Security and Strategic Culture
of the Visegrad Group Countries
Jaroslav Ušiak
Security and Strategic Culture
of the Visegrad Group Countries
Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
© Jaroslav Ušiak, PhD.
Title:
Security and Strategic Culture
of the Visegrad Group Countries
Reviewers: prof. Pavel Nečas, PhD.
assoc. prof. Jana Lasicová, PhD.
Publisher: Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations
Banská Bystrica, 2013
ISBN 978-80-557-0515-6
Content
Foreword ............................................................................................................. 7
Introduction....................................................................................................... 8
Security as a Phenomenon in the Contemporary World ......................... 14
Security Policy of the State ................................................................................. 16
Strategic Culture as an Important Element in the Development
of State Security .................................................................................................... 24
The Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries ......................... 34
The Strategic Culture of the Czech Republic .................................................. 36
The Strategic Culture of the Slovak Republic ................................................. 45
The Strategic Culture of the Republic of Poland ........................................... 52
The Strategic Culture of the Hungary .............................................................. 61
Security Policy of the Visegrad Group Countries
after the Disintegration of the Soviet Block .............................................. 80
The Security Policy of the Czech Republic ..................................................... 84
The Security Policy of the Slovak Republic................................................... 105
The Security Policy of the Republic of Poland ............................................. 126
The Security Policy of the Hungary ................................................................ 148
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 175
References ....................................................................................................... 180
Index................................................................................................................ 195
Foreword
In recent years also small states started to regularly issue their national
security strategies, which significantly contributed to shaping their strategic
culture.
The research of security in contemporary society uses a number of ways
and methods. The phenomenon of security is part of the research agenda of
military science, political science, international relations and international
law. New impetus for research of security is related to changes in
international environment after the end of the Cold War and the onset of the
so-called post-bipolar era. After the end of Cold War the Visegrad countries
entered a period of transition; they were the first post-Communist republics
to enter the North Atlantic Alliance, i.e. the organisation of collective
security, as well as the European Union, i.e. economic integration group of
Western countries with elements of security and defence policy. Therefore, it
is important to compare their development and eventual convergence or
divergence in the areas of security policies.
The major impetus to write this publication came from constantly
increasing debate about the need for security cooperation in Central Europe,
whether as a result of the economic crisis, as well as necessity to guarantee
the security interest of this region in protecting its territory and population.
Essential prerequisite of any collaboration is to find a base built on common
interests of these countries. Based on the analysis of the strategic culture of
the countries in question and the analysis of developments in the area of
security during the past two decades, we want to point out the common
elements that would allow for such cooperation. Consequently, we would
like to contribute to security research in the specific environment of the
Visegrad countries region through our scientific monograph. The aim is to
highlight those aspects of the historical development of the countries that
have an impact on the possibilities on their future cooperation.
This publication would not be possible without great support of
Associate Professor Jana Lasicová. In my early student years she was my
invaluable mentor, and my inspiration in the area of science and research. I
owe many thanks to Dr. Lucia Husenicová for her constant support and
inspiring friendship, as well as to Dr. Dominika Kaščáková for her
invaluable professional assistance in the translation of the text and thoughtprovoking comments. Last but not least, a big thank you goes to my wife
Lenka and my parents for their constant support in my work.
Jaroslav Ušiak
Introduction
Existing research in the area of national security as we know it today is
essentially connected to the process of formation of nation states. Although
a major breakthrough occurred already at the end of World War I, the new
quality in the security research has become evident after the end of World
War II. This development has been caused by the increasing violence
between respective players in the world political system. We may conclude
that increasing tensions in the international political system (questions
regarding the internal system and establishment of the states, influence of
multinational organisations, corporations and interstate institutions) and also
increasing tensions within states (ethnic groups, economic disparities, ethnic
conflicts) have been associated with a change in perception of the security of
state. Developments in the crisis areas of the world resulted not only in
increased intensity of conflicts and their impact, but also in far-reaching
consequences for the civilian populations directly exposed to these conflicts.
Consequently, the role of the state does not focus exclusively on the
preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also on
maintaining the security of the civilian population itself and the complex
range of non-military risks and threats that potentially affect the state.
When focusing on the region of Central Europe we may state that this
territory is located in an area that has no fixed geographical boundaries. The
Visegrad Four (V4) countries are relatively small to medium-sized
democratic states with market economy. In the past this has been quite
unstable, and the national boundaries have been changing constantly. Only
after World War II the territory of this region took the shape we know
today. The main problem in this region was its multinational, multi-ethnic
and multi-confessional character that significantly influenced and fostered
regional disputes. According to J. Lasicová contradictions and conflicts
themselves arose “rather through language and identity as a means of mutual
contacts. Conflicts in this area always related to power ambitions of bigger
players and not with the risk elements of specifically regional origin.”
(Lasicová, 2006, p. 26)
The principal geopolitical changes of the contemporary era occurred
mainly in the last decade of the 20th Century. The V4 countries that
previously formed part of the Soviet bloc, which determined their regime,
political orientation and economic dependence, after the collapse of the
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
bipolar structure faced the problem of seeking direction in the new
international environment. All V4 countries have become independent
states, but their natural and human resources are limited and, therefore, they
are economically dependent on neighbouring states. The main factor that
influenced the future direction of Central Europe was the integration to the
European Union where these countries expected to achieve economic
stability and prosperity. On the other hand, in terms of minerals and natural
resources the V4 countries have been and continue to be bound to
cooperate with the Russian Federation. In the security area, the orientation
of the V4 countries since their establishment focused on their integration
into European security structures. The first milestone was their admission to
the UN and the OSCE (formerly CSCE), followed by their participation in
the Partnership for Peace program and, finally, their admission to NATO. At
present, Visegrad countries are fully-fledged members of NATO and the
European Union. These two organisations significantly determine the
decision-making and orientation of the V4 countries, including also security
area.
Security expressed in the national security policy is one of the most
important parts of foreign and defence policy of the state. Together they
form and determine the foreign policy orientation of the country to the
extent that many documents of states (or organisations) they are listed
together1. It is therefore necessary to include the concept of security policy
in particular and in term of timeframe specified framework of foreign policy,
contingently on the context of internal political development. Linkage
between the doctrinal thinking expressed in doctrines and strategies of
foreign and national security policy and time specified and defined area and
implementation tools of these doctrines is expresses in the concept of
strategic culture. Strategic culture is based on the historical development and
specifics; it sets limits and possible directions for the future development
and, therefore, determines the security policy of the state.
The main objective of this publication is primarily an analysis and
comparison of developments in the field of security policy and strategic
culture of the Visegrad Four (V4) countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, Republic of Poland and Hungary. Individual chapters are devoted
1 Foreign policy is a set of external official relations, i.e. relations to other states, international
organisations and other actors of the international community. It is governed by an independent
sovereign state on the basis of internal political organisation and definition of raison d'etat (i.e. national
interest). Foreign policy is formulated and implemented through specific models, techniques, doctrines
and frameworks so that it exhibits sufficient flexibility for accommodating any potential changes. State’s
foreign policy is also part of a network of transactions, information and services that states provide to
each other within closer integration or broader cooperative relations.
9
Jaroslav Ušiak
to defining the basic theoretical background of the publication - security
policy and strategic culture, followed by description of the strategic culture
of the individual V4 countries. The emphasis is put on outlining the
development of security policy of V4 countries after the collapse of the
bipolar international order combined with the analysis of security documents
adopted during this period. Developments in the area of foreign policy and
military transformation of the armed forces are considered to be
complementary and by no means insignificant; however, given the focus of
our publication these are treated only marginally. Consequently, the
transformation of the armed forces of V4 countries, their conceptual
documents, as well as the foreign policy doctrines are not analysed in detail,
but only to extent sufficient to our primary goal.
Within the framework of the present security agenda we may conclude
that the research of national security is a multidisciplinary area. Primary
sources for the research are to be found in the area of International
Relations, Political Science and International Law. Other important partial
sources are represented by studying security institutions, security
environment, as well as economic sciences, sociology, psychology and
studies dealing with the functioning of international organisations and
institutions. Security research, therefore, interferes with other disciplines, and
represents an interdisciplinary problem. The security of a state, i.e. national
security is affected by complex combination of numerous factors. National
security, therefore, is not just a matter of political organisation of the state
and its interests, which should be defended externally, but is also subject to
internal factors that affect it and create the security environment.
In terms of sources we have relied heavily on the primary documents
elaborated by the responsible state organisations and authorities of the states
which are subject of our research. These were complemented by relevant
research papers and other publications of authors from the V4 countries,
because they represent the best way to gain insight and to critically assess the
developments in their home countries. We have complemented our research
with the analysis of official documents and publications of relevant state
institutions complement, which gave us possibility to capture the official
position of the respective governments in specific periods. Due to the fact
that the area of security policy is constantly evolving, we have reflected the
situation and developments as of July, 2013.
Due to the current situation in the international system (i.e. processes of
integration) it is common to base the analysis of the security environment of
a state on materials of higher importance (e.g. when analysing the security
environment of one of the V4 countries it is essential to do so against the
background of specific strategic documents of NATO, the EU or the UN or
10
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
OSCE). It is necessary to know these documents, but one has to work with
them creatively, with due regard to the specific threats and risks of a
particular state, its defence capabilities, financial and material resources,
taking into consideration also other than the qualitative variables such as
traditions, narrative context, public opinion, security priorities, patriotism
and symbolism. Additionally, the analysis should be complemented by the
perception of threats by citizens, expressed through opinion polls, political
and social debates. Detection of these attitudes has its significance regardless
of the field of study. Based on this analysis, it is essential to define the term
doctrine and strategy, in order to allow us to determine how they reflect the
security environment.
Majority of authors of the theories of Political Science and International
Relations define doctrine as plans for the use of existing and further
aggrandisement of power. The official doctrine of foreign and hence national
security policy is publicly available, because it consists of a set of documents
adopted by state authorities, parliamentary institutions, including the official
formulation of objectives, instruments and institutions designed to
implement these plans. The doctrine is not a document, it is a concept that is
evolving in a process of shaping domestic and foreign policy, and becomes
an essential tool especially in the application of soft power during the
peacetime (Vlček, 2003), and in the application of International Law at the
time of conflict and in ending the conflict. (Rosputinský, 2012) The doctrine
is also regular way to use the power of the state in the international arena. To
sum up, doctrines may be included in political science as concepts of the use
of political power.
Nowadays, however, doctrines are often equated with strategies. It is
mainly because strategies, similarly to doctrines are primarily political
concepts that arise from the analysis of the security environment. But when
we ask the question what is the security environment we are again
confronted not with one term, but rather with the concept of different
analytical levels. Therefore, it is necessary to define the difference between
doctrine and strategy. The difference is notable in particular in terms of
historical tradition. Word “stratégos” already in ancient Greek language koiné
designated the commander or captain who defined the objectives and
methods of combat, attack and defence, selection of material and human
resources, outlined a strategy, i.e. the course of action, objectives,
instruments and methods of warfare, whether in attack or defence. Stratégos
in ancient military art has always been an important figure, as suggested by
historical evidence, but also legends and myths about personalities such as
Alexander the Great, Caesar, Hannibal and many others. The link
between strategy and doctrine, which has become a sign of modern wars, has
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Jaroslav Ušiak
been established at the beginning of the 19th Century by personalities such as
Napoleon and his leveé en masse, i.e. the strategy may be based upon the
doctrine of the interest of a nation or population. Another example is
provided by Carl von Clausewitz and his famous dictum that war is the
continuation of politics by other means, making very clear the link between
the doctrine and strategy. The same is true in respect to the strategy of
preemption known from the security strategies of the United States after 11
September 2001, which according to the author M. Kaldor related to the
way of warfare led by official Army of the United States against the Indians2.
Term strategy is polysemic and it requires an adjective to provide
relevant description and information. There are many economic and energy
strategies, strategies of cultural development, business strategies etc. In this
context, it is always necessary to give the extended term, for instance defence
strategy, security strategy, or strategic concept of state/organisation that
always maintains link with the doctrine. In the past twenty years, however,
the concept of security doctrine or foreign policy doctrine occurs less
frequently. Doctrines are on the verbal level replaced with policies3. This
linguistic shift occurred probably due to the intent to stress the political
dimension of a strategy, its ideological concept and values that are in current
international relations attributed to individual ideologies or to theoretical
concepts such as Liberalism, Realism, Neoliberalism, Social Constructivism
and various “neo” paradigms that significantly affect internal and foreign
policy of the state, including security.
The question is, therefore, if we do not have rigid concepts inherent to
the doctrines of the past but only more or less vague ideological tendencies /
paradigms flexible in such matters as war and peace, what should we
consider to be an alternative concept to become the basis for future
strategies, whether they be strategies of nation states or international
organisations. It is precisely the analysis of strategic culture that offers such a
possibility. The relationship between culture and strategy cannot be
understood only as a terminological definition of the two concepts. It is
precisely the kind of relationship that determines the quality of strategic
culture and forms through security policy to a particular system that is so
complicated that it needs an explanation of the basic categories. (Hofreiter,
2013) In the past, strategic culture has been formed based on existential
2 Strategy of preemptive destruction of villages, tribes, destruction territories of indigenous peoples
before they could threaten the emerging cities or military forts stemmed from the fear and xenophobia
and related to the doctrine of necessity to obtain its own territory for the emerging United States of
America.
3 The examples include: the Mediterranean policy, Open Door Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy,
NATO policy, security policy, and defence policy.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
necessities, as stated by M. N. Barnett. The research of strategic culture,
however, did not begin until the late 1980s. There are two reasons for that a change in relations between the superpowers and transition from bipolarity
to the new international relations arrangement, as well as regional security
concept of the Copenhagen School COPRI based on Social Constructivism.
Changes in security (hence also in strategic culture) are contingent on and
provoked by changes in the social identity, i.e. re-arrangements of the
interest groups in society, changes in the social infrastructure, ideological,
religious and cultural movements. These factors vary in different countries,
and, consequently, strategic cultures of states are not identical, which,
however, does not mean that these states cannot perceive their security
environment similarly, or even identically.
The basic elements which according to M. N. Barnett define strategic
culture are: common historical experience (against someone); elements on
which to form a military force (patriotism, recruitment, Defence Act, private
armies); military capabilities reflecting the technological progress (as the
most variable element); definition of protection for persons, objects and
symbols (what is the hierarchy of these elements); role of myths and legends
(narrative history). (Barnett, 2013, p. 179)
We believe that a return to the study of Central European strategic
culture should have double effect. It should strengthen national selfconfidence and allow specifying custom security environment more
precisely, which would in turn affect the quality of future security strategies
and the formation of national security policies.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Security as a Phenomenon in the Contemporary World
In defining the term “security” there is no consensus or universally
accepted interpretation of this term. Therefore, in addressing the term
“security” we will refer to the dictionary definition of “security as a
category”, which defines security as “a complex concept, the category of
being at different analytical levels of individual, group, local, national,
regional and global level, where there are several differentiated, flexible
internal and external social factors (such as military, economic, domestic
political, international-political, social, legal, environmental, energy, cyber),
which have the ability to create temporary (relative) stability at the causal
level and through which they can eliminate all kinds of crises, risks, and
threats of war”. (Lasicová, Ušiak, 2012, p. 240)
In the security research agenda there are several approaches to analyse
and define security. We may talk about absolute versus relative security
(absolute security is seen as a property of the material and spiritual resources
to achieve their own security per se; the relative security is determined by
mutual interaction of two or more actors with absolute power in the system);
hard versus soft security (focusing on means that players use to achieve
security - hard security represented chiefly by the military power, and soft
security, represented by diplomatic and other non-military means); or
objective versus subjective security (security is, by definition, an objectivesubjective kind of relationship. The existence of a threat is objective, i.e. it
exists autonomously from the subject or entity in question and its actions.
The subjective part of the security refers to the fact whether and how the
reference entity perceives a threat.).
Another approach widely used by theorists in the field of security
(J. Lasicová, Š. Danics, B. Buzan) is negative and positive definition of
security. This approach is based on the assumption that security of a given
entity (person, state, society, etc.) is very difficult and almost impossible to
measure. Negative definition stems from the fact that certain types of threats
do not exist in a certain area, and, consequently, there is no need for the
State to implement measures to ensure the protection and safety. Positive
definition of security refers directly to a given entity (person, state, society,
etc.). It is the result of active attempts to restrain potential threats by
providing physical protection, to support the elimination of these threats
14
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
and, last but not least, to create the conditions for development that would
lead to the elimination of new threats.
An instructive example of a negative definition of security is the absence
of threats arising from the use of weapons of mass destruction in Central
Europe. On the contrary, in other countries the use of weapons of mass
destruction poses a direct security threat, and may require an intervention of
the international community or the state to eliminate this threat. This, by
definition, represents a positive definition of security. Determining where
exactly are the limits of positive and negative security is getting more and
more into the spotlight of the theorists of (international) politics and
security. The international environment is constantly changing. States that
have not been exposed to some type of threats are becoming vulnerable
while those which were vulnerable may become safer through effective
elimination of these threats. Determination of boundaries between security
and vulnerability is difficult and results primarily from human needs and
interests. (Danics, 2007) The answer to the question of limits of security may
be provided from two points of view, wider and narrower. As for the narrow
concept of security the authors base it on the political-military notion of
security (narrower definition) with state being the main subject of research
(and, in fact, the only major actor). Broader concept of security focuses also
on other areas of social life such as economic, societal (social),
environmental, energy and information area (this segment breakdown and
approach points to the width and comprehensiveness of the security
discourse and security itself).
Security is no longer seen only from one point of view, i.e. from the
perspective of the state, but it encompasses more basic aspects: individual
security, security of intrastate groups, national security, regional security, as
well as international security environment (according to some authors
concept of security is deepened through the involvement of multitude of
actors). (Lasicová, 2006; Danics, 2007)
At the same time, the depth and width of the concept of security
demonstrate also its narrow and broader definition. While using the narrow
definition, researchers were dealing with only one particular analytical level,
i.e. the state and its political-military sector. On the contrary, modern
concept based on the broader definition of security does not focus
exclusively on state as the main actor. It includes also other level of analysis,
namely the international system, regional groupings, national groups and
individuals and their position in the field of advanced security agenda (there
is a deepening of the concept of security and increase in the number of levels
of analysis) in the context of expansion of security agenda into different
sectors - environmental, economic, societal, information, and energy sector.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
From this perspective, and based on the security considerations
discussed above, new potential threats for all analytical levels began to
emerge (widening and deepening of the concept of security), related to
different sectors and different actors. Consequently, a new area opened for
new approaches to the study of security at the international, but also at
national level. Due to the fact that states (especially small and medium-sized
ones) have different position in the international system in comparison with
the previous era as a result of integration processes, their traditional national
roles and interests cease to exist because they are severely limited by their
global or national dependence on international organisations of which they
are members.
National security, therefore, may be examined from various aspects.
However, the development of strategic culture of the state and its impact on
the attitudes (and interests) presented in the state security doctrines and
strategies over a period of time remains one of the basic approaches in the
study of security.
Security Policy of the State
The organisation and management of human society posits evidence that
historically it has been linked to some form of establishment. From primitive
societies to contemporary modern states, people living in these societies had
need for creating communities for a common purpose of protecting
themselves and to obtain a sense of security within such communities. As
the institutional structure of a state underwent changes (its form, reach,
rights and duties of a ruler, territory and population) so the sovereignty was
changing as well, alongside with the ruler’s jurisdiction over these “states”
and the extension of their sovereignty (division of sovereignty to external
and internal).
In terms of the type of social organisation clan societies (formed on the
basis of kinship relations or kinsmen) represented first “national” societies.
In ancient Greece “polis” or city-states with boundaries formed by the outer
boundaries of the city itself constituted basic political units. The population
was divided into free citizens who have had their rights and the slaves who
had no rights. Representatives of city-states entered into alliances with other
independent cities, forming an equal relationship.4 During the period of the
4 Even though the Greeks did not know International Law or Diplomacy in the contemporary sense of
both terms, these alliances really existed.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Roman Empire the clan-based society gave way to a class-based society,
paving way for the establishment of the slave societies.
During this period rights lied within the hands of free individuals,
specifically wealthiest citizens (Patricians), whose assets were represented
mainly by land ownership. Wealthy Patricians supported by mercenary
armies which served as a means of power concentrated state power in their
hands. (Charvát, 1980, p. 65-78)
In the Middle Ages the Church and its leaders gained central position in
the society. Pope, the highest ecclesiastical authority and a mediator of divine
power, distributed the territory as his fief, and named princes (rulers) as his
servants. Territories were governed by princes who also exercised
administration over population, over which they had almost unlimited
power.
In modern times5 the structure and political system were created in line
with the development of nation-states, where the sovereign had the right and
function of the highest authority over the territory and population. During
this period the population affiliates to state on the basis of nationality, and
sovereign does not wield unlimited power, because his actions in this period
are already limited by other institutions of parliamentary nature, initially
constituted by the aristocracy, and later on also by the bourgeoisie as a
representative of the new forces in society instilled by the liberal ideology. It
was precisely the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois revolution that strengthened
the national principle as a cornerstone of the state also in the absolute
monarchy.
Basic definition of a nation is provided by A. D. Smith's in his work
Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History from 2001. He defines nation as
historically developed community of citizens (people) who share a common
ethnic characteristics according to which they integrate (and which are
distinguishing them from others). These are language, specific material and
spiritual culture, religion, mental or even economic history. (Smith, 2001, p.
87-117) Such community of people based on shared sense of identification
and sense of belonging to a group is trying to co-exist as a national entity.
In the late 18th Century (after the French Revolution) the rise of states
started to be identified with the right people to self-determination, which in
the international political system rushed in a relatively turbulent period of the
rise of nation-states.6 In subsequent period parliamentary democracy has
5 Based on the stages of development of sovereignty, the period of modern times falls in the era after the
Peace of Westphalia, i.e. after 1648.
6 In the International Law the right to self-determination of nations has not been declared until after
World War I under the influence of ideas of W. Wilson (in ensuing peace agreements).
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Jaroslav Ušiak
been strengthened, laying the foundations of modern democratic system as
we know it today. (Stevenson, 2003) The contemporary state is characterised
by its four essential attributes: (Weber, 1990; Kulašik, 2007, p. 94-95)
- permanent population;
- defined territory;
- government, respectively state authority;
- ability to assert their sovereignty - both internal and external.
The population of a state is made up of various social, ethnic and
national groups, which compete with each other to achieve power. The
stability of the state and its decisions, therefore, are dependent on which
group in society will prevail. In practical terms, the interests and will
determine the actions and development of the state. The majority group
determines state priorities and the security threats that it perceives to be
fundamental.
Territory – territory of the state – is the space delimited by the state
boundaries. The current international political system is composed of states
whose territory is territorially marked, i.e. is determined through the process
of delimitation and demarcation of the state boundaries. This process started
already in the Middle Ages but back then the territory was under the
administration of the Church, gradually it came under the administration of a
ruler and later on the state territory started to be administered by the state
power represented by the state government. State is entitled to administer its
territory and through legal use of force require citizens to comply with the
duties and responsibilities they are entrusted with. By virtue of its dominant
position, state has right to administer the territory and population through
the three branches of its power.7 This is its inalienable right within the state
territory.
Lawful use of force is a sovereign’s right to require the fulfilment of
duties entrusted to the population within its territory. His sovereignty
(supremacy), i.e. state sovereignty is composed of several elements such as
administrative, police, legal, financial and other, though which the state
fulfils its functioning internally. It is precisely the possibility of using legal
coercion which provides a legal framework to achieve the exercise of state
sovereignty in the above mentioned sectors.
Internal monopoly is the absence of several internal power centres,
which would interfere with the exercise of power in a given area. (Krejčí,
2001, p. 234) The exercise of this power (internal monopoly) is implemented
Horizontal separation of power into legislative, executive and judicial branches has been defined by Ch.
L. Montesquieu in his response to Locke’s doctrine of power-sharing in his piece “The Spirit of Law” in
1748. However, it has been put into practice only at the establishment of the United States of America.
7
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
through state functions (which can be divided into internal and external) and
instruments of law, which form part of an authentic internal monopoly of
state power designed to achieve the priority goals identified by the state.
State functions relate to the fact that the state is obliged to manage the
lives of the population for the benefit of all residents, and, moreover, to do
so in all spheres of social life. (Liďák, Koganová, 1998; Koper, 2003)
Regardless of the historical stage, we may assert that “the state is a social
institution that acts primarily toward maintenance and development of the
social community, to its unification, protection and development.” (Novák,
1997, p. 292) In theory we may speak of various concepts of the state minimal state, developmental state, social democratic state, collectivized
state, totalitarian state. (Heywood, 2004) Each of these concepts favours
different role of the state in enforcing and performing its internal
functioning, and, by extension, also its interference in the international
political system.
Regardless of the different concepts of the role of the state in the internal
affairs (and degree of its engagement) in political science we may
differentiate state functions broadly classified into two main areas, i.e.
internal and external. The internal state functions refer to the internal
organisation of society, while external features are designed to focus on the
interaction with external actors - it is a coordination, cooperation and
regulation of internal state entities with entities that are not subject to its
jurisdiction. In general, both internal and external functions of the state may
be summed up as follows: (Kulašik, 2005, p. 100-102; Surmánek, Gbúrová,
Dudinská, 2003, p. 97-99; Liďák, Koganová, 1998, p. 44-45; Heywood, 2004,
p. 116-119)
- Integrative - ensuring that all groups in society enjoy equal rights; the
role of the state is to integrate these groups into a single community
without generating conflicts and tensions; on the other hand,
externally this function requires the state to integrate into the broader
international community and international organisations, if the society
and social consciousness requires it to do so;
- Economic - represents the main function of the state in the economy
of the country essential to ensure the state’s ability to function and
perform its internal duties (social support, other state functions etc.)
as well as its external responsibilities (fulfilment of contractual
obligations, humanitarian and developmental aid etc.)
- Control – execution of power and political decision-making
represents an important aspect of governance, primarily associated
with the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power in the
state;
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Jaroslav Ušiak
- Cultural - organisation of social life in this area and support for
cultural activities is an important aspect of the role of the state,
alongside with development of knowledge-based society, of science
and technology. The state must regulate this activity internally as well
as externally;
- Security (safety) – safeguarding the population against external or
internal aggressors and protection of the political establishment;
preservation of order and relative security, while creating conditions
for effective development of this function.
Specific external functions of the state are closely connected to its role in
the international political system. In this regard, the most important is the
defensive function of the state, designed primarily to ensure the inviolability
of the territory and public safety. Naturally, we cannot neglect the need for
coordination with other states in the international political system. In
general, we may assert that the primary focus of the state is to enforce
interests defined in the form of national interest. We assume, however, that
the state does not exist and operate in international political system on its
own, but in association with several other states or actors. Consequently,
these are primarily external functions designed to provide for the
development of the state and to promote its interests in the international
environment (i.e. legal regulation of relations with foreign countries,
protection of the population against external aggressors, the pursuit of peace
and peaceful coexistence with other nations, and integrative function).
(Surmánek, Gbúrová, Dudinská, 2003)
Specific internal state functions are related to activities affecting
governance of the society and organisation of its internal functioning. We
may define the following internal functions of the state: (Kulašik, 2005, p.
100-101)
- Legal – state regulates activities of various internally based entities
through legislation and standardisation, aiming to achieve the greatest
possible benefit for all residents and entities;
- Security – the protection of the population and the state
establishment against the negative influences that might endanger or
undermine their security, together with the development of measures
to strengthen this function;
- Economic – through the state economy the state seeks to increase
economic growth and welfare of its citizens;
- Social – state seeks to provide protection to the most vulnerable
sections of the population, especially through various government,
subsidies, grants and benefits;
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
- Cultural – may be termed also educational – state expands
consciousness of the population for the purpose of exercising
influence through the use of the mass media, scientific research and
other activities;
- Adaptation – an effort to maintain sustainable development through
deployment of various supporting measures to promote development
or to inhibit negative phenomena in the society.
From the previous definitions it is clear that internal functioning of state
may vary depending on the role of state and form of government. The role
of state may be conceived as minimal, where state interference is very
limited, or acquire the form of a welfare state, characterised by strong state
intervention in society and the redistribution of resources. Form of
government, i.e. democratic or non-democratic (totalitarian or authoritarian)
rule, also determines the extent of internal state intervention. As for the
external state functions, however, the extent of state engagement is roughly
the same for all states. This interesting phenomenon leads us to conclude
that states are in this respect very similar and, when we conceive of them as
subjects of international political system they may be perceived as equal.
The above-mentioned external and internal functions of the state are
carried out primarily through the following instruments the state has at its
disposal: (Surmánek, Gbúrová, Dudinská, 2003, p. 96)
- Law enforcement agencies (armed forces, police, intelligence, customs
and other security forces) – these tools are integral part of an internal
state monopoly on the legitimate use of force and to pursue its
interests eternally;
- Legislation and standardisation – state power consists of legislative,
executive and judicial branches; these components provide for the
exercise of power and political decision-making, enforcement of
adopted decisions and control over the lawful activities (whether
conducted by state or population);
- Foreign policy – a sum of all activities carried out by the state to
enforce its interests in the external environment, mainly carried out to
ensure the economic, political, social and military communication, to
achieve national and security interests, and to maintain security and
prosperity of the state;
- Autonomous decision – the legitimacy of power and the principle of
non-intervention into national decision-making.
The exercise of state power is directly determined by the existence of the
highest state authority – the sovereign, who wields and exerts power. In the
past, this authority lied in an individual, a particular person or group of
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Jaroslav Ušiak
individuals who personified the right and exercise of sovereign powers. At
present, as we have already mentioned, this authority materializes into three
branches of sovereign power, and the supreme legislative power, i.e. the
sovereign, is represented by the parliament and the elected representatives of
the citizens. (Krasner, 1999, p. 47) These elected representatives have the
opportunity to determine the course of conduct also in the area of national
security. At the same time they identify the essential interests of the state and
shape the development of the security system of state, i.e. the instruments
which the state is willing to implement to ensure security.
State security interests determine priorities for the state. Security interests
reflect the social needs of the population, having both objective and
subjective aspect. Objective part entails the measures necessary to ensure the
protection of the individual and society as a whole so that we can avoid the
occurrence of destructive phenomena in society. Subjective part is
conditioned by and based on the value orientation of the ruling elites at
given time, and is subject to its assessment of certain phenomena and events
in the country. Each country establishes its own hierarchy of individual
interests based on which it proceed with their fulfilment and enforcement.
(Žídek, Cibáková, 2009) The actual security concerns are an important factor
that determines actions of the state in this area, and the actual classification
(vital, important, and secondary) determines the priority and importance of
the interest to the state. From the perspective of a time span, security
interests may be classified as long-term (mainly the vital interests of the
state), medium-term (could be characterised as important state interests), and
short-term (secondary interests). This does not, however, exclude the
possibility that also short-term interest may eventually become a vital one,
especially in situation when a certain threat endangering the security or the
vital interests of a state appears, and the state need to address it. To
conclude, we will adopt the definition of security interest as “a generalised
response of the state to the needs whose fulfilment is necessary for its
survival and fulfilment of its functions in the desired extent and quality.”
Hierarchy of the interests of the state, as well as changes in this hierarchy
from the point of view of the timeframe, ideology or security are system
components that generate valid and pragmatic security system of the state.
They also determine the structure of the entities that the state may use to
ensure security. Security system of a state shall be considered as a tool for
the implementation of the objectives of the state in the field of security
policy. Its main role is to protect the national security interests, and its
constitutive parts are responsible for the analysis of the security environment
and changes that take place in it. In the case of adverse events such system
ought to be able to provide tools to adequately address and eventually
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
eradicate them. The security system should be permanently built on the basis
of the above-mentioned analyses, it should function as an integrated and
consistent entity including all the necessary tools to ensure the security of the
state at a given time and space.
The fundamentals of developing a security system are to be found in the
answers to two key questions: which actors are involved in the formulation
and implementation of security policy?; and what is the correlation between
them? (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009) Through answering these questions we may
construct the theoretical model of the ideal security system, including its
internal organisation and structure and character of the relations between its
constitutive parts.
In theory, the subjects forming the structure of the security system may
be divided into three main components or branches:
- Political branch – authorities within this branch are primarily
responsible for designing the security policy objectives and their
implementation in practice;
- The executive branch – the institutions and agencies pertaining to this
branch are focusing mainly on the practical implementation of
security policy objectives; they perform actions designed primarily to
prevent the occurrence of crises, and in the event of the actual crisis
situations are responsible to respond to them;
- Security branch – bodies and institutions of this type are tasked with
ensuring that the information security system works properly, as well
as ensuring the management and mobilisation of available resources
(human or material) that the state may need to ensure its security.
(Žídek, Cibáková, 2009)
The security system, therefore, may be characterised as a system whose
primary aim is to prevent the occurrence of armed conflicts or crisis
situations in the state, ranging from political instability to natural hazards and
disasters. Its main objective is to avert threats that may arise against the life
and property of citizens and society. (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009) “Effective
security system of the defined type requires from the state effective
arrangement of technological protection measures (security alarms, alarm
equipment, emergency equipment, fire alarms and other means); adequate
application of the organisational measures (directives, surveillance,
evaluation, inspection, preparation of emergency measures and procedures,
doctrines of protection of objects and population etc.); but in particular it
requires the provision of human resources (the need for analysis of the
human resources in accordance with the specifics of operational activities,
training and development of personnel to implement the security tasks,
monitoring, reviewing human resources requirements, analysis and the
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Jaroslav Ušiak
preparation for communication during emergency situation, etc.).”
(Hofreiter, 2004, p. 134)
A security system thus structured is capable to operate within the state,
but developments in the second half of the 20th Century point to the
necessity of interlinking it with international organisations of which the state
in question is a member. Coordination within the larger unit may in many
cases prove to be beneficial not only to the state itself, but also to the
international organisation as such.
For the purposes of our paper we focus primarily on those areas of
national security policy which could be defined as “a condition that allows
the functioning, stability and development of the state, preserves peace,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders, internal
order in the country, fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and
assures protection of the lives and health of persons, property and the
environment.” (Zaplatynskyi, 2009, p. 61) From the need of the state to
ensure its security we derive its security policy, representing the sum of all
tools, resources and institutions of a state which it is able and willing to
deploy in ensuring vital and secondary interests of citizens, as well as values
of the national territory or coalitions or organisations to which it belongs. It
also includes defence policy and, generally speaking, it may be divided into
external and internal. The security policy of the state consists of two
components, i.e. conceptual component and implementation. The
conceptual security policy is a set of objectives and principles, which are
subject to particular political decision-making in terms of the security
interests of the state. The implementation part of the security policy (i.e.
formation and implementation of plans) is best understood as the activity of
the various branches and components of the security system that focus on
prevention and management of various destructive phenomena in the state.
(Danics, 2007; Žídek, Cibáková, 2009)
Strategic Culture as an Important Element in the Development
of State Security
As mentioned above, national security expressed by security policy, is in
addition constituted also by another important component, which is very
difficult to quantify – i.e. the strategic culture. When defining strategic
culture it is essential to base our approach and considerations on the two
basic categories, i.e. doctrinal thinking (expressed in the doctrines of foreign
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
and security policy) and strategies (that reflect a time-specific set of tools and
instruments for the implementation of specific doctrines).
Doctrinal thinking represents a specific field in the research of security,
related to an existential question – where are we going? Doctrines had been
created in any society that cared about security, although in the traditional
historical science, which is primarily devoted to political history, they were
depicted mainly as a “great deeds of great men”. These were certain
concepts, systematised instructions related to national interests and state
efforts to survive and prosper. According to O. Krejčí, doctrinal thinking
may be defined as a set of specific blueprints designed to bring the notions
of national interest into reality. “The foreign policy doctrine is relatively
systematised and generally also formally approved set of ideas which
determines the hierarchy of political objectives and determines ways to
achieve them. The doctrine is an official conceptual framework of the use of
power of the state in the international environment.” (Krejčí, 2009, p. 20)
O. Krejčí also introduces two aspects of doctrines – they are part of the
national ideology constituted by symbols, traditions and theories used to
guide the practical conduct of human communities, i.e. represent a
conceptual framework of the national security policy. (Krejčí, 2007, p. 274)
Doctrines, however, are also a reflection of the social organisation of a state
or states, since they interfere with all strata of the society and include
historical memory and historical experience present in every power-political
system. That is why the formulation of the doctrine is dependant on policy,
law, morality, and also on the general state of social conscientiousness and
knowledge. Doctrines are related to the so-called major forms of power,
namely the state, the government, the majority, partisan or ideological, or
religious. Doctrines are formed in space and time, and if they relate
specifically to the area of security they bring into the society certain
restrictions and differentiations, inducing power realignments. Fundamental
character of doctrines as the quintessence of social or group will is able to
change the future direction of the state, but may also lead to stagnation,
depending on which form of power participates most substantially in the
formulation and implementation of the doctrine. If the dominant power is
ideological, the doctrine may be split into two components – its effect at
macro-level (the conduct of foreign policy and the character of the regime as
such) and its effect at micro-level (denial of the regime and everything
associated with it, showing a tendency to lean towards a different doctrine
based on the prerequisites of freedom of conscience). Therefore, the
doctrine in the traditional sense of the concept is open and may be
falsifiable, while at the same time it is easily replaceable by another doctrine.
All types of regimes – absolutist, totalitarian or liberal- democratic – deem
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Jaroslav Ušiak
doctrines necessary because they draw together and merge three important
analytical activities necessary for the functioning of the regime, i.e. the
analysis of the situation, the choice of the general objectives and the choice
of means to achieve them. (Krejčí, 2007, p. 275)
For the practical application of the doctrine it is essential that these
concepts are adequately materialised and pragmatically developed into the
form of a binding document, which especially in the field of security
delineates not only facultative but often compulsory guidelines for the
actions of the state. This process is implemented through transformation of
doctrines to foreign policy strategies which, however, have various aspects
themselves. The most important ones are the following:
- strategy as a selection of means to achieve the set objectives (in this
sense we may speak of financial strategy, energy strategy, education
and culture strategies; indeed every human activity which aims to
achieve certain objectives in the future is subject to developing its
own strategy);
- strategy as a military strategy which aims to reduce, stop or destroy
the enemy’s military forces (offensive, defensive and deterrent
strategy), or a strategy to maintain balance of power, or to gain
control over certain territories. It has to be noted that this second
aspect of the strategy is preferred and more often used in security
research.
Strategy, namely the political-military strategy represents one component
of doctrine, focused on national defence or defence of an alliance of states.
It defines the goals, interests, resources and tools for the implementation of
defence measures of the state or an alliance under specific circumstances.
