The Castro-Chávez Alliance
by
Max Azicri
Socialist Cuba and Bolivarian Venezuela have embarked jointly on a historic journey
of hemispheric dimensions. Under the collaborative and solidarity alliance between
Havana and Caracas a complex web of bilateral trade and services has been developed,
including Venezuelan oil and Cuban medical expertise. The mutually beneficial
exchanges have served as a blueprint for the continentwide exchanges promoted by the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, which was conceived by Fidel Castro and Hugo
Chávez in opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Washington Consensus,
and neoliberalism. Venezuela’s alliance with Cuba is more than political calculation or
commercial exchanges. Its reasons and foundation run deeper. The revolutionary solidarity between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, the bedrock of the alliance, is based on the
vision of a united Latin America free of Washington’s control, turning Simón Bolívar’s
legacy into a new reality.
Keywords: Cuba-Venezuela alliance, Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, CastroChávez friendship, Latin American unity, Antineoliberalism
In the half century since the Cuban revolutionary leadership came to
power, many regional leaders have been close to Havana, sharing values,
objectives, and the common dream of seeing a united Latin America free of
U.S. domination. Chile’s Salvador Allende, Grenada’s Maurice Bishop, and
Nicaragua’s Sandinistas come to mind. Now it is Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez’s
turn, and socialist Cuba and Bolivarian Venezuela have embarked jointly on a
historic journey of hemispheric dimensions.
The Cuba-Venezuela alliance is Cuba’s first post-1959 international relationship to have experienced a presidential succession, from Fidel Castro to
Raúl Castro. Proving detractors and skeptics wrong, the island’s transition
placing Raúl at the helm has gone smoothly, and, mirroring its success, the
alliance with Chávez is doing quite well. Timing is an important factor here.
Venezuela became central to Cuba’s life at a critical juncture—following the
demise of European socialism and Washington’s increasing hostility. Though
Cuba was achieving a slow but steady recovery, leaving behind the very difficult years of the early 1990s, Caracas provided the critical lifeline in the energy
field: Venezuelan oil reenergized vital sectors of the island’s economy, ending
the enervating blackouts of the Special Period. Economic growth had reached
11.8 percent by 2005 and has remained at a respectable level since. In return,
Max Azicri is Professor of Political Science at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania and the
author of Cuba: Politics, Economics, and Society (1988) and Cuba Today and Tomorrow: Reinventing
Socialism (2000).
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 164, Vol. 36 No. 1, January 2009 99-110
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X08329174
© 2009 Latin American Perspectives
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Cuban physicians and Cuban technical know-how and expertise have
guaranteed the success of many of the social misiones (missions) created by the
Bolivarian revolution, solidifying a strong popular power base that supports
the internally and externally beleaguered Chávez administration. Still, there is
more to this collaborative and solidarity alliance than objectively defined and
measured mutual benefits.
The alliance involves subjective and objective factors linked in such a way
that it is difficult sometimes to differentiate them. The fraternal and revolutionary friendship between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, reminiscent of the
historic one between Fidel and Che Guevara, has provided the foundation for
a productive exchange between their countries that has expanded beyond
their borders to the farthest corners of the continent. By conceiving jointly
such ambitious projects as the Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas
(Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas—ALBA) in opposition to the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Washington Consensus, and neoliberalism, they have established a complex web of trade and services that is
helping their countries become a model for the planning and execution of similar programs in the hemisphere, having demonstrated what mutually beneficial exchanges can accomplish (Azicri, 2008a; 2008b).
Latin American leftists are politically on the rise, extending their influence
from Caribbean insularity to the Americas’ terra firma, from Havana to
Caracas to La Paz and beyond. The seeds of Latin American South-to-South
collaboration are already bearing fruit, including goods and services to an
extent unimaginable before. While projects such as literacy campaigns and
sustainable economic growth continue, there is a noncommercial television
network, TeleSur, set up by Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay in 2005,
broadcasting anti-U.S.-hegemony programming to the continent. When
President Evo Morales rewrote the history of Bolivia in 2005 with his electoral
victory, he found a helpful interactive structure awaiting him in ALBA, and so
have Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, Haiti’s René Préval, Ecuador’s Rafael
Correa, and many other regional leaders. Also, the poor of the U.S. East Coast
have been able to purchase gas and heating oil at subsidized prices for several
winters thanks to Chávez’s humanitarian gesture, while no American oil
company has had a similar program.
