Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
2002, Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 589±615
0360-5310/02/2705-589$16.00
# Swets & Zeitlinger
Animal Research, Non-vegetarianism, and the Moral Status
of Animals ± Understanding the Impasse of the Animal
Rights Problem
Hon-Lam Li
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong
ABSTRACT
I offer some reasons for the theory that, compared with human beings, non-human animals have
some but lesser intrinsic value. On the basis of this theory, I ®rst argue that we do not know how
to compare an animal's claim to be free from a more serious type of harm (e.g., death), and a
human's claim to be free from some lesser type of harm (e.g., non-fatal morbidity). For we need
to take account of these parties' intrinsic value, and their competing types of claim. Yet, there
exists no known way for making such comparison, when a human's intrinsic value is higher
than that of an animal, whereas the type of claim an animal has is morally weightier than the
type of claim a human has. Second, I explain why utilitarianism is unhelpful in making such
comparison. Third, in the case where some animals can be sacri®ced for saving a larger number
of humans, it is crucial to ask whether animals have the right to life, and I argue that this
question is more perplexing than we might think. My conclusion is that the various dif®culties
mentioned above have a deeper source than we have so far acknowledged, and that this re¯ects
that the moral reality is less tidy and more complex than many theories portray.
Keywords: animal research, animal rights, undecidability, inter-species comparison of utility,
intrinsic value, moral status, non-vegetarianism, preference utilitarianism
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Joseph Chan, Sin-yee
Chan, Ruiping Fan, Joe Lau, Win-chiat Lee, Yuan-kang Shih, Peter Singer, Bonnie Steinbock,
Kai-yee Wong, Allen W. Wood, the Editor of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, an
anonymous referee, and especially John G. Bennett. I also thank Jonathan Chan, Chen Te,
Raymond Geuss, and James Grif®n for useful discussions. Earlier versions of this paper were
presented at The International Conference in Bioethics at National Central University (Taiwan)
in June 1998, The Saturday Ethics Group in Hong Kong in October 1999, and The International
Conference on Applied Ethics at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in December 1999. I
would also like to thank the audiences on these occasions for helpful comments.
Address correspondence to: Hon-Lam Li, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong. E-mail: [email protected]
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HON-LAM LI
I believe one should trust problems over solutions, . . . and pluralist
discord over systematic harmony. Simplicity and elegance are never
reasons to think that a philosophical theory is true: on the contrary, they
are usually grounds for thinking it false . . . . Often the problem has to be
reformulated, because an adequate answer to the original formulation
fails to make the sense of the problem disappear. It is always reasonable
in philosophy to have great respect for the intuitive sense of an unsolved
problem, because in philosophy our methods are always themselves in
question, and this is one way of being prepared to abandon them at any
point. (Nagel, 1979, pp. x±xi).
Rather than proposing a solution to [the problem], I shall try to explain
what it is, and why a solution is so dif®cult to achieve. This result need
not be thought of pessimistically, since the recognition of a serious
obstacle is always a necessary condition of progress . . . . (Nagel, 1991,
p. 3).
I. INTRODUCTION
Until relatively recently, discussions of ethics have generally focused only on
human persons. Ethical issues such as euthanasia, pornography, capital
punishment, and world hunger only concern human persons. However, with
the increasing prominence of issues such as animal rights and abortion, in
addition to human persons, other beings are involved. This is a signi®cant
change, because the ethics dealing with problems involving only human
persons is ill-adapted for problems involving not only human persons, but also
other beings: such as non-human animals and human fetuses.1
In this paper, I shall examine the problems of animal research, nonvegetarianism, and the moral status of animals. I shall argue that the intrinsic
value2 (or moral status) of a non-human animal is typically less than that of a
normal human adult. As to the problems of animal research and nonvegetarianism, I shall try to explain what they are, and why at present there
appears to be no satisfactory solution.
Because of the lack of space, I shall be able only to describe various views
on the moral status or intrinsic value of animals very brie¯y and sketchily, in
sections II to IV. In sections II and III, I consider anti-speciesism and
speciesism. In section IV, I argue for the view that human beings and non-
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
591
human animals have intrinsic value or moral status, albeit to different degrees.
In section V, I argue that if intrinsic value is a matter of degree, then the
problem of animal research to prevent non-fatal human morbidity and the
problem of non-vegetarianism would seem dif®cult to resolve. Section VI
discusses some exceptional cases in which the method of approximation can
be used to achieve resolution of certain problems. In section VII, I consider
whether utilitarianism is a way out of the impasse, and argue that it is not.
Finally, in section VIII, I consider whether we are justi®ed in sacri®cing nonhuman animals in medical research to save more human lives. I argue that this
issue would depend on whether non-human animals have rights, and try to
show why it is such a perplexing issue.
II. ALL-OR-NOTHING ANTI-SPECIESISM
The starting point of the problem of animal rights is clearly the question
concerning the moral status or intrinsic value of non-human animals.3 There
are three types of view on this issue, two of which hold that intrinsic value, or
moral status, is all-or-nothing.
The ®rst type of all-or-nothing view to consider is an anti-speciesist view.
We may call it all-or-nothing anti-speciesism. One view holds that all human
beings and non-human animals have equal inherent value.4 Another more
plausible view maintains that all human beings and some non-human animals
have equal inherent value.5 Tom Regan's in¯uential theory is of the latter type.
Regan holds that some non-human animals and all humans, except possibly
permanently comatose human beings (Regan, 1983, p. 246), have equal
inherent value. For him, higher animals, such as mammals, are ``subjects-of-alife''. This term refers to (the human and non-human) animals that have
beliefs, desires, perceptions, memory, preference, experience, individual
welfare, and psychological identity over time (p. 243). Regan believes that all
subjects-of-a-life have inherent value equally, and all those of equal inherent
value have equal rights.6 To reach such a surprising conclusion, he starts from
Kant's view that all moral agents have equal inherent value. He argues that if
this were not true, then it would lead to the pernicious ``perfectionist'' view
that those having greater inherent value can treat those having less inherent
value in an unjust way, as slave-masters treated slaves. Since this consequence
is morally repugnant, all moral agents must have equal inherent value. Regan
then argues that this equal inherent value must be extended to very young
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children and the mentally enfeebled because they too can suffer as much as
human moral agents (pp. 183, 240). Further, he argues that since these human
non-moral agents are relevantly similar to non-human mammals, any refusal
to extend equal inherent value to the latter would be speciesist (Regan, 1985,
p. 23). So Regan concludes that all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value
and hence equal rights.
My chief criticism of Regan is that there exists a more plausible alternative
to his view. This alternative view holds that one's inherent value is the inherent
value of one's capacity for experiencing life (or experiential capacity). This
view would maintain that a normal human adult has greater inherent value
than a dog, which in turn has greater inherent value than a ®sh, because of their
differing experiential capacities. The only reason Regan (1983) has for
rejecting this line of reasoning is that he thinks that this would lead to
pernicious perfectionist views. But his reasoning seems dubious. The
pernicious perfectionist consequence that those of greater inherent value
can exploit or otherwise treat as a mere means those with less inherent value
simply does not follow. As he acknowledged in an earlier paper, normal
people have greater inherent value than the severely mentally enfeebled
(Regan, 1978, pp. 136±139).7 He rightly said that as long as a being has some
inherent value, it cannot be exploited or otherwise used as a mere means by
those of greater inherent value (Regan, 1978, p. 138). So the pernicious
perfectionist consequences do not seem to follow.
