India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism
Author(s): Ashutosh Varshney
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 11 (Nov., 1991), pp. 997-1019
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INDIA,PAKISTAN,AND KASHMIR
Antinomies
of Nationalism
AshutoshVarshney
Ethnic, religious,and nationalistpassions have returnedto the agenda of world politics. The hope of intellectualsand
statesmenat theturnof the 1950swas thata risingtideof rationality
and
in both liberaland Marxistvariants,would sweep away
modernization,
these ascriptiveidentitiesthat had led to such violence,bloodshed,and
ruin. However,theirexpectederosiondid not take place; rather,these
passionshave persistedand,it wouldbe fairto say,have now gonebeyond
all expectations.Today, severalsocieties-mostdramatically,
the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia-seem to be on the vergeof ethnicdisintegration,
dependingon how theirpoliticsand institutions
are restructured.
Serious
ethnicassertionalso marksa good deal of EasternEurope, the Middle
East, Africa,and South Asia.
in ethnicand
Whyare so manypeoplein theworlddefining
themselves
religiousterms?Althoughtheproblemis notfullyunderstood,
someminimal comparativeobservationscan, nonetheless,
be offeredon the ethnic
and nationalistrevivalof today,and it can be markedby at least four
factors-twoold, tworelatively
new. First,manyethnicgroupscutacross
international
boundariesthathave been constructed
to represent
juridical
statehood,or theyare spreadacrossregionalboundarieswithina nationAshutosh Varshneyis AssistantProfessorof Governmentand
FacultyAssociate,CenterforInternationalAffairs,Harvard University,
Cambridge. The
authorwould like to acknowledgethatthe fieldresearchin India upon whichthisarticleis
based was fundedby the Departmentof Government,Harvard University.The author
would also like to note that researchin an area of insurgency
is not possiblewithoutthe
and theKashmiripeople,
generoussupportof activists,politicalleaders,journalists,officials,
who sharedemotionsand thoughtsin countlessconversations.Thanks is also extendedto
BashiruddinAhmed,HouchangChehabi,Ashok Jaitley,
JayaJaitley,SunderViswalingam,
MyronWeiner,severalPakistanistudentsat Brownand Harvarduniversities
forcomments
and suggestions,
and Nisha Kumar foradmirableresearchassistance. The authoris solely
responsibleforthe analysis.
? 1991 by The Regentsof the University
of California
997
998
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
state. Such groups(Kurds, Tamils,and Muslimsin South Asia, several
nationalitiesin Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) seem eitherto
demonstrate
themostvirulentformofnationalismor are objectsofa terrible nationalistrepression.Second, partisanintellectualsand leadersare
charges,either
reconstructing
nationalhistorieswitha litanyofinterethnic
withtales of brokenpromisesor storiesof ethnicingratitude.Through
to push out a shared
selectiveretrieval,tales of betrayalare threatening
heritageof communalcoexistencefromcollectivememories.Hindu naMoghulrultionalistspreferto recallBabar and Aurangzeb,theintolerant
ers, ratherthan Akbar, the tolerantone. Sikh militantspoint to the
betrayalof Hindus in 1951 whentheygave up theirmothertongue,Punjabi; fewreferto thefactthatit was once commonfortwosonsin thesame
speakofhowTamils
familyto be a Sikhand a Hindu. Sinhalanationalists
corruptedtheiroriginalBuddhistland; centuriesofSri Lankanhistoryare,
however,fullof Sinhala-Tamilcoexistence.
Two new factorsare givingmarkedvirulenceto thesetraditionalattributesofethnicstruggle.Deadly weaponsare plentifully
availablein many
partsoftheworld,makingethnicity-andtheresponseto it-more brutal
in unprecedented
ways. The violenceraisesseriousconcernsofcivilrights
in some circlesand equally seriousconsiderations
of orderand national
in thedecision-making
integrity
realms. Secondly,thespreadof informaand videos-impartsa newemotionalintensity
tiontechnology-television
on
thatis notthesame as readingor hearingaboutone's own community
or
in
forces
roll
it
Kashmiri
an insurgency
back.
path
watchingsecurity
crackdown;Hindu nationalists
militantsshow videos of the paramilitary
filmthe police firingon activiststryingto "liberate"Lord Ram's birthplace and thenthefilmis commercially
released.Withtoday'stechnology,
'imagined communities,"to borrow Benedict Anderson's evocative
phrase,have come to existmoreeasilythanbeforeand withgreaterintensity.
The Kashmirproblem,which goes back to the partitionof India in
of thenew ethnicity.Kashmiris a disputed
1947,sharestheseproperties
betweenIndia and Pakistanwithone-third
oftheoriginalstateof
territory
Jammuand Kashmir(J&K) nowwithPakistanand two-thirds
withIndia.
Kashmirhas twicein thepast led India and Pakistanto war,in 1947 and
in 1990 once again broughtthe
1965,respectively.An armedinsurgency
two traditionalfoesveryclose to war,and mostIndian,if not Pakistani,
war has been underwaysince
observerswould arguethata low-intensity
December 1989 in the Kashmirvalley. Moreover,eventshave come full
state,refusedto join
circle;in August 1947,Kashmir,a Muslim-majority
Pakistan. In October 1947 followingHindu-Muslimviolencein Poonch
Districtat the border,thousandsof well-armedPathan tribalsfromthe
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 999
NorthwestFrontierProvince(NWFP) decidedto "liberate"Kashmirby
force. To save his embattledprincelystate,the maharaja of Kashmir
signeda treatyof accessionwithIndia, and the NationalConference,
the
mostpopularpoliticalorganization
in Kashmir,supportedthatdecisionto
accede to India and resistedtheinvaders.India's armypushedtheinvaders back.
Four decades later,theequationsin Kashmirhave changeddrastically.
For the firsttime since 1947, an armed insurgencyhas eruptedin the
Kashmirvalley. To India's embarrassment,
Kashmirisare now fighting
India's securityforces,not Pakistan-backed
invaders. In a place known
foritsquietist,syncretistic
has acIslam,militantIslamicfundamentalism
quired a foothold.A valleyso exquisiteas to be "almostabove human
desire,"as Nehrudescribedit,has oflate beenburning,itsbeautycharred
by a savage destructionof life and property.The fireof nationalism,
and religionhas consumedover 2,000 lives.
ethnicity,
This articledeals withtwo setsof issuesabout Kashmir. First,whydo
India and Pakistanalwaysfightover Kashmir? What do theywantand
thattheKashmiris,bothHindusand Muslims,
whycan't theyunderstand
are grievouslysuffering?
of
Secondly,what explainsthe transformation
battlein Kashmir-from1947 (and again in 1965) whentheIndian army
and KashmirisjointlyfoughtPakistan-to now whenKashmirisfightthe
Indian armedforces?
The Argument:
Antinomies
of Nationalism
At its core,the Kashmirproblemis a resultof threeforces:religiousnationalismrepresented
by Pakistan,secularnationalismepitomizedby India, and ethnicnationalismembodiedin what Kashmiriscall Kashmiriat
(being a Kashmiri). Each side accuses the otherof duplicity;however,
internal inconsistencies,contradictions,and paradoxes mark all three.
Religiousnationalism. Pakistanwas bornwiththeargumentthatHindus
and Muslimswerenot onlytwo different
but also
religiouscommunities
two separatenations. Kashmir,beinga Muslimmajoritystate,Pakistan
believed,shouldhave come to it at the timeof partition.Two paradoxes
have createdproblemsforPakistan. First,itsfounder,M. A. Jinnah,had
arguedthattherulersoftheprincelystates,notthemassesruledby them,
would decide whichof the two new nation-states
theywouldjoin. However,neitherthemaharajaof Kashmirnor theNationalConference(that
the maharaja'srule),optedforPakistan.
amongotherthingswas fighting
Many KashmirisfoughtPakistanvigorously.SheikhAbdullah and the
NationalConference
rejectedthetwo-nation
theoryunequivocally:"I and
1000
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
myorganizationneverbelievedin the formulathatMuslimsand Hindus
formseparatenations.We did notbelievein thetwo-nation
theory,notin
communalism or communalism itself ...