Fidel and Chávez also conceived PetroCaribe, providing an energy lifesaver to neighboring countries at a time when the price of oil had reached
unaffordable levels. Venezuela supplies 198,000 barrels of oil daily to the
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Cuba, and 10 other Caribbean islands through
PetroCaribe. While 40 percent of the payments have been deferred for 25
years, the remaining balance may be paid in cash or through barter of goods
such as rice, bananas, and sugar. According to direct agreements between
Havana and Caracas, Cuba receives 90,000 barrels of oil a day largely in
exchange for over 30,000 doctors and medical personnel and specialists in
fields such as education and sports.
An early agreement, the 2000 Cuba-Venezuela Cooperation Agreement on
Health, improved the health of many ill Venezuelans. Besides bringing firstrate medical assistance to the poorest Venezuelan barrios, Cuban medical personnel and facilities welcome Venezuelans traveling to the island for
specialized medical treatment—over 100 health flights took place during the
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first three years of the program. The program is free not just for the patients
but for Venezuela. When Chávez brought in the first eight children to receive
treatment in Cuba, Castro said, “We cannot charge for this.” The portion of the
agreement sending patients with serious illnesses to be treated in Havana
received special attention.
ALBA’s solidarity and assistance programs have grown steadily under Cuban
and Venezuelan joint leadership: greatly needed specialized medical services are
being provided to more countries, including African ones. Moreover, beginning
in 2004, Cuba’s Operation Miracle has offered free eye surgery for cataracts,
glaucoma, diabetes, and other vision problems to people unable to afford it. The
joint Havana-Caracas program has been flying Venezuelans to the island costfree for surgeries. Within a few years 28 countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean were participating in the program, and operations restoring patients’
sight numbered close to 850,000. Jet liners loaded with patients come and go
from Havana every day, and by early 2007, 13 modern eye clinics built in
Venezuela were performing thousands of operations. Other clinics were being
established in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti, all with
Cuban planning and staffing. The initial goal of Operation Miracle, restoring
sight to the people of Latin America and the Caribbean, has been expanded to
treat from 6 to 10 million people and now includes African countries.
THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP OF TWO CHARISMATIC LEADERS
Two weeks after startling the world with the news that after 47 years of governing Cuba he was temporarily ceding power as president to his brother Raúl,
minister of defense and head of the armed forces, because of a life-threatening
operation to repair intestinal hemorrhaging, former President Castro celebrated
his eightieth birthday bedridden. The official celebration was held months later,
on December 2, the date of the 1957 landing in Oriente Province that started the
revolution. In a friendly gesture, President Chávez visited his close political ally
and friend to celebrate his birthday and wish him a rapid recovery. Pictures of
the meeting, with Raúl present, showed Fidel convalescing and enjoying
Chávez’s visit. By then, even though he would not become president officially
until February 2008, Raúl Castro was already carrying out his new duties as
interim president, including meeting with visiting heads of state while presiding over the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana in 2006.
Although it has produced a beneficial and growing exchange of goods and
services satisfying any major expectation based on purely state self-interest,
Venezuela’s alliance with Cuba cannot be explained as only a matter of commercial and political calculation. From the beginning of their interaction, the
two leaders have felt friendship and solidarity. The closeness they have developed over the years was exposed to the world when the Venezuelan leader
was repeatedly shown at the Cuban leader’s bedside, a trusted foreign witness at a time when the world was wondering about Castro’s health. During
those days the exchanges between Chávez and Raúl Castro became more visible, photographs of them together and of Chávez visiting with other prominent Cuban leaders appearing several times in the media. Reinforcing the
special relationship between their countries, Chávez appointed his own
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brother, Adán Chávez, a former college professor and lifelong political
activist, as his ambassador to Havana, and Castro’s ambassador to Caracas,
also an academic, later crowned his diplomatic service with a penetrating
study of the two revolutions (Sánchez, 2007).
Contrary to Castro’s numerous opponents, especially among American
officials, Chávez deferentially conveys an affectionate regard for the Cuban
leader, giving him due credit for his role in the hemisphere’s revolutionary
history. An analysis of this phenomenon put it this way (Brooks, 2005):
One tends to forget in the United States or in Europe how popular and significant Castro is for Latin America. He remains this extraordinary bulwark against
the United States, and he is regarded as the great Latin American figure of the
20th century. And Chávez belongs to a strand in Venezuelan life, essentially of
nationalism, and socialism, and support for the Cuban revolution, and he’s
never made any secret of that. But of course he has no plans to emulate the particular Soviet form of the Cuban economy, or the particular form of Cuba’s political arrangements. . . . But he does appreciate Castro’s advice; they talk on the
phone every night. They’re very, very close.