Moreover, if we are faced with saving either a normal human being or a
dog, but not both, we should save the former. The most plausible explanation
seems to be in terms of the human's greater inherent value, in comparison to
the dog's.8
III. ALL-OR-NOTHING SPECIESISM
Another type of all-or-nothing view maintains that whereas a human being has
intrinsic value, non-human animals do not have any intrinsic value or moral
status. In substance, this view is diametrically opposed to anti-speciesism. R.D.
Guthrie (Guthrie, 1967±1968) and Carl Cohen (Cohen, 1986) are proponents
for this view. We may call this type of view all-or-nothing speciesism.
All-or-nothing speciesism is correct in holding that human beings have
intrinsic value, but seems unjusti®ed in denying non-human animals any
intrinsic value or moral status at all. Guthrie thinks that non-human animals
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
593
are amoral beings, and that a wild wolf killing a wild deer is ``not subject to
moral analysis'' (Guthrie, 1967±68, p. 53). Because a non-human animal is an
amoral being, Guthrie reasons, it is illogical to treat it as an amoral being at the
same time. Hence, we should treat a non-human animal as an amoral being,
that is, to treat it amorally. Thus every time we bite into a pork chop, we need
not ``cringe in sin'' or feel guilty (Guthrie, 1967±68, p. 55).
The crux of Guthrie's argument is really that because a non-human animal is
not a moral agent, it is therefore excluded from the realm of moral concern. This
line of reasoning seems too quick, however, because it is based on an ambiguity
in the term ``moral being.'' In one sense, Guthrie uses the term ``moral being'' to
mean a moral agent. In this sense, since a wild wolf is not a moral being and is
incapable of acting morally, what it does to a wild dear is not subject to moral
appraisal. In another sense, Guthrie uses the term ``moral being'' to mean a
recipient or object of moral concern. These senses of ``moral being'' are clearly
different. A being that is not a moral being in the ®rst sense can be a moral being
in the second sense. An infant is a clear example: It is not a moral agent, but can
be a recipient or object of moral concern. Thus, Guthrie's argument that
purports to show that we need not cringe in sin when biting into a pork chop is a
result of his commission of the fallacy of equivocation.9
Moreover, I take it that virtually everyone would agree that we should not
cause any unnecessary pain to animals. If this is correct, then at least to this
extent we should treat them morally. I shall offer an account as to why we should
not cause any unnecessary pain or suffering to non-human animals in section VI
below. This account is based on the view that most non-human animals have
some intrinsic value. I shall discuss Carl Cohen's view in section VIII below.
IV. THE MATTER-OF-DEGREE VIEW
Contrary to the above types of view is the view that intrinsic value or moral
status is not all-or-nothing, but a matter of degree. We may call this view the
matter-of-degree view. Although the structure of this view is different from
that of an all-or-nothing view, this view is in substance in-between the two
types of all-or-nothing views discussed above because it maintains that
whereas human persons have intrinsic value or moral status, non-human
animals do have some lesser intrinsic value or moral status. R.G. Frey (1988)
and Bonnie Steinbock (1978) are proponents for this view. Of all three types of
view, the most plausible one is the matter-of-degree view.
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HON-LAM LI
We know that there is a wide range of conscious life among different species
of animals: at the higher end of the range, self-conscious life, and at the lower
end, mere sentient life and even non-sentient life. If consciousness itself is a
product of evolution, and if all species are the results of more-or-less gradual
evolution, then a more-or-less continuum of differing levels of consciousness
is what we would expect.
Human beings have the capacity for the highest level of conscious life in the
animal kingdom, and their conscious life is also the richest. Their lives are
richer and at a higher level than those of chimps and gorillas, and chimps and
gorillas in turn have a richer and higher level of conscious life than birds and
reptiles. And birds and reptiles have richer and higher levels of conscious life
than ®sh, shrimps, and crabs. At the lowest end are amoebae, bacteria, and
virus, which are probably not conscious at all, and accordingly their lives have
no richness at all.
Animals have various capacities, some of which are intrinsically valuable
and some not.10 The intrinsically valuable capacities of an animal are those
that enable it to experience life, such as the capacities for experiencing
pleasure and for having a ¯ourishing life.11 As Frey observes, (1) the intrinsic
value of a life is a function of its quality, (2) the quality of a life is a function of
its richness, and (3) the richness of life is a function of its scope and
potentiality for enrichment (Frey, 1988, p. 193). In other words, the intrinsic
value of a life is its capacity for experiencing life, or experiential capacity. The
capacity for experiencing conscious life is an intrinsic good, even if one's life
turns out to be full of sufferings.12
Compared with other living things, a human being is capable of having
a richer life, such as listening to music, writing a book, and discovering about the universe. Even if we suppose the view, held by Paul W.
Taylor,13 that humans are not in fact superior to other living things is
correct, it does not follow that human life is not richer, or does not have
more intrinsic value, than the lives of other species. To take an extreme
example, it seems clear that a human life is richer and more intrinsically
valuable than that of an amoeba. Even compared with a dog's life, a
human life is still richer, for a human can mold her own life, and can
participate in activities and projects that enrich her life. Though a dog can
do things that a human cannot, there is no reason to think that all species
must have equal intrinsic value.
I hope to have sketched some brief reasons for the matter-of-degree view
and against its rivals, in this and the preceding two sections. The main
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
595
arguments of the rest of this paper are premised upon the matter-of-degree
view.
V. ANIMAL RESEARCH AND NON-VEGETARIANISM:
THE TWO-VARIABLE PROBLEM
The main thesis of this paper is that we have dif®culties in solving the central
problems of animal rights despite the fact that the easy cases have solutions.14
The central problems are as follows. First, when we sacri®ce the lives of
animals not to save human lives, but merely for the sake of improving the
quality of human lives, questions arise as to whether we are justi®ed in doing
so or not. One example is animal research that aims at preventing or curing
non-fatal human diseases. Another example is using animals as a source of
food. Second, when we sacri®ce the lives of animals in medical research in
order to save more human lives, it is not clear whether we are justi®ed in doing
so because it is not clear whether non-human animals have the right to life.
These two problems, I shall argue, have no obvious solutions at present,
though in part for different reasons.
Let me put forward the structure of the ®rst problem and its besetting
dif®culties, as I see them. (I shall consider the second problem in section VIII.)
In many traditional moral questions, such as those concerning the limits of
freedom of speech, only human beings are involved, and we only need to
consider the competing claims of the parties involved. In deciding whether
people have the right to defame others as a special case of the right to free
speech, for instance, we take account of the pros and cons of allowing
defamation versus the pros and cons of prohibiting it. In other words, we have
to weigh and compare the claims of potential defamers versus those of
potential victims. In this way, we can in principle arrive at the solution.
Unfortunately, in questions that involve non-human animals, the traditional
method of weighing and comparing the competing claims becomes inadequate. The reason is that besides considering (1) the relative moral weight
of the competing types of claim in question, we also need to consider (2) the
intrinsic value or moral status of the competing parties, namely, the intrinsic
value of human beings (whether human patients bene®ting from animal
research, or human non-vegetarians) and that of non-human animals. Here, a
human being and a non-human animal have different intrinsic value, or moral
status.15 It will become obvious that this is a crucial consideration to the issue
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of animal rights. Let me say for now that in the traditional moral problems
involving only competing claims of human persons, we need to consider the
variable of competing claims only. But in cases involving not only human
beings, but also non-human animals, an additional variable of intrinsic value
(or moral status) needs to be considered as well. I shall argue that, because of
this additional variable, we do not know how to make the comparison of
competing claims between humans and non-human animals in many cases.