We believed that religion had
no place in politics."1
Secondly,65 millionMuslimsjoined thetwowingsofPakistanin 1947,
but 35 millionwere leftbehindin India. This numberhas grownto be
almost100 millionbynow,whereasthenumberofMuslimsin thestateof
Jammuand Kashmir is a mere 4 million. If Pakistantriesto liberate
Kashmir,or ifKashmirbreaksaway withits help,Pakistanrunstherisk
of endangering
the welfareof 100 millionMuslimsin India. If political
and civilrightswerealwaysviewedas individualrights,a Muslimoutside
Kashmirshouldnotbe affected
by whatKashmiriMuslimsdo. Unfortunately,rightsare also viewedby the populace as groupentitlements,
not
onlyin India but also elsewhere.Willynilly,
because of the way Pakistan
was carvedout of India to represent
a Muslimhomeland,IndianMuslims
became implicatedin Pakistan'sactions. If popularperceptionsmatched
theliberalnotionofrights,thatwouldnotbe true. An inevitablenationalist cry,however,is: how manytimeswill India be partitioned
due to the
so-calledMuslimQuestion? Muslimsof pre-1947India alreadyhave two
homelands,Pakistanand Bangladesh. Would Kashmirbe a third?Ultiis not a rationalquestion. Reason
mately,the breakupof nation-states
collapses on the bedrockof emotions. Nation-statesget embodied;to
feelslike a limbtearingapart.
manypeople,theirbreakup,therefore,
Severalnon-KashmiriIndian Muslimsmade explicitargumentsabout
theimplications
ofPakistan'sactionsin Kashmir. In a memorandum
submittedto theUnitedNationsas farback as 1951, 14 distinguished
Indian
Muslimsargued:
Pakistanhas made our positionweakerby drivingout Hindus fromWestern
Pakistanin utterdisregardof the consequencesof such a policyto us and our
welfare.... Such a policymustinevitably,
as thepasthas alreadyshown,result
in the uprootingof Muslimsin thiscountry....
It is a strangecommentary
on politicalbeliefsthattheMuslimsofPakistanwho
would like theMuslimsof Kashmirtojoin theminvadedtheState,in October
1947.... In its oft-proclaimed
anxietyto rescuethe 3 millionMuslimsfrom
what it describesas the tyrannyof a handfulof Hindus in the (Jammuand
Kashmir) State,Pakistanevidentlyis preparedto sacrificethe interestsof 40
millionMuslimsin India-a strangeexhibitionof concernforthe welfareof
fellowMuslims. Our misguidedbrothersin Pakistando notrealizethatifMuslims in Pakistancan wage a war againstHindus in Kashmir,whyshould not
Hindus,sooneror later,retaliateagainstMuslimsin India? . ..
1. SheikhAbdullah's statementto the SecurityCouncil, officialrecords,3rd year,nos.
16-35, 241stmeeting,3rd item,pp. 16-27, February6, 1948.
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1001
Does Pakistanseriouslythinkthatit could give us any help if such an emergencyarose? It is incapableofprovidingroomand livelihoodto the40 million
MuslimsofIndia shouldtheymigrateto Pakistan.Yet, itspolicyand action...
may well produce[that]result.2
Althoughonlyanticipatedin 1951by theseMuslimintellectuals,
a Hindu
nationalistupsurgeis a politicalrealitytoday. Moreover,thosewho left
India forPakistanin 1947 are called muhajirs(refugees)in Pakistan. Arguingthat theyare discriminated
againstin the countrytheyliberated,
theyhave organizedas a separatepartyin Pakistan. In a veryreal sense
thereis no place leftfor India's Muslims in Pakistan. Kashmir thus
threatensto make 100 millionMuslimspoliticallyand emotionally
homeless. It should not be surprisingthat Indian MuslimsoutsideKashmir
in Kashmiror thatImam Bukhari,a
have not supportedthe insurgency
prominentreligiousleader of Muslimsin India, has publiclystatedthat
Kashmiris an integralpartofIndia.3 For Pakistan,thus,Kashmircontinues to represent
the unfinished
businessof partition.Since East Pakistan
has alreadybrokenaway,gettingKashmirback cannotbut restorepride.
Pakistan supportsa plebiscitein Kashmir but not Kashmir's independence, even if Kashmiriswant it. The only alternativesofferedto the
Kashmirisare: eitherIndia or Pakistan.
Secular nationalism. Led by the CongressParty,India's nationalmovementneveracceptedthetwo-nation
theory.Hindusand Muslimshad separatereligionsbut theywerenot distinctnations. Muslimswereas much
citizensof India as the Hindus. The secularnationalismof the Congress
notonlyfacedan ideologicaladversaryin Muslimnationalismbut also an
intraparty
rivalin Hindu nationalism.Hindunationalists
did notobjectto
Muslimslivingin India butratherarguedthattheMuslimswouldhave to
demonstrate
theirloyaltyto India and also recognizethatIndia was primarilya Hindu civilization.The Hindu nationalistfactionwas powerful
but not powerfulenoughto subduethe secularideologyof the Congress.
It could not winthebattleforstateformation.Hindu nationalistsalways
to take controlof
lurkedin the background,waitingforthe opportunity
in Kashwas submitted
to Dr. FrankGraham,U.N. representative
2. This memorandum
mir,on August 14, 1951. The signatoriesincludedDr. Zakir Husain (thenvice chancellor,
AligarhUniversity;
laterpresidentof India); Sir SultanAhmed(formermemberoftheGovernorGeneral'sExecutiveCouncil); Sir M. A. S. Khan (formeractinggovernorof United
Provincesand primeministerof the princelystateof Hyderabad);Sir MohammedUsman
Sir Iqbal Ahmed(formerchiefjustice,AllahabadHigh
(vice chancellor,Madras University);
Court),and nineotherrespectedand highlyplaced Muslims.
3. "PreacherPolitician,"India Today,July31, 1990. The onlyMuslimpoliticalleaderof
some standingto have disagreedwiththispositionis Syed Shahabuddin.Cf. MuslimIndia,
June1990.
1002
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
Kashmirto
the Indian state. The voluntarydecisionof Muslim-majority
join India bolsteredthe secularargument.Once partof India, however,
threatens
to emKashmir'sdecisionto breakaway,iftakenor successful,
forit legitimates
itsmainargument
thatMuslims
powerHindunationalism
are essentiallydisloyalto the country.The inevitablecry again is how
manytimeswould India be dividedbecause of the MuslimQuestion?
Thus, thebattlebetweensecularand Hindu nationalismafterindependencecame to be embodiedin Kashmir,whichled to a seriouscontradictionin thepositiontakenby Nehruand his followers.Nehruarguedthat
in orderto maintainsecularismin India and keep Hindu nationalismat
bay, Kashmirmuststayin India-if necessary,by force:
as symbolic
forus,as ithasfarWehavealwaysregarded
theKashmir
problem
in India. Kashmiris symbolic
as it illustrates
thatwe
reaching
consequences
area secularstate.... Kashmirhasconsequences
bothin IndiaandPakistan
on thebasisofthetwo-nation
becauseifwedisposedofKashmir
theory,
obviouslymillionsof peoplein India and millionsin East Pakistanwill be
affected.
powerfully
Manyof thewoundsthathad healedmightopenout
again.4
Nehruhad in mindthe woundsof partition,
accompaniedas it was by a
fromeiquarter-to a half-million
deathsand over 15 millionmigrations
therside of theborder.
Nehru'sfears,however,werenot imaginary.In 1952,Hindu nationalistsled a popularmovementin JammuagainstKashmir'svacillationson
full integrationwith India, and the wounds were reopenedin the late
1980s. Nurturedby a widespreadfeelingamongtheHindu middleclasses
thatIndia's secularstatehas gonetoo farin appeasingminorities
(Sikhsin
Punjaband Muslimsin Kashmirand Muslimsin general),Hindunationalism has gained remarkablestrengthin recentyears. The attackon the
mosquein Ayodhyain October1990 and theriseof theBharatiyaJanata
Partyare examplesofa deepeningpoliticaltrend,includingthemostwidespreadHindu-Muslimriotingsince 1947. Kashmirinationalismmay not
entirelyaccountforthe riseof Hindu nationalismbut,because of its hisfor
contributes
to it and makesit difficult
toryand context,substantially
fromthe
theIndianstateto deal withit generously.If Kashmirwithdraws
Indian unionand a secondpartitionof India takesplace, themainbeneficiarieswill be Hindu nationalists.
