The Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict: an exercise in dealing with the Soviet paradigm?
Audrey Eugénie Schlegel, LL.M.
The U.S. Secretary of State John KERRY described the Russian aggression upon the Ukraine
as the behavior of a state still living in the 19 th century1. According to Randall D. LAW,
Russia’s foreign policy, as well as its internal politics, is still driven by concepts out of the
Soviet nationalism2. Soviet nationalism can be seen rooting deep into the 19 th century3.
Without engaging here into a detailed discussion about how deep did the Soviet Union root
into the 19th century, a common point can be found to the two statements: Russia behaves as if
it was living in another era. This comes to the fore in its current behaviors, motivated by ideas
and a world view seemingly coming from, and maybe belonging into, another time.
In a maybe more nuanced approached, we shall argue here that Russia works according to
another paradigm. A paradigm different from the one Western powers such as the USA, the
EU and its member states would expect it to follow. Russia follows the Soviet paradigm. Why
choosing the Soviet over the tsarist era? Several reasons support this choice, among others,
the fact that key members of the Soviet state apparatus also hold crucial offices in current
Russia, or that the Russian state has deliberately restored several symbols of the Soviet
period, such as the national anthem, or the proposals to reintroduce the Ready for Labor and
Defense Program, or the Hero of Labor title. Even though the PUTIN government also
restored tsarist symbols (such as the flag and the coat of arms), the government went further
1 J. Kerry, quoted by W. DUNHAM in „Kerry condemns Russia’s ‘incredible act of aggression’ in Ukraine”,
Reuters, 2.03.2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerryidUSBREA210DG20140302 (last consulted on the 25.06.2014).
2 R. D. LAW, „Soviet Nationalism is Still Driving Russian Politics” , on The Atlantic, 22.12.2011. Available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/soviet-nationalism-is-still-driving-russianpolitics/250391/ (last consulted on the 25.06.2014).
3 See F. VENTURI, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth
Century Russia (transl. F. HASKELL), 1961.
1
in its glorification of the Soviet era. The rehabilitation of the Soviet symbols also led to more
debates than the rehabilitation of the tsarist ones4.
A paradigm is commonly defined as a typical example or pattern of something, or its model.
The recent affirmation by B. QUIGLEY that Israel and Texas represent new state paradigms 5
could be an illustration of this definition. A definition according to which our previous
affirmation means that Russia follows a model different from the one Western power would
expect it to follow.
However, the word ‘paradigm’ takes on yet another meaning in international relations theory.
There, it could be defined as the world view upon which a given methodological approach to
international relation relies. The failed-state paradigm6, the Atlantic Alliance paradigm and the
Pacific Basin Paradigm7 have been frequently called upon during the last years. In this case,
our affirmation should be taken as meaning that international relations scholars see in Russia’s
behavior many features usually characteristic of the behavior of the Soviet Union, or of
Russia in the 19th century.
Both definitions, the one from the common language and the one from the international
relations vernacular, have one common point: it is not about the way the object of
observation/study sees itself – it is all about what an external (neutral?) observer assumes
about his object’s world view.
4 See for instance A. PODRABINEK, “Soviet Forever” on Institute of Modern Russia, 10.04.2013. Available
under: http://imrussia.org/society/432-soviet-forever (last consulted upon the 01.07.2014).
5 B. QUIGLEY, „Israel and Texas as New State Paradigms“, in The Hill, on the 27.05.2014. Available at :
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/uncategorized/207331-israel-and-texas-as-new-state-paradigms
(last
consulted on the 26.06.2014).
6 See, M. J. MAZARR, „The Rise and Fall of the Failed State Paradigm“, in Foreign Affairs, February 2014.
Available at : http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140347/michael-j-mazarr/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-failedstate-paradigm (last consulted on the 26.06.2014)
7 See J. R. KURTH, „The Pacific Basin v. the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations” in
The Annals of the American Academy, Issue 505, 1989. Available at http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/kurth-1.pdf (last consulted on the 26.06.2014).
2
However, both definitions differ insofar that the paradigm is used in international relations to
describe a pattern found in several states or situations, while the general meaning of
‘paradigm’ could also describe a recurrent pattern in the behavior of a single actor.
A priori, the words ‘Soviet paradigm’ would potentially represent an accurate description of
the behavior of any state issued from the former Soviet Union, possibly even for its former
satellite states. A description also fitting (but not limited to) Russia.
