AMITAI
ETZIONI*
The central thesis of this essayis that nation-building-however defined-by
foreign powers can rarely be accomplished and tends to be very costly, not
merely in economic resourcesand those of political capital, but also in human
lives. Hence, for both empirical, socialscienceconsiderationsand on nonnative
grounds, foreign powers would be best advisedto scaleback gready their ambitions and promises. The more these powers focus whatever resources they are
willing and able to commit on modest intervention, the more good they will do
for the nation they seekto help and for themselves.
There are many reasonswhy superpowersand other powers are tempted to
promise nation-building. They believe in the value of forging nationsand helping
their development. They are keen to share with others that which they hold
dear-domestic peace, the blessingof democratic politics and the rich fi:uits of
developedeconomies.They believe in the possibility of human progressand have
a weaknessfor positive thinking, which leads them to hold that such developments can be brought about relatively easily, especially if one is dedicated to
bringing them about. They also follow a practice common in domestic politics:
launching programmes with great fanfare, which dazzlesthe media, the voters
and sometimesthe legislature.Often thesesamegroupsdo not pay much attention
to the complicated details of what can actuallybe achieved.Thus politicians can
promise cake without having to deliver it-for instance, the $15 billion the
United StatespromIsed to fight HIV / AIDS globally. And if governments' feet
are held to the fire, they often claim to have made good on their promises by
defining down what is meant by nation-building, democratization or economic
reconstruction. Mission accomplished-by public relations.
In contrast, what is advocatedhere is a foreign policy that recognizes that one
size does not fit all, that unmodified western ways may well not be suitable for
other cultures and societies; that making progress happen long-distance, in
other people's countries, is very taxing; that positive thinking is just that*
This work
draws on my book From en'pire to community: a new approach to internqtional relations (April
2004).
International Affairs So, 1 (2004) 1-17
Amitai
positive
Etzioni
thinking: it cannot deliver the mail, let alone move mountains; and
above all, that a greatly scaled-back, restrained agenda is more credible, and
therefore more likely to result in actual achievements.
A three-legged definition
We need straight away to define 'nation-building'. Unfortunately, there is no
social science or intellectual academywhere terminology is clearly defined and
its consistent use enforced. The phrase 'nation-building' is generally used to
describe three related but different tasks:unification of disparateethnic groups;
democratization; and economic reconstruction.
In its original usage,nation-building was frequendy identified with unifying
diverse ethnic groups within a state, that is, community-building: 'A major
object of nation-building was to weld the disparate elements of the populace
into a congruent whole by forging new identities at the national (=state) level at
the expense of localism and particularistic identities'. I Creating a sense of
national identity was seento be important for the formation of the state itsel£
Nation-building means 'both the formation and establishmentof the new state
itself asa political entity and the processesof creating viable degrees of unity,
adaptation, achievement, and a senseof national identity among the people'.2
Another view of nation-building emphasizesimprovements in governance.
Creating effective governance means implementing the rule of law, fighting
corruption, installing democracy and ensuring freedom of the press.3Historically, nation-building encompassed'an effort to construct a government that
mayor may not be democratic, but preferablyis stable'. Today, nation-building
often 'implies the attempt to create democratic and secure states'.4This democratization imperative was particularly stressed during the presidencies of
Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, both of whom sought the 'enlargement' of
democracy around the world.
A third view seeseconomic reconstruction asan important part of nationbuilding. It is suggestedthat when the economy is improved, a more stableand
better-functioning statecan evolve. Also, economic well-being is associatedwith
democratization.s It is best not to equate, asmany do, economic reconstruction
with economic development. Economic reconstruction assumesthat there was
a well-functioning economy, but that some catastrophicevent, such asa war or
I Pal Kolsto, 'Nation-building
and social integration theory', in Pal Kolsto, ed., Nation-building and ethnic
integrationin post-Sovietsocieties:an investigationof LAtvia and Kazakslan (Boulder, CO: Westview, .1999),
P.49.
2 Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, 'Introduction', in Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, eds,
Ethnicity and nation-building: comparative,international,and historicalperspectives
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
1974),p. .II.
] Michael IgnatiefI, 'Nation-building lite', Neul York TimesMagazine, 28 July 2002, p. 30.
4 Karin von Hippel, 'Democracy by force: a renewed commitment to nation-building', Washington
Quarterly 23: .1,2000, p. 96.
5 Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political
legitimacy', Atnerican PoliticalScienceReview53: .I, 1959, pp. 69-105.
2
A self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
civil strife, undennined it, so that the economy must be put back on its feet.
This sense of nation-building is particularly employed with regard to the
rebuilding of japan and Germany after the Second World War. The phrase
'economic development' is bestreservedfor building a modem economy where
none previously existed: an even more demandingtask.
Whether one usesthe term 'nation-building' in only one or more of these
senses(many use it in all three, interchangeably),one should take into account
that the reference is to the building of a nation,not a state.A nation is widely
understood to be a community invested in a state.6It hence entails much more
than merely forming a state,which may be achieved, say,by granting independence to a previous colony. It entails in addition fonning a community where
none previously existed, or shoring up one that was not firmly or properly
constructed, or whose existencehas been undennined, in many casesby war or
inner strife.