Expressing a “fatherly” concern, Castro admitted his fear that Chávez’s
enemies (domestic and international) would try to kill him. This was credible
because by then Chávez had won the 1998 and 2000 presidential elections and
survived the 2002 coup d’état. (Among the decisions made by Pedro
Carmona, head of the business association FEDECAMERAS, during his twoday presidency was to cancel oil shipments to the island, disregarding the
2000 Cuban-Venezuelan convention on oil.) Chávez outlived the 2002 and
2003 general strike and oil stoppage and won the 2004 recall referendum, the
2005 National Assembly elections, and the 2006 presidential election. His only
electoral defeat has been the narrowly decided 2007 referendum.
In a visit to Venezuela, Castro said publicly, “Chávez is not taking care of
himself.” Thereafter, said Chávez, “Wherever I went, people in the street
shouted to me, ‘Chávez, look after yourself, do you hear.’ Each time we meet he
reminds me of it” (Guevara, 2005: 88). Revealing his feelings, Chávez admitted:
I call Fidel “brother,” and he is like an older brother for me. A few months back
Fidel sent me a handwritten message, maybe six double-sided pages long. After
I read it . . . I said that I was unsure whether to call him “brother” or “father.”
That is the kind of very special relationship I have with him. . . . We are in constant discussion. He gives me ideas. Some of his ideas could be called advice.
He added,
I am honored by Fidel’s friendship and each time I feel this in my soul I express
it. I am grateful to him, not for me, but for my people. Fidel’s determination to
cooperate with us is unprecedented. I don’t believe that a precedent of this kind
exists between any other president and a people that is not their own people.
Furthermore, this cooperation is permanent, solid, and on the increase.
Chávez’s first chance to see Castro in person was from a distance, when
Castro attended the inauguration of President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989
and Chávez was assigned to the military detachment of the Miraflores presidential palace. During his two years in prison for the failed 1992 coup, a
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period of reflection in his life, Chávez thought seriously about the Cuban
Revolution. He read, among other works, Castro’s History Will Absolve Me
(Castro’s defense during his trial for the attack on the Moncada military barracks on July 26, 1953), Frei Betto’s Fidel and Religion, and Gianni Miná’s An
Encounter with Fidel. To meet Castro after leaving prison was Chávez’s wish. He
received an invitation to visit Havana after his release in March 1994. Upon his
arrival, he was surprised to find Castro waiting for him at the airport. The picture showing Castro giving him a hug was later used against Chávez. Published
in a Caracas daily under the headline “Chávez Subordinate to Fidel,” the picture appeared in full color. When their relationship was just beginning it was
used, in Chávez’s words, “to instill a fear of communism in our people, a fear
of Fidel Castro, of dictatorship, and all such stories” (Guevara, 2005: 89).
And yet, from the initial bonding of two charismatic leaders a creative
interactive network was born, engaging their countries in an exchange of
goods and services, technical aid and personnel, and strategic products such
as oil and other beneficial joint ventures, all supported by a close political
alliance. The experience has since been expanded to the rest of the hemisphere. A new era with continental unity and solidarity as its core values has
commenced.
CUBAN SOCIALISM AND VENEZUELAN BOLIVARIANISM
Castro identified the revolution as socialist during the CIA-sponsored 1961
Bay of Pigs invasion by disaffected Cubans, and he later professed to be a
Marxist-Leninist. Still, his political thought is rooted in Cuban history and
political culture. Shaping his domestic and world outlook are the ideas and
legacy of José Martí (1853–1895), the most honored man in the nation’s history
(Mañach, 1952; Kirk, 1983). Also, “the roots of Castro’s political culture can be
traced to a tradition of radical Cuban political thought, of which he became a
major exponent. . . . [His] rebelliousness, demonstrated . . . by his defiance of
U.S. might and power, appears to be built into his own charismatic brand of
leadership” (Liss, 1994: xviii).
