The Legacy of Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in
Tanzania:
A Case Study from Morogoro
By
Brigitta Bode and Diana Wu
January 2011
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent in their
entirety the views of CARE International in Tanzania.
Research Team
Brigitta Bode, Lead Consultant
Diana Wu, Consultant
East and Central Africa – Regional Management Unit
Elsa Owange
Delphine Pinault
CARE Tanzania
Agnes Erio
Abdulrahman Hamad
Anita Kazenga
Victor Kitambi
Mande Limbu
Casimir Mabina
Victoria Maganga
Makame Makame
Thabid Masoud
Dhahia Mbaga
Francis Mbwambo
Edgar Mgeta
Blastus Mwizarubi
Edson Nyingi
Leticia Pima
Fatma Rashid
Thomas Welwel
Chumu Yussuf
CARE Tanzania Partners
Amini Muro – (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Forestry and Beekeeping,
Morogoro Office)
Shushuda Masaga (Gejaru Education and Training; Tanzania Pastoralist, HunterGatherers Association)
CARE Somalia
Said Sheikh Aden
Ali Ahmed Hersi
CARE South Sudan
Francis Asam
Tamba J.A. Kassoh
CARE Uganda
Christine Achieng
Charles Owuor
Richard Businge
CARE UK
Bianca Suyama, CARE UK
CARE USA
Doris Bartel, CARE USA
Michael Drinkwater, CARE USA
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Table of Contents
Part 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 5
Part 2. A Brief History of East Africa............................................................................ 6
2. 1 Pre-European East Africa ..................................................................................... 6
2.2 The Beginnings of German Rule............................................................................ 7
2.3 German Colonial Rule ........................................................................................... 8
2.3.1 Land and Labor for the German Plantation Economy ................................... 10
2.3.2 Wildlife and Forests under German Rule ...................................................... 11
2.3.3 Resistance to Colonial Rule .......................................................................... 13
2.3.4 World War I................................................................................................... 14
2.4 Tanganyika under British Rule ............................................................................. 15
2.4.1 Agricultural Production, Land and Labor ....................................................... 15
2.4.2 Wildlife and Forests under British Rule ......................................................... 17
2.4.3 Indirect Rule ................................................................................................. 18
2.4.4 Towards Independence ................................................................................ 19
2.5 Post-Colonial Tanzania........................................................................................ 20
2.5.1 The Nyerere Era ........................................................................................... 20
2.5.2 Nyerere‟s Socialism and Villagization ........................................................... 21
2.5.3 Structural Adjustment, Liberalization and Decentralization ............................ 23
2.5.4 Political Reform and the Power of the CCM .................................................. 24
2.5.5 Local Government Reform ............................................................................ 26
2.5.6 Roles of Civil Society in Government ............................................................ 28
2.6. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 29
Part 3. The Study Village in the Context of Larger Development Trends ................ 30
3.1 Morogoro Region ................................................................................................. 31
3.1.1 Social Development ...................................................................................... 31
3.2 Village D – An Introduction to the Study Area ..................................................... 36
3.3 A Note on the Research Difficulties ..................................................................... 39
Part 4: Village Level Governance ............................................................................... 40
4.1 Village Governance in Practice ........................................................................... 42
4.2 Land Allocation .................................................................................................... 45
4.3 Dispute Resolution .............................................................................................. 46
Part 5: Class Differentiation, Land Tenure and Livelihoods in Village D................. 46
5.1 Class and the Changing Economic Roles of Women ........................................... 46
5.2 Land Tenure ........................................................................................................ 51
5.3 Agricultural Policies and Strategies ..................................................................... 52
Food Security Policies ........................................................................................... 54
5.4 Crop Cultivation in Village D ................................................................................ 55
5.4.1 Division of Labor ........................................................................................... 55
5.4.2 Comparative Crop Yields and Prices at Harvest and Peak Seasons ............. 57
5.5 Wages in Village D .............................................................................................. 59
5.6 Kilimo Kwanza ..................................................................................................... 61
5.6.1 Tanzania‟s Push toward Marketization: Kilimo Kwanza ................................ 61
5.6.2 Commercializing Agriculture in Tanzania ...................................................... 63
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Part 6: Pastoralists ...................................................................................................... 66
6.1 East Africa and Pastoralists ................................................................................. 66
6.2 Pastoralist Tribes of Tanganyika and Colonialism................................................ 67
6.3 Present: Farming and Natural Resources ............................................................ 69
6.4 Identity, Cultural Tourism and Discrimination ....................................................... 70
6.5 Relations within the Barabaig Community and Class Differentiation among
Pastoralists................................................................................................................ 72
6.6 Gender Relations................................................................................................. 73
6.7 Settlers vs. Pastoralists ....................................................................................... 74
6.8 Wami-Mbiki.......................................................................................................... 75
Part 7: Natural Resources Management in Tanzania with an Emphasis on Wildlife
Management Areas and Hunting ................................................................................ 76
7.1 Wildlife/Forest Management and Policies ............................................................ 77
7.2 Wildlife and Hunting............................................................................................. 78
7.3 The Case of Wami-Mbiki and the Danish Hunter Assocation…………………….. 82
7.4 Core and Buffer Boundaries and Conflict ............................................................. 85
Part 8: Social Development and Gender Relations ................................................... 86
8.1 Education, Learning and Child Development ....................................................... 87
8.2 Water Sanitation and Hygiene ............................................................................. 89
8.3 Health and Health Services ................................................................................. 89
8.4 Social Protection ................................................................................................. 91
8.5 Marriage, Divorce and Widowhood ...................................................................... 93
Part 9: Conclusion....................................................................................................... 95
9.1. Locating Poverty ................................................................................................. 95
9.2 Underlying Causes of Poverty in Tanzania and Program Implications
with Specific Reference to CARE’s Impact Groups .............................................. 96
9.2.1 Poor Governance.......................................................................................... 97
9.2.2. Poor Livelihoods Opportunities and Exploitation…………………………… 101
9.2.3. Gender Relations and Ethnic Discrimination ............................................. 101
9.2.4. Centralized Stewardship of Natural Resources and the Case of the WamiMbiki WMA .......................................................................................................... 105
9.2.5. Poor Social Development .......................................................................... 107
9.2.6. Analysis and Social Mobilization Capacity of CARE Tanzania Staff ........... 108
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………111
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Part 1. Introduction
This study is meant to undertake an analysis of the underlying causes of poverty within
one of the working areas – the Morogoro Region – of CARE International in Tanzania. It
is designed to inform the development of its long terms strategies towards CARE‟s
specific impact populations (vulnerable and marginalized women and girls living adjacent
to forests and ethnic minorities – pastoralists). Using secondary and primary sources of
data (including field research and interviews), the paper discusses the multiple
dimension of polity, economy and society that shape the larger development context and
the lived conditions of the specific populations that CARE‟s and its partners wishes to
uplift from poverty.
In section two of the report, „a Brief History of East Africa‟, we consider the historical
dimension of the political economy of poverty by focusing on German and British colonial
strategies in relation to land, labor, natural resources, and governance, highlighting the
ways in which colonial rule shaped the prevailing trends of economic development,
distribution of resources and power, as well as state and society relations. This section
then discusses Tanzania‟s „socialist phase‟ following independence with villagization,
emphasis on universal education and health services, and nationalization of the means
of production and trade, as key strategies to achieve economic growth and development.
With the shift in the global development paradigm of the 1980s and the perceived
inadequacies of the „developmental state‟, Tanzania, in need of foreign aid, adopted
structural adjustment measures that were part of emerging neo-liberal policies.
Section three of the report discusses the study area in the context of larger development
trends in the Morogoro region, with specific reference to social development indicators
(health and education). This section also highlights the agro-ecological zones and
prevailing cropping patterns. In this part of the paper, we introduce the empirical analysis
through a discussion of the history of the study village as well as the distribution of
resources and political power, which determined our selection of the study communities
– sub-village N, a remote and poor community and sub-village K 1, an well connected
and relatively better off community. Section four presents local governance dynamics
and the implications on local level democracy, land allocation processes, and dispute
resolution with specific reference to the two hamlets that were explored in considerable
detail.
In section five, we explore class differentiation and the livelihood strategies of various
socio-economic groups. Our findings highlight that class is inextricably linked to and
shaped by access and control over land and our section on land tenure dynamics
(renting and sharecropping practices) illustrates that the landlessness of the poorest
households has important implications in terms of their (in)ability to secure sufficient food
throughout the year. This section also explores cropping patterns and yields, the division
of labor, and local wages, comparing sub-village N and K 1. The findings highlight that
yields are nearly twice as low in the poorer community and questions the
appropriateness of the crops that are cultivated, in light of the fact that the poorest
households experience seasonal hunger during the lean season. This section is
concluded by a discussion of sugar cane, cultivated largely by medium and large
farmers (many of whom are absentee owners) and harvested by migrant labor from
5
labor surplus regions, providing virtually no benefits from the only large scale agroindustry to poor households in the area.
Section six explores the question of Tanzania‟s pastoralist communities more broadly
and then focuses on the Datoga and Iraqw communities in our study areas. The analysis
fleshes out the locally specific dynamics of their marginalization and discrimination. Our
report focuses on relations between settlers and pastoralists, the patterns of class
differentiation and the forms that income poverty takes, as well as the exclusion of these
groups from local governance processes. A section on gender relations touches upon
the cultural differences between pastoralists and settlers.
In section seven, we discuss natural resources management in Tanzania with specific
emphasis on Wildlife Management Areas and Hunting. Here we flesh out the evolution of
natural resources management from the inherited colonial policies of top down control to
more participatory approaches. A section on the wildlife and hunting industries in
Tanzania, its importance in terms of annual revenues and the fascination by European
elites with Africa‟s game, sets the stage for a discussion of the Danish Hunter‟s
Association Project in the Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area that is to sustainably
manage the area and open the reserve to foreign tourist to observe and hunt wildlife with
profits to be channeled to local communities.
Section eight focuses on social development and gender relations in Tanzania drawing
where possible on the findings in the study area. This section notes that in the areas of
education and health, the remote and relatively poor study community is far behind
national trends. A discussion of marriage, divorce and widowhood illustrates the
changing norms around the institution of marriage and notes the positive as well as the
negative implications of these changes. The paper concludes with a section that
summarizes the underlying causes of poverty, the implication of the research on CARE‟s
definition of its impact groups and selection of working areas. Finally, the paper
summarizes the findings in relation to each of the underlying causes of poverty and
provides recommendations for programming and identifies the remaining gaps that need
to be explored.
Part 2. A Brief History of East Africa
2. 1 Pre-European East Africa
Prior to German and British colonialism, the economic activities in the region varied from
pastoralism to intensive cultivation, and exchange networks (Håkanson, et. al. 2008). At
the time of the Omani Arabs, the interior was occupied by subsistence agriculturalists,
with more centralized chiefdoms towards what are now Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
(Waters, 2000). Staple crops included banana, millet, cassava and yams whilst trade
was focused on salt, copper, bark cloth and local cotton products (ibid). Smaller groups
of pastoral people worked for their own and the subsistence of their cattle. Tribal chiefs
collected taxes to maintain food stocks for times of crisis and in the absence of famines,
these reserves became the property of the chiefs (Feierman, 1990).
By the 1850s, the regional economy became tied to the Indian Ocean through ivory and
slave trade, as the Oman Sultanate had penetrated deeply into the hinterlands. The
alienation of labor arrived with the Arabs and their caravans (Waters, 2000). Two forms
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of labor emerged: slave labor, in which individuals were bought and sold, and corvée
labor, where families were forced to supply a porter in return for which a payment was
received (Koponen, 1988).
On the island of Zanzibar, the Sultanate had initiated slave-labor based production of
cloves and grains to feed the slaves that were held to be sold and transported to far off
places in the Middle East. Along the coast, various cities along with trade corridors in the
inland areas were developed and gained vitality (Huijzenveld, 2008), whilst communities
along the trade routes began to produce for surplus, investing in irrigation and terracing,
and yet others invested in cattle (Håkanson, et.al., 2008). Estimates of certain trade
routes, highlight that the amount of food that had to be produced was considerable. For
instance, based on the calculations of the number of porters needed to carry ivory
through the Pangani region, a relatively small trade route, the area had to produce a
surplus food for 10,000 persons per season (ibid). Håkanson, et.al., 2008, argue that
caravan routes demanded as much as 400 metric tons of food in the Pangani region
alone, transforming the landscape through expansion of agriculture and pastoralism into
areas in which the natural vegetation had to be removed and „cultivation steppes‟ were
created.
Similarly, there appear to be important changes that occurred as a result of the ivory
trade. By the 1850s, more than 500 tons of ivory were exported annually from East
Africa (Håkanson, et.al., 2008). The decimation of the elephant population (11,000
annually during the heyday of ivory trade) is likely to have profoundly impacted the local
ecology, by leading to a decline in grasslands and an expansion of woodlands, which is
believed to have promoted the spread of tsetse flies (Håkanson, et.al., 2008). This
discussion highlights that the region was tied to international trade long before the
advent of western colonialism and experienced important changes as a result.
German colonialism transformed existing regional nodes of political power as well as
economic linkages, in terms of plantation agriculture and the exploitation of labor. The
discussion below highlights the ways in which German rule with its emphasis on export
crops, required the alienation of land, new forms of production, and forced labor. In fact,
German policies and practices – forced labor, physical punishment, heavy taxes,
controlled access to forests, hunting regulations – created considerable dissent (Sunseri
2003; Baer and Schröter, 2001; Stoecker, 1987; Gann and Duignan, 1977).
2.2 The Beginnings of German Rule
The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, at which the major European States established
the „rules of the colonial game‟, marks a crucial moment in Africa‟s history, opening the
doors to the „Africa Scramble‟. A decade prior to the conference, a mere 10 percent of
Africa was colonized. By 1902, 90 percent of Africa was under European rule (Bear and
Schröter, 2001). The Conference, hosted by Bismarck, was also a turning point for
Germany‟s ambition to participate in Europe‟s empire building. Germany had been eurocentric in outlook, concerned with increasing trade and commerce, and hesitant to
participate in the colonial race. The initial impetus for colonial conquest came from
various pressure groups, including German merchants in search for new markets,
geographical societies that were increasingly significant following the fame of Alexander
von Humboldt and Karl Ritter, and to a limited extent German missionary societies that
advocated the use of the „holy sword‟ to abolish slavery and convert „heathen natives‟.
7
Trade relations with East Africa had been established as early as the 1850s. The
German Hanseatic merchants companies were operating as middlemen, importing
German and non-German goods to East Africa and exporting East African products to
Germany and elsewhere (Fabian, 2007). When Germany did adopt a formal colonial
policy – in the 1880s – it ruled through a chartered company, with limited financial
support from the state. Following the Berlin Conference, now assured that Germany‟s
claims in Africa would not threaten the balance of powers in Europe, Bismarck gave an
imperial charter to the German East Africa Company (DOAG) to operate in East Africa.
The DOAG, formerly the Society for German Colonialism, however, had already
acquired 190,000 sq.km. without an imperial charter, constituting roughly 15 percent of
the future size of German East Africa (Baer and Schröter, 2001). The Society had been
founded by Carl Peters, a German explorer, and funded by patriotic bankers, capitalists,
and landowners. Peters, in charge of the first exploration, had bargained with local chiefs
for territories posing as an agent of the German state. These early territorial acquisitions
by Peters took place through shady transactions with local rulers and their legitimacy
was questioned by the Oman Sultanate, who claimed the areas that Peters had acquired
as a sovereign territory.1 The inland areas had been trade routes for Arabs and Muslim
caravans for centuries, who had moved far inland to trade, sometimes raid, and in some
cases create their own suzerainties.
By the early 1800s, the Omani „merchant prince‟ – King Seyyid Said – had established a
thriving island economy, based on slave and ivory trade. By the mid 1850s, Zanzibar
was the largest slave market in East Africa and the center of ivory trade (Wesseling,
1986). With the backing of the German state, the DOAG carried forward Peters‟
negotiations with local rulers and the Sultanate of Oman in Zanzibar. In 1888, the
Company succeeded and reached an agreement with the Sultan and was now in control
of 900,000 sq.km., an area that was twice the size of German Reich (Baer and Schröter,
2001).
2.3 German Colonial Rule
Supporters of German colonialism argued that Germany would benefit from enhanced
trade and new investment opportunities, would have new „living space‟, civilize natives,
and spread the blessings of German culture and the Gospel of Christ (Gann, 2001). In
reality, however, German rule was marginal to the German Reich. Trade with German
colonies never exceeded more than 5 percent of its total trade. For instance, in 1904,
trade with all German colonies constituted 0.5 percent of foreign trade (Baer and
Schröter 2001). By 1913, at the height of German colonialism, exports to her colonies
amounted to less than 5 percent (Gann, 2001). Further, German migration to the
colonies, including East Africa, was limited and in 1913, the European population in
German East Africa amounted to just over 5,000 (ibid).
Germany made few investments in its colonies and was primarily concerned with the
development of its home industries – steel-making, chemical enterprises and electrical
engineering. Whilst German subsidies to the colonies exceeded the resources invested
by private business, the monies applied were limited (Baer and Schröter, 2001). Private
1
The methods used by Carl Peters to acquire territories were questioned by many: Peters declared local
chiefs as sovereigns and had contracts signed in German, with chiefs marking a cross, whereby territories
were contractually ceded to Peters himself. The use of alcohol and bonding ceremonies, gun salutes, songs
and other merry-making activities were frequent during these negotiations. (Baer and Schröter, 2001;
Wesseling, 1996).
8
investors and entrepreneurs, on the other hand, were hesitant as investments in the
colonies were risky with the lack of infrastructure (lack of ports, roads, railways, etc.), a
host of unknown diseases that threatened man, animals and crops, lack of soil surveys,
and untrained labor. During the later colonial phase (1906-1914), the German state thus
put more emphasis into infrastructure development to enable surplus extraction through
mining and plantation agriculture. They also build a western type of civil administration,
engaged in medical research, opened a large number of dispensaries and German
missionaries laid the foundations for a modern education system (Baer and Schröter,
2001; Gann and Duignan, 1977).
The German East Africa Company (DOAG), unlike the British chartered companies,
lacked the means to finance infrastructure and had to maintain itself by squeezing the
local traders and chiefs through custom duties and tolls (collected from caravans) and
confiscation of land (Gann and Duignan, 1977). By the late 1880s, the DOAG was faced
with multiple local resistance movements – driven by Arab traders and / or local chiefs –
requiring the assistance of the German Reich. Reluctantly, Bismarck lobbied in the
German Reichstag for resources in the name of „anti-slavery‟, having to contend with the
pressure of the Social Democrats who opposed colonialism on the grounds of its
imperialist and anti-labor agenda. A military action was dispatched and 600 Sudanese
and Somalis were recruited in Cairo to form a mercenary armed force (Schutztruppe)
that would quell the resistance. Further rebellions ensued and the German state
intervened. In 1891 the DOAG lost its charter to administer German East Africa, but
continued to operate as a trading company, including the day to day administration of
large plantations.
The German state took over its functions and created an administrative system that
depended on the cooperation of natives and its Schutztruppe, the colonial police force.
German East Africa was organized into 22 administrative districts, the majority of which
were initially under military administration and as the process of „pacification‟ took hold
these were handed over to the civil authorities (Baer and Schröter, 2001).2 In the coastal
areas and the „hinterland‟ regions, the Arabs and local chiefs were subordinated to
district level officials. The district administrators, who served the dual role of judges and
administrators, were accountable to the Governor, who between 1892 and 1906 were
high ranking military officials, reflecting the militarized state through which the Germans
ruled the region.
East Africa, however, as all other German colonies in Africa, was poorly administered.
Before World War I, there were a total of 150 Germans employed in the district
administrations of the African colonies (Gann and Duignan, 1977). In East Africa, the
most important colony to the Germans, often referred to as the „German India‟, there
were a mere 40 German officials and 400 employees, who were Africans and Indians.
During the initial years of German rule, under the instructions of Wissman, the first
imperial commissioner, the Germans relied heavily on the assistance of Muslim Akidas
and dignitaries and the colonial police force (Schutztruppe) that was build up around a
nucleus of Sudanese mercenaries (Gann and Duignan, 1977). At the same time,
German government schools taught Swahili and all German governors learnt Swahili,
which became the lingua franca of the colonial administration (ibid). During the later part
of the their rule, along the coast and in some of the interior districts, the Germans
continued the administrative Akida system, whereby these salaried supervisors served
to administer groups of villages (van Albertini, 1982). In most areas, however, the chiefs
2
The kingdoms of Bukoba, Burundi and Rwanda, where 50 percent of the German East Africa population
resided, were left under the rule of the kings, with Germans functioning as „advisors‟.
9
were the executive agents who implemented German rules and collected revenues in
return for a 5 to 10 percent share of the tax revenues (ibid).
2.3.1 Land and Labor for the German Plantation Economy
To ensure sufficient land for its plantation economy, the Germans had passed an
Imperial Decree in 1895, which declared all land ownerless and ownership was now
vested in the Empire (crown land). The exception to this was if proof of ownership could
be shown (Sabea, 2008). Under this new system, those without title – entire
communities – were absorbed under the colonial state, which acted as their guardians
(ibid). Thus land alienation in favor of European settlers or plantation companies was
sanctioned by law and forced the local population into wage labor. The Imperial Decree
also entitled the colonial state to survey land, count landholders, sanction boundaries,
grant access to alienated land, set the length and terms of lease rights, mediate any land
transactions between natives and Europeans, and regulate land prices (ibid). By 1913,
790,500 acres were under European control, yet only 14 percent of this land was
cultivated by 91,892 „native workers‟, overseen by 332 „whites‟ (ibid).
Initially, the Germans wanted white settlers to colonize East Africa. But in time, it
became apparent that this was more difficult than anticipated. The lack of infrastructure,
such as hospitals, schools, limited understanding of local ecologies and the prevalence
of human, animal and plant diseases, made life difficult. Nevertheless, there were
economic pioneers who tried and introduced coffee and tea. Besides the settler
plantations, there were company plantations, one of the largest set up by the Colonial
Economic Committee that experimented with and established cotton as an important
crop (Gann and Duignan, 1977). Dr. Hindorf, a German botanist, employed by the
DOAG, introduced sisal, from the Yucatan region of Mexico, which would become the
most prominent crop in German and British East Africa. (Sabea, 2008).
German plantation owners, however, found it difficult to obtain a steady labor supply,
lamenting that the indigenous population was merely concerned with their subsistence
and showed no interest in selling labor. In 1898, the colonial administration introduced
the hut tax (Baer and Schröter, 2001), initially payable in kind, but later payable in cash
or labor (Giblin, 1992). Within two years of this tax, there were 25 rebellions or tax
revolts, leading to the execution of 3 chiefs and 16 lower chiefs of the Wachagga (Baer
and Schröter, 2001).
Amongst one of the darker chapters of German colonial history was the practice of
flogging with the end of a rope. The cruelty that Germans displayed – with the exception
of the Belgians in Congo – was unmatched amongst the colonial overlords. In 1893,
Governor van Schele increased the number of lashes that could be inflicted at one time
to fifty, essentially amounting to execution (Stoecker, 1987). This created a public
scandal in Germany and the head of the colonial foreign office in Germany demanded
reforms of the colonial penal system.3 The reforms were finally made in 1896, though
flogging for lethargy, insubordination, neglect of duty, or unjustified absence from work,
continued (Bear and Schröter, 2001). The German scholar and trader, Krause, who set
3
In Germany, Socialists and Democrats raised heavy objections, calling the practice of whipping inhuman,
brutal and unworthy of a country that had abolished corporal punishment in its penal codes many years
earlier (Prussia in 1848 and all other German States by 1871). The pressures from within the Reichstag and
the Foreign Office led to the issuance of two chancellor‟s ordinances which amongst other decrees limited
flogging to 25 lashes and prohibited corporal punishment for Arabs, Indians, and women. Males under the
age of 16 could not be flogged, only caned (Stoecker, 1987).
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up businesses in Togo, where Germans also worked through tax and forced labor
policies, commented in his pamphlets and letter to the German Government that the
labor policies of the German Empire in Africa were „a continuation of African slavery in a
different form‟ (Knoll and Gann, 1987).
Until the 1900s, there was virtually no resistance to the brutality of the German
administrators from the various Christian missions that operated in German East Africa.
In fact, the history of the Christian missions provides numerous examples where colonial
rulers and church leaders cooperated. Missionaries actively participated in quelling
rebellions and the 1897 “War Tribunal” that convicted the Hehe leader Mkwawa to death
included a Benedict priest (Baer and Schröter, 2001). Similarly, when the Germans
passed the hut tax, mission stations noted the „ease with which labor was now available‟
(ibid). The missions administered large plantations with commercial interests that
needed workers. Just as the plantation owners found it difficult to find labor, so did the
mission plantations, despite the fact that the working conditions here were relatively
good, as frequent breaks were given, flogging was prohibited, and health care was
provided (ibid). One of the first „expeditions‟ of the Schutztruppe in the Tununugu area,
in which entire villages were burnt to the ground, had been requested by a Catholic
missionary, who was unable to enforce school and work attendance of natives
(Reichard, 1892). In other words, the building of „Christian communities‟ or large
congregations was inextricably tied to colonial rule with its disregard for civil liberties and
existing social structures.
To recruit labor, plantations relied on Arabs and Indian contractors and merchants, on
headman, and on workers returning home. By the early 1900s, men from the southern
region were key in providing labor to work off their heavy taxes and Mozambicans who
wanted to escape the resistance movements against the Portuguese (Sabea, 2008). By
1913, the number of laborers moving into plantations had increased and reached nearly
100,000 workers. As Iliffe has argued, “so wide was the migration network by 1914 that
the illuminating question is which people were not involved” (Illife, 1979).
2.3.2 Wildlife and Forests under German Rule
In the last few years of the 19th century, East Africa experienced a series of diseases
and natural disasters that were partially related to the colonization process. For instance,
Rinderpest was introduced through Indian „provisioning cattle‟ brought by Italians when
they invaded Eritrea in 1889 (Mutowo, 2001). When the disease reached East Africa it
wiped out 80-90 percent of all cattle, including wild ruminant ungulates, such as
wildebeest and giraffes (Nelson, et. al. 2007; Baer and Schröter, 2001; FAO, 2002). The
livelihoods of the pastoral communities were devastated. It is estimated that two thirds of
the Maasai who depended on livestock starved to death (Johnson, 2000).The
devastation of cattle, was followed by an outbreak of small pox, which killed about one
tenth of the population of German East Africa (Bear and Schröter, 2001). To make
matters worse, between 1890 and 1900, the country experienced a severe drought and
three locust devastations and thousands more died from hunger (ibid).
The destabilization of pastoral livelihoods, however, was not unwelcome by the colonial
powers in the region. Lord Lugard, an influential British officer and colonial administrator,
commented on the Rinderpest and its impact on the Maasai in 1893:
“..never before in the memory of man, or by the voice of tradition, have cattle died in such
numbers”. He went on to state that “these powerful and warlike pastoral tribes had their pride….
11
humbled and our progress [in conquest was] facilitated by this awful visitation [of rinderpest]
(cited in Mutowo, 2001).
The Germans took advantage of the situation and used this opportunity to force the
weakened Maasai and other pastoral tribes of the fertile highlands into reserves in the
plains, where they suffered from fever, faced water scarcities and depended on
cultivation for their livelihoods, which they were not used to (Pipping and Hulten, 1974).
The heavy losses in livestock and the famine-like conditions forced many Maasai into
cattle raiding and hunting, which served to substantiate the colonial view that pastoralists
were unruly subjects that required administrative intervention (Gißibl, 2006); whilst the
expulsion of pastoral groups from their traditional grazing lands increased conflicts
amongst pastoral tribes and between pastoralists and agriculturalists, as the Maasai and
other groups tried to rebuild their herds and needed grazing areas (Börejson, et.al.,
2008).
The Rinderpest of early 1890s had not only decimated the population of domestic
livestock, but had also killed hundreds of thousands of buffalo, wildebeest and giraffes
(Gichochi, et. al. 1996, cited in Nelson, et.al., 2007). The devastation of wildlife,
combined with the decimation of the elephant populations during the past few hundred
years, led the Germans to implement regulations to control wildlife use in order to
maintain this resource for recreational as well as commercial value, such as ivory
(Nelson, et.al., 2007). By 1896, hunting required a license, essentially, banning all forms
of hunting, including customary practices that involved the net, pits and snares, and
restricting access to this valuable resource to Europeans (Nelson, et.al., 2007). The
Germans also established Protected Areas for wildlife, which could be opened or closed
for hunting, depending on wildlife numbers. By 1913, there were fourteen such reserves,
located in the eastern region (Nelson, et.al., 2007). People continued to reside in these
areas, but their hunting rights were curbed.
The Germans also profoundly affected the ability of indigenous uses of forest resources,
which were important economically and socially. Forests provided food in times of
famine and contributed to the cash economy through extraction of wild rubber, honey,
wax, and hunting of elephants (ivory) and game, whilst some tribes‟ livelihoods were
inextricably tied to the practice of shifting cultivation (through burning) in forest areas
(Sunseri, 2003). From a social / cultural perspective, forests were places for spiritual and
physical healing, where mediums derived their authority and power (ibid).
The German view of forests, on the other hand, was shaped by the notion that forests
were scarce resources essential for state revenue and that forests must be conserved,
given the link between forest cover, soil health and climate change (Sunseri, 2005).
German „scientific forestry‟, which reflected the depleted forests of industrial Germany,
aimed to create long-term cycles of tree planting and harvesting that would allow for
sustainable forest management. This was a mono-cultural model with one species with
all trees being of uniform size that would allow for the quantification and harvesting in set
rotations to meet fiscal and industrial needs. The Forest Ordinance Laws of 1893 placed
restriction on the burning of fields and crop debris near government stations and rivers,
and demanded that peasants cut and rake grass and brush into concentrated areas for
burning, rather than setting entire fields on fire. Further, the ordinance restricted
woodcutting for domestic and commercial uses near government stations, requiring
permits for these activities. By the late 1890s, the forest ordinance applied to even
remote areas. Village headmen, who were in charge of collecting the hut taxes, were
now also responsible for maintaining healthy forest areas in which burning and
woodcutting were prohibited (Sunseri, 2005).
12
German extraction for forest resources, for example the cutting of mangrove trees for
poles in the rich forest in the Rufiji Delta, were accompanied by complex and labor
intensive management schemes. By 1898, the Germans had constructed a saw mill that
could process 400 cubic meters of mangrove timber per year for export. Mangrove tree
bark, which was used in the processing of leather dyes, was also harvested, whilst
attempts were made to sell mangrove timber to South Africa to be used as railway
sleepers. The overwhelming bulk of trees (70 percent) that were cut in Rufiji Delta
forests and provided to various government stations, however, were used for fuel wood.
(Sunseri, 2005). Colonial forest policies and extractive practices were directly at odds
with local uses of timber. Charcoal production was essential for households and local
industries, whilst entire logs were required to boil drums of cane juice that would produce
jaggery (brown sugar), an important regional trade product (Sunseri, 2003).
2.3.3 Resistance to Colonial Rule
The „Maji Maji Rebellion‟ illustrates the ways in which colonial domination and
exploitation remained incomplete. In fact, the increasing levels of economic exploitation
threatened to undermine colonial political arrangements. It is not surprising that the „Maji
Maji Rebellion‟, the greatest challenge to German authorities, occurred in the Rufiji
region. The ostensible reason for this outbreak was the resistance to forced labor in the
cotton fields (Coulson, 1982). To cultivate this labor-intensive crop on large state-owned
plantations, the Germans demanded that all men in the surrounding villages had to
provide 28 days of annual labor, the payment for which was paid for after the sale of the
harvest (Baer and Schröter, 2001). The rebellion, however, also reflected the
widespread discontent with the prohibitions of customary extractive practices of timber
and non-timber products – wild rubber, wax, ivory – in the forest areas of the region that
were crucial for the livelihoods of the local population (Sunseri, 2003, 2005). The
German beer brewer, Schulz, whose business was the largest in the colony and who
needed a steady supply of fuel wood, commented on the cause of the rebellion:
“I have no question that the natives, since olden days accustomed to the free use of mangrove
forests, have a strong ground for discontent owing to the rigorous closing of the mangroves, as
well as inland forest reserves…. … endangered the economic existence of definite circles of
natives and fed a general discontent (Sunseri, 2003).
In other words, the German colonial economy affected the local population in all spheres
of life. The resistance spread across the southern region and involved struggles against
the Germans by multiple tribes. The Germans were heavy handed in the use of brute
force, engaging in an scorched-earth campaign where crops, crop stores and entire
villages were burnt, whilst cattle was confiscated and water sources were poisoned
(Baer and Schröter, 2001; Coulson, 1982). The use of the „Maxim Gun‟ (invented in
1885) – the first self-powered machine gun that could fire 600 rounds per minute –
provided superior firepower for the Germans who gunned down thousands of people.
Even the missionaries at Station Jacobi of the Berlin Mission used these guns to protect
their institution from 2,000 warriors (Baer and Schröter, 2001).
The „Maji Maji Rebellion‟ lasted for 18 months. The exact number of people who were
killed is unclear. The German authorities claimed that 75,000 people died (Baer and
Schröter, 2001); however, newer studies place the numbers of persons killed around
200,000, which includes those who died of the widespread hunger that resulted from the
scorched earth policies (Baer and Schröter, 2001; Waters, 2000). The use of the Maxim
Gun left the Germans with minimal losses of life – 15 Europeans and 73 Askaris
13
(Schutztruppe) (ibid). However, the property damage caused by the rebels was
extensive: in Liwale, over 40,000 rubber trees were burnt and a large number of cotton
plantations were destroyed (Sunseri, 2003). Although the „Maji Maji Rebellion‟ failed to
oust the colonial rulers, it sowed the seeds of a new political consciousness amongst
those who survived the brutal suppression of the movement.
Following the „Maji Maji Rebellion‟, the Germans made some reforms under a new
Governor, Rechenberg, fluent in Arabic and Kiswahili, with a history of civil service in the
colonies: a judge, district commissioner, and vice consul to Zanzibar (Bear and Schröter,
2001). Rechenberg, the first civilian to hold the Governor office since 1893, reduced the
practice of forced labor on cotton plantations and allowed cash and in-kind payments,
rather than labor, for the hut tax. To put an end to land speculation, the appropriation of
land that was settled by Africans was now prohibited and the rule that land had to be
fully cultivated by settlers after five years of possession was strictly enforced. The
German Colonial Director, Dernburg, wanted to ensure that the colony continued to
make profits and negotiated for funds and sanctioned the completion of the railroad from
Dar Es Salaam to Morogoro, Kigoma, and Tabora. By 1914, 2,000 additional kilometers
of railroad had been completed with as many as 16,000 African workers engaged in
construction (Baer and Schröter, 2001). The railroad opened the way for new plantations
and settler farms with the local population shifting to crops that could supply the rising
labor force (Sabea, 2008). By 1913, of the 172,000 wage workers in East Africa,
139,500 worked for Europeans as plantation and railroad labor, miners, porters,
servants, and labor for the Christian missionaries (Gann and Duignan, 1977)
Rechenberg also made important changes to the administration of the colony. More
Africans were trained as junior officials to aid in the administration of the districts and the
local governments that included plantation owners who had been charged with the
collection of taxes were dissolved (Baer and Schröter, 2001; Gann and Duignan, 1977).
Rechenberg introduced „district commissioners‟ who were to govern the affairs of each
district and ensure just treatment of plantation workers. The freedom of the plantation
owners to punish recalcitrant workers by flogging was restricted and for the first time
„whites‟ were being charged for brutalities against „blacks‟ (ibid).