A state can exist without its citizens having the kind of loyalties which, in
political matters, would give precedence to the state should it come into
conflict with component entities suchastribes or ethnic groups. Such a layering
of loyalties is essentialif a nation is to stay together and avoid secessionor civil
war, without relying merely or mainly on force.
Behind these statements-especially the notion that a nation is more than a
state, that it hasa strong element of community, if only an imagined one-is a
bit of social and political theory that should be spelledout. Commitments to the
common good and to a shared community are essentialbecause effective
collective decision-making often entails imposing on various participants
sacrificesfor the common good (for example, to protect the environment for
future generations). If these sacrificesare not backed up by shared values and
bonds, the key elements of community, they will not be treated as legitimate,
and hence will either have to be brought about through force, or will not be
effectively achieved. (This view contrastswith the notion that the stateis largely
a place where various interest groups meet, work out dealsand contracts, and
make exchanges. In that model, no loyalties or commitments are needed, as
self-interestprovides the necessaryglue.7)
Deliberate change is unnatural, above all by outsiders
My main thesis is that significantly advancing any of the elements of nation-building,
let alone all three of them, by external powers, is under m9st
circumstancesvery difficult to accomplish, and at best requires a considerable
commitment of resourcesand time. Moreover, assiduouspromotion of these
elementscan be counterproductive.
II For an excellent examination of the meaning of 'nation' seeMargaret Moore, The ethicsof nationalistn
(New York: Oxford University Press,2001), pp. 6-9.
7 For more discussion see Amitai Etzioni, Politicalunificationrevisited:building supranationalcomtnunities
(Lanhan1,MD: Lexington, 200.1).
3
Amitai
Etzioni
My thesis rests on two observations, one general and one specific. The
general observation is that deliberate,
purposive societal change of any importance is difficult to achieve. For the discussionat hand (and for many others) it is
essential to distinguish deliberate and purposive societal change (sometimes
refeued to as social engineering)-that is, societal changes that policy-makers
and public authorities seek to bring about (through, for example, the 'wars'
againstdrugs, poverty or cancer)-and societal change that occurs naturally, all
on its own. (The difference is akin to that between the changing of a river's
course naturally, which requires no effort, and building and manning canalsand
locks to change its course, often at considerable cost.) Social engineering, in
contrast to physical engineering, is a very limited art, facing huge obstaclesas it
aims to change what human and social nature provided. In this sense it is
unnatural. Social engineering alsoraisesnumerous moral issuesthat greatly limit
what canbe done and that mechanicaland electrical engineering face to a much
lesserextent.
By and large, the record of major deliberate efforts by public authorities to
changesocieties significantly is one of failure or massiveunderachievement. All
planned societies-including such major polities as the USSR and Chinafailed not only to achieve their various goals (notably, abolishing stratification,
religion, the family and the state)but also failed to sustaintheir command and
control systems.Even the plans of social democraciesto reallocate wealth in a
significant manner have made limited progress:the 'Great Society' goals in the
United States,for example, remain largely unfulfilled. Major changesoccuued
in all thesesocieties,but not asthe result of public policies. Often they reflected
the work of social movements that arose spontaneously(in the sensethat they
were neither initiated nor controlled by public authorities or even private
corporations), which both made changesof their own and pushed the government into making changes.These included, in earlier eras, various religious
movements; at the beginning of the twentieth century, the US progressive
movement; and in its latter half, the civil rights, environmental and women's
movements, among others.
The reasons why significant, deliberate, purposive societal change is very
difficult to come by are numerous, and their study would fill a long volume.
Suffice it to say here that it entails altering long-established personal predispositions, habits and relationships among people who will resist such alteration
unless they have their own reasonsand motives for embracing it. It requires a
re-engineering of moral and social cultures that are deeply ingraineq and a
recasting of societal structures, especially power relations and allocations of
assets,that are particularly resilient.
The reasons why external powers are particularly hampered in promoting
deliberate change are also numerous. They include a limited understanding of
the local culture and societalfounation; an unwillingness to make the sacrifices
involved; the opposition generatedby the mere presenceof outsiders; and faulty
theories of societal engineering, especiallythe belief that change can be readily
4
A self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
and quickly introduced at low human and economic costs. As Gary T.
Dempsey writes:
Nation-building is perhapsthe most intrusive form offoreign intervention there is. It is
the massiveforeign regulation of the policy making of another country. The process
usually entails the replacement or, in the caseof a country in a state of anarchy, the
creation of governmental institutions and a domestic political leadership that are more
to the liking of the power or powers conducting the intervention. Since such profound
interference tends to elicit resistance,the nation-building process typically requires a
substantialmilitary presenceto impose the nation-building plan on the target country.8
This general observation applies with specific force to nation-building by
outsiders,as I will show in the following section.
Historical anti-precedents in nation-building: breaking away
Nation-building occurred successfullyon a large scale in earlier generationsby
working againstand breaking away from superpowersand other external nations,
rather than under their guidance or tutelage.The well-known period of wars of
national liberation took place when scores of ethnic groups rebelled against
colonial powers and gained their independence,often afterprolonged bloodshed.
Most nations that now make up Latin America, Africa, large segmentsof Asia
and the Balkans were formed in this way.
In other cases,nations were cobbled together from fragments, but again only
after prolonged wars that gave voice to a fledgling community, rather than this
voice being engenderedby an externalpower. These famouslyinclude Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy, Chile and the United States.