In Venezuela, Chávez came to power after a 1998 victory in competitive multiparty presidential (and legislative) elections. He was reelected under the 1999
Constitution, which changed the country’s name to the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, and he was reelected again in 2006. In contrast to Castro, Chávez is
not a communist, but he is not an anticommunist either. As he has admitted,
his knowledge of Marxism is superficial. His support for twentieth-century
socialism is not based on Marxist-Leninist values and practices. His socialist
vision anticipates vaguely a system “based in solidarity, in fraternity, in love, in
justice, in liberty and in equality” (Wilpert, 2005; Dieterich Steffan, 2001). But
he does not demonize Marxism, and many of his supporters and collaborators
are communists. However, the Venezuelan left has split, with some of its
members joining the anti-Chávez movement (Gott, 2005: 216).1
To divine the solutions for the problems facing Latin America it is necessary
to go beyond Marxism, says Chávez (Gott, 2005: 24). Bolivarianism, combined
with nationalism, populism, and lately an ill-defined twenty-first-century
socialism, provides the main ideological underpinning of his revolution.
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Cuba, emulating Venezuela by also embracing Bolívar’s ideas, views them as
the ideology capable of “enhancing the [Cuban] revolution’s international
stature and influence,” particularly in the region (Erisman, 2004: 308).2 The two
revolutions jointly pursue the goal of uniting Latin America, following Bolívar’s
example. Simón Bolívar, the nineteenth-century liberator who freed Venezuela,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia from Spain, has received little attention
from Venezuelan Marxists. Today, similarly to when “Bolívar fought to throw
off the yoke of Spanish colonialism, Chávez considers the United States the
imperial power from which all of Latin America must now be freed. . . .
Traveling the motorways of Caracas, [one] can’t avoid the billboards touting
[the] Bolívar jeremiad, ‘The United States seems destined by Providence to
plague Latin America with misery in the name of liberty’ ” (Foer, 2006: 97).
Chávez’s heroes include Simón Rodríguez, Bolívar’s teacher, political mentor, and traveling companion, and Ezequiel Zamora, who brought soldiers and
civilians together—an idea cherished by Chávez—in the struggle to defend the
rights of landless peasants in the Venezuelan civil wars of the 1840s and 1850s.
Their legacy was a hemispheric message of Latin Americans struggling for
common social and political ends. Inspired by Bolívar’s example, the Bolivarian
Revolutionary Movement 200, founded in 1982 by four officers including
Chávez, commemorated the two hundredth anniversary of his birth. They took
a solemn oath to follow his ideas under Bolívar’s historic Samán de Güere.
Later, the Caracazo (a spontaneous popular revolt in opposition to President
Carlos Andrés Pérez’s neoliberal policies on February 27–28, 1989) provided
the backdrop for President Hugo Chávez’s political career, although at the time
“neither the civilians nor the military were prepared for it” (Gott, 2005: 58).
However, by taking full responsibility for the failed military coup launched
three years later under his leadership (in 1992), in a brief but historic television
address to the nation, the until then nationally unknown Chávez became a
popular opposition symbol. Nine years after the Caracazo and six years after
the failed coup, Chávez was elected president for the first time.
TWO DIFFERENT REVOLUTIONS
Despite the historic significance they share, the Cuban Revolution and the
Venezuelan Bolivarian revolutionary process are quite different. Almost four
decades separated Castro’s coming to power from Chávez’s. The time elapsed
between the two events and the leaders’ different ways of attaining power
framed their domestic and external decision making, creating a difference in
the scope and nature of their exercise of power. Cuba and Venezuela embody
different social, political, and economic transformation processes. Contextually
(domestically and internationally) and individually (politically, ideologically,
and historically) they differ in the extent of their social penetration and control. At the international level, the revolution in Cuba happened at a propitious time for radical movements in Latin America. By 1998, however, after the
demise of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries and in spite
of Cuba’s staying power, revolutionary Marxism was considered an outdated
ideology (Castañeda, 1993).
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Contrary to the charges that Venezuela would become another Cuba under
Chávez, the Bolivarian process is not duplicating the island’s socialist
system—notwithstanding the high regard Chávez and chavistas have for Fidel
Castro and Cuba’s social achievements. Among South American countries,
Venezuela scored the highest level of support for the Cuban leader in a
Latinobarómetro (2007) opinion poll on regional leaders. Also, residents of
low-income barrios have taken good care of Cuban physicians and other volunteers, protecting them from the criminals living in their communities.
Disregarding the media campaigns against the presence of Cuban volunteers
in their country, Venezuelans have publicly expressed their appreciation and
regard for them and the numerous helpful functions they perform (McCaughan,
2005: 191–195).