India's secularnationalMoreover,and thisis thesecondcontradiction,
ism functions
in a liberaldemocraticframework.Commitment
to liberal
principleswas the reason Nehru offereda plebisciteto Kashmirisas a
a provisionalaccession. But nationalismsoon demethodof confirming
Debates,3:34, p. 3,995.
4. Speech to Lok Sabha, September17, 1953,Parliamentary
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY
1003
finedthelimitsofliberalism.If liberalismmeansfreedomto organizeand
speak,does it also meanfreedomto secede? Essentially,
liberalismhas no
way of resolvingthisproblem.If it does notlet peoplesecedeevenwhere
thereis a demandforsecession,it meanspeople in the disputedarea are
notfreeto choosetheirrulers.If it concedesfreedomto secede,itbecomes
a loftybut bloodlessprincipleforpeople outsidethe area of secession.
Human beingsare not simplydisembodiedindividualsbut also peopleattachedto soil,a history,
and a nationalpride. Whatgood is liberalismifit
cannoteven protectthe nationalboundariesand integrity
because of the
freedomsit offers?There is no escape fromthisquestion. A liberaldemocracyfunctions
wellwhena nationhas alreadybeenconstructed;
Kashmirexemplifies
the helplessnessof liberalismagainstnationalism.
KeepingKashmirin India, thus,mayhave led to a tragedy,but letting
Kashmirgo, however,meansa tragedyof greatermagnitude-a possible
Hindu-Muslimbloodbathand an invigoratedattackon secularism.The
prospectof ensuingnationwideviolencefrightens
India's secular politicians and intellectuals.Not onlyis Kashmira prisonerof thelargercontext;eventhosewantingcommunalpeace in India havebecomea prisoner
of Kashmir. A dreadfulbut real symbiosisis in operationhere.
Ethnicnationalism. A complexof emotionshas markedKashmir'srelationswithIndia and Pakistan,and it is clearlydominatedtodaybya desire
forindependence.Kashmirinationalism,5
however,has runintotwo objectionsabout its consistency.First,ifsome of Kashmir'sleadersdid not
choose Pakistandespitereligiousaffinity
but optedto staywithIndia on
groundsof secularism,shouldit notalso meanthatKashmirinationalism
is a subsetof Indian nationalismand, therefore,
Kashmir,withstate-level
autonomy,is partoftheIndianfederation?Whatjustification
mightthere
be foran independent
Kashmirexceptbad faithand opportunism-Kashmir,afterall, was saved fromPakistan'soccupationby India's armyin
1947-48 and 1965? On theotherhand,and thisis thesecondproblem,if
the argumentis that Kashmirinationalismis incompatiblewith Indian
thenhowcan twootherethnically
nationalism,
different
partsoftheKashmirstatego withKashmir? Whatis generallycalled Kashmirhappensto
be thestateJammuand Kashmir. J&K has threeethnically
separablegeographicalregions-a Dogra Hindu-majority
Jammu,a Muslim-majority
5. For wantofa morepreciseterm,"Kashmirinationalism"is beingused hereto analyze
thefeelingsand politicsof Muslimsin the valley. Muslimsin Jammuand "Azad Kashmir"
are also called Kashmiris,but my argumentsapply to valleyMuslims,wherethe Indo-Pak
battlehas beenthemostintense.Kashmiriathas,on thewhole,beenbothethnicand secular.
it is theethnic
However,sinceit has triedto separateitselffromIndia's secularnationalism,
mark.
aspect ofKashmiriatthathas becomeits distinctive
1004
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
Kashmir,and a TibetanBuddhist-majority
Ladakh. If Kashmirinationalismis notbasedon religionbuton Kashmiriat,
a separateKashmiriethnicity,thenit has to be realizedthatethnicallythe Buddhistsin Ladakh are
Tibetans,the Hindus of Jammuare Dogras, and the Muslimsof Jammu
are Punjabis. Moreover,Jammuis only a shade smallerthan Kashmir,
both nearlyconstituting
two halvesof the J&K state(Ladakh is tiny,in
populationterms,at least). An ethnicnotionofindependent
Kashmircannotcarrytheentirestatewithoutbeinginternally
inconsistent,
particularly
ifnon-Kashmiri
groupsdo not wishto join such a state.
From 1947 untilhis deathin 1982,SheikhAbdullah,themostnotable
of Kashmir'sleaders,embodiedin his persontheironiesof Kashmir. He
fluctuatedbetweenaccession to India and independence.As already
noted,he explicitly
rejectedthetwo-nation
theory.Even moreimportant,
Abdullah recognizedthe linkbetweenKashmir'saccessionto India and
India's secularism:
in India,whichmayin the
havebeenasserting
themselves
Certaintendencies
theinterests
future
convert
itintoa religious
statewherein
ofMuslimswillbe
had a dominant
jeopardised.Thiswouldhappenifa communal
organisation
andCongress
ofallcommunities
handintheGovernment,
idealsoftheequality
Thecontinued
intolerance.
accession
weremadeto givewayto religious
of
thistendency.
Frommy
KashmirtoIndia should,however,
helpin defeating
itis myconsidered
ofthelastfouryears,
thatthepresence
experience
judgment
in theUnionofIndiahasbeenthemajorfactor
in stabilising
ofKashmir
relationsbetween
theHindusandMuslimsofIndia.6
Havingseenthislink,however,Abdullahlaterdithered.He asked,should
Hindu nationaliststriumphin the strugglefor power in Delhi, would
Kashmirbe securein India? "Many Kashmirisare apprehensiveas to
what will happen to themand theirpositionif,forinstance,something
happensto . . . Nehru. . . . If thereis a resurgenceof communalismin
India,how are we to convincetheMuslimsofKashmirthatIndia does not
intendto swallowup Kashmir?"7
It is hard to see whyAbdullahand secularistsin Delhi wereso afraid
of Hindu nationalism,because it is clear in retrospectthat,if anything,
violenceof 1947and theassassinaHindu nationalism,
afterthefratricidal
tionof Gandhiin 1948,declinedin the 1950s. It is onlyin the 1980sthat
has risento politicalvisibility
and strength.An ex-post
Hindu nationalism
perspectiveis, however,misleading,amountingto readinghistorybackin politicsin the 1940sand saw thecommuward. Those whoparticipated
nal madness accompanyingIndia's partitioncould not fullydistance
Assembly,November5, 1951.
6. Openingaddressto theJammuand KashmirConstituent
the Timesof India, April 12, 1952.
7. Speech in Ranbirsinghpura,
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY
1005
the
themselves
fromtheirpoliticalsocialization.If we wishto reconstruct
universeof how leaders behaved, an ex-anteperspectivewould make
greatersensein whichcase thefactthatHindu nationalismdeclinedin the
1950s is less importantthan the factthatpoliticalleaderswere afraidit
secularistslikeNehruin
wouldrearup again. To fightHindunationalism,
support.In theend,a cripplingparaDelhi neededAbdullah'sunqualified
dox emerged.Abdullahwas not sure of the longevityof secularism;his
longevity
to secuunequivocalfaithwas, however,requiredforimparting
larism. Kashmirhas stillnotemergedfromthedarkshadowofthisparadox.
Uncertainty
aboutthefutureofsecularismis nottheonlywayto explain
Abdullah'svacillations.It has oftenbeen arguedthatAbdullahwas aimingat independencewiththehelp of theBritishand Americans.Secularists oftendismissedthis propositionas a fantasyof the paranoidHindu
mind, but some declassifieddocumentsof the State Departmentgive
credenceto the Hindu nationalistclaim. Loy Henderson,U.S. ambassador in Delhi, wroteto the U.S. Secretaryof Stateon September29, 1950:
Whilein Kashmir,I had twosecretdiscussionswithSheikhAbdullah. . . at his
thatin his opinion[Kashmir]should
request.... He was vigorousin restating
be independent;
majoritypopulationdesiredthisindepenthatan overwhelming
dence;and thathe had reasonto believethatsome Azad Kashmirleaders. . .
wouldbe willingto cooperate.... Kashmiripeoplecould notunderstandwhy
the UN consistently
ignoredindependenceas one of the possiblesolutionsfor
Kashmir....