Moreover, in many of those caseswhere external powers did fashion a state
they assumedwould be a nation, severetensions~nsuedamong the ethnic groups
that were combined into these'nations'-as, for instance,in Burundi, Iraq, Nigeria
and Rwanda. These groups were often held together only under the thumb of a
tyrant and following much bloodshed. In other cases-India and Yugoslavia,
for instance--these artificial constructions did not hold together at all.
In short, if by nation-building one means cobbling together various fragments to make one community, most nationswere built in oppositionto external
powers rather than by them. And to the extent that thesepowers fashioned new
states,they were born in blood and bathed in it, and rarely matured to be
nations, asthe term is commonly understood.
Such efforts have become even more difficult in this age of mass political
awarenessand heightened antagonismto foreign power, asthe USSR and the
United Statesdiscovered in Mghanistan and the United Stateshasdiscovered in
Iraq, among many other examples.
8 Gary T. Dempsey, 'Fool's errands: America's recent encounters wid1 nation-building', Medite"anean
Quarterly /2: /,200/, p. 59.
5
Amitai
Etzioni
The limits of democratization
The record of exporting democratization is not much better. A study
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peacefound that out
of the 18 forced regime changesto which American ground troops were com~
mitted, only five resulted in sustaineddemocratic rule.9 Three of the five are
Germany, Japan and Italy, in which conditions prevailed that are lacking elsewhere. The reasonsfor the exceptional successin these countries are explored
below. The two other countries listed asdemocratized-Panama and Grenada
-actually have yet to earn this title.
It is worth pausinghere to considerthe dubious use of the term 'democracy'.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan used the phrase 'defining deviancy down' to
describe the practice of labelling as legitimate and legal items of behaviour
formerly considered deviant and illegal. One side-effect of this practice is that
public authorities can vastly improve the measurementsof their achievements
without doing anything new or additional. Thus crime statisticsplunge when
whole categories of crimes are no longer termed asillegal. A similar damaging
tendency can be observed with regard to 'democracies'. When it turns out that
it is very difficult to export or even domestically construct a democratic polity
under many conditions, many public policy-makers keep the triumphant march
of democracy going by declaring democratizationachieved for scoresof nations
that at besthave only some democratic features.Elections are especiallyused for
these sleight-of-hand democratizations, leading to what Max Boot, among
others, has referred to as 'one person, one vote, one time'.Io This undue
emphasis on the holding of elections disregardsthe fact that practically all
tyrannies hold elections reguiarly-one needs only to recall that elections were
regularly carried out in the USSR, Syria and Saddam's Iraq to note that
democratization meansmuch more than ballot boxes. Some try to deal with this
catch by referring to 'electoral democracies' to hint that those so described
might not be regular or fully fledged ones; but this nuance escapesmany. As a
result, what normative power the title bearsis lost when a state can get it by
doing so little, and what is fostered by its application to countries that are
corrupt to the core, or do not have a free pressor the rule of law, or boast only
one political party or a military that can veto whatever the legislature rules, is
anything but democracy. A democracy does not have to meet all the criteria,
and there are differences in the political systemsamong those that genuinely
deservethe title; but defining the term down so far ashas been recently done is
neither good political science nor sound public policy.
The difficulties that the United Statesand its allies have recently had in
democratizing Afghanistan and Iraq are but the most recent examples in a long
list of failures which includesBosnia,Cambodia,Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
\I Minxin rei and Sara Kasper, 'The "morning after" regime change: should US force democracy again?',
Christian ScienceMonitor, 1.5Jan. 2003, p. 9.
10Max Boot. 'What next? The Bush foreign policy agendabeyond Iraq', WeeklyStandard,5 May 2003, p. 29.
6
A self-restrainedapproach to nation-building byforeign powers
Kosovo, Somalia and South Vietnam. US nation-building attempts in Panama,
Haiti, Nicaragua and Cuba all took more than ten years-engagement in
Panama lasted 33 years; today, none of these countries can be considered a
successfuldemocracy..1.1
As Thomas Carothersput it, 'the idea that there's a small
democracyinside every society waiting to be releasedjust isn't true'..l2
There is no agreement as to what makes a democracy, although there are
very extensive and strong studies of the subject by such scholars as Graham
Allison, Archie Brown, Thomas Carothers,Robert A. Dahl, and Adeed Dawisha
and Karen Dawisha.I3
Some scholarsinsist, in the tradition of the area studies school, that each
situation is unique and that only by immersing oneself in the particular history
and culture of each particular country can one establishwhat must be done
there. I hold with those who, on the contrary, suggestthat a general theory of
democracy formation is possible. As part of this approach it seemsbeneficial to
draw up a checklist of the factors that go into making a democracy. The list is
bestdivided into facilitatingfactorsand constitutivefactors. The first list consistsof
the conditions that easeor hinder the formation of democracy. (They can also
be referred to asthe democratic infrastructure.) These factors are not all or even
each 'prerequisites',becausesubstitutesmight be found; but their presenceclearly
improves the probability that a democracy will be formed and sustained.The
second list specifiesthe necessarybuilding blocks. Both lists canbe used to indicate how readya country is to be democratizedand what, particularly, is missing.