Usually it refers to certain period of time and is periodically updated or
replaced by a new strategy, especially if there are fundamental changes in
internal or external geopolitical and security environment. From an ethical
point of view, strategy is a pragmatic and moral justification of specific
actions defined by the doctrine. A typical example is the strategy of
deterrence, maintaining that through increasing the number of strategic
weapons (which are unacceptable from a human point of view) the risk of
war is being reduced (thus averting the greatest evils and the worst breaches
of morality).
Especially in the second half of the 20th Century strategies started to be
perceived particularly in relation to the development of strategic studies, field
of study focusing on a systematic research of possible military actions of
states in bipolar system. Over the last two decades, however, there is a slow
but continuous erosion of thus perceived strategy. Experiencing a
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
renaissance of a doctrinal thinking as a fundamental ethical component of
the security strategies of states and organisations, we can say that especially
in security research more space is dedicated to the analysis of non-military
factors, asymmetric threats and risks, connecting multiple disciplines and
creating epistemic communities and think-tanks. Doctrinal and strategic
thinking is no longer just a concern of politicians, soldiers and statesmen;
there is increasing involvement of public opinion institutions, academia, civil
movements, and documents that are issued are subject to social discourse
and criticism. We may also discern the impact of widening and deepening of
the concept of security and security agenda. Virtually all contemporary
national security strategies and strategic concepts of intergovernmental and
international organisations are increasingly devoting more attention to
security threats and risks associated with various security sectors. For a
doctrinal and strategic thinking to be effective, it must be based primarily on
the analysis of the security environment of the state.
The Explanatory Dictionary of Security posits that “the security environment
is part of the social and natural environment in which the conditions of the
existence and development of social objects, their activities, interests and
relationships determined primarily by security concerns. It expresses
particular spatial dimension of security associated with the actions of given
subjects in a particular space and time. At the same time, it represents the
broadest expression of the security situation in a particular space and time,
wherein the security situation is the result of the activities of relevant security
actors (security authorities, institutions, states, coalitions of states, etc.).”
(Zaplatynskyi, 2009, p. 62) In simplistic terms we could say that the security
environment of a state may be understood as a set of external and internal
factors including geopolitical, historical, cultural, political and economic
activities of the state affecting its security. It is geographically and politically
defined space, which may be perceived as having several vertical levels of
analysis – thus distinguishing the global, regional, state, local, and sub-local
security environment.
The security environment is therefore part of the state environment
specifically oriented to security. It is composed of entities and their relations,
activities and interests, which are determined by security. The security
environment is delimited by allocating certain – geopolitically relatively
coherent – area, which is generally contingent on the other socio -economic,
military-strategic, cultural and historical factors. (Terminológia
bezpečnostného manažmentu, 2005) By adopting this perspective on a
specific dimension of social environment we create a space for analysis of
the security situation and the processes taking place in that environment.
After the end of the Cold War, however, the international environment
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Jaroslav Ušiak
underwent fundamental changes. In terms of sovereignty, the nation-state no
longer represents the highest authority due to the fact that its prerogatives in
some areas are transferred to a higher authority (for instance, after becoming
a member state of NATO the defence of the Slovak Republic in the event of
an attack has been transferred also on other states of the Alliance).
Security environment consists of several levels of analysis through which
we can locate the actors in the security environment - international systems
(global); international subsystems (continental); units (regional); sub-units
(local); and individuals. (Lasicová, 2006) Through analysis of these levels we
are able to identify threats and risks to the state at each of these levels. In
order to characterise the security environment of the state, from
geographical and geopolitical point of view we may distinguish external and
internal security environment: (Hofreiter, 2004)
- External security environment – focusing on global, continental and
regional analytical levels, which affect the external security
environment state;
- Internal security environment – focusing on local, sub-local and
individual analytical levels (key determinants on these levels are, in
particular, positive security actors involved in the implementation and
development of national security policy, and internal holders of
security threats, potentially threatening or involved in threatening the
security interests of the state).
Other factors might include geographical considerations, time period,
holistic problem-centric approach, and also an in-depth assessment of the
security environment.
The core element of a thorough analysis of the security environment of
the state is the complexity of all the factors affecting the security
environment of the state. Consequently, if we want to carefully analyse all
possible challenges (problems), threats and risks in the system, we ought to
examine all the factors that affect the environment as thoroughly as possible.
Due to its protective function, state must consider security to be its top
priority and the ultimate goal of all its activities. In the international
environment, however, security can only be relative, because achieving
absolute security is not possible otherwise than by the physical elimination of
all other potential threats, i.e. states and other potential enemies, from the
system.
As we have already mentioned, the concept of security is currently being
widened and deepened. Therefore, we maintain that it is appropriate to
reflect this process and to apply security sector approach in our further
analysis (i.e. deepening of the security concept though including new sectors,
not only military and political ones as in the classical approaches; and
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
deriving also from the vertical division – individual, group, state,
international organisations, and the international system).
The analysis of the security environment provides the basis on which to
formulate state security strategy. It represents a fundamental conceptual
security policy document and stems from the notion of comprehensive
security. It contains a comprehensive summary of values that the state wants
to protect, as well as identification of vital, important and secondary interests
of the state. After a thorough analysis of the security environment such
document provides a summary of potential threats and assesses the extent of
identified threats or risks. It also includes an analysis of the resources
available to the state (state commitments, alliances, own assets and
resources) and provides overview of the opportunities through which a
potential risks or threats may be eliminated and tools which might be used in
the process. Strategy provides a conceptual framework for the development
of other legislation (laws, doctrines, operations etc.) to be implemented in
various areas (foreign policy, internal politics, economic, social, and
information politics etc.). (Danics, 2007) “The strategy is the product of
highly creative mental activity combined with the application of scientific
knowledge. It expresses how the social system perceives its possible
responses to changes in the strategic environment in order to maintain the
optimal conditions for the fulfilment of its mission.” (Žídek, Cibáková,
2009) In a simplified form it can be argued that the security strategy is the
basic document of the state in the realm of security, which defines the main
starting points and goals for national security, describes the basic tools for
achieving these objectives and interests. This comprehensive strategy is
usually detailed in various partial strategies that stem from it.
Appropriate structure of the security strategy is as follows:
- determines the basic assumptions of the national security policy and
defines security interests;
- defines the security environment of the state in which it is located as
well as threats emanating from this environment;
- determines what tools and resources the state is willing and able to
use to ensure its internal and external security.
Formulation of the national security strategy is the task of the
government and the parliament. “The Security Strategy is the product of a
complex decision-making process. Its content expresses the intent to protect
the security interests of the state via influencing its security environment, i.e.
it represents a project that contains the answers to the questions: What the
state intends to do to protect its security interests, how it intends to do so
and with which means?” (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009) The development of the
strategy itself is a comprehensive analytical process, including designing and
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Jaroslav Ušiak
testing scenarios, defining resources, determining interests and goals, as well
as ways to achieve these goals. Creating a strategy is a complex process
consisting of two stages, as theorised by R. Žídek: (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009,
p. 77-87)
- Formulating a complex problem: a) delimiting the strategic
environment, b) determining the desired state; c) analysing the current
status of the strategic environment;
- Designing solutions to complex problems: a) formulating strategic
objectives b) the choice of methods, c) selection of means; d) risk
assessment of the proposed strategy.
Formulation of a comprehensive problem – at this stage of preparation
of the strategy we outline the preferred characteristics of the environment
compared to its current status – i.e. we determine the differences in the
strategic environment of the state.
- Delimiting the strategic environment - the state should be understood
as an element in a complex system – in the international political
system; therefore, only after comprehensive analysis of the entire
system we may define the structure of the system – i.e. the state and
its internal environment.
- Determining the desired state – at this stage the desired state of the
security environment of the state is determined. It is the ideal state we
want to achieve, i.e. the ideal conditions for its functioning and
fulfilment of its basic responsibilities. The aim is to promptly react to
the challenges and trends to which the environment in question is
exposed and that in the future could have a negative impact on the
functioning of the state.
- Analysing the current status of the strategic environment – analysis
takes place at two levels – external and internal, in form of thorough
review of trends, threats and challenges, which could have negative
consequences for the functioning of the state. The basic objective of
this phase is to identify all possible threats, risks and challenges the
state may confront when trying to achieve the ideal state that would
guarantee optimal conditions for its functioning and preservation of
its values. This phase takes place through the so-called “analysis, and
represents a simple analytical technique which can be used in all
situations requiring decision-making. It is based on summing up the
strategic situation for the purposes of deciding what ought to be done
to solve the complex problem and to achieve the desired state of the
object of interest.” (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009, p. 83) This analysis
provides answers to questions about strengths and weaknesses of the
actual environment in correlation with its desired state.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Designing solutions to complex problems – this phase leads directly to
designing solutions through validation of various scenarios to eliminate
selected negative elements in the security environment identified during the
preceding phase.
- Formulating strategic objectives – achieving of strategic goals is a
condition sine qua non achieving a desired state, including elimination
of challenges, threats and risks.
- The choice of methods – the use of structures the state has at its
disposal (both external – membership in alliances – and internal – its
own resources) to achieve defined objectives, ways of their
implementation and their optimisation.
- Selection of means – realistic assessment of available resources
(financial, material, human resources, support of allies, etc.) to achieve
strategic objectives taking into consideration methods chosen in the
previous stage.
- A risk assessment of the proposed strategy – “strategy = goals + ways
+ means”. (Žídek, Cibáková, 2009, p. 86) When formulating the
strategy all three elements should be optimised in order that the
overall strategy is functional in achieving the set objectives, i.e.
strategic concept.
***
Doctrine and strategy are often believed to denote the same theoretical
concept. This happens because both doctrine and strategy are political
concepts that are developed based on the analysis of the situation, the
definition of common objectives and selection of resources. (Krejčí, 2009, p.
20)
From the perspective of national defence, however, there is a noticeable
difference. Doctrines are usually formulated in the political environment
(policy analysis, political theory and theories of international relations). The
strategy, on the other hand, is initially associated with military science, as
evidenced by many historical works researching the phenomenon of war
since the period of Herodotus, G. I. Caesar, H. Grotius,
C. von Clausewitz, to modern military science of the 20th Century based on
three core elements – strategy, tactics and military sociology. (Kára, Rehák,
1971, p. 527) Formulation of strategies in the past had, nowadays still does
and in the future will preserve its fundamental importance in shaping the
position of the state in the international system and its orientation. This is so
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Jaroslav Ušiak
because it included the assessment of the position of the state in the
international environment, its basic postures both internally and externally,
simultaneously representing and creating the strategic culture of the state in
the doctrinal thinking.
From the above definitions we may conclude that strategic culture is a
broader concept in comparison with both doctrinal thinking and strategy,
even though these concepts remain closely connected. Strategic culture,
however, needs to be analysed from various perspectives. In particular we
refer to a historical perspective of state creation and/or disintegration, its
eventual annexation by a stronger state or empire entailing changing the
concept of national defence to defence of the interests of minority and its
value system (which, when connected to a greater entity is always in
jeopardy). Furthermore, we may speak of the cultivation of national
consciousness, language, culture, religious and patriotic ideas, and the pursuit
of self-determination. The result is creation of dichotomous structures in the
empire. If a state previously enjoyed autonomous development and at least
some degree of independence after losing these benefits it tends to create
structures that are contrary to the national interests of the empire, especially
any attempts at autonomous developments are suppressed or persecuted by
the central authority. Consequently, such structures are based and nourished
by stressing the national identity, mythologizing own history, thus bringing
the elements of patriotism, national pride and needs to “defend own
territory” to the strategic culture.
As a result, the strategic culture of large states or empires that in the
course of history enjoyed material help and knew how to make use of it for
their own benefit differs from the strategic culture of small states, which in
the course of history involuntarily became part of other units. Strategic
culture of large and powerful states has been shaped by geographical
circumstances such as the size of the territory, eventual territorial isolation,
natural resources and productivity of its exploitation, population, the ability
to solve internal political changes, economic development and its protection
through financial policy, customs, stability of the currency, religious
tolerance and establishment of central power. Internal and external
sovereignty have gradually become an integral part of strategic culture,
drawing on the principle of the rule of law, underpinned by an adequate
system of defence, but also by the principle of intervention. (Cygankov,
2003, p. 197)
The strategic culture of small states which have been losing their
independence throughout history has been shaped in different way. The
centrepiece of their strategic culture became not the defence, but the survival
of the nation and the preservation of national identity in a hostile
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
environment imposing involuntary assimilation. While the strategic culture
of large states has been outward-bound (i.e. focused on promoting the
national interest and power), the strategic culture of small states was inwardbound (i.e. focused on protecting their own cultural values, territory, and
identity due to the fact that the population lived in an assimilated
environment). Therefore, the “defence” for the small states was intrinsically
related to the question of sovereignty, resulting in the most important part of
the strategic culture of small and weak states – achievement of the status of
an independent state. In recent history we have witnessed a number of
groundbreaking periods during which based on international law this
element of the strategic culture has been legalised and supported. We refer
especially to the period of the Peace of Westphalia and Versailles system, the
era of decolonisation and the collapse of the bipolarity.
33
Jaroslav Ušiak
The Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
National security can only be formed on the basis of the existing political
system due to the fact that the existing system creates specific security
environment, causes its changes and conditions its development. When
referring to the security environment we understand it as a set of
phenomena and processes that surround an individual during his life and
represent a special significance and value for him. (Hofreiter, 2006, p. 57)
The security environment is a correlation entity that includes natural, cultural
and social environment, and at the same time, expressed the impact of
security entities in objective reality.
At the most basic level the security environment may be divided into
external and internal, or more precisely into immediate security environment
(state and neighbouring countries), close security environment (Europe –
participation in organisations such as Warsaw Pact, Comecon, the EU,
NATO, etc.), and remote security environment (areas of interest from the
purview of great powers – membership in the UN and other international
organisations). In both cases, the relations between the actors and the
objective reality are channelled thought the state and its political system. It
does so not only as an organisational unit of a society at a particular time and
place, but also as a particular set of institutions, bodies and rules designed to
protect the state’s own ideas, integrity, citizens, and to protect against
specific external threats, determined by the values underpinning the political
system of the state. This relationship also creates specific strategic culture
which differs depending on the fact whether we analyse great powers or
small states. In our analysis we focus the attention on four small to mediumsized states, which throughout the repeatedly lost their independence, and,
therefore, formed their own strategic culture on other grounds compared to
a great power. In many cases their primary objectives were not only the
defence of territory, but the very survival of the nation and the preservation
of national identity. “Small nations that were once independent state entities
survived thanks to the hope that the process of changing of their boundaries,
names, and maps would eventually stop, and that their defence would go
from purely emotional to actual. These nations in Central Europe,
historically derived from an independent state, for centuries were subject to
foreign invasions setting fires to their homes and changing their
surroundings into the battlefields. They were blackmailed from three sides,
34
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
and residents had only so much possession they could have saved with their
own hands. They did not know the meaning of freedom and they were
banned from using their own language. Foreign institutions and laws dictated
survival – and the choice was to adapt or to perish. National sentiments were
punishable by imprisonment or banishment. Therefore, those states are the
most vulnerable, unable to choose their own development or direction; they
had to join the others. It is this “joining the others” the terrible curse,
creating the deep rift and division inside the nation, resulting in further
weakening of internal forces. But the goal was very important, it was gaining
autonomy and independence. There is no such monument, which would
sufficiently commemorate those efforts.”(Szabóová, 1983)
Those words can also be used to describe the strategic culture of V4
countries. Its specifics are historically different in time when these states
were independent entities (Great Moravian Empire, rule of Přemyslids
Dynasty in Bohemia, Polish state), later, when they formed parts of other
empires (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were integrated into AustroHungarian Empire, and Poland was a part of Russia and Prussia), and when
they eventually achieved independence after World War I (following the
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dissolution of the Russian
Empire.) After World War II, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland became
part of the Soviet bloc, and since 1955 part of the Warsaw Pact. This process
took more than three decades and ended after the dissolution of the
USSR. His successor state Russia has abandoned any doctrinal – either
political or strategic – dominance in Central Europe. After 1993, when
Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic
and the V4 (Czech Republic, Republic of Poland, Slovak Republic and
Hungary) was established, the strategic culture of these countries gradually
began to take shape. It developed in very similar way in all these four
countries, i.e. towards membership in the NATO and EU structures. The
last two decades point to a convergence of strategic cultures of four analysed
countries.
Therefore, we have to responsibly analyse strategic culture and security
of Visegrad countries. We will try to analyse its linguistic, analytical and
informative significance, and how its planning and operational capabilities
are reflected in the practice of foreign and national security policy of these
states.
35
Jaroslav Ušiak
The Strategic Culture of the Czech Republic
Kde domov můj, kde domov můj?
Voda hučí po lučinách, bory šumí po skalinách,
v sadě skví se jara květ, zemský ráj to na pohled!
A to je ta krásná země, země česká domov můj,
země česká domov můj!8
(The National Anthem of the Czech Republic, verse 1)
Western Slavs – its Czech group settled in the 5th and 6th Centuries in the
area beyond the natural mountain border of the Sudeten and Carpathian
Mountains, and were part of the first empires in that geographic area. It was
Samo's Empire (625-660), Great Moravia (830-906) and, finally, historic state
of Přemyslids between 894-1306. During the existence of these state form
the transition from clan society to feudalism occured. Merging of new clans
joining the state structures allowed for the development of a nation,
completed during the period of 11th and 12th Centuries. (Wolf, 1979, p. 100)
The rule of Přemyslides ended in 1306 with the death of King Wenceslas
II. The next century Czech country remained in free association with the
Holy Roman Empire, but through personal unions it became from time to
time associated not only with its neighbours in the Empire, but also with the
Hungary and Poland. Personal unions has thus become an important
element in Europe’s geopolitical evolution, as some showed a high degree of
stability and determined the strategic culture of its members. Personal union
of the Habsburgs (Austrian, Czech and Hungarian territory) of 1526 gave
legal status to states forming the Habsburg monarchy. (Baar, 2000, p. 129)
Significant changes in the internal policy of the state, however, occurred
already a century earlier.
In 1452 Jiří of Poděbrady ascended the throne as a king of Bohemia.
During his reign, in the years 1452-1458 the Czech territory was subjected to
a dual threat. The first was internal, related to religious disputes associated
with the emergence of the historical ideology. Its essence is the
groundbreaking use of certain religious categories, such as the law of God
and the Bible. A new understanding of religion under the influence of the
8 Where is my home, where is my home? Water roars across the meadows, Pinewoods rustle among
crags, The garden is glorious with spring blossom, Paradise on earth it is to see. And this is that beautiful
land, The Czech land, my home, The Czech land, my home.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
English philosopher J. Wycliffe, widely advocated by the Czech priest
Jan Hus attempted to clean the Church from undesirable phenomena such
as accumulating wealth, buying indulgences and increasing
politicisation. Hussite ideology is divided into two streams, bourgeois one,
concentrated around Prague University and rural-plebeian stream,
concentrated around the town of Tabor where, in the years 1419-1421 a
community has formed focusing not only on the criticism of the religion, but
also on the critique the whole feudal society. The Hussite movement belongs
to the reformist movement and is considered to be the first and largest antifeudal movement in Central Europe, which was formed mainly from poor
families. The demands of justice, in particular the reform of the Church
preached by J. Hus and P. Chelčický led to the creation of the Hussite
army, active on national soil against troops of the Papal curia. Its
members Jan Žižka and Prokop the Great became the symbols of just war
and the liberation of the society from feudal oppression. Hussites had an
elaborated combat strategy based on new types of weapons, a new type of
leadership and new logistics. Some famous battles were fought domestically,
but they also undertook numerous campaigns outside the Czech territory –
the so-called “graceful rides”. Between 1428 and 1433 the Hussites
dominated also Slovakia. Bourgeoisie offshoot of the Hussite ideology,
however, eroded over time, since the Hussite wars hindered the
development of agriculture, crafts and trade. Domestic anti-Hussite “Lord’s
unity” was created, which in the battle of Lipany (1434) ended the militant
history of the Hussite movement. A revolutionary idea for a resurgence of
the Church and society, however, lingered in the society, thus forming the
basic strategic tradition of the Czech nation.
Installing Jiří of Poděbrady to the throne represented a solution to
fading but still influential Hussite ideology, as he had support of both
Catholic leaders and opposition. Jiří of Poděbrady was indeed called the
“Hussite king” but after the election he swore obedience to the Pope and
promised to persecute the Czech heretics, i.e. adherents of radical Hussites.
However, he did not comply and was deposed, the Pope interdicted
him. The second, external threat, to which Jiří of Poděbrady had to
respond was the Turkish invasion of the Balkans and Central Europe. He
believed that Turkish invasion could not be effectively met by force of one
country, and, therefore, he drafted a proposal for peace confederation of
states to defend against the Turks. From 1465 to 1467 he sent various
diplomatic messages to Western Europe: In France he found support from
the important diplomat Antonio Marini. Peace Confederation of States,
however, did not materialise, because it was considered not only as a means
37
Jaroslav Ušiak
of defence against Turkish expansion, but eventually also as the means to
challenge the dominance of papal power. (Veselý, 2003)
The Hussite movement, however, has left its mark in the Czech strategic
culture. The society progressed towards certain kind of modern
emancipation, first through the Czech revolt against the Emperor
Ferdinand, and the strengthening of Czech Estates’ offices, as well as the
development of humanistic literature and education. In 1575 the socalled Confessio Bohemica was drafted and presented to the emperor. It was
the text of a joint settlement and confirmation of faith, which was vetted by
the Calixtines and the Catholic nobility. The emperor, however, did not
confirm this document.
In 1615 the General Assembly convened in Prague, calling for the
protection of Czech language and cultural heritage. By the emperor,
however, it was seen as a rebellion, which later resulted in the Czech Estates
uprising in the 1618. Resistance continued until 1620 and was directed
against the Habsburgs. In 1619 the Czech side to choose a new king - the
Elector Palatine Frederick I. (in Czech Fridrich Falcký), which only
worsened relations between the Habsburgs and the Czech lands. The revolt
culminated in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 where it was violently
repressed by the imperial troops, its leaders were executed and a year later
Counter-Reformation decree was issued, reinforcing the re-Catholicisation in
the area. Bohemia was involved by the direct participation as well as by the
consequences in the Thirty Years War. The Czech Estates Revolt of 1618 is
referred to as its beginning. The war ended with the Peace of Westphalia
(1648) which also predestined the fate of Czech lands.
Following the Peace of Westphalia Bohemia has become an integral part
of the Habsburg monarchy until 1918. The internal security of the Czech
territory has been threatened more than ever by poverty, violent reCatholicisation, strengthening serfdom hindered economic development and
national efforts were ever accepted by the Habsburgs. (Mrva, Kamenický,
Tonková, Valachovič, 1997) From 1653 to 1655 census of the Czech
population was carried out, the population fell by 50% in comparison with
the beginning of the century, and the demographics further deteriorated as a
consequence of a plague epidemic in the years 1679-1680.
Nobility, which in past centuries represented one of the revolutionary
forces in society, has become increasingly conservative, diverted from the
national interest. Transformational forces were becoming poorer sections of
the society. This was due to several measures adopted by the Habsburgs,
including the strengthening serfdom duties and any suppression of
freedoms. In 1680 took place a large peasant revolt in north-western
Bohemia, in the 1695 uprising of serfs in Moravia and southern Bohemia.
38
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Rákóczi’s uprising in Hungary (1704-1711) also resonated in Bohemia. On
the other hand, the Czech lands witnessed development of manufacture
production, support for guilds, which meant improving the standard of
living to the extent that it led to increased birth rate and reduced child
mortality. (Mrva, Kamenický, Tonková, Valachovič, 1997)
Development was interrupted by war of Austrian Succession in the years
1741-1763, in which the Czechs lost territory of Upper and Lower Silesia
and Kladsko (Northern Bohemia) in favour of Prussia. At the same time in
these years centralistic and statist administrative reforms took place, which
were directed mainly against the poorer strata of the society. Germanisation,
which was associated with this reform, was one of the reasons of national
revival, which had a major impact on changing the concept of strategic
culture. The literary form of national revival took inspiration from the
models of the past. Czech language, history and art became subject of
thorough study. Personalities of the past were glorified, especially those
related to national defence, the protection of Czech identity and
sovereignty. In the 18th Century Bohemia did not witness a war, apart from
the aforementioned wars of Austrian Succession, but this was century when
serfdom was abolished, compulsory education was introduced, new factories
of heavy industry were built, and the first sections of the railway line opened.
This development also fostered other civic activities in 19 th
Century. Various associations established to protect the Czech industry and
Czech culture reinforced their position, inevitably aiming at national selfdetermination. Bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848-1849 led to a
proposal to drawn up a petition to the emperor. This petition contained
request to restore constitutional integrity of the Czech lands, equality Czechs
and Germans in all areas, the introduction of self-government authorities,
freedom of press and assembly. In 1848 the first constitution was
proclaimed, initially only as a draft. On April 10, 1848 Czech National
Committee was established, greatly influencing geopolitical position of the
Czech lands though its activities. František Palacký, an important
personality of the Committee, wrote to Frankfurt, where the discussions on
establishment of the German Confederation were ongoing, that Czech lands
were opposed to the possible participation if the Confederation. He also
rejected participation in the Congress inclusion in a future unified Germany.
Amendment of the Constitution, published in 1848, was further
amended by the imposed March Constitution in 1849. In political practice,
this meant the imposition of ruler’s supreme power – in this case the power
of Austrian Emperor, without negotiations with the representatives of the
people (nations of the Habsburg monarchy). This tendency was further
strengthened by the October Diploma of 1860 representing a continuation
39
Jaroslav Ušiak
of the so-called Bach’s absolutism. In January 1862 Czech society and
members of the Czech association Sokol responded to these changes. They
initiated a period of passive resistance to the Vienna Imperial Council and
ceased to attend its meetings.
The Revolution of 1848 had far-reaching consequences for the Czech
lands. They found themselves in the sphere of interest of the two Germanspeaking powers, i.e. Austrian Empire, hereditary of the Czech crown, and
Germany, which have sought to include this area in German
Confederation. The Slav Congress in Prague (1948) rejected both
orientations, when the attending most prominent leaders of ethnic
movements opted for the so-called Austro-Slavism, meaning the recognition
of the unifying forces of Austria while preserving national specificities. For
the Czech government and nationality, however, internal situation in Austria
remained unfavourable. Bach’s absolutism was marked by ethnic and
political oppression, which in Bohemia meant the end of the attempts to
establish municipal government, to use the Czech language in schools and
offices, as well as the end of many associations. Consequently, the
progressive strata of Czech society began to lean more to the idea of PanSlavism and to Russia. It is not possible to speak of the Czech strategic
culture in terms of state security, for it has been limited to ideational form as
a party of the broader national revival. In practical terms, everything related
to security and military strategies has been addressed within the purview of
the foreign policy of Austrian Empire, where the participation of the Czech
population in the army was only to the extent of fulfilling its obligations to
the monarchy. In the first two decades after the revolution of 1848-1849
Austria has been entangled in many wars, often being on the brink of war
herself. The situation was critical due to the fact that state devoured in
internally destabilising ethnic conflicts became engaged in inter-state
conflicts.
The situation in Europe, however, has changed dramatically in the
second half of the 19th Century. New, often contradictory policy concepts
were introduced. Republicanism questioned absolutism, liberalism stood in
opposition to conservatism, and visions of upholding the multinational
empire clashed with the quest for self-determination and national
sovereignty based. Austria at this time alienated many countries and required
the nations of her Empire to uphold the same position. In the Crimean War
in 1853, Russia expected aid from Austria. Austria did not intervene to help
her ally for she wanted to get territory of Moldova and Wallachia. In 1859
Austria suffered a crushing defeat at Solferino, resulting in a major foreign
policy fiasco.
40
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Rivalry within the German Confederation has resulted in conflict with
the greatest adversary Prussia, which was the cause of bloody PrussianAustrian war in 1866. For the Czech lands, as part of the monarchy, this
meant forced participation in the war without any strategic plan. Last decade
of the 19th Century a large-scale industrial revolution took place in Bohemia,
accompanied by a requirement to reform social legislation and
education. Political parties were created (National Socialist Party, the
Catholic National Party, Social Democracy et al.). Reforms in the army were
requested, together with the right of universal suffrage. During 1903-1909
strong anti-militarist movement formed the Czech lands in response to the
need to fight on foreign battlefields for the interests of the Austrian
Empire. Already during the World War I, when Czech soldiers had to submit
to general mobilisation, T. G. Masaryk spoke at a conference in Geneva
(July 6, 1915) against Austria-Hungary and the participation of Czech
soldiers in the war, which is “not ours”. (Charvát, 1980, p. 165)
At the same time, 28° Prague Regiment operating in the Carpathian
Mountains defected on the Russian side as an expression of opposition to
the monarchy.
In 1918, when the Pittsburgh Agreement was adopted a new period of
Czech strategic culture and thinking commenced, with a milestone on
October 28, 1918 when the Czechoslovak state was declared.
The declaration of an independent state was preceded by several political
programs formulated by representatives of exile and expatriate clubs of both
Czech and Slovak nations. Personalities, who gave to these programs a single
foreign policy dimension, were T. G. Masaryk, Eduard Beneš and
Milan Rastislav Štefánik. A new state was to include Czech, Slovak and
Moravian historical territory, even territory in the east of Slovakia inhabited
by Ruthenians. This delineation of the future state was based, especially for
T. G. Masaryk, in strategic and security considerations regarding the
borders of the future state. Therefore, the territory of the future state was
shaped in a way that the Peace Conference could be presented as a nationally
interconnected and monolithic. (Veselý, 2009, p. 7)
Thus, the question of a new state has been put forward at the Paris Peace
Conference, where the most important issue, however, was a peace treaty
with Hungary The Treaty of Trianon resolved this issue.
In terms of internal security of the new state there existed several risk
factors, in particular economic and social asymmetries as Slovakia (especially
the Carpathian Ruthenia) stood in very unfavourable position in comparison
to Czech lands. Another problem was national minorities – German one in
the Czech Republic, and foremost Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
41
Jaroslav Ušiak
T. G. Masaryk opined that the resolution of these problems it is a matter of
time and that nothing should be forcibly accelerated.
External threats to strategic culture of a medium sized democratic state
were associated with the development of the European security environment
in 1920s and 1930s. In Slovakia, there were Hungarian revisionist efforts and
tendencies, and Czech Republic struggled with positive response to the Nazi
ideology, which in 1930s found its adherent especially in the Czech
borderland. Slovakia had a significant role in the new state, particularly in
terms of national defence – it represented a space where defence forces
could be concentrated in the event of German aggression of Czech
territories. Therefore, in Slovakia was primarily strengthened capacity
building in the arms industry. (Veselý, 2009, p. 10)
Many historians believe that in the case of positive developments
Czechoslovak strategic culture would have developed in a positive direction
and would have become one of the pillars of Central European security. This
assumption is based on historical facts – neither the northern nor eastern
neighbours endanger the new state. The ideological influence of the Soviet
Union in democratic Czechoslovakia did not pose an acute threat.
Czechoslovakia was an ally of the United Kingdom and France, which
guaranteed its external security. Democratisation brought in positive changes
in the social and ethnic areas. At the end of 1930s, however, the
development was not favourable. Western European powers, especially
Great Britain, began a policy of appeasement based on the belief that
conflicts can be solved by peaceful means. Paradoxically, the abovementioned approach has been used to answer also Hitler’s “national”
requirements and requirements concerning the Anschluss of Germanspeaking countries, including part of Czechoslovakia.
Implementation of the policy of appeasement culminated in the Munich
Agreement (1938), in Czechoslovakia called the Munich betrayal. When on
September, 29-30 Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy signed this
Agreement, Czechoslovakia found itself in danger. On March 15, 1939
German troops entered the Czech territory and started the occupation. On
the Slovak territory an independent Slovak state was established, meaning
the break-up of the republic.
World War II in Czechoslovakia brought about the innovation of
strategic culture in two ways. Separate Czech and Slovak resistance
movements were formed, thus both states became part of the anti-Hitler
coalition. Especially Slovak National Uprising was a decisive event that
allowed for the restoration of the common state at the end of the war,
expressed in the so-called “Košice Government program” (April 1945). In
its VI Chapter Slovakia has not declared herself only as part of
42
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Czechoslovakia, but as an autonomous entity with its own legislative (Slovak
National Council) and executive (Board of Commissioners) bodies. (Mrva,
Kamenický, Tonková, Valachovič, 1997)
In terms of internal policy and internal security the development of postwar Czechoslovakia was very dynamic. Main bone of contention, however,
was no longer the question of the degree of autonomy of Slovakia, but the
overall direction of the internal political regime, which after February 1948
clearly leaned towards a policy of converting the democracy into the socalled socialist democracy under the leadership of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (CPC). Czechoslovakia became one of the first pillars of the
Soviet bloc. This change reflected in the strategic culture in two ways:
- Dealing with a so-called internal enemy (bourgeois ideology, Church,
certain forms of dissent, opponents of the policy of CPC), which
resulted in staged political processes and political assassinations,
negative change in policy towards Church, but mainly in complete
ideologicization of power components - military, police, security
agents.
- Rejecting the impact of Western culture and ideology in all spheres of
politics, economics, culture, foreign and security policy. In 1995
Czechoslovakia became a member of the Comecon and the Warsaw
Pact.
Both these tendencies determined the strategic culture of the state for
nearly four decades. The state has become dependent on the decisions of
Moscow and drifting away from the official ideology resulted in
repression. The military was founded on the principle of the leading role of
the Communist Party and socialist internationalism.
Crisis years of 1968-1969 meant a change in strategic culture on the
grounds that the official ideology transformed into new forms soft, the socalled “socialism with a human face”, entailing elements of liberalism and
market economy. The political opposition had more space for their activities,
especially in the cultural sphere, and was supported by many civic
initiatives. This was seen as a deviation from the centre, as a threat to the
Communist bloc. The consequence was the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops
in Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968. This aggression has been justified in
two ways:
- internal violation of sovereignty built on socialist state establishment
(state sovereignty derived from the socialist establishment)
- “invitation” issued by the Communist Party leaders, who demanded
Moscow to counter the negative developments in Czechoslovakia,
unmanageable by internal resources.
43
Jaroslav Ušiak
Both justifications are still being discussed by the historians, political
scientists, theorists of International Relations and professional soldiers, as
they both had far-reaching consequences for the further development of
ČSR and the development of the situation in the entire Soviet bloc.
Czechoslovak army during these events maintained impartiality, there
have been conflicts (including fatalities) only among residents and members
of the intervention forces. It can be assumed that this attitude of the army
and its high representatives was correct, and helped to avoid bloodshed and
perhaps even civil war. It can be concluded that in this paradoxical situation
army really served the people and demonstrated the strategic culture based
on good judgement and tactics.
Development of Czechoslovakia in the years 1969-1989 has been similar
to other countries of Central Europe. Despite fierce normalisation9 it was
not possible to stop the tendencies aimed at elimination of the one party
system. State armed forces have always been the executor of decisions
adopted by the political elites, but during these two decades the army
maintained a significantly positive status in society. Internally, however, the
army gradually began to be considered oversized in relation to the needs of
state security forces. Moreover, it has been greatly influenced by the State
Security Service (STB). Changes in strategic culture were approaching along
with the speeding up of the democratisation process, first in the declaratory
form (Charter 75), then the growth of dissident movements and inclination
toward the model personalities who fought for democratisation (e.g. student
movement, followers of Ján Palach, underground movement in culture,
conceptual changes in the foreign policy towards neighbouring and other
countries).
Years 1989 - 1993 were groundbreaking in the history of Czechoslovakia,
for the state ceased to exist peacefully, and the two successor states – Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic were formed.
The term normalisation comes from the Moscow Protocol of 1968, in which the Czechoslovak leaders
committed to achieve normalisation of conditions in the country on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. It
was a milder form of oppression compared to Stalinism of 1950s. Although there were no judicial
murders, the armies of the Warsaw Pact were dislocated on the territory of Czechoslovakia throughout
this period.
9
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
The Strategic Culture of the Slovak Republic
Nad Tatrou sa blýska, hromy divo bijú.
Zastavme ich, bratia, veď sa ony stratia, Slováci ožijú.
To Slovensko naše posial tvrdo spalo,
ale blesky hromu vzbudzujú ho k tomu, aby sa prebralo.10
(The National Anthem of the Slovak Republic, verse 1-2)
Any politico-military change that took place in Central Europe,
influenced the development of Slovak security environment.11 As the first
politico-military event of importance that took place in this area might be
considered the dominance of the Roman Empire, when the territory of
Slovakia for the first time came into contact with military events. This period
can be dated around the year 179 AD (at that time the Roman army defeated
the barbarians) and afterwards the territory of Slovakia became for a long
time a neighbour of the Roman Empire, at the so-called axis Limes
Romanus.
Slavs living on the territory of today's Slovakia were particularly exposed
to invasions of the Avars. This did not change until 623, when an open
struggle broke out between Slavs and Avars. Under the leadership of
the Frankish merchant Samo Slavs managed to defeat in an open battle
Avars and the South-Western Slovakia, South Moravia and North-Eastern
Austria created a tribal union. Later on a union has been forced on Western
Slavic tribes – which led to creation of the first state organisation of Slavs –
Great Moravia. Disintegration of the Great Moravian Empire has been
caused by numerous military incursions of old Hungarian, until finally in
1018 the entire territory of today’s Slovakia has been incorporated into
Hungarian state. (Nižňanský, 1993)
Another important milestone was the 11th and 12th Century military
clashes between the Hungarian, Czech and Polish State. Of course, we
cannot forget the internal unrest in 14th Century caused by Matúš Čák of
Trenčín, who rebelled against the central state power. At the end of the 14th
Lighting flashes over the Tatra, the thunder pounds wildly. Let them pause, brothers, they will surely
disappear, the Slovaks will revive. This Slovakia of ours has been fast asleep until now. But the thunder
and lighting are encouraging it to come alive.
11 Under the term Slovak security environment we understand the security environment in Central
Europe, which influenced Slovak (Slavic) tribes, and that during the historical development changed the
borders of the empires and states (in particular rivalry of Germanic and Russian influence).
10
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Century the territory of the Hungarian has been subject to the incursions of
the Ottoman Empire, expanding its power and territorial space. Ottoman
advances instilled fear also in Western European countries, steering them to
help Hungary by sending their troops. After this period, the Slovak territory
came into the immediate neighbourhood with the Turks in the Balkans and
under the influence of the Habsburgs as part of the Habsburg Empire.