Obviously, in some cases, comparison of claims between humans and nonhuman animals does not pose any dif®culty. If either a normal human adult or
a dog is to die, it is morally preferable that the misfortunate occurs to the dog,
because less intrinsic value would be lost. One situation in which a solution is
available, is where one of the two ``variables'' is held constant. Since either
one of the two variables may be held constant, let us consider both cases. First,
consider the case in which the variable of competing types of claim is held
constant. For instance, in the case of either saving a normal adult human's life
or a dog's life, but not both, the variable of competing types of claim (i.e., life
versus life) being held constant, it is the human's intrinsic value versus the
dog's intrinsic value that determines the solution. A solution is therefore
possible. Second, consider the case in which the variable of intrinsic value (or
moral status) is held constant. For instance, if we could choose to save either
one stranger from injury, or another stranger from being killed, then we should
choose to save the latter. Here the variable of intrinsic value being held
constant, the relative moral weight of competing types of claim determines the
outcome of the issue. A solution is again possible.
It is clear that if one of the two variables is held constant, the problem can in
principle be solved.16 It does not follow that only if one variable is held
constant can the problem be solved for the following reason. Suppose either a
normal adult human is to be killed, or a dog is to become injured, but not both.
It is surely better if the dog is to become injured than if the human is to be
killed. In this case, no variable is held constant, but both variables ± intrinsic
value as well as type of claim ± are on the human's side. So if the human's
claim defeats the dog's claim when both claims are of the same type, then a
fortiori her claim will defeat the dog's claim when both variables are on her
side.
However, if either a normal adult human is to be injured, or a dog is to be
killed, which would be worse? We can conceive of a party's claim to consist of
two variables, (x, y) where x indicates its intrinsic value and y indicates the
moral weight of its type of claim. Thus, we can conceive of a normal adult
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
597
human's claim to be saved from injury as, ®rstly, her intrinsic value, and
secondly, the claim to be saved from injury (abstracted from the fact that it is a
human's claim). Similarly, we can conceive of a dog's claim to be saved from
death as its intrinsic value and the claim to be saved from death (again
abstracted from the fact that it is a dog's claim). My claim is that, apart from
some exceptional cases to be considered in the next section, we know how to
compare the claims of two animals of different species, only if (1) one variable
is held constant or (2) both variables are on the side of one of the parties.
This means that if one party has higher intrinsic value, whereas the other's
claim belongs to a morally weightier type of claim, then, apart from some
exceptional cases, we do not know how to make the comparison at present.
Thus, given that a human person has higher intrinsic value than a dog, and
also given that the (dog's) claim to be saved from death belongs to a morally
weightier type of claim than the (human's) claim to be saved from injury, we
do not know whom to save, if we can only save one of them. This is because
the human has higher intrinsic value, whereas the dog's claim belongs to a
morally weightier type of claim. I believe the problem at present has no
satisfactory solution for the following reason. We need to take into
consideration the human's intrinsic value and the type of claim of which
her claim is an instance, as well as the dog's intrinsic value and the type of
claim of which its claim is an instance. That is to say, we need to compare a
normal adult human's injury with a dog's death, and then decide which,
objectively, is worse. But we do not yet have any ethical calculus or
conceptual apparatus to compare (1) the morally less weighty type of claim of
a normal adult human who has certain intrinsic value, and (2) the morally
weightier type of claim of a non-human animal of lesser intrinsic value.
This type of case is very common. On example is animal research that aims
at alleviation of human pain, or that enhances the quality of human lives. It is
an animal's claim to life versus a human's claim to be free from pain17 (or
some non-fatal disease). Another example is the problem of whether we are
morally permitted to have steak for dinner. We do not need to have steak for
survival but we like its taste. So here, it is a cow's claim to life versus the nonvegetarian's claim to good taste.18
On the above issues of animal research and non-vegetarianism, advocates
of animal rights only discern the difference between the moral weight of the
claim to life and that of the claim to some lesser good (such as alleviation of
pain, or taste). Those on the opposite camp, on the other hand, only focus on
the difference between beings of higher intrinsic value and those of less
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HON-LAM LI
intrinsic value. However, neither view is the full truth, because each is only
partially valid. Yet we can also say that both views have to be taken into
account. The problem is that these partially valid perspectives seem incommensurable and cannot be combined. (I shall consider the question of whether
both variables can be combined in the last part of section VII.) The result is
that the above problems of animal research and non-vegetarianism are undecidable, because they do not have a determinate solution. We may call this
the two-variable problem, and the thesis that these cases are undecidable the
undecidability thesis. This explains why at present we do not know how to
resolve the con¯ict between the variables. If I am right, the impasse in the
above problem of animal research and non-vegetarianism has a deeper source
than we have so far acknowledged.
The undecidability thesis has implications not only for animal research and
non-vegetarianism, but also for similar situations, such as cases in which
animals are killed so that human beings can have bene®ts of a lesser type. For
instance, minks and foxes are killed so that some people can wear their furs.
Pigs are skinned so that those who received burns of a non-fatal type in a ®re
can heal more quickly. Rabbits are caused great pains before becoming blind
so that we can have shampoo that does not irritate our eyes.
VI. APPROXIMATION AS A WAY OUT
Despite the undecidability thesis, we might be able to ®nd ways out of the
impasse in exceptional cases. One way out is by way of approximation. When
scientists and mathematicians encounter in their research a factor which is so
small in dimension, compared to other relevant factors, as to be negligible or
trivial, they make approximation when doing so enable them to make progress
in their research. There is no reason why ethicists cannot make approximation
in similar circumstances.
One type of approximation is justi®ed when the bene®t gained by human
beings is so little as to be negligible or trivial. This is so because deeming certain
claim of a party to be negligible is, on a ®rst approximation, tantamount to
wiping it out from our consideration (analogous to scientists considering certain
things to be so small, comparatively speaking, as to be negligible). And the
contrary claim, being the only claim under consideration, must therefore win
out. One such example is the causing of unnecessary pain or suffering to animals.
Pain or suffering caused to an animal is unnecessary, if the corresponding bene®t
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
599
to humans is negligible.19 Because such negligible bene®t can be deemed to be
nil, we should not cause animals any such pain or suffering.
Some vegetarians also purport that our bene®t in consuming meat is
negligible or trivial. Assuming that including meat in one's diet has no other
bene®ts than the pleasure of taste, Peter Singer, for one, has tried to convince us
that our interest in tasting meat is negligible or trivial. If he is correct, then nonvegetarianism would be morally wrong. For if tasting meat is deemed to have
negligible or trivial value for humans, then killing animals for their meat on a
®rst approximation would be tantamount to killing them for nothing. However,
many people, including some sympathetic to animal rights, do not agree with
Singer that consuming meat has trivial or negligible value for humans.20
We can also deem certain sufferings to be as bad as death. When the
suffering is so painful, incapacitating or dehumanizing that one will consider it
almost as bad as death, approximation can be made. For instance, Mary suffers
from a certain disease. It does not threaten her life, but causes her severe and
continual pain and as a result she is unable to think or work. For her, thinking
and working are essential parts of life, without which life would be
meaningless and not worth living. Therefore, Mary considers her disease to be
almost as bad as death. Thus, if we can save either a dog's life, or Mary from
such severe condition, but not both, we should save Mary, on the ground that
not saving her would be as bad as death for her.