Two methodological comments are called for at this juncture. First, the lists
provided here are far from exhaustiveand are provided merely asa first approximation. Second, one should keep in mind that there is an interaction effect
among the various factors: namely, if one factor is available, it easesthe formation of the others, but if one factor is maximized while all the others are grossly
neglected, the deficient state of these other factors is likely to retard democratization. More or lesseven development is superior to skewed development.
Drawing on the works already cited, a few others and my own observations,
here are the two tentative lists. (All variablesshould be read asif accompanied
by the statement, 'the more, the better', without concern that excessivelevels
could be reached, becausethesedo not occur.)
[I Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessonsfromthepast: the Americanrecordon nation-building, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Policy Btief no. 24, May 2003. Available at: http://wwW.ceip.org/
files/pdf/Policybrief24.pdf. Accessed8Jan. 2003.
[, Thomas Carothers, quoted in George Packer, 'Dreaming of democracy', New York Times Magazine, 2
March 2003, p. 60.
'3 Graham Allison, 'Deepening Russian democracy: progress and pitfalls inPutin's govemrnent', Haward
InternationalReview 24: 2, 2002, pp. 63-4; Archie Brown, 'Russia and democratization', Probletnsof Post.
Comtnunism46: 5, 1999, pp. 5-6; Thomas Carothers, interviewed by Warren Olney in 'Creating
democracy in Iraq', To the point, ed. Kyle McKinnon, Public Radio International, KCR W, Santa
Monica, 16 April 2003; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy:participationand opposition(New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1971), p. 3; Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, 'How to build a democratic Iraq',
ForeignAffairs 82: 3, 2003, p. 47.
4mitai
Etzioni
Facilitating
factors
.law
and order, pacification;
.literacy,
general education, civic education;
.economic
development, separationof economic power from political power,
levelling of economic differences;
.a
sizeable,developed middle class;
.the
rule of law, independent judgments, respect for law enforcement
authorities; and
.civil
society, voluntary associations,communities.
Constitutive
factors
.political
leade~ and parties with unencumbered ability to compete for
support and votes;
.the
determination of criteria regarding eligibility for public office;
.the
assuranceof free and fair elections;
.formulation
of a constitutional order and processthat ensurespower-sharing
aswell as separationof powe~, essentialfor checksand balancesamong the
executive, legislative and judicial branches;
.a
low level of corruption (high level of transparency);
.protection
of minority rights;
.freedom
of association;
.freedom
of expression;
.freedom
of the press;and
.the
enumeration of rights people have with respectto the government.
To reiterate, these lists are but a preliminary attempt to outline the factors
needed to form a sustainabledemocracy. They support one another. Above all,
they highlight how difficult it is to form a democracy in conditions where many
of the factorsare in short supply. It is obvious from even a cursory examination
of most of them that developing them will be difficult, slow, costly and, above
all, next to impossible for outsiders to achieve. Cultivating respect for law
where little exists,making a middle class,greatly reducing corruption where it is
rampant-all are difficult tasks.
EconomicIreconstruction/: from the StoneAge?
Arguably economic reconstruction-if one means reconstruction rather than
new development, as distinguished above--may be the easiestof the three
processes(which is not to say that it is easy). If the country at issue had a
relatively developed economy, was industrialized, had laws protecting privateproperty,
a solid banking system, a trained labour force and so on, and if these
were disrupted by war or for some other reason,they can be relatively readily
~
A self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
jump-started again. The reasonsare that self-interest will make people reopen
their shops once they are free to do so, which in turn will create demand for
products and services, all with little relatively planning or intervention. Outsiders can help in shoring up the infrastructure if it is damaged,provide credit,
and help restore law and order, but need do little more. In short, the less
economic development is involved-in the sense of creating the needed
elements-and the more reconstruction takesplace, the more successfulnationbuilding will be.
In contrast, in a country like Mghanistan, where next to none of the elements needed for a modern economy are in place, referenceto 'reconstruction'
amounts to little more than obfuscation. And promising economic development is both self-deluding and misleading to others. There is a very large
literature on economic development and it would be foolhardy to attempt to
addressthese complex and much-studied processesin a few lines. Hence, I offer
here just a few observations on the topic at hand: the ability of external powers
to engineer large-scalesocial change.
Countries that developed over a hundred yearsor so did draw a great deal on
others. For instance, US industrialization during the nineteenth century benefited greatly from the importation of labour, capital, ideas and technologies
from Europe. But these inputs were sucked in, asa result of internal dynamics,
not shipped out to the United Statesaspart of any plan or the foreign policy of
a nation seeking to develop the United Statesor to help it to do so. The same
holds for the four Asian tigers: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong
Kong, consideredthe most successfulcasesof economic development. The same
must be said about China and India. In contrast, the twentieth-century beneficiaries of development assistancefrom the US Agency for International
Development and the World Bank, and from other countries, have been much
lessable to develop, even when they have had great wealth of their own derived
from oil exports: certain African and Arab countries are especially pertinent
examples.1.4
In a preliminary effort to draw up a list of what economic reconstruction
requires I draw here on a previously published study in which I examined the
seven 'needs' that were satisfied when the American economy was first
developed (roughly, from 1830 to 1930); showed the ill-effects that followed
when six of the seven factorsinvolved in satisfyingtheseneedswere allowed to
deteriorate (from 1950 to 1980); and examined what needed to be done--and
to a great extent was done--thereafter to reconstructthe American economy! 5
Like the elements of democracy, the factors of economic development support
eachother, and rushing one while neglecting the othershas a deleterious effect.
4 Seee.g. William Easterly, Ross Levine and David Roodman, New data, new doubts: revisiting 'aid, policies,
andgrowth', Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 26,June 2003. Available at: http://
www.cgdev.org/wp/cgd_wp026.pdf.
Accessed9 Aug. 2003.
5 Amitai Etzioni, An immadestagenda:rebuildingAtnerica beforethe 21stcentury(New York: New Press,1983).
9
Amitai
Etzioni
The elements of economic
reconstruction
.expeditious
transportation of resourcesand goods;
.effective
communication of knowledge and signals;
.secure supplies of power;
.highly
prepared and availablehuman capital (the mobilization and preparation of labour);
.a
high level of innovative capacity;
.supportive
legal and financial institutions; and
.the
accumulation of capital and capital goods.
Before I proceed, a word about the underlying theoretical model, of needs
and responses.It is important to keep the analytical elements distinct from the
particular historical forms in which they have been introduced. We are accustomed to thinking of a car, for example, as a vehicle with wheels, a petrol
engine, a radiator and so on; these are 'historical' forms of the car's elements.
Analytically, one would seeinstead that a car hasa friction-reducing mechanism
to facilitate movement over the ground, which might take the form of wheels,
or caterpillar treads, or an air cushion. It hasa meansof propulsion-an internal
combustion engine, a steamengine, an electric motor-which in turn is fuelled
by petrol, diesel, alcohol or storagebatteries. Unwanted heat is dissipated-by
water, air, refrigeration coils. Furthermore, these parts are assembled,not at
random, but according to a systemdesign, which ensuresthat they are compatible. A steamengine will not typically be fuelled by storagebatteries. So it is
with the elements of economic reconstruction.
I suggest that a study of successfulreconstruction efforts~uch as that of
Germany and japan after the Second World War-would show that many of
the needed elements were in place. Although these countries' economies had
deteriorated, they could be relatively readily resupplied and reactivated. In contrast, when one usesthe same list to examine the conditions of a country like
Afghanistan, it rapidly becomes evident that economic reconstruction is not
possible becausemost of the needed elementswere never in place, or present
only in very rudimentary amounts. Moreover, importing them en masseis not
practical. It should be further noted that even in those exceptional conditions in
which large-scaleeconomic reconstruction was successful,it took much longer
and cost much more than is now commonly implied.
It follows that the notion, so often repeatedlike a mantra,16that if the United
Statesjust provided a Marshall Plan to umpteen countries they would develop
(and democratize on the side) haslittle validity.
[6 See, inter alia, Stephen E. Ambrose, 'The master (nation) builder', National Review, II March 2002, pp.
30-2; Bob Geldo£ 'A continent in crisis: we must act now to prevent apocalypse', Observer,15June
2003,p. 20; Gordon Brown, 'MarshJlll Plan for the next 50 years', WashingtonPost,17 Dec. 2001, p. A23.
10
A self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
Culture and psychological predispositions
There is a set of sociological factors that can ease--or severelyhinder-all three
forn1s of nation-building: unification (pacification included), democratization
and economic reconstruction. This setis often not listed (although it is included
in several,more informal, treatments),becausethose who invoke it are sometimes considered prejudiced, or at the leastpolitically incorrect; and those who
adhere to rationalist schools of social science, according to which self-interest
and rational calculation dominate, are blind to it. The notion that cultural and
psychological factors are at work is prejudiced only if one assumesthat there are
some inherent, genetic factors that make it impossible for some race or people
to become democratic or developed, as some have written about the Arabs (a
stance known asArab exceptionalism).17One commonly given reasonfor this
view is that Arabs have a senseof being victims and tend to blame others for
their condition and demand that those others act, ratherthan placethosedemands
on then1Selves.
I merely follow a sociological giant to suggestthat some cultures-which in
turn are embedded in personalities-make economic and political development
much more difficult than others and are especiallyresistantto change. To avoid
any misunderstanding,I will sayplainly that I do not agree with those who hold
that Arabs are congenitally unableto develop a liberal democracy; merely that
given their culture (one might more accurately say cultures) it will take much
longer and will. make it more difficult to do so than several other cultures. I
agree with those who remind us that at one point or another it was said that
Japan could not be made democratic or that Catholicism could not be made
compatible with a liberal democratic regime. But all these changes took time
and effort. After all, the British and the Americansdid not develop democracies
overnight under the tutelage of a foreign power. And the conditions in Arab
countries are even lessfavourable for such development than in other Muslim
countries. 18
Max Weber, the sociological giant whom I echo, showed that some cultures
are less disposed to capitalism-and other features of modernization-than
others. Specifically, Catholics, Muslin1Sand Confuciansare lessso disposedthan
Protestants.I9 'Culture' in this context means not art, music or artefacts, but
social and moral values. It is expressedin personality predispositions, especially
the impetus to save much and work hard, that are essentialfor building up a
modern economy. What Weber showed for economic development holds for
the other elements of nation-building.
[7 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, 'An "Arab" more than "Muslim"
18
electoral gap',journal of
Democracy
Ib
.d ' 14: 3,2003, pp. 29--44.
1 ., pp. 41-2.
19Max Weber, The Protestantethic and the spirit ofcapitalism,trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner,
1958), Econotnyand sodcty: an outline of interpretivesociology,
trans. Ephraim Fischoff et aI., ed. Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster, 1968), The religionof China: Confucianismand Taoi.,m,
trans. and ed. Hans H. Herth (New York: Free Press,1951).
Amitai Etzioni
As I seeit-as someone who grew up in the Middle East-the most important value and trait is self-restraint. It is what allows a personto work hard rather
than laze around; save rather than spend; follow rules rather than follow their
own lights; refrain from acting violendy againstthose who are different or with
whom differences must be worked out. Self-restraintis not inborn. It is introduced, with variations, into people who grow up in some cultures, for example
those of Britain and Japan; and in many others is much lessso. By itself it does
not guarantee that the nations where it is inculcated will be unified, democratic
or developed. But it is an important facilitating facto~, often downplayed by.
those who believe, or want to believe, in quickie nation-building.
To the extent that the importance of culture is recognized, it is all too often
assumedthat one can change cultures quite readily, via communications ( Voice
of America,the State Department's new HI magazine, etc.), in what might be
called a Madison Avenue approach:changeattitudes,valuesand habits, by sending messages,undertaking educational efforts, developing leadership training
and encouragingcultural exchanges.(An example of this approach, which would
be humorous if the consequenceswere not so saddening,is the work of Charlotte Beers, a former public diplomacy chief at the State Department. Under
Beers, the State Department developed commercials, websites and speakers'
programmes to 'reconnect the world's billion Muslims with the United States
the way McDonald's highlights its billion customers served'. According to
Robert Sadoff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 'The results
were disastrous'.Yet somepeople would argue that Beersdid not go far enough,
'that blitzing Arab and Muslim countries with Britney Spearsvideos and Arabiclanguagesitcomswill eam Washington millions of new Muslim sympathizers'.2~
The Madison Avenue approach works only when very large amounts of
money are spent to shift people from one product to another when there are
next to no differences between the two (e.g. two brands of toothpaste) and
there is an inclination to use the product in the first place. However, when
these methods are used in the attempt to change attitudes about matters as
different ascondom use2Iand the United Nations,22they are much lesssuccessful.
Changing a culture is many hundreds of times more difficult.
20 Robert Sadoff, 'How to win friends and influence Arabs', WeeklyStandard, 18 Aug. z003, p. 18.
2' For instance, the Center for Disease Control conducted a ten-year advertising campaign to educate
Americans about condon1Sand to encourage their use to prevent HIV transmission. After millions of
dollars had been spent on these ads, a CDC study found that only 45 per cent of sexually active high
school students had used a condom the last time they had had sex. See Jeffry Scott, 'Condom ads get
direct: use them and get sex', Atlantajournal and Constitution,3 Oct. 1994,p. BI. A recent evaluation of
the programme issued an unqualified 'no' in answer to the question 'Has the US federal governf!1ent's
HIV / AIDS television [public service announcement] campaign been designed not only to make the
public aware of HI V / AIDS but also to provide appropriate messagesto motivate and reinforce behavior
change?' See William Dejong, R. Cameron Wolf and S. Bryn Austin, 'US federally funded television
Public Service Announcements (PSAs) to prevent HIV / AIDS: a content analysis', journal of Health
C'ommunication6, ZOOI , p. Z56. Of the 56 ads reviewed, 50 were created by the CDC; the other 6 were
created by the National Institute on Drug Abuse.
22 Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGill Hughes, 'Report on an educational campaign: the Cincinnati plan for
the United Nations' ,journal of AmericanSociology55, 1950,pp. 389-400. quoted in Bernard Berelson and
Gary A. Steiner, Human behavior:an inventoryqfscientific
findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1964),p. 530.
12
The
A self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
Germany and Japan: exceptions that prove the rule
successfulreconstruction and democratization of Germany and Japan afterthe
SecondWorld War rested on many conditions that are unlikely to be reproduced elsewhere.First of all, both countrieshad to be defeatedin a war, and then
occupied. The occupation lasted much longer than many assume.For Japan,
occupation lasted nearly seven years,and for Germany, while the occupation
lasted four years, full control over foreign relations and trade, industrial production and military security was not turned over to the Germans until 1955,
ten years after the occupation began.
Both occupations also cost more than is commonly assumed.Many facilitating factorswere in much better condition than they are in most other countries
in which nation-building is attempted. There was no danger that these countries would break up in civil war among ethnic groups, asis the casein Afghanistanand Iraq, for instance.No effort had to be expended on building unity. On
the contrary, strong national unity was a major reason why change could be
introduced with relative ease.Other favourable factorsincluded a high level of
education, high per capita incomes, a sizeablemiddle class,competent government personnel and a low level of corruption.23 Others cite 'technical and
financial expertise, relatively highly institutionalized political parties, skillful and
visionary politicians, well-educated populations, [and] strong national identifications'.24Above all, there was a strong culture of self-restraint.
Political elements were also relatively favourable in these two countries.
After the SecondWorld War both GermanyandJapanwere completely defeated
powers whose national leadersno longer held sway. The United Stateshad a
security interest in thesecountries in particular becauseit was trying to hold off
the advance of communism.