WhenI asked Abdullahifhe thoughtKashmircould remaina stableindependentcountrywithout[the]friendly
support[of]India and Pakistan,he replied
negative.In his opinionKashmircould existonlyin case boththesecountries
had friendly
relationswitheach other;and in [the]case [ifthe] U.S. through
or othereconomicassistance....
[the]UN ... wouldenableit,by investments
he
Therewereso manyareas of India in urgentneed of economicdevelopment
it
was convincedKashmirwould get relativelylittleattention.Nevertheless,
forKashmirto go to India thanto Pakistan. It would be
would be preferable
with[a]
disastrousforKashmiristo be broughtundercontrolof [a] government
medievalKoranic outlook.8
Abdullah'sdisapprovalof Pakistanis, thus,consistent.But how does
one interprethis equivocationbetweenindependenceand integration?
to Delhi and
PossiblyAbdullahwas speakingthe languageof integration
thekindofduplicitythat,accordto Washington-precisely
independence
was mindlesslyignoredivyNehru. These texts
ing to Hindu nationalists,
should,however,be readwithcare. Did Abdullahditheron a fullintegraD.C.: Departmentof State,
8. ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,vol. 5 (Washington,
1978), pp. 1,433-1,435.
1006
TABLE 1
ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
PopulationofJammuand KashmirState,1981*
% ofState
Population
% Muslims
% Hindus
Kashmirvalley
3,134,904
94.96
4.59
0.05
Jammu
(52.36%)
2,718,113
29.60
66.25
4.15
46.04
2.66
51.30**
64.19
32.24
3.57
Ladakh
Total State
(45.39%)
134,372
(2.24%)
5,987,389
(100%)
% Other
of India.
SOURCE: Census 1981,Government
in onlyone significant
respect.The numberof
NOTE: Percentagesfor1951 weredifferent
Muslimsin Ladakh was muchlowerin the late 1940s.
* 1991 censusfigureare not yetavailable.
** Buddhist.
tion because he was unsureof Indian secularismor because of his hope
thatthe Americanswould supportindependenceat some laterdate,and
had to positionhimself?
forthe moment,he, therefore,
characterof
TheJammufactorand Kashmirinationalism. The tripartite
even moresharply.
J&K (see Table 1) exposedAbdullah'scontradictions
Of thethreeparts,Jammuwas theregionin question.Jammuhad nearly
45% of the state population,but in contrastto Kashmir valley,where
of the
Muslimswere95%, the Hindus in Jammuwerenearlytwo-thirds
roughlytheotherthird.Abdulb
populationwiththeMuslimsconstituting
lah had a solid popularbase in the valleybut not in Jammu.The Dogra
fromKashmiriHindus in the
Hindus in Jammuare ethnicallydifferent
valley,and themaharajacame froma Dogra family.Similarly,the Musfromthe valleyMuslimswho,like
limsin Jammuare ethnicallydifferent
the Hindus in Jammu,are more Punjabi than Kashmiri. Abdullah was
not popularamongtheJammuMuslimseither.AnotherpoliticalorganiJammuMuslims. Most leadrepresented
zation,theMuslimConference,
ers of this organizationhad migratedto the Pakistaniside of Kashmir
afterthe partition.
upon
When SheikhAbdullahbecamethehead of theJ&K government
the departureof the maharaja,powershiftedfromJammuto the valley.
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY
1007
Thus emergedthe Jammufactorin Kashmirpolitics,a factornot fully
recognized,especiallyin international
circles,butone thatcomplicatedthe
issues in Kashmirimmeasurably.Jammu'spoliticalleadershad an unequivocalstandon therelationship
withIndia: theywantedfulland unconditionalintegration.On a basic issue, then,the two major areas of the
stateranintoa conflict.Abdullahcould nothaveJammuand subjectit to
Kashmirihegemony
whilemakingan argument
aboutDelhi notappreciating Kashmiriaspirations.This contradiction
remainsunresolvedin 1991.
HistoricalEvolutionof the
KashmirProblem
1947-53
Phase 1: FatefulOriginsin Ambiguity,
The earliestdevelopments
are wellknownand can be briefly
narratedhere.
At thetimeofpartition,
Jammuand Kashmirwas a princelystate. When
theBritishdecidedto leavein 1947,theprincelystateswereadvisedbythe
Britishto opt fora mergerwithIndia or Pakistan,althoughtheoretically
the optionof independencewas available. In decidingwhichcountryto
and
choose, two principleswere recommended:geographicalcontiguity
in thestate. All exceptthreeofthe
thereligionofthemajoritycommunity
princelystates-Hyderabad,Junagarh,
and J&K-decided tojoin India or
Pakistan. From the perspectiveof religion,thesethreehad a ruler-ruled
paradox. Hyderabadand Junagarhhad Muslimrulersbuta Hindumajority. Moreover,neitherwas contiguousto Pakistan. India settledtheiraccessionby a combinationof forceand diplomacy. J&K had a Muslim
majorityand a Hindu rulerbut threeadditionalfeatures.First,despiteits
areas mergedinto one
Muslim majority,J&K had threeverydifferent
state-Kashmir, Jammu,and Ladakh. Secondly,unlikeHyderabadand
led
itwas contiguousto Pakistan.Thirdly,a popularmovement
Junagarh,
by SheikhAbdullahhad developedagainsttheautocraticruleofthemaharaja. Because of its secular character,encompassingHindus, Muslims,
and Sikhs,Abdullah'smovementwas ardentlysupportedby Gandhi and
Nehru and, equally strongly,
opposed by the Muslim League underJinnah's leadership.Whenthemaharajadid notjoin eitherIndia or Pakistan,
Pathan tribesmen,
latersupportedby the Pakistaniarmy,invadedKashmir. To obtainthe help of India's armedforces,the maharajasigneda
treatyof accessionwithDelhi. When a cease-firewas called in January
of
1949,theinvaders,thoughbeatenback,werestillin controlofone-third
Jammuand Kashmir;thecease-fire
line,slightlyredefined
in 1973,holds
today.
as Article370, the treatyof
Incorporatedintothe Indian Constitution
and commuaccessionmade Delhi responsiblefordefense,foreignaffairs,
1008
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
nications;otherwise,J&K was autonomous. Moreover,Prime Minister
Nehruoffered
thatKashmir'saccessionto India wouldbe submittedto a
popularreferendum
later. The promiseof the plebiscite,however,would
soon beginto hauntIndia.
It is, in retrospect,
ironicalthat India took the lead in bringingthe
Kashmirissueto theU.N. on December31, 1947. Nehru'spurposewas to
in or
get theSecurityCouncil to censure"Pakistan'srole in participating
assistingthe invasion."9To beginwith,Pakistandeniedofficialinvolvement,arguingthat the tribalshad undertakenthe invasionthemselves.
Pakistanalso arguedthatIndia was carrying
out a genocideagainstJ&K's
Muslims,thatit had securedtheaccessionof Kashmirby fraud,and suggestedthat,sincea pro-Indiagovernment
existedin Kashmir,a plebiscite
in Kashmir should take place under U.N. supervision.10Representing
Kashmir,Abdullahcalled Pakistanan aggressorin the SecurityCouncil.
India gottheJ&K government's
supportbutnotthatofBritainand the
UnitedStates. A U.N. CommissionforIndia and Pakistan(UNCIP) was
appointedto carryout the U.N. mandatein Kashmir. The commission
reportedon August 13, 1948,to theU.N. that"the presenceof troopsof
Pakistanin the territory
of Jammuand Kashmirconstitutesa material
changein thesituationsinceit was last represented
of
by theGovernment
PakistanbeforetheSecurityCouncil."11Beforea plebiscitecould be conducted,a two-partprioractionwas necessary,accordingto the UNCIP.