However, the colonial government continued to be weak with about 10.5 percent of the
population being organized and ruled by Swahili-speaking Akidas and only 1.5 percent
were subject to the district administration (Gann and Duignan). The Germans depended
largely on the traditional African authorities to enforce peace and to make people obey
government regulations. In this system, the German administrative heads of districts
were men with extraordinary powers, controlling troops and police, and operating as
judges and executive officers, who could use their military powers and control over the
Schutztruppe to „sway‟ the chiefs and Akidas to follow German rules and regulations.
2.3.4 World War I
In 1914, East Africa became embroiled in World War I, a war that unleashed another
period of human and ecological devastation in the region. The Germans increased the
Schutztruppe numbers from 2,500 to 14,000, including 3,000 German commissioned
and non-commissioned officers, mostly from the ranks of the plantation owners and
colonial administrators (Baer and Schröter, 2001). The Askaris of this expanded
Schutztruppe had a small minority from Sudan and Congo, with the majority being
former porters and wage laborers from the East African colony.
14
German East Africa was surrounded by allied forces. The British alone had 114,000
troops, not including the Belgians and Portuguese, who also fought the Germans (Gann
and Duignan, 1977). The war was largely fought on the backs of porters who carried
supplies and became conscripts in the armies of the European powers. Estimations by
German officials put the number of porters who died for the German side at 120,000
(Bear and Schröter, 2001). The Germans also demanded conscripts amongst the civilian
population. Both, the British and Germans destroyed infrastructure to prevent the other
side from using it, with the Germans destroying large sections of the railroad lines. It is
estimated that a total of ½ million people, of a total population of 7.5 million, died in
German East Africa (ibid). German losses were minimal at 735 people (Baer and
Schröter, 2001).
In February 1916 a large force of British, Indian and African troops under the command
of South African General Jan Smuts invaded from Kenya and by September had
captured the central railway and – together with Belgian forces from the Congo –
controlled some 90 per cent of the territory‟s population. (Havinden, 1993)
The war effort, with its heavy demands to feed the expanded Schutztruppe, had
significant impact on the food production in the East African colony. Maize and cassava
were promoted by the government, and in mountain areas too cold for maize production,
potatoes gained importance. The Germans recruited many local and migrant laborers to
guard the „British‟ borders (to prevent infiltration) and/ or join the porters (Huijzendveld,
2008). The plantation owners relied increasingly on women and children who were
forced to work by the Akida (ibid).
2.4 Tanganyika under British Rule
2.4.1 Agricultural Production, Land and Labor
The British inherited a colonial economy based on the production of export crops on
European farms and plantations. The former German properties were not returned to
Africans (with the exception of the upper slopes of Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro),
but placed under the Custodian of Enemy Property and beginning in 1921 they were
auctioned off with the bulk of the properties landing in Greek, Indian, British and Dutch
hands (Sabea, 2008). The British and Indians owned large tracts of land and dominated
the sisal industry, which required a heavy outlay of capital and depended upon easy
access to communications – railway routes or the sea (Albertini, 2010; Sabea, 2008).
A common characteristic of colonial economies was the dependence on a small range of
crops or mineral products (Schuknecht, 2010). By the time of the Great Depression,
Tanganyika‟s economy derived 70 percent of its export earnings from three crops: sisal
(43.2 per cent), cotton (14.8 percent) and coffee (12.6 percent) (ibid). In fact, sisal
production had doubled between 1913 to 1929 (van Albertini, 1982).
Although the British retained the plantation sector, they placed heavy emphasis on the
creation of commercial smallholder agriculture (Schuknecht, 2010; Håkanson, et.al.
2008; Foushey, 2008). As Cameron, the governor of British East Africa explained in
1926:
“The first object of the Government is to induce the native to become a producer directly or indirectly, that is,
to produce or assist in producing something more than the crop or local foodstuff‟s that he requires for the
sustenance of himself and his family” (cited in Schuknecht, R., 2010).
15
The cultivation of coffee (in the highlands) and cotton (in the plains) was encouraged,
and maize was spread as a food and market crop. Despite resistance from European
plantation owners, coffee farms run and owned by the Chagga were established around
Kilimanjaro, leading to economic prosperity of some groups (Albertini, 1982). In 1924,
the Chagga planters formed the Native Planters Association, which demanded that all its
members had to sell their coffee through it (ibid). Cotton continued to be an important
crop for the British economy, and the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, a lobby group
of major British textile manufacturers, promoted the cultivation of the crop in Tanganyika
(Schuknecht, 2010).
In the late 1920s, the British introduced the “Grow More Crops” campaign to increase
agricultural production by native farmers and plantation owners to offset low Depression
era prices (Fourshey, 2008). The imposition of quotas for particular crops and a certain
acreage meant that the state was now moving farmers towards crop diversification and
the intense commercial production that the British desired. It was hoped that this policy
would increase the production of crops that could be sold and exported by pressuring
farmers to plant more (maize in particular) and work harder at doing so (ibid). The policy
was driven by expectations of increased output. There was little discussion around the
nutritional value of maize, compared to traditional staple crops, or the implications on
food security with the decline of slowly maturing, but drought resistant crops, such as
millet and sorghum. In fact, the British initiated a massive propaganda campaign that
portrayed millet and sorghum as „famine‟ crops that are less nutritious, slow maturing,
low yielding, whilst maize was presented as a potential wonder crop that might mature in
as few as sixty to seventy days (ibid). 4
In 1939, at the outset of World War II, the Grow More Crops campaign gained a new life
when the British proclaimed that the wartime economic policy of the Tanganyika
Territory was “Produce to the limit. Export all we can” (Fourshey, 2008). A 1939 memo to
the provincial commissioners and agricultural officers circulated by the Department of
Agriculture in Tanganyika outlined the objectives: “The United Kingdom will require
increased quantities of maize and will be able to absorb any increases in exports from
this Territory” (ibid). Maize was crucial to the British as a critical food source for laborers
and soldiers and could be used industrially (for fiber and oil). Maize seeds were supplied
at little or no cost, whilst the government continued to emphasize maize in its advertizing
campaigns (newspapers, shops, cold stores, steamers, and railways). The impact was
that during British rule maize acreage doubled in Tanganyika, whilst sorghum and millet
acreages plummeted (ibid).
British colonialism thus emphasized the transformation of poor, subsistence societies
into communities of individuals engaged in market production through the cultivation of
cash crops (including maize) or waged employment on plantations. The decline of millet
and sorghum was most profound in southwestern Tanganyika, but it also affected other
areas, depending on the local agro-ecology. Huijzenveld (2008), focusing on West
Usambara, for instance, discusses how irrigated banana cultivation constituted the core
of agricultural activities until the late 1890s. By 1914, maize, which was later followed by
potato and cassava (rain fed) with extensive slash and burn had taken over as a staple.
Banana cultivation, crucial for subsistence during drought, provided 2 to 3 times more
calories per unit land than maize, declined considerably (ibid). The reasons for this shift
are multiple: labor demands on the local population to pay taxes forced many to migrate
to work, irrigation requirements for coffee which used irrigation channels for long
4
Fourshey, who has done extensive research on Maize in colonial Tanganyika writes that the British also
pushed cassava, in light of its drought resistance, despite its low nutritional qualities (Fourshey, 2008)
16
distance water transport and processing of coffee at the plantation, meant the diversion
of water away from subsistence crops. The loss of authority by local elites meant that
complaints to colonial officials were mostly settled in favor of plantation owners, not
natives.
In 1923, the British passed a Land Ordinance which declared all lands as „public lands‟.
Europeans had occupancy rights for 99 years, with specified rents and development
conditions pertaining to the title (Sabea, 2008). African land rights were determined by
„native interests‟ and the recognition and enforcement of native customs. As Donald
Cameron, the Governor (1925-1931) elaborated: “it is right to the use of the land and not
to its ownership which is vested in the Governor for the benefit of the tribe” (quoted in
Sabea, 2008). Land rights for the native population were largely usufruct rights linked to
a tribe‟s occupation of given areas through cultivation and residence.
However, as people retained access to land for household production, labor markets
developed in only partial and uneven ways. The key to capitalist development – free
wage labor (a proletariat) – was absent and thus the „labor problem‟ that the Germans
had confronted, remained. Forced labor continued to be the primary means to build
infrastructure (roads and railways), whilst taxes provided the „incentive‟ for workers to
seek employment. In 1923, the British introduced a tax for the localities and imposed
criminal sanctions on „deserters‟ (van Albertini, 1982). The tax was equivalent to one or
two months‟ wages at the prevailing rates (Spear, 1997). A few years later, the British
appointed a special labor commissioner who pressed for state controls on working
conditions of plantation labor; however, the issue of wages was not included (ibid).
Between 1929 and 1932, the prices of sisal fell from £ 32 per ton to £ 12 per ton; at the
same time wages reduced by half (ibid). By 1935, prices had risen to £ 29 per ton, but
wages had remained unchanged. The 1933 Baker Report highlighted that wages were
insufficient to provide adequate diet and housing, pointing to the reality that despite the
importance of export crops, employment in that sector did not improve the living
conditions of the laborers (ibid).
British interests in East Africa focused more heavily on Kenya and Uganda, than on
„mandate territory‟ of Tanganyika in terms of investments (Waters, 2000). This was due
to Britain‟s own economic strains due to the decline of Britain as a world power, the
social and economic strains of WWI, and the large-scale unemployment in Britain
resulting from the great depression (Brett, 1992). Investments by colonial governments
in the economic development of their countries depended on their public revenues and
their ability to borrow funds from London (Havinden, 1993). The former were tied to
taxes on trade (which were kept low) and the later were scarce during the interwar
period, as the colonial governments had to provide social services and pay the costs of
administration, defense and pensions of retired British officials. Most importantly,
throughout the British colonial period, aid to the colonies was seen from the perspective
of the center: as a cost to the British taxpayer, the benefits to the British economy and
the prolongation of British authority (ibid).
2.4.2 Wildlife and Forests under British Rule
British forest and wildlife policies were part of the larger colonial project that transferred
control of valuable resources from Africans to Europeans (Neuman, 1998). Building
upon German efforts providing for a seamless transition between the British and the
Germans, the „forest estates‟ were expanded, colonial forest service personnel was
posted throughout the country, and a National Forest Policy that reflected the colonial
17
scientific and economic preoccupation with forests was implemented (Hurst, 2003). The
principles of colonial forestry included forestry as a separate sphere of activity through
control and management of forest reservations, the imperative of generating financial
returns from the nation‟s forests, and the establishment of a cadre of foresters.
German boundaries of existing forest reserves were accepted and with the 1925 Forest
Policy further forest areas were reserved for economic and ecological reasons.
Reserved forests were to allow the economic exploitation of wood resources in light of
the general view that there was an „idleness of the forest capital and that plantation
forestry to provide timber to commercial centers would be lucrative and useful (Hurst,
2003). German plantations of teak and pine were to be extended. The spatial
segregation – the reservation of forested lands – outside the bounds of normal land
management was fundamental to maximize exploitation of forests and the protection of
large tracts of forests to maintain an ecological and climatological balance.
Between the 1930s and 1950s, the British introduced exotic trees suited for plantation
production for timber, firewood and pulpwood. By the early 1950s, large scale planting –
pines, cypresses and eucalyptus – was begun, particularly in the highland areas
(Lundgren and Lundgren, 1983). The 1953 Forest Policy, as the earlier Policy, was
designed to ensure commercial timber production and restrict local people‟s access to
state forests. Although the 1953 Policy made reference to non-demarcated lands as
those which would serve the needs of the local population and in which local
government bodies should be assisted to maximize the utilization of wood, few
resources were devoted to this effort (Hurst, 2003). The distinction between state forests
(for the benefit of industrial economy) and local forests was a common feature across
the British Empire (Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007), reflecting the imperatives of
the colonial state. Under the British, forest reserves tripled covering 3,386 square miles
to 10,945 square miles, with the most significant increase coming after WW II, when
pressures to exploit resources were the greatest (Neumann, 1997) with new reserves
being located near markets and ports for export. The British thus laid the foundation for
forest industries that would later be expanded by independent Tanzania.
As outlined earlier, the Land Ordinance of 1923, which made all land the property of the
British Crown, with customary land rights held at the discretion of the Governor, enabled
expropriation of land when it suited the colonial state (Shivji, 1998). From the 1930s
forward, colonial policies were shaped by the changing European conservation attitudes
which were promulgated in the 1933 Convention for the Protection of the Flora and
Fauna of Africa that mandated colonial administrations to adopt wildlife protection
measures. In 1940, the British passed the Game Ordinance establishing national parks
as a legal entity (Nelson, et.al., 2007).
2.4.3 Indirect Rule
During the pre-World War II colonial period, the British advocated „indirect rule‟, which
meant the administration of colonial subjects through traditional rulers or institutions,
most notably chiefs. This meant that chiefs – now considered Native Authorities – were
to be given legislative, judicial and executive power. Chiefs were also given powers to
collect taxes and recruit labor. In practice, indirect rule was quite different than
envisioned. A lack of understanding of traditional institutions made it difficult to make
sense of the diversity of tribal structures. For instance, in the Luguru area, there was not
a single chief, but 800 lineage heads; not to mention the mismatch between tribal and
administrative boundaries (Young and Fosbrooke, 1960).
18
Further, the policy of indirect rule assumed that „traditional authorities‟ would oblige and
offer themselves as claimants of traditional office. As a result, there was the tendency to
elevate some men that could carry out the key functions of government, without much
concerns as to the process by which local society had accepted these leaders (ibid). It
is not surprising that there was considerable abuse. Spear (1997) outlines how chiefs
used their authority for personal accumulation and some became the wealthiest and
most powerful men in their localities, supporting their own patronage networks to
advance their positions. By in 1926, Cameron‟s administration created the Native
Authority Ordinance, which provided treasuries for salaries of chiefs, sub-chiefs and
officials and monies for the construction of houses, roads, and schools (von Albertini,
1982).
In some localities, the German Akida system (appointed outsiders) stayed in place and
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, customary chiefs were removed and replaced with
„better administrators” (Schneider, 2006a). The perceived inability and ineffectiveness of
customary chiefs as agents of central government and progressive politics, the
pressures from nationalist and anti-imperial groups in colonial countries, and forms of
resistance to land and labor policies, led to a new vision throughout the British Empire:
native authorities were to be replaced with elected councilors. The trend to move
towards extending franchise to the local population and constitutional advances in British
colonies began in India in 1919, under the pressures from Gandhi‟s Civil Disobedience
campaigns and the reality of a weakened British Empire unable to continue to govern
India, as they had before.
A 1947 Circular Dispatch informed governors throughout the African colonies of the
need to secure African cooperation in development programs and that government
should be close to the people, efficient to improve the living standards, democratic to
absorb the educated and command respect and support of the masses of the people
(Cell, 1992). In 1953, the British passed the Tanganyika Local Government Ordinance
which established elected country and local councils (with directly and indirectly elected
local councilors) (Schneider, 2006a).
2.4.4 Towards Independence
Over the course of colonial rule, colonial policies in agriculture, land and labor stirred
discontent. The push towards maize, though successful in many areas of the country,
was not received without opposition. Farmers were reluctant to cultivate maize in the
prescribed acreages as yields varied from year to year and region to region. At the
same time, traditional staple foods held cultural significance for rituals and special
occasions (Fourshey, 2008). Further, from the 1930s through the 1950s, a series of
conservation agriculture techniques (later found to be mis-informed) were enforced
through the Native Authorities Ordinance and raised discontent and resistance the
countryside (Feierman, 1990). British policies, rules and regulations became increasingly
restrictive: forced acreages for maize, cotton, cassava (as an anti-famine measure),
prohibitions of tree cutting in state lands or transporting cattle without permits, tight
controls on cattle inoculations, without which hides could not be sold, etc (Coulson,
1982). In 1951, the government attempt to displace Nanyuki peoples in favor of white
dairy farmers led to large protests and the case was presented to the United Nations
Security Council (Coulson, 1982). Across this period, chiefs increasingly lost influence,
as demands of the economy led many to leave their homelands and relocate near
19
economic opportunities in plantations or urban centers, and as their loyalties eroded as
they were used to enforce European policy (Feierman, 1990).
In the midst of these unpopular policies and with dissatisfaction among elites of colonial
education plans as well as with the under-representation of Africans within the
Legislative Council, the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) was founded in
1954. With a constituency of educated Tanganyikans using Swahili as its language of
operations, TANU did not appeal to one specific ethnicity over another. Throughout the
mid-1950s, TANU‟s influence spread across Tanganyika as it organized non-violent
strikes and acts of disobedience in defiance against agricultural rules. The party gained
support not only from teachers, traders and government clerks, but also form exportcrop, food-crop, and labor exporting regions (Iliffe, 1979). While the British tried to
diminish its influence, by 1958, the colonial power announced that Tanganyika would
become an independent African state. In 1961, power was handed over peacefully to
TANU‟s leader, Julius Nyerere (Coulson, 1982).
2.5 Post-Colonial Tanzania
2.5.1 The Nyerere Era
In its initial years following independence, Tanzania‟s socio-political landscape was
characterized by the promotion of pan-African and Tanzanian identity, the consolidation
of central government control in rural development and governance, as well as African
socialism. A primary and immediate focus of the new state was to establish modern
health and education facilities throughout the country for which funds were needed. One
of the key issues raised by independence leaders had been the repressive and coercive
measures of colonial rulers in the collection of taxes. Facing the same issues with
revenue generation as their colonial predecessors (Hyden, 1997), Tanzania accepted a
large number of aid programs from the US, The USSR, China, and Scandinavian
countries (Waters, 2000).
Without a stated development ideology, the country‟s first 3-year development plan fell in
line with a World Bank report‟s recommendations for development, which included an
emphasis on developing commodity production to realize the benefits of market
economics. Scandinavian governments, in particular, funded factories, rural
development programs, and health programs with the goals to increase productivity and
self-sufficiency (Waters, 2000). At the same time, the government put in place a number
of initiatives to reform its structural make-up: schools were racially de-segregated, and a
wave of government posts transitioned to Tanzanian nationals such that 60 percent of
posts were filled by Tanzanian nationals by 1967 (compared with 30 percent in 1962).
New districts were created and the government established the National Development
Corporation, the Tanzania Central Bank, and the Tanganyika Housing Association
(Robinson, 2001).
In 1962, „self-help‟ was incorporated as a formal development policy (Jennings, 2003).
At the local level, the government dismantled traditional rural authorities and customary
tribal law through the repeal of the African Chiefs Ordinance in 1963 and put in its place
elected village councils and village development committees to establish formal
channels for bottom-up development planning and local structures for self-help schemes
to operate (Miguel, 2004). In 1962, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were
formed for the first time, comprised of village council members, local party leaders, as
well as village elites (heads of cooperatives, successful farmers and other producers,
20
etc.). These committees decided on land allocations for crops for each farmer, and selfhelp initiatives for village members and their planning was to inform national
development plans (Jennings, 2003). Further, the conservation and management of
common property resources – public lands, irrigation intakes, riverbanks and forests that
colonial institutions had supported local chiefs and kin groups to regulate – dissolved
into negotiations between farmers and planners over usage as the power of chiefs
became obsolete and associated with colonial power (Sheridan, 2004).
Within this system, there were few opportunities for women to rise within the civil service
despite the important role they played in campaigning and mobilization for TANU during
the liberation movement. Rather, since independence, women‟s roles in politics became
confined to the Women‟s Union, which focused on women as targets of development
efforts to „modernize‟ traditional practices in child-rearing, cooking, eating and health,
rather than seeing women as actors in nation-building and politics (Bujra, 1998).
The various initiatives during this early phase of independence also served as a means
for development actors and the state to influence traditional communities resistant
against the rise of a cash economy in Tanzania (Coulson, 1982). Initially, the self-help
model was seen as a low-cost means for development with limited government support.
Villages used this scheme to repair and build infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges,
schools, health clinics and dispensaries, community centers, party offices and fish
ponds. Many village councils used these self-help schemes to secure government
funding, as constructed schools required teachers, and dispensaries would need drugs
and nurses to staff them. In this way, state funds were not balanced across regions, as
communities more organized to pull together project proposals gained greater funding
than less developed areas. Between 1963-1964, Kilimanjaro was allocated double the
amount for self-help in comparison to most other regions of Tanzania.
Patron-client relations flourished, and the disparate priorities of the central government
and local communities soon emerged. Self-help projects were spontaneously initiated to
improve local living conditions in contradiction to the national government‟s development
plans focused on expanding production (in line with World Bank recommendations).
Further, the government feared that disillusionment in the state‟s capacity to deliver
would lead to growing opposition. From this perspective, local elites and cooperatives
were viewed more as obstacles to development and socialism rather than allies
(Coulson, 1982).
By 1963, the Government of Tanzania reformed the Village Development Committee
and District Development Committee to increase administrative control. Reflecting global
development practice at that time, development schemes became increasingly top-down
to keep planning and decision-making within a small group of elites. Central control over
local development was further concentrated in 1967 with the development of the District
Development and Planning Committee, which placed the area commissioner, technical
officers, the district council chairman, Member of Parliament, finance committee officers
and executive officer in authority for all local development programs. By 1969, Ministerial
appointed Ward Development Committees replaced Village Development Committees,
further marginalizing middle-class and poor peasants from community-level decisions
affecting their lives (Coulson, 1982).
2.5.2 Nyerere’s Socialism and Villagization
The Arusha Declaration in 1967 was a key moment in the history of Tanzania and was
influenced by emerging development debates and ultimately a paradigm shift. The
Arusha Declaration set out to establish principles around development based on equity,
21
self-reliance and rural development (Robinson, 2001). Under this policy, TANU outlined
its vision for socialism within Tanzania, emphasized the abolition of exploitation, peasant
and worker ownership of the means of production, and the need to gain independence
through self-reliance. To accomplish this vision, the government nationalized banks and
large commercial buildings, established a price commission to regulate prices, created a
series of state-owned companies, and launched ujamaa vijijini (socialist villages, known
popularly as villagization from 1973-1976). These reforms were envisaged to develop
collective structures as a basis for agriculture as well as expand rural access to basic
services.
Villagization rearranged the organization and power structures of societies, as
households were voluntarily, then forcibly relocated into collective communities for
communal work. In this initiative, clans whose lands became sites of new villages
frequently became the top tier of a new rural class structure leading to the
marginalization of other groups who had been forced to move onto „foreign‟ land. During
these moves, new households were allocated plots of land, granted under the name of
male household heads excluding married women from claims over property. Further,
villagization affected different regions to varying degrees, with minimal relocation of
farmers in the cash-crop plantations to the north and with the Lindi and Mtwara regions
in the South as the first areas to undergo villagization. (CARE Tanzania, 2010).
The compulsory villagization of the rural population in Tanzania during the early 1970s
was the largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa (Hydén, 1980). Between 1973
and 1976, over eleven million people were moved and at the conclusion of the program
thirteen million or 80 percent of the country‟s population were living in „new‟ villages
(including the earlier programs initiated in 1969) (Shao, 1986). The government used
extensive force by the military and para-military, which often used violence against
persons and property (Coulson, 1982).
Pastoralists suffered disproportionately from the villagization schemes. The Barabaig
people of Hanang district, for instance, were coerced to move to villages by the 1973
order of the Regional Commissioner (Shao, 1986). In the discussion of the colonial
period, we mentioned the devastation of pastoral people‟s lives because of cattle
disease and colonial resettlement policies. Just as the colonial powers viewed
pastoralists as „unruly subjects‟ that needed to be „civilized‟5, the leaders of independent
Tanzania failed to understand the rationality of transhumance (nomadism), which is a
sensible response to low and marginal rainfall. For pastoralist groups, villagization
greatly restricted their way of life (Miguel, 2004). With the best lands allocated to a small
minority of elites, the maintenance of private livestock ownership, and the minimal
relocation of farmers in arable cash-crop areas concentrated in the north, these
initiatives did not lead to greater equality (ibid).
In theory, the socialist movement in Tanzania was meant to empower peasants, in
reality, however, the rural poor had little opportunities for meaningful participation,
particularly with government decentralization. Decentralization of the 1970‟s served to
consolidate control by the center across Tanzania. During this time, cooperative unions
were nationalized and then replaced by parastatals (national corporations), locally
5
In British India, where there were a large number of pastoral and wandering groups, the British, as a result
of their inability to extract taxes and their racist colonial attitudes, declared a large number of groups that
migrated seasonally as „criminal tribes‟. Historians have pointed out that the need to control the movements
of wandering groups led to stereotyping of nomadic groups as „criminal elements and unruly subjects,
leading to the „notification‟ of some 3,5 million people as „criminal tribes‟ in 1871, which included a variety of
marginal people, who did not conform to the colonial pattern of settled agriculture and wage labor.
22
elected government was dismantled and in its place central-government appointed
development officers made decisions on behalf of communities, sometimes in alliance
with local elites. In addition, the flow of information became strictly controlled through the
Newspaper Act and Tanzania News Agency Act of 1972 (Samoff, 1979). The number of
civil servants posted to regions rose from 75,000 in 1972 to 175,000 by 1983. In this
way, areas of social, economic and political life were subsumed by the party-state
apparatus (Robinson, 2001).
These circumstances enabled fraud and corruption and facilitated patronage systems. In
terms of livelihoods, villagization also made it difficult for households to cultivate
effectively, as many plots for relocation were in areas with poor soil quality or overgrown
bush, households were situated farther from fields, and raising livestock or protecting
crops from wildlife became problematic (Coulson, 1982).
Despite these drastic reforms in the social organization of society, communities also saw
very little change in gender roles and relationships within family institutions. Household
gendered division of labor persisted, with women taking on more roles within agricultural
labor (and taking charge of food crops) and men maintaining power over cash crops.
The practice of bride price remained a common feature across Tanzania. Further, the
Marriage Act of 1971 provided for polygamy (with the first wife‟s consent) and set the
marriageable age for girls at 15 (and 18 for boys). Though the Marriage Act also
provided for divorce and women‟s rights to own property and retain it, in practice,
traditional land inheritance systems were maintained within communities and women
generally remained economically dependent upon their husband‟s land (Coulson, 1982).
Just as the top-down controls in political participation led to a visible fall in local self-help
initiatives for community development, the mandatory nature of villages for communal
work, combined with fixed prices and regulations on marketing/selling crops,
compromised farmer incentives for production (ibid). Further, this period coincided with a
number of financial shocks – with the spike in oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979,
drought from 1973-74, the break-down of the East African Community in 1977, as well
as the war with Uganda (Lele, 1989). During this time, Tanzania shifted from having the
highest food production rate within the region throughout the 1960s, to a country that
imported around 200,000-300,000 metric tons of grain per year throughout the late
1970s and early 1980s (Wei, undated). By 1982, food output fell 88 percent in
comparison to 1969 and many rural poor faced a food security crisis, which led some
households to seek alternative means for livelihoods such as poaching or illegal use of
game lands (Yeager and Miller, 1986).
At the same time, strong central government and villagization did facilitate greater
access to goods and services for many rural peasants, who found themselves closer to
roads where schools, health facilities, water and local markets were more easily
accessible (Coulson, 1982). This period also saw government investment for universal
primary education, as well as initiatives promoting education for self-reliance and adult
literacy (Mascarenhas, 2007). At the same time, there was also an increase in village
health workers and medical assistants in rural communities and Tanzania experienced
gains in preventative health (Harrington, 1998).
2.5.3 Structural Adjustment, Liberalization and Decentralization
With inefficient parastatals, low levels of production and nationalized corporations
indebted to nationalized banks, Tanzania was recipient to one of the highest levels of
non-military foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa by 1980 (Coulson, 1982). Despite the
large amount of foreign funding, Tanzania remained one of the poorest countries in
23
terms of per capita income (Waters, 2000). In 1986, struggling with falling agricultural
production and increasing dependence on foreign aid, Tanzania – based on World Bank
requirements – underwent a period of structural adjustment. The country opened to
market liberalization, and privatized state-run businesses and banks. During this period,
the Tanzanian government downsized its investments in public services by eliminating
50,000 public sector jobs and introducing user fees for social services.
Under the leadership of Mkapa from 1995-2005, economic priorities focused on
globalization and entrepreneurship (Shivji 2006), and the government underwent a
process of eliminating price controls, liberalizing internal and external trade, abolishing
export taxes and initiating reforms to liquidate parastatals (Ponte, 1998). In line with
these changes, the government leased large tracts of land to foreign business,
expanded protected park lands and established hunting blocks (and native hunting bans
in these same areas) to promote conservation, foreign investment and tourism (Dowie,
2009).
The drastic economic reforms that took place beginning in the mid 1980‟s succeeded in
increasing government revenue, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita more
than doubled between 1994 and 2006 (World Bank, 2008). However, growth has been
uneven to the exclusion of the rural poor, and inequality has increased in terms of
income and wealth as well as access to quality education, health care, livelihood
security, as well as land and other natural resources.
For rural producers, these policies resulted in the removal of agricultural subsidies and
price supports and wage freezes (Johnson, 2004). This created conditions where smallscale agricultural producers were no longer able to compete. Farm incomes and
investment were depressed whilst liberalization generated new opportunities for land
grabbing by both domestic and foreign capital at the expense of peasant holdings
(Bernstein, 2001). In her article on the „End of Smallholder Farming‟, Marjorie Mbilinyi
(1997) highlights the impact of structural adjustment policies and liberalization on small
scale rural producers in Tanzania. The policies meant that the restrictions on the
movement of grains across regional boundaries were removed and pricing policies were
abolished. Private traders were now allowed to purchase crops directly from farmers and
they began to provide farm inputs and credit, and have often become the primary buyers
in rural localities, replacing cooperative arrangements in many areas. In areas with poor
infrastructure, this meant that producers were not selling at competitive prices in primary
markets where farmers could choose among different buyers, but were now faced with a
situation where traders are able to dominate and dictate prices. Further, traders
insistence on the use of volume unit measures rather than weight measures, allowed
cheating, whilst the absence of grading systems, reduced the incentives to maintain
quality output.
2.5.4 Political Reform and the Power of the CCM
During the 1980s, the various reforms focused on „getting the economy right‟. In the
early 1990s, however, international agencies demanded reforms of political and
administrative structures and a pluralistic political system as a condition for aid
(Carothers, 2006; Hydén, 2006). Some reforms had already been put in place, for
example, the 1982 legislation that re-instated local authorities, increasing village level
participation in development planning, though lack of resources for funding development
remained a problem. In 1990, Nyerere proposed a review of the single party system.
Following, the party underwent a number of reforms. Party members were allowed to
engage in private capitalist activities and since 1992, political parties apart from Chama
24
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, which was a merger of TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party of
Zanzibar) have been allowed to form and register to campaign and contest elections at
the Presidential and National Assembly levels, under some regulations (Mascarenhas,
2007). During this time, the number of independent media sources also expanded,
creating space for political discussion and debate (Shivji, 2006).
After nearly two decades of the introduction of a multi-party system, the CCM continues
to enjoy monopoly of power. The party has won three national multi-party elections with
increasingly large margins (Therkildsen, 2009). The 2005 general elections were also
overwhelmingly won by CCM with 93 percent in 2519 wards (Tidemand and Msami,
2010). Similarly, at the village council level in the 2004 election, the CCM got 97 percent
of all votes (ibid). Therkildsen (2009), attributes the CCM‟s power and electoral success
to its ability to maintain an uneven political playing field in the context of multi-party
competition, providing political access to office for its leading members, and
responsiveness to voter preferences.
Although national and presidential elections have been declared free and fair by national
and international observers, there are election rules that reinforce the CCM‟s
dominance. Only party members are allowed to stand for candidacy and with CCM‟s
strong geographic hold throughout the country at all levels (village, district, regional, and
national), CCM candidates often run unopposed. At the same time, the national elections
are held one year after the grass-roots elections, with CCM members in political offices
(and sometimes civil servants) at the lower levels mobilizing voters for the higher level
elections.
The President, who is also the chair of the party, has overarching powers through his
ability to appoint, promote, terminate, transfer, dismiss the Chief Secretary, permanent
secretaries and their deputies, heads of extra-ministerial / independent departments,
regional administrative secretaries for regions, regional and district commissioners, high
commissioners and ambassadors, and members of the public service committees (Bana
and McCourt, 2006, cited in Therkildsen, 2009).
Further, the party has been able to maintain support across regional, ethnic, social and
class divides. In fact, when TANU was formed in the 1950s and since its rise to mass
support, it has not withdrawn support from any societal group. Today, the CCM consists
of a coalition of various factions who share a nationalistic outlook and a pragmatic
interest in staying in power. Landmark reforms, such as the abolition of primary school
fees, the abolition of the development levy (a local tax that had been reintroduced in
2003), reintroduction of fertilizer subsidies, and expansion of secondary school
education, had popular support (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). Whilst there have been
other key reforms, such as the Local Government Reform, the privatization of banks,
telecommunications and utilities and the introduction of direct foreign investment in
natural resource exploitation, these have only partly been implemented and some lack
widespread political and policy support (Therkildsen, 2009). Other political parties are
fragmented, tend to be dominated by a few individuals, have relatively weak linkages to
the grass roots and remote parts of the country. This leads to their inability to influence
decisions at local, national or executive levels (REPOA, 2008).
These dynamics appear to be changing, however, as in the 2010 election, the party
suffered set-backs as President Kikwete of the CCM won with only 61 percent of the
vote, as opposed to 2005 when he won with a comfortable 80 percent. The latest
elections not only saw lower voter turn-out (with only 43 percent of registered voters
coming to the polls, as opposed to 72 percent in 2005), but also notable gains for the
25
opposition parties – with the leading opposition party Chadema gaining 50 of 322 seats
in the parliament (Whilehead, 2010; Gettleman, 2010).
2.5.5 Local Government Reform
The 1999 Local Government Laws Act called for the promotion of accountability and
citizen participation as well as greater local government autonomy through consultation
between local and central government bodies. In this model, local development
decisions are made at the level of District Councils, though case studies of local
government found the central government still approves important local government
deliberations in Tanzania, and issues in accountability and transparency of local
government leaders to citizens remain weak (Robinson, 2001). At least 30 percent of
council members at the district and village levels must be women. These appointments
are made to mirror proportions of party representation within councils at each level (as
well as within Parliament) (ibid).
Figure. Local Government Structures and Lines of Appointment
The local government reform also called for village councils to engage in participatory
approaches (through Participatory rural Appraisal, Opportunities and Obstacles to
Development tools and Community Information Systems) to enhance citizen
26
participation in village development planning and to improve communications. While
these methods have begun to be implemented across a number of villages, a study by
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) of six case districts and municipalities found
challenges in the reform‟s implementation in terms of government accountability, citizen
involvement, or implementation of participatory approaches (Chaliga, 2007).
Civil society actors and citizen participation are beginning to gain space, as well. Civil
society has more space to influence local development plans through representation in
Ward Councils, though these participants do not have an official vote in ward-level
decisions. Trade Unions and Cooperative Unions are no longer government
entities.(Lawyers Environmental Action Team, 2010a). However, a number of measures
remain to limit the influence of civil society. The National Policy on Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) maintains that NGOs must remain non-political, are subject to
registration requirements, and must submit annual activity and financial reports to be
audited by the Registrar‟s office (Lawyers Environmental Action Team, 2010b).
Registration requirements for both NGOs and unions, however, enable the government
to refuse registration for any civil society organization.
While Local Government Reform (LGR) calls for greater space in citizen participation
and greater local autonomy, case studies of local government found the central
government still approves important local government deliberations in Tanzania, and
issues in accountability and transparency of local government remain weak (Robinson,
2001). To ensure citizen engagement, village councils are to engage the local population
in planning and development through participatory approaches (Participatory Rural
Appraisal, Opportunities and Obstacles to Development Tools and Community
Information Systems at Village Assembly Meetings. A REPOA case study of six districts
and municipalities found challenges in the LGR‟s implementation in terms of government
accountability, citizen involvement, or implementation of participatory approaches
(Chaliga, 2007). A survey conducted by the government of Tanzania found that many
Tanzanians valued the importance of civic participation, but did not feel that officials
listened to them. Among those interviewed, 22 percent of rural adults participated in
village planning activities with 9 percent who had attended a local council meeting within
the past year.