In a different type of case, we can make approximation not about the moral
weight of a claim, but about the intrinsic value of one side concerned. For
instance, if a useful experiment requires the sacri®ce of oysters, one can argue
that the intrinsic value of oysters is approximately nil, and that such an
experiment is justi®ed. Another example concerning the approximation of
intrinsic value is this. Suppose we can save either a chimp from injury, or a
gorilla from death, but not both. Who should we save? A chimp is more
intelligent and has a greater experiential capacity than a gorilla, but only
slightly. However, there is a big difference between injury and life. So we
should save the gorilla.
I do not have a general theory of how, or in what circumstances, we should
deem either certain bene®t to be trivial, or certain harm to be almost as bad
as death, or certain intrinsic value to be equal to another intrinsic value.
However, it seems that cases eligible for the method of approximation
represent only a relatively small fraction of all cases. If so, this would mean
that many cases of animal research and non-vegetarianism are still plagued by
the two-variable problem, and appear to be undecidable.
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VII. IS UTILITARIANISM A WAY OUT?
Someone might object: ``Utilitarianism can render all types of claim to be
commensurable. The moral weight of all human and non-human claims can be
reduced into either: (1) pleasure and pain, or (2) happiness and unhappiness,
or (3) the satisfaction of preferences.''
Since this is an important challenge to my view, I shall consider such a view
at three different levels, namely, at the levels of (1) practical feasibility, and (2)
theoretical possibility, of inter-species comparison, and at the level of (3)
moral signi®cance of any such comparison. First, even assuming that there is
no theoretical problem in inter-species comparison, I question whether any
such comparison whose result is not already obvious can really be carried out
according to utilitarianism in practice. I admit that there are cases in which the
result of comparison is obvious. If we can either save a dog's life and a normal
adult human's life, but not both, utilitarianism will tell us that saving the
human's life will maximize utility and hence is the right thing to do. But we do
not need utilitarianism to tell us that this is what we should do. In fact, on my
view, as well as on any other view, this is what we should do.
Now can utilitarianism tell us whether we should save a dog's life or a
normal adult human from injury, if we can save only one of them? On my
view, and on many people's view, (1) if the human's injury is negligible or
trivial, we should save the dog's life, and (2) if the human's injury is very
serious, we should save the human from injury, because we can rely on the
method of approximation. There is no reason why a utilitarian cannot arrive at
such results by means of approximation. But can a utilitarian achieve more
than that? Can she resolve the problem as to whether saving the dog's life, as
opposed to saving the human being from injury, would maximize utility? Or in
other words, can she carry out in practice the inter-species comparison
between the dog losing its life and the human getting injured? My challenge is
that utilitarianism is not useful in practice, because it cannot resolve the
dif®cult cases in practice.21
Now, I want to challenge the very theoretical possibility of inter-species
comparison of utility (aside from some obvious cases where we can use the
method of approximation), on the ground that there does not exist a common
denominator to make such comparison possible. Let me explain this point
with an easy case. Assume that a ®sh is only a receptor of pain and pleasure,
and has no higher or other experience. My question is, how can we make interspecies utility comparison between a human being and a ®sh? We can imagine
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
601
a governmental proposal to turn a small lake (full of ®sh) into a land®ll on
which to build a marine museum (because there is no other site available), and
in the process, all the ®sh will be killed. Is there any way to take account of
and compare (1) the pleasure which would be enjoyed by the ®sh if they were
still around, plus the pain experienced when they are killed, and (2) the utility
enjoyed by all who visit the museum. The hedonistic theory can fully take
account of the pain experienced by the ®sh as well as the pleasure that would
be experienced by them if they were not killed. But it cannot fully take
account of the utility or bene®ts enjoyed by those who visit the museum,
because their bene®ts (such as knowledge and other experience) cannot be
reduced into pleasure and pain. This is a familiar point,22 and I need not
belabor it.23
The crucial point is the less familiar one as to whether preference utilitarianism can enable us to carry out inter-species comparison of utility.24 I
have grave doubts about the view that preference utilitarianism can enable us
to do so. The ®rst major problem concerns whether a ®sh has preference of any
kind. To have a preference for x, as Donald Davidson rightly argues, is to have
a certain propositional attitude, or ``evaluative attitude'', about x (Davidson,
1986, pp. 197, 203). To have an evaluative attitude such as having a preference
involves several capacities. First, one would have to be aware of the alternatives, and this implies that one knows what the alternatives are. Second, one
has to be able to compare these alternatives and, third, to be able to make a
choice among them. All of these capacities require a certain degree of intelligence and self-consciousness. Can a ®sh have such an attitude? I doubt it,
because if, as I assumed, a ®sh is a mere receptor of pain and pleasure, then ex
hypothesi it cannot have any of these capacities. Even if this assumption is
relaxed, it still seems that a ®sh is not self-conscious or intelligent enough to
have these capacities.
Now it might be objected as follows. First, there is surely a broader sense of
the word ``preference'' such that even a ®sh can be said to prefer life to death,
health to sickness, and pleasure to pain. Second, even if lowly creatures such
as clams, shrimps, and ®sh do not have preferences, surely all mammals (and
perhaps even birds and reptiles) are self-conscious and intelligent enough to
have preferences, and so inter-species comparison is still very meaningful and
applicable to a whole range of situations.
As to the ®rst objection, I have three counter-arguments, and the second and
third of them also serve as counter-arguments to the second objection. First, I
agree that it is better for a ®sh to stay alive than to be eaten, and to stay healthy
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than sick, and to have pleasure than pain. But unless a ®sh has the capacity for
evaluative attitude, it cannot have preference, because it is one thing to say that it
is better for x (or in the interest of x) to rather than to , but quite another thing
to say that x prefers -ing to -ing. For instance, it is better for a ®ve-year-old
child (or it is in his or her interest) to attend school than to stay in the playground
day after day, but he or she may prefer what is not in his or her interest. So I am
not denying that there is something which is in the interest of a ®sh or a ®ve-yearold child. All I am denying is that (1) the interests of the ®ve-year-old child
should be equated with his or her preferences, and that (2) the interests of the ®sh
can be expressed in terms of preferences, let alone be equated with them.
Second, suppose that I am wrong about this, and that a ®sh does prefer
pleasure to pain.25 We still need to worry about whether a ®sh has all the
relevant preferences. We can consider a non-human mammal, which clearly
has preferences. But does it have all relevant preferences. Suppose a dog can
have either ®ve intensely pleasurable years of life, or ten moderately pleasurable years of life, before it dies. Does it have a preference? The answer would
seem to be no, because though a dog is capable of having preferences, it is not
capable of having any preference about these options. For in order to have a
preference in this case, a dog must understand the meaning of these options,
but we can assume that a dog does not have such understanding. I am not
saying that there is no correct answer as to which alternative is better for the
dog, or which is in its interest. There probably is such an answer, but the range
of preferences a dog is capable of is not suf®cient for deciding all (answerable)
questions concerning its well-being.