In 1526 at the Battle of Mohacs Turkish Sultan Suleiman the
Magnificent defeated Hungarian and Czech army led by King Louis II. of
the reigning Jagellon dynasty. The king himself was killed in this battle,
which meant that the Austrian Duke Ferdinand Habsburg claimed his
entitlement to the Czech-Hungarian throne after the deceased king. In
Slovakia, however, he had a strong opponent – Ján Zápoľský. Strong
Habsburg monarchy, however, strategically exceeded Slovak influence in
Hungary, especially after Ferdinand Habsburg led increasingly successful
campaign against the Turks. Ferdinand Habsburg laid the foundations of
future Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The situation got complicated by a
number of partial Turkish victories as well as by war between the Habsburgs
and the Turks in the Balkans in the years 1593-1606. Initially successful
military and diplomatic strategy of the Viennese Court during the war with
Turks had to face also internal security threats, most importantly numerous
uprisings with anti-Austrian character (revolts of Transylvanian and
Hungarian aristocracy, as well as Estates revolts combining Slovak and
Hungarian demands). Formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had
therefore also security connotations because the period of its inception
overlapped with the Thirty Years War and numerous anti-Habsburg revolts.
The centre of these revolts was the Slovak territory. In 1619
Gabriel Bethlen with the help of disgruntled members of the Hungarian
Estates started his campaign to support the rebellion in Bohemia against the
Habsburg monarchy. The rebellion in Bohemia began with the
defenestration in Prague in 1618 and led to the Thirty Years’ War. Only in
1622 G. Bethlen signed compromise peace with the Emperor
Ferdinand II.
Resistance against the Turks in the territory of Hungary culminated
during the years 1663-1664, after the German Empire provided military and
material assistance and Emperor Leopold I. defeated the Turks. Liberation
War against the Ottoman Empire, however, lasted until 1699, when joined
forces of German, Polish and Austrian-Hungarian armies took over the
territories in Hungary which were under the control of the Turkish pashaliks
for previous 150 years. (Gonionskij, 1967) Strategic culture of Slovakia
incorporated also the ideas of the Enlightenment, which has resonated
during the anti-Turkish resistance, but always had also anti-Habsburg
46
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
connotations (liberating people from the rule of absolutism, as one of the
ideals of the Enlightenment). The last great anti-Habsburg revolt took place
with the active support of France in the years 1703-1711 under the
leadership of František II. Rákoczi. The revolt ended with the Szatmár
peace in 1711 and the Habsburgs were confirmed as hereditary rulers of
Hungary. (Gonionskij, 1967)
The very existence of the Slovak nation as part of the Hungarian state
under the influence of the Habsburgs was marked by injustice and
oppression - re-Catholicisation, Counter-Reformation measures and so forth.
These efforts led to revolts and armed conflicts (1604-1867). These years
have brought many changes to the organisation of military units as well – in
1715 joint standing army of Austria and Hungary was established. The actual
Estates revolts culminated in the early revolutionary years of 1848-1849,
during which the Slovaks M. M. Hodža, J. M. Hurban, Ľ. Štúr created
Slovak National Council in Vienna. Slovaks expected that in exchange for
the assistance they provided to Vienna it would in turn fulfil given promises
– providing solution to national oppression and social injustice. During this
period, the Slovaks for the first time created their own armed troops. These
promises, however, did not materialise, and a dual state of Austria – Hungary
has been established, leaving Slovak territory under Hungarian
administration. (Nižňanský, 1993)
Slovakia under both Hungarian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire
remained only a minor enclave. Despite the fact that until the early modern
period the working language of all scholars was Latin this area maintained its
own language (the popular language). Ethnically, culturally and to some
extent also religiously, it constituted a homogeneous unit resistant to
attempts at assimilation into Hungary. Politically and administratively-wise it
adapted to the situation in the empire, but at the same time it maintained the
internal cultural identity. In many aspects its strategic culture was identical to
the ones of Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, in particular with regard
to more than two hundred years of Turkish threat, however, had its own
historical symbols and myths as testimonies of the Slovak patriotism and
national pride, always with an emphasis on national values.
It is a special ability of Slovak identity that from the 18th Century
onwards Hungarian liberalism, Viennese conservatism and Slovak
nationalism co-existed side by side. This inner identity was presented as a
resistance current in both Vienna and Budapest, but not strong enough to
cause internal security problems to the monarchy. (Rupnik, 1992) Until the
revolutionary years of 1848-1849 Slovak question has been presented mainly
as a cultural problem. In this respect, there were crucial differences between
the national liberation movements in Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and the
47
Jaroslav Ušiak
Czech Republic. In Hungary it was a matter of honour – Hungarian nobility
could not bear the superiority of Vienna, thus revolts were always had antiHabsburg character. In the Czech Republic and Poland, the national
liberation movements were aiming at political independence. In Slovakia,
however, the situation was different. Despite the wide agitation campaign
national liberation never comprised the entire nation. Evangelical
intelligentsia has been particularly active, fulfilling also the role at present
provided by the mass-media. The autochthonous Slovak aristocracy, nobility,
middle classes but also the peasantry were rather indifferent to the
revolutionary efforts to liberate the nation. The idea of Pan-Slavism proved
to be stronger than the national idea, emphasising the need to prevent the
assimilation of the Slavic peoples in Germanic identity of the Habsburg
Empire and its opposition to Pan-Germanism. The idea of Pan-Slavism was
seen as an alternative, as a Slavic unity, not in the Habsburg Empire but
under the protective aegis of Russia. Spiritually, Pan-Slavism stemmed from
the ideology of Russian Slavophilism rejecting Western cultural
model. Strategic connotations of Pan-Slavism were, however,
contradictory. By putting Russia into the centre of attention of Slavs,
Ľ. Štúr, a member of the Hungarian parliament and a significant figure in
Slovak national liberation movement in the first half of the 19 th Century,
paradoxically caused a split in the idea of “unity of all Slavic people”. Poland
could not accept the concept due to its vassal status in Tsarist Russia. In the
Czech Republic a tendency to Austro-Slavism prevailed and Hungarian
intelligentsia also perceived Russia as an enemy (especially after the defeat at
Világos in 1849), while it never belonged ethnically or shared sympathy for
the Slavic tribes.
Štúr’s concept of unification of Slavs, or more precisely of the nations of
Central and wider Central Europe, which should be a guarantee of conflictfree development of the territory under the motto: “it is time to reach the
agreement, brothers!” has not been fulfilled. (Štúr, 1993)
The Štúr’s heritage for future strategic orientation of Slovakia proved
ambivalent. On one side it marked the beginning of an awareness of the
possibility of creating an independent nation state, and it is worth asking a
question whether without this epoch Slovak ethnic community would even
survive. On the other hand, precisely at this stage de-linking with the West
began which until then represented our historical, cultural and civilisational
space, culminating in the aggressive and intolerant form of East-West
relations after World War II. (Rupnik, 1992)
The biggest impact on our military history had the World War I, which
has been fought also on the territory of present-day Slovakia. During this
period, the Slovaks participated in Austro-Hungarian army. This hectic
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
period accelerated social change, raised awareness of the role of military
force in social organisation and about the possibilities of its engagement in
the struggle for national liberation – that initiated the creation of the
Czechoslovak Legions. National resistance movement was in many cases a
prerequisite for declaring the attempts to form a new nation-state. This joint
Czechoslovak effort culminated in the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty
and the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state. After the war,
the newly independent Czechoslovakia began to build its own army and its
National Assembly enacted the Defence Act in 1920.
Versailles system newly shaped the international security environment;
however, by its very character it also established the elements of inequality
between states. Although League of Nations has been created, it lacked tools
for peacekeeping; consequently, it lacked the mechanism by means of which
the states could create their own security policies so as to not contradict the
common interest. In practice, these shortcomings were revealed in the
national interests of several states (USSR, China, and Germany). Since the
Versailles system was built on the power and strength of the victorious
powers which decided to apply their will regardless of the defeated powers.
Later on, when the victorious powers began to disagree – development
supported by their increasingly differing power potentials – the system
started to gradually break down and paved way for the emergence of a new
conflict. Another failure of this system was the weakness of the League of
Nations, which failed to prevent the encroachments of the Nazi regime in
Germany, leading to the World War II.
World War II brought to the military history of Czechoslovakia strong
ideological and political orientation. Marked by a long-standing oppression
of nations, especially Slovaks began to resist harsh Czechoslovakism leading
to the unbridled nationalism. Under the influence of war events the
independent Slovak State has been created, with its political leaders leaning
strongly towards the Nazi Germany. The change of political course has been
brought about by the popular resistance movements and Slovak National
Uprising, thanks to which Slovakia emerged among the victorious powers
after the end of war. The World War II and its aftermath newly revived “big
themes” of international relations – the question of sovereignty of states and
the question of division of spheres of influence in the global
environment. Efforts to create the United Nations reflected the real situation
in the international environment, characterised by efforts to preserve world
peace after overcoming two world wars. The United Nations was established
as “an international organisation to protect the peace, to guarantee social
progress and human rights, as well as to increase welfare of the states.”
(Bělina, 1995, p. 237) In this regard, the emergence of the United Nations
49
Jaroslav Ušiak
denotes the beginning of era of delegating portions of state sovereignty on
transnational actors – on a higher authority, which should ensure the
protection of national security. This process continued with the emergence
of two regional security organisations. Already at Potsdam Conference initial
discrepancies between the United States and the USSR started to show off,
eventually ending up in the bipolar division of the world with two regional
security organisations - NATO (US block) and the Warsaw Pact (Soviet
bloc). Czechoslovakia came under the influence of the Soviet bloc for a long
time, and this affected her not only in its ideological, but also economic and
security aspects.
After World War II Czechoslovakia has been twice included in the
agenda of the UN (Security Council). First time it was in 1948, after
Communist takeover in February, which was presented in the West as a
coup d’état. In fact, it consisted of the resignations of twelve non-communist
ministers due to personal changes in the security forces. Then
President E. Beneš and accepted the resignations and entrusted the Prime
Minister K. Gottwald (CPC) to form a new government. This meant the
victory of the Communist Party in all aspects of horizontal and vertical
power-sharing. (Michálek, 1997, p. 28) Except the Western press, which
considered these events to be result of USSR’s meddling in internal
development of Czechoslovakia, several personalities refused to accept the
new status. Diplomat Ján Papánek, Czechoslovak ambassador to the UN
handed a protest note to the Secretary General Trygve Lie regarding a
breach of internal security of the state by annulling the democratic elections
of 1946. Communist Party was promised assistance from the USSR,
including the use of armed force if necessary, to preserve the system
established by February 1948. After several meetings at the United
Nations Ján Papánek summed up the situation as follows: seizure of power
in Czechoslovakia by the Communist Party with the help of the Soviet
Union constituted a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, he
requested to submit the issue to the UN Security Council
meeting. (Michálek, 1997, p. 29) Czechoslovakia question was discussed by
the UNSC on March 17 at its 268th session, but it was discussed also in the
coming days. The negotiations were very dramatic, the USSR has been
represented its Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko, who
defended the position of the Soviet Union by stating that the USSR only
respected the will of the Czechoslovak people. Furthermore, he asserted that
in the event of the vote on this issue in the UN Security Council, he would
vote against the resolution condemning the events in Czechoslovakia
because it would represent an interference with the sovereignty of the
Czechoslovak state. (Michálek, 1997, p. 35) When voting on this issue the
50
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Soviet Union used its veto power. The inquiry into the events in
Czechoslovakia which took place in 1948 was attempted once again in 1955,
when the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold recommended to the UN
Security Council members to exclude the Czechoslovak question from the
agenda.
The second time the Czechoslovak question has been raised in the UN
Security Council on August 23, 1968, after the intervention of Warsaw Pact
troops into Czechoslovakia. (Hájek, 1970) The Soviet Union, France, Great
Britain as well as the United States voted against the recognition of
intervention as an act of aggression. Particularly from the perspective of the
United State this intervention has been considered as an exclusively Soviet
issue. In this period the United States dealt with its own foreign policy
priority, i.e. negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms
(SALT), which was not feasible without the positive attitude of the
USSR. The question of Czechoslovakia was withdrawn from UNSC session,
which de facto legalised intervention of the USSR and the four countries of
the Warsaw Pact in terms of compliance with international law. (Pástor,
2004, p. 23)
There were, however, more reasons for the withdrawal of the
intervention of the UN Security Council meeting, not only SALT
negotiations. This was mainly European détente period, which was between
1960-1970 considered to be an essential pillar of both European and EuroAtlantic security strategy. There were also events and internal political crisis
in the context of student riots in several countries of Western Europe. The
most important reason, however, were preparations for future Helsinki
Conference and the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy “from confrontation
to negotiation”. (Davies, 2000, p. 137) Strategic culture Czechoslovakia has
been affected in two ways by these attitudes of UN Security Council and the
international community generally. They confirmed the wisdom of
politicians and the leadership of the armed forces of the state to protect
primarily the internal security and not to intervene at times of social
unrest. In 1968, neutrality and passivity of the army was purposeful and
pragmatic, in order to avoid the possibility of bloodshed and breakout of
civil war. On the other hand, it confirmed the historical experience that the
problems of small states in the international environment are addressed only
if it is in the interests of the great powers. Small state has almost limitless
possibilities to become part of mainstream security currents and thus also its
strategic culture has to been seen as such, i.e. focused more on soft security
and cultivating tools that prefer this type of security.
The inception of modern Slovak history has been brought about only
with the dissolution of the bipolar division of the world. An important role
51
Jaroslav Ušiak
has been played by economic integration and transformation. All these
factors have gradually eroded the existing bipolar structures and blurred the
lines between block antagonisms. (Horemuž, 2009; Horemuž, Klus, 2011)
Solving problems in the security environment though power mechanisms
has become intolerable both in the Euro-Atlantic and the post-Soviet space.
However, new security challenges have appeared, and a newly formed state –
the Czechoslovak Federative Republic – had to address them.
Paradoxically, change of the strategic culture of Czechoslovakia in this
direction occurred only after the split in 1993, when two independent states
have been established – the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. The
division took place without disrupting the internal security of the old state
and also without endangering the security of the newly formed states, which
in broader Central Europe in the period of 1990s represents one of the rare
cases. It also shows the orientation of the former Czechoslovakia on soft
security.
The Strategic Culture of the Republic of Poland
Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła kiedy my żyjemy,
Co nam obca przemoc wzięła, szablą odbierzemy.
Marsz, marsz, Dąbrowski, z ziemi włoskiej do Polski.
Za twoim przewodem, złączym się z narodem.
Przejdziem Wisłę, przejdziem Wartę, będziem Polakami.
Dał nam przykład Bonaparte, jak zwyciężać mamy.12
(The National Anthem of the Republic of Poland, verse 1-3)
The origins of Polish strategic culture date back to the 10th Century,
when the Polish tribes belonging to the Western Slavs settled in the area of
Vistula River. The tribes were unified by prince Mieszko of the Piast
Dynasty, who derived the name of the future state from his tribe – the
Polani. Further unification of tribes came under the rule of Boleslaw I. of
Poland (Boleslaw the Brave), who joined the tribal area of Polana with
Lusatia, Pomerania and Galicia, and reign as the first Polish prince between
992-1025, later becoming the first Polish king. This territorial unit had from
Poland has not yet died, so long as we still live. What the alien power has seized from us we shall
recapture with a sabre. March, march, Dąbrowski, to Poland from the Italian land. Under your command
we shall rejoin the nation. Like Czarniecki to Poznań returned across the sea to save his homeland after
the Swedish partition.
12
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
the very beginning to face raids of other tribes from the South-East (Kievan
Ruthenia), West (German knightly orders) and South (the Přemyslids). As a
strategic decision proved to be the adoption of Christianity and the
establishment of the Archbishopric of Gniezno, which rid the Polish of
German tribes ecclesiastical influence. Throughout the 11th to 13th Century
Polish territory oscillated between consolidation and weakness, depending
on the raids of nearby Polabian and Russian tribes, with the Krakow
principality being the strongest centre. (Charvát, 1980, p. 118-119)
The importance of Polish territory as a stable Slavic settlement was
twofold: in the early Middle Ages it created the conditions for cordon
sanitaire between Germanic and Russian territory. Secondly, its importance is
related to the ancient “amber route” that since the Roman period led from
the Adriatic Sea through the Balkans, Moravia to the Baltic Sea. Particularly
cities of Lviv and Krakow have become important trade and power centres,
being already in the 13th Century cosmopolitan centres of commerce,
industry and education, steering the development of language and religion,
exceeding other cities of the then Central Europe in terms of their
importance. (Ossowski, 1984)
Development of Eastern Europe, however, was different than in the
Western parts of the continent. In the Early Middle Ages a strong feudal
monarchy emerged in the West, based largely on the principle of one
majority nation. Also in Eastern Europe large state authorities developed,
but their national composition was varied. The geopolitical rationale for this
difference is to be found in geographical circumstances. Eastern Europe, the
territory of today’s Ukraine and Western Russia geographically consist of
vast plains, where the population got mixed in a natural way, especially in
times of military conquests of Tatar armies. Polish, Lithuanian, Western
Russian, Northern Russian, Finnish tribes often associated due strategic
reasons related to protection against Tartar raids from the East and South,
and to guard against the influence of the Teutonic Knights from the West.
For the tribes on the territory of today’s Poland these threats were an
incentive to create a Polish-Lithuanian state (13th Century). At the beginning
of the 14th Century major part of the territory has been seized by
Bohemian King Wenceslas II., and only after the extinction of the
Přemyslids dynasty the prince Vladislav Lokietka (1261-1333) became
Polish king (1306-1333). However, in the raids against the Teutonic Knights
Poland gradually lost Silesia, Pomerania and Mazury, weakened his power
and ceased to play a strategic role as an important actor on the crossroads
between East and West. The next stage of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, however, strengthened Poland again – in the Battle of
Grunewald (1410) Polish-Lithuanian army triumphed over the Teutonic
53
Jaroslav Ušiak
Knights, gained access to the sea area and the territories of Teutonic Knights
became Polish fiefdom. (Charvát, 1980, p. 165) After this victory the power
of the nobility strengthened, which thanks to feudal fiefs and trade in grain
was able to finance an army based on patriotism. Patriotism has been
strengthened also through the composition of the Royal Council (Senate),
because its members came exclusively from the families of elite nobility (socalled magnates). Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth completed the
unification of the Polish crown lands with the incorporation of Mazurska
(1526), thus stretching from the Baltic Sea to the lower basins rivers Dniester
and Dnieper, the Grand Duchy of Moscow was the second largest European
state from the territorial point of view. It weakness was the lack of natural
boundaries, which would protect it from the East and South was, however,
compensated by its access to the Baltic Sea. Port of Gdansk belonged at this
time to Europe’s greatest centres of trade. Food, timber and cattle were
exported from Poland; luxury goods and weapons were exported from
Western Europe.
In the 16th Century, the Polish-Lithuanian nobility became the most
powerful Estate, which defined national security and interests of the
state. These interests derived from the necessity to protect its territory by the
mean of alliances with Lithuania, Bohemia, and to guards against threats, in
particular the Turkish incursions into Southern and Central Europe.
In the second half of the 17th Century, the territory of Poland fell into a
deep and prolonged crisis. Wars of the preceding centuries, the growing
power of Prussia and the War of Austrian Succession devastated agriculture
and, consequently, also trade. Market towns were economically weakened,
thus allowing further rise of the power of nobility, which was, however, not
able to unite the country divided into duchies ruled by local councils. The
internal development of Poland was decided by its more powerful
neighbours. Moreover, the rival nobility groups vied for the assistance of
Poland’s powerful neighbours, thus further deepening internal
contradictions. (Chałasiński, 1968) Frequent changes on the Polish throne,
the absence of central authority and strategic fragmentation concerning the
interests of the state headed Poland towards inexorable decay.
These events took place at a time when the growing power of
neighbours – mostly the Russian Empire, the Habsburg monarchy and
Prussia – expressed itself especially through territorial expansion. Frederick
II. the Great was the first monarch to put forward the proposal for
distribution of Polish territory. In 1772 began the traumatic period in Polish
history, which marked 150 years of the future development of Poland in a
position of a vassal state of the then European powers, and which historians
refer to as the triple division of Poland. (Charvát, 1980, p. 25) Both Austria
54
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
and Russia agreed to Frederick’s proposal, and the first partition ensued in
1773. Prussia requested the Polish Pomerania, thus gaining the connection
with East Prussia. Austria wanted to get Galicia and Russia has demanded
annexation of Belarus and West Ukrainian territory. These requested were
only partially fulfilled. Second partition of Poland in 1793 meant to finalise
the annexation of the above-mentioned areas to Prussia and Austria, led to
mobilisation of the progressive parts of Polish nobility, which under the
influence of the Enlightenment ideals from France sought to reform the
state system, thus seeking to reinforce internal security and independence of
the state. The formation of patriotic forces led by General
T. Kościuszko had initially distinctive features of the national liberation
movements, as nobility has teamed up with armed peasants and the idea of
patriotism based on the idea of national identity was strongly promoted
throughout Poland. The movement was not successful, as it was defeated by
Prussian and Russian troops. (Charvát, 1980) The suppression of the revolt
resulted in the third partition of Poland (1795), in which Russia gained
Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian areas stretching to the rivers Bug and
Neman. Prussia took the so-called Wielkopolska territory with its centre
Warsaw. Austria received Galicia and Lesser Poland (the Krakow
area). (Charvát, 1980)
Partition of Poland was of particular strategic importance to the
participating states, because neither Russia nor Prussia or Austria had any
interest in the stabilisation or growth of the Polish territory. Polish
statehood, which existed since the 10th Century and was cultivated through
language, Christianity and aristocratic identity, disappeared after nearly eight
centuries, together with the strategic culture based on permanent defence of
the territory. Ethnic, political and social oppression became common. Some
hope for Poland has been restored by Napoleon Bonaparte during his
campaign to Russia, but did not materialise. After the defeat of
Napoleon Russia presented herself as the victorious power, member of the
so-called Holy Alliance, and strengthened autocracy and absolutist principles
on its territories. Autocracy and absolutism were associated with the
absolutizing the central power. Division of power on executive, legislative
and judicial branch has not been possible anymore, for it has been perceived
as a destabilisation of the monarchy. Given the fact that historically
separation of powers existed in Poland (the existence of the Royal Council
Chamber) Russian Tsar had to grant some concessions. Tsarist decree issued
in Warsaw in 1810 was meant to alleviate oppression by granting certain
constitutional reforms. Internal political developments in Poland, however,
was so crippled that two decades and the July Revolution in Paris in 1830,
which in France put an end to rule of the old aristocracy, to mobilise again
55
Jaroslav Ušiak
Polish progressive forces. The November Uprising in 1830, also known as
the “Cadet Revolution” (its initiators opposed the conclusions of the Vienna
Congress) spread rapidly across the country. The Final Act of the Congress
of Vienna (June 9, 1815) in its Article 5 stated that the Duchy of Warsaw,
with the exception of counties and districts, which are treated separately in
the flowing articles, acceded to the Russian Empire. It was to be subject to
Russian Constitution and hereditary possession of the Russian Tsar, his heirs
and successors. Tsar reserved the right to decide the internal structure of this
territory... and according to the Final Act the title King of Poland shall
pertain to him. (Veselý, 2004, p. 55) The uprising was based on the ideas of
redefinition of the Polish statehood, the right to self-determination and the
need to recognise the Poles as heirs of nearly millennial identity. The Polish
aristocracy, however, failed to join forces with the nation, as this was the
case in other European countries. The high aristocracy claimed exclusive
rights to posses the signs of Polish identity, denying them not only to
peasantry, but also to the intellectuals and priests. Strong peasant estates in
Poland therefore did not have a guarantee of finalisation of land reform, and,
consequently, did not support the uprising. Inconsistency of ideas, contempt
for the masses and lack of strategic thinking of the aristocracy, ultimately led
to suppression of the uprising. The aristocracy relied heavily on foreign aid,
especially from France, as opposed to the levée en masse, previously used
by Napoleon Bonaparte or V. I. Kutuzov, Italian revolutionaries and other
progressive forces in Europe. In 1831, Russian Tsar Nicholas I. abolished
his decree (Constitution of 1810), dissolved the parliament and the Polish
army. Catholic churches were closed; Polish universities were abolished and
massive social, political and cultural Russification ensued.
Numerous other revolts against Russian domination and tsarism took
place in this period – in Krakow in 1846, in Galicia in 1847-1848, and many
others, however, without success. The Polish nobility, intelligence and
growing class of developers, however, maintained their strong patriotic traits,
and the ongoing development of industry in Poland contributed to raise
awareness of national superiority over backward Russia.
Abolition of serfdom in Poland took place already in 1807. It caused a
mass migration of peasants to the cities, where they provided labour force
for the growing industry. In 1860s Poland witnessed economic crisis
associated with unemployment. Discontent, however, spread also among the
nobility and the rising bourgeoisie and was directed mainly against the
Tsarist regime, which hindered any liberalisation efforts. In January 1863
general uprising broke out, followed by establishment of a revolutionary
government composed mostly of the members of nobility, for aristocracy
has been still considered a driving force of the nation. However, the
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
government has not enacted the required land reform and trade
liberalisation, thus losing domestic support. In the summer of 1864 the
Russian army suppressed the uprising and the government was
dissolved. Sanctions adopted by the Tsarist regime removed last traces of the
special position of Poland in the Russian Empire. Instead of the Kingdom of
Poland the territory came to be known as Vistula Land, with Russian as
mandatory state language, Russian legal system and under Russian control of
the territory. Although the uprising did not bring the expected results, for
Poland and other Slavic nations it meant the end of subservience to another
country and strengthened the Polish national consciousness. It has become a
base on which illegal attempts to create an independent state
started. (Kaczmarek, 1968) This idea formed important part of the strategic
culture of the future Polish state, as it evolved in many emigrant groups in
Western Europe and was encouraged also by Polish intellectuals and artists
of world prominence.
The practical implementation of the idea of Polish independent state has
been for the first time formulated in a document of international importance
– Wilson’s Fourteen Points, elaborate by U.S. President W. Wilson (1918).
His thirteenth point states that it is necessary to establish an independent
Polish state, which includes the territory inhabited by indisputably Polish
populations, guarantee its free and safe access to the sea, and to guarantee
his political and economic independence and territorial integrity by means of
an international treaty. (Veselý, 2004, p. 80) This requirement is consistent
with the attitude of the new Soviet government, which in 1917 issued a
Decree on Peace, which explicitly guarantees to all territories depleted by war
peace without annexation and contributions, and asserts that if any nation is
held against its will in the border of another country ... he shall be given the
right to self-determination. (Lenin, 1965) The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
(1918) also in its Article III states that ... all territories lying west of the line
determined by the contracting powers and which formerly belonged to
Russia will no longer be under her sovereignty. (Veselý, 2004, p. 82)
International documents concerning Poland were completed by bilateral
Polish-Soviet Peace Treaty (Peace of Riga, 1921), which ultimately
determined the boundaries between the two countries. Poland renounced
claims to the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the area between
Poland and Lithuania, which would be addressed as an exclusive issue of
these two states. (Veselý, 2004, p. 92)
The origins of the modern sovereign Polish state are thus associated with
the end of World War I. In the vision of Polish Chief of State
General J. Piłsudski two ideas of the future Poland competed. The first
concerned the necessary consolidation of economically, socially and
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Jaroslav Ušiak
politically fragmented state; the second one was kind of a new idea of
“Greater Poland” extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which has
become a threat to the new socialist state – the Soviet Union. (Charvát, 1980,
p. 223) This idea, however, was at odds with the conclusions of the
Versailles system and Covenant of the League of Nations.
The global economic crisis and the rise of fascism blocked the economic
development of Poland for the next decade. Germany’s expansionist efforts
were reflected in the abolition of German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact,
which Poland has concluded with Germany in 1934. The Pact was abolished
by Nazi Germany in April, 1939 due to requested return of Danzig to
Germany, access of Germany to the borders of the USSR through the Polish
territory, and a route that could be build from Germany via Poland to East
Prussia. (Veselý, 2004, p. 117)
Following the abolition of the Pact, on September 1, 1939 the German
army invaded Poland. This date is regarded as the military beginning of
the World War II. As already many times in history, Poland has found
herself at the intersection of geopolitical and strategic objectives of stronger
states. United Kingdom and France, which promised to provide assistance to
Poland, fulfilled this promise only at sea and by declaring war on
Germany. Due to the fact that Poland missed the interwar evolution of
trends towards national defence or expansion (contrary to the USSR and
Germany), strategic culture remained embedded only in traditions and
legends of the past, lacking any realistic vision of defence built on ideology
and warfare doctrine. Very soon, Poland found herself occupied by Nazi
troops and divided into two parts. The Western part was annexed to
Germany and Central Poland was declared the General Government,
territory occupied and governed by Nazi authorities in line with the vision of
building a “German Reich”. World War II changed Poland into battleground
and territory of the concentration camps, brought the physical destruction of
Polish intellectuals and Jewish population, and the immense devastation of
the country and people. During the war, however, a resistance movement
formed under the leadership abroad (both in the West and in the East). After
liberation by the Soviet Army (1945), the territory of Poland again proved
problematic and was subject to negotiations of the Three Powers at the Yalta
Conference (11.02.1945). In the Conclusions of the Conference, in Article
VI it is stated that ...at the conference, we decided to resolve disputes
relating to Poland as follows: total liberation of Poland by the Red Army
created a new situation. This calls for the creation of the Polish provisional
government, which would have a broad base, broader than the government
established at the end of the war. It should include the leading Polish
democrats, but also expatriate Poles ... and should be called a government of
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
national unity. Three Powers judge that Polish Eastern borders should
follow the Curzon line, but the final definition will be adopted at the Peace
Conference. (Veselý, 2004, p. 142) At the Potsdam Conference (02 08.1945)
Poland’s reparation claims were recognised (to be satisfied by the USSR), the
legitimacy of the Interim Government of National Unity was confirmed, and
Eastern and Western Polish borders were delimited. In the Article XIII the
Great Powers also agreed on rules of the withdrawal of Germans from
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
March 5, 1946 is known for the speech delivered by W. Churchill in
Fulton, in which Poland was mentioned as a new geopolitical milestone:
from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent... (Veselý, 2004, p. 163) In this speech
Poland was characterised a state being encouraged by the Russians to unfair
interventions against Germany – against her own will, and the Communist
Party was described as a small aggressive party, numerically not
corresponding to the interests of the people, but seeking total control. This
period – from 1945 until March 5, 1946, may be seen as the beginning of
Poland’s internal political schizophrenia. On the one hand, there were forces
inclined to the communist ideology supported by the USSR, and on the
other hand, there lingered an unfulfilled desire of a nation to have its own
identity and freedom of choice, supported by the West. Poland as a strong
Christian state showed respect for authority, dignity and obedience. In most
cases, however, this idea was not associated with the authority to the regime
established in 1950s. Some theorists and politicians (L. Walesa,
L. Kolankiewicz) consider the years 1950 to 1990 to be a continual struggle
for democracy, proper identity and political independence, because contrary
to other socialist bloc countries (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria)
Poland had relatively advanced and stable political spectrum, left - centre right. On the other hand, the Communist ideology, citizens’ dissatisfaction
with the regime, authoritarianism, inconsistency of intellectual and political
elites caused numerous crises, culminating in the period of 1955-1956 (when
Poland became a member of the Warsaw Pact, but the political orientation
changed as well). Crisis in post-war Poland had two main causes: first,
nationalisation of property of the Church, and mandatory five-year
implementation plan for the years 1951-1956. These actions of the state
prompted opposition from the residents. In particular, five-year plan, which
included forced collectivisation of agriculture, was seen as unfeasible and
greatly worsened living conditions of the population. Changes in the political
leadership of the state provoked a wave of protests and demonstrations,
which began in Poznan. Wage increases were demanded from the new
political representation. Demonstrations were violently crushed by the army,
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Jaroslav Ušiak
not avoiding also civil casualties. The USSR voiced its opposition to
electing W. Gomulka as the First Secretary of the Communist Party in
Poland, but it did so to little avail, because the Catholic Church supported
the W. Gomulka and army accepted this change.13
Poland managed to defend her position of the political system reform
also during the following critical period, which began in 1970 with the
outbreak of series of strikes in the North of the country. These protests did
not concern exclusively the social sphere anymore, but demanded also
changes in the political system. (Pástor, 2004, p. 78) Protesters had the
support of the Catholic Church, the opposition movement for the defence
of human and civil rights, as well as of several parliamentary factions and the
Solidarity movement. The political system proved unable to respond to this
situation; therefore, the representatives of power resorted to harsh measures
- intervention, military action against protesters, and declaration of Martial
Law in 1981. The development in next five years, however, confirmed that
these tendencies were irreversible and directed primarily to the abolition of
the dominance of the Communist Party.
The strategic culture of the Communist regime developed in accordance
with the requirements of the Warsaw Pact, at least officially. Internally,
however, it was nurtured by ideas tending rather to liberalism, supported by
the liberal intellectual development, especially in Social and Political Science,
unparalleled in other countries of Central Europe. On the other hand,
contending ideas of clericalism and secularism, nationalism and
cosmopolitanism led to constant alternations of left- and right-oriented
governments – characteristic that remains valid until present days.
The renaissance of patriotic strategic culture, based on the participation
of the entire nation, quite ironically, reappeared after the first visit of
Pope John Paul II in his native country in 1980. Population has clearly
begun to lean towards Solidarity Movement and its moral condemnation of
Communist ideology. It began to demand renewal, reform and
recognition. (Kolankiewicz, 2000, p. 652) Alternative movements,
institutions and organisations led by social and intellectual elite began to
form outside the official structures, representing an autonomous union of
citizens against the state. Initially, in 1981 this led to the imposition of
During this period, encouraged by of concessions of the Soviet Union to Polish political
representation and its demands, an experiment was conducted by A. Rapacki in 1957. He proposed the
creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, comprising the territory of West Germany, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This idea was presented at the 12th UN General Assembly. It was
not adopted due to fear of great powers of possible limitations for NATO defence, without actually
limiting the USSR offence capabilities. His proposal, however, became the model for the Antarctic
Treaty (1959-1960).
13
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Martial Law, later on, however, it led to reforms of the Communist
government. The process concluded in 1988, when the situation was
resolved in a few days.
At the end of 1980s, Poland has found herself on the brink of massive
inflation; production dropped nearly by 40 percent, and the living standards
dropped by staggering 2535 percent. (Kolankiewicz, 2000, p. 652)
In the June 1989 elections Solidarity Movement caused a breakdown of
all internal political structures which were replaced the civil parliamentary
committee. In this committee various platforms formed, alternated, and
finally ceased to exist. This ultimately led to the disintegration of Solidarity as
a political movement. L. Walesa, however, was elected President in
1990. Two inner tendencies started to emerge, having impact on the internal
security of the state, already disrupted by the previous
developments. Intellectual elites and members of the Solidarity required
gradual democratic transformation through the so-called “thick line”
(Asmus, 2002), i.e. without political and social victims. Members of the socalled Central Alliance – radical wing of Walesa’s advocates, however, called
for “decommunisation”, meant to remove from public life all those
institutions and practices partaking in the Communist regime. In ensuing
conflict the Roman Catholic Church with its impartial attitude retained high
authority, for it appealed to traditional values of the Polish state – patriotism,
Catholicism, and avoidance of extreme ideologies. This position of the
Church corresponded with the strategic culture of Poland, which like all the
states of the former Soviet bloc found herself in the defensive phase of her
development. It was not clear what actually Poland had to defend, what
interests it had and in what kind of security environment it operated.
The Strategic Culture of the Hungary
Isten, áldd meg a magyart jó kedvvel, bőséggel,
nyújts feléje védő kart, ha küzd ellenséggel;
Bal sors akit régen tép, hozz rá víg esztendőt,
megbűnhődte már e nép a múltat s jövendőt!
Őseinket felhozád Kárpát szent bércére,
általad nyert szép hazát Bendegúznak vére.
S merre zúgnak habjai Tiszának, Dunának,
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Árpád hős magzatjai Felvirágozának.14
(The National Anthem of Hungary, verse 1-2)
Homeland Finno-Ugric tribe of Hungarians was located in the forest
steppe in the lower basins of the river Kama. Hungarians separated
themselves from their broader linguistic and cultural community already the
in 2 Millennium B.C. They moved westward, crossing Volga River, and
further southwest towards the Pannonian Plain. Their prolonged movement
has often been disrupted by various alliances with the then empires. After
the failure to occupy part of the Balkans, Hungarians turned north toward
the Great Moravia. In 906 they defeated Slavic tribes, occupied the entire
Pannonia and continued to penetrate deeper into Central Europe. The allied
armies of the Franks and Slavs in battle on the Lech River in 956 forced
Hungarians to withdraw south to the Pannonian lowlands. (Wolf, 1979)
Time period around year 1000 is commonly known as the end of the era
of large migrations within Europe. During this period new power centres
appeared, but none of them had greater regional importance. Concurrently,
two major geo-cultural centres were formed, based on Eastern and Western
Christianity orientation, respectively. (Baar, 2000, p. 128)
Formation of tribal / ethnic and territorial integrity of the historic
territory of Hungary took nearly two millennia. It was associated with the
migration of peoples, and strategic culture during this period might be
perceived as “acquiring territory by the sword”. No sooner than after
successful overtaking of Pannonian lowlands this historic nation realised that
there is no room for further expansion towards the North or the West (these
areas had already been settled by Germans, Celts and Slavs); in the South
Bulgarians had settled, and in the East the Byzantine Empire continued to
expand its influence. Relatively good living conditions combined with fertile
soil and plenty of river water had an impact on changing the way of life of
Hungarians, turning them away from nomadism to agriculture. The biggest
influence on domestication and further development towards a state entity,
however, exerted other facts. It was the adoption of Christianity and the
introduction of the feudal system of production. These two factors were not
only of cultural and economic significance. They formed the base upon
which a new strategic culture started to emerge, based on the territorial
expansion of the North – South axis, but also on the requirement to defend
14 O Lord, bless the nation of Hungary with your grace and bounty extend over it your guarding arm
during strife with its enemies; Long torn by ill fate bring upon it a time of relief this nation has suffered
for all sins of the past and of the future! You brought our ancestors up over the Carpathians' holy peaks
by You was won a beautiful homeland for Bendeguz's sons. And wherever flow the rivers of the Tisza
and the Danube Árpád our hero's descendants will root and bloom.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
the area delineated by the first Hungarian King Stephen. Christianity spread
in this territory by the activities of the Czech Bishop Adalbert and
Radl-Anastasius, Abbot of Břevnov, who became the first Archbishop of
Esztergom. Christianity, therefore, significantly contributed to creation of an
early feudal state out of the original tribes. King Stephen (997-1038) gained
territory of southern Slovakia, and after defeating the Czech
prince Břetislav permanently gained from him the entire territory of
Slovakia, so-called Upper Hungary. This area provided protection by means
of existing defence system of fortresses (southern flanks of the Carpathians,
areas of the rivers Vah and Hron, part of contemporary Eastern Slovakia).