Beyond challenges in participation of citizens at the community level, the REPOA study
reported that rural village councils struggled with the multiple planning, budgeting and
reporting systems in addition to shortages of funds, compromising implementation of
plans (REPOA, 2007).6 In this system, while measures were taken for participation of
community members, many remained superficial and planning was generally carried out
by the village council management team. In this environment, the study found that many
community members interviewed did not feel they have avenues available to hold duty
bearers accountable or to terminate council officials for non-performance or corruption
(Chaliga, 2007).
To address and prevent corruption, the Government of Tanzania established the
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB). However, the PCB has not been able to prevent
corruption as high-ranking officials have interfered with investigations in the past and
political connections may influence how cases are followed up. The PCB is categorically
6
Under local government reform, each level of government is responsible for raising a large portion of their
own funds. However, the state also restricted types of taxes that could be imposed at the local government.
As such, local governments struggle to collect taxes, particularly as many citizens do not see the benefits
from taxes and resist payment.
27
unable to investigate the president. Issues in management, participation and
accountability have been reported not only in local government decision-making
structures, but also with justice systems, policy, health services, educational institutions
and other institutions. In a survey of Tanzanian perceptions on governance, almost half
of respondents felt poor accountability and corruption affected their lives and was
common across institutions, particularly among police, the legal system and health
services. Despite challenges, the survey found that respondents felt accountability and
governance have been improving over the past three years. In particular, respondents
saw improvements in education as well as in the accusations and dismissal of officials
for misuse of resources (URT, 2007).
2.5.6 Roles of Civil Society in Government
Enabling poor governance, civil society organizations and media also face barriers and
some elements of central control given registration and reporting procedures. While a
number of private media sources have emerged since political liberalization, their space
remains restricted. A series of restrictive acts from the 1960s and 1970s (The
Preventative Detention Act of 1962, the Newspaper Act of 1976 and the National
Security Act of 1970) continue to restrict space for journalists to access and report on
information. Some publications have been banned or their owners harassed in what is
interpreted as state intimidation. As a result, self-censorship is generally practiced by the
media, with many publications careful not to criticize government – particularly involving
police and security services. The role of media as a watchdog is further limited by a
system of bribes to journalists to ensure positive coverage, and the limited penetration of
newspapers into rural Tanzania. While radio remains the primary source of information
in rural Tanzania, stations remain dominated by the government-owned station, Radio
Tanzania (Lawson, et.al., 2005, ARD, 2003).
Before independence, civil society organizations have in the past played critical roles in
widening people‟s rights. Union strikes and boycotts posed a powerful threat to the
British, and the women‟s section of TANU was an important source for political
organizing and mobilization for the party that led to its independence (for discussion on
women in politics, see Textbox 1) (Geiger, 1997). However, upon independence both
workers‟ unions and the women‟s section of TANU were brought under state control. In
Independent Tanzania, however, the government has allowed space for NGOs within
the realm of service provision, but has tightened controls over civil society organizations
as more and more NGOs took an explicit focus on advocacy and human rights.
The NGO Act of 2002 explicitly banned NGOs from becoming political, but never clearly
defined what activities are considered „political‟ in concrete terms (Shivji, 2006). Further,
the Act established the NGO Board and NGO National Council, which can investigate
NGO activities and impose fines and penalties to those found to violate national laws.
NGOs must also align their activities to national development plans and are prohibited
from forming coalitions across NGOs (ARD, 2003). Today, regulations on civil society
activity and independent media greatly mirror colonial government measures taken to
repress liberation opposition (Shivji, 2006, Faloo, 2006). By and large, civil society
organizations remain heavily influenced and limited by government oversight and
regulations (Maoulidi, 2006). While NGOs do engage in advocacy, it remains guarded
and selective – both due to the policy environment along with, Shivji asserts, the elite
membership base and foreign donor dependence that have come to characterize NGOs
in Tanzania (2004). Those that have engaged more aggressively in advocacy agendas
28
have faced de-registration for crossing either becoming too political or duplicating
existing organs associated with the CCM (Tripp, 2000).
Beyond civil society, a number of informal institutions and interest groups also wield
influence at local to national levels. Through clans, elders are often elected or appointed
to committees and shared identity and membership offer an important source of
solidarity, through inheritance, appointments and elections (Lawson, et.al., 2005).
According to a Views of Religion survey conducted by Research and Education for
Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), 30 percent of traditional religious leaders contested
for local level positions during the 2000 elections as vitongoji leaders, ten cell leaders
and village council positions. Of those who sat for elections, 85% reported winning the
elections. Those who did not win cited poor education, age and their own ambivalence
about competing for the position for their loss (Mhina, 2006). Further, as an intensely
religious society, religious organizations and leaders can also act as powerful influencers
at the local level. In villages, village councils can act as extensions of mosque politics,
and Christian churches also play active roles in service provision. Within this context,
religious leaders play important roles in dispute arbitration and their opinions can hold
great weight within local communities. To represent their interests to the state,
BAKWATA (a Muslim representative council) and the Christian Council of Tanzania both
have cultivated links to government (Lawson, et. al. 2005).
Business associations also represent an influential interest group in Tanzania‟s political
context. Both the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture and the
Confederation of Tanzanian Industry are routinely consulted by the government in prebudget talks. Some political scientists assert that these groups have been critical in the
government decision to abolish „nuisance taxes‟ at the local level. Further informal
networks of powerful businessmen, politicians and civil servants have also played a role
in imports and tariffs, tax exemptions and government contracts across the privatization
process (ibid). Most recently, the development of Kilimo Kwanza was largely driven by
business interests in consultation with the government.
2.6 Conclusion
Our discussion of colonial rule illustrate the ways in which colonial powers took
advantage of brittle and fragile governing structures to control economic resources and
shape the political economy to suit their needs. The re-structuring of the means of
production (land and labor) to create an export economy and the creation of state
structures to preserve law and order and appropriate surplus are thus the key factors
that contributed to under-development. At the same time, the colonial powers laid the
foundation of modern state structures and facilitated the rise of elites (through their
educational and governance systems), who would lead the oppositional forces that
contributed to the demise of colonialism.
The response of the new independent nation was a strong commitment to state
intervention for social change. This has meant a complete re-organization of society, in
order to create the conditions for economic growth and development in which citizens
could be free from exploitation. This idea, promoted by Nyerere and TANU, had raised
the expectations of people. By the late 1960s, however, it became clear that the state
had not delivered on its promises to improve the lives of the common people. In line with
the prevailing paradigm in western development economics – a developmental state that
29
manages the economy by injecting funds – the World Bank and the international donor
community injected vast amounts of foreign aid. Through the nationalization of the
means of production and trade, the (party) state developed monopoly power over
virtually all economic activities, further institutionalizing its powerful position. These
macro-economic measures were accompanied by Nyerere‟s villagization schemes
envisioned to create collective structures as a basis for agriculture and greater ease to
expand basic services. Whilst villagization succeeded in considerable improvements in
education and health services, it not only failed to increase agricultural production, but in
combination with various other factors (including the 1974 drought), the scheme led to
food shortages from which the country was unable to recover for nearly a decade.
During the early 1980s, the global development paradigm shifted and neo-liberal policies
now condemned the developmental state and advocated its withdrawal from production
and trade, the reduction of inflation, and price incentives for local producers. Foreign aid
(much of it now provided in loans), crucial for Tanzania, was linked to „structural
adjustment‟ policies that would reduce the role of the state in the economy and thereby
the „leakage of funds‟ to political patronage. These changes were accompanied by
democratization policies, such as decentralization schemes and the introduction of a
multi-party system in the 1990s. A larger number of political parties emerged, but, so far,
none have been able to wrest power from the CCM, which is largely due to their inability
to finance, compete, and reach out to rural areas. This trend, however, seems to be
changing. During the last election (October 2010), the CCM won with a just over 60
percent, as opposed to the landslide margins that characterized earlier election
outcomes. At the same time, whilst decentralization schemes are in place, local political
actors are not responsive to the needs of local people, as accountability mechanisms
continue to work upwards. Further, a long history of being ruled as „subjects‟ has left a
large number of the rural population disempowered and unable to press local
government to work on their behalf.
Part 3. The Study Village in the Context of Larger Development Trends7
In the previous sections we have outlined the history of Tanzania and the profound
changes that have taken place in all spheres of the lives of rural people from the colonial
period through independence. In the following sections, we discuss the empirical
research that we conducted in village D of Mvomero district in the Morogoro region.
The study, which was designed to be a capacity building exercise in social analysis as
well as research to explore the underlying causes of poverty in one of the working
villages of CARE International in Tanzania, focuses on one slice of reality and is not
meant to be representative of the larger context of Morogoro region. At the same time,
in the larger development context of Tanzania, and the villages surrounding the WamiMbiki protected area, the findings offer considerable insight in terms of local governance,
class differentiation, including land tenure arrangements and cropping patterns, social
dynamics between pastoralists and agriculturalists, natural resources management, and
gender relations.
7
The names of places and people have been changed to protect the anonymity of the actors involved.
30
3.1 Morogoro Region
We begin this section with a brief outline of the Morogoro region including some basic
discussions of the social development indicators of the area. Morogoro is the second
largest administrative region in Tanzania, situated west of Dar es Salaam and extending
south along the Eastern Arc Mountain Range. It is comprised of five districts: Kilosa,
Kilombero, Ulanga, Mvomero and Morogoro.
In 2006, Morogoro Region had an estimated density of 27 persons/ km2, with higher
population densities in Morogoro Urban and Mvormero district (URT, 2002). In
comparison with other parts of Tanzania, however, density is below average, and the
combination of low population density and agriculturally favorable land has attracted
immigrants to the area. The 2002 census showed that of Morogoro‟s population, 16.2
percent were born outside of Morogoro. While a number of former residents have
migrated out of the region – particularly for Dar es Salaam), 2002 saw a net migration
into the area.
The people of Morogoro Region are mainly of Bantu origin,8 and most follow patrilineal
systems though the Luguru (who are the majority group in the Uluguru Mountains) follow
a matrilineal (and matrilocal) clans are traditionally led by the brother of the matriarch. In
this system, land could be inherited by both men and women, though control and
authority of women and her children are generally exerted by her brother (Brain, 1980).
Since land reform, there has also been a rise in primarily Maasai and Sukuma (agro)
pastoralist in the region, many of whom have moved south and resettled in search of
grazing land. In recent years, conflicts have arisen between these groups and local
populations over land use and rights.
3.1.1 Social Development
Assets and Income
According to the 2000/2001 Household Budget Survey, the mean per capita rural
household income in Morogoro was around 13,065 Tanzanian Shilling per month, or
about 10 USD per month.9 Twenty-nine percent of households in Morogoro fall below the
basic needs poverty line with 14 percent below the food poverty line,10 and households
reported spending about 70 percent of consumption expenditures on food (URT, 2002).
Health and Health Services
In terms of health, a number of people in Morogoro are vulnerable to poor health and
nutrition. In 2006, a government report found that 35.8 percent of children under the age
of five were stunted, with one in five children underweight. Further, as of 2005, the
region has seen high infant mortality rates of 111 deaths per 1000 live births. The
8
The primary tribes include: Wakaguru, Wasagara, Wavidunda, Wambunga, Wandamba, Wabena,
Wahehe, Wapogoro, Wandamba, Wangindo, Wabena, Wangoni, Waluguru, Wakutu, Wazigua, Wanguu and
Wakwere.
9
According to this report, the mean per capita household income was 37,408 Tsh among urban households,
and 18,406 Tsh in Morogoro across urban and rural households. The median per capita household income
was 7,668 Tsh in rural Morogoro, 16,328 among urban households, and 8563 Tsh across both urban and
rural households.
10
The household budget survey calculated the food poverty line at 5107 TSh and the basic needs poverty
line at 6996 TSh for 2000/2001. URT (2002) Tanzanian Household Budget Survey: p. 78.
31
leading causes of death for children under five are malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea and
anemia.
For people over five,
HIV and AIDS also
accounted for nearly
2.75 percent of deaths
in 2005. According to
the URT website, HIV
and AIDS is the leading
cause of adult mortality
in Morogoro, especially
affecting women. Also particularly vulnerable to HIV and AIDS are migrant workers. For
example, the government of Tanzania reported that there is an HIV prevalence of about
30 percent among farm and plantation workers in Iringa and Morogoro, compared to the
national HIV prevalence of 7 percent (URT, 2010).
Currently, the Tanzania Commission for AIDS reports that there is a national prevalence
rate of 5.7 percent among people between the ages of 15 and 49, with rates higher
among women (6.8 percent) in comparison to men (4.6 percent) (Tanzania Commission
on Aids, 2010). For children and adult men and women, malaria remains the leading
cause of death, though in Hai district, parts of Dar es Salaam region, and Morogoro
Rural, AIDS/TB is now the primary cause of mortality among adults (Mascarenhas,
2007).
Vulnerability to poor health is unequally distributed across Tanzanians. In terms of the
provision of healthcare, each health facility covers an average population of 7,254
people, though it is uneven across districts, with a ratio of one health facility per 10,000
people in Kilombero and Kilosa. In comparison with other regions, Morogoro gairs
relatively well in terms of access to healthcare with 2/3 of births taking place in health
facilities.
Education
In terms of education, Morogoro has reached 96 percent enrolment rates for children 713. However, retention and quality of learning in schools remains a problem, particularly
affecting girls. In terms of dropout, truancy and pregnancy were the main reasons for
drop-out, as policy states that girls must leave school if pregnant.
By secondary education, gender parity in enrolment disappears with boys‟ enrollment
over 10 percent higher than that of girls. In terms of achievement, one indicator used to
assess learning has been student performance in the standard examinations for
students leaving primary school. In 2005, Morogoro ranked last in pass rates, with 55.7
percent passing.
According to the Household Budget Survey of 2002, over 30 percent of adults in rural
Morogoro have had no education or only pre-school education. For women aged 15 or
up, 40 percent in rural areas have had no access to education. Only 66 percent of adults
32
in rural Morogoro are literate in any language. According to the 2004-05 Demographic
and Health Survey, 51 percent of women were able to read an entire sentence
presented to them, in comparison to 76.5 percent of men (Demographic and Health
Surveys, 2005).
In terms of performance, girls are consistently underperforming in the classroom, and
student achievement varies from region to region. For example, pass rates for the
Standard IV exams in 2008 stood at 70 percent in Morogoro, while in Dar es Salaam and
Dodoma, pass rates hovered at 97 percent (Ministry of Educational and Vocational
Training, 2008). Further, both early pregnancy and marriage have been identified as
obstacles against girls‟ education, as the law has until 2009 forced girls to leave school
upon pregnancy. Though a reform has since come into effect repealing this law, in
practice, many girls continue to face significant barriers accessing education after
pregnancy. The 2004-05 Demographic and Health Survey found 25 percent of
adolescents between the ages of 15-19 are pregnant or have already given birth. Rates
are particularly high along the Lake Zone as well as in the South (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2005).
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Across Morogoro, the main water sources for households are primarily: piped water,
protected and unprotected wells, as well as rivers and streams. Some households also
reported use of protected and unprotected springs, ponds or dams, rain water as well as
water vendors. Management of water resources are maintained at the village level by
water committees and funds. In terms of sanitation, pit latrines were most commonly
available across all districts, though some households reported that they did not have
access to any toilet facilities.
Topography
Morogoro holds both the mountainous areas of the Eastern Arc Mountains, as well as
lowlands to the north and through Kilombero district which extends from the south-west
to east. Mountains in the area include the Uluguru and Nguru mountain ranges, as well
as the Mahenge and Udzungwa ranges which extend to Iringa region. Climate is
generally moderate, with an average temperature of 25 degrees Celsius year-round.
Morogoro generally has two rainy seasons, with long rains between May and November,
and short rains between January and February.
33
34
Agro-ecological zones
The region is characterized by three broad agro-ecological zones:
The Mountain Zone: The mountainous area is generally characterized by higher
rainfalls, ranging from 800mm-2500 mm on the eastern side, and average rains
of less than 600mm annually on the leeward side. Average temperatures are
about 18 degrees Celsius. Given high rainfalls, the eastern side of the mountain
zone is densely populated, with maize, potatoes, banana, peas, yams, beans,
groundnuts, wheat, cassava and horticultural crops as the main food crops. Cash
crops in the area mainly consist of coffee, oil seeds, vegetables and fruits such
as oranges and pineapple. Livestock are generally limited to smaller animals like
goats, sheep and pigs. Given deforestation in the area along with unsustainable
farming practices, soil erosion has become a problem in the area (URT, 2009).
Further, given the terrain, roads and transport infrastructure remain poor in these
areas.
The Intermediate Zone: Comprising the south of Morogoro District and much of
Kilosa, this area ranges in altitude from 300-600m above sea level. Average
rainfall falls between 700-1200mm per year and the zone has an average
temperature of 18 degrees Celsius. Food crops are largely maize, millet,
cassava, sorghum, paddy and legumes. Cash crops include cotton, sisal and
oilseeds. With land suitable for agriculture and livestock, this area is densely
populated.
River Valleys and Basins: These areas are largely plains, and comprise the
valleys of rivers Mgeta, Kafa, Ruvu (a main water source for Dar es Salaam),
Wami, Msongozi, Mbulumi and Ngerengere. Annual rainfall ranges from 900 mm
to 1400 mm, and the area faces frequent flooding during the rainy season –
posing challenges for transport and communication infrastructure. Most recently,
severe floods in January 2010 affected Morogoro, particularly Kilosa District
where nearly 24,000 residents were forced to flee their homes and move to
make-shift camps (URT, 2009). Average temperatures fall around 30 degrees
Celsius. The upper areas of valleys are densely populated. Major food crops
include maize, paddy, sorghum, beans, cassava, fruits and vegetables. Cash
crops include cotton, sisal, oil seeds, sugar cane and coconuts. Cattle, sheep
and goats are the main livestock in the area.
Other livelihoods strategies in the area include beekeeping, fisheries and mining. To
bolster economic development, a number of women and youth economic groups have
formed – through government and NGO mobilization as well as independently – to
access credit and build social networks, and a number of cooperatives remain active
across districts.
Today, Morogoro hosts a number of protected areas across its ecological zones, which
include: Selous Game Reserve, Mikumi National Park, Kilombero Nature Reserve, the
Ramsas site and Udzungwa Mountains National Park, with forest reserves in Kilombero,
Kilosa, Ulanga and Morogoro Rural (Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment,
2007), as well as the following protected Areas fall within the Morogoro region:
Twatwatwa GCA, Eastern Arc Mountains and Wami-Mbiki Wilidlife Management Area
(WBWMA). In the section on Natural Resource Management (below) we will discuss the
Wami-Mbiki area in some detail. Other than forest reserves, land is primarily used for
agriculture though villages also have public lands, many of which have been threatened
by banana plantations in the north as well as cannabis farming in the south (Ministry of
35
Natural Resources and Tourism: Forestry and Beekeeping Division (2009). Most of
these forests have diminished or disappeared over the past 30 years. In lowland areas
there has also been increasing pressure on woodlands, as people engage in slash and
burn cultivation, villages expand, and some people migrate temporarily to lowlands to
cultivate certain crops that do not grow in the mountains. Within public lands, some
villages also maintain small areas of sacred forests for traditional uses, though these
areas tend to be very small and the influence of traditional chiefs in protecting these
lands have been compromised as their power over land tenure has diminished (Hymas,
2000).
3.2 Village D – An Introduction to the Study Area 11
Village D lies in the Wami basin catchment, adjacent to the buffer of the Wami-Mbiki
Reserve. There are 5 hamlets – K 1, K 2, N, K 3, K 4, and K 5 – with K 1 and K 2
constituting the older core settlements that existed prior to villagization drive of the
1970s. Annual rainfall ranges from 800-1200 mm and cropping patterns are dominated
by maize in the highland areas and sugar cane and rice in the lowland areas, with
farmers cultivating various vegetables on small plots.
Figure 1 Mapping Village D with local leaders
K 2, the oldest hamlet in the village was established in the early 1900s.12 At that time,
the hamlet was settled by Salim Seif of the Zigua tribe, whose uncle became the first
leader. During the colonial era, people were forced to cultivate cotton under strict rules.
11
The participatory methods used in this study are discussed and described in considerable detail in a
separate paper: Bode, B. 2010. “Guidelines for Participatory Methodologies: East Africa Regional Capacity
Building Initiative on Social Analysis”. The capacity building process has also been captured in Bode, B. and
D. Wu. 2010. “Process Report of the East Africa Regional Capacity Building Initiative in Situation Analysis”.
12
This history is based on discussions with elders from K 2 hamlet.
36
Beatings were not uncommon and if taxes were not paid, people were arrested. At this
time, a road was constructed to link the area to the coast for the transport of goods. The
history of K 2 is characterized by various environmental crises, including a locust
invasion in the early 1930s, floods in the late 1930s, and an „army worm‟ invasion in the
1960s. All of these led to the destruction of crops and many people starved to death,
whilst others went off in search of food to faraway places or collected roots to survive.
People periodically suffered from diseases, such as small pox. Until the villagization
scheme of the 1970s, the area was difficult to farm as it was surrounded by forests
where wildlife was abundant.
Besides the road, built during the British era, there was no infrastructure until the 1970s
when the first school was built, a go-down was constructed, and a milling machine was
installed. With villagization, a large number of people from various parts of the region
moved to K 2 and at this time the first Christians moved to the area. The village was
officially demarcated in 1995, around the time that the multi-party system was
established. Until that time, leadership was generational with Salim Seif, who became
the leader after his uncle passed away, appointing the next leader. In 1995, the first
election was held in the village.
K 2, a sub-village with over 500 households, is the power center of village D, with the
majority of elected representatives and a larger number of developmental resources. It is
home to the present village chairman, the ward councilor, and more than half of the
elected representatives (14) of village D live in sub-village K 2 (see the resource map
below). It also has a deep tube well, several shallow well, four churches, a mosque,
shops and a market, as well as concentration of NGO activities.
37
38
K 1, the sub-village13 adjacent to K 2 is also quite large with 504 households, but with
considerably less resources and six elected representatives, despite its size, is politically underrepresented. From a political perspective, the hamlets of K 3 and K 4 are also underrepresented with 2 representatives for K 3 and 1 for K 4. Hamlet N has 5 elected
representatives, but this is likely because it is divided into 3 clusters: N, M 1 and M 2, which are
considerably distant from one another.
It is interesting to note that in discussions with the elected representatives from all hamlets
during the mapping process, we found that none were aware of the exact number of
households. We were told that hamlet K 2 has 260 households, and hamlet K 1 250
households, and hamlet N 96 households. During the social mapping process of these three
hamlets, however, we found that K 2 has 539 households, K 1 has 504, and N, the poorest
community in the village, has 127. We did not study K 3 or K 4, but suspect that the numbers
provided need to be adjusted upwards. This lack of clarity about the size of hamlets has
important implications for resource distribution and central government funds allocated through
the district administration. A census is planned for 2012 and in light of the increases in the
number of households, it may lead to the creation of new villages in the area.
For our study, we selected K 1 and N as our study communities, but also conducted some
exercises in K 2.14 The reason for selecting K 1 and N was that we felt it important to explore the
poorest and one of the better off communities, in the context of CARE‟s overall strategy to
identify its future impact group. „Poor‟ and „better off‟ in this context were defined by the
resources available, the political representation, and discussions with elected representatives
around the levels of poverty in each of the five hamlets, during the village mapping process, as
well as the insights of CARE staff who had been working in the village for some time.
3.3 A Note on the Research Difficulties
It is important to note that we faced considerable difficulties in this research. Firstly, village D is
not new to NGO activities and the residents felt that NGOs often collect information that is
neither shared with them nor used in a way that leads to visible impact. Secondly, CARE‟s is
now in the process of establishing its I-Wash program and has already done some analysis
around the water and sanitation situation, raising the expectations of the local residents that
water will be provided. The water situation in all villages is problematic, but it is particularly
severe in N sub-village, where women have to walk far and face uncertainty if water is available
or not. We found women waiting at small ditches for water to percolate up. Thirdly, in N, there
was some suspicion that we were associated with the Wami-Mbiki Protected Area project and
that our work was designed to assist with their removal / displacement of the community (see
our discussion below on the Wami-Mbiki area). Fourthly, as is customary in rural Tanzania, all
meetings/ discussions / exercises with rural residents has to be organized through locally
elected representatives. This meant that we had to inform the hamlet chair persons prior to our
visits and ask them to organize the meetings for us. Towards the end of our work, the leaders
were tired of organizing meetings and we found it difficult to meet with a sufficient number of
persons to conduct our exercise. Finally, in light of the upcoming local government elections, it
was difficult to discuss certain aspects of local governance, particular relating to electoral
processes, budgets, and political party dynamics.
13
In this paper, the terms sub-village and hamlet are used interchangeably.
Initially, we only wanted to explore two communities, a better off and a poor hamlet. However, the staff working in
the village thought it important that we study both hamlet K 1 and K 2, with K 2‟s leadership coming from the ruling
party and K 1‟s leadership coming from the main opposition party, it was felt that we should not marginalize either.
We therefore conducted some analysis in hamlet K 2, but focused our work mostly on hamlets K 1 and N.
14
39
Part 4: Village Level Governance
The village represents the lowest unit of local government with two major bodies of governance:
the village assembly (VA) and the village council (VC). The village assembly consists of all adult
members, eligible to vote and the village council consists of no less than 15 and no more than
25 elected representatives headed by an elected chairperson. Each hamlet (vitongoji) also has
a chairman.
Tanzania‟s electoral laws outline the qualifications of candidates standing for local government
elections, which include the ability of to read and write Swahili or English, have legal income
sufficient to make a living, and be a member of a (political) party. Party memberships as one
criteria is questioned by many as the restriction is divisive and restrictive (REPOA, 2009) and, in
our view, likely to create a bias against the poor who are less likely (because of a preoccupation
with livelihoods) to join political parties. This anti-poor bias of the LGA is further exacerbated by
the „sufficient income‟ regulation. Our analysis shows that the process of land allocation during
the 1990s in our study village was corrupt, leaving large numbers of households in remote
clusters of sub-villages without land to cultivate. These households live in abject poverty and
have no legal recourse, no political means, or social power, to address the unfair practices that
characterized land reforms in their area. Finally, the literacy requirements exclude 25 percent of
men and nearly 50 percent of women in the Morogoro region from contesting elections and
thereby the opportunities to represent their class interest through the political process.
As outlined in the LGA, the village assembly is the „supreme body‟ at the village level and is to
convene four times per year, but in practice its only major function is to elect the council every 5
years (REPOA, 2008). There are special seats reserved for women, which must constitute no
less than one quarter of all elected seats. Since the introduction of the multi-party system, there
have been four local government elections – in 1994, 1999 and 2004, and 2009. The village is
further divided into smaller administrative units – sub-villages (hamlets) with their own
chairperson and the ten-cell leaders. Earlier, ten-cell leaders were the party representatives,
representing ten households. The structure still exists though it has no official connection to the
party. Today, the ten cell leaders mobilize people for collective work and still provide an
important link to the hamlet chair.
General decision-making begins with the different committees in the villages, who write a
request for a particular project (e.g. the repair of a school) and ask for financial support. The
plan is then put before the village council, and if approved, is taken to the village assembly.
Sub-village / hamlet chairpersons, who are members of the village council, and ten cell leaders
then pass the plans on to the villagers, collect monies (if needed) and mobilize labor. Larger
projects must be cleared by the Ward Development Committee (ibid).
Above the village level lies the ward development committee (WDC) which consists of the Ward
Executive Officer, all elected village chairpersons and the VEO, who is an appointee of the
District Council and serves as the secretary of the village government, but has no right to vote
(REPOA, 2008). The WDC has virtually no power and is merely responsible for coordinating
development activities and planning in the Ward and linking with the district level.
At the village level, there are three standing committees – Finance, Administration and
Planning; Education, Health and Water; and Economic Affairs, Works and Environment
Committee. The village councils, may, at their discretion, appoint ad hoc committees (land,
etc.), if a specific issue arises. The committees are not decision making bodies, but essentially
oversee the implementation of council decisions (ibid). The standing committees are to meet
every three months and review the progress of their respective work.
40
Local governments have four sources of funding: own resources, central government transfers,
loans from financial institutions and development aid. Village level government can also raise
resources through user charges and through various self-help activities (construction and
maintenance of schools and health facilities). Since the government abolished the „nuisance
tax‟ there are few monetary resources that can be raised at the local level, leaving local
governments depending largely on central government transfers (ibid).
The Local Government Reform Program – Decentralization by Devolution – in 1998, was an
attempt to move away from the earlier de-concentrated approach to enable local governments
to effectively and efficiently deliver services to the people; to make policies and operational
decisions (consistent with national laws), to operate democratically (through elections), to
facilitate the participation of people in matters that affect their lives; to operate through
transparency and accountability, and to adhere to strict codes of ethics and integrity (ibid).
The task of land allocation by the village council was maintained from the earlier reforms that
were undertaken during Nyerere‟s time in office. Since liberalization, the leasing of large tracts
of land to foreign business investors, the influence of tourism and powerful conservation
interests as well as the country‟s economic interests in wildlife tourism, have greatly limited
access to land, and led to the displacement of households and entire communities in protected
areas and restriction of their use of land and its resources.
The 1999 Land Acts formalized the powers of government to allocate land for commercial or
residential uses. Tanzania‟s Land Reform classified three types of land: general or „unused‟ land
to be governed by the National Board of Land Commissioners, reserve land which is ruled by
statutory law and ministry personnel, and village land which is administered by the Village
Council (in consultation with/ approval from the Village Assembly) and allows for customary
law.15 However, all land remains vested in the president, who can transfer any village land to
general or reserve land.16 While the process of titling land is on-going, the policy does bear
some contradictions as to the powers of different levels of government, as the act calls for
village government to make decisions on how unused village lands are managed, while the
district government simultaneously holds management power over unused lands within its
jurisdiction. This ambiguity may be further complicated by recent moves by Kilimo Kwanza that
aim to reclaim unused lands for the development of commercial agriculture.
Further, the Land Acts call for individual certification of land holdings to be managed by village
lands. At the village level, village councils – often with approval of village assemblies – play a
key role in classifying occupied, common or future lands; issuing certificates of customary titles;
leasing of larger tracts of lands to non-residents 17; and the formation of by-laws concerning
village land management. (EMPAFORM Programme, 2007)
Devolution in Tanzania also meant the inclusion of mechanisms through which the population
could be involved in the development agenda of each locality. Of particular interest is the
methodology of Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD), which is a participatory
planning approach that was designed to be used by the Local Government Authorities (LGA) to
enable economic and social development through a participatory process. The O&OD method
15
EMPAFORM Programme (2007). A Plain Language Guide to the Environment, Land, Forest, Beekeeping and
Wildlife Policies and Laws of the United Republic of Tanzania. CARE Tanzania.
16
Kamata (2003). The Land Bill/Act 1998 and Rural Producers.
17
For leasing 6 or more acres of land (>2.4 ha) to an outside party, the village council must gain the agreement of the
village assembly. For the lease of land equal to or exceeding 74 acres (30 ha), the village council must also consult
with the Land Commissioner. Also, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Village Council to lease land to foreigners or
foreign-owned companies.
41
was to enable bottom up identification of opportunities and challenges and thus lead to better
planning that would be informed by local realities.
4.1 Village Governance in Practice 18
Governance in village D
reflects the relatively short
period (since 1995) that
local government has been
formed, the inherent antipoor bias of electoral
regulations that we outlined
earlier,
local
level
corruption, and the lack of
implementation
of
the
participatory and bottom-up
components
of
Local
Government Reforms.
D‟s village council consists
of
25
elected
representatives, with over
50 percent of council
members hailing from K 2,
creating a system of underrepresentation of the other
Figure 2 Meeting with village government leaders
4 sub-villages. We were
unable to explore the reasons for this, but based on the electoral rules, we can offer some
possibilities.19 The fact that electoral candidates must be nominated by their political parties,
creates a possibility that there is a bias towards K 2 by the local CCM party chairman, a resident
of K 2, who may have approved more applications in K 2; K 2 is relatively better off and may
have a higher percentage of eligible citizens (literacy, income and party membership) to contest
elections, and / or since K 2 is the center of activity, including where the village assembly meets,
more residents from K 2 may have turned up on election day. The village chairman offered
some answers when he explained that „K 2‟s women and men are more likely to participate in
meetings, are more educated, exposed and with higher aspirations in life. Whilst residents from
the other sub-villages are not educated, spend much of their day playing cards, drinking alcohol,
and selling labor‟. The village chairman also displayed a bias against the other communities, as
„most of the residents in other sub-villages do not belong to the village originally, but came
during the villagization era.‟
Discussion with various elected representatives, the VEO and the chairman, revealed that the
25 elected representatives (19 men and 6 women) meet monthly to discuss the progress of their
development plans. The plans are formulated on the basis of issues that are raised by key
citizens, such as school headmasters, extension officers, or doctors, as well as hamlet meetings
(though not even the elected representatives were able to tell how often such meetings take
place). The standing committees (referred to by different names, depending on who is asked),
are nominated by the chairman and approved by the village assembly. According to the
18
This discussion is based on various interviews with the Ward Executive Officer, Village Executive Officers, the
Village Chairman, elected representatives from hamlets K 1 and N, and residents from hamlets K 1 and N.
19
We thank Edson Nyingi for raising these points and drawing our attention to these aspects.
42
government‟s guidelines, except for the village chairperson, the rest of the members of the
village council can be leaders of the standing committees. But, generally, the rules for selection
of elected members to participate in the standing committees are vague, with the exception of
the women‟s quota.
To select the members of the standing committees, the village chairman, a CCM member, and
VEO create a list of names that they put before the village council. If the village council
approves, the list is put before the village assembly for final approval. Each committee has 5-8
members whom the chairman and VEO select on the basis of „how well they are known in the
village, their capacity and readiness to engage in voluntary work, and their reputation for not
exploiting people‟. According to the chairman, for each 3 men, there are usually 2 women
selected.
There was considerable un-clarity amongst our interviewees as to the frequency of village
assembly (VA) meetings: according to the chairman, the VA meets twice a year, and according
to the VEO it meets monthly, whilst the residents of hamlet N (M 1 cluster) told it meets once a
year, and the residents of hamlet K 1 said there has been no village assembly meeting for the
past 2 years. Though the government‟s regulations are clear: the VA should meet four times per
year, neither the elected or appointed officials, nor the general public that we interviewed were
aware of the frequency in which the general public should participate in local government
affairs.
There was also considerable variation in terms of the extent to which residents are involved in
the planning process of the village. In the remote cluster of Marui in the poorest hamlet N, male
and female residents (in separate interviews) told that the planning process works through the
ten cell leaders. Here, the ten cell leaders inform the residents of the plans that have been
made by the village council and what individuals have to contribute to implement the plan.
Essentially, it appears that remote areas are not included in the planning process at all. The
women of Marui added that if they have any development agenda, they tell their ten cell leader
who then takes their request to the hamlet chair, a resident of the N cluster, who in turn raises
the issue in the village council meeting. In hamlet K 1, the participants of the focus group
discussion told that when the meetings were held (2 years back) they were asked to prioritize
the development plans that were put before them.
