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2 May 2017
The Potential for Tensions in South Asia: The Food and Water
Vector
Madeleine Lovelle
Research Analyst
Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
Key Points
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Water scarcity is predicted to affect 1.8 billion people by 2025, many of
whom will be from across Asia.
The headwaters of most of Asia’s major rivers are located in Tibet, giving
China a significant degree of control over the flow of these rivers to
lower riparians.
The effects of climate change also threaten future stability within the
region, particularly when Chinese dam construction activity is already
creating tensions.
Multilateral engagement between South Asian countries must ensure
that the consequences of dire food and water security do not eventuate.
Summary
Chinese control of Tibet has resulted in it controlling many of the headwaters of South Asia’s
major rivers. The survival of these rivers and the livelihoods that they sustain are likely to
face future challenges from both direct intervention from China, as well as the worsening
effects of climate change. Although the uneven balance of power throughout the region
makes transboundary co-operation difficult, it is essential that countries within the region
establish co-operative relationships to help mitigate against future threats to food and water
security.
Analysis
Forty-six per cent of the world’s population depend upon rivers originating in Tibet. These
rivers include the Mekong, Salween, the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra, Indus, Sutlej,
Irrawaddy, Yellow and Yangtse rivers. Though this paper will only focus on the rivers located
in South Asia, the flow of the Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, Yellow and Yangtse rivers
significantly contribute to food and water security in the region. By 2025, water scarcity is
predicted to affect 1.8 billion people, particularly across Asia. Control of Tibet places China in
a dominant position to control Asia’s water sources.
Tibet’s annual glacial melt rate is currently at seven per cent; by 2050, it has been predicted
that two-thirds of Tibet’s glaciers will be eliminated. The melt from the Himalayas as a result
of climate change has increased runoff for many of these rivers, but this increased river
supply will only last as long as the glacial melt does. Dams have been built on many of the
tributaries of the major rivers throughout Asia which ultimately affects the flow in these
major rivers. The likely implications of glacial melt and damming on the major rivers sourced
in Tibet will play a significant role in regional food and water security.
Source: http://www.meltdownintibet.com
The Salween
The Salween is the region’s largest free-flowing river, and is one of the major rivers not yet
affected by damming. China has recently released its latest energy plan, which does not
include new dams on the Nu River (as the river is known in China) that it previously
considered building. There are currently plans in Myanmar, driven by Chinese and Thai
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investment, for the construction of seven dams along the river. These plans have been met
with resistance from environmental protestors, and by those in the proposed dam areas that
will be displaced. The locations of the dam sites are in parts of the country that are home to
ethnic minority groups who generally have hostile relations with the central government.
The Yarlung Tsangpo/ Brahmaputra
China’s Zangmu Dam became operational in October 2015. The dam lies along the upper
reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo (known as the Brahmaputra in India). Due to its close
proximity to India, the dam may trigger floods in the Indian state of Assam during the rainy
season and, in the worst case scenario, could cause parts of the Brahmaputra to dry up
during winter. In this event, downstream agriculture will be seriously affected and soil
salinity will increase.
The Gyatsa and the Zhongda Dam are in construction along the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet.
China also has plans for two more dams along the river. Dam construction along the Yarlung
Tsangpo is opposed by India because of the effects it will have on its own hydropower
projects. Chinese plans to divert water would reduce water flow, damaging agriculture,
ecology, lives, and the livelihoods of up to 1.3 billion people downstream in India and
Bangladesh.
Predictions expect India and Bangladesh’s combined total population to surpass that of
China within a decade. Rapid population growth downstream is likely to contribute to
increasing water demands which, in turn, could severely heighten Sino-Indian tension.
Geopolitical tension between the two major powers of Asia greatly increases the potential
for conflict in the region.
The Brahmaputra and the Ganges
Bangladesh will experience a serious threat to its water supply by Chinese and Indian
activities upstream. The Brahmaputra and Ganges River (or the Padma River, as it is known
in Bangladesh) merge in Bangladesh to form the Meghna River, which flows into the Bay of
Bengal. While the headwaters of the Ganges River do not commence in Tibet, the significant
number of people that rely on this river, coupled with its flow into the Brahmaputra, mean
that the Ganges is still a significant force that must be considered in ensuring future food
and water security.
Indian damming of the Ganges River has already reduced its flow downstream. Soil salinity in
Bangladesh has increased as a result, seriously damaging agriculture. Thousands of
Bangladeshis have been forced to relocate to north-east India and, due to the demographic
composition of the area, there have been serious ethnic conflicts. Chinese dam construction
upstream has also had grim consequences downstream. Bangladesh has little capacity to
challenge its upper riparians, yet further reductions in its water supply may continue to
create grounds for internal conflict.
Parts of India and China are stressed for water which contributes to tensions between the
two countries. Climate change, depleting aquifers, rapid population growth and urbanisation
are placing pressure on scarce water resources within the two countries. Tibet has remained
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an underlying issue that affects Sino-Indian relations. Coupled with on-going border disputes
over Arunachal Pradesh, tension over water has continued to strengthen since China began
constructing dams upstream.
The Indus and the Sutlej
Climate change could alter the situation on the ground and affect the fragile relationship
between India and Pakistan. As the rivers of the Indus Basin originate in the mountains of
Tibet, they are influenced by the melting of glaciers in that region. There are concerns that
the Indus could become a seasonal river by 2040, which would make the Pakistani Punjab
increasingly prone to drought. Climate change also has the potential to increase the severity
of extreme weather events, which could lead to more devastating floods, such as those that
occurred in 2010.