Fortification units started to fulfil their dual role – they were centres of
military units, bases for territorial defence, but they also had features of
feudal administrative units – the so-called “stolica”, whose historical names
have been preserved till today (Nitra, Novohrad, Gemer, Zvolen, Trenčín
and others). Each unit was led by the representative of the King – a
governor, or so-called “bán”. (Charvát, 1980, p. 119)
For certain period of time Wallachia and Moldova were part of
Hungarian territory, and Hungarian influence extended also over Slavic
Croatia and even Bosnia. Such regional order lasted until 14th Century, when
the Ottoman Empire started to expand through the Balkans to the borders
of Hungary. On the Hungarian Southern, Western and Northern borders the
Habsburg Monarchy tried to adjust to the territorial claims of the Holy
Roman Empire. In terms of defining strategic culture of respective nations
and empires this period is interesting for two reasons. First, it was the period
of gradual consolidation of a future multi-polar Europe built diverging
organisational units and personal alignments. This required creating
foundations and objectives of the common foreign and defence policies. On
the other hand, precisely such consolidation created the conditions for
geopolitical stabilisation in different configuration when compared against
the situation at the beginning of the second Millennium. (Baar, 2000, p. 129)
It seemed that the geopolitical axis were by-passing the Hungarian state,
thus allowing it to avoid the rivalry between Russian and the Islamic
Empires, as well as to stabilise internally. As already mentioned, in the 11th
Century Hungary territorial units were created on the basis of strategic
fortresses, administrative areas, but also on feudal fiefs. Many uninhabited
areas were occupied by refugees and internal migrants; however, they had to
succumb to secular and ecclesiastical power. Cultural and linguistic identity
was important only to the extent that it denoted different ethnic
groups. Latin was the language of communication (as the result of
Christianisation); ethnic groups used mostly Slovak and Hungarian language.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Both languages have been preserved and used as a popular language, the
basis of folk literature and national culture.
The development of strategic culture of Hungary was influences mainly
by the above-mentioned factors mentioned due to the following reasons:
1. Thank to its organisational and institutionalisation the Christian Church
survived disintegration of the Western Roman Empire and became a
model for the administrative organisation of new states. The Church was
organised according to metropolitan areas in the dioceses led by their
bishops, with the prerogative of the supreme authority of the Bishop of
Rome. During national and regional conflicts from 10th to 14th Century
the Church maintained its authority in the administration of religious but
also secular affairs, thus becoming an important tool of sovereign’s and
aristocracy’s power. In the Western Europe, states focused more on the
Crusades, in Central and Southeast Europe the Church established itself
more on the domestic territory. It influenced also security policy of
states, as it supported contacts and alliances with those states that have
adopted Christianity and recognised papal primacy. Consequently, in this
way it influenced also future alliances forming the Turks, the
development of soft power measures – diplomacy cultivated through the
Papal State, where every Christian ruler had his ambassadors. Papal State
also sent its own ambassadors, so-called legates, had at its disposal means
of soft power but deployed also coercive diplomacy towards nonChristian rulers (predominantly the institute of absolution, i.e. exemption
from punishment, forgiveness). Soft power was exercised also through a
motto of Jesuit order applied throughout Europe – “Maiorem Ad Dei
Gloriam”, i.e. for the greater glory of God. It was part of efforts to unite
the Christian worldview exercised through the ecclesiastical authority,
transcending the power of states and monarchs (Passuth, 1981),
especially during the Reformation.
2. Semi-nomadic and pastoral peoples were not familiar with the private
ownership of the land. When a tribe or nation settled on uninhabited or
abandoned territory, as in the case of Hungarians, land ownership has
been obtained by its seizure. The basic of feudal fiefs were laid already in
the Roman Empire in the form of colonates. After 11th Century, the
territory of Hungary rich with fertile land created feudal estates, which
allowed its owners to have a steady income from the auctioning of land –
rent. With the acquisition of a land his owner acquired also residents who
have lived in this area. Despite they had personal freedom they could
ensure their survival only by working on feudal estates. They had to pay
monetary tax or payments in kinds on the revenues from the land, as sort
of the land lease. Organisation of labour, collection of payments,
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
population registry in relation to its feudal obligations was in charge of
military units set up and funded by feudal lord. The expansion of
agriculture required the development of crafts, which burgeoned in cities
and strengthened their economic status. In Hungary this development
has been particularly dynamic thanks to historic trade routes. It began to
stagnate in the 15th Century, when the focus of economic development
transferred to the states situated along the Atlantic coast, thanks to the
discovery of a new overseas territories and shipping routes.
National defence, specifically in case of Hungary, depended on the will
and power of feudal lords; it cannot therefore be seen as national defence
executed in a centralised way.
At the end of the Late Middle Ages Hungary was a powerful state taking
into consideration the then-distribution of power in Europe. At the
beginning of the modern times Central Europe, especially independent states
such as Hungary, but also states of the Holy Roman Empire were to subject
to double threat. The first was related to the expansion of the Ottoman
Empire in the Balkans, through Austria to the Upper Hungary. This resulted
in formation of the first national anti-Turkish resistance focusing on the
defence of the national territory. He had a dual character, i.e. military forces
based on the ethnic principle and build-up of fortifications along the line of
Turkish raids, particularly in southern Slovakia (Nové Zámky, Komárno).
A milestone in history of independent Hungary was a battle of Mohacs in
1526, after which Hungary became part of the Habsburg monarchy. Their
political union was permanently enacted as a Personal Union in 1723 with
the euphemistic slogan “until the Habsburg family vanishes”. In fact,
Hungary was only inferior part of the monarchy. (Deák, 1995)
Second serious threat was represented by increasing religious
disputes. New, so-called Protestant factions detached from the Catholic
Church and formed Protestant movements, leading to bloody Thirty Years
War, which ended in the 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. (Baar, 2000, p.
130) In Hungary, two kinds of Reformation movement diffused, Calvinism
and Lutheranism (Lutherans). Both movements were in strong opposition to
the traditional Catholic Church. Calvinism based its teachings on a specific
personal liberalism, according to which moral life leads to successful life.
Success (especially professional and business one), therefore, is a sign of the
chosen people. Chosen people form a chosen nation which does not need a
Church with accumulated wealth; such people do not need priests to practice
the religion, because every believer may become a preacher, and ecclesiastic
issues are being decided by ecclesiastical council (Consistory). Lutheran
Church was based mainly on simplifying rites, cults and traditions. It was
65
Jaroslav Ušiak
based on the clarity of learning and personal responsibility of man for his
actions. Above all, it rejected the dichotomies of the Catholic Church
resulting from the accumulation of wealth and its preaching to live in
poverty. From the ideological point of view, however, both movements were
conditioned not so much by quest for religious purification as by economic
development. Feudal ownership of the land, divided between Hungarian
magnates and the Catholic Church has been an obstacle to capitalist
development. Although Central Europe lagged behind Western European
countries, its economics and trade already in the early modern period had
trans-border dimension. Consequently, Reformist movements draw their
supporters predominantly from the nascent bourgeoisie class. This class has
constituted the progressive force when Hungary, exhausted by struggle
against the Turks, sought inspiration in the early French Enlightenment. At
the end of the 18th Century, however, Eastern and Central Europe was
divided again, acquiring a new form, as consisted of only four countries –
Russia, Prussia, Austria (or, more precisely, the territories of former state
united under Habsburg rule), and the Ottoman Empire. (Baar, 2000, p. 132)
Formation of the modern Hungary was associated with revolutionary
changes in 1848, which engulfed the entire of Europe. In Hungary, however,
revolutionary changes progressed in a different way. They clearly had antiHabsburg connotations, persisting since 17th Century, when we may trace
the inception of a national strategy designed to extend the Estates’ rights
vis-á-vis Habsburg authority. Leading figures of the movement,
Gabriel Bethlen and Nikola Zrinski, led the revolt not only to ensure the
rights of the aristocracy, but also the rights of the nation, based on historical
experience, that Hungary applied in questions of national identity. (Rupnik,
1992)
According to Hegel’s philosophical assertions that “revolutions take
place first in mind, only then in practice” the reform movement
of I. Széchenyi and a national movement of L. Kossuth begin to
form. Year 1848/1849 in Hungary had a strong, strategic context, with clear
ambition to gain independence, even using violence if necessary. The history
clearly shows over past 300 years Hungary never lacked militant attitudes
against the Habsburgs. The revolt ended successfully – Vienna authorised
the Hungarian Constitution (1848). This did not bring the end of the
revolutionary movement, however, because the Constitution did not
guarantee the right to self-determination, only a certain kind of selfgovernment. Antagonism in Austro-Hungarian relations resulted in a bloody
conflict in the city Világos, where the Hungarian rebels were forced to
surrender to joint Austrian and Russian intervention units in June
1848. Austrian monarchy sought help from its “Russian brother”, and Russia
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
granted it because it saw the Hungarian revolt as dangerous precedent for its
own policy in Poland. (Rupnik, 1992)
For the next four years Hungary lived in the state of siege, leaders and
participants of the revolt were executed; the Austrian army in Hungary
imposed Martial Law, military courts and harsh penalties for residents. These
actions only strengthen the Hungarian national identity and inspired patriotic
connotations in the strategic culture. In 1852, the Emperor visited Hungary,
abolish Martial Law, granted political amnesty, but at the same time
abolished also the Constitution of 1848. The offices were staffed with
Austrian officials; culture, education and a social life were subject to
Germanisation. In 1853 Austrian administrative and judicial authorities were
forced upon Hungary. The army was built on the Austrian platform and its
members, especially senior officers, were closely vetted. Domestic support
the revolutionary movement for self-determination abated and only existed
in passive form.
Suppression of national movement had similar features of absolutist
despotism as in Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Italy. Austrian
monarchy, however, was much more aware of potential conflicts, because
multinational state could not afford to ignore the separatist movement in
either of its nations. Hungary, thus, after nearly two decades gained
concessions, especially after the removal of Alexander Bach from the
government. Promulgation of the so-called October Diploma was a first step
towards parliamentarism and according to ideological leaders of the
Hungarian independence it also meant the possibility of renewal of the
Hungarian state. (Pástor, 2003) In 1861, February Diploma valid for the
entire monarchy was promulgated, codifying certain human rights and civil
liberties according to the Western European model. Hungarian parliament
was elected, partially due to restitutions claimed by Hungary. It showed,
however, the ideological rifts between the Hungarian elites. Unlike in the
period of G. Bethlen’s revolt, who managed to unite all social classes and
estates, then-elites led by Ferenc Deák and Kalman Tisza contributed to
the situation when the Hungarian parliament was dissolved without
achieving any conclusion. The situation in Upper Hungary, where the Slovak
national consciousness had been forming for almost half a century, also
contributed to the unrest.
In this period of uncertainty another politician has contributed to the
change of strategic culture, i.e. a modern liberal intellectual Anton von
Schmerling, who became Minister of Justice in Hungary. Unfortunately, he
absolutely did not understand that the French and British liberal principles
cannot be applied in the Habsburg monarchy, where a united Austrian State
had always been a mere ideal, conflicting with the federalist aspirations of the
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Slavs and Hungarians. These ideas were also supported by Slovak nationalist
and politician Ľudovít Štúr. Domestic and foreign policy of Anton von
Schmerling triggered another wave of national resistance in Hungary, but
also had a positive effect. It forced the Habsburg monarchy to negotiate with
Hungary, which in 1867 led to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
(dualism). (Davies, 2000) New Austro-Hungarian Constitution of 1867
guaranteed Hungary self-government except for the areas of foreign policy,
defence and finance. Hungarian elites gave an extraordinary intensity to the
idea of building a national interest, because they considered dualism as a
means to consolidate their own identity. It is the irony that it was precisely
the Hungarian nation with its historical experience who initiated a policy of
repression towards other nationalities within its territory. The first strong
attempts at Hungarisation in Slovakia can be traced back precisely to the
second half of the 19th Century. They were conducted by fomenting
divisions between the Catholic and Protestant Church, also by excluding
Jews from economic and social elite of Hungary. This was the cause of the
mass immigration of Hungarian Jews and their capital in Slovakia, which
ultimately enhanced Slovakia’s industrial development. Hungary remained
agrarian country and proclaimed liberalism of national policy remained only
a promise. Prevalence of conservative ruling elite, lack of qualified local
government structures and overall economic backwardness determined the
role of Hungary in World War I. Ethnic Hungarians did not constitute even
half the population of Hungary, therefore, already during the war opposition
to protect “the Hungarian homeland” was growing in other, non-Hungarian
nationalities. After nearly two centuries of its own efforts to achieve
independence, Hungary became the enemy of its Northern, Western,
Eastern and Southern neighbours. The defeat of Austria-Hungary in World
War I caused post-traumatic reaction accompanied by a national-ethnic
disintegration, and absolute loss of control of the Hungarians over their
national ideology. The Communist experiment in 1919, the so-called
Republic of the Council, lasted less than six months. (Davies, 2000) In terms
of international law, the 1919 Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria
addressed territorial claims and the right to self-determination Hungary in
Article 89, where ... Austria declares that it recognizes and accepts the
boundaries of Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia ... as these are to be set by the major powers. Another
important treaty was the Treaty of Trianon (1920), where the Article 73
declares the inviolability of the independence of Hungary, and in Article 74
Hungary declares that it recognizes and accepts borders of Austria, Bulgaria,
Greece, Poland, Romania and the Czechoslovakia, as these boundaries were
determined the major powers. (Veselý, 2004, p. 88, 91)
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Strategic culture of the newly established State has been addressed in
other articles of this Treaty:
- Article 103 – general conscription would be abolished in Hungary; the
Hungarian Army will be built and replenished exclusively on voluntary
basis;
- Article 104 – the total number of military forces in the Hungarian
Army shall not exceed 35,000 men, including officers, service
personnel and stand-by forces;
- Article 161 – the Allied Powers affirm and Hungary accepts that it is
responsible, together with its allies, for the outbreak of war, and for
the loss and damage suffered by the Allied Powers and their nationals
as a result of the war that was forced upon them by the attack of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and its allies;
- Article 163 – provides an overview and schedule of reparation
payments requested from Hungary as a defeated country; dates and
amount of reparations was to be determined after examining the
reparations from Germany. (Veselý, 2004, p. 91)
In 1920, based on the old constitution Hungary became an independent
kingdom, with the Imperial Governor as an actual head of state. The
Communist Party was banned, and suffrage of some citizens was
limited. The key political sentiments were irredentism; nationalism inspired
by the French Treaty, which reduced territory and population by two-thirds,
and hostility towards radicalism but also liberalism. At the end of 1930s
many political movements transformed into fascist ones thus winning
Hungary German ideological as well as financial support. Before World War
II Hungary joined the Axis Berlin-Rome-Tokyo. In 1944 the country was
ruled by interim fascist government.
After liberation in 1945, the Sovietisation of the country began, although
the electoral support of the Communists was small (only 17%). The
adoption of a new democratic constitution in 1946 transformed the country
into the Republic of Hungary. (Kovrig, 2000, p. 439)
The strategic culture of the new state, however, still has not been clearly
defined. Based on pre-election agreement, initiated in Moscow, Hungary was
to create a coalition government. This agreement ensured the participation
of Communists in the government, despite the small number of votes. The
agrarian Independent Smallholders’ Party won the election with 57% of the
vote; Communists and Democrats each obtained 17%. The governments of
the U.S. and the UK recognized the results of elections and accepted the
government as legitimate. But already in August 1947 new elections were
held in which the Hungarian Workers’ Party led by communists received
majority of votes. The government established after the election passed a law
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on nationalisation of banks, key industries and control of the defence. On
February 18, 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
was signed between the USSR and Hungary. (Pástor, 2003, p. 26) This
agreement triggered a tragic double track of Hungarian domestic and foreign
policy, hence also the double track of strategic culture. There was an
apparent contradiction between principles of respecting the conditions as
required by the incorporation of Hungary into the Soviet sphere of
influence, and continuity of historical heritage since the 16th Century, when
the battle of Mohacs set the Hungarian identity and orientation towards
independence, self-determination and cultivation of their own traditional
values. Hungary, however, never achieved this goal permanently. This
trauma caused further crises in the years after World War II, which in part
were connected with the internal development of Hungary, and in part by
other crises of the Soviet bloc.
After the end of World War II Hungary had to face many crises which
resulted from the conflict in orientation of domestic and foreign policy,
which developed under the double influence. The first impact was
determined by power, held by agrarian parties strongly opposing the rapid
confiscation and redistribution of large estates. In Hungary, this trend had
tremendous consequences. The creation of cooperatives, the existence of
small and medium-sized farms, however, could not stand the deflation and
credit policy of the state. In Hungary, therefore, there was neither thorough
collectivisation, nor market economy. State, whose prosperity was based
mainly on agriculture, had to face a major problem with lack of food,
consumer goods, because the existing cooperatives and enterprises were
unprofitable. The elections in 1945 and in 1947 showed the impact of the
above in the sense that a majority of the votes were received by agrarian and
petty-bourgeoisie political parties. Secondly, offensive policy of the
Communist Party required rebuilding agriculture according to the Soviet
model, which resulted in forced collectivisation during the years 19521953. (Pástor, 2002, p. 93) Economic losses generated by the cooperatives
combined with their on-going problems led to demise of I. Nagy from the
office of the Prime Minister in 1955 and to strengthening the Communist
principles within the state. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, Hungary did not
entirely accepted these principles, this second influence exerted by the Soviet
Union very soon proved counterproductive for both internal security and
international position of Hungary in the mid 1960s. Tens of thousands of
people emigrated from Hungary to Western Europe and the USA, food
crises occurred on regular basis; dissenting sentiments spread especially
among the youth and intelligence. Events between October 23
and December 12, 1956, are often considered as the beginning of the
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revolution in 1956. It actually began with a general strike of the Workers’
Council in Budapest, calling for redress of social situation. At this time,
however, armed rebel groups had organised themselves for over a year
throughout Hungary, especially in the capital Budapest. Consequently, the
People’s Army has been involved in the revolution as well. (Germuška, 1997,
p. 153) Its position, however, from the beginning appeared to be
contradictory. Until the end of October 1956, the majority of the army
opposed the armed groups. From 1 November, however, the military
leadership decided to uphold the patriotic principles and to defend the
country against Soviet forces deployed in Hungary. The Hungarian Army
built anti-Soviet military defence and literally fought in the streets of capital
city against Soviet forces. Further clashes between Soviet and Hungarian
forces took place in Debrecen, Sopron, Veszpém, as well as in other cities
and rural areas. Shelling and bombardments also took place at Dunapenteli,
and all these clashes were accompanied by massive casualties. (Germuška,
1997)
International implications of this internal war were the result of Soviet
strategic thinking The USSR maintained that the regime in Hungary must be
forced to accept a status similar to Poland, where the protest of October
1956 has been resolved peacefully through negotiations. Involvement of the
Hungarian People’s Army in revolution, however, caused direct intervention
of Soviet troops located in Hungary, presented by the USSR as “exhaustion
of all possible peaceful solution to the crisis” and the necessity to prepare for
military operation Cyclone. (Schöpflin, 1993, p. 327) Ideologically, this
decision was justified as the protection of Hungarian sovereignty based on
the people’s democratic principles endangered by the counterrevolution. The
aftermath of the revolution brought ban on all Workers’ parties, mass
arrests, martial law and the establishment of internment camps, street
executions, and paralysis of state power and of the entire infrastructure of
the state. At the beginning of 1957, these military measures have been
replaced by policy instruments. J. Kadár became the new leader who
strengthened the elements of Stalinism in Hungarian state.
In Central and Eastern Europe the Communist version of the events of
1956 has been espoused, thus marking the development in the countries of
the Soviet bloc for the next three decades. The lesson learnt was that the
state either adjusted its official policy to the requirements of the USSR, or
had to bear the consequences, including the threat of intervention by the
Warsaw Treaty, as it happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
In terms of strategic culture these events had a dual significance for
Hungary. They strengthen the identity of resistance against interference from
other states, formed already during the period of Austro-Hungarian Empire.
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Secondly, an enemy was identified enemy as any state which interferes with
the internal and external dimension of state decision-making. Hungary
became a cautious state, where other asymmetries in internal politics were
dealt with through systemic reforms until the dissolution of the Soviet bloc,
and, may we say, quite successfully. It was also under the international
response to these events. Western Europe and the United States took the
indifferent attitude towards the situation in Hungary. Hungarian opposition
forces conceived of the assistance of the Western countries in terms of an
all-out confrontation. The United States, Great Britain and France, members
of the UN Security Council, however, suggested systematic discussions,
which resulted in the convergence of Great Powers and general
improvement of West-East relationship.
It was the Soviet intervention in Hungary that probably generated the
idea in the West that any direct intervention or strategy that would lead
to intervene by armed force in the development of the satellite states should
be “contained”. (Germuška, 1997, p. 156) The changes were be made
through envisaged “détente”, but also through the traditional tools for
initiating changes such as propaganda, intelligence, eroding the value system
of the socialist bloc.
Hungary as Czechoslovakia and Poland did not avoid crises during 19451990. They were mostly caused by the economic factors, however, in the
1970s the human rights agenda started to figure prominently as well. The
end of the dominance of the USSR was, as well as in other analysed
countries, accompanied by the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. The fall of
the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War rushed in a new era for
Hungary, thus opening the way to its democratic development.
***
Strategic culture and future security policy of the V4 countries were in
the past determined by specific factors, characteristic for the respective
states. This difference is due to historical and geographical specificities.
From 20th Century onwards, however, these differences were formed
especially based on the impact of various ideological tendencies.
Differences determined by historical development and geographical
location are the following:
- The relative availability of the sea when it comes to the territory of
Poland, which determined the development and structure of trade
already during the Ancient Times (Amber Road), in the Middle Ages
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
(routes linking the contemporary Polish territory with the German
Hanseatic cities), and also in modern times after the establishment of
Poland after World War I. During the last two decades of the 20th
Century, this fact has also played an important role on respect to the
opposition political movements, centred in the areas of harbours,
shipyards and industries linked to those commodities;
- Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have always been in-land
states, which caused the flexibility of their borders, whether during the
period of their independent existence or as part of empires. Pushing
the boundaries had several serious consequences, for instance
questioning of international treaties since the time of the Vienna
Congress, through the period of the Versailles treaty system, to very
sensitive issues related to the forced departure of the population of the
border area after the end of World War II. These factors worsened
nationalist and ethnic tensions between the three respective countries,
but partly also in Poland. In the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and
Hungary these problems continue to exist and periodically are
securitised;
- Due to geographic predisposition the economic development of V4
countries has also differed. While the Czech Republic and Poland
developed industrial centres and several industries during the 19th
Century, Slovakia and Hungary were agrarian countries both within
the Habsburg monarchy and after the declaration of independence
(Czechoslovakia in 1918, Hungary in 1920). The rate of industrial
development, the first industrial crisis but also low productivity of the
agricultural production influenced demographic trends, most
importantly the emigration. Polish population migrated en masse to
the United States. Czech population migrated to the United States as
well, although in a smaller numbers in comparison to Polish
immigrants. Slovak population migrated to various destinations, i.e.
the Lowlands (the Balkans), France and Belgium, but also the United
States and Canada. The highest diversity in migration destinations
showed the Hungarian population. The United States and Canada
were most common destinations, but Hungarians migrated to almost
all states of Western Europe. These routes, targets and establishment
of migrants affected especially the changes in the political system and
shaping the public opinion in respect of the home country abroad.
Differences determined on the basis of ideological tendencies:
- In terms of religious ideology and orientation the V4 countries exhibit
differences in belonging to individual churches. In Poland strong
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Catholicism always prevailed. In the formation of strategic culture it
acted as anti-assimilation factor against Orthodoxy and Protestantism.
In the last half-century Catholicism represented a significant portion
of public opinion and civic culture, with its highest representative,
Pope John Paul II. Some argue that the force of personality of Pope
contributed to fall of the totalitarian political regimes in Central
Europe. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have survived many
internal conflicts associated with a preference for Protestantism and
violent re-Catholicisation throughout the history. These conflicts have
been part of the European Movement re-assessing the religious
dogmas of Catholicism, thus becoming an integral part of strategic
culture of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Hungary as a Catholic
territory and ally of the Papal State from 15th Century, a century later
became the centre of the Calvinist religion, and thus determined the
various intellectual trends of the Hungarian intellectuals towards
liberalism, patriotism and the Enlightenment, but also caused changes
in the internal politics of the Habsburg monarchy, in particular
deteriorated relationships between the different nations and
nationalities of the monarchy, including parts of Galicia (PolishUkrainian part of the monarchy);
- Before the end of World War I, when the new states Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia have already been established, the influence of a
new ideology based on the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917
started to appear. Strategic culture of the countries in question has
been affected by this event, especially due to the fact that it provided
them with the possibility to refuse to participate in the war in the
interests of the monarchy. On the other hand, major Central
European cities like Prague, Krakow, Olomouc, Bratislava, Budapest,
and Vienna became the place of temporary or permanent residence of
Russian emigrants already before the establishment of the USSR.
Initially, the support for the Communist ideology as the foundations
of Russia's successor state - the USSR, has been notable in promoting
the ideas of Lenin's “Decree on Peace” (1918). This document was in
many respects a variation of W. Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” (1918).
Support was provided mainly by leftist intellectuals, in particular in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Due to the fact that in the World War II
the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian soldiers fought on the side of the
monarchy upon their return the ideas of Communism spread in these
countries. Both Slovakia and Hungary had a short-term experience
with the Soviet-style Republic (the so-called Republic of Councils); in
Prague it was the support of Masaryk's ideas on self-determination
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declared also by left-wing political parties. On the other hand, many
Russian immigrants sought to revitalise Czarism, due to rather
emotional, not rational arguments. Period of 1920-1939, however,
might be described as a period of transforming the nations (Czech,
Slovak, Polish and Hungarian), in particular in regards to the V4
countries. This meant the formation of a “state nation”, i.e. the
formation of a democratic and civic culture. The rise of fascism and
the beginning of World War II made further development of this type
of strategic culture completely impossible;
- Geopolitical incorporation of the V4 countries into the Soviet sphere
of influence after the World War II represented a major ideological
turning point. The first decade after the war showed significant
disparities in adopting the Communist ideology through artificial
political processes, violent de-Catholicisation. Thanks to the liberal
strategic culture from the past, however, the countries managed to
avoid serious internal political conflicts. Tendencies towards
nationalism (especially in Slovakia) have been addressed by the courts
and persecution. In Poland and Hungary, however, already in the first
decade after the war serious conflicts appeared, which also had foreign
policy implications, because both Poland and Hungary faced direct
military intervention of the USSR, or, more precisely, of the Warsaw
Pact states. Significant anti-Soviet attitudes have become integral part
of strategic culture of the major part of the society, leading to the
fragmentation of the political unity of the state despite the proclaimed
leading role of the Communist Party. Czechoslovakia had to face the
similar situation after the events in 1968;
- Anti-Soviet attitudes of the society were most pronounced in Poland;
however, they have been expressed in a decent manner, through
science and research. Within the framework of the official philosophy
of Marxism-Leninism Polish universities started slowly but
purposefully conduct research on academic communities in the West,
focusing especially on the areas of philosophy, sociology, psychology,
cultural studies, history and other social sciences. They were searching
for the parallels and points of contact between Marxism and the socalled bourgeois science. Polish scientific community in the period
between 1950s and the 1970s greatly influenced the development of
science in Central Europe towards criticism and ultimately rejection of
dogmatic Marxism. This introduced important aspect to the strategic
culture, i.e. doubts about the validity of the omnipotent doctrine of
peaceful coexistence through the adoption of a uniform ideology;
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- Hungary had similar views as Poland in respect of the issue deSovietisation of the national economy. This meant the strengthening
of private and semi-private sector as an important instrument of
economic and social policy of the state. This development has been
reflected in the strategic culture as doubts about the ability to
guarantee social development only through central planning and state
sector. If the state is not the guarantor of social development, what is
the purpose of a large state army as a powerful tool of the state?
Especially in the late 1970s Hungary and Poland in various periodicals
reported on spending on the armed forces, their numbers and on the
necessity of the Defence Act;
- Czechoslovakia expressed anti-Soviet attitudes in particular in the
1970s, in line with the expansion of the policy of détente in Western
Europe and the rise in importance of the human rights agenda.
Political document “Charter 77”, signed by prominent figures of the
Czechoslovak politics, science, arts, sports, and culture was an
expression of a new course of future state strategy towards
liberalisation, democratisation and the elimination of the leading role
of the Communist Party in the state and society. The idea of this
change, however, was related also to the change of position of power
structures of the state - the army, police and other state security forces,
which after revoking the leading role of the Communist Party had to
transform towards essentially apolitical character and roles. State
armed forces were to be gradually reformed and established on the
apolitical basis, i.e. without affiliation to any political party. The
transformation took place only after 1993 in all states and V4 was not
easy;
- Last change took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, when all V4 countries under the
influence of democratic strategic culture decided for democratisation,
free market (private property) with the ultimate goal of forming
democratic and civil society. This process of change has been
complicated in all countries, and pointed to many weaknesses that are
also reflected in the contemporary strategic culture and the security
strategies of the respective V4 countries.
In the period following the World War II the analysed nations began to
converge. Soviet influence on all four states was reflected also in their
strategic culture and marked its gradual transition towards their
rapprochement. Within the collective consciousness of the three states (one
of them, Czechoslovakia, consisting of two nations), however, residual
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reminiscences of the previous strategic culture continued to resonate.
Precisely this phenomenon contributed to recurring crises and tensions in
the internal political development of Central European states, which have
been addressed by political purges undertaken by the ruling Communist
Party, as well as by interventions by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact
members. In fact, these represented repeated loss of sovereignty of Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Based on the internal organisation of the
socialist states and other popular democracies, however, the state sovereignty
has been vested in the continued leadership of the Communist Party. If the
party was losing its position or was in any way threatened by opposition
forces, this was, according to the dictum of the Warsaw Pact, compromising
the sovereignty of states, and requiring fraternal assistance of other socialist
countries. Strategic culture of the states in question, therefore, has been
again marked by a dichotomy. On one hand, internal political and party
structures officially existed in all states, but at the same time there were also
numerous movements opposing the official structures and aiming at a
reform of socialism so as to allow for a greater liberalisation of the economy,
politics, culture, strengthening of civic engagement and development of
conditions for multi-party political system. The weakness of these
movements was the belief that the reform was feasible from within, which
admittedly proved to be too romantic belief. This showed that resentment is
potentially effective historic and social force, but it cannot develop
exclusively in a static, non-coherent environment. It was necessary to
organically combine the ideas of democrats, liberals, pacifists and innovators
in the economy, to include moderate reform and thus restructure the vision
of popular democracy to a real liberal democracy.
The strategies of opposition forces employed against the Soviet strategy
of strengthening of communism in the satellite states varied. Its forms were
declarative (charters, declarations, participation in international fora, such as
the CSCE), ideational (the action of literary and artistic groups, art unions),
political (the formation of political movements on the platform of dissent),
civil (civic initiatives such as twin cities), professional (loosening of strict
rules for international cooperation between the Eastern and Western bloc in
industry, agriculture, construction, etc.). In Hungary mainly civic and
professional forms were applied, which ultimately led to the strengthening of
relations with Austria, Yugoslavia and to providing help to the citizens of
GDR in the years before the fall of Berlin Wall. In Poland ideational,
political (Solidarity) and civic forms (religious movements) were used, and,
last but not least, in Czechoslovakia professional (contacts with foreign
companies), ideational and declaratory (Charter 77) forms were most
commonly applied.
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The period of 1990s was for all countries characterised by seeking their
own identity in the new international environment shaping after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. We now know that these
four countries have become members of NATO at different times; Czech
republic, Poland and Hungary already in 1999, and Slovakia following suit in
2004. Internal political reasons, in particular the lack of fulfilment of
democratic criteria, are generally considered to be the most important causes
for Slovakia’s belated accession. (Asmus, 2002) This period was also
influenced by the effort of the V4 countries to join the European Union,
which was fulfilled in 2004. Since then, their security environment can be
also defined within this wider area. Today, we know that the road to
democracy is not easy, that democracy and liberal system are threatened by
crises as well as other systems. That is why it is necessary to deepen and
enhance the strategic culture of the state to become a pillar of state power,
serving at the same time to peaceful development and national
defence. Therefore, we will try to formulate what aspects of the strategic
culture of V4, particularly from the historical perspective, may also serve to
enhance its current developments. In particular, we refer to these traditions:
- Respect for authorities that show humanistic and patriotic thinking;
- Ability to select leaders not on the basis of their political status and
populist rhetoric, but based on their responsibilities and respect for
morals in politics. All V4 countries had such leaders in the past
(L. Kossuth, Ľ. Štúr, F. Palacký, A. Modrzejwski and others) –
leaders who did not strive to maximize their power but to maximize
moral standards (although political developments in the V4 countries
during the last decade point to the opposite effect);
- Ability to survive while preserving the national culture, language,
religious belief, and expand their aspirations in spite of forced
assimilation and acculturation lasting several centuries;
- Ability to perceive their own security environment as an integral part
of national and civic identity, without necessity to threaten it by
dominating the lower structures (ethnic, cultural and religious
minorities within the state), although the strategic cultures of V4
countries still beards residual traits and consequences of the Versailles
system (relationship of Hungarians and Slovaks, Czechs and Slovaks,
Poles and Lithuanians). Today, however, these tensions are particularly
of cultural and psychological nature and in any case do not a security
threat. Strategic culture of the states can help to achieve a
reconciliation between them;
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
- Tradition not to perceive the power as the basis for the functioning of
the relations between states. V4 countries have historical experience
with the application of central power against their nation, in particular
with the power implemented by means of violence, coercion and fear.
This is an important part of the strategic culture of V4 countries,
because it helped to implement the cooperation while respecting the
natural non-uniformity in the political development of the V4
countries as an inherent part of a liberal democracy.
- Strategic culture V4 today develops a new dimension. Besides
irrational features such as identity, patriotism, collective memory,
defence of territory and national values, normative aspect are being
incorporated through formulation, implementation, monitoring and
reforming the national security strategies of these states in the course
of last two years. The normative aspect has a dual form – it is shaped
by the state, its political authorities and institutions, but also by the
NGOs and civic movements. Especially the latter form is important
for the future, because it would directly affect future strategic culture
and the quality of the security environment through civic initiatives.
The strategic culture of V4 countries, therefore, is at present directed
towards normative political, army, civil, and hopefully also moral
quality. This can be seen in the changing proportions of the national security
and defence strategies of V4 countries, shifting from military to non-military
security as the critical role of strategic culture of the future. Strategic culture,
however, despite its enhanced normative aspect will always be first and
foremost a system of meanings and symbols, as well as system of resources,
which to a large extent determine compiling of foreign policy doctrines and
security policies.
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Security Policy of the Visegrad Group Countries
after the Disintegration of the Soviet Block
Ensuring the safety of the population and nation is the most important
responsibility of the state. There is no generally accepted definition of
national security policy among experts, however, they agree that the “the
nation state remains a key creator of security and the main motive for its
definition is safeguarding state’s national interests.” (Danics, 2007, p. 38)
Thus, we can say the security policy of the state is “a summary of tools and
processes to achieve the fundamental national interests and objectives in the
field of defence, security and internal order of the state and its citizens.”
(Šimák, 2006, p. 7) It is a comprehensive summary of the activities of the
state in the realm of security of a state and citizens, based on the definition
of national interests, security environment analysis and classification of
security threats and international obligations. Nowadays, the sectoral
breakdown of national interests is widely acknowledged.
After World War II, specifically after at the formation of the Warsaw
Pact in 1955, the V4 countries were under Soviet influence and their security
policy was significantly affected by this fact. The Warsaw Treaty
Organisation was of particular importance to the socialist countries because
of providing them with the collective defence, thus mirroring the function of
NATO. Nevertheless, for Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary years 1956,
1968 and 1981, respectively, were significant milestone – for the Warsaw
Treaty troops entered the territory of the member states in order to stabilise
and uphold Socialism in those countries. The intervention of Warsaw Treaty
troops had various forms - in Hungary it bloodily suppressed the resistance;
in Czechoslovakia it had non-violent character and lasted until 1991; and in
Poland the intervention took place without violence and without military
intervention. These interventions were caused by reform efforts of political
leaders of the countries that in the Soviet Union leaders aroused the feeling
of weakening the positions of the Communist bloc. Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (or Warsaw Pact) as a security organisation justified its
existence by the persistence of the Cold War. Short period of détente laid the
foundation for putting an end to the confrontation (the Geneva
Conventions, Helsinki - the CSCE, Charter of Paris). Not until the 1990s the
end of the Cold War started to be discussed, steered by the unification of
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Germany, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and after a
series of non-violent revolutions in the former Socialist countries.
Quick transformation of these countries in security realm towards the
CSCE / OSCE and NATO prevented to review sufficiently the period of
Cold War. The evaluation of the Cold War is very problematic. Positive
effects may be attributed to it as well, as increased activities of states and
international organisations in the area of disarmament. Antagonism through
the arms race became extremely dangerous. The planet Earth found itself at
the brink of its very survival and, together with the economic consequences
of arms race, which threatened the economies these events initiated the
adoption of a number of multilateral and bilateral treaties on disarmament.
It follows that the process to acquiring the spheres of influence through wars
and arms race had to be suspended and modified. Bipolar system, precisely
due to its inner ideological and security antagonism, devoured itself. Basic
changes responsible for such development took place first in national
political systems and later in the transformation of the international political
system. Confrontation of the two blocks disappeared, but a new polarisation
together with new security threats emerged.
A turning point is represented by M. Gorbachev’s speech delivered in
July 1989 in the Council of Europe, marking the departure from the
Brezhnev doctrine and waiving the spheres of influence, as well as initiating
the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the collapse of the USSR
and the changes brought about by the disintegration of bipolar system.
Eastern European countries faced new security challenges, and they had to
find appropriate responses to them. In the purview of the decision-making,
the countries faced six alternatives: a) neutrality b) building their own
independent regional security organisation, c) engaging in then-existing
regional security organisation and its transformation, d) re-creating the
Eastern security organisation, e) engaging in Western security structures, f)
creating a pan-European security architecture; g) relying on its own national
defence. (Nagy, Kovács, 2006; Cottey, 1995)
At that time the countries were most concerned with the possible
restoration of the strength and power of the Soviet Union, and the decades
of their dependence. If we analyse all the alternatives in a given situation, we
may deduce the most appropriate one to meet the interests of the countries
concerned. Specifically, we will assess the individual options for each
country. In this sense we first will try to generally evaluate given possibilities.
Neutrality – the choice is between soft or hard form – a soft does not bring
any safeguards to the country, and hard one could not find support and
safeguards, provided, for instance, by the UN Security Council. Building one
owns independent regional security organisation did not find a positive
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response in all countries that had diverging interests. Joining the then
existing regional security organisation and its transformation was at the time
applicable only to the CSCE / OSCE, which has never had any security
forces and failed to provide security and defence guarantees. Re-creating the
Eastern security organisation, on the other hand, looked very unattractive,
given the historical experience. Engaging in Western security structures
seemed to be extremely attractive to all countries, even though the prospects
at the time were highly unrealistic. Such option, however, provided
possibility to achieve security and defence guarantees for the region. Creating
pan-European security architecture, combined with a defensive initiative of
Western states, offered a promising idea for the countries of Europe,
especially the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the
feasibility, however, this option seemed to be very tedious if not downright
impossible. The last option, relying on their own independent national
defence proved to be extremely expensive taking into account the
obsolescence of the defence technology and the need for major investments
to carry out necessary transformation reforms.