The Local Governance Authorities reform of 1998 has not yet reached village D, although
discussions with the Ward Executive Officer we were told with certainty that it was being
implemented in D village. Whilst the Village Chairman and the Village Executive Officer were
aware of the reforms, they told that it was not implemented, whilst the elected representatives
from hamlet K 1 did not know about the reforms and those from hamlet N had heard about it
through the media, but noted it had not reached their village. In the meantime, village D council
continues to operate under a top down approach with elites (teachers, extension officers, etc.)
influencing the development agenda and remote areas being merely informed of the plans,
rather than consultations with the public at large through the various processes, including
O&OD approach that has been outlined by the state.
Since the election of the last government in late 2009, the present council has attempted to hold
one village assembly meeting. The new council came to power in the midst of a corruption
scandal, where the earlier government had embezzled TSH 800,000 and it is still unclear to the
present government who took this money. When the present chairman called the first village
assembly meeting under his newly elected government, the residents who attended wanted to
discuss nothing else but the embezzlement of the funds and demanded explanations. The new
council, unable to answer their questions, and after heated exchanges, had to leave the
43
meeting. The mismanagement of these funds, according to locally elected representatives, is
likely to effect the ability to collect taxes and / or ask people to provide labor for various social /
community development schemes. In the governance discussion with the residents of K 1, they
told that the government will not be able to hold a village assembly meeting until the embezzled
funds are accounted for.
When asked about their understanding of development and their vision for village D, the elected
representatives, including the chairman, most of whom come from the middle or upper classes
in the villages we studied, indicated a service mentality (emphasizing development as access to
services – schools, health centers, etc.) and a focus on modernizing agriculture (through
tractors and better inputs), though some, including the chairman mentioned that good housing,
food and clothing were goals of the development process. The interviewed residents of K 1
focused on access to land, the forest reserves, and the need to improve agriculture. The
residents of M 1 cluster in hamlet N, the poorest cluster of communities, focused on water, fair
allocation of land, plenty of food, equal opportunity to earn money for food, and improving
cultivation through tractors. The discussions with various groups and classes of local society
highlight that local government recognizes that development is about the quality of life of rural
residents, but it appears that they do not have the means nor systems and processes in place to
address development issues. Based on the development activities that do take place:
maintenance of schools and construction of health dispensaries it appears there are no
mechanisms to address extreme poverty.
The backgrounds of the elected village chairman and the hamlet chairman of K 1, provide
perhaps some insight in terms of their own class interests to represent the poorest households
in the village. The village chairman‟s family migrated to village D in the early 1930s. His
grandfather was a builder who worked on the construction of the nearby primary school in the
adjacent village and the dispensary. Both the chairman‟s father and grandfather were informal
leaders. At present, the chairman owns 60 acres of land and cultivates sugar cane, maize,
paddy, cassava, and various vegetables. He is one of the few local people (as opposed to
absentee farmers) who farms through tractor power. Prior to the election (in 2009), he was a
member of different village standing committees for more than 20 years. He is also a member of
the School Board in the adjacent village. Some time back, he had decided to take a break from
his involvement in local government to focus on farming, but was approached by 20 elders from
throughout the village, who asked him to stand for the chairman election. He agreed and stood
for election under the ruling party ticket. He won in all hamlets, with the exception of K 1, where
CHADEMA (the opposition party) is strong.
The opposition leader of CHADEMA in village D is also the hamlet chairman of K 1. He farms
10.5 acres of land with sugar cane and maize, placing him into the upper middle class. He
cultivates 2 acres with maize, 2 acres with sugar cane, and the remaining land is rented out. He
also earns income from selling „local brew‟ which is made from coconuts. He does not reside in
the K 1, but has a house in a nearby village on ½ acre of land. The K 1 sub-village chairman‟s
main concerns around development lie around water and sanitation, poor roads, and lack of
reliable markets.
Neither of the two most important political leaders in the village raised the issue of seasonal
hunger as a development concern. Nor was there any mention of the issue of unfair land
allocation, the increasing alcoholism that is apparently pushing households into poverty, in
some cases through the alienation of land, and the denial of access to the nearby valuable
natural resources (the Wami-Mbiki Protected Area).
44
The village chairman sees his role in rather „prescribed‟ terms: plan for community development,
identify development activities; supervise implementation, look after village resources; supervise
the allocation of land, ensure that people are involved in the development process. The same
was true of the elected representatives, whose answers were focused around providing social
services (hamlet N), whereas the elected representatives from K 1, excluding the K 1 chairman,
considered the development of individual households to have sufficient and better food, good
houses, etc, in addition to the availability of social services. The VEO considered his role as
overseeing the development projects of the village. The residents we interviewed saw the
government‟s role as one in which they mobilize people for development activities and ensure
services, with some groups mentioning fair land allocation and access to food.
We are not suggesting that rich or better off households should not be elected to local
government or that they are unable to represent the class interest of the poor. However, it is
important that the findings of this study and in particular the prevalence of hunger and extreme
poverty in various pockets of the village are brought to the attention of elected leaders and that
concrete plans are developed to address these issues in the long term. The discussion on local
governance also raises the need to work with locally elected representatives to build a collective
vision for village D that represents the realities of the poorest households, including the
pastoralist groups, and addresses the overwhelming concern of local government officials in
terms of improving the accumulation strategies of the landed and the social services mentality
that is presumed to be a solution for poverty. For instance, the development plan of the village
has prioritized schools (education) and health services as the primary development goals.
In village D, the village council faces considerably difficulties raising resources. We were not
able to access the development budget, which according to the LGA Reform, should be posted
in public spaces. According to the chairman, there is no budget, but the village council tries to
mobilize resources as and when needed. For instance, the council had decided to construct a
school and a house for the teacher, and received donations worth TSH 1,000,000, whilst
various sub-villages contributed labor and bricks. The chairman highlighted that the absence of
local businessmen in village D, the fact that the district government takes the revenues from the
local markets, and the tax evasion of landlords, is a serious hindrance for revenue generation in
the village.
The various Focus Group Discussions that were conducted around local governance highlighted
two important roles of local government that are often missed in the literature on local
governance or only discussed in a cursory fashion. These are land allocation and dispute
resolution.
4.2 Land Allocation
Land allocation is a crucial issue in an agrarian society and, in light of the prevalence of landless
households in both K 1 and N (see our discussion below), we tried to explore the issue in some
detail. As with all other issues discussed, there was considerable variation in terms of the land
allocation process, depending on who responded. The VEO and village chairman, in separate
interviews explained that the process for outsiders is as follows: a letter of application with TSH
50,000 is made to the VEO who passes the information on to the council. The council then
explores the availability of land and decides whether or not to approve the application. If
approved it is presented to the village assembly, who make the final decision. The application is
non-refundable and 10 percent of the sale value has to be paid to the village council. Local
residents apply in a similar fashion as outsiders and if land is available it is allocated without a
fee.
45
Elected representatives from N cluster said that the land applications are made to the village
council who decides upon the request (based on availability of land). If approved, the land is
shown to the person and if the allocation takes place, the person pays TSH 5,000 per acre. The
men of M 1 cluster in N sub-village noted that they had repeatedly applied for land since the
1990s, but were not allocated any. Instead, large areas of land were allocated to outsiders by
the village D Land Committee in the mid 1990s. It is not surprising that the respondents
expressed distrust of their leaders, particularly in the area of land allocation. The women of
Marui cluster, in a separate discussion, noted that in 1991 village D land was allocated to
outsiders by the land committee of nearby village K elected council (D as an administrative
village was formally created in 1995). In 1995, the village D‟s elected council re-allocated land,
but through an inadequate process, and because of land disputes the adjacent village K people
continue to own land in village D. Further, in the 1995 allocation, large areas were allocated to
outsiders, leaving most of the residents of M 1 cluster landless, a reflection of the corruption of
village D leaders. While the village D elected council no longer allocates land, it continues to
play a role in land dispute resolution.
4.3 Dispute Resolution
An important role of village government is to adjudicate disputes. The various focus group
discussions with elected representatives, the village chairman, the VEO, and civil society,
highlighted that the disputes center largely around conflict between pastoralists and cultivators
and land issues, though some mentioned access to the Wami-Mbiki reserve. Disputes are first
brought to the village chairman, who in turn informs the VEO to speak to the parties involved
and gather evidence. If the chairman or VEO are unable to settle the dispute, it is referred to the
general ward tribunal. Land disputes which are settled through village land committee, an ad
hoc committee, that is formed when needed, are the exception to this process. If the village land
committee is unable to settle the dispute, it is referred to the Ward Land Tribunal.
Part 5: Class Differentiation, Land Tenure and Livelihoods in Village D
5.1 Class and the Changing Economic Roles of Women
The combination of various policies (in agriculture, education, health, etc.) under structural
adjustment and liberalization strategies, have led to a process of „depeasantization‟ (Johnson,
2004; Bernstein, 2001, 2003, 2004; Bryceson, 1999, 2000). The term peasant, always linked to
agriculture, refers to households that are involved in subsistence agriculture and who maintain
some control over the means of production. Thus the peasantry does not merely consist of one
class, but represents a spectrum of rural producers that include poor farmers, those who must
sell their labor to supplement their income from farming; the middle farmer, who is able to
reproduce mainly through family labor on family land and who may diversify their incomes
through other livelihood activities; and finally, the rich farmer who is able to accumulate capital
and invest in the means of production through superior inputs and the hiring of additional labor
(Bernstein, 1979). The latter have become capitalist farmers representing depeasantization.
Whilst the poor, if they are able to maintain landholdings, and the middle farmer constitute the
peasantry. Our research highlights that depeasantization is taking place at the lower class
spectrum and that there is a process of proletarianization, whereby a large number of
households have lost control over the means of production and access land through rental or
sharecropping arrangements and sell wage labor. (see our discussion below).
Whilst the depeasantization argument is useful in explaining some of the driving factors of
proletarianization, it is not sufficient to help us understand the pauperization of a large number
46
of households in rural society. It appears that whilst the disappearance of the peasantry has not
occurred to the extent that some scholars have argued, there is a trend indicating that a
segment of the population lacked the political wherewithal to demand and ensure their land
rights in the land allocation process. Some families have alienated land, because of economic
distress, and have lost control over their labor power through exploitative dynamics in the lean
season, when they face hunger. Poor households from remote areas also lack access to basic
(health) services, and are excluded from the political system – not able to enter into the electoral
process or influence decisions by their elected representatives – and are struggling to make
ends meet.
One of the most striking findings of our analysis is the issue of landlessness, which requires
some further discussion. We have already highlighted that the intent of land reform was to
ensure that all rural households have access to and control over land and how allocation
practices during the 1990s appear to have been corrupt. There is also the issue of land titling to
define ownership. The legal process to acquire land title, however, is complex in light of the
bureaucratic procedures that are required. This is particularly so for women, whose lack of
knowledge of their legal claims to land or unwillingness to register claims because of the
implications on relational dynamics with husbands make it unlikely to register their interests in
land (Manji, 2003).
The problems with land registration – creating conflicts over land – led the government to put in
place land tribunals at the ward and district levels to hear and rule on cases in terms of land
claims and rights. It appears that poor access to information and knowledge about the process
of land registration/ allocation has prevented poor households in N sub-village from registering
land under their names. Discussion with residents, the Village Executive Officer, and The Ward
Land Tribunal responsible for village D, reported cases where land was allocated to more than
one household, where village government allocated land beyond their border / jurisdiction, or
where the certification process had not been followed, leaving households with no
documentation or rights over land. Several pastoralists in N sub-village reported that they felt
insecure about their land holdings as they were not confident that the procedures they followed
to gain access to land were legitimately conducted.
Some pastoralists reported past experiences where they registered land and were later evicted
because of procedural problems or fraud. Whilst land tribunals mediate conflicts over land, one
of the focus group discussions on governance among poor residents revealed that many had
filed complaints that were never heard. This may be due to the reliance on village government
to forward cases to the tribunals, lack of knowledge amongst the residents on how to file
complaints over land, or poor access to hearings due to their location or due to the TSH 7,000
fee required to bring a case to the tribunal.
Insecurity over land use rights extended to both pastoralist groups as well as poorer
agriculturalists within village D. In both of the study sub-hamlets – K 1 and N – the poorest
households do not own land. Further, N sub-hamlet is characterized by large absentee
landholdings that are cultivated with sugar cane for the nearby Mtibwa Sugar Estate. The land
rights of the absentee land owners was established during the 1995 allocation.
In village D, landlessness seems to be linked to the waves of in-migration to the marginal areas
within the village. From the village histories, it became clear that landlessness has been a
problem among residents who had migrated to the area during and after the height of structural
adjustment policies and following the land reform process of Tanzania‟s socialist era when the
state focused heavily on securing access to land for each household.
Landlessness, in village D, particularly effects the marginal frontier areas that are only recently
(during the past 15-20 years) being cultivated. Whilst further study needs to be done to
47
understand the circumstances and characteristics of powerful and marginal households within
village D, interviews with local leaders and livelihood network analysis with few households
indicate that those in the wealthier class and holding political power had generally been either
long-time residents of the area or had married into the area and have been able to access land
through family. However, in-migrants who had not held the same level of social support, and
settled in more frontier lands did not gain access to land nor voice in local governance. This
particularly effects the pastoralist migrants households, whose livelihoods and culture are
distinct from local settler communities. As a result, these frontier areas are where more landless
in-migrants households and pastoral groups have settled and where conflicts between
pastoralists and settled communities tend to concentrate as demand for land has pushed both
groups into these areas. In some of our discussions, the issue of alcoholism was raised and that
some men were addicted to its use, having sold land to purchase „another bottle‟.
The class analysis of the various clusters in N and K 1 sub-villages illustrate the increasing
impoverishment of a considerable percentage of the population.
N Sub-Village – Classes
M 1 Cluster -- Total Number of Households (HHs) – 39 (0 Women Headed Households)
Rich
Upper
Middle
Middle
Poor
Land: >50 acres
Land Use and Technology: Rent out, hire tractor, hire labor, ox-plough and hand hoe
Livestock: large number of cattle, also some chicken
Other resources: Bicycles, radios, mobile phones
Houses: Poles with mud and grass
Have Latrines
Land: 20-50 acres
Technology: Hire tractor, ox plough,hire labor, hand hoe
Livestock: pigs, chicken 30+
Other resources: bicycles, radios, mobile phones, motorcycles
House: Pole with Mud and grass
Have Latrines
Land: 5-20 acres
Technology: Hire tractor, hire labor, hand hoe,
Livestock: chicken 10-30
Other resources: bicycles, radios, mobile phones
House: pole with mud and grass
Some have latrines
Land: do not own land, but hire land in
Technology: hand hoe
Sell labor
Livestock: chicken 10-20
Other resources: some have mobile phones, radios, and bicycles
House: hut with grass
Do not have latrines
4 HHs
(Barabaig)
6 HHs
18 HHs
11 HHs
N Cluster – Total Number of Households (HHs) – 76 (8 Women Headed Households)
Rich
Upper
Land: 20-50 acres, cultivate 5-10 acres, rent out land
Technology: hire tractor, hire labor, hand hoe.
Livestock: 5-20 goats; chickens 10-20, up to 5 pigs, ducks
Other resources: bicycles, radios, mobile phones, some have motorcycles, one
shopowner
House: Corrugated Iron Sheet, with Poles and mud; Corrugated Iron Sheet with burnt
bricks; pole and mud with grass
Some have latrine
Land: own 10-20 acres, cultivate 5-10 acres, rent land out
Technology: hire tractor, hire labor, hand hoe
Livestock: goats 1-10; chicken 1-20; pigs 1-3
48
7 HHs
Middle
Other resources: bicycles, radios and mobile phones, motorcycles
House: Corrugated Iron Sheets with poles and mud; Corrugated Iron Shee with mud,
mud house with grass
Some have latrines
Land: 1-10 acres, cultivate 5 acres, rent land out
Technology: hand hoe
Livestock: goats 1-10; chickens 10-20;
Other resources: motorcycles, some have bicycles, radios, mobile phones, coffee/tea
Middle shop
House: pole with mud and grass; few have corrugated tin sheet houses
Some have latrines
Land: do not own land, hire land in for food crops
Technology: hand hoe
Sell labor
Livestock: chicken 1-10
Poor
Other resources: most with bicycles; some have radios or mobile phones
House: mud with grass, poles with grass, all grass
Most do not have latrines
M 2 – Cluster – Total Number of Households – 12 (1 Woman Headed Household)
Rich
Middle
Poor
Land: 10-30 acres, cultivates less than 10 acres, rent land out,
Technology: hire tractor and labor; hand hoe, hire ox-plough
Livestock: chicken 10-30, ducks 5-10
Other resources: Bicycles, radios, mobile phones
House: Poles with mud and Corrugated Iron Sheets; mud and grass;
All have latrines
Land: 5-9 acres, cultivates less than 5
Technology: Hire tractor, hand hoe
Livestock: chicken 5-10
Other resources: bicycles, few have radios and mobile phones
House: Pole with Mug and grass
Some have latrines
Land: do not own land, hire land in
Technology: hand hoe,
Sell labor
Livestock: chicken 3-5
Other resources: few have bicycles or radios or mobile phones
House: all grass
None have latrines
21 HHs
4 – FHH
(3 widows)
20 HHs
2 – FHH
(1 widow)
28 HHs
3 – FHH
7 HHs
2 HHs
3 HHs
1 – FHH
The findings of the class analysis, conducted with the residents from each cluster, reflect their
own understanding of class and bring to the fore the very clear distinctions between rich, middle
and poor farmers. In all three clusters, the rich and middle own landholdings that range between
10-50 acres, rent out land, hire tractors, and hire labor. The difference between rich and middle
in each cluster is the size of landholding that they own. The rich generally own large parcels of
land that can be rented out. The exception to this is the definition of rich in M 1 cluster, where
the wealthiest households are settled pastoralists, who own large numbers of cattle, in addition
to land. Interestingly, despite the large landholdings of the better off households in N cluster,
none cultivate sugar cane; a cash crop that is grown only by absentee owners.
In all three clusters, poor households do not own land, but hire land in and sell labor. Whereas,
the middle and rich do not sell labor and hire land out. Discussions with women and men from
the poorest families in N cluster revealed that twenty years earlier, women used work with their
husbands on their own land, but are now selling agricultural labor. Women also noted that some
women now purchase land, have ownership (though not amongst the poorest households), and
rent land. These economic changes have had a positive effect that women now have greater
freedom in terms of mobility and do no longer need to ask their husbands for permission to go
out.
49
At the same time, the involvement in wage labor has placed additional time demands on women
that appear to overburden them with work. Discussions with women around the use of their time
throughout the day, however, revealed that women still perform most of the household chores.
The largest amount of time is consumed either working on one‟s own farm or selling labor,
followed by fetching water and firewood. These three activities consume 7-8 hours of time per
day and in the remaining time they clean the house, make food, clean their children, etc. Based
on our discussion it seems that women from the poorest households work from 5-6 am to 9-10
pm. We did not time to engage men in these discussion, but it seems that men have leisure
time, as the women noted that the only help they obtain in their household chores is from their
children.
Similar to hamlet N, the class analysis of one of the residential areas of K 1 highlighted
increasing class differentiation, with a few rich households owning up to 50 acres of land,
devoting large parts of their holdings to sugar cane and upper middle farmers, constituting 11
percent, who cultivate food crops for consumption and sale, are food sufficient, and own cattle.
Nearly half of all households own between 1.5 to 2 acres, have food sufficiency up to 8 months
and supplement their farm income through selling labor in agriculture. The poor, who constitute
35 percent of all households in the cluster, are divided into three sub-categories: those who can
manage to take 1-2 acres of land in and sell labor, those who take in small plots of land and sell
labor, and one old man who is unable to work and depends on support and hand-outs from
others.
K 1 Sub-Village – Classes
Cluster -- Total Number of Households (HHs) – 106
Rich
Sugarcane farms >50 acres; maize farms (harvest 6-10 bags),‟ hire labor; hire tractor,
sufficient food, milling machine, motor bikes, bicycles to rent; hybrid cattle, pole tree
above 12, wholesale shop, burnt brick house , cement floor, CIS roof, charcoal for
cooking
Upper
Middle
Maize farms 2-8 acres, maize harvest 5-8 bags, rice harvest 5-8 bags, rice farms 2-4
acres, hire tractors, food sufficient, bicycles, hybrid cattle, poultry 5-10, hire trucks for
harvest, un-burnt brick house, cement house, use charcoal, some are government
employees
Middle
Maize farms 1.5 to 2 acres, maize harvest 2-3 bags, hand hoe, sell labor, food
sufficient 6-8 months, goats 2-4, poultry up to 10, mud houses, CIS roofs, thatched
houses, charcoal, firewood, small restaurants/food stands.
Poor
Borrow farms 1-2 acres, maize harvest 1 bag, rice harvest 1 bag, hand hoe, poultry 110, sell labor, mud house, mud floor, charcoal
Very
Poor
Do not own farms, maize/rice harvest 1 tin, food sufficiency 1-5 months, sell labor,
poultry up to 10, thatched house, mud floor, fire wood, some women headed
households
Ultra
Poor
Dependent on others, old
4 HHs
15 HHs
50 HHs
26 HHs
10 HHs
1 HH
Discussions around the changes in gender norms with women and men (in separate groups)
from the poor and very poor categories highlighted that few women own farms in the
community, but most do not; women do however, hire land in (at the same rates as men). As in
50
N sub-village, those who do not have land, moved to K 1 during the past 20 years. During
villagization, households were allocated homestead lands and very small pieces of land for
farming, With inheritance patterns (favoring boys) land has become sub-divided into such small
parcels that are too small to maintain their livelihoods. As in N, women and men told that
women now sell labor and have become providers. Women attributed these changes to men‟s
increased use of monies for alcohol. Women also work as small traders, selling vegetables and
various craft items (e.g. mats) that they produce.
5.2 Land Tenure
These findings from both sub-villages highlighted the need to explore land tenure relations – the
terms and conditions under which poor households access land to cultivate. In K 1 and N subvillages, there are two types of land arrangements: renting land for cash and sharecropping
land. Renting is relatively straight forward, with households making a cash payment up front to
take temporary possession of the land, farm it and own the harvest. Sharecropping
arrangements are also less complicated than is the norm in many societies, where generally the
owners provides some inputs (the land, half the cost of seeds, ploughing, fertilizers, etc.). In
village D, however, sharecropping is not dissimilar to renting in that the landlords asks for the
payment (in kind) once the crop has been harvested. In N, highland, where maize, sesame and
pigeon peas are grown, and which constitutes the majority of land under cultivation, the rate is
TZS 15,000 cash or if sharecropped 1 bag of maize, 2 bags of sesame or 6 tins of pigeon peas.
Our calculations indicate that sharecropping is more costly than renting, as the value of 1 bag of
maize at harvest time values TZS 24,500. A similar trend is observed for the rental of low land,
which is used for rice cultivation. The rent on one acre of low land is TSZ 20,000, whilst the
price of 1 bag of rice (the required amount to be paid to the landowners at the time of harvest is
TZS 24,500).
Land Tenure Matrix: N Hamlet
Arrangement
Highland Soil
Low Land Soil
Renting in land
15,000 TZS per acre per season
20,000 TZS per acre per year (season)
Sharecropping
Depends on crop cultivated:
Depends on crop cultivated
1 bag maize per acre per season
2 bags simsim per acre per season
6 tins pigeon peas per acre per season
1 bag rice per acre per season
1 bag short-rain maize per acre per
season
In K 1 hamlet, the rental price for all land types is TZS 20,000 per acre per season. As in N
hamlet, sharecropping arrangements, are more costly to the person/ household taking land in,
as the price for 1 bag of maize is TZS 28,000 and TZS 32,000 for rice. This trend is likely to
reflect a form of interest that the landlord charges to „let out the land‟. In N the land tenure
discussion revealed that most households cannot raise the cash to rent land, but sharecrop;
whereas in K 1, both arrangements (renting and sharecropping) are common. The prevalence of
sharecropping, as opposed to renting reflects the greater poverty that exists in N. Further, in
both communities, the land tenure arrangements are biased against the poorest households,
who do not have cash to rent land in and therefore pay higher prices when paying in kind
following the harvest. During the land tenure analysis in K 1, participants told that during
economic distress, households may sell land at TZS 50,000 per acre, pointing to the reality that
households are alienating land in times of crisis.
51
Land Tenure Matrix: K 1 Hamlet
Arrangement
Non-Sugarcane Lands
Sugarcane Lands
Renting in land
20,000 TZS per acre per year (season)
50,000 TZS after each harvest (annually)
for 3 years
Sharecropping
1 bag (maize, rice, simsim, pigeon peas
groundnuts) per acre per season
Family support
Free loan
*Farmers cannot plant permanent crops on rented land
In K 1 sub-village, all rental / sharecropping agreements are written and witnessed by the
hamlet chairman, whereas in N sub-village such agreements are verbal.
In K 1, some
households take land in to cultivate sugar cane and pay TZS 50,000 following each harvest.
Sugarcane, however, requires considerable funds for inputs and is usually cultivated by the
upper middle and rich households. There are also some families that provide support to each
other and allow relatives to use land for free.
Our understanding of land ownership patterns and land tenure arrangements, takes us to
consider the types of crops that people cultivate (in particular poor households), the yields, and
marketing strategies, and the division of labor within the household. The analysis and findings
are preceded by a broader discussion of the Tanzanian governments food crop policies.
5.3 Agricultural Policies and Strategies
Since structural adjustment, the government of Tanzania shed a number of regulations
surrounding agricultural production, processing and marketing. Since the late 1980s, food crop
policy underwent a series of deregulations, with controls on movement of food within the country
abolished, and price controls on both food crops and inputs eliminated. Many state enterprises
and cooperatives were dismantled and the role of marketing boards was drastically scaled back.
Across this time of rapid change, an increasing divide between regulations and legislation
emerged, along with discrepancies in how regulations were applied from district to district. For
example, at the end of the 1980s, when wholesale trade was deregulated, private traders were
able to transport grain at costs lower than the public sector and market prices for grains fell
below official grain prices, impeding the ability of the National Milling Corporation (NMC) – a
parastatal – to sell its crops. In response, the government of Tanzania imposed a restriction that
private traders must buy grain from either the NMC or marketing cooperatives. This regulation,
however, was reversed within months when the NMC became insolvent.
Not only did the rapid introduction and abrogation of regulations confuse, but conflicts of
interest, poor communication and multiple interpretations of policy also affected how crop sales
and transport have been regulated from district to district. Gradually, however, once
deregulation reached across Tanzania, changes in agricultural productivity increased inequality
in ways that marginalized smallholders and the labor class from the benefits of economic
development. With subsidies on fertilizer phased out in the early 1990s, remote areas lost
access to fertilizer as well as other agricultural inputs given their higher costs and more limited
distribution. Further, where inputs were formerly provided through credit from cooperative
societies who would recover costs by the purchase of harvests, private traders have made it
52
difficult for cooperatives to recover such debts and these schemes have become less viable.
Following these reforms, access to markets diminished and productivity of labor dropped. By
1999, real producer prices of maize, rice and beans dropped to half the level of earlier that
decade. In addition to relationships with harvest yields, and changes in food policy regulations,
fluctuations in producer prices have also been linked with the declining international prices for
food crops across that period (Minot, 2010).
Given deregulation of the agricultural sector and Tanzania‟s rapid shift toward marketization,
many rural communities have transitioned increasingly toward cash crops from food crops, and
have favored fast, low-input crops (which are generally perishable and with low nutritional
content), both of which can have implications on food security (Ponte, 1998).
Within this context, a number of policies, strategies and programs have been implemented in
Tanzania to ensure food security, in addition to economic growth in relation to agriculture, land
management and food security:
Agricultural Policy (1997) – the 1997 Agricultural Policy calls for agricultural research and
development, training, monitoring and evaluation to support quality and productivity of
Tanzanian farming, largely through extension services. In addition to working to develop the
productivity of cultivation, the policy calls for the improvement of infrastructure, market
information, tax incentives/subsidies and a clear legal framework to link agricultural products
to markets – both domestically and internationally (URT, 1997a).
Agriculture and Livestock Policy (1997) – The Agriculture and Livestock Policy focused on
ensuring food sufficiency, while striving to also enable the sale of food crops into the export
market. To achieve this end, the policy called for the enhancement of credit services and
input delivery systems for farmers by offering incentives for private companies to provide
these services. Further, the policy also discussed the importance of promoting the
cultivation of drought-resistant crops as well as facilitating farmer access to seeds, training,
market information and processing facilities for Tanzanian farmers (URT, 1997b).
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and Programme (ASDS and ASDP, 2001) –
Building from the previous policies, the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and
Programme comprised of a myriad of components to support the growth of agriculture in
Tanzania. The vision of the strategy is to modernize, and commercialize agriculture in a way
that
makes
it
more
productive,
profitable
and
sustainable.
To achieve these ends, the ASDS and ASDP focus on supporting the private sector to take
on greater roles in providing services to farmers by removing constraints on their
involvement in agricultural services and marketing. The strategy also outlines the provision
of budget support to invest in the ASDP, and the decentralization of planning to district
levels (URT, 2001).
Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project (PADEP, 2003) – In 2003,
the government also initiated PADEP – a project funded by the World Bank – to increase
food security, income and assets of smallholder farmers in Tanzania. The project works
largely through farmers‟ groups to collectively invest in sub-projects (i.e. technical inputs or
other technical recommendations on soil fertility/land management, agricultural technologies
and inputs/outputs marketing) in addition to institutional strengthening that train grantees to
assess the environmental and social impacts of the sub-project as well as manage subprojects successfully. A key component of PADEP is environmental sustainability, and the
guidelines developed for PADEP outline social and environmental considerations in the
development of sub-projects. PADEP also has outlined a Resettlement Policy Framework
on the process of assessing, consulting and redressing communities displaced due to plans
for dams, irrigation or other initiatives
53
In agriculture, with its focus on local level planning, the District Agriculture Development Plan
(DADP) plays a key role in how the ASDP is operationalized at the local level. District plans
outline the projects for agricultural development at the district, ward and village levels and re
responsible for their implementation. These plans are comprised of investments, service
provision and training/capacity building.
Food Security Policies
Food Security Act (1991) – The Food Security Act established the Deparment of Food
Security within the Government of Tanzania. Within the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security, the Department of Food Security advise on policy related to food security, and was
responsible for the implementation of government food security programmes. Further, the
department monitored the state of food security in Tanzania and set regulations on the
import and export of grains, on food security issues and on the Strategic Grain Reserve .
Food and Nutrition Policy (1992) – Complementing the Food Security Act of 1991, the Food
and Nutrition Policy called for further sharing of information on health and nutrition, to
manage the supply of nutrient supplements as well as to coordinate nutrition programs and
guidance for improving food security.
East African Community Food Security Strategy (2010) – In order to eliminate barriers
against cross-border trade, the East African Food Security Strategy called for improvements
in transportation infrastructure across borders, equal standards on food products across
EAC countries, and the elimination of tariffs that have until now prevented foods and other
products from crossing EAC borders for trade.20
Across both Food Security and Agriculture Policies, however, challenges in communicating
policies and how to implement them posed a serious threat to their viability. Similar to the
challenges facing the deregulation policies in the 1980s and 1990s, one study of current
agricultural strategies found that current policies related to agriculture are not well known across
different levels of government. Beyond the Ministry level, few district – let alone ward and village
– level officers were familiar with the current policies and strategies in place. With little
knowledge of current policies and strategies, the development of local level plans for
implementation of agricultural development plans are often not clearly articulated. Further, local
government authorities from district to village levels often do not have the budget, infrastructural
support or extension staff to enable agricultural development plans to be carried out. With
limited involvement of private sector actors and low participation at the community level, district
agricultural development plans make little, if any progress.
Presently, a number of practices common in some districts remain out of line from the broader
national policy on food security and agriculture. According to a study by CARE Tanzania,
confirmed by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as well as the government
of Tanzania‟s Poverty and Human Development Report 2009, a number of districts continue to
regulate production quotas as well as cross-district movement of food crops (CARE Tanzania,
2009; IFAD, 2007). From a district-level perspective, such measures serve as controls to protect
districts from food insecurity in times of drought. However, at the national level these regulations
contradict the government reform toward marketization (FAO, undated).
Uncertainty on food crop regulations has had a particular effect on women, who comprise a
greater share of the agricultural sector (84 percent of women and 80 percent of men are
employed in it), and take greater responsibility for household food crop production and food
security (Rubin, 2010). In that capacity, women often play key roles in livestock care and
20
http://www.afriquejet.com/news/africa-news/tanzania:-eac-adopts-common-strategy-for-regional-food-security2010021944496.html
54
milking, in addition to cultivation. Typically across Tanzania, women and men share
responsibilities in land preparation, sowing and planting. Women also perform the majority of
weeding, harvesting, transportation, threshing, processing and storage (CARE Tanzania, 2009).
However, while women typically contribute a greater share of agricultural labor, land ownership
is often titled to their husbands, and men generally control decision-making on how income from
cultivation is spent.
The division of labor in cultivation, however, is neither consistent across Tanzania nor static
over time. Often, men‟s involvement in agricultural tasks may shift with household priorities and
incentives underlying food or cash crop cultivation (Lyimo-Macha, 2010). Throughout this time,
maize represented an important crop to supply food the U.K. during World War II and also acted
as an important food source within Tanzania to feed plantation laborers and miners.
5.4 Crop Cultivation in Village D
For both sub-hamlets, the participants of the exercises that explored cultivation named maize
and rice, as the most important food and cash crops. This aligns with regional information that
lists maize and paddy as the most prominent food crops overall, followed by sorghum, cassava,
bananas and sweet potatoes. In N, following maize and rice, poor households cultivate sesame
and pigeon peas, providing cash income. In K 1, poor households named cassava as the third
most important crop, followed by cow-peas and sesame, whilst better off households from K 1
listed sugar cane as the third most important crop, followed by sesame. These trends indicate
that in N sub-village the traditional staple crops – cassava, millet, and sorghum – have
increasingly lost their importance. A similar trend appears to be taking place in K 1.
5.4.1 Division of Labor
The division of labor exercise illustrates that within the study village, men and women across
well-being categories shared responsibilities for almost all aspects of food crop cultivation in
regard to maize and paddy. According to the exercises within D village, men contributed more
labor in clearing the site, land preparation and the transport of harvests. The upper middle and
rich of K 1 use tractor power to plough and prepare the fields for cultivation. Within poor
households in K 1 sub-village, women contributed more labor in guarding both crops, and
across all three exercises women were exclusively responsible for winnowing rice. However,
both men and women shared responsibilities in almost all aspects of maize as well as rice
cultivation, with the exception of rice winnowing (which is solely a woman‟s task) and the
clearing of bush for rice cultivation. Children of poor households assist with weeding of maize in
N sub-cluster, whereas children of poor households in K 1 sub-hamlet help with planting.
Interestingly, children from better off households assist with most activities of maize cultivation,
with the exception of harvesting, transporting, threshing and marketing. Children‟s work,
however, is limited to weekends and holidays and is considered to be a method to teach them
farming.
Division of Labor: Maize (per acre)
Activity
Poor Households in N Hamlet
Total
Days
Clear Site
Land
Prep.
Plant
%M
%F
%C
21
80
20
0
5
60
40
0
Poor Households in K 1
Hamlet
Total
%
%M
%F
Days
C
Upper Middle and Rich
Households in K 1 Hamlet
Total
%M
%F %C
Days
30
60
40
0
15
50
30
20
15
60
40
0
10
50
30
20
2
40
60
20
1
50
30
20
55
Activity
Poor Households in N Hamlet
Poor Households in K 1
Hamlet
Upper Middle and Rich
Households in K 1 Hamlet
Weed
1
40
40
20
21
60
40
0
19
50
30
20
Guard
5(3)
60
40
0
90
40
60
0
60
50
40
10
Harvest
4
60
40
0
3
50
50
0
4
50
50
0
Transport
1
60
40
0
2
90
10
0
4
100
0
0
Thresh
3
100
0
0
4
50
50
0
-
-
-
-
100
0
0
50
50
0
Market
*Measures of one acre are based on the local standard of 70 steps by 70 steps. Estimating one yard per step,
which is roughly equal to one acre.