Even after the drive toward twenty-first-century socialism began, following
Chávez’s 2006 reelection (including gathering political leftists in the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela), Venezuela’s revolutionary Bolivarianism and
Cuba’s revolutionary socialism continued to differ. Venezuela’s practices contrast with Cuba’s in the scope of societal change (limited social transformation, not out-and-out modification), the degree of state social penetration
(partial infringement, not overall socioeconomic control), their institutional
political and economic structure (political and economic pluralism, not a
single-party system and a state-controlled economy), their ideological foundation (updated ideas of Bolívar, not Marxism-Leninism), and the extent of
government control of social and cultural life (limited state intervention, not
all-inclusive control).
The nature of the Bolivarian revolutionary process has been discussed elsewhere (Gott, 2007):
So, what does [Chavez’s] Bolivarian revolution consist of? He is friendly with
Castro—indeed, they are close allies—yet he is no out-of-fashion state socialist. Capitalism is alive and well in Venezuela—and secure. There have been no
illegal land seizures, no nationalizations of private companies [there have
been several in recent years]. Chávez seeks to curb the excesses of what he
terms “savage neo-liberalism,” and he wants the state to play an intelligent
and enabling role in the economy, but he has no desire to crush small businesses, as has happened in Cuba. International oil companies have fallen over
themselves to provide fresh investment, even after the government increased
the royalties that they have to pay. Venezuela remains a golden goose that cannot be ignored.
It has also been put differently (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003: 226):
The Chávez government, far from fitting into ready-made categories associated
with Alberto Fujimori [Peru], Domingo Perón [Argentina], or Fidel Castro, is a
rather unique and complex phenomenon. . . . Chávez defended democracy and
capitalism, but at the same time intended to radically transform both of them.
Chávez sought to achieve national insertion into the international economy
under conditions completely defined by his government. His overriding goal of
national sovereignty implied stiff terms imposed on foreign interests, but also
interconnectedness, as shown by his determination to attract foreign capital and
his support for regional integration.
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And it has been evaluated critically (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003: 227):
[However], the feasibility of the chavista modernization strategy—vaguely articulated beyond oil policy and mixing participatory democracy with a strong role
for the military—is debatable in a world in which global capital and the model of
liberal democracy predominate.
While Havana and Caracas are undergoing different state-building stages
that reflect their dissimilar social change processes, their relationship seems to
be anchored in historical and political grounds: two major Latin American
social transformation processes taking place in geographical proximity, sharing domestic and regional objectives, and encountering similarly motivated
opponents were destined to develop close ties. Favoring a governing modality based on a highly interventionist state and executing ambitious social
programs through a centralized command strategy seems to override their
systemic distinctions. Despite their political and economic differences (a
socialist system in Cuba and a social democratic sociopolitical one with undefined future socialist objectives in Venezuela), their governing approach binds
them together in practice.
Even though their political systems remain essentially distinct, their decisionmaking process suggests the possibility of an eventual convergence at some
point down the road. The limited changes so far, with expectations of more to
come under Raúl Castro, indicate the intention of partially retrenching from the
level of state control/penetration of earlier periods. Meanwhile, moving in the
opposite direction, Chávez has decreed a series of nationalizations, including
the banking, steel, cement, telecommunications, and oil (several projects operating in the Orinoco River basin) industries, promoting a leftward (socialist)
dynamic since his 2006 reelection. Still, it is too early to tell how far these movements will go, inasmuch as they operate in restrictive internal and external
environments—especially since the adverse result of the 2007 referendum.
The Cuban Revolution has been identified closely with Castro; they have
appeared inseparable. The Bolivarian revolution is generally seen as an extension of Chávez. Like Cuba and Castro historically, Chávez’s style, personality,
political programs, and objectives have been defining Venezuela’s course ever
since he came to office, perhaps ever since he emerged nationally in 1992. Both
leaders have influenced the region, and political observers have wondered
how much Hugo Chávez ‘s actions and Fidel Castro’s legacy will contribute
to shaping the hemisphere’s future course.