Unless the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is revised, climate change has the potential to
complicate the existing allocation of water. While the region has always been prone to
floods and drought, changed weather patterns could result in more frequent and destructive
extreme weather events. Such conditions could prove to be a factor that pushes India and
Pakistan into conflict, particularly since Pakistani hardliners often accuse the upper riparian
of contributing to, or engineering, major floods. They claim that the only way to ensure that
similar disasters are averted is to “liberate” Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir by force. Such
views are held by only a small portion of the Pakistani population but, as glacial melt is likely
to increase the potential for flooding in the coming decades, it is a view that might come to
be adopted by more in the community.
The Sutlej is one of the rivers under the IWT that has been allocated to India. Under the IWT,
India has exclusive use of this river before it enters Pakistan (Pakistan, too, has exclusive use
of some of the other rivers flowing between the countries). India uses much of this water for
irrigation and power plants. Given that the Sutlej later joins with the Indus in Pakistan, water
does flow into Pakistan, but the flow is at risk of being compromised under Indian control in
the upper reaches of the river.
Food Security, Surface Water and Transboundary Tensions
Food security is heavily entwined with water security. If the flow of a river dries up earlier
upstream, this has the potential to affect agricultural activities relying on surface water in
lower riparian countries.
Pakistan, India and the Indus River
One of the functions of the IWT is to set out provisions that govern the use of surface water
between Pakistan and India. The countries are both agrarian economies, meaning that
agricultural production is a significant factor in ensuring the livelihoods for millions of
people. Water logging, salinity and land degradation threaten the productive capabilities of
Pakistan’s agricultural sector. In 2012, 90 per cent of Pakistan’s food grains and 100 per cent
of its fruits, vegetables, sugarcane, cotton and rice crops were produced from irrigated
water. Recent statistics are difficult to come by but, in 2008, 6.91 million hectares of
Pakistan’s 19.27 million hectares of irrigated land used surface water. This figure was larger
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than the amount accounted for by groundwater, which provides irrigation water for 4.13
million hectares. While the deficit in water supply may be met by pumping groundwater, this
solution will only be viable until the dwindling supply of water in aquifers depletes. It is clear
that any alteration to Pakistan’s water supply from the Indus River will have an effect on the
country’s future food security.
It is crucial that both countries also consider the role of climate change for long-term food
security. The flow of the Indus river system depends largely on glacial meltwater from the
Tibetan Plateau, and while increased glacial melt may increase river flow in the short term,
the availability of surface water in the long term may decrease drastically. For India, the
waters of the Indus Basin also play a significant role in ensuring productivity in India’s critical
agricultural region. If the Indus river flow were to be jeopardised by any means, it is likely
that both Pakistan and Indian food security will be threatened to varying degrees. There are
likely to be heightened tensions between the two countries if they both become desperate
for irrigation water that is currently sourced from the Indus River.
Bangladesh, India and the Brahmaputra and the Ganges
The Ganges-Brahmaputra basin is the largest basin within India, and contributes 59 per cent
of India’s water resources. While India does not have a problem with the quantity of its
physical supply of water, much of its food insecurity stems from the mismanagement of its
food and water resources. If India finds itself unable to increase its current food security by
improving its methods of production, it may continue to extract more water from the river
system to produce greater quantities of food. This is likely to have an adverse effect on
downstream Bangladesh, particularly when Bangladesh already experiences higher than
average levels of food insecurity.
Rice and wheat are the staple crops produced throughout the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin.
The crops require a large amount of water to produce and, during the dry season, rely on
irrigation. Because the population of India and Bangladesh continues to increase, demand
for these grains also continues to rise. Most of the land suitable for agricultural production
in Bangladesh and India has already been cultivated, meaning that to meet this increased
demand they must better utilise land resources. While irrigation technology may continue to
develop within the region, any threat to the basin’s water supply will challenge future food
security efforts. Similar to the Indus River basin, the impact of climate change on water
resources in India and Bangladesh is likely to affect agricultural production in the future.
Easing the Tension
In 1997, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses of
International Watercourses (UN Water Convention, UNWC) was established by one hundred
countries as an international legal framework for the governance of transboundary
watercourses. China, however, voted against the UNWC on the grounds that the convention
did not support its territorial sovereignty. India and Pakistan abstained, while Bhutan and
Myanmar were absent at the time of the vote. Bangladesh, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Vietnam voted in favour of the convention. The results of the 1997 UNWC demonstrate
the difficulty in achieving regional co-operation when downstream countries have a strong
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interest in ensuring water sources are protected, yet upstream countries hold different
territorial concerns. Zhang Hongzhou, Associate Research Fellow at Singapore’s Nanyang
Technological University, argues that Chinese reluctance to sign multilateral water cooperation agreements signals Beijing’s desire for water control within Asia, despite the
detrimental implications this could have for downstream riparians.
Population growth throughout the world to 2050 is predicted to occur mainly in Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 90 per cent of the population of South and South-East Asia either
live in poverty or are susceptible to it. Increasing population growth rates and urbanisation
will only further threaten food and water security, and is likely to increase the number of
people living in poverty. Without fair agreements governing the sustainable development
and equal distribution of water flowing through Asia’s major transboundary rivers, the
potential for conflict is significantly heightened.
Integrated basin management is imperative between riparians with headwaters originating
in the Tibetan Plateau. Creating a shared perception of the tragedy of the commons problem
between riparians will create win-win outcomes, and has a greater chance of encouraging
Chinese co-operation. Although China is more likely to rely on bilateral agreements where it
can harness its power over riparians more effectively, transboundary water co-operation
cannot be holistically managed through bilateral actions alone. The threat to regional food
and water security must be at the forefront of Asian co-operation to minimise the risk of
potential conflict.
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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future
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