The sale of crops is usually done by men. This appears to be true for the better off households
as well, who explained that the division of labor (50 percent women and 50 percent men)
referred to the decision making process about how much to sell and at what time.
Division of Labor: Rice (per acre)
Activity
Poor Households in N Hamlet
Total
Days
Clear
Site
Land
Prep.
%M
%F
%C
Poor Households in K1
Hamlet
Upper Middle and Rich
Households in K 1 Hamlet
Total
Days
%M
%F
%
C
Total
Days
%M
%F
%C
1
100
0
0
10
100
0
0
14
50
50
0
1
60
40
0
8
60
40
0
4
60
40
0
-
-
-
0
30
60
40
0
Weed
(30)
60
40
0
20
60
40
0
12
40
40
20
Guard
45
20
80
0
30
10
90
0
45
30
50
20
Harvest
4
60
40
0
4
50
50
0
4
100
Transport
3
100
-
0
4
90
10
0
4
100
10
0
Thresh
3
7
60
60
40
40
0
3
50
50
0
3
100
0
0
Winnow
3
0
100
0
4
0
100
0
4
0
100
0
100
0
0
50
50
0
Plant
Market
♫
♫
0
*Measures of one acre are based on the local standard of 70 steps by 70 steps. Estimating one yard per step,
this is roughly equal to one acre.
In addition to cultivation, women in Village D are also responsible for performing domestic
chores – in maintaining the homestead, fetching water and firewood as well as food preparation
and child care (see our discussion below). These roles are consistent with the broader literature
review. Further, In line with the literature, D Village reported that although women contributed a
great deal of labor toward cultivation, few women own land or farms. To sustain their livelihoods
and that of their families, women from poor households are increasingly selling labor.
56
In terms of marketing crops, in both study sub-villages, the marketing of maize, rice and sesame
takes place at the farm gate. Prices are generally fixed with little room for bargaining. Sesame is
generally sold in advance, because of the short marketing opportunities (one month).
5.4.2 Comparative Crop Yields and Prices at Harvest and Peak Seasons
Within D village, estimated yields per acre for food crops among poor households in N subvillage were less than half of those of both poorer and better-off households in K 1 sub-village.
While households (both richer and poorer) in K 1 reported yields of 1260 kg per acre for maize,
in hamlet N the yields were nearly half (700 kg per acre). Further, yields for rice in N (252 kg per
acre) were less than one quarter of yields per acre in K 1 (1256 kg). These findings shed a new
light on the share cropping and rental arrangements in N, whereby poor farmers hand over 20
percent of their maize harvest and 33 percent of their rice harvest to landlords. Further, the
prices of maize, following the harvest are lower in N as compared to K 1.
The reasons for lower yields in one hamlet can be linked to variations in planting activities (e.g.
for rice, residents in N sub-village reported that they did not clear the site as done in K 1),
differences in soils, poor access to agricultural inputs or services, as well as possible struggles
with alcoholism. However, it is notable that while outputs per acre in N hamlet are significantly
lower in comparison to other hamlets within the village, yields for maize remain above average
yield per acre compared to average yields at district (429 kg), regional (630 kg) and national
(407.7 kg) levels. However, N yields remain below average yields for Africa (758.2 kg per acre),
and both N and K 1 sub-villages yields fall below the world average yield for maize of 2073 kg
per acre .21
Activity
Crops
Poor Households in N
Hamlet
Maize
Rice
Maize
Rice
3 bags (252 kg)
11 bags
(1056 kg)
10 bags
(1260 kg)
11 bags
(1056 kg)
4 bags
2 bags
7 bags
5 bags
10 bags
11 bags
24,500 TZS
24,500 TZS
28,000 TZS
32,000
TZS
28,000 TZS
28,000 TZS
49,000 TZS
63,000 TZS
56,000 TZS
60,000
TZS
56,000 TZS
60,000 TZS
Yield/acre
Amt saved
Price per
bag (at
harvest)
Price per
bag (at
peak price)
Maize
Upper Middle and Rich
Households in K 1 Hamlet
10 bags (1260
kgs)
5 bags
(700 kg)
Rice
Poor Households in K 1
Hamlet
In terms of rice, yields in N hamlet fall far below average at local, regional as well as national
levels.22 For K 1 hamlet, rice yields actually exceeded national as well as continental averages
(765 kg and 989 kg, respectively). However, yields fell below the world average yield of 1702 kg
per acre.23
These findings raise the issue of the appropriateness of cultivating a significant amount of land
with maize and rice, particularly for poor households. Maize is more susceptible to low yields
and complete failure in some years. It requires more precision in predicting the onset, regularity,
and duration of rains. Much of this applies to rice as well.
21
See http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor
Rice yields in 2005 were: 595 kg per acre within Mvomero District; 614 kg per acre in Morogoro region and 621.7
kg per acre across Tanzania
23
http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor
22
57
With the provision of subsidized inputs scaled back, and under-resourced extension services
targeted toward wealthier male farmers, poor farmers have less access to training or inputs. The
majority of cultivators continue to rely on the hand hoe (CARE Tanzania, 2009; Shayo, 2006). In
D village, seasonal calendars with the poorest households also showed that rainfall patterns in
the area have become less reliable – with less rain and delays in rainy seasons. In this context,
farmers have found it difficult to plan for planting seasons for their crops.
Further, particularly in N hamlet where yields were significantly lower than the other study area,
access to land and productive labor remained a significant challenge. Among the poorest
cohort, sharecropping or renting land in was common. With little access to land, the poorest
well-being group in N hamlet faced seasonal hunger and households reported cutting meals
throughout the month of May. During this time, women mentioned selling labor at half of
standard wage rates paid in cash or in food, borrowing money from richer neighbors and selling
livestock (i.e. goats and chickens). In the seasonal calendar within K 1, on the other hand, poor
households were able to sell labor during lean periods, and if necessary they sell livestock. The
seasonal calendar conducted with poor households from K 1 hamlet, showed that poorer
households are generally food sufficient for the entire year and do not enter into the same
exploitative relations of debt that were found in N hamlet.
Selling labor on others‟ land and cutting meals may also contribute to lower labor productivity for
subsistence crops within hamlet N, connected to lower yields. Another emerging concern
affecting labor in hamlet N is alcoholism. From focus group discussions as well as the gender
norms exercises, hamlet N community members mentioned alcoholism as an emerging problem
among men within the area. According to discussions with local leaders and residents, the
problem of alcoholism within hamlet N not only compromises the productivity of agricultural
labor, but has also deepened poverty as some men have sold farm land in order to enable their
drinking addiction.
58
Beyond challenges in cultivation itself, CARE‟s research on women and agriculture found that
inadequate storage facilities and weak marketing infrastructure can also make farmers
vulnerable to exploitation by private traders who purchase crops at the farm gate at belowmarket prices. In D village, all farmers within the exercise sold their harvests at the farm gate
and did not transport their crops to market. With K 1 Hamlet closer to the main road, prices for
food crops were consistently higher than prices quoted in N, which was more remote.
Interestingly, the wealthier households in K 1 only cultivated food crops for personal
consumption and did not sell their food crop harvests except in cases of emergency. Unlike the
poorer households, rich households in K 1 hamlet were also more likely to cultivate sugarcane
or work as civil servants in addition to farming.
5.5 Wages in Village D
An important dimension of the livelihood activities of the poorest households involves the sale of
labor in agriculture. In D village, various exercises have highlighted that a family of 5, requires a
minimum of 5 acres of land to secure the annual cash and food requirements. With access to
far less than 5 acres, a considerable number of women and men in both study hamlets sell
labor. Looking across the labor arrangements affecting the poor in both study hamlets,
differences between the manifestations of poverty between a better off and poorer area become
clear. Within N, which is more remote and excluded within the village, the poor engage in more
types of agricultural labor – selling labor for maize cultivation, as well as working in the
harvesting and winnowing of rice. Further, the exercises highlighted that poor households in N
are more likely to engage children in selling labor, which may partially be due to the
inaccessibility of schools there. Whilst both K 1 and N residents reported selling labor in
sugarcane cultivation, most are not involved in cane-cutting, which is largely done through
migrant labor and is paid through Mtibwa Outgrower Association (MOA), a body that consists of
farmers that cultivate cane, including the large number of absentee landholders in N (see
section on sugar cane below). Discussions with MOA highlighted that only 10 percent of cane
cutters are employed locally.
In terms of wages, rates between the two hamlets are comparable, with N wages slightly lower
for some activities – particularly for rice cultivation. Both rates, however, seem to fall above the
national agricultural labor minimum wage of 70,000 TZS per month (Association of Tanzanian
Employers, 2010). Issues over wages represent one of the most common disputes that arise
within D Village. However, discussions with both Village Council members and the Village
59
Chairman highlighted that they themselves were unclear on laws or policy concerning labor,
making it difficult to arbitrate such disputes.
Sugarcane Wage Matrix
* Also includes breakfast, medical reimbursement, injury compensation, and housing on factory grounds.
ACTIVITY
Unit for payment
Sowing
1 row (70 steps)
1 acre (70x70)steps
1 row: Short | Tall
1 acre: Short | Tall
Weeding
Fire break clearing
Payment
K Hamlet
4-500/=
20-30000/=
300/= | 100/=
30000/= | 60000/=
M
F
X
X
X
X
20,000/=
X
X
15,000/=
NN Hamlet
Land preparation
1 acre
70000-120000/=
X (group)
Sowing
1 row (70 steps)
500/=
X
X
1 acre (70x70 steps)
25000/=
Weeding
1 row
500/=
X
X
1 acre
25-50000/=
Clearing roads
Strip: 6x70 steps
6000/=
X
X
Block: 70x70 steps
10-12000/=
Sugar Plantation Laborers (not including cutting)*
Sowing
10 rows per day **
83000/= (month)
X
Weeding
15 rows per day**
83000/= (month)
X
X
Irrigation
5 rows per day**
83000/= (month)
X
X
** Calculated as 70 „steps‟ (or 70 meters) per row.
C
Time Required
4-10 rows/day
1 acre = 4 days
<5 rows/day
Short: 5 days
Tall: 10 days
N/A
5x70 steps
2.5x70 steps
X
1 acre/1 wk
N/A
X
1 acre = 1 day/4 ppl
1 strip/2-4 days
Monthly contract
Monthly contract
Monthly contract
Rice Wage Matrix
ACTIVITY
Unit for Payment
Digging with hoes
1 acre (70x70 steps)
Payment
K Hamlet
20000/=
40000/=
70000-100000/=
10000/=
20000/=
40000/=
5000/=
2500-3500/=
50000/=
30000/=
40000/=
NN Hamlet
70000-120000/=
Land Preparation
¼ acres (35x35 steps)
½ acre (35x70steps)
1 acre (70x70)
¼ acre
½ acre
1 acre
10x20 steps tall weeds
10x20 steps short
Monthly: no food
Monthly: w/ food
Per additional acre
Sowing
Weeding
Crop guarding
1 acre
1 acre
1 acre
20000/=
40000/=
30000/=
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1 acre/3-4 days
1 acre/6 days
1 acre/month
Harvesting (cutting,
threshing)
Winnowing
1 acre
40000/=
X
X
X
1 acre/6 days
1 bag
2000/=
Sowing-broadcasting
Weeding twice
Crop guarding
M
F
X
X
¼ acre/4 days
X
X
N/A
X
X
2-3 strips/day
X
X
After
school
X
Time Required
1 acre/month
1 acre/1 wk
X
60
Children
N/A
Maize Wage Matrix: N Hamlet
ACTIVITY
Unit for Payment
Land Preparation
1 acre (70x70
steps)
Planting
Measured
Not measured
Weeding
Harvesting
Payment
NN Hamlet
70000-120000/=
M
15000/= | 7000/=
5000/=| 3000/=
16-20000/=
16-20000/=
Children
X
X
Pit | Sow 1 acre
Pit | Sow 1 acre
1 acre
1 acre
F
X
X
Time Required
1 acre/1 wk
X
X
X
X
X
1 acre/3 days
1 acre/1 day
1 acre/3-4 days
1 acre/4 days
In earlier sections, we pointed to the prevalence of sugar cane cultivated by absentee owners in
N and rich and upper middle farmers in K 1, as well as K 2. In fact, though we have not precise
measurements, transect drives through N indicate that more than half of the cultivated land is
used for sugar cane. Yet poor households of N have little benefit from the crop, as they find
relatively little employment (aside from land preparation, weeding, and some road clearing). The
majority of labor for cane are migrants from other areas. Further, poor households in K 1 and N
are unable to cultivate the crop because of the high input costs and the minimum acreage under
cane that is required for farmers to join the Mtibwa Outgrowers Association. In the next section,
we briefly explore the Government of Tanzania‟s new Agriculture Policy „Kilimo Kwanza‟ to
explore the class implications and highlight which „farmers‟ are more likely to benefit from the
new policies.
5.6 Kilimo Kwanza
As our colonial and post-colonial history has outlined, government systems in Tanganyika /
Tanzania have aggressively promoted the cultivation of cash crops and the commercialization of
farms through the development of plantation farming systems. Across these periods,
government policy concerning commercial agriculture have focused on the modernization of
agriculture – through the introduction of technologies, the reformation of farming techniques and
the utilization of improved varieties and other agricultural inputs (fertilizer, etc.). The latest push
in the movement to modernize and commercialize agriculture in Tanzania has been through
Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First).
5.6.1 Tanzania’s Push toward Marketization: Kilimo Kwanza
In economic liberalization, rural communities have transitioned increasingly toward cash crops
from food crops, and have favored fast, low-input crops (which are generally perishable and with
low nutritional content), both of which can have implications on food security (Ponte, 1998). In
this context, declining soil fertility because of over-cultivation (the reduction of soil organic
matter and nutrients without sufficient replacement, as well as overuse of fertilizers and
pesticides) have also made agriculture less productive for many small-holder farmers.
The role of agriculture in Tanzanian agriculture is sizeable. Seventy-five percent of Tanzanians
rely on agriculture for their livelihoods and the sector comprises nearly half of Tanzania‟s GDP
(45 percent) and two-thirds of exports (namely in coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, cashew nuts,
sisal) (Rubin, 2010). Overall, the income from the agricultural sector has grown an average of
4.4 percent per year between 2000 and 2008, well below the targeted growth set by MKUKUTA
of 10 percent (URT, 2009).
In terms of production, the key cash crops for Tanzania include: cotton, tobacco, sugar, tea,
pyrethrum, coffee, sisal and cashews. Between 2004-2005, production in pyrethrum, sugar,
61
cotton and tobacco have increased, though production of cashew and cotton have declined
(URT, 2006). Over the past decade, the government has focused on agriculture as a means for
economic development and poverty reduction. The most recent push for economic development
in Tanzania has been the introduction of a resolution to promote the commercialization and
mechanization of agriculture in Tanzania, called Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First).
Kilimo Kwanza was initially developed by the Tanzania National Business Council, adopted by
the government in August 2009. According to the resolution, the initiative sees attracting
investment in Tanzanian agriculture and boosting productivity as key toward economic
development. In order to achieve more attractive production systems in agriculture, the
resolution calls for the transformation of the country‟s agricultural system away from smallholder farming, toward a modern commercial sector. In order to achieve this goal, Kilimo
Kwanza rests on 10 pillars:
Political will to push agricultural transformation.
Enhanced financing for agriculture.
Institutional reorganization and management of agriculture.
Paradigm shift to strategic agricultural production.
Land availability for agriculture.
Incentives to stimulate investments in agriculture.
Industrialization for agricultural transformation.
Science, technology and human resources to support agricultural transformation.
Infrastructure Development to support agricultural transformation.
Mobilization of Tanzanians to support and participate in the implementation of KILIMO
KWANZA.24
To support this resolution, the 2010/2011 budget has focused heavily on agriculture, increasing
funds allocated toward agriculture by nearly 36 percent: from 666.9 billion Tanzanian Shillings
(TZS) to 903.8 billion TZS (Kirimi, 2010). Supporting the resolution, the World Bank and
European Commission pledged financing in agriculture food production (Kirimi, 2009). With
these funds, the government plans to invest in subsidizing farm inputs and high-quality seeds,
strengthening extension services and research in agriculture, and developing plans to improve
market information and marketing structures (Kirimi, 2010).
Further, the government of Tanzania has also developed a number of VAT exemptions for
agricultural services (harvesting), equipment (hay-making machines, mowers, combine
harvesters), inputs and transport for processing (sugar, sisal, tea) (Kirimi, 2010). For dairy and
livestock sectors, incentives are aimed to support ranches by creating VAT exemptions for
machines and equipment for the transport and processing of dairy products, as well as for
animal feed and breeding services.
In addition, in 2010, the government has begun to repossess idle lands to be made use of for
agriculture. Already, 115 plots totaling 437,200 acres of land in Morogoro have been reposed.25
The Tanzania Investment Bank also announced that it would guarantee loans to farmers for
investment in agriculture, at an amount totaling 13.7 million US dollars.26
According to policy, these exemptions are only for „organized farms‟ though the definition of that
term has not been clarified. What is certain, however, is that many small-holder – a term that is
24
See Kilimo Kwanza Resolution.
Kilimo Kwanza – Initial Steps (May 1, 2010).
26
East African (June 14, 2010). Tanzania waives tax on farm inputs to boost production.
25
62
widely used, but generally includes marginal farmers – farming systems and pastoral livestock
systems fall outside of Kilimo Kwanza support (Kirimi, 2010). As the study of village D shows,
farmers invested in labor/capital intensive cash crops like sugar comprise the wealthier within
local societies, as they have the means to invest in cash crops in addition to food crops. Further,
though the cultivation of sugar, sisal and tea continue to rely on plantation labor, Kilimo Kwanza
fails to account for how to support the immense labor class upholding each of these farming
systems.
5.6.2 Commercializing Agriculture in Tanzania
While Kilimo Kwanza discusses the need to modernize „small-holder‟ farmers, it is not
immediately apparent how the strategies and incentives emerging from Kilimo Kwanza will help
the „small-holder farmer‟. In fact, it is not clear, who is meant by small holder famers, as our
analysis highlights that in the context of D village, those who can cultivate cash crops, such as
sugar are likely to be upper middle and rich farmers. Further, with its prioritization of „organized
farms‟ and tax benefits for commercial farming equipment / services, the incentives seem more
aimed toward medium- and large-scale farms. While such incentives may benefit the better-off
agriculturalists and boost agricultural production at the macro-level, they do not seem aimed
toward poverty alleviation at a local level. This is particularly true, if wage labor is brought from
labor surplus regions, who are able to sell wages lower than the local rates.
Within the context of D village, there is no one person who currently owns a tractor and few
farmers hold enough land to make mechanization efficient. Rather, most households rely
exclusively on the hand hoe for cultivation, and those who do hire in tractors, do so by renting
services from outside of the village that require a minimum of 10 acres for plowing, excluding all
categories of farmers except the rich. As the poorest cohorts of the community rely on sale of
labor for livelihoods, policies do not outline strategies for securing labor rights or interests within
agriculture.
5.6.3. Sugar Cultivation and Production in the Morogoro Region 27
In some parts of the world, sugar cane is considered as a crop which exploited slave labor to
create fortunes for colonial plantation owners. More recently, the crop is often cultivated by large
industrial plantations cultivated by gangs of hired laborers who earn sub-standard wages in
Brazil, Central America and the Caribbean. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the sugar industries differ
considerably, in terms of the size of production and the number of small holder outgrower
schemes. Sugar is one of the largest agro-processing industries in Tanzania and a major
employer with a labor force of about 25,000 including casual labor for cane cutting (Sserunkuma
and Kimera, 2006). Tanzania is amongst the 11 Sub-Saharan countries 28 that produce over
200,000 tons of sugar cane and is also one of the countries in which sugar cane is cultivated in
two production sectors: plantation estates and „outgrower‟ schemes.
Plantations, as a system of large-scale farming, continue to occupy a central role in the
agricultural sector of Tanzania, particularly in the cultivation, processing and export of cash
crops – namely, sugar, sisal, tea, coffee and tobacco (Msuya and Ashimogo, 2005). In
Tanzania‟s sugar cane sector, however, farmers – organized through four outgrower schemes –
cultivate and supply roughly 50 percent of the sugar cane to three mills: Kilombero, Mtibwa, and
Kagera (International Sugar Organization, 2008). Outgrower schemes involve „small holder‟
27
This section is based on the literature cited, as well as semi-structured interviews with Reuben Matango, Chairman
of the Mtibwa Outgrowers Association, farmers, local labor, and laborers employed by the Mtibwa Sugar Estates.
28
The other countries are South Africa, Swaziland, Kenya, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia,
Malawi and Uganda.
63
farmers who are generally organized under farmer associations and are provided with different
levels of miller support.
In the research area, sugar cane is cultivated by the Mtibwa Sugar Estates Ltd. on nearly
15,000 acres with 1,500 permanent and contract staff, as well as 1,500 casual workers
(Sserunkuma and Kimera, 2006). There are
also over 6,000 farmers who grow sugar cane
on private landholdings (including absentee
landholders). The vast majority of the farmers
are organized under the Mtibwa Outgrower
Association (MOA) that was formed in the early
1990s just before the privatization of the
parastatal sugar companies (Matango, 2006).
MOA‟s mission is to provide high quality
services (including farm inputs, machinery,
training, credit facilities and advisory services to
its members to increase cane production,
obtain better prices, and increase the standard
of living amongst its members. (ibid). The „most
critical goal‟ of MOA is „to reduce poverty
amongst its members‟ (ibid). At the same time,
the provision of various services are to work
towards improving sugar cane productivity. The
latter is crucial as the present productivity of
cane by outgrowers if relatively poor at 40-55
tons per hectare compared to 79-100 tons per
hectare yield on the Mtibwa plantation estate
(International Sugar Organization).
The low yields amongst the outgrower farmers
are due to numerous factors, among which are:
poor crop husbandry, lack of input availability,
lack of access to affordable financial services to
acquire inputs, pests and diseases (Matango,
2006). Further, production costs of sugar cane
are high (at 1 million Tanzania Shillings per acre in 2010), infrastructure is poor and inputs are
expensive (Matango, pers.comm). Production costs can vary considerably; for instance, in
2004/2005 the average cost to produce 1 ton of sugar cane was Tsh. 17,887 and in 2006/2007
it was Tsh 29,000 because of increased fuel prices, amongst other factors (Matango, 2006).
Finally, the Mtibwa Sugar Estate (which holds the only milling facility in the area) has a history of
delayed payments of up to 6 months, as opposed to the 45 days that are outlined in the contract
with MOA, making it difficult for farmers to recover their costs in a timely manner and repay
loans that were taken to finance inputs. The delayed payments have caused considerable
conflict and agitations with outgrowers organizing „lock ins‟ where the factory management is
prevented from leaving the premises. Over the past few years, there have been seven „lock ins‟
most of which were resolved after 2-3 days, when management came forth with payments.
MOA used to support these „lock ins‟ but are now trying to mediate and avoid such drastic forms
of collective action in fear that if the these large gatherings and encirclement of the premises
might get out of control and damage the factory.
Figure 3 Absentee-run sugar cane field in hamlet N
64
As a result of these factors, sugar cane is not cultivated by marginal / subsistence / small
landholders, but by medium and large farmers.29 MOA requires that farmers own 1.5 acres
minimum at the time of joining the organization, an area that has to be increased to 2.5 acres
over the next two years to maintain membership status. This would require that households
whose livelihood depends on farming own or access at least 3.5 – 4.5 acres of land in order to
cultivate food crops in addition to sugar cane. Based on the most recent data (2003), the
average landholdings size of sugar cane outgrowers was 3.5 acres, a land size that is likely to
have changed upwards (Matango, 2010 pers. comm.). It is also important to note that the farther
away from the mill, the more expensive the production costs (accessing inputs, transport costs
of cane to the mill, etc.), prohibiting farmers with smaller landholdings and less financial
resources to engage in sugar cane cultivation.30 This explains why only rich and upper middle
households – those owning more than 5 acres – in our study area cultivate sugar cane. This
does not include the absentee owners who hold considerable landholdings (>50 acre parcels) in
hamlet N and almost exclusively cultivate sugar cane.
There is also the issue of labor and who performs the key work activities associated with sugar
cane – land preparation, sowing, weeding, clearing roads and harvesting. A large number of
farmers use tractors for land preparation, particularly the absentee farmers, and sowing and
weeding is mostly done by local labor from the villages. The most prominent and year round
activity – cane cutting – is organized by MOA as well as the Mtibwa mill who work through labor
contractors that recruit cane cutters. Ninety percent of cane cutters in the outgrower scheme
come from colonial labor reserve areas (e.g. Kigoma and Iringa).31 It is generally believed that
migrants from these areas work harder, longer hours, and are more efficient. The argument that
people from „surplus labor regions‟ work harder and are therefore more productive is common
(in many societies, including Asian countries) with landowners and contractors using this to
justify undermining of local wage rates through the employment of migrant workers. This
reasoning ignores the fact that migrants who generally come from less developed areas of the
country are willing to work longer hours during „migration episodes‟. Local laborers, on the other
hand, are more likely to demand specific work hours, in light of their responsibilities at home as
well as the leisure opportunities with friends and family. The wage analysis conducted in K 1
and N highlights that local labor in agriculture earns considerably more than the national
average (minimum wage set for agriculture) of TZS 70,000 per month. The local wage rates,
however, have to be understood in the context of the seasonality of labor and the limited
number of days that work is available locally. MOA pays its cane cutters TZS 100,000 per
months (without any benefits (no meals and no health services); whilst the Mtibwa Sugar Estate
pays TZS 85,000 per months.32
We did not explore the work conditions of the outgrower cane cutters, but gained considerably
insight through discussions with cane cutters employed by the Mtibwa Sugar Estate.33 Cane
cutters line up for roll call at 5 am, eat a porridge provided by the factory, move to the work site,
and begin work at 7 am. Working hours are until 5 pm. The factory has established work quotas
that cane cutters have to fulfill (cutting 17 rows of cane that are 42 meters long). Payment of
wages are calculated based on the completion of the daily quotas. If these quotas are not met,
29
It is unclear from the literature on farming and farming systems what constitutes a „small holder‟. The terms is
widely used and is confusing as it implies „small farmer‟.
30
By law, sugar cane can only be cultivated in a 40 km radius of the milling facilities, unless farmers can prove that
they can continue to be cost efficient despite the distance (Reuben Matango, MOA Chairperson, pers. comm.).
31
The Germans and British recruited labor from up-country areas because of the strong resistance of indigenous
people near the plantations who were more informed about the working conditions in settler farms. (Mbonile, 1996).
32
85,000 TZS equals USD 58.00
33
This discussion is based on the interviews with cane cutters, weeders, irrigators and headmen who work for the
Mtibwa Sugar Estate Ltd.
65
the workers loose payment for the days that the worker „under-performs‟. For fear of not being
able to complete their quotas, the workers skip their tea and lunch breaks and work until the
quota is completed (most are able to complete their quotas by 2 or 3 pm) and then return to
their home (either factory or rented housing).
Generally laborers do not bring their families, because they do not earn enough income to rent
adequate housing in nearby Turiani and the factory provides housing only for workers, who live
in 3 x 3 meter rooms shared by 6 persons. In addition to housing and breakfast, the workers are
entitled to medical treatment in case of work-related illnesses. The most common diseases that
sugar cane workers experience are malaria, tuberculosis (related to the cane dust that workers
are exposed to), typhoid (from unsafe water) and HIV/ AIDS. Cane cutters also experiences
frequent injuries – cuts from machetes and snake bites. There is a clinic on the factory premises
that is to provide treatment and medicines. However, the clinic generally does not stock
sufficient medicines and as a result workers have to purchase their own medicines and wait for
reimbursement. The workers reported that in many cases the reimbursements are not paid and
once the harvesting season ends and workers leave for home, their reimbursement claims
expire. Illnesses that cannot be treated by the factory clinic are referred to the Bwagala Hospital
which is to bill the Mtiwba Sugar Estate Ltd.. MSE, however, has failed to pay its bills and
workers now have to pay for treatment and claim reimbursement.
There are also other work tasks, such as weeding, planting, irrigating, and adding fertilizers.
Women tend to work in irrigation, weeding, and fertilization, but do not cut cane, as the work is
physically too demanding. The workers engaged in the other activities earn TZS 83,000 per day,
under a quota system that operates along the lines of the cane cutters. The cane cutting season
– 9 months – starts in May/ June and ends in January / February, depending on the rains. The
most recent wage increase occurred in 2000/2001. At that time, the cane cutters earned 75,000
TZS. When wage negotiations with the MSE management failed, the „sugar cane worker‟s
union‟, organized a general strike, which the management tried to break through the Field Force
Unit, an anti-riot police force. After three days, the management announced a new monthly
wage of TZS 85,000 for cane cutters and TZS 83,000 for all other laborers. 34
The discussion highlights that the cultivation of sugar cane, which is grown on large tracts of
land by large and medium farmers and absentee landholders, presents the only large-scale
economic activity that requires labor throughout the year. The sector, however, is characterized
by exploitative labor dynamics, with labor contractors hiring workers from labor-surplus regions.
In other words, the only „industrial‟ agricultural activity in the region, fails to create employment
at the local level, through the recruitment of migrant labor to undermine prevailing local wage
rates in agriculture and makes payment of daily wages conditional on quotas.
Part 6: Pastoralists
6.1 East Africa and Pastoralists
The organization of pastoral societies is rooted in a foundation of resilience to changing
environments. Often occupying lands that are scarce in resources, semi-arid and remote,
pastoralist peoples seasonally move livestock across terrains to sustain production of livestock
in areas that often cannot be effectively exploited by settled cultivators.
34
Based on a 2010 Government Circular, the minimum monthly wage rate in agriculture is TZS 70,000 (USD 48.00).
66
Across the floor of the Great Rift of East Africa as well as lowlands across the Horn of Africa,
pastoralist groups have long occupied the arid and semi-arid lands and seasonally moved their
livestock in search of pasturelands, which are viewed as shared resources among clans and
tribes (Markakis, 2004). Given the mobility inherent in their lives, pastoralist groups maintain
wider-ranging social institutions that are characterized by autonomy for smaller social units
(clans, lineage groups, homesteads), in contrast to settled groups within the region (Markakis,
2004). Across history, pastoral groups have negotiated relations with cultivators, through trade,
production systems that engaged pastoralists space to graze on farmer fields before planting
seasons, and inter-marriage across groups. However, though symbiotic relationships between
settlers and pastoralists have existed for centuries, relations between the settled and pastoral
peoples of East Africa were overwhelmingly antagonistic. Cattle raids were common and
relations between groups were defined by mistrust (Illife, 1979:20).
As land has come under increasing demand, tensions have continued to grow between groups.
Across East Africa and globally, the attitudes of government and international
development/conservation interests toward pastoralists have often been characterized by
mistrust, coupled with a dose of condescension. In current and past discussions of pastoralist
communities in East Africa, tribes such as the Maasai have been labeled as culturally
conservative and primitive. These stereotypes have driven the alienation of pastoralists from
traditional grazing lands in favor of farming or conservation interests, government efforts to
sedentarize nomadic pastoralists and promote ranching systems for the cattle industry, and
more recently, the marketing of pastoralist cultures and peoples in the currently expanding
industry of cultural tourism (Hogson, 2001).
In part, the struggles that institutions have faced against pastoralists have been the repeated
inability of institutions to effectively engage and manage pastoralist communities within the
economic, social and political structures used to govern communities – from colonial times to
today.
6.2 Pastoralist Tribes of Tanganyika and Colonialism
In Tanzania alone, the Datoga and Maasai (and their subgroups) comprise the core of pure
pastoralists. Among the Datoga, the Barabaig remain the dominant tribe. Further, Tanzania
hosts a number of agro-pastoral tribes, notably the Iraqw, who place great value in cattle but
depend primarily on agriculture for subsistence.
While in the history of modern-day Tanganyika, the Datoga dominated much of the north, by the
18th century many Datoga were displaced by the aggressive expansion of Maasai tribes in the
area. Given the prominence of the tribe in northern Tanganyika and its losses against the
Maasai, the Datoga are viewed as historical enemies to the Maasai as well as to the tribes living
between Lake Victoria and the Rift Valley. When colonists arrived in the 1890s, the Datoga
people lived around the areas of Lake Eyasi and Mt. Hanang in the Manyara region. The Iraqw
settled densely near diverse groups, and have experienced long conflict with diverse groups
within the region. Despite a history of conflicts, however, the Iraqw did not develop military
organization and do not place honor in war or violence (Illife, 1979, Winter and Molyneaux,
1963, Redkal, 1998).
With colonial rule and the attempts to impose governance structures across Tanganyika, social
structures and livelihoods of pastoral societies shifted. When European colonists arrived to
Tanganyika, efforts to engage pastoralists focused on small-scale development efforts to
improve water, promote specific breeds of livestock and control rotational grazing in fixed areas.
To ensure easier governance, enforce political stability and devise a sense of „tribal separatism‟,
67
German appointed paramount chiefs with jurisdiction over distinct groups and demarcated
territories with ethnically-defined district administration centers for each (Fratkin, 1997).
Colonialism in Tanganyika was marked by a series of disasters. Waves of epidemics swept
through the region: bovine pleuropneumonia (BPP) in 1883, rinderpest in 1891, smallpox in
1892, jiggers in 1893, followed by locusts in 1894 and a third as well as forth wave of jiggers in
1897-9 and 1903-4. The Maasai, which had dominated the Arusha area before colonial rule,
suffered most from loss of cattle due to BPP and rinderpest as well as from smallpox, which led
to the deaths of an estimated two-fifths to three-quarters of the people (Iliffe, 1979).
To open land for white settlers, the administration capitalized on the weakened position of the
Maasai. In 1904, the British colonial governor in Nairobi signed the „Anglo-Maasai Agreements‟
with a Maasai medicine man, which ceded Maasai lands for white settlers and the Ugandan
railway line. In Tanzania, German colonial administrators formed a Maasai Reserve, within
whose boundaries the Maasai were forced to remain, in order to make space for German farms
and ranches (Ndaskoi, 2006). The Maasai reserve later became classified as a district
(Hodgons, 2001; Mwaikusa, 1993). In addition, the Germans demarcated Iraqw Chiefdoms and
a Barabaig Territory within whose boundaries people were allowed to move cattle (Mwaikusa,
1993; Winter and Molyneaux, 1963). To prevent movement of ethnic tribes across demarcated
boundaries, colonial troops patroled their borders. This policy was continued under British
control. For example, in 1918, when a number of Iraqw settled in an area beyond its borders,
the British burned houses and forced them to return to the lands demarcated for them to ensure
their control under the district administration overseeing the Iraqw (Winter and Molyneaux,
1963).
However, to accommodate growing commercial interest in pastoral lands for agriculture and
ranching – as well as to push pastoral groups to settle – administrators actively encouraged
cultivators to encroach on grazing lands and allocated traditional pastoralist lands to white
settlers. The Maasai lost hundreds of thousands of acres of grazing land to farming and
ranching blocks, and were often blamed for the loss due to „laziness‟ in clearing tsetse bush –
proving their indifference toward improving – and retaining – the land.