THE ADVISABILITY OF THE CASTRO-CHÁVEZ PARTNERSHIP
Political analysts have questioned the wisdom of the Chávez-Castro partnership. They have argued that, contrary to Caracas’s best interests, engaging
Cuba has seriously irritated the Venezuelan internal opposition and
Washington. The centrality of Chávez’s commitment to policies seeking social
justice and equality and the success and viability of his social missions—the
backbone of the Bolivarian revolution, in which Cuba has played such a decisive role—have no significance in this line of thinking (Baribeau, 2006).3
Instead, it is argued that receiving oil shipments under favorable conditions is
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critical for Havana in that it allows Cuba’s economy to run properly again.
(see Granma Internacional, 2006: 8–9).
Cuba pays mostly in services for Venezuelan oil, but Cuban-Americans are
vehemently opposed to Chávez’s trading with Havana, which they claim is
saving Cuba’s economy and, therefore, its socialist system (Union Liberal
Cubana, 2006). However, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations stated in
2003 that, instead of being singled out by Caracas, “the terms and conditions
binding on Cuba in the . . . sale and purchase contract[s] are equal to or less
advantageous than those relating to the rest of the countries in Central America
and the Caribbean that are beneficiaries of the Caracas Agreement [i.e.,
PetroCaribe].” Also, payments for Venezuelan oil have included U.S. “$13
million for arrears, imposed on Cuba by the coup conspiracy management [in
2002] and which [Havana] accepted . . . in spite of the fact that the responsibility for those arrears had nothing to do with Cuba” (Granma Internacional, 2003).
Also, overpriced purchases resulted from the 2002 coup, including payments of US$11,653,981 used for 415,225 barrels of crude oil from the Trasfigura
Corporation (24.4 percent over the price of a similar cargo under the Venezuelan
accord). When oil supplies were normally received during the period from
September to November 2002, payments of US$96.4 million were made “without a single moment of delay” (Granma Internacional, 2003). While Havana’s
oil payments are actually below market prices, its services are highly valuable
to Venezuela, helping to carry out the Bolivarian social programs aimed at aiding low-income population sectors. Promoting their exchange programs during a two-day visit by Chávez to the Caribbean island, Chávez and Castro
“celebrated the inauguration of branch offices of the Venezuelan state-owned
oil company PDVSA and also the state-owned Banco Industrial de Venezuela
in Havana. Also, they attended an international gathering of political activists
designed to promote the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, ALBA”
(Wagner, 2005a).
Cuba has been widely recognized as having made first-class health, educational, cultural, and recreational programs available to the population mostly
free of charge. These primary social programs continue, but their quality has
declined. Havana has skillfully prevented its economic difficulties from spilling
over and becoming a political liability. While migration attempts to the United
States have continued, public disaffection with the regime has been negligible
given the magnitude of the economic malaise of the early years of the Special
Period. In this regard, the Havana-Caracas relationship has been very helpful to
Cuba, turning the struggle for economic recovery into an achievable reality.
Commemorating the hundred-eightieth anniversary of the Battle of
Ayacucho, the invitation issued by Bolivar to the Anfitriónico Congress of
Panama in 1826, and the tenth anniversary of Chávez’s first visit to Cuba, the
Venezuelan leader and Castro signed an agreement on December 14, 2004. It
promoted the integration of two countries under ALBA, thereby formalizing
a comprehensive collaborative program. Earlier, in 1999, the two countries
had agreed to jointly operate the island’s Soviet-built Cienfuegos refinery,
which was capable of producing 76,000 barrels of oil per day. Promoting solidarity principles but recognizing systemic differences and Venezuela’s membership in international bodies that Cuba does not belong to, the agreement
covers mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services. It includes
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making available 15,000-plus Cuban doctors to the Bolivarian University and
the Barrio Adentro Mission, the training of new doctors and scientists, support for Sucre Mission participants planning to study medicine, and cooperating with other countries in eradicating illiteracy in the hemisphere. It also
establishes technological exchanges, cultural and educational programs and
scholarships, and proposes investment of state and (from Venezuela) private
funds in each other’s country, an increase in commerce and the organization
of credit, financing, and payments, and the elimination of customs fees and
taxation for joint ventures (Cuba Socialista, 2004).
CONCLUSIONS
The ongoing collaboration between Cuba and Venezuela rests on three distinct functional exchanges: (1) expressing and cementing the personal relationship between Fidel Castro (and now more than before, Raúl Castro) and
Hugo Chávez, as well as fostering fraternal ties between their countries and
peoples; (2) trading mutually beneficial goods and services under agreedupon conditions; and (3) pursuing common political continental objectives
under the banner of Bolivarianism with programs such as ALBA and others.