Central European countries chose option b), e) and partly also g). The b)
concept was supported by forming the V3 / V4, which provided a platform
for cooperation in the preparation of its members to integrate into EuroAtlantic structures. The e) concept seemed most appropriate given the
benefits of membership in NATO and g) the potential membership in the
forming European Union – starting with the formalisation of the CFSP and
the beginning of the formation of the European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI), the predecessor of ESDP / CSDP, thus creating a sort of
pan-European defence structure.
At present, the security policy of the V4 is strongly influenced by
membership in NATO and the EU, creating framework for their decisionmaking, participation and direction in the area of national security policy.
The EU, although predominantly economic integration, is recently creating
complementary components of security policy (CFSP, ESDP / CSDP)
applicable also within the framework of NATO. The current situation,
however, points to the continuous need for the existence and presence of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the continent, since it
fundamentally affects the security policy of its member states.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established as a
political-military organisation in conformity with Article 51 of the UN
Charter, which emphasizes the fundamental right of independent states to
individual or collective self-defence. At the time of its establishment its
founders did not foresaw that this organisation would surpass more than 60
years of its existence, and undergo several transformations in the meantime
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(in its organisation, membership, and procedural and functional areas). V4
countries as member states of the Alliance gained certain benefits resulting
from their membership, but also took on several obligations. The main
principle of the Alliance is based on interdependence and indivisibility of the
security of its member states. It is precisely the principle of solidarity that
ensures that member states do not have to rely exclusively on their national
forces to guarantee their security and defence; on the other hand, they are
obliged to share the problems of their partners and contribute to their
solution.
Key article of the North Atlantic Treaty, Articles 5, states “an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations...” (Severoatlantická zmluva, 1949, art. 5), followed by
the Article 10 which extends the principle of responsibility to other countries
by stating that “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty.” (Severoatlantická zmluva, 1949, art. 10)
Further important documents of the Alliance include a strategic concept
that defines the operational procedures and concepts of the North Atlantic
Alliance. The first Strategic Concept was adopted in 1991, second in 1999
and the last one in 2010. The 1991 Strategic Concept expanded the territorial
scope of the Alliance and defined enlargement as a form of stabilisation of
Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second Strategic Concept
of 1999 confirmed the open door policy, strengthened the defence
capabilities of the Alliance, and confirmed the concept of enlargement as an
instrument of stabilisation in Europe. The most recent 2010 Strategic
Concept adopted a new vision that would inextricably become part of V4
countries’ security policy as well. The agreement was reached in a number of
areas such as building a missile defence or opening new topics in the field of
security, such as the fight against terrorism and the protection against cyber
attacks. It also confirms the link between the security and development.
NATO and the European Union now cover a wide range of activities
that imply the development of a collective (member) participation in security
issues, but also the development of cooperative security towards wider
participation of other countries in the framework of partnerships at different
levels. Slovakia, Czech, Poland and Hungary, as a Member States, have an
interest in creating this kind of cooperative security within NATO (based on
attributes such as collective security, collective defence, individual security
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Jaroslav Ušiak
and promoting stability). The European Union as well has the responsibility
of conducting its own operations and activities in terms of stabilisation and
resolution of security problems (defined also in the European Security
Strategy). Consequently, both organisations gradually head for transition to a
higher stage, i.e. to the co-operative security.
It is precisely the membership in NATO and the EU which affects
significantly the security environment of the member states. Consequently,
that is how also V4 countries become part of collective defence (security) NATO, or building the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the
Common Security and Defence Policy – within the framework of the EU.
Membership in these organisations, however, has also necessary
implications, whether in the form of supporting the operations of the EU or
the Alliance, or accepting responsibility for joint decisions and their
fulfilment in the national security policy. For now, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation in particular is decisive in guaranteeing the collective defence
of the countries of central Europe, but in the future we cannot rule out
strengthening of the European security architecture at the expense of the
one provided by the Alliance.
The Security Policy of the Czech Republic
Security environment in the territory in which various state units
gradually emerged (first Czechoslovak Republic, Czechoslovak Republic, the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,
up to the division of the territory into two sovereign states in 1993) may be
seen through the lens of historical continuity in terms of external borders
(some border changes during the years 1918-1993 were of rather episodic
than continuous nature). In terms of internal security environment, however,
the image of the external enemy and the nature of the threats and risks of
regional and global character were subjects to frequent change. The part
dedicated to the security policy of the Czech Republic is divided into four
sections, based on the stages of its development. The first period of 19891992 is treated jointly with the Slovak Republic; the second period of 19931999 was marked by forming its own security identity and the desire to
integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures; the third period of 1999-2007 is
characterised by the change in the nature of security policy of the Czech
Republic from individual to collective security. There is an obvious
adaptation to the roles of NATO member state and the ongoing efforts to
integrate into the European structures not only on the formal level – by
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joining the EU, but also in practical terms after its accession, and
contradictions between Atlanticism and Europeism in security policy.
Fourth period after 2007 until present (post-integration period) is
characterised by the deeper security cooperation with the United States, as
well as by seeking coexistence and cooperation with the EU and NATO in
the security and defence field. Development of the Czech security policy
could be characterised by two main trends - a clear orientation towards
membership in NATO immediately after the establishment of independent
state and complicated quest to find its place in it; the other is a complicated
process of finding a consensus in regard to the European security
architecture, i.e. defining the position within the ESDP / CSDP and CFSP.
The first period was marked by the collapse of bipolarity and a new
dimension brought to the development of international relations, triggering
new processes that continue to this day. Czech Republic became part of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), changing not only political
organisation, but also the nature of security and the new security orientation
of the state. Czechoslovakia initially had to solve many problems, one of
which was the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops from its territory,
completed only in 1991. Czechoslovakia remained a member of the Warsaw
Pact until mid-1991. The year 1991 was characterised mainly by dissolution
of the USSR, which created a new security structure in Europe. Right after
its establishment Czechoslovakia sought to join the EC (European
Communities) and also applied to join NATO, which it saw as the guarantor
of its security. An important change occurred in 1992, when first separatist
tendencies began to reverberate in the federation. This led in 1993 to the
creation of two independent republics - the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic, both of which faced the difficult task of transformation to a
market economy, establishment of the rule of law and, among other things,
shaping their security environment and national security policy.
In this turbulent period, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic tried to
build its security policy in a new direction. During this period vast numbers
of laws were adopted, amended and modified, governing in particular change
and removal of “Socialist ideology” and the leading role of the Communist
Party from nearly all legislation. In the area of security the Military Doctrine of
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic15 was adopted in 1991, based on the
creation of independent state and related necessary actions. It proclaimed the
intention to build the army based on the defence requirements, claiming
The original title of the document is Vojenská doktrína Českej a Slovenskej federatívnej republiky,
adopted in 1991.
15
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Jaroslav Ušiak
shared responsibility for European security environment. An interesting
feature was that it did not associate with any military blocs, and the pursuit
of neutrality evident from the entire document. The UN was described as a
main pillar of international law and the CSCE (now OSCE) was perceived as
the further possible guarantor of its security. This Military Doctrine did not
define any particular enemy, and stated the intention to build the army solely
on the defensive principles. According to the doctrine, reorganisation and
even relocation of military units should be carried out across the country.
The second period (years 1993-1999) was characterised by building its
own defence and security identity, although we cannot really speak of
shaping the security policy – with the division of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic also the Council of State Defence, a central government
authority for the implementation of security policy, ceased to exist.
Consequently, focus on the defensive aspect of the security policy
implemented mainly by the Ministry of Defence prevailed in this period.
It should be noted, however, that in the Czech Republic, as well as in other
V4 countries, security and defence policy were not primary concerns of
politicians - the efforts to create democratic institutions and rules, the
transition to a market economy, limiting the planned economy were the
primary goals, and the issues of security policy emerged only in 1996 in the
Policy Statement of the Government as a separate part related to the
country’s decision to join NATO. (Mazalová, 2006)
A clear orientation of the Czech Republic towards NATO was
influenced by several events. In the first place it was seat of a non-permanent
member of the UN Security Council in 1994-1995, which pointed towards
the problem of conflict resolution and the reluctance of great powers to deal
with it, making the Czech representatives aware of the inability of the UN to
address conflict situations and to send troops to the troubled area (conflict in
Rwanda). The question, therefore, was what kind of guarantees it could
expect in the event of their problems. Secondly, it was its practical
experience from the CSCE / OSCE in the process of breakup of the former
Yugoslavia and the ineffectiveness of adopted measures. (Khol, 2004)
Finally, it was also the final attempt at neutrality, which, however, has not
been accepted by the majority of political representation (except for antisystemic parties) nor by the public.
In March 1994 the country signed the Framework Document of the
Partnership for Peace, and the following actions clearly pointed towards
gaining full NATO membership - participation in joint exercises, appropriate
political development and transformation. The most important task was the
communication with the public presenting the necessity of the Alliance, as
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well as changing nature of NATO more oriented to the peaceful settlement
of disputes as a means to guarantee the security of the region and Europe.
An important document that opened the doors of NATO to the new
countries was a Study on NATO Enlargement of 1995, which created a set
of rules required for NATO admission.16 At the Madrid Summit in 1997
Czech Republic received an invitation to begin accession negotiations, which
were completed already during V. Klaus’s government,17 just before the
caretaker government of J. Tošovský (but the trends towards integration
continued without significant changes18) and early elections when
government of M. Zeman took the office. His government eventually
continued in pro-integration direction (although the previous years and the
statements of representatives of the government pointed to the trend of the
specific position of the Czech Republic in NATO, similar to the one of
Denmark or Norway) and fulfilled all necessary requirements to the
successful admission of the country into NATO in March 1999.
At that time several strategic security documents were adopted, thus
supporting the Western orientation of the Czech Republic and its integration
to the Euro-Atlantic structures. These were the Military Strategy of 1994,
White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic of 1995, the National
Defence Strategy of 1997, and finally the Security Strategy of the Czech
Republic in 1999 and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic in 1999,
adopted just before the admission to NATO. All these documents clearly
expressed the orientation of the country towards Euro-Atlantic structures
(the discussion about the orientation of the Czech Republic has been very
clear among its political representation right from gaining the independence).
16 This study highlighted the fundamental criteria for the candidate countries to become NATO
members - democracy, market economy, good relations with neighbours, respect for human rights,
civilian control of the armed forces, achieving the minimum interoperability with NATO forces. It is an
interesting fact that of the above-mentioned criteria five are political and only one is military in nature.
(Borkovec, 2008, p. 24) These criteria are still valid for the candidate countries.
17 Despite its efforts, at the beginning of the negotiations the Czech Republic did not fulfil the all criteria
summarised in six areas - “the political, legislative, defence (defence planning, interoperability,
infrastructure of the HNS, defence industry), resources (economic and human resources), information
security and public support.” (Borkovec, 2008, p. 24)
18 This assertion is supported by the continued preparations of the strategic documents, finalisation and
adoption of the Constitutional Law on Security, which gave coherence to the development of security
policy of the Czech Republic. With its adoption the long absence of legal standards and central authority
in the field of security has ended, because the law established the basic rules of operation of the security
system in various emergency situations and designed the institutions involved in ensuring the safety and
security of the Czech Republic. Moreover, it envisaged the establishment of the National Security
Council as an advisory body to the Government in the field of security and defence. (Karaffa, Balabán,
Rašek, 2008, p. 7)
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The first document adopted in this period was the 1994 Military Strategy of
the Czech Republic19. The key principle of the concept of defence posited that
the Czech Army must be prepared to face a military attack regardless of how
strong an opponent is, from where he comes from, or what are the terms of
initiation and waging war, with the possibility to draw on the international
security structures and allies. (Rašek, 2004, p. 13) Such definition of defence
was unrealistic, given the size of the state costly, and, ultimately,
unsustainable. Consequently, it was essential to clearly define the role,
position, and the character of the Czech Army within the new system,
according to the needs of the national interests of the Czech Republic. This
seemed to be quite clear in terms of further direction, i.e. aiming at the
transformation of the Army of the Czech Republic so as to enable it to
comply with NATO, to be fully operational and compatible with the system
of the Alliance. (Vojenská strategie České republiky, 1994, p. 4)
The second document was the White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic20
adopted in 1995, which included sections dedicated to the country’s security
policy, military strategy of the Czech Republic as well as the development
and transformation of the Army of the Czech Republic. Given that it was
the first document in this area responding to the needs for defining security
policy its introductory part is dedicated to the definition of a security policy
concept. It does so along clearly discernible democratic values, embedding
the country in the future European security system. (Bílá kniha o obraně
České republiky, 1995, p. 6) It provides a basic analysis of the security
environment and the resulting threats. It delineates position towards the UN,
NATO, EU, WEU and the OSCE, as well as the stance towards the process
of disarmament and arms control. (Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky,
1995, p. 9) The most important statement, however, is an expression of
support for full-fledged membership in NATO through participation in the
Partnership for Peace program, in which the Czech Republic actively
participated since 1994. (Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky, 1995, p. 12)
Section on the military strategy comprises the complete text of the Military
Strategy of 1994. In further section the document elaborates on the
development of the Army for the last period; it defines the process and basic
principles of military transformation, providing a detailed description of the
planning and allocation of resources in order to achieve full compatibility
with NATO.
19
20
The original title of the document is Vojenská strategie České republiky, adopted in 1994.
The original title of the document is Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky, adopted in 1995.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
The National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic21, adopted in 1997,
unequivocally defined key principles and tasks in the area of security. It also
assigned the respective responsibilities of a state and municipal authorities in
various states: in peace, in an emergency, in a state of national emergency
and in times of war, thus trying to create a functioning security system under
all above-mentioned circumstances. It defines the key starting points of the
defensive strategy through definition of national interests, where the most
prominent position is dedicated to the intention of achieving full
membership in NATO. Membership in the Alliance is understood as a
primary means to ensure and enhance the defence and security of the Czech
Republic. The strategy also acknowledges the option to send the unit outside
the territory of the Czech Republic, contingent on the consent of both
chambers of the Parliament. (Národní obranná strategie České republiky,
1997, p. 8) An interesting trend is visible in the call for specialisation via
establishment of special groups, for instance anti-terrorist commandos.
(Národní obranná strategie České republiky, 1997, p. 6) It points to the
aptitude of those responsible for drafting the document and their ability to
capture in advance future global trends in the development of armed forces.
The aim was to provide a basic foundation and a framework sufficiently
flexible for adoption of additional defence policies and sectoral strategies in
the future. Czech analysts (Krulík, 2011) consider this a positive element in
the corpus of security documents of the state – an element which the
National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic successfully incorporated.
The last two documents adopted in 1999, the Security Strategy of the Czech
Republic22 and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic23, were created under
external pressure as a set of pre-accession documents just before admission
to NATO, due to lack of existence of such documents. The Security Strategy
of the Czech Republic was adopted in February 1999 and the Military
Strategy of the Czech Republic in late March 1999, after actual admission to
NATO. Military strategy is based on the Security Strategy, which sets out the
basic framework for the functioning of the security policy of the Czech
Republic.
The Security Strategy of February 1999 is divided into three parts: the
security environment, national security policy and section dedicated to
ensuring security – i.e. to the crisis management and formation of the
security system. In its first part the Strategy is dedicated to description of the
security environment of the Czech Republic, highlighting the trend of rise of
The original title of the document is Národní obranná strategie České republiky, adopted in 1997.
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, adopted in 1999.
23 The original title of the document is Vojenská strategie České republiky, adopted in 1999.
21
22
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Jaroslav Ušiak
asymmetric and non-military threats, and the need for preparedness to deal
with such threats. In addition, it also determines the importance and urgency
of these threats, creating a certain prioritisation starting with the most
important such as natural disasters and catastrophes; abuse of interstate
economic relations; possible terrorist activities and organised crime; largescale migration; violent actions of the subjects of foreign powers; and threats
to the fundamental values of democracy and civil liberties. Among threats
with rather low importance (with long-term activation up to months or
years) figure: diversionary activities in the territory of the Czech Republic
and the threat of aggression or military assault. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR,
1999, p. 6) This section of the Strategy determines the security interests of
the Czech Republic and its position in the international system. It declares
support for the Alliance on possession of nuclear weapons, which it
considers a political tool of deterrence. It goes noted that with the
membership in the Alliance also the Czech Republic obtains this kind of
security guarantees.
In the second part dedicated to the security policy various components –
foreign, defence, economic and internal – are defined. In this approach we
can see that the authors of the Strategy already at the time understood the
trend of segmentation of the security policy into multiple, both military and
non-military sectors. The most important change, however, is to be seen in
the definition of security policy tools, shifting the focus from individual,
national security and defence towards cooperative and collective defence and
security, represented by the UN and OSCE, but in particular by NATO.
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 1999, p. 8) Particularly the membership in
NATO is seen as the achievement of collective defence although the actual
definition in the text of the Strategy inaccurately reflects the approach of
NATO (i.e. the eventual attack on a Member State does not automatically
trigger an active involvement of the allies). On the other hand, it correctly
underscores the political dimension of NATO membership – function of
deterrence, which NATO extends to its new members as a form of security
guarantee.
The last part is dedicated to ensuring the safety of determining
competence, accountability of individual organs and appears here in 1998
established a National Security Council determines the basic framework for
the functioning of the various states of crisis, the state, and in addition to
this definition refers to crisis management and a summary of the tools and
procedures associated with them.
The 1999 Military Strategy of the Czech Republic was not adopted until
after the official admission of the country into NATO. It “defines the main
principles of preparation of the Armed Forces for actions in crisis situations
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
under new conditions of Czech membership in NATO”. (Vojenská strategie
České republiky, 1999, p. 1) Deterrence supported by sufficient military
capacity was defined as the basic instrument of national defence, and NATO
was providing the credibility to such deterrence. (Karaffa, Balabán, Rašek,
2008) These two documents (Security Strategy and Military Strategy) clearly
marked the transition from individual to collective defence, and also
committed the Czech Republic to participate in peacekeeping operations and
crisis management of the Alliance. The Military Strategy is based on the 1999
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, which may be seen also in defining
the same potential risks and threats to the Czech Republic. On the basis of
the above outlined principles and considerations it sets out the basic tasks of
the Army of the Czech Republic: to defend the Czech Republic from the
external enemies; to participate in NATO defence structures (by providing a
reinforced brigade with armoured fighting vehicles), to participate in
peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations, and to contribute to the
elimination of non-military threats. It also establishes the operational and
organisational structure of the Army of the Czech Republic. During this
period, however, mandatory military service continued to exist alongside the
semi-professional army. (Vojenská strategie České republiky, 1999, p. 8)
Transformation to a professional army was left pending for the future
period.
The third period (in 1999-2007) was replete with various problems, either
with the transformation and interoperability of the Army of the Czech
Republic and its transition to a fully professional army in 2005, or with
understanding the nature of the membership itself (even nowadays the
public has distorted understanding of NATO, its obligations and obligations
of Member States not only in the Czech Republic but also in other V4
countries). During the period between the decision of the Czech Republic to
join NATO and the EU, and gaining the actual membership in both
organisations, both of them have developed significantly. They have changed
qualitatively (the EU and the development of its ESDP component;
enlargement of NATO missions and out-of-area operations) during the
admission process and the Czech Republic could not affect these
developments at the time. Naturally, after the admission to both NATO and
the EU the Czech Republic had to face the problem how to cope with
extended responsibilities that both organisations took upon themselves in
the meantime, which in turn significantly influenced the further development
The first problem occurred in the spring of 1999 when Kosovo crisis led
to the initiation of military operations and the Czech Republic has to make a
decision whether to support NATO air strikes. Czech political
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Jaroslav Ušiak
representation was divided on the issue on its supporters - V. Havel and
J. Kavan, and opponents - M. Zeman and V. Klaus, and neither public was
clearly determined to support continued NATO air campaign Czech
Republic and rather refused to support the operation. Political leaders,
therefore, were confronted with an uneasy task to back their decision to
support NATO and to explain it to the public in order to preserve the image
of responsible and reliable ally. The Kosovo crisis marked the beginning of a
strategic change in security policy interests from one overarching goal
(NATO membership) to a balanced security policy entailing membership
obligations and commitments, in many cases unpopular in relation to the
population. Secondly, there was an effort to learn and to get involved in
decision-making of the Alliance (find compromise solutions, create internal
coalitions to promote the Czech national interests), i.e. ending the phase of
admission and assuming full responsibility and participation as a Member
State of the Alliance.
This period was also accompanied by an effort of the Czech Republic to
join the European Union, thus ending the process of integration into
Western structures. These aspirations were fulfilled in 2004, as for other V4
countries. Then-ruling leftist government of M. Zeman (with the tacit
support of the right-wing ODS) except for Atlanticism vowed strong
support for the European security architecture model presented by the
European Union and its political representatives. With the membership in
NATO the Czech Republic automatically assumed also an associate member
status of the WEU24 and was required to participate in its activities, especially
in cases when it functioned as a bridge between the EU and NATO. The
same was true for its participation in the EU’s CFSP. (Khol, 2004, p. 35)
Decisive impact on forming relationships and preparation for the EU
membership had primarily the Treaty of Amsterdam (adopted in May 1999),
which established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and
has incorporated Petersberg Tasks directly into ESDP.
During the pre-accession period the Czech Republic concentrated on the
CFSP dimension in relation to the EU, counting on the strengthening of the
mutual ties between the WEU and NATO. This led to certain neglect for the
ESDP. Despite their increased significance, the security and defence
dimensions we not sufficiently addressed. Not only the Czech Republic had
24 Western European Union (WEU) was an independent defence and military organisation,
headquartered in Brussels and working closely with the European Communities (especially with the EEC
and later EC), which became the forerunner of the European Union. Its activities ceased in 2010
(expiration of Paris Agreements that have been concluded for 55 years) and were incorporated directly
under the administration of the European Union. Its role was primarily an effort to coordinate security
and defence policy of the EEC and the EU.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
to resolve this issue at that time; it did not mean, however, to put the ESDP
in opposition to the commitments to NATO (as has happened many times).
It was a fundamental mistake to ignore the EU’s nascent efforts to form a
common security and defence architecture. (Mooz, 2004) Strong resistance
to creating ESDP has been expressed during the period of 2000-2001 by the
Ministry of Defence and later on also by ODS. In its 2002 election campaign
ODS articulated its opposition to building a joint army under the umbrella of
the EU. (Khol, 2004, p. 38) On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Czech Republic was more openly in favour of the EU
proposal.
There were several important milestones in this period, i.e. the terrorist
attacks on the United State in September 2001; the preparation of the Prague
NATO Summit in 2002 (where the Czech Republic presented itself as a
reliable partner); as well as the Iraqi crisis in 2003 (where the Czech Republic
supported the U.S. policy and stood against a coalition of European states
opposing the attack, thus defining the United States as a strategic partner).
All these events reinforced the ambiguous character of relations of the
Czech Republic to NATO and the EU. It is only in the Concept of Foreign
Policy of the Czech Republic for the period 2003-2006 where the first sign
of convergence of the security policy of the Czech Republic between the two
institutions may be traced. Previously prevailing attitude was to support
consultations between NATO and the EU. This Concept, however, brings
the attempt to balance the approach towards both organisations by pursuing
dialogue between them and supporting the establishment of a strategic
partnership, making use of existing functional relations and strengthening
Alliance (the U.S. strategic position) with the help of ESDP at the same time.
This so-called “dual-track system” and attempt to find a compromise for the
future development of security policy may be discerned also in the strategic
documents of that period. This transition may be seen in the 2001 Security
Strategy of the Czech Republic when compared with the 2003 Security
Strategy, as well as when comparing the defence-related documents, i.e. the
2002 Military Strategy of the Czech Republic and the 2004 Military Strategy
of the Czech Republic.
The first document adopted in this period was the 2001 Security Strategy of
the Czech Republic25, adopted in February 2001 in response to the admission to
NATO. It reflected the new NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, the Treaty of
Amsterdam establishing ESDP, as well as the events of and response to the
Kosovo crisis.
25
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, adopted in 2001.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
The strategy consists of 6 parts with different sections devoted to major
elements of national security policy. The second part focuses on the
fundamental pillars of the security policy of the Czech Republic, based on
the assumption of indivisibility of security, universality of fundamental
human rights and freedoms, and rejected indifference to the fate of other
nations and regions. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2001, p. 1) Especially the
last mentioned aspect is clearly attributable to the response to the Kosovo
crisis events. It also expresses the adherence to the collective security and
defence, as a result of the transformation and NATO membership.
The third part is devoted to analysis of the security environment. In its
respective sections it describes the position of the Czech Republic in the
international environment, and in addition to NATO and the EU (and the
emerging ESDP) it underlines the importance of the OSCE and the UN.
The Strategy expresses the inclination to the reform of the UNSC; in the
section on global threats and risks it points mainly to ethnic and religious
conflicts in crisis regions, and to the need of finding solution to the
proliferation of WMD and the possibility of their acquisitions by unstable
and undemocratic regimes. In the region of Europe the Strategy points to
South-Eastern Europe and the need to restore peace and stability in the
region, while it refers to the economic, social and demographic imbalances
between world regions as possible sources of conflicts. (Bezpečnostní
strategie ČR, 2001, p. 3-4)
In the fourth part of the Strategy security interests are defined. We have
already pointed out to the above-mentioned “dual-track” problem. For the
first time the need to develop ESDP appears in an official document. The
Czech Republic endorses the need for continued U.S. presence in the region
to ensure the European security and defence, namely by supporting the
creation of new ESDP mechanisms, but strongly prefers its further
development in the spirit of the European Security and Defence Identity.26
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2001, p. 5) This, consequently, initiated a long
debate in the Czech Republic on the need and support for the EU defence
policy. In the fifth part the Strategy focuses on the means of fulfilment of
security policy of the Czech Republic, and points to the need for effective
functioning of the security system of the country. It also stresses the foreign
policy as a means of enforcing security interests in the international
environment, and acknowledges the role of defence policy, internal security
policy and economic policy for achievement of the national security.
Since 1994, the European Security and Defence Identity has been developed within the framework of
NATO as integral part of the adaptation process of the Alliance, which should allow European countries
to act alone, if necessary.
26
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
A fundamental change may be seen in attitude towards the contribution of
the Czech Republic to international peacekeeping operations. The new
strategy maintains that these should be undertaken not only when they arise
from contractual obligations, but even if also when they are in accordance
with the national interests of the Czech Republic. (Bezpečnostní strategie
ČR, 2001, p. 8)
The second document was the 2002 Military Strategy of the Czech Republic27,
which may be included into the so-called sectoral strategies (it further
develops security strategy). The document describes the basic principles for
the formation and use of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The
document consists of six parts. The second part is devoted to the assessment
of the security situation in the context of usability of the Armed Forces of
the Czech Republic, highlighting the need for preparedness and usability of
the armed forces in time of peace within the framework of NATO, both
their military as well as non-military components, i.e. the intelligence.
(Vojenská strategie České republiky, 2002, p. 4) The third part is devoted to
descriptions of the tasks of the armed forces in various crisis situations,
specifically emphasizing collective defence and the resolution of military and
non-military crisis situations, both within its borders and outside the territory
of the Czech Republic. It also considers the conduct of these operations
under the umbrella of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as the
conduct of the so-called out-of-area operations if an action against potential
aggressor is involved, or there is a threat of spreading the conflict on the
territory of a NATO member state.28 (Kubeša, 2002, p. 48) There is,
however, ambivalence within the text, seen in emphasizing the role of
collective defence and at the same time an effort to create the complexity of
the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to ensure its security on an
individual basis. The fourth section is devoted to the pillars of the defence
strategy: 1st pillar relates to preparedness and ability of the Armed Forces to
participate in NATO operations outside the territory of the Czech Republic;
2nd pillar deals with the involvement of the Czech Republic to the defence of
the airspace - NATINEADS; 3rd pillar relates to self-defence of the national
territory. (Vojenská strategie České republiky, 2002, p. 8-9) The penultimate
part of the strategy is devoted to the principles of formation of the Armed
Forces of the Czech Republic to ensure the compatibility of their structure
and size with the requirements of NATO, the EU and the UN, comprising
the requirements for the supporting equipment.
The original title of the document is Vojenská strategie České republiky, adopted in 2002.
In this time period and context an anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan was ongoing, essentially
conducted in accordance with Article 5, outside the territory of NATO member states.
27
28
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The third document adopted in this period was the 2003 Security Strategy
of the Czech Republic29. It was the third security strategy adopted in the course
of five years, which has already reflected the future admission of the Czech
Republic into the European Union in 2004. The main reason for its revision,
however, was the response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United
States (the 2001 Security Strategy was issued before these terrorist attacks).
When compared with the previous strategy a major change occurs in relation
to terrorism. In the 2001 Security Strategy, the word terrorism (terrorists,
etc.) occurs 6 times in connection with other security threats. On the
contrary, in the 2003 Security Strategy the word terrorism occurs 31 times,
and in many cases it is treated as a main object (a security threat) and the
fight against terrorism ranked among the top strategic interests of the Czech
Republic. This confirms the clear inclination to U.S. policy in this period, as
well as our argument that the United States has been perceived as a strategic
partner.
The Strategy is divided into seven parts. The second section defines the
security policy of the Czech Republic, and provides concise and precise
terminological definitions of terms such as security, security threat, risk
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2003, p. 9), employing them consistently
throughout the text. In response to the terrorist attacks, the strategy states
that the threat of a direct military attack against the Czech Republic has
diminished significantly, but the risk of terrorist attacks increased
considerably. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2003, p. 6) Third part is devoted to
defining the security interests of the Czech Republic, differentiating between
the vital, strategic, and other important security interest. In the fourth part,
dedicated to the security environment, two areas are analysed: first, the role
of states and international organisations in the international environment, as
well as trends shaping it. It aims to involve as many countries as possible in
the process of problem-solving, highlighting the relevance of international
organisations and the UN in particular. It affirms, however, that if they are
not able to fully respond to the crisis situations, their reform is needed.
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2003, p. 7) This section was in fact a response to
Iraqi crisis and participation of the Czech Republic in the U.S.-led coalition
of “willing and able”. Secondly, the strategy provides for an engagement in
CSDP and the resulting need for an active contribution. The strategy is
vague in this regard and supports the “double-track” system, and does not
seek a precise definition of the relationship between NATO and the EU.
Thus it only supports discourse which at that time took place in respect to
the direction of the Czech Republic, i.e. promotion of European or
29
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, adopted in 2003.
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transatlantic security architecture. Trends in the international environment
are influenced by the international developments, putting emphasis on the
threat of terrorist attacks, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, but also
internal problems such as corruption, organised crime, or the climate change
and its impact on the population.
Already in the introductory part the basic rule of the implementation of
the Strategy is acknowledged, which maintains that the security of the state is
unthinkable without good communication between the representatives of
the state, local government and citizens. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2003, p.
2) This idea is reflected also in parts five and six, i.e. in the enumeration of
the factors contributing to the enforcement of security interests of the Czech
Republic, and in the part of the Strategy where actions and activities of civil
society, government action, president, regions related to the security of the
state are discussed. The fifth section, similarly to the 2001 Strategy, is
devoted to different areas of the implementation of the security strategy, i.e.
foreign policy, defence policy, internal security, economic policy, and public
awareness. In fact, we could state that the division mirrors the set-up of
respective ministries and defines their activities for the achievement of the
strategy. Here again strategy points to one of its basic principles –
communication – and necessity to connect all relevant segments in
implementation of the security policy, including the population of the state
Unlike the 1999 Security Strategy which stipulated the goal to create a
semi-professional army, the 2003 Security Strategy expresses intention to
form fully professional Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which would
be mobile, flexible and well equipped, capable of conducting operations
outside the territory of the Czech Republic. In the area of defence policy the
Czech Republic claimed responsibility for maintaining the world peace using
also coercive means in the case that prevention fails. It affirms such
responsibility not exclusively in line with its contractual obligations, but also
outside these contractual obligations in accordance with the UN Charter.
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2003, p. 11-12) As some Czech analysts point
out, the possibility that the UN Security Council decides not mandate such
action is very vaguely formulated and the text “should provide a mandate”
could be interpreted that the participation of the Czech Republic would have
been possible also without such mandate. The Czech Republic indirectly also
subscribes to the idea of the missile defence system, due to the persisting
threat of WMD. (Centrum strategických studií, 2004)
An important aspect of this Strategy is involvement of the Czech security
community led by A. Vondra in the process of its formulation. A. Vondra,
on one hand, has brought more American spirit into the Strategy, but at the
same time he did not refuse joint European responsibility. (Centrum
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strategických studií, 2004) This influence may be seen in several areas – the
qualitative elaboration of the entire strategy, clearly expressed support for
science and research in the field of security, the complexity of the
elaboration, and modern understanding of threats identified in the strategy.
The last, fourth document analysed in this period, is the 2004 Military
Strategy of the Czech Republic30. The strategy is divided into six parts. It defines
basic principles of defence policy and the role of the Armed Forces of the
Czech Republic after admission to the EU, where the Czech Republic
committed itself to working closely with both organisations to tackle current
security threats. The strategy determines the structure, size and capabilities of
the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, in accordance with the obligation
of development of NATO defence capabilities, i.e. the promise of
specialisation of the Armed Forces especially in the field of radiation,
chemical and biological protection, military healthcare and military electronic
warfare. Nevertheless, the Strategy reiterates the complexity of the
development of the Armed Forces (Vojenská strategie České republiky,
2004, p. 11) which remains one of the principles of ensuring defence of the
Czech Republic and NATO in terms of preventive measures, including, in
particular, the use of expeditionary forces that reduce the need for reactive
measures. Pillars of military defence remain the same as in the 2002 Military
Strategy. As the analysts from the Czech Republic point out, the text of the
Strategy significantly loses logical structure because it mixes together two
levels: strategy how to ensure the defence of the state, and ambitions and the
role of the Armed Forces (i.e. it does not proceed from the general to the
specific, defining first the principles and only subsequently the tasks). As a
result, this overlapping document loses transparency and clarity. (Síla, 2004,
p. 108)
During the last, fourth period (from 2007 until present) the Czech
Republic witnessed continuation of the processes in the realm of national
security heading towards deeper integration and cooperation. After
admission of the V4 countries into NATO and the EU, a process of
European and transatlantic integration of the Czech Republic was
completed. The Czech Republic integrated with the countries which shared
the same values and institutional framework; thus significantly enhancing its
security (not only when it comes to the external borders). Contributing to
the capacity of both organisations, however, remains one of the key issues of
national security policy. Crucial importance in shaping security policy in this
period had negotiations with the United States regarding set-up of a missile
30
The original title of the document is Vojenská strategie České republiky, adopted in 2004.
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defence system, similarly to Poland (Slovak Republic and its Prime Minister
Robert Fico in 2009 explicitly rejected the U.S. and NATO proposal to get
involved in this project). The preparatory phase began already in 2002 - 2004
with negotiations, assessment of technical requirements, and first talks held
in Washington. However, a major step came in 2007, when a final decision
on the participation of the Czech Republic in the system together with
Poland was adopted. The actual negotiations were not entirely
straightforward and the Czech Republic demanded many security guarantees
and benefits from the United States. In 2008, the Declaration on Strategic
Cooperation in the field of defence was adopted, which created a platform
for cooperation in the defence industry, research and development.
Following the pressure from Russia and the inauguration of B. Obama as
President of the United States in September 2009 the process of
development of missile defence system in Central Europe stopped. Despite
the failure of the process itself, the participation of the Czech Republic in it
is unique, for it represented engagement of the Czech Republic in a military
dialogue at the highest level – an achievement not common for many
countries.
Another important milestone was the Czech Presidency of the EU from
January to June 2009. During this period an overall convergence of security
and foreign policy of the Czech Republic towards security and defence
capabilities of the EU has been initiated, resulting in an active participation
of the Czech Republic in their development. The main priorities of the
Czech presidency in the field of security were to support the development of
civilian and military capabilities of the EU, while maintaining the
development of civilian ESDP capabilities. (Pracovní program českého
předsednictví, 2009) The process of preparation for the Czech presidency
began in 2007 and, therefore, this period can be considered the beginning of
the convergence of the Czech Republic with security and defence structures
of the EU. The process itself was slow, and the Czech Republic still
considers NATO to be the main guarantor of security. The preparations for
and the actual EU Presidency, however, confirmed the trend of convergence
between the Czech orientation towards NATO and its European
embeddedness. The key principle was and remains Czech effort to develop
the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of ESDP and CSDP as
complementary to the development of NATO capabilities, and avoid
duplication.
In April 2010, Prague hosted summit of the U.S. President B. Obama
and Russian President D. Medvedev during which they signed an agreement
on further reduction of strategic offensive weapons START II. (Horemuž,
2013) This summit ended the period of Czech inclination toward the United
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States and strengthened the self-perception of the Czech Republic as an
impartial and respected player between East and West.
The most recent period shows gradual convergence of two streams of
Czech security policy – Atlanticist and European, visible in Czech support
for and participation in the EU military operation (e.g. EU ALTHEA in
Bosnia and Herzegovina), the civilian missions (e.g. EUFOR in Chad), as
well as participation in the EU defence architecture by forming V4
Battlegoups. These arguments are supported also through the analysis of
security related documents adopted during this period: 2008 Military
Strategy; White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic adopted in 2011;
2011 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic; and the 2012 Defence
Strategy. All these documents confirm the Czech acceptance and
convergence with the liabilities arising from the obligations of membership
in the EU, in particular in relations to the CFSP and defence dimension of
ESDP / CSDP.
The first document adopted in this period was the 2008 Military Strategy of
the Czech Republic31, which defined the basic principles of defence policy and
political-military ambitions of the state. Compared to the previous strategic
documents it more explicitly emphasizes the need for an active involvement
of the Czech Republic in international operations and missions conducted
under the auspices of NATO, the EU, the UN and OSCE (in this order of
importance), thus showing a major effort to enhance an expeditionary
function of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. (Karaffa, Balabán,
Rašek, 2008, p. 10) This, according to the strategy, could help to minimise
the impact of threats on the security interests of the Czech Republic. The
strategy also supports the country’s involvement in international projects
focused on anti-ballistic missile defence – a clear reference to the thenongoing negotiations between the Czech Republic and the United States on
the Czech involvement in the missile defence. Fundamental debate
associated with the adoption of this document is related to changes in the
nature of the document, and replacement of the Military Strategy with the
Defence Strategy, which could include a more comprehensive range of areas
related to the defence of a state – not only in military terms. Fundamental
change in respect to the previous military strategies is an expressed
preference for collective defence, reflecting key NATO strategic documents.
It underlines the necessity to ensure the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty
area, which provides platform for elimination of the need to build complex
capabilities as maintained in previous strategies. This represents a major
breakthrough in the understanding of national defence, reflected also in
31
The original title of the document is Vojenská strategie České republiky, adopted in 2008.
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practical terms in the construction of the armed forces. From this
perspective, the document clearly builds national defence policy on collective
defence, emphasizing the readiness of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic to actively participate in expeditionary operations.
The second document was a White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic32,
adopted in May 2011. In its 168 pages it summarizes the main options and
the necessary steps for the future development of defence and the Armed
Forces of the Czech Republic. The crucial problem is identified as
insufficient financial framework for the implementation of political-military
ambitions of the state. The main findings indicate failure to maintain the
required number of professional soldiers in the future, lack of funds in the
sector due to overpriced and non-systematic investment over the last decade
with the accumulated deficit of 80-90 billion Czech crowns, and a need for
massive investments in modernisation and technical improvement of the
Armed Forces. (Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky, 2011, p. 13) It is
important to note, however, that the White Paper does not offer many
options to solve this negative situation. It proposes either to increase the
budget (requires an estimated increase in hundreds of billions of Czech
crowns) to achieve declared political-military ambitions of the state, i.e.
achieving full operational capability of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic in 2018, or, if there is no increase in the budget income, it proposes
to diminish the above mentioned ambitions or to expand the timeframe for
their implementation. For the first time cyber security is mentioned,
including global threats of cybercrime and hacker attacks to which the Czech
Republic shall not consider itself immune. The purpose of the White Paper
is to provide the basic concepts and principles of operation of national
defence in the future, further elaborated in more detail in other documents.
The third document of this period is the Security Strategy of the Czech
Republic33 from September 2011. Czech experts agree that this latest version
is qualitatively the best one. One possible reason could also be the fact that
significant part of the Czech security community participated in its
preparation. It was drafted under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and discussions and consultations were held with representatives of
the academia, security analysts and experts, i.e. on both academic and
professional level. In addition to the principles of external and internal
security and defence policy, the new strategy also deals with problems not
mentioned, or only marginally mentioned in the 2003 Strategy. The issue of
energy security is dealt with to a greater extent, mentioning the need for
32
33
The original title of the document is Bílá kniha o obraně České republiky, adopted in 2011.
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, adopted in 2011.
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diversification of sources and transit routes and points to the use of nuclear
energy as one of the key elements in the energy field. (Bezpečnostní strategie
ČR, 2011, p. 15-16)
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is divided into five main parts
that reflect the traditional structure of security strategies. The introduction is
dedicated to defining the relation of Security Strategy of the Czech Republic
to other documents, as well as its position as a follow-up to previous
strategies and security documents. Position and relations of the Czech
Republic to its international commitments are also described in this part.
The underlying principles of security policy according to this document
consist primarily of determining approaches, tools and measures to ensure
security, defence and protection of citizens and the state, and are based on
the principles of collective security resulting from the membership of the
Czech Republic in the EU and NATO. The main goal of the Czech Republic
is to ensure safety of its citizens, which is based “on the principle of ensuring
the safety of individuals, the protection of life, health and property. The
successful implementation of this principle is essential to ensure the security
of state institutions, including their full functionality, and to develop
processes and tools designed to strengthen the safety and protection of the
population”. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2011) This section emphasizes the
political and economic stability of the EU, which may significantly affect the
Czech Republic itself.
Czech Republic defines its interests according to their importance as
vital, strategic and other important interests. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR,
2011) The vital interests include: standard interests of a sovereign state such
as ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, and protection of fundamental
human rights and freedoms of the population. Considerably more interesting
is the attitude of the Czech Republic in regard to its strategic interests:
preserving global stabilisation role and increasing the efficiency of the UN;
strengthening the coherence and effectiveness of NATO and the EU;
strengthening of transatlantic ties through development of a strategic
partnership between NATO and the EU and strengthening their
cooperation and complementary security capabilities. Therefore, the “dualtrack” approach to the security architecture in Europe remains present. The
role of OSCE in prevention of armed conflict, actual problems in the field of
energy security, raw materials and food security, also represent strategic
interests of the Czech Republic. As other important interests of the state the
Strategy mentions: cooperation of the state structures with citizens and
active individuals and legal entities; development of civil society and NGOs
active in the field of security; and the promotion of scientific and
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technological development with an emphasis on new technologies with high
added value and innovation.
It should be emphasized that the strategy itself is very well elaborated
from a methodological and terminological point of view; in its respective
parts it always pays attention to the definition of the term or terms, which
are used throughout the text. The document devoted its introductory part to
definition of term “threat” and “risk” so that everyone clearly understands
them (we emphasize this fact because it is rather an uncommon practice,
specifically when it comes to Slovak strategies and documents). The 2011
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic classified the following phenomena
as threats: terrorist attacks and international terrorism as such; proliferation
of WMD and their means of delivery, which can be obtained by state or
non-state actors; cyber attacks – dependence of the Czech Republic on ICT
(i.e. information and communication technologies) exposes it to danger;
instability and regional conflicts in and around the Euro-Atlantic area –
specifically the problem of failed states and the emergence of conflicts on
the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area; negative aspects of international
migration – in particular related to the migration with the Czech Republic as
the destination country; organised crime and corruption; threats to the
operation of critical infrastructure; interruption to supplies of strategic raw
or energy; disasters of natural and anthropogenic provenance and other
emergencies. (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2011)
Fifth part of the Strategy on promoting the security interests of the
Czech Republic indicates how the Czech Republic intends to assert its
interests both internally and externally. According to the strategy, the ways
of promoting the state’s interests need to be adjusted because “the nature of
contemporary security threats and trends necessitates a broad approach to
security combining military and non-military tools. The Czech Republic is
developing tools to promote its security interests both at national level and
through its active involvement in multilateral and bilateral relations. The
successful promotion of its security interests also requires the involvement
of the population, legal entities, individuals and public authorities in the
safeguarding of security and strengthening society’s overall resilience to
security threats.” Promoting security interests, therefore, is no longer an
individual assignment for the respective ministries, but rather a coordinated
approach by all institutions to ensure security. This approach is divided into
the following main parts: a) The collective dimension of safeguarding
security and defence – focuses predominantly on the international context of
security policy and security links between the Czech Republic and
international security organisations such as the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE,
as well as on effects of collective defence and the tools provided by the EU
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to ensure security; b) Strategy of prevention and suppression of security
threats – it differentiates between internal and external security threats. It
emphasizes use of international instruments when responding to threats
which are transnational in nature. Accordingly, when dealing with internal
threats the Strategy asserts that the Czech Republic should use tools that are
available within the state to eliminate them; c) the economic framework for
safeguarding security interests – to be able to effectively address all possible
threats in the future the Czech Republic needs to develop an adequate
budget framework that would allow the Czech Republic to fulfil its
international obligations towards the EU and NATO, as well as internal
budgetary requirements (special partnership with the United States is
mentioned in this context); d) the institutional framework for safeguarding
security – this part analyses the security system of the Czech Republic, which
is considered to be operational and able to respond to eventual breaches of
security. It concludes with the description of the future attempts to combine
crisis and defence planning within the security system framework.
(Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2011)
It has to be emphasized that this strategy is one of the best strategies
among the V4 countries, not only from a terminological point of view, but
also because it is able to respond to current trends and requirements of the
state in the field of security. The strategy describes the new security
challenges that other strategies V4 not include in their security strategies, i.e.
emphasis on protection of the population; raw material and energy
sufficiency; development of critical infrastructure; and efficient use of the
EU civil protection mechanisms. (Janošec, Brabcová, 2011) In the process of
development of the Strategy the shortcomings of the old ones have been
addressed; consequently, it does not represent a mere rephrasing of
supranational documents, but forms a text that reflects the reality in the
Czech Republic.
The last, fourth reviewed document of the period is the Defence Strategy of
the Czech Republic34 adopted in 2012 following the discussion on the adoption
of the 2008 Military Strategy. Its aim was to prepare a comprehensive
document comprising also other areas besides the military defence. Based on
our analysis, however, we may conclude that this aim has not been fulfilled,
and it is necessary that this document is further developed in other sectoral
strategies. The strategy has five parts and presents the guiding principles for
the development and functioning of the national defence system; discusses
the three pillars of defence; and the last part outlines the implementation
framework for the next ten years, after which the Strategy should be
34
The original title of the document is Obranná strategie České republiky, adopted in 2012.
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updated. Even though the strategy sets out in its introduction that it is based
on the 2011 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, the 2010 NATO
Strategic Concept and the EU security documents, the CSDP is not
mentioned in the document. The only reference to the CSDP is the
expressed commitment to join the EU Battlegroups (exactly two times). The
three pillars of defence policy are defined already in the title of dedicated
section: State - Armed Forces - citizen. First pillar refers to the obligations of
the state in the area of defence, the principle of collective defence, effective
intelligence and expected higher spending on modernisation and armaments.
Second pillar refers to the development of the Armed Forces (where, among
other things, it implies the possession of its own supersonic fighter capability
which would require significant expenditures) to meet the obligations of
safeguarding national defence, providing specialised contributions within
NATO and developing the EU military capabilities. It also appropriately
defines the participation of the Armed Forces in the integrated rescue system
and especially in the event of natural and technological disasters and
catastrophes. The last pillar is based on civic duty. The Strategy underlines
that the development of a professional army does not mean that the
possibility of mobilising for war ceased to exists; therefore, due to this fact it
is necessary to develop tools to prepare citizens for such possibility.
It should be noted, however, that even these newly adopted security and
defence documents maintain the ambivalent attitude of the security policy of
the Czech Republic towards the EU’s ESDP / CSDP, the so-called “double
track” system typical of most Central European countries. The second
problem of the current period is the budget available to ensure the
modernisation and further development of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic, so that they are able to fulfil the obligations under the Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, as well as obligations and commitments to the EU
defence policy.
The Security Policy of the Slovak Republic
The three major changes in the global security environment in the 20 th
Century occurred in connection with changes in European area. These
changes also affected the formation of internal and external security
environment of Slovakia. First, it was the creation of an independent state of
the two nations Czechs and Slovaks – Czechoslovakia after World War I.
Second, when in accordance with international treaties (Yalta, Potsdam) it
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became part of the Soviet bloc after World War II, and, finally, after the
dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, when the security
environment of the independent Slovak Republic gradually integrated into
European and Euro-Atlantic structures from 1993 onwards. This is the fate
of small countries – to maintain territorial integrity, as much sovereignty as
possible, and maintain good relations with neighbours. In these terms,
Slovak Republic has proved to be a successful state. The following text is
divided into four main sections, mirroring the development of the modern
history of the Slovak Republic in the security field: 1) the period from 1989
to 1992, when the development has been common with the Czech
Republic35; 2) the period from 1993 to 1998 after the breakup of
Czechoslovakia, characterised by indecision and negative internal political
developments; 3) the period from 1998 to 2006, characterised by harsh
reforms in society and in national security policy; and 4) the period after
2006, when the country has successfully completed the process of accession
to the EU and NATO, and today is its security policy largely shaped by
membership in these two organisations. This process is accompanied by the
gradual sharing of sovereignty in some areas of security, which evokes the
question how this would be reflected in the field of national security in the
future.
In 1993, when the independent Slovak Republic was formed, its political
leaders had to address national security policy independently. The first years
of the independent Slovak Republic were characterised by attempts to form
Slovak independent statehood. Following the adoption of the Constitution,
creation of its own army and state security forces and enactment of the first
laws, it was necessary to develop also the legislation aimed at state security
policy. Radical change was associated with the emergence of democratic
governance and the transition to a market economy. At the same time, the
decisions of political representation regarding Slovakia’s future foreign and
security policy direction interfered significantly with this relationship. Initial
steps were determined by a decision on the direction of the state in the area
of security. There were three possible scenarios: 1) neutrality, 2) participation
in existing structures, 3) supporting the creation of new structures,
respectively transformation of the existing ones (CSCE / OSCE). Given the
geopolitical position of the country, the political representation opted for the
second scenario, i.e. for the participation of the Slovak Republic in existing
international organisations. This decision could bring a reasonable profit in
This period is analysed in more detail at the beginning of sub-chapter “The Security Policy of the
Czech Republic.”
35
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relation to the cost of implementing this step. The government of V. Mečiar
declared its intention to join NATO and the EU, and the first documents in
the field of security policy mirrored this intention. In 1994-1998, three key
security documents were elaborated, determining the direction of Slovakia in
the years to come: the 1994 Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic; Basic
Principles and Aims of the National Security of the Slovak Republic adopted
in 1996; and the 1996 National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic. The
first two documents express the position of the then political representation
to security issues within an independent Slovak Republic, as well as their
expectations for its future direction. The last document is still classified and,
therefore, cannot be subjected to analysis.
Second period 1993-1998 was characterised by unfavourable internal
political developments, which resulted in international isolation. The
characteristic trait of this period was particularly an ambivalent attempt of
political leaders to present Slovakia as a bridge between East and West. In
1994, the Slovak Republic joined the Partnership for Peace program,
designed as a practical cooperation between NATO member states and
partner countries – i.e. potential NATO members. The main objective was
to create a mechanism that would help acceding countries with the
transformation of the armed forces so that they are able to participate in
joint operations and missions with NATO members. Slovak Republic
declared its interest in joining NATO though signing the PfP Framework
Document (and submitting its PfP Presentation documents) in 1994.
Subsequently, in 1995, the Individual Partnership for Peace program was
approved. This mechanism operates on a basis of voluntary decision of the
country in question to participate in the transformation of the security and
defence policy in accordance with the standards of NATO. “Overall, this
program offers to PfP participants an opportunity to participate in more
than 24 different areas of cooperation, democratic control of the armed
forces, the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning and
interoperability. Partner states can choose from more than 1,400 specific
activities, which include visits to teams of experts, workshops, courses and
exercises.” (Pond, 2004) The program also includes joint international
military exercises. Through this document, each country decided which
precise tasks it wanted to accomplish within the subsequent two years
according to their abilities and skills. The two-year period concluded with a
review (of both positive and negative aspects) of the program, followed by
the preparation of a new individual program.
In 1997, Slovakia became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC), which functioned as an official parliamentary institution
and at the same time as a forum where non-members could participate. Such
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functioning allowed aspiring member states to gain a valuable experience in
areas such as defence planning, civil emergency planning for disasters and so
forth. As already mentioned, achieving the declared aim of joining NATO
did not proceed as expected. In July 1997, Slovakia was excluded from the
first round of NATO enlargement at the NATO Madrid Summit. Moreover,
it did not even figure as a primary candidate in the second round of
enlargement. The year 1997 was a turning point for the Slovak Republic. The
discussions about the possibility of the country’s accession to NATO
culminated, accompanied, however, by the effort of the Slovak Republic to
integrate into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which some
politicians considered to be in sharp opposition to the integration into the
EU and NATO. (Exchange of experience in Partnership…, 1998) Slovakia
attempted to position itself as a sort of bridge between East and West and
efforts to neutrality were also supported. Furthermore, the February 1997
thwarted referendum on the country’s accession to NATO has been
perceived also very negatively by foreign partners.
From a deeper analysis of the three basic documents listed above it is
quite evident that the Slovak political elite itself has struggled with the
question of the country’s orientation in the field of security. Although
internationally Slovakia fostered activities to promote membership in NATO
and the EU, internally some politicians contributed to a significant
disruption between the declared objectives in the political and security
orientation, and actual orientation of the Slovak Republic. This, eventually,
resulted in the rejection of integration aspirations from the external
environment.
As we have already mentioned, the first important document, which
determined the initial direction of Slovakia in the security field, was the 1994
Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic36. This document has 5 sections which
define Slovakia as a new actor in the international system, which does not
feel threatened by anyone and will develop its security and defence policy in
order to maintain its own national security and also the European security. A
large section of the document is dedicated to the terminology associated with
security, which the Slovak Republic needed to define as a new state. The
document declared intention to participate in Partnership for Peace program,
which represents a step towards further strengthening of relations between
NATO member states and their counterparts in Central and Eastern
Europe. This effort, according to the doctrine, should have led to full
membership in NATO. The necessity of building a new security system in
Europe is also highlighted; this goal is to be achieved through membership
36
The original title of the document is Obranná doktrína Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 1994.
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in the EU and also in the WEU. Furthermore, the document sets out the
principles by which the Slovak Republic wants to achieve its main objectives,
i.e. guarantee the right of the state to prepare its defence, thus safeguard its
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.
The structure of the Army of the Slovak Republic is outlined and for the
first time it contemplates the necessity of its professionalization. The
document itself was unique in its own way, because it brought the first
definition of security, national goals (interests) of the Slovak Republic and
also the means to achieve them. It put the emphasis on achieving full
membership in NATO and the EU, as major guarantors of security in
Europe, emphasizing the importance of promoting the European model of
security.
In this period an effort to join the existing security structures prevailed in
the political elites, combined with belief that new members could positively
influence the functioning and reinvigorate the existing security structures.
One of the major benefits of integration into existing security organisation
was improvement of the internal stability of the new countries by obtaining
external security guarantees. Moreover, smaller countries with limited
resources could also rely on the resources of other members of the Alliance.
(Vlček, Kaščáková, 2012) That is why they perceived the Alliance as a means
to achieve their national security interests through the collective effort. The
countries of Central Europe perceived the possibility of joint consultations
as an effective way to transform existing structures into new quality. The
accession of these countries opened up new opportunities and challenges,
but for the new countries it was above all a challenge to participate in
shaping the future of the European security system, whether through joint
forums, coordinated cooperation, or directly by engaging in some
peacekeeping missions of the Alliance. The document was also important
because it formulated the objectives and tasks of the Slovak Republic in a
way which contradicted sceptics from NATO fearing that the admission of
new members from the former Eastern bloc would diminish the cohesion
and strength of the Alliance.
The principles and postulates of the Defence Doctrine were further
elaborated in the document entitled Basic Principles and Aims of the National
Security of the Slovak Republic37 adopted in 1996. The doctrine has three main
sections, which deal mainly with the expression of national interest of the
Slovak Republic. For the most part it is a theoretical document elaborated by
professionals and experts. First section states that the national interests are
The original title of the document is Základné ciele a zásady národnej bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky, adopted
in 1996.
37
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the following: sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders,
security, economic prosperity, social stability and international recognition.
These interests may be achieved via active involvement of internal and
external factors. Second section of the document is devoted to defining the
notion of national security, security policy, and national security and to the
principles of national security of the Slovak Republic. Third section contains
final provisions.
Intention to define the objectives and principles of the national security
of the Slovak Republic was a correct move, because the Slovak Republic as a
new state had to strengthen its security structures, contingent, however, on
general strengthening of overarching political structures. This was
particularly done through enactment of laws that specifically govern the
position of the state in terms of defined national interest. This was followed
by development of institutions at central, regional and local level, designed to
protect the needs and objectives defined in the national interest.
Furthermore, a systemic definition of legislative instruments influencing all
components of internal policy was needed, with the ability to strengthen the
positive and eliminate the negative trends. In the ongoing transition process,
these new institutions, legislation and instruments were associated with the
transformation of technical and social infrastructure, which caused many
social problems. Therefore, it is necessary to see this document seen as one
of the supporting instruments, was closely associated with the future longterm development.
The document, however, does not specify how to achieve the defined
security interests; neither has it directly declared the intent to join NATO. It
rather emphasizes the need to build a new model of European security. As
the document declares, “the situation that has developed in Europe and
particularly in the Slovak Republic decisively requires creation of a
comprehensive system of its national security and security of other states.”
Taking in consideration its features, this document may be considered a
“first security strategy of the Slovak Republic”. The period between the
adoption of the Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic until the adoption
of the Basic Principles and Aims of National Security of the Slovak Republic
did not represent a radical breakthrough; both documents, however, have
presented a new quality of safeguarding the security of the state, especially in
the area of integration into international organisations. This shift can be
linked primarily with an attempt to find and define proper security identity –
finding strategic culture of the new state. Even though the individual
Partnership for Peace program continued, as well as talks on possible
admission to NATO in 1999, Slovak Republic began to lag behind in the
transformation of the Army of the Slovak Republic and other steps required
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for the rapprochement with NATO. Moreover, internal political
developments started to fundamentally differ and deviate from external
actions and declarations directed towards integration.
Perhaps awareness of the difficulty and complexity of the transformation
of existing structures, outlined in the first adopted document, forecast the
contemplation of new possibilities of the Slovak Republic in the security
area, presented in the second document. Quest for new security structures in
Europe continues to take place also nowadays, essentially as a form of
opposition to the geopolitical influence of the United States (including the
creation and development of defence and security structures of the EU over
the last 15 years – since the Summit in St. Malo). New and possible future
members of NATO, who have been significantly affected by block division
during the Cold War looked upon the rapid integration to the bloc of former
bloc enemy with caution, and began to consider the possibility and eventual
advantages of a new security system in Europe, safeguarded by another
organisation.
Third period of 1998-2006, was marked by disruption of NATO
integration process and the need to re-launch it. In the first half of 1998
feeling of mistrust persisted on the part of foreign partners, and Slovakia had
to cope with negative reactions and refusals from both NATO and the
European Commission (representing the EU). The 1998 upcoming elections,
however, hinted on the possibility of a turnaround in the upcoming period.
A change in the internal political development occurred after the
parliamentary elections in September 1998, resulting in formation of the
government of M. Dzurinda. This move not only brought new changes to
the political development of the country, but also set a transatlantic
orientation in the security area. During this period, therefore, negotiations on
the accession of Slovakia to the EU and NATO reopened. The new prime
minister faced numerous important tasks: to change the attitude of partners
able to influence the integration of Slovakia into Western structures; to
define the new course of the country in strategic security documents; to
finalise the transformation of the Army of the Slovak Republic to the desired
level and, of course, to create the conditions for public discourse about the
transatlantic direction of Slovakia. These were the questions that resonated
in the security policy of first Dzurinda government. In the early days after
taking the office, new political leadership visited Brussels and Vienna,
presenting clear decision and intention to continue the integration into the
EU and NATO – that is, to Western structures. These declarations,
however, were met with caution, given the previous experience with the
Mečiar governments, when declarations on transatlantic orientation were
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accompanied with the practical steps in precisely opposite direction (such as
contemplating the accession to the CIS). An important event that changed
the perception of Western partners and showed that the Slovak Republic
was ready to begin the accession process was the principled attitude of the
representatives of the Slovak Republic during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.
(Kmec, Korba, Ondrejcsák, 2005) In 1999, after the Washington Summit,
Slovakia joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP), offering opportunities
for further cooperation within the framework of the future membership in
NATO. MAP was presented as a sort of roadmap, highlighting the
shortcomings and identifying areas for improvement. This tool provided
answers to what needs to be changed, modified or completed to achieve full
NATO membership. In 1999, Slovakia for the first time participated in
SFOR mission conducted under the auspices of NATO. These positive steps
were appreciated by foreign partners (including the most important one, i.e.
the United States). Years 2000 and 2001 were marked by reforms, positive
attitudes of foreign partners, but also by negative statements and reports
from abroad on the state of reforms in Slovakia in the field of security and
defence policy. There were, however, other internal tensions. On the one
hand, the Slovak political representation presented the intent to join NATO
in positive terms, which was accepted by its Western counterparts. On the
other hand, the public opinion on NATO was not positive. Furthermore, the
reform of the Army of the Slovak Republic was still lagging behind and
existed only in political declarations, and the security and defence strategic
documents still contained ambivalent policy orientations and statements.
The second Dzurinda government thus faced an important task – the
transformation of the Army of the Slovak Republic; formulation of new
documents of the Slovak Republic in the field of security and defence
(resulting in adoption of 2001 Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic,
Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic, and Military Strategy of the Slovak
Republic), and eventual gradual reassessment of exclusive orientation on the
United States vis-á-vis commitment to developing European security and
defence architecture (ESDP). In 2002 NATO Prague Summit was held, at
which the decision was made to invite seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) to join NATO in the
second round of enlargement. In early 2003 the Iraq crisis resonated, and
Slovakia had to take a stance respecting the decision of the UN Security
Council. Consequently, the Slovak Republic sent 75 members of the Armed
Forces abroad, with an official mandate for the area of Kuwait, but able to
enter the territory of Iraq in the case of reasonable suspicion of the use of
weapons of mass destruction. Subsequently, in 2003, the ratification process
of the Accession Protocol of the Slovak Republic began in each NATO
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member state, completed on March 29, 2004, when Slovakia became new
NATO member state.
The above analysis shows that the years 1994-1998 were not favourable
for the Slovak Republic in terms of its efforts to integrate into European and
transatlantic structures. This changed after 1998 which brought renewed
efforts and negotiations. The hardest part was to restore the confidence of
foreign partners, and the government of M. Dzurinda was able to achieve
it.
From the perspective of policy documents it was important to
constitutionally provide for the possibility of the Slovak Republic to enter
into union with other states. This has been achieved through the amendment
of the Constitution enacted in 2001, in Art. 7, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 as
follows:
“(1) The Slovak Republic may, on the basis of its own decision, enter
into a union with other states. The entry and withdrawal is decided by a
constitutional law, which is confirmed by referendum.
(2) The Slovak Republic may, by international treaty, which was ratified
in the manner specified by law, or on the basis of this treaty transfer the
implementation of its rights to the European Communities and the
European Union. Legally binding acts of the European Communities and
the European Union have precedence over the laws of the Slovak Republic.
The cession of legally binding acts, which require implementation, is
executed by law or by Government decree in accordance with Article 120
(2).
(3) The Slovak Republic can, with the aim of maintaining peace, security
and the democratic order enter an organization of mutual collective security
under conditions established by international treaty.” (Ústava Slovenskej
republiky, 1992)
This amendment enabled the Slovak political representatives to join
NATO without previous a referendum on this issue. Another important task
after reopening negotiations and after official invitations to join NATO and
the EU was to create new documents in the field of security and defence,
most importantly to draft new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic38 (adopted
in 2001). For the first time in the history of the existence of the Slovak
Republic this strategy has brought a shift in shaping security and defence
policy of Slovakia, putting the main emphasis on the efforts of integration
into NATO and the EU, explicitly defined as vital interests of the Slovak
Republic. Compared with the previous document, i.e. the Basic Principles
38
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2001.
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and Aims of National Security of the Slovak Republic, the new strategy
reflects a shift in the definition of national interest of the Slovak Republic,
now is defined in terms of vital interests and important interests. It also
introduced the first comprehensive analysis of the security environment as
well as the definition of the basic problems and threats to Slovakia.
In the analysis of the security environment the 2001 Security Strategy of
the Slovak Republic provides the first comprehensive, integrated analysis of
the security of the Slovak Republic, which previously did not exist in this
form. In the 2001 Strategy it is elaborated on four levels:
The first is a global security environment that is particularly influenced
by globalisation and uneven development of regions. These developments
bring about new, primarily non-military challenges, risks and threats, but also
new possibilities for addressing them. At the same time there is blurring of
the differences and lines between internal and external aspects of security.
In the second part of the analysis a narrower European security
environment is defined, emphasizing the connections between various
European security processes in the form of cooperation between security,
political, economic, and environmental organisations – the OSCE,
Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the
cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Potential threats
to peace and international stability are listed, mostly in the form of ethnic
tensions, economic crises, political instability, international organised crime
and terrorism, human rights violations, abuse of information technology, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the most modern weapon
systems.
The third part analyses the Central Europe security environment. The
Strategy correctly points to the fact that admission of three countries of this
region – Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – to NATO strongly
influenced this environment. The Slovak Republic also declared its efforts to
join the EU and NATO, which would contribute to enhanced homogeneity
of the security arrangements in the Central European region and
strengthening stability in the region.
The last, fourth level defines security environment of the Slovak
Republic, which based on its size, population and economic potential
belongs to the smaller European countries lacking certain energy resources
and raw materials. This part contains also declared ambition of consolidating
democratic foundations and improving mechanisms of the rule of law.
After closer scrutiny we may conclude that the analysis of global security
environment, European security environment and Central European security
environment is sufficient both in its scope and depth. The analysis of the
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internal security environment, however, is insufficient and lacks
argumentation-based analysis and definitions of terminology.
The 2001 Strategy defined four vital security interests and six important
security interests of the Slovak Republic. In contrast to the security interests
defined in previous security strategies, they unequivocally declare the
ambition to join NATO and the EU, which in the purview of the Strategy
represent key pillars of future functioning of the security policy of the Slovak
Republic.
The strategy defines global security challenges and states that “the Slovak
Republic can ensure its general, sustainable development by its calculated
engagement in global political, economic, social and cultural trends. Slovak
disregard of this challenge would exclude it from the main currents of world
development and would be a serious endangerment to its interests.” Other
security challenges are: active participation in peace efforts by other
members of the international community and conflict prevention; full
participation in the creation of an integrated European security system;
active engagement in Central Europe and the development of good
neighbourly relations; strengthening of the democratic state based on the
rule of law and respect for fundamental human and civil rights and
freedoms; transformation of the economy; and development and utilisation
of the results of the technological revolution.
From the perspective of the Slovak Republic following threats were
identified: uncontrolled migration and unmanageable migration wave, which
could emerge as a consequence of regional conflicts; international organised
crime and terrorism, including illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs, dualuse materials, trafficking in children and women and money laundering;
criminalisation of social relations when the internal stability of the country is
affected by the growth of economic crime (fraud, misappropriation of assets
and funds, tax evasion), together with property crime (thefts), violent forms
of crime, offences with a weapon, racketeering and minor crime, extortion of
protection money, teenager and juvenile crime, and social crime. Corruption
is also part of this group, including the abuse of authority and public office,
the misappropriation of public funds and nepotism; growing tolerance of
xenophobia and racism by some social groups; activities of foreign special
services, failure or targeted disruption of information systems as a result of
information piracy and terrorism.
The fourth section of the 2001 Strategy deals with the security policy of
the Slovak Republic, formulating the objectives of security policy of the
Slovak Republic, basic principles of the security policy of the Slovak
Republic, and the tools for implementation of the security policy of the
Slovak Republic. The main strategic long-term goal of the security policy of
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the Slovak Republic is to maintain or restore the state of security, which
enables the implementation of its vital and important interests.
(Bezpečnostná stratégia SR, 2001, art. 30)
In shaping the security environment the Slovak Republic will deploy
following instruments: prevention and strengthening of global, European
and regional security (active participation in the UN, NATO and the EU);
improving international cooperation (cooperation with WTO, CEFTA, CEI,
Austria, Visegrad 4 countries, Ukraine, CIS and Russia); support for the
promotion of international law principles (arms control, control of
observation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, the fight against
terrorism and organised crime etc.); guaranteeing the stability and
development of the rule of law (by guaranteeing continuity of internal and
foreign policy of the Slovak Republic); socio-economic development (market
economy, transparent economic environment, the Slovak Republic will use
its membership in the OECD, IMF, WB, WTO); protection of the
environment.
To enhance the ability and readiness to respond to risks and threats the
Slovak Republic will strive to achieve the following: guarantee the defence of
the state (through the establishment of a new security system compatible
with NATO standards, in addition to the traditional roles the Armed Forces
of the Slovak Republic will be able to respond to new threats, challenges –
both military and non-military); integrate into Euro-Atlantic political and
security structures; strengthen internal security (to prevent uncontrolled
illegal migration, diversification of energy and raw material imports from
stable sources); prevent social risks and threats and/or eliminate them
(education of the population, balanced demographic development, healthy
lifestyle).
The 2001 Strategy concludes with the government’s commitment to
develop a security system of the Slovak Republic, which would provide a
comprehensive, integrated, functional and effective system with precisely
defined competencies, i.e. rights, duties, responsibilities and structure of
relations between its elements. The security system of the Slovak Republic
must be able to: analyse the security environment, its global, regional and
sub-regional aspects; classify security risks and threats to the Slovak Republic
and tendencies of their development; determine the procedures and
measures for prevention and elimination of security risks and threats and the
solution of emergency situations in accordance with available resources and
capabilities; ensure an effective management and co-ordination of forces and
means in the prevention, avoidance, mitigation and elimination of
consequences of individual kinds of security risks, threats and crisis
situations, including the establishment of a crisis management system of the
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state with a precise allocation of authority and mutual connections between
the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Government of the Slovak
Republic, the President of the Slovak Republic and other state organs and
local governmental organs, and legal and physical entities; achieve the
required degree of interoperability with the security systems of the member
states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and with its neighbours,
enabling effective international co-operation of the entire system and its
individual elements; act as an integral part of the mechanism of state
management in accordance with the legal order of the Slovak Republic;
ensure the required degree of sensitivity and flexibility; have at its disposal
the necessary scientific-theoretical background and qualified personnel;
ensure its continual readiness and operational capability.
When we take into consideration the sum of all the requirements put on
this system, we may conclude that the goal of developing a security system
of the Slovak Republic which would form a comprehensive, integrated,
functional and effective system has not been fulfilled so far. The main
weaknesses were a declaratory nature, lack of tools for practical
implementation of other sectoral strategies, as well as no longer valid
definition of threats (caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
The 2001 Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic39 was adopted as a part and
parcel of the complex of new security and defence documents as one of the
sectoral strategies further developing the 2001 Security Strategy of the Slovak
Republic. It defines the main goal to guarantee effective self-defence of the
Slovak Republic while ensuring compliance with the criteria for admission to
NATO at the same time. The aim of the document is to identify the military
and political aspects of the security environment and define the resulting
threats and risks to Slovakia. The main task within a defined strategic review
of defence is to create structures of the Army of the Slovak Republic, which
would be capable of ensuring the internal defence of Slovakia as well as its
active participation in international operations. In accordance with the 2001
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, the Defence Strategy sets out the
task of development of Concept of the security system of the Slovak
Republic. This document defines the basic direction of the defence policy of
the Slovak Republic and the Slovak defence strategy compliant with the
political-military transformation of Slovakia associated with the admission to
NATO.
The 2001 Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic40 was the last document
adopted in the period preceding the admission to NATO. It describes the
39
40
The original title of the document is Obranná stratégia Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2001.
The original title of the document is Vojenská stratégia Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2001.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
mission, tasks and roles of the Slovak Armed Forces. As we have already
mentioned, the Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic is one of the sectoral
strategies that are conducive to the achievement of core national security
interests as defined in the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic. The
Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic adopted in 2001 focused mainly on
meeting the NATO requirements to professionalise and modernise, i.e.
rebuild the Armed Forces in accordance with NATO requirements. It
defines specialisation and professionalization as the main objectives of the
transformation of the Armed Forces. The strategy also defines the main
military threat and non-military threats to the Slovak Republic. The military
ones are most importantly major armed conflict and regional armed conflict;
the non-military threats are primarily those whose elimination or elimination
of their consequences may require an intervention of the Armed Forces – i.e.
ecological or natural disasters. Among other things, therefore, the 2001
Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic sets the direction, mission and tasks
of the Armed Forces in a way that their capabilities, composition, training
and readiness meet NATO standards. Defence planning, including the
accurate assessment of financial and material resources, is another essential
point of the Strategy.
Both documents – the 2001 Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic and
the 2001 Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic analyse feasibility of
practical implementation of the objectives set out in the 2001 Security
Strategy of the Slovak Republic. Thus they eliminate one of the
shortcomings explicitly individuated by experts from NATO member states
in the so-called Garrett Report on a comprehensive state of the Armed
Forces of the Slovak Republic of 2000. All three above mentioned
documents unambiguously declared the intention of the Slovak Republic to
join NATO, and their elaboration was not only a response to the critique of
Slovakia’s Western partners, but also a long-term goal of the state.
Significant changes have occurred in the development of security policy
of the Slovak Republic after admission to NATO and the EU. Slovakia at
that time had to determine its position and views on the processes taking
place in both international organisations, i.e. intensified process of
development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) as well as
to take a position on various disagreements between NATO members.
Slovak political representation after the elections in September 1998
supported the United States as its strategic partner. The gradual
strengthening of ESDP instruments (e.g. Battlegroups) required the
progressive integration of all countries. Slovakia, therefore, had to address
the issue of duplication of military structures, which could be used both
within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the
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European Union, associated with new resource requirements – both material
and physical. The Istanbul Summit in 2004 defined additional requirements
for Slovak Armed Forces (reinforcing the troops in Afghanistan, helping
new candidate countries). During this period there was also a revision of
security related documents, which had to adapt to the new conditions. Two
important documents were adopted in 2005 to set the way forward: the
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic and the Defence Strategy of the
Slovak Republic. These two documents are still valid today without any
changes or updates that many experts have deemed necessary. In 2005 the
Law no. 346/2005 on state service of professional soldiers in the Armed
Forces of the Slovak Republic was also ratified, bringing a fundamental
ideological change and professionalization of the Armed Forces. The main
task was the gradual phasing out of compulsory conscription and full
professionalization of the Army in early 2006 at latest.
The 2005 Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic41 was the conceptual
document on security adopted after the accession into NATO and the EU
(as well as after adoption of the European Security Strategy of 2003). This
paper presented the position of Slovakia on matters of transatlantic
cooperation and security. Preparation of this document was launched almost
immediately after Slovakia’s admission to NATO and the EU under the
auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – unlike the previous one, which
has been created under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence in
cooperation with the third sector and security experts. The actual
development of the strategy incorporated the views of expert teams from the
third sector, non-governmental organisations such as CENAA, EAC, and
SFPA. This strategy brings a fundamental change in understanding of
security, shifting from the protection of Slovak territory to the protection
and defence of the interests of the Alliance and the EU, i.e. safeguarding the
security and defence interests in the global security environment. This is
perhaps one of the reasons for visible and significant influence of the 1999
NATO Strategic Concept and the 2003 European Security Strategy on the
2005 Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic. Today, as we have already
stated, the expert and professional public points to the necessity to elaborate
new strategic documents, including the security strategy, given the fact that
nearly seven years passed since its last update.
41
The original title of the document is Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2005.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
The Strategy of 2005 reflects changes in the security environment, caused
in particular by the admission of the Slovak Republic to the EU and NATO.
The strategy explicitly states that the membership in international
organisations – the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE, and OECD – constitutes
the conceptual framework in which Slovakia operates and defines its security
interests. According to the strategy, “the basic tendency of the security
environment development is growing instability, uncertainty, and
unpredictability in the world – the consequence of growing number of failed
states and negative influence of certain non-state actors. The international
community responds to these trends by making an effort to seek common,
effective and, in particular, preventive means in the face of such
developments. Other tendencies that have an impact on the development of
security environment include growing globalisation, increased number of
intrastate conflicts, interdependent security environment, political and
economic integration, uncontrolled spread of information and military
technologies, disparities in regional development, unbalanced demographic
development and migration movements, growing intolerance and
nationalism, increased dependence on vital natural resources and their
scarcity, and environmental degradation.” (Bezpečnostná stratégia SR, 2005,
art. 14-15) These two paragraphs, however, cannot be considered sufficient
for the analysis of internal and external security environment.