In addition to loss of land to cultivators, pastoralist groups also lost land and cattle to
conservation interests. In large part, the theories driving displacement of pastoralist lands in the
name of natural resource management was driven by the idea that pastoralist societies would
eventually destroy the lands in which they lived and grazed. As a result, the German
administration drafted a wildlife protection law for the Serengeti and Ngorongoro area. However,
it was not until the Game Preservation Ordinance of 1921 and subsequent declaration of
Ngorongoro and then the Serengeti as reserves within the decade that pastoralist access to
land became greatly restricted (Mwaikusa, 1993). These policies eventually led to the
demarcation and enclosing of thousands of square miles of savannah and the eviction of 50,000
Maasai herders living and grazing on the lands (Dowie, 2009).
Further, as efforts to incorporate pastoralists into the cattle market largely failed, colonial
regulations aimed to cull cattle from pastoralist herds. To counter Barabaig practices of
accumulate large herds, the government initiated a program to force large livestock owners to
sell cattle (Klima, 1964). To protect against growing population density and erosion, the Mbulu
Development Plan forced Iraqw herders to sell large portions of cattle. A number of Iraqw were
then forced to resettle in more marginal lands infested with tsetse fly and poor water access.
The initiative marked the first successful instance where colonists forced pastoralists to
participate in a conservation scheme.
68
The Mbulu Development Plan served not only to ease environmental pressures on land, but to
also promote the sale of livestock and monetization of cattle among pastoral groups. To
promote more capitalist attitudes among the Maasai, the British colonial government instituted
the Maasai Development Plan, which called for “the encouragement of money-consciousness
among the Masai [sic] and the provision of articles to attract their immense potential spending
power,” and established greater administrative interaction with the Maasai through education
and propaganda initiatives to ensure that the Maasai obey administrative and veterinary orders
and contribute to the economy through the sale of animals.
With animal populations depleted by insufficient land, disease, culling programs and taxes,
young men from poor families sometimes organized raids to replenish stock from neighboring
tribes. In response to raids orchestrated by a group of Barabaigs in 1955, the British
government chose to punish all Barabaigs by exacting a cattle fine from each of the over 60
Barabaig clans (Klima, 1964).
6.3 Present: Farming and Natural Resources
Many of the initiatives to modernize pastoralists in colonial Tanganyika and shift land use
toward more „productive‟ uses were maintained by the independent government. Attitudes
toward pastoralist systems during this time were greatly influenced by the rapid desertification
that characterized the era, and the concept of the “Tragedy of the Commons.” The concept was
introduced in 1968 by Garret Hardin, who published an article of that name, which asserted that
desertification from overgrazing would increase as individual pastoralists strove to maximize
herd sizes, alongside growing populations of animals and pastoralists over a fixed area. This
fear portrayed pastoral groups as threats to eco-systems rather than a part of them. This view
influenced both economic development and conservation approaches across Tanzania‟s
history.
During Ujamaa Vijiini, the government established a number of socialist villages and converted
sections of pastoral lands to collective farming schemes (Mwaikusa, 1993). Further, to contain
pastoralism, the government developed a number of livestock villages for pastoralist groups to
control water resources and grazing. However, with the development investments that
accompanied ujamaa villages, a number of migrant farmers relocated to the area, pushing
pastoralists into marginal lands, resulting in overgrazing in these areas (Fratkin, 1997).
To support food security, the government parastatal, National Agriculture and Food Corporation
(NAFCO), developed a project with the Government of Canada to dedicate nearly 247,000
acres of land for mechanized wheat farming as a measure for economic development and food
security. For the project, NAFCO uprooted the Barabaig from traditional homelands with neither
consultation nor compensation. Pushed to the lands‟ perimeter, many faced intimidation,
beatings and rape from NAFCO staff for trespassing on these lands (Lane, 1995). In the 1980s,
the World Bank used the rationale provided by Hardin to promote commercialization and
privatization for long-term development. During this time, structural adjustment programs
exacerbated economic inequality across marginalized groups. These initiatives spurred greater
encroachment into pastoralist lands by small-holders and the acceleration of agro-business. In
multiple cases, the government actively favored leasing large tracts of land for mono-cropping
against pastoral interests as well. For example, in addition to the allocation of 247,000 acres of
land to NAFCO, Tanzania Breweries acquired 100,000 acres of traditional Maasai grazing land
for the development of medium-sized barley farms. Further, a number of communal grazing
lands were privatized for the development of private ranching.
69
For livestock production, Tanzania‟s policy focused on commercialization in a way that largely
excluded pastoralists. In an initiative heavily supported by the World Bank and bilateral donors,
the livestock policy promoted privately held ranches to replace nomadic pastoral systems. This
model favored sedentary elites, by building dipping facilities and feed lots for private ranches.
Despite initial enthusiasm from donors, however, support for this approach dropped rapidly as
ecologists observed signs of severe environmental degradation and poor productivity outcomes
from this model of livestock-raising (Fratkin, 1997).
In addition to alienation of lands to pursue more „productive‟ means of land use, conservation
initiatives also squeezed pastoral communities. The notions promoted by conservationist
Bernard Grzimek, that pastoralists would one day destroy their environments, amplified by
Hardin‟s arguments, were hugely influential to Tanzania‟s approach to encapsulate rather than
integrate pastoralists in natural resource management. Underlying this approach was also the
view that grazing cattle near protected areas diminish resources for local wildlife, which
represent a lucrative source of foreign exchange through tourism.
In line with these incentives and beliefs, a massive number of pastoralists were forced out of the
Serengeti National Park, Ngorongoro Crater and Mkomazi Game Reserve, and cattle were
restricted from grazing in these areas. To fight dispossession, pastoralist groups have
increasingly taken such displacement to court. The case of Mkomazi Game Reserve was taken
to the level of the Supreme Court. However, though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Maasai that evictions were illegal, no actions were taken to reverse the displacement.
The alienation of land from pastoralists disrupted rotational grazing patterns upon which people
relied for their livelihoods and the health of their cattle. In addition to the direct impact in loss of
livestock productivity, the changing patterns of land use toward commercial agriculture also led
to environmental damage – as evidenced by the NAFCO Wheat Project (Scoones, 1991).
Despite challenges, an estimated 1.5 million people in Tanzania continue to pursue pastoralist
livelihoods (IrishAid, no date). With ever narrowing space for pastoralists to maintain their
lifestyle in traditional lands, along with failing rains that threaten food security, however,
pastoralist groups have migrated farther south, and livestock have become increasingly
vulnerable to disease (most prominently tick-borne diseases, contagious bovine pleuro
pneumonia, black quarter, as well as hoof and mouth disease) (Austroproject Program
Association, 2008). As a result, may pastoralists have migrated south to regions such as
Morogoro to maintain their livelihoods. Some have sedentarized as cultivators and agricultural
laborers, with a number migrating to urban and peri-urban centers in low-wage employment
(May, 2003).
6.4 Identity, Cultural Tourism and Discrimination
As pastoral communities face immense pressures to adapt to structural changes and that have
threatened their way of life, many have strategically engaged identity politics to assert their
rights as pastoralists and as indigenous peoples. Look across history, cultural identity among
pastoral groups in Tanzania have been shaped by their shifting relations with government and
settled communities, and struggles against discrimination and stereotypes facing these groups.
Initial European accounts of pastoral groups in Tanganyika romanticized them as a primitive,
though superior race among settled sub-Saharan Africans. This fascination, particularly
surrounding the Maasai, captured the interest and imagination of countless missionaries,
colonists and anthropologists who have written extensively about the tribe. During the 1800s
and early 20th century, European anthropologists theorized that pastoral groups including the
Iraqw, Datoga and Maasai were descendents of the biblical (Caucasian) Hamites and attributed
70
any progress within the region to this race. This “scientific racism” justified the insistence of
Tutsi superiority over Hutu neighbors in Burundi and Rwanda. In Tanganyika, while colonial
administrators did not use this argument to impose hierarchical relationships among tribes,
remnants of this theory remain in Iraqw origination myths that still link the group to the Iraqi of
the Middle East.
However, colonial attitudes toward pastoral societies shifted from admiration to disdain, as the
colonial administration struggled to impose government. The refusal of pastoral groups to be
captured by the capitalist economy, and the nomadic nature of the people posed a direct
challenge against government control and economic interests (Hodgson, 2001). Barabaig
homesteads easily migrated away from areas where residents were forced to dig roads. Where
colonial taxes successfully coerced cultivators to migrate and sell labor, pastoralists were able
to afford head taxes through the sale of cattle (Klima, 1964). Under British rule, the
administration‟s and government interventions with pastoralists – particularly the Maasai –
reinforced the image of the pastoralists as nomadic warriors, patriarchal and backward, a
stereotype that continues today (Hodgson, 2001). Further, condescending attitudes toward the
Maasai – and other pastoralists – gave them the reputation as backward and a threat to the
natural environment as well as their own development. These attitudes have been used
strategically to alienate Maasai from their lands, and invoke a certain ethnic identity that
alientated them from other groups in Tanzania. By independence, Kiswahili established itself as
the language of national identity and those who did not understand the language – largely
among the Datoga, Iraqw and Maasai – were labeled as „tribal‟ and backwards (Redkal, 1998).
By 1960, the image of a Maasai in traditional dress was removed from Tanzanian currency and
in 1967, the new government passed a law making it illegal for pastoralists to wear traditional
clothing (Redkal, 1998). The policy, under the Masai Progress Plan discussed: “certain aspects
of Masai culture as, “ancient, unhealthy customs‟, and the Masai were ordered to put on clothes,
abandon tribal rituals and start doing their share towards reaching Tanzania‟s goals.” Presented
as an impartial and scientific development initiative, the government newspaper, The
Nationalist, attacked traditional Maasai dress as unclean and tribal and argued that the Maasai
should comply to „take part in the eradication of ignorance, disease and poverty‟. These policies
were promoted not only by Nyerere but also Sokoine, a prominent Maasai parliamentarian
(Schneider, 2006b). Enforcing these ideas, Maasai men and women faced arrest, and were
often denied medical care as their dress and jewelry were accused of being unhygienic (ibid).
In addition to efforts to change pastoralist dress, the Tanganyikan government also established
a policy that forced pastoralist families to each send away one child to be socialized and
educated in western-style government schools. However, the effectiveness of this initiative was
deeply compromised as a number of school children ran away within two or three years of
education.
Facing social exclusion and dispossession, in colonial and post-colonial Tanzania, many
pastoralist groups were alienated from their lands and remained outside of social service
systems in terms of education and health, exposed to a variety of policies that encapsulated
them from – rather than incorporating them with – other communities. In response pastoral
groups increasingly claimed indigenous rights to land (Redkal, 1998). In the case of the
Canada Wheat Project, displaced Barabaig filed customary claims to the lands acquired by
NAFCO. In 1981, the case was taken to high court, which ruled in favor of the Barabaig.
However, due to a procedural flaw in the case, only 6 plaintiffs (out of nearly 800) were awarded
damages for their losses. Further, the ruling was overturned in 1986, in an appeal that not all
plaintiffs qualified as „native‟ given Somali descent of a number of plaintiffs. To campaign
against dispossession, the Barabaigs published an open letter to the Canadian people through
71
Canadian newspapers, to appeal for the customary land rights (Mwaikusa, 1993). Through
harnessing advocacy and seeking to uphold their rights through the courts, the Barabaig have
received support from indigenous rights groups internationally, and joined a number of civil
society organizations focused on pastoral rights. These organizations strengthened pastoralist
political identity to influence policy, in a way that balances the confrontational and conciliatory
approaches (Lane, 1995).
Just as pastoralist organizing have revitalized ethnic identity among groups, recent years have
also seen the rise of cultural tourism. Particularly, the Maasai, and increasingly the Datoga and
Iraqw, have become features in safari itineraries, and their handicrafts can be found across
Tanzania. Through tourism, companies have marketed pastoral groups as primitive and
traditional, consolidating stereotypes (Hodgson, 2001). While the direct effects of tourism upon
pastoralists have not been well studied, Alyson Young, an anthropologist focused on the
Datoga, has noted increasing rates of alcoholism among communities that consistently interact
with tourists.
6.5 Relations within the Barabaig Community and Class Differentiation among
Pastoralists
Having been displaced from the Canada Wheat Project, a large portion of the Barabaig have
migrated south from their ancestral lands near Mt. Hanang and Lake Eyasi to regions such as
Morogoro. One cluster of the Barabaig community has settled in the margins of village D in subvillage N, with others passing through on seasonal migrations for pasture.
Given the nomadic nature of Barabaig societies, descent groups do not have any territorial
localization and the political structures in Barabaig settlements are extremely segmented across
over 60 clan groups (Klima, 1964). In Barabaig society, rather than having an elite clan
dominate political structures, elders may gain informal recognition within communities based on
oratory skills and knowledge. Within this system, membership – and leadership – within a
cluster or neighborhood remains fluid among male elders and young men with the movements
of homesteads (Klima, 1964).
Though status within a community is fluid, the role of clans remains important. Clan councils
and authority transcend the boundaries of neighborhoods and play lead roles in justice and
peace to ensure clan rights (Klima, 1964). Barabaig society is divided into two clan types, based
on patrilineal decent: Daremgadyeg (priestly or ritual clans) and Homat’k (secular clans).
Further, among the Homat’k, two clan groups – the Bisyed (arrow-poison specialists who also
perform circumcision) and the Gidanwodik (iron-smiths) – hold lower status due to their
professions and traditionally can only marry within their clan. This practice contradicts that of
other clans, whose members can only marry outside of their clan group (Klima, 1964).
Within clans, status is largely defined by lineage – with first sons of first wives holding a higher
position than those born to other wives. Through lineage and age, men gain seniority within a
clan, and membership to the Clan Council. The Clan Council convenes meetings, deliberates
clan-related conflicts and can impose sanctions/fines against clan members who have offended
or violated the clan rights or interests of a clan member or the clan at large.
Just as lineage places a certain status of homesteads within clans, birth order is also important
in determining inheritance, and therefore wealth. In Barabaig societies, household wealth and
power are largely defined by the number of cattle, wives and children within a homestead, or
gheda. Through focus group discussions, Barabaig clusters within the study village outlined the
following categories disaggregating communities:
72
Pastoralist Class Distinctions in Village D
Rich 100
to
1,000
cattle
Middle 20
to 100
cattle
Poor –
0 to 19
cattle
Marry between 3 to 10 wives and have many children because of the labor involved in
looking after the animals
A lot of activities in their households (taking care of the cows, goats, sheep – milking the
animals, cleaning the boma etc)
Take 3 meals a day throughout the year (Ugali and milk in the morning, milk in the afternoon
and ugali and milk in the evening)
Have many people at home including distant relatives and those selling labor
It is easy to borrow money because they have security
Have the means to take their children to school
Drink bottled beer
Do not sell labour
Marry between 1 to 3 wives (but the second and third wives are taken on depending on the
number of cattle)
Drink fermented beer (from crops)
Able to afford 2 to 3 meals a day depending on the season
Do not sell labor
Marry only one wife for continuity of the family line but cannot afford to look after her
Drink the local potent gin (changaa, gongo, pure)
Cannot afford medical services and they cannot take their children to school
Cannot borrow money during emergencies
Usually have one meal a day (Ugali and porridge or tomatoes, rarely have milk)
Sell labor to the pastoralist communities and are paid about Tshs 100,000 a year or one
heifer plus other benefits like food, milk, and money for drinking. They also sell labour to the
cultivators weeding maize and working on the sugar cane plantations
Confirming these findings, one study on relations among the Barabaig noted that wealthier
gheda are generally comprised of a married man, his wives and children – with other relatives
sometimes sharing the homestead. Wealthy homesteads may also house poor families or
children in exchange for labor. Typically, labor is recruited from within the homestead.
To ensure social protection for the elderly, the study found that younger children were
sometimes fostered by older widows (usually maternal grandmothers) to provide labor and
company to the household (Klima, 1964).
6.6 Gender Relations
Within the homestead, men are viewed as the leader of the home, with wives playing key roles
in livestock care in addition to domestic duties which include fetching water and firewood,
childcare, and cleaning in addition to livestock related duties of milking, preparing skins, grazing,
preparing ghee and herding (Mulder, 1992). During seasonal migrations in search of pasture,
men typically move with the animals while women remain to take care of the homestead. For
smaller households, however, entire families may migrate with cattle (Klima, 1964).35
Boys and girls also to tend small livestock, taking responsibility over larger livestock with age.
However, where boys learn to build corrals, girls‟ take on more domestic duties in terms of child
care, food preparation and fetching of firewood as well as water (Klima, 1964).36 As an initiation
toward adulthood, both Barabaig boys and girls undergo genital cutting –between the ages of 2
and 6 for girls, and between 2 and 10 for boys. This is seen as a requirement before entering
marriage. During marriage, the Barabaig practice both bridewealth and dowry – with the man‟s
clan giving nominal cattle for marriage and with the bride‟s family giving cattle to their daughter
35
36
Research Notes
Research Notes
73
and her future children. Within a marriage, new brides take a lower status in the household, until
she bears children, particularly sons (Klima, 1964). Barabaig women manage and control their
own cattle. Traditionally, husbands must request permission to sell their wives‟ cattle. However,
a women‟s control over these cattle weakens once she gives birth to a son, who holds primary
inheritance right over the cows. However, in case of divorce, these dowry and brideprice cattle
must be returned (Mulder, 1992, Klima, 1964).
To satisfy labor needs for a homestead‟s cattle, polygyny is commonly practiced among the
Barabaig, with men taking multiple wives to fulfill labor demands. Among co-wives, their status
is largely equal within the homestead, with the first wife holding nominal authority in relation to
others – and her son gaining higher inheritance rights (Klima, 1964). In cases where a husband
dies, widow inheritance is practiced though not required. Further, in the case of the death of a
wife, a sister of the deceased may be sent to the widower‟s homestead (ibid).
Beyond the household, women play important roles within the community. Spiritually, a number
of traditional religious rituals are exclusively performed by Barabaig women. Politically, a
number of women within a cluster mobilize to form a women‟s council whose membership is
open to married women. The council operates very similarly to that of the senior clan council
and represents the rights of all women within a community. Similar to the senior clan council,
the women‟s council upholds the rights of women and arbitrates cases as well as imposes fines
against violators (ibid).37
In recent times, however, traditional gendered dynamics have shifted, with structural trends that
have made livestock-keeping and public
services more expensive. Given the severe
limitations Barabaigs face in pastoral
production,
Barabaig
homesteads
increasingly rely on alternative livelihood
strategies such as migrant labor. In the study
area, Barabaig men and women reported that
many have also begun to cultivate, sell labor
in agriculture or beg for food during lean
seasons (Young, 2009).38
6.7 Settlers vs. Pastoralists
Beyond power relations within communities
and between genders among the Barabaig,
however, most literature on the Barabaig
discuss tensions from turbulent relationships
with settled communities.
Figure 4 Discussions with Barabaig men
As pastoral groups face diminishing pasture lands and migrate south, many have settled in new
communities, but remain largely outside of governance or decision-making structures that affect
them. Viewed as outsiders, a group of Barabaig in the study village recounted that recent
meetings discussed barring pastoralists from the area due to environmental degradation.
However, the Barabaig themselves felt they had little voice in these meetings or other
discussions. With high rates of illiteracy, and facing discrimination from local communities, few
vote, know the rights entitled to them, or can access information about local level issues and
decisions. To try to build relations with the community, the Barabaig mentioned that they have
37
38
Research Notes
Research Notes
74
committed funds to local development efforts, though they have not used many of these with the
exception of health services. Very few Barabaig in the area access schooling due to the
remoteness of their settlements and because of the uncertainty of land tenure within the area.39
Issues over land use, access to natural resources and occupancy rights have also arisen as a
source of conflict in villages between local communities with pastoralist migrants (as well as
among pastoralist groups), particularly in areas like Kilosa District, where prolonged drought,
expanding crop cultivation and protected forests greatly limit resources available for cultivation
or livestock. CARE‟s baseline study of pastoralist communities in three districts found that
conflicts can take the form of cattle raids, trespassing with cattle onto others‟ or protected lands
– particularly when guiding cattle to water or for grazing (Fuime and Semwenda, 2009).
From the perspective of the Barabaig, these conflicts arise from the land use agreements made
with settled communities. With low understanding of regulations, a number of Barabaig within
the study village had bought or were renting land from settled land-owners. Neither landowners
nor renters felt secure over their tenure. According to a focus group discussion, land boundaries
have not been clearly demarcated, and in some cases settlers and village councils have
reclaimed land said to have been sold illegally. Further, in areas dense with cultivation, the
Barabaig observed that growing crops in surrounding lands make it difficult to access water
points for animals during rainy seasons. If cattle graze onto farming lands, Barabaig reported
paying a fee to cultivators, and some Barabaig claimed that cultivators would purposely drive
animals onto their property to demand fees.
6.8 Wami-Mbiki
In addition to mistrustful relationships with settled cultivators, the Barabaig also reported
tumultuous relations with the Wami-Mbiki Society (WMS), a registered community-based
organization overseeing the Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area.
Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area borders 24 villages – across three districts – and
comprising a core area of 2500 sq km with an additional 1500 sq km of village land. 40 The area
is managed through a project led by Danish Hunters Society, that aims to sustainably manage
the area as a means to earn profit for neighboring villages, through local management of the
area, and the development of photo tourism and trophy hunting (Danish Hunters Association,
2003). Local scouts – managed by WMS and appointed by village government – guard the
wildlife management area. According discussions with WMS members, a part of their role and
that of guards is to ensure farmers, settlers and pastoralists were evicted from the area, and to
protect lands against illegal use such as livestock grazers.
While the boundaries of the land were demarcated in 1998, markers of boundaries have since
been destroyed from tree-cutting. While the committee felt that boundaries of the wildlife
management area remain well-known, Barabaig discussions revealed that many felt insecure
and unsure of where the boundaries of Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area. Further, both
the Barabaig community along with forest users within the area accused guards of beating and
robbing men and women who entered the area‟s boundaries. As a result with conflicts with the
wildlife management area association, the Barabaig reported that over 40 homesteads had
emigrated from hamlet N within the two month time period preceding the study.41
39
Research Notes.
Focus Group Discusion, though documentation on the Wami-Mbiki Project (2001) stated the area touched 22
villages and that the buffer zone was 1000 sq km of village land.
41
Research discussion.
40
75
In the next section, we briefly outline the history of natural resources management in Tanzania
and the development since independence. We place particularly emphasis on Wildlife
Management and discuss in detail the case of Wami-Mbiki.
Part 7: Natural Resources Management in Tanzania with an Emphasis on Wildlife
Management Areas and Hunting
Following independence, restrictions to protected areas that were common throughout Africa
during European colonial rule were reinforced and expanded (Nelson, et.al., 2007). Western
science continued the colonial pattern of managing natural resources by isolating forest
environments from humans. Tanzania is one of the world‟s great wildlife strongholds (Erbetta,
1982) Today 27 percent of Tanzania‟s land area is national parks, game reserves, and national
forests (Dowie, 2009). These restricted areas are not evenly distributed; for example in the
Arusha region, wildlife conservation areas cover about 48 percent of all land. There are also
different access regimes depending on the classification of the land area, with wildlife
conversation laws and rules very strict in National Parks and Game Reserves, but less so in
Game Controlled Areas. Farmers continue to struggle for access to forest lands, but face the
pressures of international conservation efforts.
There have been a number of reviews of the extent of Tanzania's forests (e.g. Lundgren 1975;
FAO 1981; Maagi et.al. 1979), but they have tended to rely on old data and are unreliable. The
latest study, based on satellite imagery, estimates natural forest cover (defined as all vegetation
types with a closed canopy of woody plants exceeding 8m height) as 16,185 km2 (Rodgers
et.al. 1985). A recent environmental study of Tanzania estimates that forests and woodlands,
including those within other land use types such as game conservation areas and national
parks, extend over 45% of the country (DANIDA, 1989). The distribution of the major vegetation
types is shown in Figure 5.
Upland evergreen forests occur in the highlands of Kilimanjaro, Meru, Ngorongoro, the Pare,
Usambara and Uluguru mountains and the Southern Highlands. Lowland evergreen forests
occur in isolated patches on the coastal plain. These areas all receive over 1000 mm rainfall
annually. Several buffer zone projects have been proposed or implemented, with similar
ramifications for local land and resource control. For instance, a buffer zone project is under
way at the Selous Game Reserve, already the largest protected area on the African continent at
50,000 square kilometers. In the 1980s, the Selous Conservation Programme was implemented
under the aegis of the German Development Organization GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit) in an attempt to address some of the conflicts between reserve
authorities and local communities. A 1988 study funded by GTZ recommended that a buffer
zone be established along the perimeter of the game reserve (Lerise and Schuler 1988). The
authors of the study recommended that within the buffer zone “Game Authorities should have
the final say. It should not be considered as part of village land” (ibid:130). The government
subsequently established a buffer zone encompassing 3,630 square kilometers of adjacent
forest, grazing pasture, and settlement under the jurisdiction of the reserve authorities (Ghimire
1994). Similarly, a proposed buffer zone at Lake Manyara National Park, Tanzania, would be
managed by park authorities, who would oversee land use (Mwalyosi, 1991). In this case,
restrictions on adjacent land uses are seen as essential to “minimize conflicts across
boundaries between the Park and adjacent villages” (ibid:176). As a final example, the
Serengeti Regional Conservation strategy, on the boundaries of Serengeti National Park, was
launched in 1985. The strategy includes three types of buffer zones, including “mandatory” ones
76
(Mbano, et al., 1995:613). In these areas, the ultimate resolution for land use conflicts is “the
removal of land uses that are incompatible with conservation” (also see Johnson, 2000)
7.1 Wildlife/Forest Management and Policies
Conservation efforts have also led to clashes between the government and villagers. For
decades, Tanzania has been at the heart of debates over environmental degradation and
climate change. Today, 45 percent of Tanzanian land suffers from desertification, and each year
77
a billion acres of land are cleared for agriculture. The resulting soil erosion have further
impacted agricultural productivity and livelihoods. In particular, women, who are generally
responsible for gathering firewood and water and have been disproportionately affected by
environmental degradation (Shao, 2006). In response to degradation, the government initially
tried to isolate forest environments from community usage. Communities have faced forced
evictions, some of which were not compensated (Conte, 2004). In certain areas, protection
measures on wildlife have also restricted farmers from defending their crops, as wildlife is
perceived to be owned by the state. Measures protecting wildlife have further raised resentment
among a number of farmers, as the government has developed hunting corridors that cater to
foreign tourists while increasing restrictions on hunting among Tanzanians (Woodroffe, et.al.,
2005). In many ways, local communities and the rural poor are seen as part of the problem
leading to degradation through illegal cutting of trees for fuel, or clearing of forest for cultivation
as means for survival under increasing population pressures and limited access to land and
resources (Dungumaro, 2006).
In recent years, however, there has been broader recognition that it is impossible to effectively
pursue conservation without effective engagement of the rural communities who inhabit and
consume from targeted areas. In addition to the need for building local consensus and
ownership over natural resources, this recognition also stems from the acknowledgement of
indigenous knowledge in managing local resources and the need to build trust as well as
economic opportunities/alternatives in line with conservation interests (ibid). As a result, natural
resources policies have shifted toward participatory natural resource management and have
helped to transfer ownership and management of forests to local communities, however,
challenges around conservation and communities continue. A study on conservation and
poverty in Amani nature reserve found that communities adjacent to protected areas rely on
timber for energy (firewood), building materials, medicine and other household goods, and
restricted access to these resources have compounded poverty in the area (Jambiya and
Sosovele, 2001). Villages with participatory forest management systems found that while some
initiatives were able to generate income from forest products, the poor and very poor within
communities adjacent to protected forests did not benefit from such programs, and were often
excluded from the decision-making and/or processes of these initiatives. Women were included
on the committee by quotas, though the research did not discuss their roles or positions within
forest management (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism: Forestry and Beekeeping
Division, 2008). As a result of tensions between local livelihoods and conservation restrictions, a
study by REPOA found that households frequently turned to poaching or illegal logging to fill
short-term needs for building materials or income (Jambiya and Sosovele, 2001).
Further, in some land classifications, such as Wildlife Management Areas, local communities do
not have surety of the income generated from wildlife through hunting by international or
national hunters, as discretionary powers lie with the Ministry in Dar Es Salaam (Nelson, et.al.,
2007). There are also problems around the issue of access in buffer areas. Our research
around the Wami-Mbiki Protected Area, found that the local managing authorities, restricted
rural households or pastoralists activities in such areas, contrary to rules that allow for the
extraction of various forest products.
7.2 Wildlife and Hunting
In Tanzania, wildlife is important socially and economically. It is a source of income and
sustenance (often extra-legal) for millions of rural villagers and accounts for about 5-10 percent
of the country‟s Gross Domestic Product, contributing $700 million per year (World Bank/ MIGA,
2002; Nelson, 2007). Approximately 90 percent of conversation funding is provided by foreign
donors in Tanzania today, providing a key financial incentive for the continuation of strong
78
conservation policies (Nelson, et.al., 2007). A second source of income is derived from wealthy
foreign tourists who come to Tanzania to see or shoot animals in their natural environment.
Since independence, Tanzania has developed a tourist hunting industry which is one of the
largest in sub-saharan Africa, generating $27 million in annual revenues (Baldus and Caldwell,
2004).
Hunting has been a pastime of wealthy Europeans in Eastern and Southern Africa since colonial
times. Hunting was a way for European explorers to assert their dominance, as hunting has
been associated with aristocratic associations / clubs for sports hunting and establishing a role
of privilege (Garland, 2008). The British colonial administration encouraged the development of
safari hunting, whilst simultaneously restricting opportunities for traditional African hunting
(Leader-Williams, 2000). Prior to independence, Tanzania introduced Africa‟s first system of
lease hunting blocks to outfitters in a network of game reserves that then covered 8 percent of
Tanzania‟s surface area (Pawn, 1996a). Following independence, several game reserves
including Selous were declared „national projects‟, enabling retention of hunting revenues to
fund wildlife management and infrastructural development, which soon provided successful
when commercial poaching ceased and wildlife populations thrived (Nicholson, 1970; 2001;
Leader-Williams, 2009).
The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 outlines the restrictions on and the rights of local
populations. Most tourist hunting on village land is controlled by the Wildlife Division. The
Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 prohibits hunting and capturing animals on private land
without a license from the Director of Wildlife and the permission of the land owner. As private
lands fall under the jurisdiction of the village councils, hunting also requires permission of
elected local government. These restrictions made it difficult to obtain local support for wildlife
conservation efforts and difficulties in enforcing legal prohibitions on rural wildlife have played
an important role in shaping more community-based conservation efforts. The Wildlife Policy of
1998, reflects this new thinking, and provides guidelines designed to enable greater
participation and support from the local population. It states that there is a need to
Involve more people in conserving wildlife, particularly people from the villages and the
private sector;
Encourage local people to set up Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) to protect and
conserve wildlife outside Protected Areas (PAs);
Give more user rights to people who are affected by wildlife;
Explain clearly to people what the government wildlife policy is;
Encourage more people in the public and private sector to invest in the wildlife sector;
Give helpful rules and regulations so that rural communities and the private
sector can work together to conserve wildlife.
The Wildlife Policy of 1998 thus promotes local participation and community based conservation
through the establishment of Wildlife Management Area. Whilst the state continues „to own‟
wildlife, the policy calls for the government to „develop an enabling legal, regulatory, institutional
environment for rural communities and private sector to participate in wildlife conservation‟
(MNRT, Willdlife Policy 1998 cited in Nelson, et.al., 2007). In 2009, the Government of Tanzania
passed a new Wildlife Act of 2008, which did not make any changes, despite a 2006
parliamentary task force which recommended a range of reforms (Nelson, 2009). Further, the
new law does not provide any new level of control over wildlife on the part of local villages, for
example by guaranteeing them a minimum proportion of revenue generated by hunting on
village lands or in WMAs (ibid.) As a result local communities and civil society organizations
were widely critical of the bill (ibid.)
79
Whilst the policy articulates various participatory components, the Wildlife Conservation Act of
2008, which is the underlying law, as well as various subsequent regulations for specific land
use areas (such as WMA) – that are legally binding – indicate a trend that the state is increasing
its central control over wildlife tourism and hunting and reducing local use rights (Nelson, et.al.,
2007, Nelson, 2009). For instance, the 2000 Wildlife Conservation Regulations outline the
procedures for distribution of hunting blocks and requires the permission of the Director of
Wildlife to conduct tourist hunting, game viewing, photographic safari, walking safari, or any
wildlife based tourism within a hunting block or Protected Area (PA).
In 2002, the Government of Tanzania – Wildlife Division issues the Wildlife Management Area
(WMA) Regulations, which are of particular importance to our study of the Wami-Mbiki WMA.
The Regulations outline that Wildlife Management Areas are set aside to provide local people
with more responsibility over wildlife in an attempt to conserve and manage wildlife. Further it
states that WMAs enable local people to benefit financially from wildlife resources, so that they
see the value of conserving wildlife. Finally, WMAs bring together wildlife management with
other ways that land is used.
WMAs are to be managed by community-based organizations, which represent the villages
involved. The CBOs must form constitutions and apply to the Director of Wildlife for approval
enabling the villages to obtain use rights to the annual quota of wildlife species. Further the
CBOs must prove that they can manage the local wildlife resources that they are applying for. If
approved the CBO gains the status of Authorized Association (AA) and will then be responsible
to manage wildlife within the WMA. Further the CBO, in consultation with the local population,
must prepare a Strategic Plan for the WMA outlining their vision, mission, and business plan.
These must include a statement that outlines how the WMAs are managed for everyone‟s
benefits.
The village councils of the villages involved play a crucial role in the management of the WMA.
They prepare the land use plans, which must include local people in the planning process;
formulate natural resources management by-laws; mark out the resource zones and the area of
their village to be include in the WMA; and coordinate and monitor the natural resources
activities in the area. All plans must be approved by the District Council. Authorized
Associations may enter into investment relationships with investors to utilize the resources in
the area, with a copy of the agreement provided to the District Council and the Director.
Hunting for meat by an association can be carried out only under the supervision of a District
Game Officer and must be in line with the quota specified by the Director of Game.
A crucial aspect of WMAs lies around the issue of establishing hunting blocks and game quotas,
which lies under the authority of the Director of Wildlife. Nshala (1999) writes extensively on
this issue and notes that the allocation of hunting blocks has generally reflected the Director‟s
personal whims rather than any consistent application of guidelines. Complains from hunting
operators prompted the Minister and the Director of Wildlife to enter into an agreement with
Tanzania Hunting Operators Association (TAHOA), an NGO representing the professional
hunters in the country, setting out the conditions under which hunting blocks would be allocated.
Under this "Consensus Agreement" of 14th November 1994, every hunting company would
have to meet the following six conditions in order to be allocated hunting blocks:
1. Achieve an average utilization rate of 40 percent of its allocated quotas. This should be
based on monetary value rather than number of animals killed.
2. Contribute to anti-poaching activities in cooperation with the Wildlife Division.
3. Open up roads and airstrips for the continuing use of anti-poaching squads and the
80
Wildlife Division during the hunting off-season.
4. Offer assistance to communities adjacent to hunting areas.
5. Pay all required fees by the stipulated time (April 30).
6. Ship client trophies in timely manner.
The legality of the Consensus Agreement is open to question on the same grounds as the
Director's criteria for block allocations. Under the Wildlife Conservation Act it is the Minister who
is empowered to regulate wildlife utilization.