Third, can a ®sh have cardinal preferences? Unless the preferences of a ®sh
form a set of cardinal preferences, there is no way to maximize utility (or
preference satisfaction) between a ®sh and a human being. And it seems
impossible to obtain a set of cardinal preferences of a ®sh. This point also
serves as a reply to the second objection that non-human mammals (and
perhaps even birds and reptiles) clearly have preferences. If non-human
mammals only have preferences in the ordinal sense, but not in the cardinal
sense, clearly no utility maximization is possible. In order to form cardinal
preferences, one would need to ®nd out one's utility function, de®ned in terms
of preference and probability, as von Neumann and Morgenstern suggest (or
something that plays a similar role). But it is clear that, with the possible
exceptions of the primates, other mammals simply do not have the capacity to
work out their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Even if I am
wrong about this ± suppose they have such utility functions but are merely
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
603
unable for us to spell them out26 ± still there is no theoretical way to proceed to
inter-species comparison without having their utility functions in hand.
My point is that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (or something that plays a similar role) of a dog is a necessary condition for interspecies comparison between a human and a dog if we are to maximize
preference satisfaction between them. Even if we have such utility function of
a dog, it does not mean that inter-species comparison is possible. One problem
is that this utility function was invented for intrapersonal comparison, not
interpersonal comparison. Even if we have the utility functions of Mary and
her dog, there is no non-arbitrary common point on these two functions to
make the comparison meaningful.27
Suppose again that I am wrong, and that inter-species utility comparison is
possible. Suppose we have evidence to infer that a human's preference to is
stronger or more intense than a dog's preference to . Does it mean that the
human preference to should be given priority over the dog's preference to ?
A preference utilitarian would say so. Here is my challenge to preference
utilitarian at yet another level. I am not now challenging the possibility of
inter-species comparison, but rather the moral signi®cance of inter-species
comparison based on the strength or intensity of preference. Thomas Scanlon
argues that while we can make all sorts of interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing between persons, such as according to how much gold each has, the
moral basis on which such a comparison is carried out is often open to
criticism (Scanlon, 1991). I believe that a fortiori a similar point can be made
about inter-species comparison of preferences. It is doubtful that we can draw
anything of moral signi®cance from the fact that a human being's preference
to is stronger or more intense (or, for that matter, is weaker or less intense)
than a non-human mammal's preference to . Scanlon convincingly argues for
the following points. First, individuals do not take the fact that they have a
certain preference to be a ground-level reason for choosing one thing over
another. More commonly, people prefer one outcome for a reason, and this
reason, which is the ground of preference, is also the ground of choice. This is
because things are normally not valued because they are preferred but, rather,
preferred because they are judged desirable for some other reason.28
Second, Scanlon argues, the moral weight of a preference depends on its
content and our assessment of it rather than our sense of the bare strength of
the person's degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (Scanlon, 1991, pp. 3637). A fortiori, it seems to me, Scanlon's point would apply to inter-species
preference comparisons. We cannot obtain the moral weight of preferences
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HON-LAM LI
held by a human and a non-human mammal by comparing the strengths of the
preferences alone. If a tiger has a stronger preference to devour Mary than her
preference to stay live, does it mean that it is objectively better that the tiger
devours Mary? It would seem not, if only because the weakest preference of a
tiger may be stronger than the strongest preference of a human, perhaps by
virtue of their biological make-up.29 Clearly, Scanlon's point that the moral
weight of a preference cannot be equated with its strength severely undermines preference utilitarianism.
Further, inter-species comparison is more dif®cult to carry out than interpersonal comparison, because the former comparison purports to bridge a
larger gap than the latter comparison. Some utilitarians argue that when we
compare the relative value of experiences or desires, we rely on our imagination to imagine what having those experiences or desires might affect a life,
and base on our imagined possibilities we judge their relative merits.
However, as Thomas Nagel powerfully argues, while we can imagine the
subjective experience of other people, we simply cannot imagine very clearly
what it is like to be a creature that is biologically very remote from us (Nagel,
1974; 1986, chap. 6). If Nagel is correct, then inter-species comparison
according to this utilitarian approach are practically if not theoretically
impossible in many cases.30
Now there is a further issue in my approach to the two-variable problem
that I need to address. The fact that the moral weight of an animal's claim is a
function of two variables by itself does not imply (nor do I claim) the
impossibility of solving the problem, provided there is a way to combine the
two variables. I do not see any way to combine them, but of course that does
not mean there is no way to do so. Someone may argue that we can build in the
intrinsic value of a being into its claims, before comparing its intrinsic-valueladen, or weighted, claim. Some utilitarian may argue: ``All intrinsically good
things are psychological states. Each such state will be the state of some
creature or other. Total utility will then be a weighted sum of the utilities of
each creature capable of having such states, the weights re¯ecting the differing
intrinsic value of the creatures. The morally correct thing is to maximize the
total utility.''31
Obviously the weighted sum of utility and intrinsic value would be some
measure of the moral weight in question, and no one can deny that. Having
said this, apart from the obvious problems as to how to measure utilities and
intrinsic value between species, the crucial objection to this approach is that
it is not clear why intrinsic-value-weighted claims, formulated in the last
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
605
paragraph, can solve the problem. It is not clear why the (mathematical)
product of utility and intrinsic value would give the de®nitive, or correct,
measure for the moral weight of claims in question. Why should not the
de®nitive measure be the product of utility and the square of intrinsic value,
for instance? One might say that both are measures of the moral weight in
question with slightly different emphasis on the two variables.
However, it is absolutely crucial to arrive at a de®nitive measure, because
we are trying to ®nd guidance as to whom to save in a dilemma and two
different measures may give contrary guidance. To see this point, consider the
following example. Suppose, according to the ``weighted-sum'' method, the
disutility of a man getting injured is 20 units, whereas that of a dog getting
killed is 22 units. Does it mean that the objectively correct thing to do is to
save the dog from death rather than the man from injury? It does not seem
conclusive or de®nitive because, for one thing, the feeling of indeterminancy
still persists. For another, suppose one uses the slightly different method of
measuring the product of utility and the square of intrinsic value, and (since
the dog's intrinsic value is lower than the man's) this method would give a
different result. For example, assume that the intrinsic value of the man and
the dog to be 1 and 0.4 respectively. Whereas the disutility of the man's injury
remains 20 units, the disutility of the dog's death becomes 8.8 units. What
does this show? I think this shows that we need to have a de®nitive measure
combining utility and intrinsic value, but that there are not suf®cient grounds
for thinking that either of these measures discussed is de®nitive.
Now although I have been trying to show that at present we do not yet know
of any satisfactory solutions to the two-variable problem, I do not want to
predict that de®nitely there will be no solution to it. I am only trying to explain
what the problem is, and why a solution appears to be unavailable. As Nagel
says, this ``need not be thought of pessimistically, since the recognition of a
serious obstacle is always a necessary condition of progress'' (Nagel, 1991, p.
3). Our understanding of where the problem lies, is a ®rst step toward ®nding
the solution.