The rest of this part of the strategy is dedicated to defining the
challenges, risks and threats, and discusses, in particular, the external
strategic position of the Slovak Republic in relation to challenges, risks and
threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery, failing states, vulnerability of information and
communication system, illegal and uncontrolled migration, activities of
foreign intelligence services, organised crime, globalisation, the increasing
influence of non-state actors, economic imbalances in the world, the rise of
radical nationalism and intolerance, dependency of states on vital resources
including food, natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes, environmental
changes, unbalanced demographic development, and dissemination of
infectious diseases.
When examining the formulations of security interests of the Slovak
Republic we may conclude that declared interests, i.e.: strengthening strategic
transatlantic partnership, co-guaranteeing the security of its allies; improving
effectiveness of international organisations which the Slovak Republic is a
member of, and supporting NATO and the EU enlargement; developing
good partnership relations and all forms of mutually beneficial cooperation
with the countries with which the Slovak Republic has common interests; are
not security interests in the true sense of the term, but, according to the
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previous analysis, they should be rather included among the methods how to
achieve the values such as freedom, peace, and democracy. The security
interests defined in the Security Strategy 2005, therefore, represent rather
declaratory enumeration of eight general security interests without
categorisation, which may lead to misinterpretation and misunderstanding in
which ones are vital and which are important to ensure the security of the
state. The admission of the Slovak Republic to NATO and the EU meant a
fundamental change of the security environment, and the notion of
collective security as one of the principles of building a national security
policy has been highlighted. (Bezpečnostná stratégia SR, 2005, art. 9)
Based on our analysis we may conclude that the definition of security
challenges, risks and threats to the Slovak Republic in the 2005 strategy is
insufficient. This part was better prepared in Strategy 2001, because it
reflected the distribution of challenges, risks and threats based on the
security environment of their provenience, i.e. external and internal security
threats and risks. The 2005 Strategy put a great emphasis on global terrorism
as a strategic threat to the Slovak Republic. We can say that the perception
of security challenges, risks and threats during this period was associated
mainly with political integration with other countries and international
organisations transnational, resulting in new security challenges, risks and
threats to the state. We shall not forget that perception of challenges, risks
and threats responded also to changing global and national security
environment.
The 2005 Strategy defines that “the key objective of the Slovak
Republic’s security policy is to guarantee the security of the state and its
citizens in a stable and predictable security environment.” (Bezpečnostná
stratégia SR, 2005, art. 34) This wording is rather unfortunate, because
Article 14 states that the “the basic tendency of the security environment
development is growing instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in the
world”, thus making the key objective of the strategy unattainable and only
declaratory, contradicted further in the text of the strategy.
Third part of the Strategy, entitled the “Security Policy of the Slovak
Republic” is more exact in comparison to the 2001 Security Strategy, because
it more precisely defines tools for achieving security interests of the Slovak
Republic, i.e. Foreign Service and the Armed Forces, intelligence services;
armed security corps (police corps, railway police, corps of prison and court
guard); security corps (customs administration corps); rescue corps and
rescue services (fire and rescue service, mining rescue service, mountain
rescue service and medical emergency services); economic mobilisation
entities; entities operating on the financial market (banking, capital market,
insurance) and the institution responsible for the protection of classified
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data. The other instruments for the implementation of the security policy
include international and regional institutions and associations that the
Slovak Republic is a member (the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the
OECD, the Council of Europe, the Visegrad Group, the Central European
Initiative and others), non-governmental organisations, international
agreements, conventions, treaties, norms and standards, and the media.
In the part entitled Security of the state and citizen the 2005 Strategy
characterises the challenges, risks and threats, and defines what means it
plans to employ to limit or eliminate their negative impact on the state and
citizens. These are, most importantly: an active policy of global arms control
and disarmament aimed primarily at combating the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; adopt measures, in
co-operation with NATO and the EU and other international organisations
to minimise the consequences of any possible use of WMD against the
citizens of the Slovak Republic, the members of Armed Forces engaged in
operations abroad, and against our allies. As was have already explained
above, all the statements regarding the challenges, risks and threats remain in
declarative form (phrases as “will take action”, “will actively assist”, “will
actively contribute” are used extensively throughout the text) and their
primary audience are the partners and allies of the Slovak Republic.
Therefore, they provide mainly basic overview of foreign and security
orientations of the Slovak Republic – quite understandably, as the Strategy
has been elaborated under the auspices and with major input from the
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Next section on “Stability and predictability of the security environment”
defines how the Slovak Republic plans to achieve its security interests, and it
is emphasized that “in the pursuit of its security interests, the Slovak
Republic will use its membership in the international and regional
organisations and associations, and will improve their capabilities, flexibility
and their mutually reinforcing cooperation.” (Bezpečnostná stratégia SR,
2005, art. 62) It refers most importantly to the UN, OSCE, NATO, the EU,
Council of Europe, OECD, V4, CEI, but also mentions partnerships with
countries like the United States (the United States are considered to be a
strategic partner of the Slovak Republic), Ukraine, CIS countries, Western
Balkans (promoting cooperation and enlargement); Russia (which is
considered a major player in the Eurasian area). Slovak Republic also
commits itself to eliminate regional and national conflicts in the regions of
Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is precisely this external dimension that
underwent the most significant changes compared to the 2001 Security
Strategy. As a result of the admission of the Slovak Republic into NATO
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and the EU the tools implementation of Slovak security policy have changed
as well.
The 2005 Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic42 became one of the first
documents prepared after Slovakia’s admission to NATO and the EU, and
sought to replace two earlier documents – the 2001 Defence Strategy of the
Slovak Republic and the 2001 Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic. As
previously, the Strategy was developed by the Ministry of Defence. The
strategy brought about the expected changes, in particular in the field of
defence – it defined main tasks that the Armed Forces of the Slovak
Republic had to address after joining NATO, including the problem of the
subordination of the defence under the collective defence of the Alliance.
The main priorities of the Slovak Republic included a commitment to create
such capabilities of the Armed Forces, which will be compatible to the
commitments of the Slovak Republic to NATO and the EU. In a figurative
sense, this commitment meant that the Slovak Republic would only create
such capabilities that are approved and requested by NATO or the EU, so
that they are compatible and deployable in multinational operations and
missions. The Slovak Republic, however, reserved the prerogative to
determine while how these capabilities and the Armed Forces in general
would be deployed outside the territory of the Slovak Republic. The
document defines the requirements that are placed on the defence of the
country and how further development of the Armed Forces should proceed.
Both the Defence Strategy and the Security Strategy expressed mainly the
position and presentation regarding the transition from individual to
collective security, as well as definition of the principles of further
development of security policy within the framework of NATO and the EU.
One of the shortcomings which started to emerge already at that period was
the absence of comment on the “double track” system of the security system
in Europe associated with the development of the security structures of the
EU. This absence is still present nowadays.
More fundamental change occurred after the 2006 parliamentary
elections, which marked the fourth stage of evolution of the security policy
of the Slovak Republic. In 2006 government of R. Fico took office, and, as
already indicated in his electoral campaign, decided to eliminate previous
strong pro-American attitude and suggested a reorientation of transatlantic
security on the European model of security (to distinguish its political party
from its opponents in the electoral campaign). This attitude was exacerbated
42
The original title of the document is Obranná stratégia Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2005.
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by forming coalition with the former Prime Minister V. Mečiar and
nationalist party of J. Slota. This raised concerns, even strong negative
reactions from foreign partners and allies, who feared a repetition of the
political developments of the previous governments of these two politicians
(1994-1998). During this period there relations between the Slovak Republic
and Hungary worsened as well. Despite the expressed fear history did not
repeat itself; actions and statements of the then-ruling elites proved highly
populistic, and a slight shift occurred in the prior explicit pro-American
attitude, but no significant changes have occurred and political
representation had just adjusted processes already underway within both
organisations. The ruling elite once again highlighted the opportunities it had
besides the Western orientation. Government of I. Radičová was only of an
episodic character and did not influence significantly the process of shaping
the security and defence policy of the country. Her government had to deal
primarily with unfolding financial and economic crisis and the problems
related to the amount of funds allocated on defence. (Just, 2012) During this
period the process of strategic defence review was initiated, resulting in
formulation of basic conclusions and assumptions – i.e. the need to ensure
the alignment of resource with the political ambitions of the state regarding
the necessary reform of the Armed Forces. After not even two years of
discussions in this area early parliamentary elections took place, resulting in
second government of R. Fico. The expert public expected from his second
government to substantiate efforts at the reform of security and defence
policy, update security strategy documents, launch the reform of the Armed
Forces, or finalise the development of the security system of the Slovak
Republic. In the legislative area an amendment or adoption of a new
constitutional law on security was expected. The first step in the desired
direction was the adoption of the White Paper on Defence of the Slovak
Republic in 2013, presenting a comprehensive reform of the Armed Forces.
The basic strategic documents in this period were the so-called
“Conclusions of the Strategic Defence Review of the Slovak Republic” and
“Principles of Strategic Defence Review of the Slovak Republic” from 2011.
Their preparation began during I. Radičová government and should have
started a process of reform of the Armed Forces, at that period
unsustainable. The finalisation of the process was expected in the form of
the White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic, which was endorsed by
the government of R. Fico in June 2013. The actual process began back in
2010 when the government decided to solve a steady decline in defence
spending and increasing demands from partners and organisations to which
Slovakia is a member. Conclusions pointed to the need for harmonisation of
political-strategic framework of the state and the financial framework of
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resources it had at its disposal in the area of security policy. Three sets of
problems were identified: resources, modernisation, and personnel. Despite
the fact that both documents were drafted in 2011, had the same goal and
followed each other, the measures proposed differed. The Conclusions of
the Strategic Defence Review yielded three processes that had to be carried
out immediately: rationalisation of the Ministry of Defence; bilateral and
multilateral cooperation; and new personnel management of training
soldiers. At the same time it presented the government with three strategic
decisions. (Závery strategického hodnotenia obrany Slovenskej republiky,
2011) The Principles of the Strategic Defence Review, quite illogically, were
adopted only after adoption of the Conclusions of the Strategic Defence
Review, and contained a combination of the possible strategic decisions
proposed in the Conclusions. The Principles of the Strategic Defence
Review proposed to uphold the political-military ambitions of the Slovak
Republic, maintain the budget on the then-actual level, i.e. 1.1 % GDP, and,
at the same time, ensure rationalisation of the structure of the Armed Forces
of the Slovak Republic. According to the document, in this regime they
would be able to ensure continued protection and defence of the airspace,
Slovak participation in international crisis management operations, provide
specific military capabilities for the non-military crisis management, provide
a mechanised brigade in the operation of collective defence, and the ability
to host the allied forces on Slovak territory. (Východiská strategického
hodnotenia obrany Slovenskej republiky, 2011, p. 27)
The process, however, stopped for more than two years due to a change
in leadership of the country following the early elections. The two previous
documents, however, created the basis for the processing of the White Paper
on Defence of the Slovak Republic43 in 2013. Although the Armed Forces and the
Ministry of Defence has spent many years striving for the overall
restructuring of the sector so that the Slovak Republic was able to meet its
commitments and declared ambitions (e.g. the Model of Development of the
Armed Forces 2010, 2015 and, last proposed, 2020). This effort, however,
did not receive any real and material support from the political elites, which,
quite to the contrary, continued with permanent cuts in defence spending. It
should also be noted that during those years no major modernisation project
in the field of defence took place. (Ivančík, 2012) It is essential to realise that
there is a significant disproportion and gap between the political-military
ambitions and commitments of the Slovak political elite in the field of
security, and real financial support for implementation of these ambitions
43
The original title of the document is Biela kniha o obrane Slovenskej republiky, adopted in 2013.
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and commitments. The White Paper provides sort of a “Model 2024”, i.e.
long-term development of the Armed Forces until 2024 in newly defined
environment and the resources framework. The main shortcoming of the
White Paper is working with undefined financial resources; it expects
financial sources – i.e. sourcing, which will not fall below 1.0 % of GDP, and
allows for additional investment funds for modernisation, as well as meeting
the proposed timeframe of the projected development. Deficiencies in
defining the financial framework paves the way for vague compliance with
outlined objectives and plans of the reforms and, therefore, it remains only
to be hoped that this attempt does not prove to be unsuccessful, similarly to
the previous attempts in this field.
Many threats to the Slovak Republic, which were addressed only
marginally, have now become extremely important (e.g. energy security, food
security, etc.). Moreover, as we have mentioned above, a profound and
complex analysis of the internal security environment (minority extremism,
the Roma issue, corruption, etc.) is lacking, and the analysis provided is
highly insufficient. Continuing need for reform of the Armed Forces,
improvement of bilateral or multilateral cooperation in ensuring the defence
of the Slovak Republic and many other persisting security problems in
Slovakia point out the necessity of conducting security reforms with real and
tangible outcomes..
The Security Policy of the Republic of Poland
Polish security policy has been shaped in accordance with its strategic
culture as described above, based primarily on distrust of European partners
following the invasion in 1939, and betrayal in 1945 in Yalta. These historical
events created a sense of need of a reliable partner that Poland is looking for
and that it tries to be for its partners as well. The actual development of
Polish security policy of the last two decades could be divided into three
main periods: 1) from 1989 to 1999, i.e. the process of accession to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; 2) from 1999 to 2004, i.e. the period
after admission to NATO, when Poland became a member of the European
Union as well; 3) the period from 2004 to present, which is characterised by
gradual adjustments of the security system of the state according to the
requirements of the EU, and shaping Poland’s leading position in the V4
countries. In the first period, the country tried to rebuild the security and
defence policy based on the Warsaw Treaty model to achieve compatibility
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with the structures of NATO and to be able to respond to the emergence of
new non-military aspects of security. In the second period dominated an
effort to transform its own security system according to constantly changing
security environment, to comply with the requirements of admission to
NATO and the EU, and to obtain and acquire experience in the structures
of the Alliance. Later on, Poland also focused on active engagement within
NATO and also in the EU (from 2004 onwards) to influence its actions and
future development according to Polish national interests. In the third period
the country has sought to ensure a permanent U.S. presence on its territory
by providing support for the missile defence system on their territory
(together with the Czech Republic), and the gradual development of the
Euro-Atlantic “double-track” approach through the establishment of rules
and procedures for cooperation between the two organisations in the field of
security. It also started to cement and strengthen its position in NATO and
to provide gradual support for the Security and Defence Policy of the EU.
Internationally, it supported the creation of a security system in Europe with
the support of the EU, and domestically Poland attempted to build an
integrated system of national security based on the gradual development of
its position of a leader in Central Europe.
Security Policy of Poland after the collapse of the bipolar system has
been shaped through a number of documents, which include the 1990
Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, and 1992 Principles of
Poland’s Security policy, which established a basic pro-Atlantic orientation of
the country. The first elected president in 1990 L. Walesa substantially
influenced domestic political affairs. He managed to stabilise the situation
after the first free elections in 1991, when the country began to convulse the
internal political struggle between several parties and politicians in the Sejm.
At that time it was very difficult to find compromises between pro-European
parties and nationalist parties. This complicated also the development and
direction of foreign and security policy – the debate about Poland’s
integration into Western structures was absent, although all the parties
declared themselves as pro-integration oriented. Unlike the rest of their V4
partners, Poland after 1991 defined its foreign policy objectives as an
adherence to the Euro-Atlantic thought, the development of bilateral
relations with its neighbours and strengthening of its regional position
through active participation in regional organisations. This was confirmed by
a document from 1992, the Principles of Poland’s Security policy, which
clearly confirmed the pro-Western and pro-integration orientation. Another
political development after the elections in 1993 was characterised by a focus
on Western structures, i.e. the European Communities and NATO, the
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establishment of relations with Germany, and continued strengthening of its
elations and ties with the United States. After 1991 Poland started to
participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which later
transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), which
offered Poland a good opportunity to take part in NATO activities. Further
important step was signing the Framework Document for Partnership for
Peace on February 2, 1994 shortly after Romania and Lithuania.
(Nowakowski, Protasowicki, 2008) During the years 1995-1997 Poland has
completed all the necessary transformation processes. In 1996, Poland
submitted an Individual Discussion Paper on NATO enlargement, visions of
the European security and the future role of NATO. The efforts of Poland
to join NATO culminated at Madrid Summit of the Alliance in July 1997,
where Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic received official invitations
to join NATO. In September and October 1997, accession negotiations took
place between Poland and NATO, resulting in the admission of Poland to
NATO on March 12, 1999.
Development of Poland’s security in the 1990s show that Poland has
embarked on a way of abandonment of the strategic constraints conditioned
by its membership in Warsaw Pact, through gaining independence to
become a full member of NATO in the late 1990s. This journey was difficult
and required a complete restructuring of security and defence system in the
country. (Koziej, 2010) As the analysis of the following documents clearly
shows, this process has not always been easy and straightforward.
The first document in the development and transformation of the
security and defence policy was the 1990 Defence Doctrine of the Republic of
Poland44, adopted before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991.
This document can be considered a first material indicating the reforms
related to changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, although some
authors refer to this document as a Polish version of the Warsaw Pact. Its
creation was the first attempt to shape the post-war defence policy and an
effort to define the core elements of the national defence of the state. Due
to the hasty effort, at the time of its adoption this document has already
been outdated. Although it defined a fundamental areas of reform, such as
transforming the Ministry of Defence and integration of the General Staff
under the Ministry of Defence; restructuring the Army, ensuring its apolitical
position and adjustment of the functioning of the Polish military industry.
The document has 9 parts First part refers to the fact that Poland is still
located on the border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, therefore, the
44 The original title of the document is Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, issued by the
Ministry of National Defence in Warsaw in May 2000.
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security and defence policy must be built so that it cannot cause, or provide
any incentive for the conflict between the two coalitions; i.e. the document
posits that Poland should be ideologically and coalition-impartial. The
second part states that the defence of Poland has a communal and national
character. The defence is the right of all citizens, and at the same time it is
their commitment to the state that they have to fulfil regardless of their
political views and religion. De-ideologisation and patriotism are evident in
Article III which states that in terms of its security Poland will be governed
in particular by the Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to the
document the UN judges aggression, armed assault and approves retaliatory
measures not based on the inclination for a specific ideology, but on the
basis of the principles of international law and equality. Since Poland has no
territorial demands, has no aggressive demands, and wants to settle all future
disputes peacefully on the basis of pacifist ideas and Christian ethics of nonviolence. (Doktryna obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1990, art. 4) Article
VI may be considered outdated already at the time of adoption of the
document, and it points to Poland’s hasty action in pursuit of selfidentification in security and defence policy. It refers to the obligations
resulting from the membership in the Warsaw Treaty towards this
organisation, and it concludes that every engagement of Polish Armed
Forces as a member of the Warsaw Pact must be consistent, and never in
conflict with national and security interests of Poland. Nevertheless, we
believe that this document reflects prudent position of Poland, because it
was adopted and valid at a time when the rivalry of non-Communist, postCommunist and alternative forces caused the country’s internal political,
economic and foreign policy tensions. Under these circumstances it clearly
declared the willingness of Poland to solve any problems and disputes with
its neighbours peacefully.
Another important document was the 1992 Principles of Poland’s Security
Policy45, which declared security policy and defence strategy of the Republic
of Poland. The document was endorsed by the Defence of the Polish Sejm
and consisted of two parts: 1. Principles of Poland’s Security Policy; 2.
Poland’s Security Policy and Defence Strategy. The first part states that
Poland wants to be part of NATO due to the fact that this organisation is
considered as a guarantor of military security, but also political stability,
which will be needed after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Poland has the
prerequisites to join the Alliance because it participated in the
implementation of CSCE principles and supported arms control and
45 The original title of the document is Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa – Polityka
bezpieczeństwa i strategia obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, adopted on November 2, 1992.
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international security through active engagement in the UN missions. An
important consideration in drafting a new security policy was that Poland
declared it had no territorial disputes or claim against its neighbours.
However, the possibility of worsening of domestic security environment has
been acknowledged in relation to the dissolution of the USSR and the
emergence of new successor states in the immediate neighbourhood of
Poland. These regions are potential sources of two security threats; the first
is the political instability of the region to the east and south-east of Poland
and its unpredictable political developments. The second is a considerable
military potential dislocated in the territories belonging to the Soviet Union
during the previous half century. (Założenia polskiej polityki
bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 5) Poland has, on the other hand, have concluded
bilateral agreements with Ukraine and Belarus, which addressed economic
and security issues also focused on some specific military problems.
Poland was a strong proponent of expanding the regional cooperation
within V3 (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary), because it saw potential
benefits of a common approach in respect to the EU integration efforts.
Poland perceives the issues of national defence on the regional level. Proper
military capabilities and the defence system in vigour at that time were
primarily aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity
against any external aggression. This, however, required a thorough
transformation of the then-existing structure of the defence in order to fit
the needs of a sovereign European state of moderate size, such as Poland.
According to the Strategy, if in this period of instability a local conflict
should occur, the state was ready to eliminate it with its own resources; if
such conflict should have broader impact, Poland was ready to treat it as an
invasion – i.e. to prevent its expansion, inflict the greatest possible losses to
the aggressor and to form the defence that would allow the state could gain
time, to mobilise the support from other states and international
organisations. (Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 6) The
option of aggression, however, Poland did not consider plausible, for the
neighbouring states represented no such threat that could possibly lead to
armed aggression. In order to achieve high readiness of the armed forces,
however, these were to be deployed throughout the territory of the state, but
in line with the international commitments that Poland had to its neighbours
and other countries. The document stated that the Polish Armed Forces
were in the process of professionalization; it asserted that this trend would
continue and the attention would also be paid to the standby forces that
would intervene in the event of mobilisation.
An important part of the document is also the one characterising the
internal security environment. Consequences of disintegration of the Soviet
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bloc and the subsequent transformation of the state are perceived as the
most pressing internal threats. These consequences are visible in the rise of
non-military threats and risks associated with societal and economic security,
resulting in the weakening of those state structures responsible for ensuring
its political and economic stability. The disintegration of the socialist planned
economy and the transition to a market economy caused great losses in state
tax payments income. Secondary accompanying signs of unstable political
and economic situation, such as rising unemployment, social frustration and
inequalities, massive migration, the rise of crime and other pathologies,
disorient public opinion and society in general. Lack of legislation poses a
threat to major natural resources and raw materials. According to the
Strategy elimination of the above-described situation requires a process that
involves all levels of state and government. The effectiveness of the process,
conversely, is closely related to the quality and character of the legislation to
be enacted as a part of the transformation process. (Założenia polskiej
polityki bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 6-7) Transformation, in turn, had to be
conducted in a way that would allow Poland to establish fruitful cooperation
with the West in the future, because the West might provide it with both
material as well as intellectual support.
The document defines also the external aspects of security policy,
asserting that Poland acts and will always act within the limits of
international law, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and
other organisations such as the OSCE, NATO, the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council or the WEU. The Polish Army will also operate within
this framework, as part of peacekeeping missions of the above-mentioned
organisations.
In relation to the national defence and state forces, Poland will put
emphasis on the following aspects: support for non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, global reduction of nuclear arsenals, and complete restructuring
and conversion of the Polish arms industry, which had excessive dimensions
due to Poland’s membership in the Warsaw Pact.
In order to ensure future national defence, Poland will seek membership
in NATO as it considers this organisation to be the main guarantor and
provider of European stability and security. (Założenia polskiej polityki
bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 11) In the area of defence and security the
document commits Poland to follow the objectives defined in the Strategic
Concept of 1991 (adopted at the NATO Rome Summit), which indicated
tasks for the states aspiring at the NATO membership, as well as roles
identified by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (at that time Poland
has already participated at the Council’s activities).
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Due to the year in which the analysed document was adopted, it is logical
that it paid attention to the CSCE and the so-called Helsinki 2 Conclusions
of 1992 (especially related to arms control), as well as to the European
Communities (in relation to the enlargement of the EC of the states of the
former Soviet bloc). The Strategy explicitly stated that Poland would plan
and coordinate its activities in the field of foreign policy and security so as to
achieve the status of a member.
As a state neighbouring with the countries of the former USSR, Poland
would develop good-neighbourly relations and cooperation with these
countries. The greatest importance, however, was attributed to compliance
of Russia with conventions on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the
territory of Poland. Good relations would be strengthened also with
Germany via bilateral cooperation, without emphasizing the nationalist and
xenophobic injustices of the past. All these relationships are important not
only in political and economic terms, but also in terms of security and
defence.
The final part of the document was devoted to the analysis of defence
and defence system of the state. The basis of state defence is primarily to
ensure the material base in the following areas:
- ensure optimal conditions for the functioning and development of the
armed forces in peacetime;
- analysis of the tasks that the armed forces would fulfil in time of
emergency and in the event of war;
- preparation for the occurrence of emergency situations and the means
of their elimination. (Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa...,
1992, p. 14)
These tasks were related to the process of professionalization of the
army, the changes in the structure of funding (both from the state budget,
but also from other sources), the restructuring of institutions and bodies not
exclusively related to defence, but also to the broader concept of national
security. In addition, it affirmed the importance of supporting the
development of science and technology related to security, as well as
cooperation with NATO countries, V3 and other countries. Presumably,
Poland and other V3 states should possess compatible defence and security
structures in order to facilitate the future admission to NATO. The strategic
objective of the Republic of Poland was to maintain the defence of its
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Implementation was to
take place gradually as
- preparation, formation and maintaining the defence infrastructure;
- preparation of a defence-savvy society;
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- preparation of the Armed Forces as needed.
The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland is not based on the
exact scenario of military activities. It focuses primarily at crisis management
of the emergencies of military nature. (Założenia polskiej polityki
bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 16)
In the event of war transcending the local dimension the Polish Armed
Forces will perform the tasks that have already been mentioned above, in
particular, they will attempt to prevent the possible expansion of an invasion
or large-extent terrorism. Should such a situation arise, the state and its
defence system will face three urgent tasks: protection of the public and state
structures; organisation and management of the Armed Forces in terms of
logistics; and organisation and satisfying the material and spiritual needs of
the population. (Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 16) In
such situation the entire state economy and all the material and human
resources will be subject to their accomplishment.
From the analysed documents it follows that Poland sees the
international situation at the beginning of 1990s as not very peaceful. The
document also formulated objectives that seem to anticipate real future
events and international crises – e.g. the Polish Armed Forces should
prepare for expeditionary operations and missions carried out under the
aegis of international organisations. Therefore, the defence system should
comprise the following components:
- armed forces;
- non-military defence component;
- system of management of defences.
Armed Forces of the state are based on a system of both mandatory and
professional service. Number of professional soldiers will be gradually
increased up to 60-70% of the total composition of the Polish Armed
Forces. (Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa..., 1992, p. 17) Role of
the Armed Forces, armaments limits and the structure of deployment will
gradually change according to the needs of the state, financial possibilities
and new geostrategic situation. All three kinds of forces: land, air and sea
have their own set goals and tasks related to national defence. President is
the supreme commander of the Polish Armed Forces, and in peacetime the
Minister of Defence is in command of the Armed Forces.
Non-military defence components are designed to protect the population
against technological and natural disasters, to protect the public health and
to provide protection from other non-military threats and risks. They are
separate, specialised services within the Ministry of Interior, Police, Office of
Public Protection, Polish Border Guard and other branches of government.
It also includes civil defence system, which is also aimed at protecting the
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population and material resources in crisis situations, but also in time of war,
where legislation and moral standard applies that civil defence in time of war
maintains neutrality and is intended only to assist and protect the population.
Management of the defence system and its basic principles are laid down
in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The Constitution
distinguishes between national defence in peacetime (establishment of
infrastructure in relation to the tasks and goals of state defence policy).
Defence funding is annually determined in the state budget approved by the
Sejm. President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
coordinates the periodic elaboration of the defence strategy and determines
the main directions of development of defence. The executive body of the
President in the defence sector is the Office of National Security.
At the time of threat to state security the Constitution imposes military
governing principles. Decisions on the declaration of war or the state of
emergency pertain to the President and the Councils. In case of emergency
or war the Prime Minister also wields powers, as he presides over the
Council of Ministers, and controls also lower administrative units, which are
responsible for the operation of all state structures on the vertical level.
In the second period – after Poland’s admission to NATO in the
country’s accession to the EU – three documents related to the formation of
the security and defence policy of were issued. In 2000, the Ministry of
National Defence of the Republic adopted two key documents relating to
security and defence, designed to respond to admission of Poland to NATO.
The first was the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, and other the
Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The third document was the
2003 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland responding to the
terrorist attacks in the United States and ensuing changes in the global
security environment. The 2003 National Security Strategy was designed to
combine the two previous documents into one (security and defence
strategy) but Polish theorists considered this attempt unsuccessful. (Koziej,
2008, p. 3)
Already in 1997, Poland was invited to the Summit of the European
Council in Luxembourg, where the European Union initiated first round of
enlargement process and started the accession talks with Poland, Czech
Republic and Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. This has opened
Poland the door to prepare for EU membership and confirmed its proWestern orientation. The process of integration and accession negotiations
was completed with the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004.
During this period, Poland has launched the second phase of
development of the national defence policy. Its main content has been
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transforming its own security system primarily according to the requirements
of NATO and the effort to gain experience from participation in the Allied
structures, including further development in accordance with its national
interests. (Koziol, 2010) The period after admission to NATO was
characterised by convergence with the United States through the
membership in NATO, including the support for NATO operations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, as well as for the U.S.
military intervention in Iraq. This approach to the United States as a strategic
partner is based on historical experience, and the security and defence policy
were shaped in this vein. The support from Poland had also form of
providing the task forces, underscored also by the statement of the then
Polish Ministry of Defence who declared in 1999 that “Poland will show
solidarity with the Alliance not only in political statements, but also through
practical deeds”. (Prípadné operácie NATO v Kosove..., 1999) In this way
Poland tried to prove that it is the Central European country in Central
Europe whose admission to NATO had actual strategic importance. The
support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002 had the
similar traits and line of reasoning. Most pronounced, however, were the
Poland’s support to the United States after the events of 11 September 2001
and the subsequent support of U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. Thus,
Poland has become one of the biggest supporters of the U.S. policy in
Europe. (Longhurst, Zaborowski, 2007) Many authors consider an alliance
with the United States to be the third pillar of national security of Poland, in
addition to the alliance with NATO and the EU, while they do not indicate
which of the pillars is more important; on the contrary, they put them all on
the same level. On the other hand, support for establishment of a European
defence function during this period significantly lagged behind, which is
clearly visible from the analysis of the three documents adopted in that
period.
The first document forming security policy of the country after
admission to NATO is the 2000 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland46,
which contains the definition of the principles of Polish security policy,
analyses the security environment and the resulting threats and risks, and
provides tasks and tools for the implementation of the security policy of the
state. The document is based on the Principles of Poland’s Security Policy
from 1992, and is divided into four basic parts following the guiding
principles of internal and external security of the state. Its main objective is
46 The original title of the document is Strategia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, adopted in
2000.
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defined in the first part - basic Polish security policy, which defines strategic
objectives as follows:
- safeguarding of Poland's sovereignty and independence, border
inviolability and territorial integrity;
- safeguard constitutional and democratic order promoting security of
the citizens, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- creating stable conditions for Poland's civilisational and economic
progress, well-being of the people, protection of national heritage and
national identity;
- implementation of allied commitments, defence capability and
interests of the Polish State, active participation in creating the lasting
and just conditions for the peaceful development of Europe, founded
on democratic values, human rights and solidarity.
These objectives are based on such perception of security, which notably
takes into account the concept of security as comprising political, military,
economic, energy and other aspects. Security in Poland will always be
maintained in accordance with the Constitution of the State and in
conformity with the fundamental principles of international law, particularly
the UN Charter. Poland perceives its own security as comprehensive,
encompassing the surrounding states. (Strategia bezpieczeństwa
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2000, art. 1) Poland defines and implements its
national and security interests within the framework of NATO and the EU,
in which it aspires to gain full membership.
The second part of the strategy defines future threats and challenges. The
document states that the nature of the threats and challenges for European
countries and hence also Poland has changed dramatically. The possibility of
global and continental war has significantly decreased, but the number and
threat of regional and local conflicts increased. Their reasons are varied:
ethnic, religious, border disputes, violations of human rights and freedoms,
natural and technological disasters caused by expansive human activity. All
these causes may accumulate and cause weakening of economic and civil
structures resulting even in the collapse of regime structures. The fact that
such events directly threaten individual security and reduce the subjective
feeling of security is becoming a major source of destabilisation that may
threaten the democratic states. That is one reason why security research and
security agenda moves towards creating early warning systems and crisis
management. The Strategy also focuses on the neighbouring states, especially
Belarus and Ukraine, and it notes that although they renounced their nuclear
arms, there are still military bases with conventional forces close to the
Polish border. Therefore, one of the fundamental goals of the Republic of
Poland is to create new types of cooperation, which will be built to support
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the operation and building democratic institutions in those countries. The
other threats mentioned are: efforts to eliminate weapons of mass
destruction in the world, but also uncontrolled migration, which is
accompanied by the illicit trading in weapons, drugs and trafficking. It
mentions also organised crime and terrorism as possible threats to the
country, and need to create specialised forces to fight against them. (Strategia
bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2000, art. 2)
All above-mentioned tasks and objectives are assembled and specified in
Part III of the Strategy, where the tools and implementation are divided into:
- national tasks, resulting from the transformation, which began in 1989,
related to democratisation and the pursuit of bilateral cooperation
through diplomacy, creating conditions for the cooperation centred on
collective security; important tasks are assigned also to the Police and
Polish Border Guards, which makes them crucial part of the internal
security of the state;
- roles resulting from the integration; in the first place it is the active
participation in NATO, regardless of whether it is fulfilling its
commitments as a member state, or in its role as a member of NATO
Permanent Council - Russia and the NATO - Ukraine, as well as the
Partnership for Peace program. Poland is interested in constructive
development of the Alliance's relations with the countries of Eastern
Europe, including Russia and Ukraine. After Poland’s admission to
NATO the accession phases ended, but the lengthy process of
transformation and full integration of the Armed Forces in the NATO
structures initiated;
- task arising from active participation of Poland in international
organisations, especially the UN, where Poland participates in
peacekeeping operations as well as in a new type of civil-military
operations;
- roles resulting from cooperation – these result from cooperation with
neighbours and countries of Eastern Europe (this cooperation is
founded on NATO and the OSCE principles), and in regional bodies
such as the Visegrad Group, the Weimar Triangle, or the so-called
North-East Body (cooperation of Polish, German and Danish
authorities). (Strategia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2000,
art. 3.4)
The fourth section is devoted to the principles of defence strategy national defence is built on the principle of interdependence of military and
non-military potential of the state, declared through several concepts
(concept of prevention, concept of defence in a state of peace, in a state of
crisis, etc…). Although Poland does not possess, and by signing the NPT it
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decided to forgo the possibility to possess nuclear weapons in the future, it
supports the policy of nuclear deterrence of the countries that legitimately
possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is considered to be one of the
tools for maintaining peace and security, as for Poland they do not represent
military, but political weapons. (Strategia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, 2000, art. 4.3)
At the end of the 2000 Security Strategy of 2000 it is stated that for the
first time in the past several centuries Poland does not face an acute threat,
and that it actually finds itself in a state of national security which it did not
enjoy in its history. Despite the positive sense of security Poland is aware
that modern threats and risks can occur both in its vicinity and far from its
borders. Consequently, the main thesis of Poland's security is the statement
that in the 21st Century decisions, objectives as well as tasks of the state have
to be such that it is not only a consumer of security, but it also contributes to
creating it.
In 2000, the Ministry of National Defence of Poland released second
document in this period concerning security and defence. The 2000 Defence
Strategy of the Republic of Poland47 in comparison with the Principles of Poland’s
Security Policy from 1992 exhibits significant changes in the concept of
strategic and doctrinal thinking of the state. In particular, national and
security interests of Poland have changed. Following the admission in
NATO in 1999, Poland, along with Hungary and the Czech Republic
detached from the successor states of the former Soviet bloc which at the
time only aspired to NATO membership. Carefully formulated objectives of
Polish foreign and security policy towards the Eastern neighbours were
replaced by certainty and confidence, stemming from the membership in
NATO. Nevertheless, Poland still considered defending its border line as an
important strategic role, especially because it was also border of NATO.
Specifically, it expressed this thesis by stating that “the major Polish
contribution to NATO is strengthening the Alliance's defence system that
border member state (of NATO) - Poland is credible and responsible ally.”
(Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2000, p. 5)
Poland as a member of the international defence alliance feels greater
responsibility for the development of internal security. According to the text
of the strategy, various crises might have become the biggest threats to both
internal and international security because their nature is unpredictable, may
be political-military or non-military in character. Sources of these crises may
have political, social, economic, ethnic, or religious background; they may
Original title of the document is Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, issued by the Ministry
of National Defense of Poland in Warsaw in May 2000.
47
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threaten the country or countries directly or through their side effects.
Immediate threats may comprise a whole range of events potentially
disrupting the Polish airspace, sea or land territorial status. It may be only a
provocation, but it can also be one of the methods to test the internal
strength and stability of the internal security of Poland. Threats which are
labelled as side effects of security destabilisation arise as a result of terrorist
and other extremist actions. Retaliation in both cases is contested. As a
NATO member, Poland in such cases has to consider the use of military
force, or rule it out entirely. Crises, however, need to be addressed;
therefore, the Strategy consistently addresses the problem of non-military
crisis and military threats to emphasize strengthening the defence capabilities
of the state.
Principles of the Polish defence strategy are elaborated in a sophisticated
manner. In the first place, they are clearly compatible with the then-valid
NATO strategy (1999 Strategic Concept). They are built on national
responsibility - defence is a matter of the nation. Participation in coalitions is
a factor that boosts defence capabilities, but does not absolve the nation
from the principal responsibility for its own security. Commitment to defend
his country is a matter for every citizen and all state structures. If this idea is
reflected in all aspects of state defence, it is a guarantee of successful
defence. The above mentioned principles stem from the sense of solidarity, a
sense of belonging and integration. Conformity is primarily doctrinal defining common principles with the Alliance – but can be also found in
geopolitical orientation of Poland towards the United States and their
foreign policy doctrine.
Evaluation of both strategic security documents from 2000 can be
summed up as follows: The Republic of Poland has set rules for the defence
of sovereign territory, which in the years 1990-1993 finally broke free from
ideological and political context of the Eastern Bloc. Poland defined its goals
for the future cooperation with NATO and confirmed the direction of
orientation of its foreign policy towards the United States and Western
Europe. It recognised the need for regional cooperation as a prerequisite for
the stability of the territory of Central Europe in V4 group. Furthermore, it
defined goals and objectives of the Armed Forces and other authorities of
the state in accordance with the new conditions and objectives declared in
NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999 and elaborated on the conditions of the
internal security environment of the Republic of Poland.