This assumption negates, or ignores, the specific and unique role of Russia in the Soviet
Union. Therefore, if the ‘Soviet paradigm’ can be used to describe the behavior of any Soviet
State, it cannot possibly be used to qualify Russia’s behavior. One way out of this terminology
trap would be to differentiate between the “Soviet paradigm” and the “Soviet Russia
paradigm”.
But do we need a “Soviet paradigm” at all? The qualification ‘former Soviet state’, or ‘former
Soviet satellite states’, applies to countries as different from one another as East Germany and
Azerbaijan: a common pattern can hardly be found to the respective behaviors of these two
states. So, it would seem there is no common pattern specific to former Soviet (satellite)
states- in short, there is no such thing as a ‘Soviet paradigm’. The qualification is therefore
free for Russia.
At this point there is room for a few clarifications: we do not pretend to engage here into a
detailed study of the extent to which Russia’s foreign policy is determined by Soviet-style
aspirations. The object of this article is to illustrate how Soviet state theory still, to a certain
degree, permeates the current Russian conception of the state, and the practical consequences
of this thinking upon Russia’ attitude towards third states, namely Ukraine. These
consequences should be illustrated by a detailed analysis of the gas saga between Ukraine and
Russia.
Ukraine and Russia tried (and failed) to reach a new deal on gas prices in June 2014. Such
negotiations had become necessary since a payment deadline had passed, without Ukraine
honoring its gas debt towards Russia. However, payment issues were not the sole reason why
talks over a new gas delivery agreement had to be negotiated, and this might even not have
been the main reason. Some had claimed that the previous agreement, negotiated by the then-
3
President YANUKOVITCH, was PUTIN’s way to ‘buy’ or ‘rent’ the latter’s fidelity to
Russia8: the Russian government would consequently have lost any interest in the deal after
YANUKOVYCH’s fall. However, such motivations could hardly have been stated in any
official declaration from the Russian government. An “official” reason had therefore to be
found. After YANUKOVYCH’s fall, Russia pretexted (well-founded) doubts about the ability
of Ukraine to honor its gas debts to call the deal into question9.
Much attention has been paid in the media to the development of the debt issue between
Ukraine and Russia, which drowned out the declarations made by the former Kremlin adviser
Alexander NEKRASSOV in a CNN interview with Christiane AMANPOUR. Clearly,
declarations by a former adviser cannot be considered as binding upon the current Russian
government, and some would say they only express their author’s personal opinion and do not
represent an official statement. However, they might reflect the government’s mood and more
importantly, thinking patterns.
In this interview, NEKRASSOV referred to the previous gas deal, concluded with
YANUKOVYCH, as to “the agreement with the previous regime” 10, and indicated that since
“this new regime has not discussed anything with Moscow” 11, nothing could be affirmed
about the former (low) gas prices being maintained. Clearly, in NEKRASSOV’s view, Russia
is no longer bound by agreements concluded with third states if regime changes take place in
the concerned states. For NEKRASSOV, foreign agreements are concluded with regimes and
not with states- and therefore disappear together with the regime that signed them.
8 See S. PIFER, „A Ukraine in Crisis between Russia and the West“, on Brookings, 31.01.2014. Available under
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/01/31-ukraine-crisis-between-russia-west-pifer (last consulted
upon the 30.06.2014).
9 See E. MAZNEVA, S. BIERMAN, “Russia Gas Threat Shows Putin Using Pipes to Press Ukraine”, on
Bloomberg BusinessWeek, the 3.03.2014. Available under: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-0302/russia-gas-threat-shows-putin-using-pipelines-to-press-ukraine (last consulted upon the 30.06.2014).
10 Report of the interview by M. KREVER, “Putin has no reason to interfere in Ukraine, says former Kremlin
adviser”, on CNN, the 25.02.2014. Available under : http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/25/putin-has-noreason-to-interfere-in-ukraine-says-former-kremlin-adviser/ (last consulted upon the 30.06.2014).
11 Idem.
4
Now this is interesting. First, a line shall be drawn between change of regime and change of
government. In political as well as in (legal) constitutional terms, a change of regime
constitutes in a change of the rules applying to the conduct of public affairs, up to and
including a change in the form of the state. A regime change would be from democracy to
monarchy and vice-versa. Such changes are seldom operated in a (fully) democratic way,
while under a change of government we generally understood a change in the political
personnel leading the state, conducted according to the (usually democratic) applicable rules:
President OBAMA succeeding to President BUSH in the USA was an example of such a
(democratic) change of government.
