,
p. 90. “Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 74.
week” till they know it “perfectly by heart” (Sec.
159, p. 149). aaSee Natural Right and History,
“Ibid., p. 75. wJohn Courtney Murray, The Probpp. 219-220. Likewise, if “natural law” is delem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press,
fined narrowly (e.g. Zuckert, p. 280 ff), there is
1964), pp. 89-90. “Strauss, Natural Right and
History, p. 8. “lbid., ch. 2. -Leo Strauss and JOno doubt Locke’s “partial natural law” is Hobbesiseph Cropsey, “Introduction,” in History of POan. Bot it is incomplete. “Copleston, pp. 136,
litical Philosophy, P. 1. mIbid., P. 6. ”Acton, ch.
137. “JLocke’s hedonism can be no more proved
2. nLeo Strauss, “i?Iarsilius of Padua,” in Strauss
by citing his qualification that one is bound to
and Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosopreserve the rest of mankind “when his own
phy. In the second edition, he adds Machiavelli.
preservation comes not in competition,” than St.
“Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 8.
Paul’s can by noting his qualification that one
Summer 1978
256
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED