I.
THI NKI NG THO UG HTS A ND HA V I NG CONCEPTS
GILBERT RYLE
There are ma n y philos ophic al contexts i n wh i c h we need t o determine t he structures, t he types and t he levels of truths and falsehoods; t o consider, f o r ex ample, wh a t mak es i t legit imat e o r i l l e gitimate to inf er one f rom another or to support one by another. I n the
course o f such enquiries we of t en need t o consider t he af f iliat ions ,
types and levels of the concepts int o whic h these truths and falsehoods
are analysable. Thus we may need t o determine t hat one concept dif fers f r o m anot her as genus f r o m species. a s species f r o m f ellowspecies, as relat ion f r o m quality, and so on. We c ould c rudely label
such problems as «logical» o r «near-logical» problems .
There are als o many philos ophic al contexts i n wh i c h we need t o
consider problems about t he t hink ing t hat people are, f r o m t ime t o
time, actually engaged in — t heir wonderings, doubtings, discoverings
and concludings; t heir being surprised o r unsurprised, perplex ed o r
unperplexed, careful or careless, inv ent iv e or conservative, and so on.
We c ould label such problems as «epistemological» o r «phenomenological» problems .
At c ert ain plac es t hes e epis t emologic al o r phenomenologic al
questions necessarily int erloc k wi t h those logic al a n d n e a r logic al
questions, a n d t h e n w e f i n d ours elv es s omewhat embarras s ed t o
describe how the truths and falsehoods and t heir component concepts,
that were under investigation i n the f ormer contexts, ent er int o our
epistemological accounts of the liv e t hink ing that people really do.
For example, t he concepts of planet and orbit are concepts of dif ferent types, both of whic h enter, in different ways, into certain ranges
of astronomical truths. O r t he concepts of square root o f and seven
are concepts of different types, and both may enter, in dif f erent ways,
into arit hmet ic al truths. So, in some way , the as t ronomer engaged i n
comparing the orbit of one planet wit h the orbit of another planet is
operating wi t h t he concepts o f orbit and planet ; and t he student of
arithmetic who, a t a part ic ular moment , i s t ry ing t o f i n d o u t t he
number of whic h 7 is the square root, is operat ing wit h the concepts
of square root of and seven. But what is inv olv ed i n t his vague notion of «operating wit h concepts» ? Hav e we to say, f or example, that
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at a certain moment of t heir morning's work the astronomer and the
student were i n process of hav ing in mi n d the concepts of orbit and
square root of ? What would it be lik e t o be jus t hav ing i n mi n d a
concept ? I s there a particular, recollectable experience of hav ing i n
mind the concept of square root of ? Can i t occur by itself ? I f not,
why not ? Ca n y ou obey me i f I t ell y ou t o dismiss a l l else f r o m
your mind and just conceive the concept of square root of ? Why not ?
It might be suggested t hat at t he moment s wh e n t he as t ronomer
says t o himself, i n his head, o r b i t _..», then, at that moment , he
is actively hav ing in mind what the word «orbit» means — provided,
of course, that he is t hink ing what he is saying to himself, and not just
absent-mindedly parrot t ing t he word. But , f o r one t hing, t his s uggestion does not hing but raise the same question ov er again. Is there
a particular, recollectable experience of actively hav ing in mi n d what
is s ignif ied b y t he wo r d t hat is c urrent ly c oming of f one's tongue ?
We are reminded of the unprosperous attempts made by Locke, Berkeley and Hu me t o locate «ideas» among the recollectable experiences of a person wh o has jus t been t hink ing about something i n particular.
A more import ant objection t o this suggestion is this. Suppose y ou
are asked t o f ind t he smallest prime number af t er 1300. Y o u begin,
perhaps, by selecting the f irs t dozen o r t wo dozen odd numbers t hat
run up f rom 1301, since obviously no even number wi l l be a candidate.
You t hen eliminat e those ending i n 5 » , since these wi l l be mu l tiples of 5. You t hen eliminat e those t he digit s of whic h add up t o
3 o r mult iples of 3, since these wi l l all be div is ible by 3, and so on.
No w in an import ant way, all these operations of yours, being directed t owards t he discovery o f a number greater t han 1300, wh i c h is
divisible only by itself and 1, are s omehow operations wi t h the concept of prime number. You are work ing wit h t he concept during the
whole five-minutes search, though the phrase «prime number» comes
off y our lips, i f at all, only once or t wic e during those f iv e minutes.
Similarly, t he concept i f s omehow governs t he wh o l e of a, perhaps
lengthy, hy pot het ic al proposition, t hough t he wo r d «if» i s ov er and
done wi t h by t he t ime the second wo r d i n the sentence is produced.
In short, t he t empt at ion t o postulate t he existence o f special int ellectual acts o r experiences of «concept-conceiving» o r «idea-having»
needs t o be resisted, ab init io. I t is not i n t his sort of way t hat t he
concept of orbit enters int o the liv e t hink ing of the as t ronomer while
he is work ing out t he differences bet ween t he orbit s o f Venus and
Mars. A stretch of t hink ing is not a procession of ephemeral incidents
of having-concepts-in-mind. There are no such incidents, and i f there
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were, a mere procession of t hem would not amount t o t hink ing. So
now let us approac h the problem f rom a new angle.
There was a t ime before whic h I had not got the concept of square
root of ; t here was a lat er t ime since when I hav e had it ; and t here
was a n int erim period, s hort o r long, during wh i c h i t was not y et
quite mine, t hough no longer not mine at all. What ev er it is t hat I
possess when I have got the concept of square root of, the ac quiring it
is a case of learning something.
But there are no separate lessons i n say, legal or arit hmet ic al concepts, separate, t hat is, f r o m lessons i n l a w or arit hmet ic themselves
— save that a teacher might t ell his students to learn by heart a bat tery of def init ions o f legal o r arit hmet ic al terms, i n t he s illy expectation t hat retention of these def init ions wo u l d constitute possession
of the corresponding legal o r arit hmet ic al concepts.
Instead o f as k ing t h e Loc k ean ques t ion H o w d i d w e f o r m t h e
abstract idea, o r ac quire t he concept of square root of ? l e t us as k
instead What were we unable to do unt il we had acquired it ? I t is at
once c lear t hat t he ans wer t o t his question is int eres t ingly general.
We were unable, int er alia, t o understand t he question What is t he
square root of 16 ?, o r of any ot her number. We were unable t o t ry
to decide between t wo riv al answers to this question. We were unable
even t o wonder whet her a l l numbers hav e square-roots. W e we r e
unable t o inf er f rom t he inf ormat ion t hat 81 is the square of 9, t hat
9 is t he square-root of 81. We were unable t o see t he joke, such as
it is, i n «Some vegetables have round roots and some numbers hav e
square roots». We we r e unable t o paraphrase sentences c ont aining
«square root» int o sentences not c ont aining it. A n d so on.
To ac quire t he concept is t o bec ome able t o c ope wi t h t hat i n definite range o f int ellec t ual a n d ev en merely conversational tasks
whic h share wi t h one anot her this c ommon feature of hav ing something o r ot her t o do wi t h a number's being what a square number
is t he square of . Wh a t has been learned is being ac t iv ely applied
when, f o r example, t he jok e is being appreciated, t he c alc ulat ion is
being made o r attempted, t he question is understood o r posed, and
so on, indef init ely .
To t ry to f ind out what is the square root of 289, and t o appreciate
the joke, such as it is, about round roots and square roots are t wo bits
of v ery dif f erent k inds of t hink ing. They have, certainly, s omet hing
quite specific in common. But to point to what they have in c ommon
is not to point to a separately recollectable experience or a separately
performable act. To b o r r o w an analogy f r o m Plato, wh e n y ou pronounce t he monos y llable «top» a n d I pronounc e t he monos y llable
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«but», what you have pronounced has indeed s omet hing i n c ommon
wit h what I hav e pronounced, namely t he consonant «t». But t here
was no separate pronounc ing of a separately audible «t»-noise.
As not hing less t han a n int egral s y llable •can be pronounced, y et
t wo ot herwis e dif f erent syllables c a n s t i l l hav e s omet hing, e.g. a
consonant i n c ommon, s omewhat s imilarly not hing less t han an i n tegral jok e c an be appreciated, a n int egral equat ion be c hallenged
or a n int egral arit hmet ic al problem be tackled, y et these ot herwis e
very dif f erent int egral int ellec t ual acts c an s t ill hav e s omet hing i n
common. e.g. t he concept square root of.
We c ould hav e reached t he same negative phenomenologic al c onclusion f r o m t he ot her end, namely f rom t he logic al o r near-logic al
end. For we c ould have asked this question: Giv en a sentence whic h
conveys a t rut h or a falsehood, say the sentence «I f John is the uncle
of Sarah, t hen at least one of Sarah's parents was not an only child»,
how is the t rut h that the sentence as a whole conveys related to what
is signified by the part ic ular words in it ? For example, is the meaning
of Rif» or of «uncle» or of «not» a genuine part of this integral t rut h ?
Is the t rut h just an assemblage of the several meanings of the several
words i n t he sentence ?
Familiar considerations s how t hat t his c ould n o t be t he case. For
the same words in a different order might have produced a falsehood,
or a different truth, or a piece of nonsense. The meanings of the words
in a sentence are f unc t ionally interlocking. Concepts are not bricks,
out of whic h truths and falsehoods are built , any more t han v owels
and consonants are components out of whic h syllables are composed.
Rather a concept, say the concept i f or uncle of, is what can be c ommon t o a n indef init e range o f ot herwis e dif f erent int egral t rut hs ,
falsehoods, questions. commands, entreaties. etc. I t is abstracted f rom
them, not extracted out of them. I t is not it s elf an int egral significatum, a n y more t han a consonant is it s elf an int egral pronunc iat um.
It is a factor, not a slice.
I have one last point whic h I want to make because it has, I think,
been too lit t le discussed. A boy, wh o has learned to c ount and is now
beginning arithmetic, is told that numbers divide up into odd numbers
and even numbers. He asks whic h are whic h and is t old first. t hat 2,
4, 6, 8 and 10 are even numbers, while 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 are odd numbers;
second, that the number of the lef t hand page of any book is an even
number; t h i r d t hat any number is a n ev en number whic h is nex t door-neighbour to 1. 3, 5, 7 or 9, o r t o any number ending in one of
these; f ourt h t hat any number wh i c h is 2 o r a mult iple of 2 is an
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even number. Af t er his firs t lesson he can t ell us correctly whic h of
the numbers under 11 are even and whic h are odd.
After his second lesson he c an t ell wh i c h of t he numbers u p to,
may be, 500 or 600 are even — when he has access to a book.
After his t hird lesson he can t ell us, f or any number, whet her it is
even or odd.
After his f ourt h lesson he c an t ell us not only what numbers are
even but also, so to speak, what makes t hem even.
And n o w we ask, at whic h stage has he «got the concept of even
number» ? For at each stage there is some task whic h he can perf orm,
whic h he c ould not do before, and by the t hird stage he can ans wer
correctly a l l questions of the f orm «Is a n even number ?), Yet we
are inc lined t o say t hat so long as he has not yet realised t hat even
numbers are div is ible by 2, he has not really got the concept of even
number; or else that he has not yet got the whole of it. Hav ing been
told what a prime number is, he might still seriously and met hodic ally
search f or that logic al impossibility, an even prime number between
30 and 50.
I suggest t hat the question H a s he really got t he concept o r has
he got the whole of the concept so and so» is lik e the question «Has he
really learned t he art, o r has he learned t he whole art of skating ?»
DISCUSSION
Prof. EBBI NGHAUS
When I f irs t read y our paper i t t ook me s ome t ime u n t i l I had
clearly understood what it really was you want ed t o make clear. Was
it at bot t om a rev iv al of t he t heory c onv ent ionally imput ed t o Berkeley t hat the concept of a general concept has no meaning at all ?
But t he paper s howed t hat y ou did not wis h t o agree wi t h Berkeley
— nor did you repeat the well-k nown instances of Berkeley by whic h
he seems to prove t hat the idea of an abstract idea would be a contradictory one. 'What y ou really said i n y our paper was restricted t o
the negation of concepts as isolated ment al occurrences, whic h people
could remember as f ormerly hav ing experienced. You deny, i n ot her
words, t he pos s ibilit y t o dismiss a l l ot her stuff f rom o u r mi n d and
then jus t t o conceive the concept of say a square root of.
In t his I ent irely agree wi t h y ou. But t he ques t ion wh i c h arises
and wh i c h I want t o ask y ou as my f irs t one, is t his : wh o do y ou
imagine are those people (I mean among philosophers) t o wh o m you
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are so v igorous ly opposed ? There are indeed many authors o f oldfashioned textbooks of logic, wh o seem t o be quit e satisfied wi t h the
independent existence o f concepts, f r om whic h ( i f they are decently
put together) propositions arise — evidently by some sort of miracle.
But ev en wh e n a n aut hor keeps u p t he t radit ional arrangement of
elementary logic , beginning w i t h concepts a n d g o i n g f r o m t here
through jugdment s t o syllogisms, he mus t not needs be unaware of
the fact t hat t he logic al meaning of a concept is not hing else t han
its possible f unc t ion as a predicate. That is t o say: red as a general
concept does not mean any t hing f or itself but means t he being red
of s omet hing — as we l l as t he general concept of ma n means t he
being-a-man or rather (if you wi l l give me leave for such bad English)
the man-being of something.
We might even — and I t hink again wi t h general approv al — enlarge y our thesis in drawing it f rom concepts to propositions. Nobody
goes around dissmissing all else f rom his mind and amus ing hims elf
by t hink ing «all men are mort al » o r .soine Brit is h are scholars». And
even i f he be an acquaintance of Unc le John and Sarah, I wonder if
he ev er s hould f i l l u p his mi n d only by t hink ing isolately: I f J ohn
is the uncle of Sarah, then at least one of Sarah's parents was not an
only child. But i f somebody tells him, t hat neit her of Sarah's parents
has eit her brot her o r sister, h e w i l l probably as k his int erloc ut or,
how t hen, f o r heaven's sake, c ould J ohn hav e bec ome h e r unc le ?
And i n saying so, h e reveals t o us t hat n o w t he propos it ional i mplication we are speaking of mus t really have occurred t o him.
Generally speaking: such general truths as well as general concepts
never are present to the mind only f or themselves. They need in order
to b e ev ok ed s ome mobilis at ion, a n d t heref ore t he unders t anding
must be alarmed by some inc ident whic h gives it the signal t o work
— just as a country's army must be alarmed by some signal — before
it goes t o war. I f y ou mean o n l y t his — y ou wi l l scarcely escape
general agreement. But I v ent ure to ask y ou — as my f irs t question:
wh o m do y ou t hink t o s it i n f ront of y ou on the opposition bench ?
2.
From this, I may come t o my second question: Wh y do y ou t hink
to be i n disagreement wi t h Hume's t heory of what he calls abstract
ideas ? This theory deny ing as f irmly as possible any actual presence
of such ideas t o our mind, seems t o me as f or its negative part i n
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entire agreement wi t h y our o wn sentiment. Fo r t he positive part it
assumes a certain disposition o r readiness of our mind, ac quired by
the customary use o f some name, t o survey and of those part ic ular
ideas wh i c h are associated wi t h t hat name by it s f ormer use. This
readiness is put int o operat ion every t ime we begin t o reason upon
any of our ideas. For instance, we may be confronted by some reason
or ot her wit h the question whet her the angles of a t riangle are equal
or not. The wo r d t riangle according t o Hu me ma y happen t o bring
before our ment al eye the part ic ular idea of an equilat eral one. This
would seduce us t o the af f irmat ion t hat all triangles are equiangular.
But n o w t he requirement of a decision, b y means of t he jus t mentioned readiness, immediat ely makes «c rowding upon us» ot her i n div idual triangles as a scalene or an isosceles. These mak e us aware
that not a l l triangles are equiangular — i n t he same manner as we
become conscious of the fact t hat not all men are whit e coloured nor
all trees lose t heir leaves in the wint er.
This seems t o me t he recollectable experience b y wh i c h Hu me
replaces abstract ideas by indiv idual ones, whic h on t heir part as he
lit erally says, «are not really and i n f ac t present t o t he mind, but
only in power». I f therefore y ou imput e to his theory a suggestion of
a part ic ular recollectable experience of actively hav ing in mi n d what
is s ignif ied b y t he wo r d c urrent ly c omi ng o f f one's t ongue, y o u
imput e t o h i m a f lat contradiction t o t he v ery presupposition of this
same t heory — under t he c ondit ion howev er t hat y o u a r e really
speaking o f words s ignif y ing more t han one part ic ular idea. B u t i f
you are — how can you be entitled to such an imputation, when Hume
on t he c ont rary teaches wit hout any possible doubt, t hat the general
signification of the words is not present to the mind wit hin the scope
of any idea whatsoever, but only as the minds own disposition t o reproduce indef init e sets o f part ic ular ideas c us t omarily associated t o
these words ?
This is t he second question I wis h t o ask you.
3.
Now, when I questioned y our concept of Hume's linguis t ic theory,
it is no wonder t hat T also s hould question t he import anc e of y our
objection t o it . This objec t ion is based o n t he observation t hat we
may be work ing f or some t ime wi t h t he concept of prime number
although the phrase prime number comes of f our lips, i f at all, only
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once or twice during that time. But why should it not ? Hume does not
bid y o u constantly mu r mu r p r i me number, p r i me number, p r i me
number when y ou are researching f or one of t hem among a giv en
series of numbers. Wi t h h i m t he word has sufficiently done its duty,
if it has helped you to convey to y our mind the idea of what you are
asked to do. The words by whic h the task is explained to you certainly
vanish one af t er the ot her by being spoken. But does t hat mean the
ideas, evoked by these words wit hin y our mi n d have the same scale
of v anishing f rom y our consciousness ? And i f not, h o w c ould Hume
be ref ut ed b y y o u r observation t hat i n a hy pot het ic al propos it ion
«though the concept if somehow governs the whole of the proposition,
the word «if» is over and over done wit h by the t ime the second word
in t he sentence is prod4ced ? Hume did not teach t hat an idea reproduced f r o m o u r memory b y s ome wo r d s hould be restricted i n it s
mental activity by the t ime the word is sounding through the air. And
if he did not, as he actually did not, wh y should y our observation be
an import ant objection t o his improv ed edit ion of Locke's and Berkeley's linguis t ic suggestions ?
This is my t hird question t o Prof. Ryle.
4.
In t he second part of y our paper y ou are giv ing an illus t rat ion of
the impos s ibilit y of isolating those elements of our ideas whic h may
be c ommon t o t hem. You illus trate i t by an analogy. But I want t o
ask you, and t his is my f ourt h question, i f this analogy is not more
puzzling t han i t is enlight hening t he f ac ult y of t he mi n d of hav ing
any consciousness of such c ommon features whatsoever ? Your starting point in exposing the analogy is the impossibility, of pronounc ing
the consonant «t » independent ly f r o m s ome ot her s ound c omplement ing t he «t» t o a whole syllable. There is n o need o f «but» o r
«top» as specimens o f s uc h syllables. O n l y b y s ay ing «t» w e p r o nounce a s y llable and not a s ingle consonant. But n o w I s hall as k
you my question:
Ho w s hould it be possible t o illus t rat e t he impos s ibilit y of is olat ing
concepts by an inseparability, whic h precisely is not an inseparability
wit h regard t o concepts but t o the single perceptions. For as y ou are
well aware, t here is not t he slightest dif f ic ult y t o separate t he c oncept of the consonant «t» f rom the concept of the v owel «e». But the
inseparability of concepts f rom what is t hought of as t heir c ommon
basis nat urally mus t be conceivable wi t h regard t o the possibility of
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having concepts a n d not , as y o u propose, o f hearing noises a n d
sounds. A n d thus my question is this: What do y ou mean by saying
the factual inseparability of a consonant f rom some v owel c ould have
some analogy wi t h a link , b y whic h concepts may be «
finterlockingo
u n c t i o n ?a l l y
5.
Finally I should lik e t o question y our explanation of really getting
the concept or of getting the whole of the concept so and so. Here I
feel s ome doubt, whet her y ou mean we nev er can get the whole of
a concept or what we can. As f or empiric al concepts I am quite satisfied t hat we cannot. Wi t h t his restriction I accept y our parallel between getting concepts and learning t he art of skating. The concept
of wat er t o us means no longer an element, as i t did wi t h Aristotle,
and the concept of Gold has been very much changed by nuc lear physics. Heav en k nows , wh a t these t wo concepts ma y embrace, wh e n
another set of hundred years wi l l have passed by. But being imbut ed
by modem logic y ou lik e numbers better t han such unreliable things
as wat er and gold. O n t his f ield howev er y our idea o f get t ing b y
stages the whole of the concept f or instance of even number becomes
again unint elligible t o me. Here t he completeness of t he concept is
granted by the definition. But when I now t urn back to the preceding
stages o f what y ou present as a n ac quirement of t he concept ev en
number, I wonder what those stages possibly could mean wit h regard
to this acquirement. The boy wh o k nows t hat 2, 4, 6, etc... are even
numbers knows only that these numbers are called by that name. But
has he f or t hat any concept of what t he being-an-ev en-number is ?
And if he has not, in what sense could y ou say he has acquired what ever s mall piece of t hat concept ? I f on the contrary he once k nows
being an even number is being the number t wo or a mult iple of it, he
has got at the same t ime the complete concept of it wit hout any hope
for a possible f urt her perfection of it.
This may be a hint , t hat learning cannot be the ult imat e source of
our faculty of hav ing concepts. But i f it is not — whic h t hen would
it be ? This is my f if t h and last question.
M. BARZI N
Je v oudrais seulement f aire deux remarques:
(1') Si une des thèses soutenues par M. Ryle est que «La propos it ion
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est logiquement ant érieure aux termes o u not ions q u i l a c omposent», je voudrais signaler que la voie très originale par laquelle i l
atteint cette conclusion converge avec des efforts philosophiques de
nature t rès différente.
Léon Brunschvicg, au début du XX' siècle, a fait de cette thèse, un
des pivots de la philosophie.
La logique moderne — c'est-à-dire la logique de Frege — a c onsidéré c omme premier étage du système, le calcul des propositions,
le calc ul des prédicats — c'est-à-dire des notions — ne devant venir que plus t ard et en s'appuyant s ur les conclusions d u c alc ul
des propositions.
Enfin, les axiomatistes nous ont habitué à f onder les systèmes déductifs sur une série de postulats contenant des notions f ondamentales qui n'ont pas de déf init ion ex plic it e dans le système. I l a été
facile d e constater que, pour ces notions, les ax iomes jouaient le
rôle d'une déf init ion implic it e. Le sens des notions fondamentales
est, en effet, précisé quand on en a donné un certain nombre d'emplois, qui sont les axiomes considérés comme des propositions vraies.
Cet exemple perdra toute étrangeté, si o n réfléchit que c'est ainsi
que nous avons appris l a s ignif ic at ion de l a plupart des mot s de
notre langue mat ernelle. Nous les avons ent endu employ er dans
une série de phrases, qui précisaient de mieux en mieux leur sens
a mesure que l a série s'allongeait;
(2') Cette dernière constatation m' amène à ma deuxième remarque. I l
me semble que M. Ry le se mont re trop sévère pour nos définitions,
parce qu'elles sont t oujours incomplètes et provisoires. Mais n'estce pas l a l a s it uat ion o ù nous s ommes vis-à-vis de nos propos itions scientifiques ? Je crois que n u l d'ent re nous ne les considère
comme des vérités définitives — i l s'agit bien entendu non de propositions formelles mais de nos vérités expérimentales. Et pourtant,
tout en les sachant provisoires, nous accordons à ces vérités, une
haute v aleur.
I l me parait que nos déf init ions mérit ent le même respect. Nous
les remanions au cours des progrès du savoir. Nous les remanierons
sans doute encore dans le futur. Mais telles qu'elles sont, elles méritent notre respect, et elles sont des instruments précieux.
Prof. PASSMORE
There is clearly such a thing as not having a concept at all. A native
tribe mi g h t not hav e t he concept of number larger t han five. Th i s
does not mean, simply, that they cannot define the expression: «num-
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ber larger t han f i v e . N o t ribe c ould do this. I t means t hey cannot
give such answers as »eight» to questions. When we say that someone
has f u l l y grasped a concept, t his means t hat t hey c an ans wer t he
questions we n o w learn about: we nev er k n o w what n e w questions
might arise. Knowing a def init ion is not either sufficient nor necessary
for understanding a concept: t he test whet her we grasp the def init ion
is the same as t he question whet her we grasp the concepts the def init ion contains. So t he not ion o f grasping a concept is p r i o r t o t he
notion of grasping a def init ion.
J. HYPPOLI TE
Il y a une différence ent re l'usage d'une not ion et l a pensée seconde s ur cet usage même.
A première vue, cela me parait équivalent à la différence entre langage nat urel et réf lex ion.
Professor L. j. RUSSELL
I should lik e t o ask Professor Ry le what is attitude is t o the v iews
of t he 19t h Cent ury Brit is h Idealists, wh o held t hat t he only really
concrete existence was experience ( wh i c h inc luded not only c ognitive, but also conative and affective aspects) and who considered propositions, concepts and so on as only aspects wi t h i n experience, and
as abstract when taken by themselves. The v iews of R. L. Nettleship,
in his lectures on Logic (in his Philosopical Remains) are in this respect f ar more unc ompromis ing t han those of Bradley and Bosanquet,
and seem to me not unlik e those of Professor Ryle.
J.N. FI NDL A Y
I wa n t at this point t o ut t er a c ri d u cœur. I s hould lik e t o ask
Professor Ry le wh y he t hink s t hat his ent irely acceptable v iew t hat
having a concept ent ails being able t o apply i t i n c ert ain wa y i n
various classificatory and argument at iv e contexts s hould jus t if y t he
patently false v iew that there is no such t hing as a part ic ular recollectable experience of hav ing a concept in mind, dwelling on it, soaking
oneself i n it, realiz ing what it involves, prof oundly understanding it,
etc... I t seems t o me t hat t here c ert ainly are such recollectable ex periences and as f ar we k now they are essential t o most sorts of pro-
found thinking. There was a time in my life when I practised a sort
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of religious meditation in whic h I dwelt a great deal on what it really
means t o have this or t hat v irt ue or t o stand i n this or that relat ion
to t he world, ot her people, God, etc... N o w these medit at ions c ertainly inv olv ed a lot of going bac k and f ort h among instances and
illustrations and consequences, but they always also involved a perpetual ret urn to the central theme of this exercise and a simple brooding
upon it. I t was a mos t definite, clockable, remark able experience.
No w i t seems t o me p l a i n t hat s uc h a medit at ion a n d s uc h a
brooding o n concepts s imply i s a n indispensable, int egral p a r t o f
every sort of thorough-going thinking. A mat hemat ic ian must feel the
primeness a n d t he f ac t oriz abilit y of number int ermit t ent ly , perhaps,
but def init ely . I c ert ainly do f eel i t myself. I recognize mult iples of
certain numbers as old friends recognizable by t heir savour whit e the
recalcitrant individualists of genuine primes impresses one wit h equal
strictness. A mat hemat ic ian i f he is more t han a mere manipulat or
must c ert ainly savour concepts i n t his manner before he applies o r
employs t hem, and he c ert ainly tests t heir applic at ion or elaboration
by his subsequent meditative enjoy ment of the outcome. I do not my self k now how one c ould possibly proceed in mathematics or in anything else wit hout this constant recourse t o what I may c all such recollective synthesis. I am sure Professor Ryle has such experiences and
cannot see why he should wis h to suppress or minimiz e the fact. I can
only t hink he does so because he thinks that separate t hought - experiences wo u l d necessarily be at oms instead o f elements c ont aining
wit hin themselves t he structure of t he whole t o whic h t hey belong.
Prof. KL1BANSKY
If we were to accept the views proposed by Prof. Ryle I should lik e
to ask h i m what is exactly the status of the concept, i f it is t he out come of learning.
M. PERELMAN
La réponse à la question du professeur Klibansky me semble dev oir
exiger non pas une analogie, mais l'indic at ion de cas, aussi différents
que possible, où l'usage du concept «concept» est légit ime et ceux où
i l ne l'est pas.
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