In thefirstpart,Pakistanshould"securethewithdrawalfromthestateof
Jammuand Kashmirof tribesmenand Pakistannationalsnot normally
residentthereinwho have enteredthestatesolelyforthepurposeof fighting." In thesecondpart,after"the tribesmen
and Pakistaninationals...
have withdrawn... [the]Governmentof India [will]beginto withdraw
thebulk of its forcesfromthatstatein stagesagreedupon withtheCommission." Once both withdrawalswerecompleted,a plebiscitewould be
held. The August 13, 1948,UNCIP resolutionremainedthe bedrockof
the UN's positionon Kashmir for the next threedecades. However,
neitherIndia norPakistanwithdrew
theirforces,India claimingthatPakistanhad to pullback firstand Pakistancontending
thattherewas no guarantee India would withdrawits forces.
Meanwhile,by 1951-52, the tripartitecharacterof the Jammuand
Kashmirstatemade thesituationwithinit explosive.In November1951,
9. SecurityCouncil documents,S/628, Indian complaint,January2, 1948.
10. Sir ZafarullahKhan's replyon behalfof Pakistan,U.N. documents,S/PV 228-29,
January16-17, 1948,pp. 36-96.
11. UNCIP resolutions,
S/1430,December1949 (textsof theAugust13, 1948,and January 5, 1949,resolutions).The January5 resolutionmaintaineda similarpositionregarding
Pakistantroops. The citationsbelow come fromthe text.
ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY
1009
J&K's Constituent
Assemblywas electedbut eithertheelectionpapersof
politiciansopposed to the National Conferencewere foundtechnically
faultyor theoppositionpartiesboycottedtheelection.The purposeofthe
ConstituentAssemblywas interalia, to debate and politicallysettlethe
questionof accessionto India, ratifythe land reformprogram(Abdullah
had announceda radicalone thatwoulddispossessthelandlordswithout
forthe governanceof the state.
compensation),and devisea constitution
To Abdullah'slack of a politicalbase in Jammu,threespecificsourcesof
cabinet
discontentwere added between1950-52. First,his five-member
Assemhad onlyone representative
fromJammu,whilein theConstituent
bly,Jammuhad only29 out of75 seatsand thevalleyhad 44. Second,the
land reform
program,evenifintendedbyAbdullahto be entirely
socioeconomic,was viewedin communalterms.The reasonsimplywas thatmost
landlordsin KashmirwereHindusand mostpeasantsMuslim. Third,suspicions about Abdullah's intentionswere deepenedby the emergingreports that in his dealingswith the Westernpowers,he had expressed
preference
forJammuand Kashmiras a sovereignindependent
state,not
as a statefullyacceded to India.12
By themiddleof 1952,a popularmovementemergedin Jammuagainst
Abdullahled bythePraja Parishad,a Hindu regionalparty,andjoinedby
the Jan Sangh, the Hindu nationalistpartyin Delhi. S. P. Mookerjee,
presidentof the Jan Sangh, took a personalinterestin the movement.
AfraidthatJammuwouldforcibly
come underKashmiridomination,the
of theenHindu nationalistsarguedfora fulland irrevocableintegration
tire state with India. They questionedSheikh Abdullah's motivesby
in his logic: if SheikhAbdullah hated the
pointingto "inconsistencies"
two-nation
theoryand his principleswerethesame as thoseof Indianpolity,thenwherewas the groundfornot acceptinga fullaccession? Where
was theneedfora stateconstitution
as distinctfroma nationalone? Why
should Abdullah retainthe title of primeministerfromthe royal dynasty-if he had foughttheprincelysystemand alreadyunseatedthemaharaja, otherheads of stategovernments
all over India werecalled chief
and withthe titleprimeministerreservedonlyforthe head of
ministers,
in Delhi? Whatwas therationaleforcontinuing
thenationalgovernment
to have a separatestateflag(as in theprincelytimes)insteadofa national
flag,whichall otherIndian stateshad? Why should Article370, giving
the statea special status,existeven thoughotherprincelystateshad acceded fullywithoutany specialprovisions?Indeed,wasn'tAbdullah'sarto sayingthattherewerethree
gumentaboutlimitedaccessiontantamount
12. Cf. Karan Singh,Autobiography,
1931-1967 (New Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress,
1989), p. 121.
1010
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
nationsin India-Hindus, Muslims,and Kashmiris?Mobilizationforthe
viewwas conductedthroughthehighlysymbolicand emotionalslogan: ek
one flag,and one
Pradhan,ek Nishan,and ek Vidhan(one primeminister,
constitution).
Soon thereafter,
mattersslippedbeyondthecontrolof bothNehruand
Abdullah. DissentagainstAbdullahin his partyand cabinetwas brewing.
His positionon India was eventuallydisownedby threeof the fourother
withIndia,which
membersof his cabinetwho wanteda fullerintegration
essentiallymeantsupportforthe Parishad'sstandtoo. Abdullahrefused
to resignand the orderwentout forhis arrest. Abdullah remainedin
twistoffate;
prisonwithfewexceptionsuntil1968.13It was a remarkable
in a matterof six years,Nehru'slongtimefriendand Delhi's trustedlieutenantin Kashmir,a Muslimwho had attackedtheveryfoundingprinciples of Pakistanin the UnitedNationsand supportedIndia's secularism,
could not have been
languishedin Indian jails. Delhi's embarrassment
deeper.
Phase 2: ImprisonedEthnicNationalism,
EmasculatedReligiousNationalism,and the
Triumphof Secular Nationalism,1953-83
SheikhAbdullah'sarrestremovedthe mostpowerfulexponentof Kashmirinationalismfromthepoliticalscene. His supporters
formeda Plebiscite Front but it could not pose a serious challengeto Abdullah's
successor,Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed. Even thoughhe was a leading
Bakshiwas an advocateofa complete
memberoftheNationalConference,
at
union withIndia. Delhi and Srinagarresumeda normalrelationship
the governmental
level,and to sootheany possiblesense of injuryin the
of India startedpouringin developmentalfunds
valley,the government
thatwould build roads,hospitals,schools,and bringin electricity.Over
beganto freeze
time,a combination
of internaland externaldevelopments
theexistingdivisionof Kashmir. The thirdofJ&K underPakistan'scontrol at the timeof cease-fire,
was broughtincreasingly
underPakistan's
political control,whereas the Indian side of Kashmir went througha simi-
lar logic underIndian tutelage.
into the Cold War was
Externally,the insertionof the subcontinent
it made the UNCIP resolutionirrelevant.In
mostsignificant.In effect,
1954-55 on groundsthat Pakistan was on the peripheryof the Soviet
a securityallianceto Pakistan.
Union in theMiddle East, theU.S. offered
Pakistanacceptedthedeal, despiteIndia's proteststhatthearmssupplied
13. In a politicalcareerlastingover50 years,Abdullahwas jailed ninetimes,six timesby
the maharajaof Kashmirbeforethe partitionof India and threetimesafterthat.
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1011
by the U.S. would be used againstIndia, not the SovietUnion. Rather
thanpullingout troopsfromKashmir,NehruarguedthatPakistanwould
actuallybolsteritsarmedforcesin Kashmir. The SovietUnionseizedthe
opportunity.AbstainingfromtheearlierKashmirdebatesin theSecurity
Council,it begansupporting
India's standin theU.N. and,as a permanent
memberof theSecurityCouncil,could vetoany resolutionpassed against
India. On theotherhand,Pakistan,who was receivingU.S. support,also
did nothave to pull out of Kashmir. The SecurityCouncilbecameirrelevantto a peacefulresolutionoftheKashmirproblem.A plebiscitedid not
take place because its priorconditionscould not,and would not,be met.