The current system of allocating hunting blocks is flawed since it allows officials of the Wildlife
Division to allocate and withdraw hunting blocks without good cause. Further, the current
system of hunting block allocation does not provide or promote any safeguards to ensure fair
play and guard against nepotism. For example, there is no requirement under the law or the
Consensus Agreement barring the Director of Wildlife from owning shares in any hunting
company, nor forbidding the Director from adjudicating applications in which shares are held by
a relative. The same is true at the ministerial level. This has led to the formation of hunting
companies in which sons, brothers, or in-laws of these officials have shares.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, known as the Warioba Commission,
was formed by President Benjamin Mkapa on the 17th January 1996 as a way of fulfilling his
election pledge to fight corruption in the country. The Commission was asked to review the laws
of the country and working procedures in the government and parastatal sectors in order to
reduce opportunities for corruption as well as to improve transparency in the rendering of
services. Examining the Wildlife Division and the system of hunting block allocation, the
Warioba Commission found that blocks had been assigned to companies formed primarily to
take advantage of insider connections.
Presidential License was to allow shipment of animals to other parts of the world in support of
scientific research, and to provide education on the importance of wildlife conservation.
However, the only safeguard provided by law against the misuse of this power by the Director is
that he must have the approval of the Minister. There is no prohibition against the Director
issuing licenses to his friends, relatives, the Minister, his official superiors, or to people with
whom he or she has business relationships. The Commission found the Presidential License to
be one of the most abused areas of the hunting regulatory structure, establishing that it was
regularly issued to people who were friends of the Director and the Minister or who were former
holders of these posts
Further, the country has no overall trophy monitoring system capable of providing the Wildlife
Division with reliable information. As a result, quota setting is based solely on anecdotal reports
from game officers in the field and hunting companies. In some instances, quotas have been
issued that exceed the population of animals in a particular hunting block. While the country's
wildlife population has been declining over the years, the number of hunting blocks has been
increasing - with quotas for each block remaining at the same level. In 1965, when the country's
wildlife population was higher than it is today, the country had only 47 blocks. By 1997 this
number had increased to over 140.
81
7.3 The Case of Wami-Mbiki and the Danish Hunter Assocation42
Efforts to establish the Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area began in 1997, when an
expatriate staff from the Danish Hunter Association (DHA), recognizing the potential of the area,
initiated discussions with the District Natural Resources Officer to work towards changing the
status of these wild lands into a community based conservation area. The endorsement of the
District Officials led to discussions with the 24 villages that surround the wild life area. It was
agreed that membership would be granted to villages which were willing to contribute part of
their land to constitute the Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area.
Subsequently, DHA, funded by DANIDA, initiated a project that envisions for “Wami-Mbiki to be
managed as a Wildlife Management Area to provide natural resources and profits in a
sustainable manner to the local population“ (DHA, 2003). Among the objectives was to earn
yearly profits through hunting and non-consumptive tourist activities (e.g. photography) that
would be equitably distributed to member villages after deducting management costs and any
form of investment as decided by member villages. The idea was that member villages could
use the profit according to village assembly approved budgets for each village.
DHA was founded in 1992, following a merger of various hunting organizations in Denmark, the
oldest of which was established in 1884. The organization started to work internationally in
1995 and now operates under a mission (for Africa) that seeks to work outside of protected
areas, with civil society and community partners, to develop profitable, community-based wildlife
initiatives, to restore wilderness areas and to reduce loss in biodiversity. DHA‟s principles are:
local responsibility for conservation of nature, linking development and nature conservation,
recognizing that sustainable hunting is important in wildlife management.
In the context of Wami-Mbiki, DHA acts as an advisor to the Wami-Mbiki Authorized Association
concerning wildlife conservation and economic activities. It is to help „target the right segment of
hunters (particularly in Europe and the US) / alliances / agreements with appropriate hunting
safari companies with high ethical standards. DHA is also to assist with allocating quotas for
local and residential hunting (based on the overall quotas established by the Director of
Wildlife). An important dimension of DHA‟s work is to assist the establishment of participatory
approaches between community and government ensuring that profits are administered through
village council or village natural resources committees. The participatory component also
includes initiatives to support local schools and the education of youth to raise awareness
around the conservation of wildlife and natural resources.
The DHA project is entirely financed by DANIDA, with two full time expatriate staff in Tanzania.
There have been three phases so far:
Phase I (1997-2000): community mobilization, awareness raising and establishing the
CBO;
Phase II (2000-2006): ensure legal processes to acquire authorization status and obtain
user rights certificate; and
Phase III (2007-2011): focus on creating sustainability through promotion of business
development and the establishment of a revenue base from photographic tourism and
42
This discussion is based on interviews with members from village D residing in proximity to or within the buffer
area, members from the community-based Authorized Association that manages Wami-Mbiki, staff from the Danish
Hunters Association in Morogoro, and the District Game Officer for Mvomero District, as well as a project document
from DHS (2003).
82
licensed hunting. The 5 year budget for the phase III is DKK 15.6 million (USD 2.8
million at 2010 conversion rates).
So far, hunting has not begun and the revenue base of the project is limited. There are DHA
funds, concessions fees from one investor (Safari Vegas) who at the moment controls the
photographic tourism, fines collected from the Wam-Mbiki Association, village contributions, and
revenue sharing from beekeeping (so far, 306 hives have been established).
83
84
7.4 Core and Buffer Boundaries and Conflict
The village land (provided by the 24 villages) constitutes the „buffer area‟ (1,500 sq.km), whilst
the wild land under the Division of Wildlife with some pockets for land under the Forest and
Beekeeping Division constitutes the „core area‟ of the WMA. Before 1997, the core area was an
„open access‟ public land with no conservation status, with the exception of the Pagali Forest
Reserve which had been established in 1951. According to DHS staff, the wildlife was not
protected under the open access regime and this is believed to have caused the extinction of
wildebeest. At the request of the Forestry Department, the Pagali Forest Reserve now falls into
the Wami-Mbiki WMA to be managed as part of the larger catchment area. The Pagali forest
reserve now has two land use designations: forest reserve and WMA.
The buffer area, which constitutes village land, and falls under the jurisdiction of the village
council, guided by each village‟s individual land use plan. According to DHS staff, fuel wood
collection, water extraction, and cattle grazing are generally allowed in the buffer, unless the
land use plan stipulates otherwise. Resident hunting is not allowed in the buffer nor the core
area. Further, in the core area any extractive activities are strictly prohibited. In fact, entrance
into the core area, without authorization is against the WMA regulations. According to DHS,
there are clear demarcations between the buffer and the core area through beacons, painted
trees, and a path with „shot‟ grasses which is clear distinguishable from the other vegetation.
DHS concedes that there, however, some areas, where the boundaries are not clear.
Discussion with the members (2 guards and a member of the governing council) from the WamiMbiki Society (the local terms for the Authorized Association) highlighted that they make no
distinction between the buffer and the core area. In fact, in our interview with the society
members, they told that the Wami-Mbiki Society vision is to protect, conserve, and develop the
natural resources in the WMA and to ensure that pastoralists, farmers, and settlers within the
boundary are „evacuated‟. In these discussions, the respondents refer to the entire area as a
„reserve‟ in which no one is allowed to enter without a permit. Further, the member of the society
told us that there are about 50 pastoralists who reside in the reserve, but they are unclear of the
exact number.
Community members from M 1, one of clusters of hamlet N that we studied, which is adjacent to
the buffer area, told that they are unclear about the boundaries and that there is considerable
conflict. The boundaries used to be demarcated with trenches and painted trees, but the
trenches are no longer there and the trees have been cut. The Pagale forest reserve lies very
close to some of the outlying residents of village D and this constitute part of the core area. But,
according to the Marui villagers, the people who reside near Pagale have lived there since 1941
and their homestead lands were allocated by village government.
The Marui residents also said that they were consulted if they wanted an WMA, but were told of
the benefits – 1 million TZS (USD 667 – 2010 rates) per village per year. These funds would be
used to build schools and dispensaries. They agreed to this, but no one talked about the
boundary at that time and how it would affect them. So far, one school has been built in nearby
K village and 1 school in village D. For the past three years no monies have been received by
the villages. This was confirmed by the Wami-Mbiki society members, as well as DHS.
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The Marui residents told us that they are not allowed in the WMA, and „unlawfully‟ punish those
caught in the buffer. Last year, 7 cows were found in the boundary area and were killed by the
guards and there were no legal ramifications. Last year, a man who had entered the buffer was
badly beaten and his axe confiscated.
In the midst of our research, Hanota, a man from the Barabaig community was perceived to
have been in the „reserve‟ (we do not know if this was the buffer or the core), though according
to residents it was the buffer, was beaten, had TZS 50,000 taken from him, in addition to the
confiscation of 4 cell phones and 2 goats, his money was taken, and he was dragged off
towards a police station, but dropped beyond the station and had to find his way home. The
incident created considerable tension between settlers and pastoralists and we noted that unlike
our other visits to the outlying communities where pastoralists would come and observe our
activities, they were now absent. The settlers of N warned us not to travel to the pastoralist
settlements for fear that we might be attacked. The presence of a Barabaig man amongst our
research team, enabled us to approach the pastoralists and discuss the broader issues around
the WMA, which have been outlined in the earlier section on pastoralists. It is not clear what
happened to the confiscated items and who retained them.
The community members also told us that they had no involvement in the management of the
WMA, were not aware of who was a member of the council or the board, nor the election
process of the guards. In fact, they were only informed about the election of a woman guard
after the fact.
These dynamics have created considerable suspicion of outsiders and the residents of Marui
told us that when they were approached about establishing the WMA, the people who came
where just as humble as the CARE people who are here now! Further, there were rumors and
allegations that a (Mzungu) investor, would reward the village chairman with TZS 8 million, if he
would evacuate people from the WMA. The lack of transparency in terms of the financial
dealings, the lack of demarcations of boundaries as well as the lack of participation of local
communities, had created a situation that should concern any actor who has influence and
power (DHS, the Wami-Mbiki Society (Association), the village council, the Wildlife Authorities)
regarding the future of the WMA and the likelihood of increased conflict when hunters
(international and domestic) arrive and leave behind large sums of money.
Besides the policy and legal issues that we outlined, which can only be addressed at the
national level and with a coalition of actors who can press for reforms that are pro-poor and
participatory, our findings point to the need to make considerable changes in the ways that the
Wami-Mbiki WMA is managed and to work with the association, local village government and
the communities – settlers and pastoralists -- to gain a collective understanding of the
boundaries and their rights within the buffer and the prohibitions in the core area. In light of the
governance issues that we outlined earlier, it is also unclear how the various sub-villages and
cluster will benefit from the huge revenues that will be generated once hunting proceeds.
Part 8: Social Development and Gender Relations
With the introduction of user fees and privatization during the structural adjustment period of the
1990s, which were promoted by the World Health Organization and World Bank to eliminate
86
government overspending, poor households – particularly those in remote locations – have
been systematically excluded from social services (Harrington, 1998; Ponte, 1998).
8.1 Education, Learning and Child Development
While enrolment dropped after the introduction of school fees, since 2000, primary education
fees were abolished by Presidential decree and the Primary Education Development Program.
Since that time, net enrolment in 2009 hovers at around 96 percent; this is even between boys
and girls (BEST – Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania, July 2009). Primary completion rates,
however, remain low, with 62.5 percent in 2008 (REPOA and URT, 2010). While transition to
secondary school increased by 10 percent since the 1980‟s (reaching 20 percent for boys and
girls), over the past two years, transition rates between primary (Standard VII) and secondary
(Form 1) schooling have been on the decline, dropping from nearly 2/3 of students transitioning
to Form 1 in 2006 to just over half in 2008 (URT, 2009b). Even so, the overall increase in
enrolment in primary education has been attributed for increased basic literacy rates (at 71.4
percent for Tanzanians over the age of 15), according to the Household Budget Surveys
(REPOA and URT, 2010). These rates have been linked to a slight rise in women‟s literacy from
64 to 66 percent since 2000, while men‟s literacy has remained constant at 80 percent across
the same period (URT, 2009b).
The re-introduction of private schools, government programs that offer scholarships for girls,
and the Complementary Basic Education program for older children, have also enabled greater
access to education. However, these reforms have also been marked by widening inequality
across gender, socio-economic class, urban versus rural contexts and regions in terms of
learning due to challenges in the costs and quality of education (Mascarenhas, 2007). A high
student-to-teacher ratio in many schools (an average of 54:1 as of 2009) and poor provision of
textbooks to students – particularly those in rural areas – have further compromised the quality
of education in public schools. Private schools often cater to the upper-classes and urban
contexts (URT, 2009b).
Though there are no longer enrolment fees, households still must cover the costs of uniforms,
books and other contributions for their children‟s education. If households cannot afford costs of
education for all their children, families generally favor boys‟ education over that of girls. Further,
poor infrastructure, such as inadequate provision of gender-separated latrines for boys and girls
serve as a barrier against girls‟ education. According to the 2007 Basic Education Statistics of
Tanzania (BEST), using the ideal measure of one latrine per 20 pupils, provision of school
latrines only meet 37 percent of recommended levels for girls and boys, nationally. This also
varies widely across regions, with rates as low as one quarter in Dar es Salaam and Shinyanga,
and as high as nearly 60 percent in Iringa and Kilimanjaro (URT, 2009b).
In terms of performance, girls are consistently underperforming in the classroom, and student
achievement varies from region to region. For example, pass rates for the Standard IV exams in
2008 stood at 70 percent in Morogoro, while in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, pass rates hovered
at 97 percent (Ministry of Educational and Vocational Training, 2008). According to the
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, discrepencies in performance are linked to the roles
and expectations facing girls at an early age. In school and the community, girls are introduced
at an early age to take on more domestic and subordinate roles that can affect girls‟ selfesteem, and how they perceive themselves and their own capabilities, as well as aspirations
(Mascarenhas, 2007a). Further, as girls take on greater domestic responsibiltiies at a young
87
age, a CARE study found that their time to pursue studies decreased, as households prepare
daughters as future wives and mothers (Mascarenhas, 2007b).
Further, both early pregnancy and marriage have been identified as obstacles to girls‟
education, as discussed earlier. The 2004-05 Demographic and Health Survey found 25 percent
of adolescents between the ages of 15-19 are pregnant or have already given birth. Rates are
particularly high along the Lake Zone as well as in the South (National Bureau of Statistics,
2005).
Issues of early pregnancy among girls are indicative of wider problems in regard to genderbased violence against girls. For girls, lower status, limited social networks and human capital,
combined with social norms around marriage can put them at risk of rape, sexual exploitation or
transactional sex and poor sexual and reproductive health. Studies on sexual behaviors of
adolescent girls found that sexual relations with men sometimes serve as a means for survival.
Additionally, girls have also engaged in sex as a medium of gaining small luxuries and status,
using men as an „mshikajiwa wa muda’ or „mbuzi’ (a goat to milk; D Robinson, 2009). Given
their stage in development, adolescent girls are particularly at risk in terms of sexual and
reproductive health, which has implications on their future roles and opportunities. The number
one cause of mortality among adolescent girls in Tanzania is child-birth, with many others facing
higher risk of debilitating birth complications such as fistula. In addition to the health risks
associated to early pregnancy, many girls also leave school following early marriage, which
continues to be enabled through Tanzanian law that set girls‟ marriageable age at 15, and is
encouraged by the traditional practice of bride-price (Mascarenhas, 2007a).
In our study area, there has been change in terms of education of boys and girls. Until 1975,
there was no primary school in village D, and children had to travel to another village, which is
considerably distant (5 miles) and required walking through a dense forest area. People
realized that the children who did make the journey to the other village and graduated from
class 7, were able to read and write, which was helpful to the community at large. According to
residents of K 1, the teachers were few then, but they seemed more committed. Nevertheless
attendance was low in those days, because many parents did not yet value education and
children were given many household chores. The children of N, the remote and comparatively
poor community, have not had the benefit of schools nearby. They have to go to a nearby
village, which is closer than village D, to attend primary school, but the distance to the
secondary school is very far. As a result, attendance is low, though it has increased from earlier.
People expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of education. As in K 1, people note that girls
have a higher drop-out rate, because of pregnancies.
Now that there is a primary school in village D, most children from K 1 attend primary school
and pass through to completion. Nowadays, since the value of education has increased, some
boys and girls attend secondary school in Kanga, with the higher ratio of girls being selected, as
they tend to have better grades than boys. At the same, time, girls are more likely to drop out of
upper primary and secondary school because of pregnancies. The respondents also noted that
the quality of education has reduced with parents noticing that many children who pass class 7
are unable to read or write. This is attributed to the student / teacher ratio which in Kanga
secondary schools is 100:1. There are also concerns about the quality of drinking water and the
poor and insufficient sanitation facilities in light of the large number of students in school
compounds.
The discussion with women around education, also highlighted that the marriage age of girls
has reduced from 17-20 to 15-17, which effect their education, as they drop out. The times have
88
changed and it used to be that parents would chose the marriage partners for their sons and
daughters, but now teenagers do not accept their parent‟s choices or decisions and become
involved in sexual relations at a younger age. People noted that girls have greater mobility now,
and this freedom of movement is attributed as one of the factors that girls get involved with boys
at an earlier age.
8.2 Water Sanitation and Hygiene
Access to water and sanitation facilities is an essential basic service, for both education and
health. However, the Government of Tanzania continues to struggle to develop the
infrastructure to ensure protected/improved water and sanitation across the country. The Joint
Monitoring Program between WHO and UNICEF (2008), found that over half of households
used unimproved sanitation facilities that could lead to disease such as cholera, with only a third
of households reporting use of improved latrines.
For access to water, Government of Tanzania introduced a water extraction system in line with
its shift toward market liberalization. The Water Extraction Policy of 2002 defines water as an
economic good and calls for cost-sharing in the provision of water within rural areas. While
richer households can now have water delivered from vendors or through water tankers, poorer
rural households often invest a great deal of time to wait in queues for cheaper water sources,
or travel longer distances for free, and often unprotected, water (with seasonal variations in
relation to rainy and dry seasons). Overall, the 2009 Human Development and Poverty Report
found that 71 percent of rural households do not have proper access to water.
8.3 Health and Health Services
In terms of health, access to services
also remains a challenge. The
government has initiated a number of
policies to promote health, and
Tanzania has seen gains in health
indicators,
paired
with
greater
coverage of births attended by trained
physicians. Between 2004 to 2007,
infant mortality rates dropped 15
percent (from 68 to 58 deaths per
1000 live births) and under-five
Figure 5. Regional comparison of Under-Five Mortality Rates
mortality rates fell approximately 19
percent (from 112 to 91 deaths per
1000 live births) (Leach, 2008; REPOA and URT, 2010). However, maternal mortality ratios
remain at 578 pregnancy-related deaths for every 100,000 live births, less than half of births are
attended by a skilled health worker, and 250,000 women suffering from disabilities in relation to
birth complications each year. One of the most debilitating disabilities from childbirth includes
the socially marginalizing Vesico Vaginal Fistula (which often is linked with births by adolescent
girls) (Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey, 2004-2005; Mascarenhas, 2007).
Currently, the Tanzania Commission for AIDS reports that there is a national prevalence rate of
5.7 percent among people between the ages of 15 and 49, with rates higher among women (6.8
percent) in comparison to men (4.6 percent) (Tanzania Commission on Aids, 2010). For children
and adult men and women, malaria remains the leading cause of death, though in the districts
of Morogoro Rural, Dar es Salaam and Hai, AIDS/TB is now the primary cause of mortality
among adults (Mascarenhas, 2007).
89
Vulnerability to poor health is unequally distributed across Tanzanians. Children under five in
the bottom two quintiles of poverty experience stunting at a rate three times that of children in
the wealthiest income category. Further, the government census 2002 also shows clusters of
poorer health in the Southern Zone of the region, which experiences higher rates of under-five
mortality. The Poverty and Human Development Report also found great variation in HIV
prevalence rates across the country with four regions (Kigoma, Arusha, Singida, Manyara and
Kilimanjaro) reporting prevalence rates of less than 3 percent, while areas like Mbeya, Iringa
and Dar es Salaam have an adult prevalence rate of over 9 percent (and Iringa with an adult
prevalence rate of over 15 percent) (URT, 2009). Mobile populations are particularly vulnerable
to HIV. For example, the government of Tanzania reported that HIV prevalence rates of about
30 percent among farm and plantation workers in Iringa and Morogoro (URT, 2010).
Despite poorer health, the poor are also least likely to access health services. The likelihood
that a woman from the poorest quintile will give birth at home and receive no post-natal checkup is 7 times more likely than that of woman from the richest quintile. Further, women in urban
areas and with at least secondary education are over twice as likely to deliver in a health facility
as compared to rural women or women with no education, respectively. Even in terms of
vaccinations – which has been an area of great achievement in Tanzania, with 90 percent
coverage for BCG, measles and PFT3 – children of richer households are 40 percent more
likely to be vaccinated for measles than children from the poorest quintile. This differentiation
persists across use of health facility treatment, provision of medication and use of insecticidetreated bed-nets. The Fair‟s Fair study conducted by the Women‟s Dignity Project and the
CARE-Women‟s Dignity study on women‟s experiences in maternal health services, cited a
number of factors preventing access to healthcare:
Costs: In the Fair’s Fair study, over 50 percent of women cited costs as the biggest barrier
against health care. A CARE-Women‟s Dignity study on facility-based childbirth found that
many women face charges – both formal and arbitrary – in order to access services. In the
study, women reported the need to bring or purchase essential medical supplies for delivery
in facilities.
Quality of care: Poorer households did not receive the same quality of care as better-off
households, both because of poorer quality facilities, over-crowding, shortages of trained
staff and medical equipment, as well as lack of accountability mechanisms to hold service
providers accountable for quality care.
Social barriers: The CARE-Women‟s Dignity study on maternal health found restrictions in
women‟s mobility and permissions restricted access to health services. Further, many
women reported ill treatment and discrimination from health workers.
Distance: In some regions (particularly Shinyanga, Dodoma and Tanga) the mean distance
of rural households to a primary health facility is greater than 5 km, and 10 percent of rural
households nationwide reported they must travel more than 10 km to the nearest primary
health facility, sometimes in areas with poor infrastructure. For most of these households,
distances to hospitals – for more specialized care – is far greater.
Poor Information: Some households who have not had access to information or education
about health may not seek health services because of lack of knowledge in detecting danger
signs requiring medical attention (Women‟s Dignity and CARE Tanzania, 2008; Smithson,
2006).
Our study confirms these national trends. In K 1, the better off and well connected sub-village
now has a dispensary (since 1988), whereas earlier people had to walk long distances to
Bwagala (in Turiani) or Kanga. As a result, most people relied on traditional medicines. This
90
was particularly difficult for women during pregnancies and at the time of delivery. There was a
heavy reliance on Traditional Birth Attendants and when complications arose, the mother and
child were in danger of dying. The role of traditional medicine has also reduced now. It used to
be that if someone fell ill, they would first go to a traditional healer, but now they go to the
hospital first and if they are not cured they visit the healer. Family planning was unheard of 20
years ago and birth spacing reflected this. Children were malnourished, because mothers could
not breast feed them appropriately and the use of traditional herbs tied around the waist of the
baby to alleviate illnesses and malnutrition was common. With the dispensary in K 1, with well
trained personnel, people make use of the facilities. Although many cannot afford the cost of
medicines, better off members from the community provide support, if needed. With the
improvement of roads and the prevalence of motorcycles and a few cars in the sub-hamlet,
women, who face complications during deliveries, can obtain a lift, making it easier for them to
obtain services. The dispensary provides various family planning methods (pill, injections, etc.)
and it is now common for women to use contraceptive methods, as a result the average number
of children in K 1 families has reduced from 9 to 4. Men are not concerned with contraception
and in fact, in both study communities, the interviews revealed that women use contraception
without the knowledge of their husbands.
The people of N still have no dispensary (though one is under construction, but this seems to be
stalled). There are some medicine shops in a nearby village that N residents frequent and
where women can obtain contraceptive methods. Despite the absence of a dispensary in N, the
discussions with residents highlighted that people‟s attitudes towards traditional medicines has
changed. Many people go to village D if they require medical services, despite the distance.
The reason are that people know that whilst traditional medicines may heal a person, they can
also be dangerous when given in the wrong dosage. Family planning is common now, but
husbands and some traditional healers disapprove, as they believe that a woman should stop
bearing children when she naturally cannot anymore.
Interestingly, the women noted that birth spacing used to be determined by the last child‟s ability
to join her elder siblings in participating in household chores (for the girls this meant fetching
water and for the boy taking the animals to the pasture). This is how a mother knew that she
could try for another child. Nowadays, birth spacing is based on the age of the child.
8.4 Social Protection
Given the toll of HIV and AIDS, extreme and persistent poverty, poor maternal and child health,
and food insecurity affecting much of the population, social protection mechanisms are critical
safety-nets to insure the vulnerable position of many rural households to shocks.
The government is currently in the process of developing its National Social Protection
Framework, and has developed a number of programs to respond to issues of social protection:
Social Security: Currently, the government has developed a Social Security Policy, which
serves those employed within the formal, but only reaches 5.4 percent of Tanzania‟s labor
force, as the vast majority of Tanzanians are engaged in the informal sector (Pinda, 2010).
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TASAF: This programme focuses on building
the provision of resources and grants for
poverty reduction projects and the
construction of village-level infrastructure
(i.e. schools, bridges, clinics, etc) as well
as income for work on public infrastructure
such as roads, forest lots and schools.
The Rural Financial Services Program
under the Prime Minister‟s Office focuses
on supporting micro-finance organizations
to work with rural households to provide
financial services through savings and
credit for income-generating activities. It is
financed by the central government, Swiss
government and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD).
infrastructure and poverty reduction, through
What is Social Protection: An understanding (taken from D
Robinson (2009). The role of social protection: A potential
catalyst for social movements? CARE International)
“Social protection involves policies and programs that protect
people against risk and vulnerability, mitigate the impacts of
shocks, and support people who suffer from chronic
incapacities to secure basic livelihoods”
“It can also build assets, reducing both short-term and
intergenerational transmission of poverty.”
“It includes social insurance (such as health, life and asset
insurance, which may involve contributions from employers
and/ or beneficiaries); social assistance (mainly cash, food,
vouchers, or subsidies); and services (such as maternal and
child health and nutrition programs). Interventions that provide
training and credit for income-generating activities also have a
social protection component”
Adato and Hoddinott, 2008
Worst Forms of Child Labor Initiative aims
to build collaboration with government and
donor activities to raise awareness, develop community-monitoring and conduct enrolment
drives for schools to prevent children from engaging in labor. The project was funded by the
international Labor Organization (ILO) with the Ministry of Labor, Youth Development and
Sports.
HIV/AIDS Orphans and Vulnerable Children through investment in private sector whose
profits are funneled to support orphans and vulnerable children. The initiative was
established jointly by the Government of Tanzania and USAID. Another program also
focuses on HIV/AIDS orphans and vulnerable children to provide counseling, treatments,
awareness-raising, food and materials, and is carried out through CCBRT in collaboration
with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance.
Child Survival and Protection Development Program aims to strengthen community-based
systems for analysis of vulnerability, and provision of services. It focuses on improving
maternal health and supporting early childhood development activities. The project is
supported by UNICEF, and implemented through district councils.
TACAIDS coordinates district responses to HIV/AIDS and monitors progress toward the
TACAIDS Strategic Framework (Lerisse, et.al. , 2003).
In terms of health, the government has also developed a free insurance plan to cover those
particularly vulnerable (i.e. orphans and the elderly), free services for maternal health and
children under five, as well as The Community Health Fund (CHF) System as a basic
medical insurance package.
In addition to these government-supported programs, numerous NGOs also play a role in
developing social protection programs in Tanzania.
Despite the program and policies, however, the effectiveness of these initiatives is questionable.
A study of social protection programs in Tanzania found that many programs lacked a clearly
defined target group with whom to work and did not reach the very poor. Further, most
programs did not reach more remote rural areas, and generally had an urban bias to their
implementation. The scale of work was also limited by time-bound durations of programs and
their dependence on funding from international organizations/donors (ibid). Another challenge
has also been the communications around social protection policies and programs across
92
communities. For example, in terms of health services, despite the existence of several social
protection services related to health, in practice the ability to access health services or utilize
insurance schemes remains inconsistent, with health workers uncertain about programs and
benefits. Further, free insurance schemes for the elderly and orphaned continue to face
obstacles in targeting these groups, and also in ensuring that they are able to fully utilize these
benefits (Robinson, 2009).
Loss due to disease such as malaria and AIDS, chronic poor health, and extreme poverty are
only deepened by the exclusion of many people from social protection measures like the health
insurance system. Further, the burden of care falls to households and extended family
networks, particularly affecting women as traditional caregivers, as well as the elderly who may
need to care for orphans and other vulnerable children due to the loss of parents and labor
migration patterns. Costs of care can be economically disabling for households, because of both
greater demands for food, medicine and healthcare, as well as the implications on time for
caregivers, driving households further into poverty and in positions vulnerable to economic
shocks or exploitation (ibid).
In K 1 sub-hamlet, there are HIV/ AIDS patients. In village D, they are able to obtain antiretroviral drugs (ARVs). The groups we spoke to were insensitive, lacked empathy, and were
highly discriminatory of persons infected with HIV/AIDs. For instance, in K 1, the men‟s group
told that the medicines for HIV/AIDS patients make them appear healthy and as a result they
continue to spread the disease. Their conclusion was that the government should stop making
ARVs available and „simply let people die, because this way other will learn.‟ In N, people have
awareness of HIV/ AIDS and that it does exist, but people have to travel to Bwagala (Turiani)
which is quite distant. Most importantly, people are too afraid to be tested.
8.5 Marriage, Divorce and Widowhood
There have been important changes in terms of marriage arrangements, divorce and
widowhood. In N, as in K 1, people lamented the fact that boys and girls now chose their own
partners and do not abide by the wishes of their parents any longer. In N, the respondents
explained that the ceremonies, however, continue. Here, the bride is asked to join the family of
the groom (his grandparents and parents). A stiff porridge (or ugali in Swahili) made of sorghum
flour is then prepared and if the bride accepts the porridge that is dipped into a meat sauce from
the groom‟s hand and swallows it (the other option is spitting it out), she has agreed to the
proposal. The families then enter into bride price negotiations. In the past, the bride price was
limited to a he-goat (or two), but now the bride‟s families demand one or two he-goats as well as
TZS 100,000 – TZS 200,000.43
Another important change is that the bride used to live with her husband‟s parents until she had
borne two children, but nowadays, the young couple lives on their own from the time of
marriage. Despite this shift in practice, the ceremony of moving in together (before marriage)
has been maintained. Here, the young man brings the girls to his house and then informs his
sister (she still lives with her parents) to bring food to this house. When she arrives, she is told
to bring water in the morning, as there is a „guest‟. Upon hearing this, the sister realizes that the
brothers wife has arrived and she informs her parents, who then send a messenger to the girl‟s
parents to inform that their daughter is with them. The marriage can then be formalized, with the
boy having to pay a fine for breaching marriage rules. The discussion in K 1 also revealed that
nuclear families are more common now and that the joint/ extended family is disappearing.
43
The minimum monthly wage rate in Tanzania is TZS 83,000.
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Marriages do not last anymore and divorces have become frequent. People attribute this trend
to the lack of parents‟ involvement in choosing a marriage partner (making sure the girl comes
from a good background) and providing advice to the couple. It used to be that the entire
community was involved in making sure that marriages lasted, but now young people want
minimal involvement from others. In K 1, the men‟s group attributed the increasing divorce rates
to women‟s unwillingness to persevere with their husbands through difficult situations. They also
noted that women have greater mobility and imitate their husbands many of whom lie about
where they are going. According to the men, women have become more stubborn because of
external influences and are now less respectful of their husbands. Some are even engaged in
prostitution. All of these trends are related to parents not being strict enough with their
daughters, who have freedom of movement, which they also demand as wives. In N, the
women‟s groups said that earlier, when divorces did happen, they used to be arbitrated by
religious leaders, who made sure that marital properties were fairly divided based on Islamic or
customary law, depending on the religion of the divorcees. But now, marriages are often not
formalized in the church or mosque and as a result, women receive nothing. (this needs to be
written in the context of Tanzania‟s divorce laws ). Interestingly, in K 1, the men‟s group noted
that religious marriages (Muslim and Christian) were increasing. The K group also said that cohabitation is increasing and polygamy is reducing, as the cost of living has increased and
husbands can no longer afford multiple wives. Cohabitation is attributed to the inability of the
boy to afford the bride price. Widows are now worse off than before. In the past, widows used to
stay with their husband‟s family or clan if she had borne boys, otherwise she would stay with her
daughters at the mercy of the daughter‟s in laws. But now, she is usually forced to return to her
clan.
These discussions illustrate the changing nature of the institutions (family and marriage) that
define gender relations. The changes appear to be influenced by various factors – economic
contributions of women (through the sale of labor power) and generational shifts in life styles
which are likely to be influenced by the media, seasonal migration, exposure to urban areas,
and so on.
At the same time, the unequal division of labor at the households level has not changed at all.
In fact, women are not only engaged in wage work, but also share half of the work in agriculture
on rented or sharecropped land, in addition to the numerous activities of household work, such
as cooking, cleaning, gardening, getting the children ready for school, bed, and dinner. The
norms around socialization of children discussed with the poorest households in N highlight the
parents (husband and wife) socialize boys and girls into this unequal division of labor. Young
boys are taught by their fathers to hunt birds, uproot cassava, make and build things, etc., whilst
young girls are taught by their mothers to do various domestic chores, such as washing utensils,
peeling onions, etc. Development activities that are to improve the lives of poor women must
address the fact that husbands are taking advantage of their wives.
Issues in unequal gendered divisions of labor, restricted mobility facing women, as well as
shifting norms and tensions in marriage, are confirmed in broader literature. While not explored
within the scope of this study, the literature also discusses the persistence of high rates of
domestic violence against women within households. In many communities, violence in the
household is viewed as a private matter and an acceptable means of men‟s domination.
Generally treated as taboo, there is little information on the actual rates of violence across
Tanzania, though a WHO study in Dar es Salaam and Mbeya found that 48 percent of women
interviewed reported experiencing violence, many of which considered it a normal part of their
lives. According to the study, one in three women victims of violence told no one about it, and
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60 percent did not seek health services or report the incident to the authorities (2005). A 20022003 study in Moshi reported that 21 percent of women faced domestic assault or rape over the
past 12 months (Mascarenhas, 2007a).
Part 9: Conclusion
9.1. Locating Poverty
In Tanzania where 15 to 55 percent of the rural population is living in poverty, every community
is likely to have a large number of poor households (WFP, 2006). There is, however,
considerable regional variation in terms of natural resource endowments (forests, land
(productivity and access), and water), rainfall, political and social dynamics and struggles over
resources (e.g. pastoralists vs. settled agriculturalists), remoteness (e.g. lack of access to
markets), all of which are factors that shape the extent of poverty. It is important that CARE
International in Tanzania gain a sense of the regional variation in terms of development and
under-development in Tanzania and determine which are the poorest areas to locate its
activities. Without specific focus on key areas, the organization will not be able to concentrate its
efforts sufficiently to have a transformative effect on local communities, with an emphasis of
uplifting specific impact groups. As this study has highlighted, poverty dynamics are complex
with considerable variation amongst communities / groups within communities in just one
locality. This requires that CARE and its partners limit their geographic spread within the country
to a few areas in which they build appropriate development programs that address the multiple
dimensions of poverty.
Identifying „poverty pockets‟ can be achieved through various methods that allow for
triangulation. For instance, World Food Programme Vulnerability Maps are a useful to identify
the areas which are most vulnerable in terms of food security. The 2005/2006 Comprehensive
Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis of the World Food Programme highlights that Tabora
and Singida regions, followed by the Dodoma region, exhibit the highest food insecurity in
Tanzania with 40-55 percent of all households, lacking sufficient food. In Mwanza, Manyara,
and Kagera regions food insecurity ranges between 20-30 percent of all households. A focus on
Social Development Indicators – education, health (including maternal mortality an stunting of
children) – highlights that the South of Tanzania is more disadvantaged (Wu, 2010). The region
also has high rates of extreme poverty. The Southeast region with poor infrastructure, remote
areas, and lack of access to services closely follows the southern region. These findings
should be considered and regional level statistics should be reviewed and consultations with
government officials should be entertained, as well as discussions with national and
international NGOs working in the areas that have been identified should be held.