VIII. DO ANIMALS HAVE RIGHTS?
In section V, we considered the two-variable problem, and I argued that it
leads to the undecidability thesis. Let us now turn to animal research that saves
human lives. Notice that the undecidability thesis is inapplicable here, because
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the variable of type of claim being held constant (i.e., both the human and the
non-human animal both compete for life), the human's higher intrinsic value
means that her claim, all things considered, is morally weightier.32 Moreover,
sacri®cing a small number of non-human animals might save a larger number
of human lives. So it looks as though we are justi®ed in sacri®cing a certain
number of non-human animals for research that can save at least the same
number of human lives. But do non-human animals have rights, such as the
right to life?33
This question of whether non-human animals have rights is vitally
important. When dealing with the two-variable problem in section V, we
treated the issues of animal research and non-vegetarianism as if they were
structurally similar to the question of whether to save a non-human animal or a
human, that is, as if they were only a matter of comparing the competing
claims between a human and an animal. In fact, an important dimension to
these issues (which I have not discussed so far) is whether animals have rights,
such as the right not to be killed, harmed, or otherwise used as mere means to
ends. In the case where we choose to save either a normal adult human or a
dog, but not both, it does the dog no injustice if we save the human. No
deontological grounds are relevant, and hence consequentialist reasoning
alone is adequate. In the cases of animal research and non-vegetarianism,
however, we are using animals as mere instruments, and whether we have
done them injustice depends on whether they have the rights not to be killed,
harmed, or used as mere instruments.34
I shall ®rst discuss Carl Cohen's argument that purports to show that
animals do not have rights. He denies that non-human animals can have any
right on the following grounds:
A right, properly understood is a claim, or potential claim, that one party
may exercise against another . . . [Rights] are in every case claims, or
potential claims, within a community of moral agents. Rights arise, and
can be intelligibly defended only among beings who actually do, or can,
make moral claims against one another. Whatever else rights can be,
therefore, they are necessarily human; their possessors are persons,
human beings. (Cohen, 1986, pp. 458±9)
A right-holder, according to Cohen, must have certain capacities in order to
have rights. He does not claim originality for his view, because he says that the
attributes of human beings from which this capacity arises have been pointed
out by various great philosophers. It is described as ``inner consciousness of a
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
607
free will'' (St. Augustine), ``the grasp, by human reason, of the binding
character of moral law'' (St. Thomas), ``the self-conscious participation . . . in
an objective ethical order'' (Hegel), and ``the universal human possession of a
uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails'' (Kant) (Cohen, 1986,
p. 459). ``Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous. [But]
[a]nimals . . . lack this capacity for free moral judgement. They are not of a kind
capable of exercising or responding to moral claims'' (Cohen, 1986, p. 459).
Cohen's argument involves two steps. First, in order for a being to have a
right, it must be able to exercise this right, that is, to be able to make claims
against others who are right-holders. Second, this ability to make claims
against others is supposed to require moral autonomy. Neither step is obvious,
but Cohen does not purport to explain either step. I suppose Cohen's rationale
behind the ®rst step is that unless one has the capacity for making claims
against another right-holder, there is no point in ascribing any right to one. I
®nd this rationale doubtful. If a representative of x can make claims on x's
behalf, then even if x lacks the capacity for making claims itself, Cohen has
not provided any basis for denying x's status as a right-holder. A limitedliability company (which is a legal person) is one example, which literally
does not have the capacity for making claim. However, since it has representatives who can make (and receive) claims on its behalf, it can have rights (and
liabilities). Similarly, in the common law, one's right of self-defense can be
exercised by one's parents or close relatives. So even if one happens to be a
child or even infant, one's right of self-defense is not defeated simply because
one is not capable of advancing one's claim.35
There are certain rights, such as the right to vote, which everyone would
agree it does not make sense to attribute to an infant or a non-human animal.
The ground for this is presumably that they lack the capacity for voting,
a capacity that presupposes autonomy.36 On the other hand, there are
certain rights which do not require autonomy. These are the rights not to be
killed, raped, or assaulted, etc. These rights are ``protective rights,'' which act
as a shield to protect one's body against unwanted external intrusions. This
shield is operative all the time, for autonomous and non-autonomous human
beings.
If I am correct so far, then having a protective right, unlike having the right
to vote, does not imply that the right-holder must be autonomous. Therefore,
even if infants and non-human animals do not have the necessary capacity for
exercising rights, it does not mean that they cannot have such rights. In
Cohen's view, an infant would not have the right to life, because he or she is
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HON-LAM LI
not autonomous. I realize that this is a controversial area, but it seems to me
that Cohen's view would be contrary to our moral intuition about the right of
self-defense (discussed above), and also contrary to the common law.37 I
suggest that to have a protective right, the right-holder need only have the
capacity to have interest, not autonomy; however, having a right to vote would
be another matter. If I am correct, then Cohen's argument fails.
Even if Cohen fails to convince us about his purported necessary condition
for having rights, it does not follow that non-human animals have ful®lled the
suf®cient conditions for having such a right ± not that we know what the
suf®cient conditions are. The ®rst problem concerning whether animals can
have rights has to do with our ignorance of, or at least the lack of consensus
about, what the suf®cient conditions for having rights involve. To say the least,
what constitutes the suf®cient and necessary conditions for having rights is
highly controversial.
Apart from this, the main dif®culty in determining whether animals have
rights, or which species have rights, stems from the fact that various species
are similar to, and different from, human beings to different degrees.38 The
spectrum from ®sh to reptiles, to birds and mammals is rather wide-ranging.
The dif®culty, then, involves how to demarcate the spectrum of all sentient
animals into those who are right-holders and those who are not, without
arbitrariness. I ®nd this hopelessly dif®cult.
In other words, if the matter-of-degree view is correct, the spectrum of
creatures from ®sh to human beings represents a continuum of intrinsic value.
To determine which type of creatures have the right to life, and which do not,
will surely involve a certain degree of arbitrariness. Since arbitrary solutions
are not good philosophical solutions, the issue of whether non-human animals
have rights has remained unsolved. This is also the reason why three important
philosophical problems have remained unsolved. They include the problem of
personal identity, in which memory is a matter of degree but personal identity
is all-or-nothing. The problem of whether a human fetus is a human being is
another example, because a fetus grows continuously, but whether it is a
human being is supposed to be an all-or-nothing matter. Finally, the search for
the de®nition of knowledge is another instance. Justi®cation of belief is a
matter of degree,39 but knowledge is supposed to be all-or-nothing (Unger,
1975, chap. 2). If I am correct, the question of whether animals have rights, or
which species have rights, has a similar structure. This issue does not seem
any easier to resolve than those of personal identity, the moral status of human
fetuses, and knowledge.
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
609
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have performed three tasks. First, having sketched some
reasons for thinking that the matter-of-degree view is more plausible than its
rivals, I argued that we do not yet know how to deal with the two-variable
problem, and hence that the questions of whether animal research that
prevents non-fatal morbidity, and non-vegetarianism, are justi®ed is undecidable at least at present. Second, while many philosophers who champion
ethical vegetarianism are utilitarians, I argued that utilitarianism and in
particular preference utilitarianism cannot resolve the two-variable problem.
Finally, in regard to life-saving animal research, I considered the question of
whether non-human animals have rights, and I showed that this question is not
any easier to resolve than the issues of personal identity, the moral status of
human fetuses, and knowledge.
Those who accept the all-or-nothing views would have an easier time
solving the problem of animal rights for the following reasons. First, neither
anti-speciesist, nor speciesist, all-or-nothing views would lead to the twovariable problem or the undecidability thesis. For in assuming that non-human
animals either have intrinsic value equal to that of human persons, or have no
value at all, the two-variable problem leading to the undecidability thesis is
thereby reduced into a one-variable problem, which is solvable. But such
reduction is premised upon implausible all-or-nothing views, which I rejected
in sections II and III.