Internally,
theJ&K Constituent
Assemblyapproveda mergerwithIndia in early1956. On March 29, Nehruwithdrewtheofferof a plebiscite
on the threegroundsthat (1) fora plebisciteto take place underU.N.
terms,Pakistanhad firstto withdrawits forcesfromJ&K; (2) Kashmir's
Constituent
Assemblyhad approvedthe mergerwithIndia and accepted
India's constitution;
and (3) the insertionof the subcontinent
into Cold
War securityallianceshad changedtheobjectivesituationdrastically,
for
it reflected
Pakistan'sdesireto seekmilitary
solutions,something
intolerable and a signofbad faith,accordingto Nehru.14 The secondpointrepresenteda changein his position.To showhis liberalcredentials,
Nehruin
theearly1950shad rejectedAbdullah'sproposalthattheConstituent
Assemblyshouldbe takenas representing
popularwishes,and itsdecisionon
therelationship
substitute.ForwithIndia shouldbe deemeda legitimate
tifiedby Sovietsupportin the SecurityCouncil and provideda reasonby
Pakistan'ssecurityalliancewiththe U.S., Nehru'snationalismedged out
his liberalism.
Nehru'sthirdpointabout Pakistan'smilitaryintentions
towardKashmirturnedout to be prophetic.Persuadedby the Britishand Americans
to resumenegotiations
withPakistanon Kashmir,he did briefly
trydiplomaticsolutionsbeforehis deathin 1964. He securedthereleaseofAbdullah fromjail, and askedhimto go to Pakistanto talkto PresidentAyub.15
14. Nehru'sspeechin theLowerHouse ofParliament,
March29, 1956,also publishedas a
pamphlet,"KashmirMein LokmatNahin" (No plebiscitein Kashmir)(Srinagar:Lala Rukh
Publications,undated). In a resolutionpassed on December2, 1957, the SecurityCouncil
commentedthattheKashmirConstituent
Assemblycould notoverruletheU.N. resolution.
15. In thelasttwoto threeyearsofhis life,Nehruexperimented
withtheidea ofa confederationas a solutionto the Kashmirproblem,whichwould eventuallylead the way to an
Indo-Pakistanconfederation.For details,see S. Gopal, Nehru,vol. 3 (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 1980), pp. 261-64, and Y. D. Gundevia,Outsidethe Archives,pp. 311-39.
Abdullahconveyedthisidea to PresidentAyub,who "vehemently
denounced"theproposal,
forit "would encouragethe forcesof disintegration,
not only in Pakistanbut more so in
India" (in Y. D. Gundevia,SheikhAbdullah'sTestament[Dehra Dun and Delhi: Palit and
Palit, 1974],p. 82).
1012
ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 11,NOVEMBER1991
By then,however,too much acrimonyand distrustsurroundedSheikh
Abdullah. Moreover,India had just been mauledand humiliatedon the
battlefield
by China. ThinkingIndia was weakerthaneverbefore,Pakistanwas in no mood to compromise.In theevent,no breakthroughs
were
made. In 1965 Abdullahwas arrestedon suspicionof anti-Indiaactivities
and, upon Pakistan'sconfident
movesin Kashmirin thatautumn,a second Indo-Pakwar brokeout.
thewar was an inconclusivedraw,butpolitically,
Strategically,
it was a
gravemiscalculation
on Pakistan'spart. Afternearly15 yearswhenIndia
had been on the defensivein the internationalforums,the situation
changed. Apparently,Pakistan's calculationwas that, with Pakistan's
support,Kashmiriswould risein revoltagainstIndia, somethingthatIndia's armed forces,batteredin the war againstChina only threeyears
back, would not be able to quell. For this reason,severalhundred-by
some calculations,nearly7,00016-armymen and paramilitary
personnel
in civilianguise were sent into the valleyto generatean uprising.The
uprisingdid notcome about,buta war,nonetheless,
tookplace as mostof
in the valleywere turnedin by the Kashmiris.
Pakistan's"infiltrators"
Pakistancontendedthatthe people capturedby India werenot Pakistani
"infiltrators"
butKashmirifreedomfighters
openlyin revoltagainstIndia.
IndependentWesternobserverscould getno evidenceofit. Once again,it
seemed clear that whateverthe state of theirrelationshipwith India,
Kashmirisdid not wishto embracePakistan.
A Kashmiriuprisingalong withan Indo-Pakwar would,indeed,have
put India's armedforces,onlymarginally
afterthebattering
stronger
sufferedat theChinesehands,to a severetest. Speakingpurelystrategically,
ifthe 1989 Kashmiriuprisinghad takenplace in 1965,Pakistan'smilitary
chancesin Kashmirwould have been strong.India's armedforcescould
deal with Pakistan's militaryin 1965 but would have been terribly
stretchedif bothan invasionand an uprisinghad takenplace simultaneously. Anotherwar eruptedsix yearslaterin 1971. While the bone of
contentionthen was East Pakistan,not Kashmir,it had seriousconsequencesforthe latter.Pakistanwas bifurcated,East Pakistanisclaiming
that theywere Bengali Muslims and not simplyMuslims,decimating,
thetwo-nation
thereby,
of religionoverethnictheorybased on a priority
ity. Moreover,the war was a severeblow to Pakistan'sarmed forces.
Both ideologicallyand militarily,
it was a catastropheforPakistan.
16. For an accountof Pakistan'splan froma Pakistanigeneralinvolvedin the war, see
MohammedMusa, My Version(Lahore: WajidalisLtd., 1983). GeneralMusa had not recommendedinfiltration
in Kashmir,code namedOperationGibraltar.His objectionswere,
however,overruledby Z. A. Bhutto,thenforeignminister,
Aziz Ahmed,defensesecretary,
and ultimately
by PresidentAyub.
ASHUTOSHVARSHNEY 1013
The war was an awfulmomentfor Kashmirinationalistsalso. They
mighthave opposed Pakistan,but since theyhad a troubledrelationship
withIndia-often seekinga divorcefromwhat theyviewedas a forced
marriage-theyended up gettingan ally in Pakistan. For Pakistan,the
best-casescenariowas Kashmir'saccession. Kashmir'srupturefromIndia, whateverit meantforPakistan,was second best but betterthanthe
worse-casescenarioof Kashmir'sintegration
withIndia. The 1971defeat
of PakistanweakenedKashmirinationalists;a plea fordivorcehad to be
turnedintoa compromise.SheikhAbdullahfinallymade his peace with
India: "our disputewiththe Governmentof India," he told the Times
(London) in an interview,
"is notaboutaccessionbutit is aboutthequan17 This was thefirst
tumofautonomy."
publicadmissionofa changein his
position,somethingthe Indian government
was willingto deal withas it
could be easilyaccommodatedin a federalframework.
On its part,Delhi proceededat two levels,externaland internal.After
its defeat,Pakistancame to a peace agreementwithIndia. For India, it
was also an opportunity
to extractconcessionsconcerningKashmir. In
the event,on July2, 1972, an agreementsignedby Indira Gandhi and
ZulfiqarAli Bhutto,knownas the Simla Accord,proposed: "In Jammu
and Kashmir,thelineofcontrolresulting
fromthecease-fire
ofDecember
17, 1971,shall be respectedby bothsides withoutprejudiceto the recognizedpositionofeitherside. Neitherside shallseekto alterit unilaterally,
irrespective
ofmutualdifferences
and legalinterpretations.
Bothsidesfurtherundertaketo refrainfromthethreator theuse offorcein violationof
thisline."18
Internally,Delhi reopenednegotiationswith Sheikh Abdullah who
signedan agreement
withDelhi in February1975,acceptingthatKashmir
was "a constituent
unitof theUnion of India" and that"no law made by
the Legislatureof the Stateof Jammuand Kashmir,seekingto makeany
oftheStateofJammuand Kashmir... shall
changein ... theconstitution
take effectunless the Bill .
.
. receives [the presidentof India's] assent."19
Moreover,India's Parliamentwould "continueto have power to make
laws relatingto the prevention
of activitiesdirectedtowardsdisclaiming,
or disrupting
thesovereignty
... ofIndia ... or causinginsult
questioning,
to theIndianNationalFlag, theIndianNationalAnthem,and theConstitution." In return,Article370 was keptalive, whichgave,as originally
intendedin 1950,moreautonomyto J&K thanto anyotherstatein India
17. Interviewgivento correspondent
PeterHezelhurst,the Times,March 10, 1972.
18. From the textof the Simla Accord releasedby bothgovernments
on July2, 1975.
19. From the textof the KashmirAccord,signedin November13, 1974,and announced
in Parliamenton February25, 1975. The othercitationsin thisparagraphare also fromthis
text.