Once the broader areas has been defined and districts identified, district officials and NGOs
working in the region can assist with the identification of wards and villages that are the poorest.
This study placed specific emphasis to identify the poorest communities (hamlets) within
villages through mapping political leaders and development resources with the aim to locate the
communities which are political marginalized (under-represented) and lacking in basic
requirements, for example schools and health services, and political under-representation which
is key in communities being unable to access key resources. This mapping process for village
D enabled the research team to identify hamlet N as the poorest community and hamlets K 1
and K 2 as relatively better off. The various exercises conducted in hamlet K 1 and hamlet N
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hamlets illustrated that hamlet N hamlet is considerably poorer in terms of infrastructure
(schools, health services) as well as the economic well being of the poorest households who
face hunger during the lean season, a reality that is absent in hamlet K 1.
On Impact Groups
CARE International in Tanzania is working on defining its impact groups and so far it has
decided to work with „most marginalized and vulnerable women and girls living in severely
underserved and environmentally restricted areas at all critical life stages‟, with a focus on the
sub-impact groups that depend on agriculture and forests and pastoralists. The findings
highlight that the definition of the impact group with its sub-impact group populations are
perhaps still too broad, in light of the class dimensions that we highlighted. Households, and
women /girls may be marginalized and vulnerable, but may not necessarily be the poor. In
other words, the definition of impact groups needs to capture the income poverty dimension to
ensure that the organization and its partner organizations work with the poorest households.
Having identified the poverty pockets in its working rural areas through mapping, as we have
outlined earlier, CARE should conduct well-being (class) analyses in the poorest communities
and identify poor and very poor households to work with.
There is also the question if ethnic minorities, such as pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, should
be placed in a separate impact group altogether. Our findings highlight that pastoralist
communities have very different socio-cultural, political and economic dynamics and potential
pathways for social, economic and political change may look quite different for these groups
than for women and girls from main stream society. Placing pastoralists in the same broad
impact grouping may be analytically and strategically limiting.
9.2 Underlying Causes of Poverty in Tanzania and Program Implications with
Specific Reference to CARE’s Impact Groups
The literature and our locally contextualized research have pointed to poor governance,
discrimination and exploitation (along class and gender lines), limited livelihood opportunities for
poor households, centralized stewardship of natural resources, and poor human and social
development conditions (education, sanitation, and health). Future interventions should be
informed by a nuanced understanding of how these various dimensions intersect and shape the
conditions of poverty. As we have shown, poverty dynamics are not uniform across space. For
instance, in hamlet N crop yields are considerably lower than yields in hamlet K 1. At the same
time, unlike poor households in K 1, the poorest households in hamlet N face seasonal hunger
and are entangled in exploitative debt dynamics. Hamlet N also faces exclusion in terms of local
governance. In fact, despite the fact that hamlet N has a wealth of natural resources, the
inhabitants do not own sufficient land to cultivate, because of unfair land allocation practices
during the 1990s that favored outsiders. Similarly, hamlet N lies adjacent to a large forest area
with wildlife, timber and non-timber forest products, and yet, because of poor governance and
non-participatory decision-making processes of the wildlife authorities, the residents of village D
and hamlet N in particular, face conflict over access and use of natural resources. Recognizing
and comprehending these micro-dynamics in local society will assist CARE and its partners to
work with the poorest households to strategize and maneuver the social, economic and political
complexities and take advantage of existing opportunities to reduce poverty and social
marginalization.
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In the section below, we discuss the programmatic implications and potential areas for
intervention in light of the underlying causes of poverty that we identified through this work.
These recommendations are also informed by CARE‟s global Strategic Impact Inquiry, which
has highlighted the importance of simultaneously working on agency – the ability of poor women
and men to make strategic choices and influence the world in which they live; social relations –
addressing forms of class, ethnic and gender discrimination that disempower poor women and
men, and addressing structures – the larger institutional arrangements in which households and
communities are embedded. The reader must be cautioned that a study with just a narrow slice
of reality cannot possibly convey an entirely representative picture of the situation in the larger
locality, let alone in the wider region or the country as a whole. This research has generated a
number of issues that should be further explored and here we point to the gaps in knowledge
and understanding.
9.2.1 Poor Governance
Our study has pointed to the need to address poor governance at various levels. The latest
election has highlighted that the entrenched hold of the CCM is decreasing and opposition
parties are becoming stronger and able to garner more votes. With higher levels of political
competition, it is likely that debates around economic, social and political development will
broaden, that politicians will consider the needs and interests of a wider cross section of society,
creating opportunities for poor villagers to have greater influence through their voting power. In
this context, local representatives from various political parties will become more valuable in
higher level competition. At the same time, the issue of electoral laws is crucial. The limitations
that only citizens who can read / write Swahili or English, have sufficient legal income to make a
living, and are a member of a political party is problematic. All of these qualifications essentially
create a bias against poor women and men and are likely to contribute to the political underrepresentation that we found in some of the hamlets in village D. This is not to say that CARE
Tanzania must be directly involved in advocacy initiatives that work to change electoral laws,
but the organization could provide evidence-based knowledge from the grass-roots and join
alliances with national and international organizations that lobby for changes in the electoral
laws and policies. Similarly, there is a need to work with organization that focus on land tenure
and „fair‟ land allocation. In light of the Kilimo Kwanza, a policy that is likely to widen the gap
between better off and poor, as the better off will benefit from the „industrialization of agriculture‟
that is envisioned. At the same time, one of the 10 pillars of the policy is to make more land
available for agriculture, which means that land distribution processes are likely to continue,
providing an opportunity for households that were unable to gain ownership of land earlier to do
so now, if corrupt practices at the local level are addressed and land allocation are
strengthened. It is important that CARE Tanzania consider how the insight that the organization
gains from „deep social, political and economic analysis‟ can be used to influence policy and
decision makers at various levels.
At the local level, there is a need to work with elected leaders to become more accountable to
citizens and responsive to their needs. As we have outlined, the Local Government Act
envisions the use of participatory methodologies, such as the Opportunities and Obstacles to
Development (O&OD) to be used in planning and implementation. But as the review of
secondary literature and our findings indicate, participatory practices are far from the norm in
terms of planning and implementation, partly because of the lack of skill on the part of elected
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local government officials, but also because of the lack political will to do so. In its working
areas, CARE Tanzania and its Partner NGOs should work to build such capacity and involve
locally elected representatives in social analysis (exploring questions such as „why does
extreme poverty exists in certain pockets?‟) and based on the findings create a long-term vision
(e.g. abolishing hunger, education and health services for all, etc.) with concrete steps to
achieve it. Equally important will be to work with elected representatives that explore and reflect
upon their own attitudes and biases towards the poor and underserved areas and their notions
of what local governance essentially means. Such engagement of locally elected
representatives in various processes (participatory poverty analysis, planning and
implementation), as well as addressing their mindsets towards specific groups (e.g. anti-poor
biases and discriminatory attitudes towards pastoralists) and their work in general, has the
potential to transform governance at the local level to work in more democratic ways. This work
is fundamental not only in the realm of traditional governance, but also to ensure that any
natural resource management schemes at the local level, the benefits of which are channeled
through local government, reach all residents of locality.
Our discussion of the colonial era has illustrated the oppressive and exploitative history of
Tanzania. Whilst our section on the post-colonial state has elucidated the ways in which people
have been managed as „subjects‟, particularly pastoral communities. This history of oppression
and marginalization has shaped the ways in which people trust and can take advantage of and
participate in newly elected government institutions. This makes it fundamental to work with
communities, particularly, the poorest and most marginalized hamlets and pastoralist
communities and the poorest women and men within those communities, to build their capacity
in collective analysis, planning and decision making, so that they can meaningfully participate
and hold local government accountable. As CARE and its partners, as well as other
development actors in the area, engage in development initiatives – sanitation through CLTS,
education, health, livelihoods, governance, natural resources management – local leaders from
within the community will emerge and they should be encouraged and their capacity should be
build to drive the development process forward. This study has highlighted that the key issues
for the poorest households in the poorest communities are hunger, exploitation by landlords,
poor crop yields, discrimination by local government, non-participatory governance of natural
resource management schemes, exploitation by landlords, etc.). Trainings with such emerging
leaders should focus on analysis of key issues, how to address these in light of local resources
and actors, planning mechanisms, and monitoring of the initiatives. Such leaders may come
from any socio-economic background, but should include women and men. Leadership in this
context is defined as the willingness to work for the benefit of all, the contribution to a particular
development initiative, and the mobilization of one‟s peers to contribute. NGOs working through
such approaches must ensure that the interests of the poorest women and men are placed at
the center of such activities and those for whom the initiatives are intended are part of the
decision making processes and thus the local leadership.
It might be useful for CARE Tanzania and its partner organization to consider selecting two –
three villages in which there are positive minded elected representatives with whom governance
pilots can be implemented and where such community led initiatives can be build up and
become development models. This two way approach, working with the locally elected
representatives and the communities, has the potential to build relations of trust, enabling a
more conducive, enabling environment for development initiatives, including participatory
practice.
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9.2.2 Poor Livelihood Opportunities and Exploitation
This study has illustrated that class differentiation is pronounced, particularly in the poorest
communities; whilst our discussion of the recently articulated agriculture policy – Kilimo Kwanza
– with its emphasis on cash crops and the industrialization of agriculture exhibits a clear antipoor bias. Our empirical discussion of the sugar cane sector has also pointed to the
disadvantage that land-poor households face in entering that particular sector altogether and
the hard working conditions that laborers have to endure. Both of these dynamics – the
exclusion of land-poor households and an anti-labor climate – are likely to prevail in other cash
crop sectors. In light of the overall importance of agriculture as an economic activity, it is likely
that the gap between rich and poor will increase and that the poor are not going to benefit from
the new agricultural policy, with the exception of perhaps reduced food prices, if food production
increases. This, however, will not be sufficient to uplift them out of poverty in the long run.
Addressing the livelihoods opportunities of settled communities must include the issue of land
tenure. This is because in agrarian societies, such as Tanzania, land is the primary resource
through which households can convert their labor into meaningful contributions to their overall
well-being. Thus access to land – the ability to make use of a piece of land for productive
purposes – and the terms and conditions under which households gain access to land are
crucial to build a more egalitarian society. Our analysis has highlighted that despite a land policy
that envisions land to be allocated by local government to local residents, following proper
procedures, poor households generally do not own land, but take land in through rental /
sharecropping arrangements.
Sharecropping is more prevalent amongst poor households than rental arrangements, which
require payment up-front. Sharecropping, however, is more costly than renting. The crops
harvested are shared with the landlords, who provide no inputs, besides the provision of the
land. In hamlet N, where crop yields are half of those than in hamlet K 1, the share of crop
handed over – 20 percent of rice and 33 percent of maize – leave households with insufficient
amounts of food during the lean season. Those who rent land or share crop land must agree
with landlords which crops they cultivate, with rice and rice being the two crops that landlords
favor. These crops, however, are not necessarily the most suitable for the poor to cultivate. For
example, in hamlet N, yields of maize and rice are considerably lower than in hamlet K 1,
because of soil conditions, the prevailing micro-climate, and the inability of the poor to invest
sufficiently before and during the cropping process. Cassava and sorghum require less inputs
and are less sensitive to the vagaries of the weather, and are likely to provide a greater food
supply throughout the year. For instance, studies at conducted at agricultural experiment states
in the tropics show that Cassava ranks first (in comparison with rice, wheat, maize, sorghum,
sweet potatoes, yams, coco yams and bananas) in terms of tons per harvest, tons per year, and
calories produced per hectare per day (De Vries, et. al. 1967; Goering, 1979). A hectare of land
planted in maize provides roughly 7 million calories per annum, whilst the same land planted in
bananas should yield more than 11 million calories per annum, but if planted in cassava the
same land will produce more than 20 million calories per annum (ibid). Such high-yielding
caloric crops, however, such as cassava, are not favored by landlords, as they less profitable
when sold in markets. Any livelihood activity with the poorest household in this area, must in
the short-term engage the poor in analysis around which crops are more suitable in light of their
circumstances and based on this analysis, assist them to negotiate the cultivating of such crops.
In the long-term, it is important to address access and control over land (through governance)
and to improve farming methods.
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Our analysis has also highlighted that in hamlet N, the poor face hunger during the lean season
(throughout the month of May). During this time, women noted that they sell labor at half the
wage rates (paid in food or cash), and households borrow money from richer neighbors and sell
livestock. This was not the case in the hamlet K 1 a community that is less remote with poor
households able to sell labor at regular wage rates. Any livelihood intervention should first and
foremost address the issue of seasonal hunger through analysis with households in such
communities that lead to plans and action to overcome this reality. In the short-term, seasonal
hunger could be addressed through grain-banks (individual or collective), whereby households
set aside a small amount of rice or any other staple food to be saved for the lean season. This
would allow households to some food supply and avoid selling wages at low rates or taking
loans with interest. In the long term, there should be discussions, analysis, plans and action to
consider which crops are more suitable in light of the economic reality that such households
face. Cultivating „traditional crops‟ such as cassava, millet or sorghum, which are more drought
resistant and generally require less inputs, might be an important alternative to maize and rice.
Whilst improved agricultural practices and increases in production in communities such as
hamlet N are crucial, at the same time, there is a need to work with households to crop improve
storage facilities to maintain stocks for consumption. Equally important, is the issue of better
understanding agricultural markets and the role of private traders. We did not have sufficient
time to explore these issues, but there is a need to develop a strategy through which more
remove communities can market their crops and produce to avoid middlemen who purchase at
the farm gate.
The lack of regional economic development in the larger locality and with it the prevalence of
under-employment, forces poor households to depend on agricultural labor. As our wage
analysis has highlighted, the seasonality of agriculture, makes it difficult for men and women to
find gainful employment during the gestation periods of crops, when work is not available in
agriculture. The cultivation of sugar cane, which is grown on large tracts of land by large and
medium farmers and absentee landholders, presents the only large-scale economic activity that
requires labor throughout the year. The sector, however, is characterized by exploitative labor
dynamics, with labor contractors hiring workers from labor-surplus regions. In other words, the
only „industrial‟ agricultural activity in the region, fails to create employment at the local level,
through the recruitment of migrant labor to undermine prevailing local wage rates in agriculture
and makes payment of daily wages conditional on quotas. Mtibwa Sugar Estate also fails to
abide by its contractual obligations to provide health care for its employees. The sugar worker
union is weak and poorly organized and unable to press for improved conditions. Whilst laborers
(cane cutters) that are recruited through contractors that work for MOA, the outgrower scheme,
are paid 15 percent more than Mtibwa cutters, they do not receive health insurance. The poor
wages, in relation to the agricultural wage rates in the locality, paid by MOA are a) linked to the
wage rates of the Mtibwa Sugar Estate, b) the inability of migrant labor to collectively organize
and press for their interests, and c) the class-interests that MOA serves as a farmer
organization.
CARE Tanzania and its partner organizations might consider linking to organizations that work
for the rights of laborers employed in the industrial agricultural sector (including sisal, tea,
coffee) to explore the types of strategies that are used to improve the working conditions and
wages of laborers. Further, once CARE has established its social mobilization strategy in the
locality and has established interest groups, the organization might consider to work with local
labor to negotiate access to jobs through MOA and better wage rates. This, however, would be
a difficult proposition, given that MOA represents large and medium farmers (in village D)
despite the rhetoric that the organization consists of small holders.
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A crucial issue is the emerging trend of alcoholism that we observed in hamlet N. Alcoholism is
an issue that does not only affect rural communities in Tanzania, but has been observed
throughout the world. In particular, studies have noted that the poor, and particularly men, are
more likely consume alcohol and become addicted. There are no easy solution to this and it is
recommended that CARE and its partners explore the extent to which poor men (and women)
consume alcohol, which type of alcohol (distilled or fermented), and how it contributes to
increasing impoverishment and land alienation. This should be done through participatory
methodologies that include an analysis of the negative impacts on the individual, the household,
the community and strategies should be developed to address this issue. For instance, we
found that many households supplement their livelihoods through making fermented drinks that
are then sold throughout the locality. This reality should be part of the analysis.
9.2.3. Gender Relations and Ethnic Discrimination
Gender Relations and Discrimination
Women‟s Work Load
Women from poor households perform a disproportionately large amount of work, compared to
men. As our „division of labor matrix‟ for the main crops of maize and rice illustrates, women
work slightly less than men in land preparation, weeding, guarding, harvesting and transporting,
whilst men do the majority of the clearing of land and marketing and women do all of the
threshing. Besides these crop activities, women from poor households also sell labor, when
they are free from work in their own fields, in addition to performing the vast majority of
household work that includes a huge number of tasks, leaving little time in the day for leisure.
Whilst men also sell labor, the hours they do so are limited, leaving them time free to visit
others, gossip, rest, and /or consume alcohol. With the ability to earn income – a change that
has occurred during the past two decades – through selling labor, women noted that they do
have now greater freedom of movement and do not need permission to ask their husbands to
go out. But these economic changes do not appear to have changed the division of labor at the
household level with women fetching water, firewood, preparing meals, etc. Interventions to
improve women‟s lives must therefore work to address women‟s work load at the household
level. As discussed in the training workshop, this can be done through a simple daily time use
exercise (women and men, separately and then presented to each other), which is followed up
by commitments for change. Similarly, there is a need to discuss and work through the
socialization practices of children, which our study shows, contributes to the unequal division of
labor at the household level.
Marriage, Divorce and Widowhood
The institution of family in village D (this is likely to be true for other areas, but needs to be
confirmed) is changing with young women and young men having much greater choices about
whom they wish to marry, nuclear, as opposed to joint, families becoming the norm, and divorce
becoming a common practice. Whilst men lament „women‟s new found freedom, stubbornness,
and liberties which used to be their own prerogatives‟, they attribute these changes to external
influences, both women and men have commented that these fundamental changes have
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negatively affected widows who are now often forced to return to their own clans, after the
husband passes away. Our discussions on changes in gender norms and trends also
highlighted that co-habitation (women living with men outside of marriage) is increasing, as men
cannot afford the bride-price that needs to be paid to legally marry more than one wife.
Based on the discussions with the various groups around gender issues, it was highlighted that
the age of marriage for girls has reduced from 17-20 to 15-17. The discussants implied that this
was because of the changes in norms, which lead to earlier sexual contact between adolescent
boys and girls and subsequent pregnancies. This was also cited as the main reasons why girls
drop out of school at considerably higher rates than boys, despite the fact that the girls tend to
perform better than boys. We did not have sufficient time to explore this in greater detail, but
there need to be follow up work to explore this in more depth. Our discussions were held with
adults (fathers and mothers) and it is important to understand the views of youth, especially
girls, on the causes for school drop-out. These discussions should include the safety of girls at
schools and the possibilities of sexual harassment and gender-based violence.
The changes in gender norms and trends exercises pointed to general increases in men and
women‟s sexual promiscuity, which was one of the main reasons that marriages now take place
without the involvement of parents, who used to select their children‟s partners. Whilst these
trends are welcomed by the younger generations, there is a need to raise awareness of sexual
disease prevention and to ensure that local clinics carry condoms, as HIV/AIDS is increasing.
Whilst we did not conduct any detailed studies, discussants noted that there HIV/AIDS infected
persons residing in the communities and showed utter disdain and a lack of empathy, noting
that medicines should not be provided, so that they die and others learn. The participants of our
discussions also noted that people fear to be tested and thus avoid doing so. These attitudes
and behavior towards the disease, people who are afflicted, and testing should be addressed in
any future programs.
Decision-making
We had initially planned to conduct a semi-structured questionnaire to explore the issue of
decision-making around marriage, education, resources and income at the household level, but
were unable to do so, because of various reasons. The questionnaire has already been agreed
upon and should be implemented to better understand household level dynamics and the
influence that women from various classes have over the various decision making areas.
Gender-based violence
We did not have time to consider gender-based violence, but suggest that this should be
followed up. One method to explore the extent and dynamics around gender-based violence is
to depersonalize the issue, by asking women into workshops and work up scenarios of events
that trigger domestic violence. This will help to broadly talk about the issue and yet have a firm
grounding in reality with naming any particular household or person.
Ethnic Discrimination: The case of the Barabaig and Iraqw Pastoral Communities
Our historical analysis of pastoralist communities has highlighted their marginalization and
displacement during various eras (German, British, post-colonial), whilst the discussion of the
present day context has elucidated the ways in which discrimination against the pastoralists,
with special reference to the Datoga and Iraqw in the study area, continues and threatens their
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ability to engage in their livelihoods, excludes them from participation in local government, and
generally prevents them from inclusion in larger community affairs.
The livelihood strategies of pastoral communities in which cattle is central has been and
continues to be a source of conflict. As pastoralist increasingly face difficulties finding grazing
lands and water for their livestock, their cattle sometimes stray /encroach on farm lands leading
to conflict. In such cases, pastoralists often pay to compensate the landowner / farmer for any
damages. Whilst some of the wealthier members of the pastoralist communities have purchased
or rent land, they do not have tenure security. In light of the biases on the part of local
government, and non-pastoralists in general, towards these ethnic groups, dispute resolution
tends to favor settled members of the community. The Datoga and Iraqw in our study area have
made attempts to ease these tensions by contributing to community funds, and efforts to
maintain good relations with settlers through visits to settlers and attendance in meetings.
However, this has not changed the assumption on the part of settlers that pastoralists should
not live in these areas and that they have no legitimate claims to settle here. The cultural
differences (in terms of livelihoods, dress, food, drink) are further pronounced by the fact that
the Datoga and Iraqw speak little or poor Swahili and that their language is fundamentally
different.
Any work with pastoralists to improve their lived condition must begin with addressing the
discrimination that they face. One approach to this could be to engage members of each
„community‟ (settlers and pastoralists) in discussions in which their histories and assumptions
about the other are shared. Many settlers will be able to comprehend and empathize with the
„displacement‟ of the Datoga from the Mount Hanang Region of Tanzania and the ways in which
an entirely people was separated from their ancestral homeland and forced to scatter in search
for grazing lands for their cattle, given the upheaval that the vast majority of Tanzanians faced
during villagization. A history of each community, should be followed by a discussion of how
one community perceives the other and which of these are based on reality and which are
myths. For instance, during our research we discovered that it is generally assumed that the
Datoga raid cattle because for a adolescent boy to become adult, he needs to prove his
manhood through a successful cattle raid. Discussions with the Datoga, however, revealed that
this is no longer true and that they have abandoned cattle raiding. The settlers told us that one
of the reasons they do not raise cattle is that they fear raids. Further, the usage of the term
„Mang‟ati‟ to refer to the Datoga has become common practice throughout the areas that the
Datoga / Barabaig can be found. This includes the CARE staff. The word „Mang‟ati‟ comes from
the Maasai language and means „enemy‟, reflecting the hostile relations between these two
pastoral groups based on the earlier practice of cattle raiding. Naturally, the Datoga people
resent the use of the term „Mang‟ati‟ as an appellation, as our Barabaig colleague explained to
us in our training. Similarly, engaging pastoralists and settlers in a dialogue may go a long way
to shatter entrenched notions about „the other‟.
Similarly, such exercises and discussions should be conducted between elected local
government members and clan elders from the pastoral communities, in order to create an
atmosphere of respect and trust, and thereby the possibility of cooperation. This is particularly
important in light of the shared interest in natural resources, in our case the Wami Mbiki
Reserve, in which both settled and pastoralist communities have an interest and which are, in
theory, to be managed by the communities that live in the surrounding area. At present, given
the social dynamics between the two groups (settlers and pastoralists), the cooperation and the
unity that is needed to negotiate for the interests of both groups is absent. Further, settled
communities may find that the Datoga and Iraqw have an intricate knowledge about the larger
eco-system and micro-climatic conditions in light of dependence on range lands.
103
In light of the fact that CARE Tanzania has decided that pastoralists will be one of the impact
groups that it wishes to focus its efforts on, the organization needs to make some important
adjustments. Firstly, it should hold the same kinds of discussions about assumptions, biases,
and prejudices towards pastoralists and come to terms with the fact that staff are shaped by the
larger discourse that has marginalized pastoralists. At the same time, the organization needs to
recruit members from the various pastoralist communities that it wishes to work with. This is
important in order to communicate and approach this community. Our visits to, lengthy
discussions with, and various exercises with the Datoga and Iraqw people would have been
impossible, had it not been for our colleague Mr. Shushuda Masaga, a Barabaig activist, who
works for the uplift of his community and pastoralists in general. We recruited Mr. Masaga
during the beginning of the second phase of our work. The Barabaig and Iraqw of village D were
taken aback by our interest and noted that no development organization had taken an interest in
their lives and their well being and that they were keen to build a relationship and work with us.
Although we made some progress in understanding the condition of the Barabaig / Iraqw
communities in village D, we were unable to explore many issues in detail. This is because our
ability to engage was limited with only one person (of a team of over 25 persons) who could
speak their language. As a result, we were able to have 2-3 sessions in the field and it was
impossible in such a short time to explore important issues such as education and health, or
sensitive issues such as the distribution of wealth (cattle), gender relations, and the political
structure of these communities. Our recommendations in terms of the pastoralist communities
are therefore largely limited to the work that needs to be done in the future, in order to design
effective programs.
Livelihoods and Poverty
Our analysis with the Barabaig and Iraqw people highlighted that as in all societies there are
important class distinctions. We were able to gain a sense of the what it means to be rich,
middle class and poor, with rich households owning between 100 to 1,000 cattle, whereas the
poor own less than 20 cattle. In fact, poor households because they lack sufficient cattle to
ensure their livelihood can only eat one meal per day, borrow monies during emergencies, sell
labor to pastoralists in return for money, food, and milk, and sometimes a heifer. They also work
for settlers weeding maize and few work in sugar cane.
The discussions highlighted that „cattle‟ are what defines wealth in Barabaig and Iraqw society,
although some households (the better off) have purchased land or rent land and are cultivating.
Any livelihood intervention should consider various exercises with the Barabaig and Iraqw to
consider alternative livelihood opportunities to cattle for the poor (besides selling labor) enabling
diversification and reducing their dependence on cattle. This is not to say that interventions
should work to shift pastoralists‟ livelihoods away from cattle, but rather to supplement it and
ease further pressures on natural resources.
It is also important to explore the labor relations that prevail between pastoralists and between
pastoralists and settlers, in order to understand the dynamics of poverty. There is also the need
to know more about the dynamics within the Barabaig community and the leadership structure
to better understand the extent to which any intervention can build upon the solidarity (or must
work to create a solidarity) of the pastoralists community to collectively work towards eradicating
the forms of household poverty (hunger, begging, and so on) that exist. It will be a challenge to
establish which households are poor (number of cattle), as pastoralists across the region are
generally wary of sharing the number of cattle they own. In other words, more work needs to be
104
done to explore livelihoods.
Gender Relations
Our findings and the literature highlight that pastoralist societies are patriarchal with women
taking on the overwhelming burden of the work, whilst men, as heads of households, have
greater leisure time. Polygamy (among middle class and rich households) is common with the
sons of the first wife having higher inheritance rights. Both bride-price and dowry are practiced,
with men giving some cattle for marriage to the girl‟s parents, but fathers also giving cattle to
their daughters which they are able to own and control. Ultimately her sons inherit her cattle.
Whilst we were able to gain a cursory understanding of some of these issues, there needs to be
further work done to explore these dynamics in more detail:
The following research questions need to be answered:
In practice, how many cattle are paid in the form of bride-price amongst different classes
of households? This is matters because if women are in abusive relationships and wish
to leave, the amount of cattle that has to be returned is often a key factor in preventing
her from leaving;
In practice, how many cattle does a bride from rich, middle, poor household receive from
her father (compared the cattle owned by the groom)? Does she control these cattle,
even when her sons have grown up? Does she control the income (through milk or
meat) from these cattle or is this handed over to her husband? Does her husband ask
her permission or consult with her before selling the cattle that she brought as dowry? In
practice, what kind of security does a wife/ mother have once her husband passes
away?
What are the dynamics between co-wives? Is there a hierarchy? Is this different for
different classes (rich and middle, as poor households generally do not practice
polygamy)?
In practice, how does the inheritance system amongst the Barabaig and Iraqw operate?
What are the differences in terms of girls and boys attending school and why?
In practice, what are the kinds of activities in which men assist women (productive –
related to cattle and reproductive – related to the household and the rearing of children)?
What is the average age of marriage of pastoralist girls and boys?
What are the attitudes of pastoral women, men, girls, and boys towards education? How
are these different from the attitudes towards education of poor households from settled
communities? Do pastoralist boys and girls face specific forms of discrimination and / or
harassment at schools?
Answers to these questions will allow CARE to gain a better sense of the gender relations
amongst the Barabaig and Iraqw and consider interventions that work to reduce existing gender
inequalities.
9.2.4. Centralized Stewardship of Natural Resources and the Case of the WamiMbiki WMA
Our analysis of the Wami-Mbiki Wildlife Management Area (WMA) has raised some important
105
issues from a policy perspective (national level), the implementation of the project funded by
Danida and implemented by the Danish Hunter Association, and the lack of participatory local
governance structures and processes to administer any future funds that will be generated and
are intended to benefit the residents of the larger locality. The latter has been discussed in the
earlier section on Local Governance.
National Level
Whilst the Wildlife Policy of 1998 envision a participatory approach towards the management
and use of Wildlife Management Areas, the Wildlife Act of 2008, as well as WMA Regulations,
on the hand contradict many of the 1988 policy. Essentially, the Government of Tanzania has
articulated participatory guidelines for action (the 1998 Policy), but the underlying law and
regulations, which are legally binding do not support the policy, rather they show that the State
has increased central control over wildlife tourism and hunting, leaving very limited space for
local communities to participate. Further, the 2008 Act maintains the discretionary powers of
the Wildlife Division in allocating and withdrawing hunting blocks and quotas, issuing licenses to
wildlife tour operators, and to decide on the portion of revenue to be provided to the
communities with no minimum proportion of revenues generated guaranteed to communities.
Unless the legal framework (the 2008 Wildlife Act and WMA Regulations) of wildlife
management reflects the intent of the 1998 Wildlife Policy, co-management (the state and
communities) of wildlife areas is not possible. In light of CARE Tanzania‟s commitment to
impact populations that live in or adjacent to protected areas, the organization should join
advocacy coalitions that work to address this discontinuity between the laws and the policy.
The DHA Project
Our findings indicate that the Danish Hunter Association has failed to establish participatory
processes in relation to the Wami-Mbiki Authorized Association. In village D, the Association is
top-down in its dealings and interactions with local residents, using force and police intimidation
to patrol the WMA. Further, there is considerable un-clarity around what constitutes the buffer
and the core areas, with the Association essentially claiming the buffer as core and applying
brute force to enforce their understanding of the boundaries. Those who are perceived to violate
the „boundaries‟ are punished heavily: with livestock being killed, people being beaten,
particular pastoralists, and personal possessions (mobile phones, money, axes, etc.) being
confiscated. Unless DHA addresses the boundary issue with Wildlife Division, the Forest and
Bee-Keeping Division and local government to define and mark the boundaries clearly (buffer
and core), there is likely to be further conflict in the future. For instance, in village D area of the
WMA, there are at least 50 household that reside in the buffer, though the Association claims
they reside in the core.
Although the communities were consulted and asked if they wanted the area to be declared as
a WMA, they agreed because they were told that they would receive funds (1 million TZS
annually) that would be allocated for schools and dispensaries, but for three years no funds
have been provided. Further, the residents had no idea that this confusion between buffer and
core would arise and affect them in such profound ways. There is also a lack of transparency in
terms of who are the board or council members and the election process of the guards.
DHA should be informed and briefed about these findings, whilst these issues should also be
taken up with Danida, who is funding the project. There is a need to establish a sound natural
resources management system with good governance practices so that adjacent communities
106
can exert the limited influence that is provided through the legal framework. Once the hunting
actually begins, foreign tourist arrive, and revenues are generated (though it is unclear how
much will be given to the local communities), the conflict is likely to increase, as communities
and local governments of the surrounding villages will learn about the revenues that are
generated and in light of the „policing‟ and top down approaches that the Association is
presently engaged in, there is likely to be considerable resentment.
9.2.5. Poor Social Development
Sanitation and Access to Water
The sanitation conditions in village D are abysmal and access to clean drinking water
throughout the year are lacking. The issue of water is particularly pressing in hamlet N, where
women, girls and boys, have to walk long distances to collect water that can be described as
murky, at best. CARE‟s I-Wash program has done an extensive analysis on the situation, which
is available in a separate report.
Education
The literature on education in Tanzania highlights the tremendous achievements that were
made in the first few decades following independence, with literacy rates in 2000 lying at an
average of 66 percent for women and 80 percent for men. There are regional differences, and
the Morogoro region, the literacy rates are lower than the national average with literacy rates of
50 percent for women and 75 percent for men (Wu, 2010). Whilst achievements were also
made in improving access to and the quality of secondary education, recent trends (2008)
indicate that only 50 percent of children attending primary school transition to secondary school.
Though we did to explore the extent of illiteracy through surveys that would allows us to
specifically comment in a statistically accurate manner, our analysis and discussions indicate
that literacy rates in hamlet N and amongst the pastoralists are extremely low. Whilst most
children in hamlet K 1 have been attending and completing primary the primary school in village
D, which was completed in 1975, the children of hamlet N have had to cover a some distance to
attend primary school in a nearby village, whilst the closest secondary school lies at
considerable distance, with attendance from hamlet N being low.
Any initiative to address education has to address access to schools and this is directly linked to
the marginalization of the more remote communities of hamlet N. There is also a need to work
with women and men from settled and pastoralist communities to understand their attitudes
towards education and through an analysis process work up the benefits to future generations if
children have access to quality education. Thus besides working with local government and
relevant authorities to establish schools in the locality, there is a need to raise awareness about
the benefits of education, and once schools have been build to work with parents, teachers and
students to ensure high quality education.
Health
As with education, the better off communities in village D (K 1 and K 2) have access to
medicines and advise through the dispensary that was built in 1988 and as a result of relatively
good infrastructure, members from these communities can easily travel to doctors and hospitals
107
in Turiani. Whereas residents from the remote hamlet N have no dispensary with qualified
health professionals, but obtain medicines and advise from shops in nearby village K. As with
education, it is important for CARE and its partners to work with local government (that is in the
process of building a dispensary, but the process is stalled for some time) to ensure that these
under-served, remote communities have access to health services.
9.2.6. Analysis and Social Mobilization Capacity of CARE Tanzania Staff
CARE is now working in all hamlets of village D through a community led approach towards
sanitation (CLTS). This represents a good opportunity to not only address the dismal sanitation
conditions and the lack of drinking water sources, but to initiate a social mobilization process
that has the potential to address the multiple dimensions of poverty that we discuss in this
paper. In light of the work that has been done and the detailed understanding that has been
gained, as well as the gaps that have been identified, CARE International in Tanzania may
consider creating a pilot initiative in village D, with specific emphasis on the poorest households
in hamlet N and the pastoralist community. Various initiatives that address governance,
livelihoods, NRM, women‟s empowerment, social development, could be attempted by CARE
and its partners, as well as working with DHA, could provide a learning lab for the organization.
This, however, will require that CARE and partner staff gain greater skills in working with
participatory methodologies, facilitation and social mobilization. If the organization decides to
pursue the implementation of its programs through participatory approaches, it should invest
resources in its staff to improve its skills. This would require further capacity building by external
agencies. In this case, the organization should explore potential training organizations in
Tanzania or East Africa region.
108
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