Second, because anti-speciesism regards non-human animals as having the
same intrinsic value or moral status as human beings have, the deontological
problems concerning life-saving animal research and non-vegetarianism are
again solvable. For deontological constraints against killing or harming people
would also be applicable to the case of killing or harming non-human animals.
And hence both of these practices would have to be banned. If, on the other
hand, one embraces speciesism, then again the issues are solvable, for both
life-saving animal research and non-vegetarianism would be morally
acceptable, on the grounds that non-human animals have no moral status or
intrinsic value whatsoever.
As I have said, since anti-speciesist and speciesist all-or-nothing views are
implausible, the fact that the issues of animal rights would have been solvable
if they were plausible is unhelpful. I do not know whether ± nor do I suppose ±
that the problems of animal rights are in the end undecidable. But I hope to
have shown why there appears to be no satisfactory solution to these problems,
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HON-LAM LI
at least at present. The ``solutions'' offered by various writers so far are less
than convincing at best, and unbelievable at worst, because either all-ornothing views have been assumed, or else those holding a-matter-of-degree
views40 fall short of providing a convincing solution.
One reason why all-or-nothing views fail is that the moral reality is less tidy
and more complex than they portray. In philosophy, views that take short cuts
(e.g., some forms of reductionism) often achieve solutions by cutting the
reality down in size or scope. The residual reality is manageable. But the
desire for solutions and simplicity is satis®ed at great costs, because the
problem attacked is no longer the original one.
As Thomas Nagel observes, ``[s]implicity and elegance are never reasons to
think that a philosophical theory is true'' (Nagel, 1979, p. x). As he also points
out, ``one should trust problems over solutions, . . . and pluralistic discord over
systematic harmony'' (Nagel, 1979, p. x). At the very least, Nagel is correct
about the issue of animal rights. For the all-or-nothing views are forms of
reductionism that cut down the moral reality in size, that is, by cutting down a
two-dimensional issue into a one-dimensional one.
NOTES
1. I argue that traditional ethics is not adequate for solving the problem of abortion in Li,
1997.
2. Intrinsic value, being an end-in-itself, is opposed to instrumental value. Yet, there are
different sorts of intrinsic value. When we say that a work of art has intrinsic value, we
mean it has value-in-itself. But such value is derived from the fact that beings like us
appreciate works of art. Following Joseph Raz (1986), this sort of intrinsic value can be
called derivative intrinsic value. On the other hand, a human being has value regardless of
the existence of any other beings which might appreciate her presence. And this sort of
intrinsic value can be called non-derivative intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall be talking
about non-derivative intrinsic value only.
3. By `intrinsic value', I mean non-derivative intrinsic value. See Note 2. Moreover, I shall not
distinguish between ``non-derivative intrinsic value'' and ``moral status'' in this paper.
4. Paul W. Taylor is an important proponent for this view. He holds that every living organism
has a good of its own and it can be harmed or bene®ted by our actions (Taylor, 1981). To
say that a living thing possesses inherent value is to say that its good is deserving of the
concern and consideration of all moral agents, and that the realization of its good has
intrinsic value. For Taylor, all living things have inherent value simply because they are
members of the Earth's community of life. Further, all living things possess the same
inherent worth because no species is ``higher'' or ``lower'' than, or ``superior'' or
``inferior'' to, any other species. Taylor's view seems to me implausible for it implies
that all living beings ± for instance, a bacterium, a plant, and a human person ± have the
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
611
same inherent value. Plainly, this cannot be correct since a human person must have higher
value than a bacterium. Moreover, Taylor does not address the troubling issue of how to
balance the competing claims of different types of being. For instance, are we morally
justi®ed in eating vegetables?
5. I am hesitant about including Peter Singer here for two reasons. First, he is a utilitarian, and
supports the case for animals only to the extent that this will maximize utility. Thus, he is an
unreliable supporter for animals because his egalitarianism of all (human and non-human)
animals ± or anti-speciesism ± can get ``trumped'' by his utilitarianism, when the two are in
con¯ict. More important, he may not believe that intrinsic value is all-or-nothing.
6 In an analogy to explain what inherent value is, Regan says that one is to one's experiences
as a cup (or receptacle) is to its content (Regan, 1983, p. 236). This means, for Regan, while
one's experiences have value, one who leads a life has inherent value that is not reducible to,
nor commensurate with, the value of one's experiences. Moreover, one's inherent value
cannot be earned, nor does it depend on one's utility to others. It is also independent of one's
being the object of anyone else's interests (p. 237).
7. This seems to me a plausible view, but unfortunately one that he no longer maintains. See
Regan, 1983, p. 412, n. 3. My only major disagreement with Regan (1978) is that I believe
the greater inherent value of a normal adult human consists in her greater experiential
capacity rather than her moral virtues (as Regan said in 1978).
8. Regan's rescuing of his position can be found in Regan, 1983, pp. 324-5. His view is that
we should save the normal human instead of the dog on the ground that the human is
harmed to a greater extent than the dog, because of the opportunities of satisfaction that
death forecloses (Regan, 1983, pp. 324-5). But this has the counter-intuitive consequence
that, if a life boat does not have enough room for everyone, we should throw overboard the
elderly before everyone else.
9. Tom Regan uses the term ``moral patients'' to refer to those subjects-of-a-life that are not
moral agents. Though they are not moral agents, they can be objects of moral concern
because they can suffer as much as moral agents do. See Regan, 1983, esp. chaps. 5 and 7.
10. The capacity to absorb water, to be carried around easily by human beings, and the
capacity to engage in photosynthesis are not morally relevant, nor are many others one can
think of.
11. In a sense, any living organism can ¯ourish in that they all can multiply in number. This is
clearly not the sense of ¯ourishing I am talking about. A person with many children may
not have ¯ourished (in the relevant sense); an accomplished artist with no children is likely
to have a ¯ourishing life. So to say that one has ¯ourished is not to describe one
biologically.
12. My view here is similar to Regan's view that one's inherent value is independent of the
experiences one actually has.
13. In Taylor's view, ``various nonhuman species have capacities that humans lack. There is the
speed of a cheetah, the vision of an eagle, the agility of a monkey. Why should not these be
taken as signs of their superiority over humans?'' (Taylor, 1981, p. 474.) For fuller
discussion of Taylor's view, see Note 4.
14. If one is attacked by a wolf, one would be justi®ed in killing it. Another instance is the case
in which we can save either a normal adult human or a dog, but not both; we should save the
former.
15. I am using these terms interchangeably, though I am aware that, for some authors, they do
not mean the same thing.
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HON-LAM LI
16. Of course, in order that the problem can be solved in principle, we have to assume that it
has no other dif®culties, such as the presence of deontological constraints that might
complicate the issue.
17. Here I do not mean some extreme pain over a long period of time, which may be as bad as
death. I consider such a case in section VI below.