Changes of regimes are often conducted on the brink of legality, which might provide neutral
third observers as well as interested parties with grounds to call into doubt the new regime’s
legitimacy: the choice of the words “regime change” to qualify a political change generally
entails a negative opinion of this change. On the other hand, “government change” is mostly
neutral, possibly even reveals a positive opinion.
It is therefore not surprising that the Russian government and its representatives usually
qualify the chain of events in Ukraine of “regime change” 12. Before the new gas negotiations
began, Russian officials even deemed the new regime to be illegitimate 13. This further
illustrates the Russian position towards the new Ukrainian regime, but does not bear any
particular signification for the fate of the YANUKOVYCH gas agreement.
This agreement represents a classical foreign agreement between two states. It was actually
concluded between the Ukrainian state on the one hand and Gazprom on the other hand, but
the latter is nothing but an emanation of the Russian state. Besides, Russian authorities played
a decisive role in drafting the terms of this agreement. We are therefore faced with a classic
foreign agreement between two states, to which the general rules of international public law
apply.
12 See the report of an interview with the Russian UN envoy Vitali CHURKIN on The Voice of Russia,
22.04.2014. Available under: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_04_22/US-intentionally-drove-Ukraine-toregime-change-Russias-envoy-to-UN-5903/ (last consulted upon the 01.07.2014).
13 See B. KENDAL, “Ukraine crisis: What Next for Both Sides?”, on BBC, 2.03.2014. Available under :
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26407604 (last consulted upon the 01.07.2014).
5
According to said rules, foreign agreements are concluded between states, and are binding
upon states, and remain so until the disappearance of one of the state parties (and even in such
a case, a legal successor is often to be found- such as Russia taking over most of the
contractual liabilities and rights of the former Soviet Union). Foreign agreements are not
concluded between particular regimes or governments, and binding only upon the precise
regime or government that concluded them (even the so-called gentlemen’s agreement are
usually considered to remain binding for the next generation in office, if not for the state).
This might be deduced either from “pacta sunt servanda”, or from the notion that states enjoy
a legal personality different from the ones of the human beings member of a given regime or
government14.
For instance, an old agreement concluded between the German Reich and the Persian Empire
is still in force today15, even though none of its initial parties still exists today.
But NEKRASSOV seems to have seen in the YANUKOVYCH government, and not in the
Ukrainian state, the true party to the agreement with Gazprom. And this might not be
symptomatic only of the current relations between Ukraine and Russia, but of a much more
complex feature of Russian state thinking.
This is there the Soviet paradigm intervenes. It intervenes to help us understand how and why
a former advisor to the Kremlin could, a man one could legitimately assume to be an authority
on foreign policy issues, affirm that an international agreement has been automatically
terminated upon a change of government, or even a regime change.
It should however be noted that upon such changes, it is not excluded that some international
agreements concluded with given states may be abrogated. Such an abrogation usually takes
place when the respective interests of the concerned states no longer align (military alliances
are a perfect example of such situations 16). Abrogation is however not the same as automatic
14 For an account of this separation, see C. FOCARELLI, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle
for Global Justice, 2012, p. 226.
15 Niederlassungsabkommen zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und dem Kaiserreich Persien („Convention on
Establishment between the German Empire and the Persian Empire”, concluded in Teheran on the 17 th February
1929). Available under : http://www.datenbanken.justiz.nrw.de/ir_htm/dt-iran_niederlassungsabkommen.html
(last consulted upon the 01.07.2014).
16 See B. A. LEEDS, B. SAVUN, „Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?“, in The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, N°4, Nov. 2007, pp. 1119-1132.
6
termination of the convention: the abrogation results from a conscious decision expressed in a
positive and express declaration from the state, while NEKRASSOV’s declarations tend to
indicate that he saw it as self-explanatory that the agreement has been automatically
terminated upon the change of government (“change of regime” in his opinion). This is
however also in contradiction of traditional Soviet theory of international agreements,
according to which treaties could only be abrogated, and this for two reasons: a deep change
in the international situation, or a breach of the treaty of the treaty by the other party17.
How could then NEKRASSOV come to hold such opinions?
One possible answer would be that for him, a change of political personnel and a change in
the very person of the state amount to the same: in short, the state is not, in his world view
(his paradigm), to be seen as a person different from its rulers. The rulers are the state:
“L’Etat, c’est moi”. Modern states are supposed to have come a long way from this
assimilation of the state to its rulers18, but the personalization of state power is a common
feature of dictatorships19. We shall argue here that personalization of state power to the point
where the state is assimilated to its rulers constitutes one of the key features of the Soviet
paradigm- a feature of which the current Russian government has not gotten rid (yet?).