1014
ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. II, NOVEMBER1991
on "welfaremeasures,culturalmatters,social security,
personallaw, and
procedurallaws in a mannersuitedto thespecialconditionsof thestate."
Also, the Congresschiefminister,
Syed Mir Qasim, was asked to resign,
and SheikhAbdullahsucceededhim. Abdullah'scompromise
did notlead
a partythat
to any significant
protestin the valley. The Jamaat-i-Islami,
has always arguedforKashmir'sintegration
withPakistanon religious
grounds,organizeda small demonstration
thatdid not go veryfar.
Abdullah's leadershipwas later electorallylegitimated.Electionsin
1977 demonstrated
overwhelming
supportforhim. It is widelybelieved
that the 1977 electionswere the firstfairones in the state,as the three
earlierelectionshad been riggedby the rulingcoalition. Abdullahruled
till he died in 1982. Kashmir became quiet-and beautifulas ever; it
seemedas thoughthe problemhad been solved. From the perspective
of
Delhi, it was a goldenphase,boththerulersin Kashmirand thepopulace
seemedcontentas ifa marriagehad beenmade.20Ironically,nothingsymbolized thisbetterthan the Sheikh'sfuneralprocession.The dead body
drapedin an Indian flagwas carried12 km fromthepolo groundsin Srinagarto theburialgroundnear the Hazratbalmosque. Observersof the
ka kya irshad? Hindu,
funeralheard a familiarchant: "Sher-e-Kashmir
Muslim,Sikh Ittehad" (What was the messageof the lion of Kashmir?
FriendshipbetweenHindu,Muslim,and Sikhs"). This had been the slogan of the late 1940s, when the Sheikh'spartymen and Indian forces
of Pakistan,"noteda keen
foughtthe tribalinvaders. "The Government
observerof Kashmir,"had no commentto offeron the death of Sheikh
Abdullah."21
Phase 3: AbusiveSecular Nationalism,Islamic
Resurgence,and a RekindlingofKashmiri
Nationalism,1983-91
SheikhAbdullahwas succeededbyhis son,Farooq Abdullah. A yearlater
in 1983,Farooq won thestateelectionand emergedas a leaderin his own
right. The National Conferenceunderhis leadershipwon handsomely,
beatingtheCongressPartyin thestate. IndiraGandhiherselfcampaigned
fortheCongressagainsttheNationalConference.ExpressinghersympathywiththeHindusof Jammuwho,accordingto her,livedin a Muslimmajoritystate,she used blatantlycommunalmessagesin searchof votes,a
20. Speculativelyin retrospect,
Delhi misseda goldenopportunity
duringSheikh'srule.
Withhis supportbehindIndia at longlast,Delhi wouldhave,in all probability,
won a plebiscitein Kashmir,but it is easy to be wise afterthe event. No one foresawa returnof the
Kashmirproblem.
21. M. J. Akbar,The Siege Within,p. 275.
ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY
1015
trendthatwas to deepenlaterin Congress'selectoralpolitics. This was
centralizingpolitical
also the time of Indira Gandhi's well-documented
ruledby nondriveas she soughtto undermineseveralstategovernments
and Farooq beCongressparties. These partiesbegan to come together,
came partof theemerging"oppositionconclave." Faced withopposition
unity,Indira Gandhi used defectionsand her controlover gubernatorial
runbyopposition
appointments
to dislodgedulyelectedstategovernments
parties,and J&K was given a governorknown to be close to her,
acts was to dismissthe Farooq
Jagmohan.One of his firstgubernatorial
government
on thegroundthatit had lost majoritysupportin theassembly. GovernorJagmohandid not givethe chiefministera chanceto test
his majorityin theLower House, whichwas standardprocedure.Farooq
was simplygivena listof legislatorswho,accordingto thegovernor,had
defectedfromhis party.
In thisawkwarddisplayofpower,Delhi thusviolatedthefederalprinciimposedon Kashmir. Farooq received
ple and had a pliantchiefminister
considerablegrass-roots
supportbut thatwas not enoughto undo Delhi
and its allies in the state. Most observersagree that Farooq's dismissal
was the beginningof a new phase of alienationin the valley. Old fears
were revived. These fearscould have been channeledwithina federal
ifFarooq had continuedto fighton thatprinciplewiththesupframework
volteface and
portof otheroppositionparties. However,in a surprising
defyingthebasic logic of Kashmiripolitics,in 1986 afterIndiraGandhi's
death,Farooq ended up signinga deal withthe Congressunderwhich
Rajiv Gandhi'sCongressand Farooq's NationalConferenceundertookto
ifthey
contestthe 1987 stateelectionstogetherand formthe government
won. When a similarproposalhad been made by Congressforthe 1983
elections,Farooq had "discussedthe matterwithseniorcolleagues.. . .
[It] becameclear to us thatifwe agreedto an alliancewiththeCongress,
would ... graduallybe wipedout." These words
theNationalConference
would turnout to be prophetic;Farooq now admitsthatit was a horrible
mistake.22
In the electionsthatfollowedin 1987,Kashmiriatwas mobilizedby a
coalitionof Islamic groups,knownas the MuslimUnitedFront(MUF).
This development
was as unexpectedas Farooq's alliancewithCongress.
In KashmirtheorthodoxIslamicpartieshad beenelectorally
insignificant.
The Jamaat-i-Islami
had won a merefiveseatsin the 1972 stateelections,
only one in 1977 and none whatsoeverin 1983. Of these,the 1977 and
1983 electionsare widelyviewedas theonlytwofairelectionsin thestate.
AbsorbingseveralpracticesfromHinduismand Buddhism,KashmiriIs22. Farooq Abdullah,My Dismissal(Delhi: Vikas PublishingHouse, 1985), p. 21.
1016
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1991
and supportforan orthodoxIslamic
lam is well knownforitssyncretism,
politicalplatformgrew.
alliance
Watchingthesurgein MUF support,theConference-Congress
one can say that
riggedthe 1987 elections.Withthebenefitof hindsight,
supportfor the MUF, while considerableand surprisingin a land of
quietisticIslam, would not have been enough to oust Abdullah. Even
thoughhe was less popularthanbefore,Abdullah'ssupportbase was still
not wipedout. In thevalleywhereno partyexceptthe NationalConference had any hold, the emergenceof a partycapable of gettingeven a
pluralityof vote,let alone a majority,alarmedthe Conference-Congress
alliance. Not onlywas thevoterigged,reportsindicatethatseveralelectoral candidatesof theMUF werebeatenup. Those who weremanhandled
groups.
crossedtheever-porous
Indo-Pakborderand joined theextremist
twoyearslaterwouldcomefromsomeof
The leadershipoftheinsurgency
these contestants.Later that year, riots against Farooq's government
burnedthe Indian flag,and called
broke out; Muslim fundamentalists
Farooq a traitorto theKashmiricause. As peoplewerekilledin riots,the
intensified.Farooq and the Congressmanagedto
anti-Farooqsentiment
buttheyruledwithoutlegitimacy.The sanctityofthe
geta hugemajority,
electoralprocessand Kashmiritrustin Farooq, alreadydecliningafterthe
withCongress,collapsedaftertheseelections.In 1953,Abdulagreement
did not lead to an uprisingbecause Kashmirdid not
lah's imprisonment
have a substantialmiddleclass at thatpoint. But by 1989,a strongmiddle
and large,and provideda muchmorefertile
class had emerged,disaffected
groundforan uprising.
This was also the timeof Pakistan'smilitaryrevival. Ruled by a milithe Afghanistancrisisrestoreda frayedPakistantary-ledgovernment,
of Americanarms,PakiU.S. relationship.Once again the beneficiary
stan'smilitary
shookofftheeffects
ofits 1971debacle. More importantly,
PresidentZia, thenewleader,begana processof Islamizationin Pakistan.