18. To explain this point further, we can use the following analogy as a heuristic device. We can,
in mathematics, solve an equation with one variable (e.g., 2x ˆ 8); but we cannot solve
certain equations with two variables (e.g., 2x‡y ˆ 8), because there is one unknown too
many. The moral analogue in the animal rights problem is as follows. We can solve the
problem of competing claims in which (1) two entities of different intrinsic value have claims
of the same type, or (2) two entities of the same intrinsic value have claims that are not
equally morally weighty, or (3) when both variables are on the side of one the competing
parties. In (1) and (2), one variable is held constant and hence in effect eliminated. However,
we do not know how to solve the problem in which two beings of different intrinsic value
compete for types of claim of contrary moral weight. That is, when an intrinsically more
valuable being makes a morally less weighty claim whereas an intrinsically less valuable
being makes a morally weightier claim, we do not know how to deal with the problem,
because there is one unknown too many. Note that the above analogy is not a perfect one,
because whereas we do not know what the solution to the animal rights problem is, the
equation ``2x‡y ˆ 8'' has in®nitely many solutions. But I think the point of the analogy is
clear and worth making, namely, that no satisfactory or unique solution exists without
eliminating one of the two variables, and in this sense both cases are undecidable. Thus, the
utilitarian axiom that every person is to count for one is not only important in its own right,
but is also a vital premise without which (or something that plays a similar role) no
maximization of utility could possibly begin. For by assuming that everyone is equal,
utilitarianism assumes everyone's intrinsic value to be equal. This allows utilitarianism to
hold ``one variable'' constant, and thereby in effect eliminate it from ``the equation''.
19. Another suf®cient condition for unnecessary pain or suffering is when there exists another
way to achieve the same bene®t without causing so much pain or suffering to the animal.
20. The ®rst reply takes issue with Singer with respect to his assumption that including meat in
one's diet has no other value than taste. The Chinese people, for example, have for centuries
held the belief that consumption of meat is good for health. The chief aim of obtaining
expensive food, such as birds' nest, shark ®ns, and abalone, is for keeping good health.
Their belief may or may not be correct, but cannot be assumed to be false. One can also take
a more speculative line by arguing that humans are omnivores, animals that by nature would
feed on both plants and meat, and that to deprive them of meat is to deprive them of half of
their diet. And if we believe in the theory of evolution, we may infer that there should be
some bene®ts for omnivores to consume not only plants but also meat ± just as carnivores
must eat only meat, whereas herbivores must feed on only plants. Now I am not saying that
this view is correct, but only that this is an empirical issue and needs to be explored.
The second reply is that even if consumption of meat is for the satisfaction of our taste
buds, it does not follow that such activity has negligible or trivial value. It is somewhat
surprising that Singer, a preference utilitarian, would try to ignore many people's
preferences to include meat in their diets. Some of these preferences could be very intense.
Even for a non-utilitarian, the pleasure of consuming meat, like various other types of
pleasure (such as sexual pleasure), cannot be deemed to be have negligible or trivial value.
Moreover, many cultures were built on their food cultures. I am not suggesting that
THE IMPASSE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PROBLEM
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
613
non-vegetarianism is justi®ed, but only that it is unlikely to be repudiated by our deeming
the value of taste to be negligible.
Utilitarianism has no clear advantage over the methodology of relying on approximation.
But utilitarianism is not the same as the method based on approximation. The former
purports to sum up bene®ts to many parties involved (as in a case where one can sacri®ce an
animal in research to save a number of people from pain), whereas the latter is basically an
approach of one-to-one, or pair-wise, comparison.
In fact, it is well-known that both the utilitarian theory of pain and pleasure, and that of
happiness and unhappiness, are problematic because many things that humans value cannot
be reduced into these terms.
If the main dif®culty with hedonistic utilitarianism is that too many things cannot be
reduced into pain or pleasure, then the same can be said of the utilitarianism based on
happiness and unhappiness.
Peter Singer, a preference utilitarian, believes that preference utilitarianism can do so
(Singer, 1999).
One might object that we should ascribe preferences to a ®sh based on its behavior. But it
can be replied that unless a creature has evaluative attitudes, its behavior is not suf®cient for
grounding preferences. We can use someone's behavior as evidence for ascribing
preferences to her, but that is only because we know that she has evaluative attitudes.
An amoeba or bacterium may ``behave'' in certain way upon stimulus, but clearly we are
not justi®ed to impute preferences to it.
A dumb and deaf person still has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, even if he or
she is unable to inform us about it.
For a similar point on interpersonal comparison, see Allan Gibbard, 1986, esp. p. 177.
For further discussion of this and related issues, see Scanlon, 1998, chaps. 1, 3.
See also Scanlon, 1975.
I thank Joe Lau for pointing this out to me.
I thank John G. Bennett for urging me to take this approach more seriously.
What is argued here also applies to the case in which consumption of meat can save human
lives, as in a case of shipwreck, where the only source of food available is non-human
animals.
By ``the right to life'' here and henceforth, I mean the right not to be killed.
The issue of whether non-human animals have rights is important in regard to the
signi®cance of the undecidability thesis. For if non-human animals have such rights,
then apart from the undecidability as to whether to save a dog's life or a human from injury,
the thesis has little relevance in regard to non-vegetarianism and animal experimentation,
since an animal must not be used as a mere instrument. On the other hand, if a non-human
animal does not have any right, we can use it for medical experiments that save human
lives, though the undecidability thesis still applies in most cases of non-vegetarianism. (For
the exceptional cases of non-vegetarianism in which the undecidability thesis does not
apply, see Note 32.) So it is important to ®nd out whether non-human animals have rights.
There seems no reason why morality should not follow the common law in regard to the
right of self-defense.
I am not saying that this is Cohen's position. Cohen's view is not only much more sweeping
in scope, but he seems to think that in order to have a right, one must be able to make claims
against others. And this view of his is different from the view that certain rights (such as the
right to vote) require autonomy.
614
HON-LAM LI
37. Two remarks. First, there are obvious connections between the right to life and the right of
self-defense. For one thing, the right of self-defense appears to be grounded on the right to
life. Second, the view I discuss here is Cohen's view in Cohen, 1986. His most recent view
is that infants, but not animals, have rights, on the grounds that x has rights if x belongs to a
kind whose normal adults have rights. I cannot go into discussing his recent view here,
highly implausible as it seems. But see Cohen's view and Regan's critique of it in Cohen &
Regan, 2001, chap. 5 and pp. 275±279 respectively.
38. I disagree with Regan's claim that it is the similarity, rather than the difference, between
humans and non-human animals that is more important. This seems to beg the question.
39. We can say that Einsteinian physics is more justi®ed than Newtonian physics, which in turn
is more justi®ed than Aristotelian physics.
40. Bonnie Steinbock's seminal paper on animal rights is full of interesting ideas (Steinbock,
1978). However, she holds a view similar to Carl Cohen's on the necessary condition for
having rights. She argues that humans are morally autonomous, can reciprocate, and have
the desire for self-respect whereas animals do not have these capacities, and therefore that
humans are in a privileged position compared to animals. Hence animal research that
involves animal suffering is justi®ed, she argues, if that is the only way to save human
beings from crippling diseases (Steinbock, 1978, p. 438). There are two areas in which
Steinbock's view is wanting. First, her view on the necessary condition of having rights is
problematic (see discussion of Cohen's view in section VIII). Second, even if it can be
assumed that non-human animals do not have rights, then while I would agree that we can
sacri®ce them to save humans from ``crippling pain'' (via the method of approximation), it
is not clear whether animals can be sacri®ced for curing lesser pain or diseases.
Despite his valuable paper on intrinsic value (Frey, 1988), R.G. Frey is an act-utilitarian
who argues that (1) rights do not exist, and (2) even if rights exist, non-human animals do
not have them because they do not have interests (Frey, 1980). I cannot go into discussing
him here, but both claims seem to me implausible.
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