Dr. Zaal ANDRONIKASHVILI presented a theory of the Soviet Union in which state
authority was personified in the Soviet rulers, as opposed to the normal situation in which
state authority is mainly “borrowed” by the rulers 20. Indeed, historians often break the history
17 J. F. TRISKA, R. M. Slusser, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties, 1962, p. 100.
18 See an account of this process in M. NEOCLOUS, Imagining the State, 2003, p. 94. See also U. PAGANO,
“Marrying in the Cathedral: A Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance” in A. M. PACCES (ed.),
The Law and Economics of Corporate Governance: Changing Perspectives, 2010, p. 286.
19 See G. BAREEBE, K. TITECA, “Personalization of Power under the Museveni Regime in Uganda”, in
L’Afrique des Grands Lacs-Annuaire 2012-2013, pp. 83-105.
20 Z. ANDRONIKASHVILI, „La notion de la liberté et la société post-totalitaire », 16.06.2014, Conférence
internationale « Valeurs et identités européennes » at Ivane Javakhishvili University (Georgia).
7
of the Soviet down into periods corresponding to the time in office of a given Soviet rulers 21.
The use of this criterion is justified by the fact that each “era” is characterized by a different
specific pattern, whole details find to a large extent their justification in the personality or
ambitions (personal ones, as well as a given “state project”), of the respective rulers 22. This
assimilation between state and ruler in the Soviet Union has even been institutionalized to
some point in the different Soviet constitutions, as has been evidenced by the German
constitutionalist Georg BRUNNER23.
This is the Soviet paradigm: the government does not merely borrow the state’s authority, it IS
the state. Signing an agreement with any state amounts, in this representation, to sign an
agreement with the government currently in place. Once this government disappears, the
agreement disappeared with it.
Can such a paradigm hold against a rational, realistic approach to international agreements? If
all international agreements were to be automatically terminated with each new election, and
had to be concluded anew, international trade would become well-nigh impracticable, and
international organizations simply could not exist. However, (international) contract law gives
to people defending such a theory a useful tool, a tool that not only explains the existence of
international trade and international organizations, but also makes them concretely possible:
the tacit prolongations of agreements. In this view, all agreements are automatically
terminated upon a change of government, a fortiori upon a change of regime, but it is
commonly agreed that these agreements are tacitly conducted in the same terms between both
the party to the original agreement and the ‘new party’.
This theory of international contracts, in the Soviet paradigm, does not lead to any significant
difference from the classical theory of international agreements in most situations, meaning in
situations where both parties wish to pursue the agreement: in the classical theory, the
agreement never ceased to exist, in the Soviet paradigm, it is concluded anew. But it makes a
huge difference in those cases where one of the parties no longer wants to be bound: it only
21 See N. CHERNYSHOVA, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era, 2013. See also M. MALIA, Soviet
Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1994, esp. p. 546.
22 See. S. DAVIES, J. HARRIS (eds.), Stalin : A New History, 2005, p. 108.
23 See G. BRUNNER, Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa, 2006, p. 20.
8
has to affirm it does not wish to conclude a new agreement in order to be set free. And this
seems to be the line of thinking followed by NEKRASSOV- and probably by the whole
Kremlin.
The aim here is not to provide a detailed description of a new theory of international
agreements, only to provide an explanation to Russia’s behavior, by giving insights into what
seems to be current Russian state theory- a theory following what we could qualify as the
“Soviet paradigm”.
This paradigm does not only explain past situations: it shall also be kept in mind by both
scholars and actors of international relations for their future dealings with Russia. Because
Russia’s behavior cannot be simply discarded as irrational and erratic: it does rely on a system
of its own, with its own paradigms. And these paradigms clearly are not the ones that most
Western states claim to follow. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel had complained to the
US President Barack Obama about Putin “living in his own world” 24, a fact making
negotiations difficult. The term ‘world’ maybe is a trifle exaggerated. ‘World’ or ‘paradigm’
are only two synonyms for ‘conceptual framework’: what makes sense in the conceptual
framework of the current Russian rulers may not make sense in ours.
24 Reported by S. WAGSTYL, „German Diplomacy: Dominant by Default“ in Financial Times online, on the
5.08.2014. Available under : http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/82cf774a-1c8a-11e4-98d8-00144feabdc0.html?
segid=0100320#axzz39inMUyDD (last consulted upon the 7.07.2014).
9