Not only were the conditions in the targeted countries different, but conditions in the United Stateswere different at that time aswell. As John W. Dover
hasargued about the difference between the An1ericanoccupation of Japanand
that of Iraq in 2003, 'We do not have the moral legitimacy we had then, nor do
we have the other thing that was presentwhen we occupied Japan-the vision
of the American public that we would engagein seriousand genuinely democratic nation-building and that we would do this in the context of an international order'.25 Further, the United Stateswas committed to reconstruction
after the SecondWorld War to a significantly greaterdegree than it is to foreign
aid today. In 1948, the first year of the Marshall Plan, the aid sent to the 16
European countries that were to benefit under the plan totalled 13 per cent-of
the entire US budget, without even counting money spent in Japan and all of
23 Marina Ottaway, 'Nation-building', ForeignPolicy 132, Sept.-oct. 2002, p. 17.
24 Robert A. Packenham, Uberal Americaand the Third World (princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1973), pp. 34-5.
'5 John W. Dover, quoted in Packer, 'Dreaming of democracy'.
11i
14
Amitai Etzioni
the costs of occupying Germany.26 In comparison, the United States today
spendsless than I per cent of its budget on foreign aid.
When a cool look is taken at the factsand circumstances,suggestionsthat a
new 'Marshall Plan' would work for a typical African or Arab country are
profoundly ahistorical.
A restrained approach
One might argue that the viewpoint presentedhere is exceedingly pessimistic,indeed outright discouraging. There are good reasonsto support many forms of
foreign aid to 'have-not' countries, most of which are humanitarian. Thus,
helping nations fight malaria, tuberculosis and HIV is a good thing, even if it
will not significantly contribute to nation-building in any senseof the term, or
even stem the pandemic. Vaccinating and feeding children and providing them
with elementary schooling is good in itself; but it should not be dressedup as
something else.And surely pacification-preventing genocides of the kind that
occurred in Rwanda, halting ethnic cleansinglike that in Kosovo, and stopping
civil wars, as in Liberia-are fully worthy causes,even if they do not result in
nation-building.
As far as nation-building by external powers is concerned, a much more
restrained approach is called for. One element of such an approach is that it
greatly narrows the scope of factors it tackles.As Robert Kaplan has suggested,
still in my view a bit optimistically, 'We shouldn't try to fix a whole society;
rather, we should identify a few key elementsin it, and fix them'.27 It follows
that the first criterion by which a restrainedpolicy is to be measuredis the scope
of its ambition. Does it seekto advance on all three fronts or limit itself largely
to one? And on that front, does it recognize that progressis slow and halting,
with at least one step backwards for every two forwards, and requires a large
commitment of resourcesfor long periods of time? Does it recognize that there
will be no glory down the road-that the new nation (if successfullyformed)
will not appreciatethe help given, or necessarilybe an ally of the external power
that heavily invested in its construction? The narrower the goal, the greaterthe
commitment, the lower the expectations,the more likely it is-and I do not say
it is 'likely'-that the approach will make some progress.
Second, a restrained approachentails working initially with whomever is in
power (as the old regime implodes or is decapitated), rather than starting by
dethroning them. This is in sharp contrast to the hyper-ambitious approach,
which assumesthat one can extract the warlords, the tribal chiefs, the "ethnic
leaders and the religious authorities and replace them with national leaders,
Curt Tamoff, The Marshall Plan: design,aaolnpli.,hments,and relevanreto the present,CRS Report for
Congress (Washington DC: Congres.~ionalResearch Service, 6 Jan. 1997), cited in ~n
von Hippel,
Delnocracybyforce: us military interventionin thepost-Cold War world (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), p. 187.l'
Robert D. Kaplan., 'Supremacy by stealth: ten rules for managing the world', Allantic Monthly, July-Aug.
2003, p. 78.
4 self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
often selectedand appointed by the external power, and 'neutral' professionalsand
civil servants(one of the first goals of the US occupation of Iraq in 2003). In
the processone hopes to effect a shift from tribalism and favouritism to a rule of
law that deals with all citizens in the samemanner, to move from corruption to
transparency,to switch from dealing in contraband, drugs and guns to serving
local and global marketsin consumergoodsand services.This is what the United
Statestried to do in Mghanistan when it promoted and supported Hamid Karzai
asthe national head of government and largely refused to deal with the warlords-after the war was over, that is; a war that the warlords had largely helped
win. This is what Britain is trying to do in Bosnia, which is in effect in trusteeship under British rule. This is what the United Statesand its allies are trying to
do in Kosovo. Progress in all these places is hampered by going against the
sociological grain, rather than using the lie of the land to change the country,
gradually.
To put it less metaphorically, over-ambitious societal engineering seeksto
overcome prevailing social forces and long-established societal structures and
traditions and to generate new ones. It vainly tries quickly to undo deeply
ingrained cultural and psychological predispositions,strong emotional ties and
(often) religious beliefs, as well as very powerful reward allocations by tribal
chiefs or warlords, and equally quickly to substitute alien frameworks. A restrained approach would start by dealing with whomever is in power. This is
what worked in Germany, where many of the Nazi officials were initially
allowed to stay in place, becausethere were few others to run the country. (In
contrast, in Iraq the US attempted to remove all Baath party officials, high and
low, down to the cop on the beat.)