Each exchange is interactively significant, but functionally combined they
have enabled the charting of a ground-breaking path in the two countries and,
by extension, in the hemisphere.
Major differences separate Havana’s socialist and Caracas’s Bolivarian revolutions (notwithstanding Chávez’s current drive for twenty-first-century
socialism) and the institutional structure in which they operate. Ideologically,
constitutionally, economically, socially, culturally, and politically they operate
in different environments. The combined effect of the three functional
exchanges, however, has neutralized their differences by facilitating their collaborative interaction. Another unifying factor has been the hostility of the
Bush administration toward both leaders and regimes. Cuba has been treated
as Washington’s foe for a half century, but Venezuela under Chávez has
earned that position in a relatively short period. Besides the alleged support
of the Bush administration for the 2002 coup that temporarily ousted
President Chávez and its continuous support for the opposition (which has
been engaged in numerous legal and illegal actions against the constitutionally elected Chávez regime), President Bush has publicly shown his displeasure with Chávez, including giving a private audience to a leader of the
opposition group Súmate, who was also received by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice (Ceasar, 2006; Wagner, 2005b).4
Havana’s and Caracas’s common dispute with Washington’s hegemonic
role, the FTAA, the Washington Consensus, and other IMF-recommended
neoliberal formulas touches upon substantive issues. The ALBA’s pursuit of a
united Latin America with sustainable human development and economic
growth places it in the mainstream of today’s Latin American political sentiment and direction. The hemisphere has been waiting to bring to fruition its
own fulfillment, insulated from U.S. control.
Gauging the performance of the Havana-Caracas interaction is challenging.
It could be measured by the socioeconomic development and improvement in
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living conditions achieved at home, which is always a major concern. It could
be argued, however, that the lasting regional impact of the Cuban-Venezuelan
alliance is having turned ALBA’s conceptual framework into praxis.
Economists have provided various assessments of the monetary value of the
current exchange between the two countries, including their growing trade
volume. The commercial cost of the barrels of oil shipped to Cuba (to mention
the main Venezuelan commodity) could be calculated using commercial
or subsidized prices, but despite its comparable value the price tag for
Cuban assistance to Venezuela is more difficult to estimate accurately—
notwithstanding the extent of such unprecedented collaboration and the
social and political impact of the numerous and sizable nation-building projects undertaken by Havana.
At the hemisphere level, how much Fidel and Raúl Castro, Chávez,
Morales, Correa, Ortega, and leaders like Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Uruguay’s Tabaré Vázquez, and
Chile’s Michelle Bachelet could lead the regional leftward movement beyond
its present limits is a major concern. What seems certain is that socialism and
Bolivarianism, more than just Latin American historic references, are ideological paradigms that transcend national boundaries and spur leaders and popular movements into action. Alongside the Havana-Caracas alliance, the
pursuit of Latin American unity is already bearing fruit with a commitment
and determination not seen before.
NOTES
1. Prominent among disaffected leftists is Teodoro Petkoff, who was a guerrilla in the 1960s
and the founder of the Movement Towards Socialism. While writing for the daily El Mundo,
Petkoff led the opposition to Chávez.
2. The logic behind Bolivarianism’s becoming an expansion of Cuba’s thinking includes the
following: “We have to evolve our ideas, according to the situation in the world. . . . Marxism [is]
against dogmatism. . . . The main principle is to work for the happiness of everybody in our
society” (Oltuski, 2002: 286).
3. Venezuela’s social missions include Barrio Adentro (health), Robinson (literacy campaign),
Ribas (school-dropout adults), Sucre (schooling for college), Vuelvan Caras (unemployment),
Identidad (voter registration), Zamora (peasant welfare), Piar (mining communities), Guacaipuro
(indigenous population), and Mercal (supermarkets). Mothers of the Barrio fights drug use and
unintended pregnancies in young girls and offers aid to mothers in poverty. All the missions
combined are to become the “Christ” mission eradicating poverty by 2021.
4. Founded in 2003 by María Corina Machado, Súmate was charged with receiving US$53,400
from the National Endowment for Democracy for “electoral education.” Machado was charged
with signing (at the time of the 2002 coup) with other Chávez opponents a decree that would
transform Venezuelan democracy into a dictatorship. Venezuela’s ambassador to the United
States, Bernardo Alvarez, stated on U.S. television that in all his years of representing his country
diplomatically he had never been given an audience by Secretary Rice.
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