As troublein Kashmirbrewed,Kashmirinationalismonce againfoundan
ally in Pakistan. By 1987, two kinds of Kashmirimilitantgroupshad
startedoperatingfromPakistan-Islamic groupslike the Hizbul Mujahideen and the more secular Jammuand Kashmir LiberationFront
wingof theJamaat-i-Islami,
(JKLF). The Hizbul Mujahideen,a fighting
want Kashmirto join Pakistanon groundsof religionwhile the JKLF
Kashmiron groundsof ethnicity.
wantsan independent
It is widelybelievedthatIslamic groupshave receivedgreatersupport
acceptsthatit providespolitical
fromPakistan. The Pakistangovernment
ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY
1017
supportto the militantsbut deniessupplyingarms.23Many believe,includingtheU.S. government,
thatPakistanhas also providedarmedsupport, primarilyto the Islamic militants. While it is difficultfor a
researcher
to confirm
thiswidelyheldbelief,it is knownthatthanksto the
Afghanistanwar, weapons of deadly potentialare so easily available in
Pakistanthatthe government
does not have to supplyweaponsin order
forthe militantsto get them. A veritablearmsbazaar exists. Kashmiri
militantshave not only taken on India's paramilitaryforces with
Kalashnikovsand grenades,theyhave also engagedthe armyconvoysin
pitchedbattlesfor eight to ten hours. Weapons meant for war have
reachedthe handsof insurgents.However,Islamicmilitantsare eventoday not the most populargroupin the valley. While the Hizbul Mujahideen are organizationally
the strongest,
the JKLF, a secular militant
group,maybe the morepopular. Supportforthe JKLF is open and explicit,whereasfortheHizb it is confinedto pocketsand, moreoftenthan
not,not openlyexpressed.
Dimensionsof a Tragedy
India's responsehas beenmorebrutalthaneverbefore.The government's
efforts
to rollback theinsurgency
and themilitants'armedresolveto "liberate" Kashmirhave produceddaily deaths. The Muslimsconstitutea
majorityof those killed,primarilyby India's armed forcesbut also by
in theirowncommunity.The
armedMuslimmilitants
silencingdissenters
numberof Hinduskilledwouldhave beengreaterifmostofthemhad not
migratedto camps in Jammuand Delhi. Some leftafterlosingkithand
kinto Islamicmilitants,
othersafterreceivingdeaththreats,but mostdepartedin utterpanic betweenJanuaryand March 1990-simply to preemptdeath. Of the morethan 150,000Hindus,onlya feware leftin the
valley,theirnumbersat best in threedigits.
A typicalsocial scienceexercise,burdenedwithrationalconceptsand
disembodiedlanguage,cannotcapturetherealdimensionsoftheKashmir
tragedy.It is necessaryto understandthenatureof thepain beingexperienced,partlybecauseno solutionof theKashmirsituationwill last ifthe
emotionaltruthsare ignored.People willmakea compromisebutnotany
compromise.The Congress-Conference
alliance,whateverits rationality,
founderedon the rockof mistrustand betrayal.Thereare two storiesto
tell,one fromthevalley,theotherfromthemigrantcamps. Bothtalesare
and a virtually
markedby a deep senseofloss,bitterness,
completelack of
trustin government.The difference,
however,is thatKashmiriMuslims
PakistanHigh Commission,New
23. Interview,ShafghatKakakhel,minister-councillor,
Delhi, August 13, 1990.
1018
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1991
feelmutilatedand defiledby thesecurityforceswhiletheHindu migrants
feeluprootedand betrayedbythegovernment,
thoughclearlyseveralhave
also been defiledby the Hizbul Mujahideen. To KashmiriMuslims,the
securityforcesare theuglyfaceof "India"; to Jammumigrants,
theHizb
are the despicableface of Islam. Betweenthe two agonies,the tolerant
religiousmiddleas wellas themoderatesecularcenterhave collapsed. Soberor rationalthinking
liesburiedunderunceasingemotionsand angeron
bothsides. Implicationsfora solutionare such thatthemutilationin the
valleywill not go away unlesstheparamilitary
forcesare withdrawn,
and
the displacementof the Hindus will not abate unlessthe Hizbul Mujahideenlose theirstrength.The JKLF, committedto an independent
but
secularKashmir,is willingto take the Hindusback. However,whilethe
JKLF may be the mostpopularorganization,the Hizb continueto be a
substantialpresenceand are opposedto the returnof Hindus.24
ConcludingRemarks
The logic of Kashmiripoliticscan be culled fromthe discussionabove.
Kashmirhas not been a problemwhen(a) its leadershave acted autonomouslybut withoutgoingto the pointof secession,(b) the searchforautonomyhas not been crushedby Delhi but ratheraccommodatedin a
federalframework,
and (c) Pakistanhas been militarilyweak. At this
point,shouldit try,Delhi can, in principle,have controloverthe second
elementonly;a stalemate,therefore,
continues.
How longwill thestalematelast? Two factorsgo againstthemilitants'
cause. First,beyondPakistan,Kashmirimilitants
havelittlegovernmental
support. In a dramaticchange,the U.S. government
currently
supports
India's positionthata resolutionoftheKashmirproblemshouldbe sought
withinthebilateralframework
oftheSimlaAgreement.The secondfactor
is domestic. Unlike Punjab, wherethe insurgency
does not destroyeconomicactivityin thevillageswheremostPunjabislive,Kashmiris a onecrop, one-seasoneconomy. Tourismis the lifebloodof Kashmir'seconin addition,is dependenton horticulture,
omy,and the countryside,
the
exportof apples and peaches. Both activitiesare essentiallyconductedin
the summer,stretching
a littlebit intothe fall. A civilwar killstourism,
and sincebanksand transport
are essentialto the exportof fruitsbut are
closed due to the insurgency,
it also takesaway the main sourceof rural
incomes. Anothersummeror two withouttouristsand exportswilllikely
bringgraveeconomicmisery.
24. Interviewgivenby one of the area commandersof Hizbul Mujahideento Observer
News Channel(Delhi), December 1990.
ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY
1019
Since the moderatecenterhas collapsed and the militantgroupsare
popular,no solutionis possiblewithoutthe militants.When asked how
long theywill supportthemilitantsin viewof the economicimplications,
resentthe questionin groupsettingsbut admitto a possible
Kashnmiris
economiccatastrophein private.Militants,of course,say theywill fight
tillthe veryend. It is unlikely,however,thatthe militantscan providea
mass supportforthemilifortheseactivities.In all probability,
substitute
tantswill declinein such a situation.At thatpoint,two thingscan hapon the
pen. Fearfulof losingsupport,theremaybe a greaterwillingness
part of militantsto compromise.If not, an even biggertragedyawaits
Kashmir,giventhatIndia will not give up its claims forall the reasons
outlinedabove.
Can militantsagreeto negotiatea solutionwithIndia? Withoutan unbetweenIndia and Pakistan,it is unclearwhythe militants
derstanding
would come to the table. Pakistanmay not be strongenough-militarily
or diplomatically-toforcea solutionon India, but neitheris it so weak
themilitants
out offear. So longas
thatit wouldhaveto cease supporting
Pakistan'ssupportis available,at least the pro-Pakistanmilitantgroups
can continueto operatewithor withoutpopularsupportwithinthevalley.
An agreementbetweenIndia and Pakistan,thus,is a necessarycondition
do, that
forthesolutionof theproblem.To believe,as Hindu nationalists
is all thatis neededto defeatthemilitants
a fullassertionofstateauthority
is to be bothinsensitive
to Kashmiriagonyand farfromrealistic.At the
withPakistanwill
committed
to Kashmir'sintegration
militants
veryleast,
militantsdo.
not negotiatewithDelhi, even if the independence-minded
in
ofextinction
And ifthelatteragreeto negotiate,
theyfacethepossibility
warfare.So long as armscontinueto come to the Islamic
an internecine
groupsand Pakistansupportsthem,no agreementwill stick. The agreementin Punjab withthe moderatescollapseddue to the exclusionof the
who ultimately
killedthemoderatearchitectoftheagreement.
hardliners,
In orderforKashmirto havepeace,India and Pakistanneedto comprobutitslack willonly
mise. The shapeofcompromisecannotbe predicted,
of Kashmirisand the sadprolongthe tale of sorrow-to the misfortune
ness of outsiderslookingformeetingpointsin theseparallelacts of defiance and brutality.Midnight'schildrenmustbeginto growup; will their
leadersbecomestatesmen?