The next step entails hammering out dealsand agreementsto gain the support of the various warlords or chieftains or mullahs for certain new national
features, such as building a connecting road or forming the first units of an
integrated national army. Gradually, often very slowly, asthe commercial classes
increase,the middle and professionalclassesexpand; and asnational institutions
are able to dispenseresourcesand rewards,the social forces that support nationbuilding will be enhanced, and the power of the warlords and their ilk will be
scaledback.28
In addition, the more the external power allows local people to work things
out among themselves,even if the emerging patterns are not exactly the way
things are done in its home country or do not fit neatly into a masterplan, the
more likely the new regimes are to develop. Foreign powers would do best if
they limited themselvesto setting somebroad 'dos and don'ts', but otherwise let
'nature' take its course. Details differ from place to place, but the experience in
28 One might say that those in power. the warlords and the tribal chiefs. are not without insights of their
own. They are sure to see the trend and oppose it. But given the choice betWeen taking them on fi-om
the outset and trying to win them over or buy their cooperation for limited purposes while validating
their positions. the second approach is more attractive. both to the external power and to the warlords or
chiefs themselves; becausefi-om their viewpoint the choice is either to give up some power while
remaining in place. or face a direct confi-ontation with the external power.
15
Amitai
Etzioni
Iraq will illustrate the thesis advancedhere. The United Statesin Iraq in 2003
tried to run everything. Not only were American troops and their few allies
training the police, forn1ing a new anny, patrolling cities to prevent looting and
other crimes, ensuring that the various ethnic groups did not fight each other,
and sorting things out among Kurds and Turkmen and Arabs in the north, but
US soldiers were also selecting new 'professional' judges and civil servants,
ensuring that no Baath party memberswere among them, taking sidesin fights
among various mullahs, firing a media minister for censoring the local press,
trying to jump-start the economy by providing jobs, renovating schools,drawing.
up final exams for medical students,supervisingthe construction of a women's
shelter and making deliveries to nursing homes-among many other things.29
It might be said that the purpose of all theseactivities was not to remake and
run the Iraqi society, but to gain goodwill. The United Stateshas long accepted
the notion that if you seekto win a war againstlocal guerrillas, you have to win
over the support of the civilian population ('drain the swamp' in which the
guerrillas breed). There is some merit in the policy (referred to in Latin America
asAccion Civica). However, it too can be readily oversold. Iraqis, for instance,
are a very patriotic people. They have a long and bitter memory of foreign
occupations and causedtens of thousandsof casualtiesto the British when they
took over governing Iraq after the collapseof the Ottoman empire. Providing a
few goods and serviceshere and there, even learning to speaka bit of Arabic and
gaining some understanding of the local culture-as the Special Forces are
trying to do-will not make Iraqis accepta govemrnent run by a foreign power.
Moreover, the scope of the social engineering attempts in Iraq and elsewhere
clearly shows that the attempt is much more one at nation-building than at
gaining goodwill. Hence, although there is nothing in the restrained policy to
oppose generating goodwill, the notion that doing the latter will win over the
population at large is unrealistic; above all, it should not be used to justify an
over-ambitious agendaof societal change.
A restrained approach setspriorities: it focuses first and foremost on pacification (to avoid inter-ethnic anned conflict) and security, the cessation of
support to groups such asAl-Qaeda, and of course prevention of the production
and acquisition of weaponsof massdestruction; but initially it goeslittle further.
Developing domestic police forces that are professional rather than political or
corrupt-say, by Jordanian standardsor even of those of New York City 50
yearsago, rather than, say, London's standardstoday-comes next. All the rest
follows gradually, in line with the needsand policies worked out by and with
the changing local leaders.If in Iraq this had meant that a religious regime was
establishedin southern Iraq, it would have been left to the Iraqi people who
opposed the regime to struggle with it, the way the majority now does with
such a regime in Iran. If it had meant Baathparty members initially running the
;9 Dexter Filkins, 'Chaos and calm are 2 realities for US in Iraq', New York Times,24 Aug. 2003, p. AI;
Michael M. Phillips, 'Marines do it all in one Iraqi city; now they're going', Wall StreetJoumal,22 Aug.
2003, p. AI..
16
4 self-restrainedapproachto nation-building byforeign powers
civil service,as long asthey did not undermine security, it would have been left
to the Iraqi people to oppose them or replace them. Gradually, as commerce
was restored, asthousandsof Iraqis living in the West went back to their native
country, as the fear of Saddam'sdecommissioned secret police waned, so the
demand for various development measureswould increase.But these would be
driven largely by Iraqis; and Iraqis would be responsiblefor making them work.
The result might well look, for the first yearsat least,like some kind of mixture
between Lebanon and Egypt, maybe like Jordan; but it would be distincdy
better-for all concerned-than the fate that befell the US and the occupied
territory in Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan. Lessis more.
More generally, advocates of nation-building would gready benefit from
following the Alcoholics Anonymous prayer: 'God, grant me the serenity to
acceptthe things I cannot change; the courage to change the things I can; and
the wisdom to know the difference'. Gready curtailing foreign ambitions and
promises will lead to much greater credibility of these projects and those who
pursue them; will provide stronger domestic support for such efforts among the
taxpayersand donors who have to foot the bills; and will produce results by
focusing more resources on the few facets that are relatively easyto change
rather than tackling numerous facetswith litde discernible effect.
17