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The final strategic document adopted in the period in question, the 2003
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland48 profiled the Polish security
policy as clearly oriented towards NATO and the United States. Some
sources term this trend as a “militant Atlanticism” (Ondrejcsák, 2005, p.
194), given that in 2003-2004 Poland supported several foreign military
operations conducted by the U.S. Air Force and armed its own Air Force
with American equipment – clearly a political decision, also justified in this
way by the Government. Poland, however, through this close cooperation
with the United States achieved certain prestige among other European
countries.
This spirit of presenting itself as a powerful European state and a NATO
ally is typical for the 2003 Polish Security Strategy. Initially, Poland analyses
the new challenges to security. As a NATO member state it has guaranteed
security in Europe; on the other hand, both in European neighbourhood and
in near abroad there are conflict zones (Western Balkans, the South
Caucasus and the wider Caucasus region). There are also tensions and the
threat of instability resulting from international terrorism, proliferation of
nuclear weapons and the phenomenon of failed states. Poland as a member
of the international contingents cannot ignore these challenges.
Security challenges are also linked to national security because Poland's
territory with active structures of international organised crime, also due to
the fact that Poland is the border state of the EU and NATO and has
seaports. This makes its transport and information networks particularly
vulnerable to various threats.
Basic objectives and principles of security policy therefore based on a
dual motivation: to maintain the continuity with the objectives of the
Alliance and provide all the guarantees for citizens and the state. The first
objective is continuation and extension of previous security and defence
strategies, i.e. it is the preservation of the independence, territorial integrity
and inviolability of borders. The second objective is based on the
requirements of modern society – it is related to safeguarding democracy,
constitutionality, and human rights. This objective has exceptionally deep
roots in Poland, especially in comparison with other Central European
States, because it subscribes to the historical tradition demanding religious
freedom and economic liberalisation declared in previous decades. The third
objective is prosperity, preservation of national heritage and strengthening of
national identity. (Ondrejcsák, 2005, p. 193) Poland has different historical
experience with the suppression of identity when compared to other V4
The original title of the document is Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
adopted in 2003.
48
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countries; therefore, this goal is reiterated several times throughout the text
of the 2003 Security Strategy. The fourth objective is to contribute to
stability and peace in Europe, which also exhibits a degree of continuity with
the previous Defence Strategy of 1992.
Part of the security strategy is the clarification of the concept that we
introduced at the beginning, i.e. the “militant Atlanticism.” Poland frames its
international activities primarily through NATO which is a key platform for
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area of security. Supporting
NATO represents commitment and challenge of Poland. It is a commitment
to extend guarantees provided by NATO to other fragile states. It is a
challenge because it allows Poland to apply its own capacities, its own knowhow and responsibility as a credible ally wherever the international situation
would require.49
The 2003 Strategy also includes part on the EU, which is seen in twofold
way: as an area supporting security and stability, and, at the same time, as an
instrument through which the so-called Eastern Policy, advantageous for
Poland as well, can be implemented. Poland's relations with the UN and
other international organisations are characterised in terms of compliance
with the rules of international law, diplomacy and support for peacekeeping
and stabilisation missions. Poland perceives international organisations
primarily as a platform for discussion and negotiations, and it believes that
most security issues should be discussed at international fora, such as the
UN. (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2003, p. 7)
The 2003 Strategy elaborates also on the question of the Armed Forces,
but not to the extent as it was in previous documents specifically focused on
the issue of defence. More attention, however, is devoted to intelligence.
Internal security of the state is defined through four basic objectives that
we mentioned above. However, there is an interesting section on
strengthening the local and regional government as part of the public
administration of the state. Local and regional government are perceived to
be the main tool in the fight against crime and organised crime. However,
local authorities should have greater legal force and work more closely with
the police and other security forces, because especially economic crime
causes considerable damage to the state. Homeland security should be
strengthened also through the border guards. Borders of Poland, particularly
in the east and in the area of the Baltic Sea represent a risk for the state
territory. It is therefore necessary to focus on the development of new
It is worth noting that in Poland there were no demonstrations against the participation of Polish
forces in international missions, nor public contestation of such Polish commitments to NATO.
Doctrinal links between Poland and NATO, therefore, has not been questioned.
49
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Jaroslav Ušiak
technologies, information and detection systems. All this requires funds that
are often lacking. In this respect there are long-term plans for solutions
linking legislative, financial and administrative projects entitled “Public
Security 2004-2007” (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland, 2003, p. 11), in which the institutions of public administration and
self-government should also participate.
The document also analysed the economic security regarding the more
effective use of finances, control of public funds and economy of state.
Although the economy exhibits steady growth, there are several gaps in
technology (food-processing industry), services (lack of transparency) and
low production efficiency. Energy security is directly connected with the
above mentioned issues. Poland still has many energy-intensive industries,
has functional defects in the transport of commodities and is dependent on
imported oil and gas products. Natural resources and environmental security
are directly based on the above mentioned characteristics. If the state does
not have satisfactory supplies of energy resources its energy policy has to
adapt and apply less energy-demanding approach, seek other options and
save its own energy resources. In all these areas, Poland cooperates with the
EU, UN, and OECD.
During the period from 2004 until present, the Republic of Poland has
adopted two major strategies and one White Paper on national security. The
first document is the 2007 National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland, responding to Poland's accession to the European Union, and the
conflicts that occurred in this period (especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, as
well as other international crises). The second document is a 2009 Defence
Strategy, which supported the foreign policy and security orientation of
Poland towards the encouragement of the Common Security and Defence
Policy of the European Union. White Paper on National Security of the
Republic focused on defining tasks and objectives in the area of future
national security challenges, as well as in other aspects of security.
During this period Poland finally decided to support the EU in building
its own defence capabilities. Trend of supporting the United States as the
main partner of Poland, however, persisted, as well may see in Poland's
constant rejection of ESDP at the expense of the European Security
Defence Identity (Poland promoted ESDI at the expense of building the
ESDP already since 2000, i.e. already during the accession negotiations with
the EU). (Pomorskie, 2011) This gradual change stemmed from the fact that
after the failure of missile defence system project in Central Europe and
under pressure from the Russian Federation the US-Polish alliance was not
as strong as in the past, and that promoting the interests of NATO was
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subject to the decisions of major players. Consequently, Poland started to
perceive the military capabilities of the EU as an option of power projection,
in addition to its activities within NATO
The second important element was growth of self-confidence in respect
of its position of a leader in Central Europe, as well as in Europe as such, in
the area of the EU operations (setting up Poland's own camp in the EUFOR
mission in South Africa, etc.). That brought Poland the leading position
within the V4 and in the forthcoming EU battlegroup EU formed by the V4
member states.
A significant milestone was the build up of a missile defence system;
officially since 2007, although the first unofficial negotiations took place
between the Republic of Poland and the United States as early as 2002.
Poland saw the deployment of missile defence system on its territory as a
means to further strengthen the already long-term cooperation with the
United States and to ensure the continuation of the U.S. presence on its
territory. First negotiations have yielded negative reaction from Russia,
which later threatened with deployment of missiles in Kaliningrad. Change
occurred after the parliamentary elections in November 2007, in which
President J. Kaczyński has been replaced by D. Tusk. While J. Kaczyński
was willing to accede to any request from the United States to build the
missile defence system, D. Tusk had an opposite approach. He used this
theme during the electoral campaign, given the fact that the public has not
been inclined to unconditional support for the United States in this matter.
After winning the campaign, D. Tusk started to request certain benefits as a
quid pro quo for the deployment of the missile defence system on Poland's
territory (mainly in the form of financial assistance for the modernisation of
the army). The preparatory phases of an actual construction and deployment
of the system significantly defined the development of Poland's security
policy. In 2009, the transformation of the Armed Forces was completed,
armed forces were professionalised and the compulsory military service
ceased to exist. Poland was preparing to accept a strategic partner on their
territory. The emergence of the global financial crisis and the election of
B. Obama as the new U.S. President, however, meant a turning point in
U.S. foreign policy. The pursuit of pragmatic foreign policy during the first
Obama Administration meant halting the construction of a missile defence
system in Central Europe in 2009. Poland, however, has at least achieved the
presence of U.S. troops on its territory as compensation for its willingness
and efforts (by means of the Agreement on the Status of the U.S. Armed
Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Poland). (O'Donnell, 2012)
Through this agreement the Polish Armed Forces acquired to possibility to
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use the Patriot system during their military exercises, and thus the capacity to
better defend Polish airspace.
Membership in the European Union and ensuing opportunity to
participate in decision-making, eventually the possibility to lead some
operations, combined with the failure of the negotiation on the deployment
of the U.S. missile defence system and historical perception of Russia as one
of the major threats to the country pointed out that the real partners in the
security and defence of Poland are the EU Member States. Moreover, with
the framework of the EU Poland had much greater chance to rank among its
peers and to be able to effectively influence the CSDP (former ESDP) and
the CFSP directly, not only as a U.S. ally in NATO without any substantial
influence. Consequently, the period after 2004 is characterised by growing
awareness of its power and dominance at least in Central Europe, with
possible impact on the decision-making at the EU level.
The first document adopted in this period is the 2007 National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Poland50, which responded to the new environment
and the country's admission to the EU.
The strategy includes an official interpretation of the state’s approach to
security. The strategy defines threats and risks for the state, the conceptual
framework of measures which the state intends to apply and also the role of
specific bodies of the state in providing and guaranteeing security. Poland is
considered a sovereign and democratic state in Central Europe with
considerable size of population and political, military and economic power.
It considers itself an integral part and equal partner of NATO and the EU
member states, and claims responsibility for security in the region. (Strategia
bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007)
Poland’s national interests are divided into vital, deriving from the
Constitution, and other important interests. Among the vital security
interests there are: safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity;
ensure inviolability of borders, protection of freedoms of citizens, ensuring
the safety and security of citizens, respect for human and civil rights and
freedoms, protection of the democratic establishment. Among essential
security interests of the state are the following: to ensure cultural and
economic development of the country; to create conditions for further
growth and economic prosperity, create conditions for the development of
science and technology, preservation of cultural heritage, and environmental
protection in terms of sustainable development. For other important security
interests Poland considers: ensuring the preservation of Poland’s strong
The original title of the document is Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
adopted in 2007.
50
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international position to enforce effectively Polish interests abroad, ensuring
the ability to efficiently participate and pursue its national interests in the
most important international institutions, the pursuit of the development of
international relations based on respect for law and effective multilateral
cooperation in accordance with the objectives and principles set by the UN
Charter.
Security threats and challenges for the Republic of Poland are defined in
chapter two, entitled “Security Environment”. This chapter points out the
fact that Poland is influenced by the environment in which it is located,
which underwent several changes in recent years - involvement in European
and transatlantic security structures, geographical location in the dynamically
evolving Central Europe region. We may point out foremost the following
security threats and challenges for Poland (Strategia bezpieczeństwa
narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007):
- limit the spread of WMD and their means of delivery;
- international organised terrorism, which can also threaten Poland;
- extremism and criminal groups;
- failed states, which are the catalyst for organised crime;
- regional destabilisation of the Middle East and the emergence of
regional conflicts, which may cause migration waves to Poland;
- migration due to demographic changes;
- problems arising from the widening disparities between regions - not
only between the EU members and non-EU members, but also
between respective regions of the EU member states themselves;
- natural and environmental disasters which may disrupt and endanger
the Polish environment;
- international organised crime is one of the problems that arose as a
result of participation in the Schengen area, where Poland become a
transit country;
- energy dependence on the gas and oil - Poland considers this to be the
greatest external threat and supports the necessity of finding new
alternatives – in respect to both routes and sources;
- Article 32 elaborates on the possibility of collapse of the European
integration and, in particular, the EU’s inability to further cooperation;
- process of developing information and communication systems, and
providing protection against cyber-terrorism.
In the next section, entitled “National security goals and tasks”, the
Strategy is trying to define ways and options to achieve national interests. It
sets the main instruments of their implementation, which it sees mainly in
the active cooperation with NATO and the EU, as well as in Poland’s
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partnership with the United States. It stresses the need for closer
cooperation and coordination in addressing all the above mentioned
international security. In this section Poland confirms its commitment to a
policy of active participation in maintaining global and regional security both
within NATO and the ESDP. It then looks at different areas and tries to
categorise possible threats and challenges, and present a possible solution
ton safeguards against them. It dedicates specific sections to the following
areas: external security, military security, internal security, civil security, social
security, economic security, environmental security, and information and
telecommunication security. (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007)
In the last chapter, “The Republic of Poland’s National Security System”,
the authors of the Strategy deal with the identification of means and
resources that are needed to implement the outlines goals and objectives.
The strategy refers to the need to build a new integrated security system
which will be composed of several elements. The strategy lists the tasks that
should be carried out in various areas: foreign affairs, defence, finance,
health, agriculture, the police, the judiciary, education and government. It is
an attempt to create a set of sectoral policies which are responsible for
security in the respective areas, and an attempt to define their mutual
relations and individual responsibilities. (Strategia bezpieczeństwa
narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007)
The current National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (i.e. the
2007 Security Strategy) correlates with the NATO Strategic Concept and the
European Security Strategy (supporting ESDP). This may be considered a
positive development - particularly in taking responsibility as a member state
of both these organisations and the perception of both of them as
guarantors of security in Europe. On the other hand, as a big negative aspect
in both 2003 and in 2007 security strategies is that it dedicates inadequate
and unsatisfactory proportion to solutions to national issues, i.e. to internal
security. The entire document addresses the complex challenges and external
threats, but the analysis of the internal security environment is essentially
avoided. The 2007 Security Strategy, however, is a modern strategy which
reflects the new threats and challenges that many countries failed to
incorporate into their own security strategies.
Penultimate analysed document is the 2009 Defence Strategy of the Republic of
Poland51, which probably in the most pronounced way builds on the achieved
trends in cooperation within the European Union. The document itself
points to the recognition of the existence of asymmetric threats for the
51
Original title of the document is Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, adopted in 2009.
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armed forces and as a major threat to the state, but also points to the need
for building military power as well (as illustrated by the 2008 conflict in
Georgia). Strategic objectives of Poland focus, in addition to traditional areas
such as ensuring the sovereignty and independence of Poland, defence and
protection of the population, especially on improving the conditions of
preparedness to cope with challenges arising from the membership in
NATO and the European Union through participation in crisis management
operations. It stresses the importance of the ESDP and the European
Defence Agency as one of the main tools and pillars of the European
security and the need for greater involvement and commitment of Poland in
these structures. (Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2009, p. 7)
The 2009 Defence Strategy defines the prerequisites of the functioning of
national defence, sets tasks and structure of state defence system which it
divides into three basic components: national defence management
subsystem, military subsystem (which is formed by the Polish Armed Forces;
its purpose is to protect the sovereignty and independence of the state and
safeguard its security and peace, eventually participate in the fight against
natural disasters and elimination of their impact and consequences, assist in
searching and rescuing human health and life, and participate in response to
crisis situations), and non-military subsystem (which consists of a wide range
of activities such as: national reserves, economic mobilisation, protection of
objects of particular importance to security, protection of critical
infrastructure, preparation for the provision of health care, education or
communication; i.e. it focuses mainly on civil defence). In recent years
Poland has paid considerable attention to the establishment and
improvement of crisis management at all levels of government. Precisely the
2009 Defence Strategy is largely devoted to these facts as well, but as stated
by several experts from Poland, (Bieniek, 2012) crisis management and civil
defence are still problematically implemented due to lack of precise relations
to each other, and due to the overlap of their tasks.
In 2013, Poland issued the last major document dedicated to the security
and defence of the country, the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of
Poland52, which analyses the contemporary security situation in Poland and
evaluates the possibilities of its development for the next 20 years. It is based
on the results of a strategic assessment of the Committee for National
Security, which began its work in November 2010 and continued for almost
two years until September 2012, involving more than 200 experts in the
process.
52 Original title of the document is Biała Księga bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
adopted in May 2013.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
The identification of the principal risks and threats for Poland the White
Paper points to the trend of expanding security agenda. Security has been
characterised in very broad terms - not only to include the analysis of the
current state of the Armed Forces, but also the state of the health care and
safety of the Polish roads and transport infrastructure, including even a sense
of national identity. Experts agree that there is no threat of direct military
conflict, however, it is necessary to pay attention to the risks associated with
non-military threats such as low birth rate and poor infrastructure - both
road as well as energy infrastructure. (Biała Księga bezpieczeństwa
Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2013)
The White Paper consists of four chapters which contain the most
important recommendations. They recommend integration with purpose to
integrate the currently fragmented system of security management of the
state. The government, therefore, proposes to create a National Security
Committee on Security, which should coordinate these activities based on
the model of the President's National Security Council. Other proposals
contained in the White Paper are: professionalization (understood as
improving the quality and specialisation of all security branches of the state)
and, last but not least, the objective of the White Paper is also the
dissemination of knowledge about security among residents of the country.
This document points to existing linkage between the modern security
research and practical actions in ensuring the national security.
The Security Policy of the Hungary
Hungary53 already in 1989 (May/June) indicated the new direction of
foreign policy in practice. It opened the Hungarian-Austrian border and thus
allowed thousands of East Germans to get through the Hungarian border to
the West. Hungary also led the efforts and pressures to dissolve the Warsaw
Pact. (Asmus, 2002, p. 219) As noted by numerous Hungarian scholars,
Hungary could make a choice out of five options: neutrality, forming a
regional security organisation, forming a new independent security
organisation, the reintegration into Eastern security organisation or
participating in Western security structures. (Nagy, Kovács, 2006) On the
other hand, political leaders have been deciding between only two acceptable
53 Within the following text we will employ the name “Hungary”, which represents the official name of
the republic as of the changes in constitution from April 2011 (changing it from the previous name
Republic of Hungary).
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concepts - neutrality or integration into Western security structures.
According to the declarations of the then Ministry of Defence, in 1989 and
1990 there were several proposals that advocated neutrality as the main
concept of ensuring the country’s defence, but given the changes occurring
in those years these voices disappeared and the possibility of forming a
multi-layered system involving NATO, EC and CSCE started to be seriously
contemplated. (Cottey, 1995, p. 96)
The most important question of foreign and security policy in Hungary
since its establishment as an independent state (after the end of World War I
and the dissolution of the Austro - Hungarian Empire) has been the issue of
relations with its neighbours54, especially in view of relations to Hungarians
living in these countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, the countries
of former Yugoslavia). This element was the most prominent aspect of
forming relations with its neighbours and decisively influenced even the
Hungary’s security-related documents over the past two decades.
The actual formation of security policy could be divided into three
separate development periods: 1) the period of 1989-1999 was the stage of
the accession process of Hungary into NATO, characterised by seeking the
strategic orientation of the country; 2) the period between 1999 to 2010
characterised by the accession negotiations to the EU and accession to the
organisation, as well as by searching for the strategic balance in the area of
security (internal and external) between the two organisations and efforts to
adapt strategic thinking to collective defence; 3) the period of 2010 until
present - period of making strategic choices in the field of defence between
the EU (ESDP / CSDP) and NATO, characterised by setting a new
direction in the reform of the security policy and the armed forces.
The initial period of 1989-1999 was full of changes and reforms needed
in the light of changes in the structure of the country’s defence. Hungary was
the first country in Central Europe which clearly confirmed the pro-Western
orientation not only in declarative way, but through the actual changes in its
internal politics. In 1990 (March / April) the first free elections were held
and from 1990 to 1994 the first post-Communist government considered
NATO membership to be its top priority. In terms of relations with
neighbouring countries, however, Hungary was still exhibiting significant
marks of the Trianon syndrome, which meant putting emphasis on
addressing the question of minorities in neighbouring countries, particularly
in Slovakia, but also in Romania. These problems were part of an overall
54 According to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon Hungary lost almost two thirds of its territory when
compared to the situation before the World War I.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
political transition of the state, similar to the one which took place in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Hungary, however, this transformation has
been quite specific due to historical connotations of the strategic culture.
Hungary has never been a convincing advocate of the doctrine of the
Warsaw Pact. Already in 1991 it abandoned its old obligations, accentuating
instead the framework of the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept. The next step
was the acceptance of the Partnership for Peace as a commitment to future
challenges arising from membership in NATO. The transformation,
however, required the clarification of some important domestic political
issues, in particular the introduction of tighter fiscal and economic policy, a
ban on arms sales to the so-called rogue states, as well as solving ethnic
problems with Slovak Republic and Romania. (Asmus, 2002, p. 220)
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the three Central European
states concluded an agreement in respect of the issues of common policy in
the area of security. In May 1992, President Václav Havel, Lech Walesa
and Prime Minister József Antall met in Prague for the discussions.
Hungary has received assurances that the issue of national minorities and its
possible solutions would not hinder the opening of the first period of the
NATO accession negotiations. (Almási, Kádár, 2005, p. 262) At the same
time Hungary was identified as a state which might play an important role in
the transformation of the entire region, threatened during the mid-1990s by
the conflicts in the Balkans. This, however, required several changes
concerning the armed forces, especially air force, but also change in the
strategic culture. Both Czechoslovakia and Poland had armed forces that
even during crisis situations in the past retained the support of the
population. The historical role of the army has been seen as a heroic past.
Hungary, quite to the contrary, wanted to forget its past post-war period,
because its People’s Army subordinate to the Warsaw Pact lacked any
historical significance. (Asmus, 2002)
Accession negotiations, carrying out the tasks of the Madrid NATO
Summit (1997) and the adoption of the Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Hungary clearly identified itself as a fit candidate for admission to NATO.
This has been official enacted at the Washington Summit in April 1999. At
the same time, Hungary was assigned the task to become the future donor in
the bilateral issues with other candidate countries (Slovakia, Romania and
Slovenia). (Almási, Kádár, 2005)
The major line of the strategic culture of Hungary in the early 1990s
focused on the development of its own, domestic security strategy.
Resolutions adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in the field of security
comprise two basic documents on the new direction within the security
policy landscape: Basic Principles of Security Policy of Hungary no. 11/1993
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and the Basic Principles of Defence of Hungary no. 27/1993, which also
determined the formation and adoption of the Act CX of 1993 on National
Defence55. All these documents were drawn up and adopted it in the light of
the new social system and political regime. Consequently, before the country
joined NATO, Hungary enacted third important document in the field of
security, which linked the two previous documents into one comprehensive
document: The Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy of the
Republic of Hungary in 1998.
In connection with the above-mentioned principal characteristics of the
strategic culture with the chief objective of integration to the NATO
structures it is important to focus on a more detailed analysis of the 1993
Basic Principles of Security Policy of Hungary56, which express the efforts of
Hungary to balance national and international dimension of national security
policy. At the national level, it is in particular the definition of the tasks
which the state and a government have in the field of security, as well as the
development of legislation and control of the tasks through the Parliament
(National Assembly).
As a guiding principle of national security is herein defined protection of
statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ensuring them forms the base
upon which internal stability, democratic institutions, civil and human rights,
and the principles of market economy are built. It specifically highlighted
ethnic, religious and minority rights. (A Magyar Köztársaság
biztonságpolitikájának alapelvei, 1993) From the very beginning of this
document is discernible the utmost importance which Hungary gives to
human rights, a clear inherence to the past century in which Hungary had to
face the changes of the state, borders, and its international status.
Other chapters on relations of Hungary with its neighbours and the
international community as such are formulated in a similar vein. In relation
to its neighbours, Hungary is aware of the sensitive relations and, therefore,
deems that “it will be necessary to find a suitable method of communication,
avoiding the danger of confrontation, isolation, or irregular competition.” (A
Magyar Köztársaság biztonságpolitikájának alapelvei, 1993)
The document highlights the tasks and the principles of international law
as it is enshrined in the UN, OSCE, and Council of Europe, which Hungary
fully respects mainly due to the fact that it is precisely the international law
that guarantees that the small central European countries will be able to meet
the threats and risks of regional and global character. To achieve this aims,
The original title of the document is 1993 évi CX törvény a honvédelemről.
The original title of the document is 11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság
biztonságpolitikájának alapelvei, adopted in 1993.
55
56
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Jaroslav Ušiak
Hungary is prepared to actively participate in all documents providing for the
cooperation with the EC, NATO, OSCE, WEU and the NACC. This gives
rise to new challenges in the state security and defence policy, in particular
supporting the reform of the defence sector and the creation of mechanisms
to deal effectively with crises in international relations, including those that
take place in the vicinity of Hungary, i.e. in the Balkans.
The document clearly outlined specific objectives of security policy of
Hungary. They can be summarised as follows:
- full integration into Western European structures and the gradual
activation of all internal and external factors that would contribute to
convergence with NATO;
- Hungary is part of a wider Central European region and, therefore, it
must shape its security policy so as not to conflict with regional
security, especially as the transformation takes place at several levels
(political, economic, security and others);
- wider Central European region has specific safety risks arising from
historical, national, ethnic and cultural diversity, which in the past
often constituted a de-stabilising factor. Dealing with this problem is a
very important task; however, in the context of relevant international
organisations there are certain standards which may Hungary use as a
tools to prevent and solve with these problems;
- in terms of military capabilities Hungarian armed forces are built and
managed under several international treaties (CFE, CSBM, Treaty on
Open Skies, and more). As Hungary declares preference for political
means to the military ones in the events of any threat, it favours
prevention in its defensive principles. Nevertheless, also with the
preference of non-military means of conflict resolution it should be
taken into account that a modern military of a state must also be
compatible with the requirements put on the armed forces by
international cooperation commitments, and, consequently, that
military modernisation is also essential in maintaining peace.
The second document of this period, the Basic Principles of Defence of
Hungary57 pointed in the clear direction of ensuring the defence of the
country primarily by its own means, but concurrently requesting meeting the
requirements for full membership in NATO. It defines joint consultations in
the field of security, training soldiers, and the total transformation of the
armed forces as the main instruments in achieving the rapprochement with
The original title of the document is 27/1993. (IV. 23.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság
honvédelmének alapelveiről, adopted in 1993.
57
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
the Organisation. (A Magyar Köztársaság honvédelmének alapelveiről 1993,
art. 16) In its four sections the document characterises the principles and
objectives of defence, threats to the state, defence policy strategy and the
state defence system. Although according to this document Hungary does
not expect extensive military conflict in the continental Europe, it highlights
the ethno – national conflicts in the area due to disputes over territory as a
major security problem. Significant impact on the prioritisation of
integration into NATO as one of the major security interests had the events
from the early 1990s, especially the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In this
respect, in May 1992 the Hungarian Parliament demanded security
guarantees from NATO, given the threats to which Hungary as a
neighbouring country has been exposed. The document in question further
suggests that ensuring defence of the state by its own resources is
challenging in terms of financial resources and depend on the willingness of
the population to participate in the armed forces of the country. Therefore,
in the long term document recommends focusing on the political, economic
and military relations within the framework of multilateral cooperation, i.e.
looking for ways to get involved in such structures.
The only option how to guarantee security during this period was to rely
on Hungarian own national defence. Hungary, however, in both documents
adopted in the same period clearly stated that this trend is unsustainable for
the country in the long term (a fact further evidenced by the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia and the unfortunate bombing of Hungarian village during
the conflict, and the inability of Hungary to respond effectively).
Consequently, there was an apparent effort to anchor the security and
defence policy in the full membership in NATO and the European Union.
As we have already pointed out in the previous chapters, Hungary has not
been the only Central European country which came to the same conclusion
virtually at the same time.
The third strategic document adopted towards the end of the analysed
period is represented by the Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy of the
Republic of Hungary58 (1998), enacted by the National Assembly resolution no.
94/1998. The formulations in this document are already modified as a result
of changes in the political situation and international environment of
Hungary (in this period Hungary already had the near certainty to become
the NATO member state, as agreed in June 1996 at a meeting of NATO
Foreign Ministers in Berlin). Especially two foreign policy activities
concerning two countries neighbouring with Hungary contributed to its early
58 The original title of the document is 94/1998 (XII. 29.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság
biztonság- és védelempolitikájának alapelveiről, adopted in 1998.
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admission to NATO: establishment of the NATO - Russia cooperation in
1996 and the NATO – Ukraine cooperation in 1997.
While in the document of 1993 the national security transformation
represented a major issue (in relations to Hungary’s neighbours, in the field
of human rights, economy, rapprochement with the international
organisations) together with the paramount effort to distance itself from
being perceived through the prism of Trianon trauma, the document of 1998
states that Hungary positions itself among other actors of comprehensive
security and builds the potential to become an equal partner in an
international environment in terms of international politics, global challenges
and technological development.
As a consequence of the end of bipolar era, however, new threats and
risks typical for the Euro-Atlantic region emerged. In the processes of
meeting the criteria required for the admission to NATO, Hungary also had
to adapt to these new threats and risks to be able to meaningfully participate
on the security tasks of the international community.
Nowadays, security of Hungary is based on two pillars. First, it is the
strengthening of national self-confidence and ideology, and second, the
Euro-Atlantic orientation and cooperation. (The basic principles of the
security and defense policy of the Republic of Hungary, 1998) Perhaps for
the first time during the development of the strategic culture of Hungary
such sincere commitment to cooperation has been officially declared. By
strengthening itself, the state at the same time also strengthens its partners.
Through preparations for NATO membership it is increasing its
international prestige. Hungary is steadily becoming part of the European
Security and Defence Identity, with the consent of constitutional and
parliamentary bodies.
In 1998, Hungarian security policy together with its institutional system
are created so that their main objective and goal at any time and under any
circumstances is ensuring the protection of the state, its sovereignty,
population and values. Security policy must aim at creating preventive tools
and abilities that would allow it to respond to crisis situations and to build
effective economic and foreign policy base for the national defence.
Hungary currently represents a stable area in the Central Europe, and
maintains good relations with its neighbours in all areas. It is a leader also for
other Central European countries in their integration efforts. Hungary pays
specific attention to the conflicts that occur for reasons of national, ethnic
and racial intolerance, chiefly because it considers it as its role and obligation.
It addresses all these issues in accordance with the rules of international
organisations. The position towards the minority issues have been also
defined in an interesting way, especially in relation to the Hungarian ethnic
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
minority living in the territories of other states. Here the document refers
explicitly to the fact that these problems cannot just be a matter of one
country, and state borders are considered to be secondary when compared
with the priority issue of human security. (The basic principles of the security
and defense policy of the Republic of Hungary, 1998, art. 11)
Thanks to its ability to successfully implement the EU requirements in
the field of legal, social and economic cohesion Hungary becomes a stable
state also from the economic and social welfare point of view. In the field of
national defence it adjusts their capacity to make them capable to
meaningfully participate in international missions.
From the point of view of the contemporary threats and risks, its actions
are based on the realistic assessment and analysis of the sources of these
threats and risks. This is designed to pave the way for its role in the Alliance,
while taking into consideration not only the requirements for modernisation
of the armed forces that reflect the needs but also the real possibility of
financial resources. The chief objective of the national security policy is to be
able to create a system of balance in resources, their allocation and
requirements. The National Assembly of Hungary has the primary obligation
when it comes to creating conditions for the implementation of the tasks
defined in the document. Government is responsible for developing a future
national security strategy, which is to become the most important document
defining the objectives and tasks of national security. (The basic principles of
the security and defense policy of the Republic of Hungary, 1998)
The 1998 Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the
Republic of Hungary is a document which provides for a transitional stage in
preparation for NATO membership. Next documents - already termed as
“security strategies” - are formulated according to different criteria. The
importance of the document from 1998 lies in how fundamentally different
it defines the role of Hungary in the European area. It brings greater selfesteem, disburdens the country from the “historical trauma of minorities and
state borders”, its motto is faith in the future. It should come as no surprise,
however; the years 1995-2004 were very favourable for Hungary and this
document mirrors a positive image of reality coming from both political
elites and from citizens. The document also stated that the Government
ought to prepare two separate documents - security strategy and military
strategy, but the process took longer than originally planned.
Second period concerning the development of security policy of
Hungary in the years 1999-2010 was significantly shaped by NATO
membership, initiation of the transformation of the armed forces and strong
support for further enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as of
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Jaroslav Ušiak
the EU's enlargement to promote further stabilisation of the surrounding
area of the country. Furthermore, this period was characterised also by the
attempts to find a balance between the two organisations in the future (after
becoming the EU member state) in advance, not only after effectively
gaining the EU membership (as was the case of other Visegrad countries).
During this period several Central European countries became NATO
member state, not even after 8 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, however, the Balkans region
remained unstable, in close vicinity or even direct neighbourhood of these
countries. Therefore, Hungary became one of the staunchest supporters and
advocates of the idea of further NATO enlargement, given the fact that until
the enlargement in 2004 (comprising seven countries) Hungary has been in
the position of the “NATO-island” in the Central and Eastern Europe.
(Nagy, Kovács, 2006)
As a NATO member, Hungary actively participated in many operations
that NATO carried out in Kosovo, as well as in the humanitarian operations
in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. Because of this participation some
articles of the Hungarian Constitution had to be strengthened or amended,
which occurred in late 2003. For example, according to Art. 40/C of the
Constitution the participation in the NATO military mission had to be
ratified by the government. Furthermore, several laws determining the
security policy of the state in accordance with NATO membership were also
adopted. (Almási, Kádár, 2005) One of these acts sets out the conditions
under which units may be sent abroad, i.e. when the mission meets the
conditions of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, or at the request of the UN,
when the government itself might send troops anywhere for six months
without the consent of Parliament. In case of extension of the period,
however, the parliamentary approval is required, which is necessary also in
the case if the assistance requested by an allied state.
Already at that time the question of the relationship between the EU and
NATO, plus the United States began to resonate more strongly, and
Hungary tried to find a suitable location for itself in this triad. From the
perspective of its geopolitical position Hungary became well aware of its
strategic position useful for both the EU and NATO, and clearly pointed out
to this fact. The awareness of the benefits that such strategic position
brought to Hungary resulted in an increased possibility to address many
threats directly impacting also the internal security of the state. This aspect
was associated with an awareness of the possibility of creating an effective
policy towards ethnic minority Hungarians living in other countries. Also the
formation of ESDP within the EU has encouraged Hungary’s interest in
effective EU defence policy through the utilisation of NATO capabilities.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
In addition to Hungary’s admission to the EU, 2004 brought about also
changes in the field of security and defence policy, such as the abolition of
conscription and the establishment of a professional army (or soldiers
serving on contract). These changes were associated with the necessary
adjustments of the armed forces in terms of interoperability, its deployment
in remote regions and specialisation for use in joint operations and missions
of the two organisations, i.e. the EU and NATO. Similarly to other
countries, however, also Hungary faced a decline in defence spending (in
2004/2005 defence spending declined to 1.5/1.4 % GDP from 1.8 % GDP
in 2001) and this trend persists until present day. (Nagy, Kovács, 2006)
A major influence on shaping or, more precisely, not shaping security
policy of Hungary in the period of 2005-2009 had a government led by
F. Gyurcsány, who under pressure for its inaction, needs for economic
reforms and negative remarks of Prime Minister to previous government of
his own political party, eventually resigned from the post of Prime Minister.
During this period in 2006/2007 the process of reform of the Ministry of
Defence started together with the reform of the armed forces of the country
aiming at their unification.
During this period, three major documents related to security were
adopted, i.e. the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary in
2002 and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary in 2004.
Both documents have brought a decisive change in the perception of
defence. Relative narrow time frame during which these documents have
been adopted, i.e. only a two-year difference, was due to the EU admission
and the need to reflect this admission in the Strategy of 2004. Therefore, the
text of both strategies is very similar; some text sections of the 2002 strategy
were only taken over and pasted into the 2004 Strategy. These two strategic
documents formed the basis for the adoption of Act CV of 2004 on
National Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces which indicated the
basic direction of the state’s military transformation and the role of state
defence. The third important document was the National Military Strategy of
2009, adopted as a reaction to nearly a decade long period without this
important document designed to determine the basic goals and tasks of the
armed forces of the state.
The first of the above-mentioned documents was the 2002 National
Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary59. This strategy reflected the changes
to which Hungary had to adapt after joining NATO, most importantly the
transition to the collective defence and respecting the principles arising from
59 The original title of the document is Biztonság az új évezred küszöbén - a Magyar Köztársaság
Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, adopted in 2002.
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Jaroslav Ušiak
the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the events following the 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States, as well as subscribing to the continuation of
efforts to join the EU. The document is in its first chapter dedicated to
geopolitical characteristics and security policy clearly shows the importance
of NATO as the guarantor of security of Hungary and prioritises NATO
over the EU in this aspect. Due to the characteristics of the geopolitical
security environment the document contemplates also the geopolitical
surroundings, highlighting the still unresolved problems in the former
Yugoslavia, as well as potential problems in the CIS states. It do not shy
away from indicating the prioritisation of importance of the main actors in
world politics, putting the United States in the first place.
The main threats to the global nature of the strategy are considered to be
the following: unstable areas of the world south of Hungary; international
terrorism; weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery;
financial instability; challenges of the age of information society; natural,
technological and man-made disasters. Among regional problems are
considered the following: combination and intertwining of several problems
such as uneven development of regions; internal instability; the situation of
Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary; the challenges in the
post-Soviet space and South-Eastern Europe; illegal migration;
environmental security and their potential impact on the state. As for
domestic security threats, the Strategy considers chiefly: organised crime; the
black economy; drug trafficking; corruption and demographic problems. The
Strategy also warns against internal political instability, which may result in
rise of extremely nationalist and extremist groups. (Biztonság az új évezred
küszöbén - a Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, 2002)
The 2002 Strategy has raised many questions; however, some of them are
only briefly accentuated, or treated in exclusively negative sense. In the
section devoted to actors in world politics the strategy negatively perceives
Russia’s role in geopolitical space, points to Russia’s problems with the
transformation and puts Hungary in the role of a bridge between East and
West. In the third chapter dedicated to the means to achieve internal security
some threat are only vaguely defined and thus also in some cases ineffective
strategies are put forth. In the field of defence the strategy highlights the role
of the United States in the transatlantic security relations and also points out
its solitary position as a NATO member state in the region. Consequently,
Hungary puts strong emphasis on the support for the further enlargement of
both the EU and NATO, as well as on deepening of Euro-Atlantic
integration, which considers being the two most important trends in
ensuring the defence of Hungary in the future.
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Less than two years after the adoption of the first strategy it was
amended and in fact replaced by the 2004 National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Hungary60, drawing on both the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept
and the 2003 European Security Strategy. Changes it brought about were
primarily related to the incorporation of the membership in both
organisations.
The 2004 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary consists
of five chapters and introduction. The first part defines the core values and
interests underlying the framework of the entire strategy. The strategy is
based on the principles of traditional political and defence components, and
as the crucial elements considers the protection of fundamental values such
as peace, sovereignty, stability, security, democracy, rule of law, free
enterprise, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well
as prosperity and development of its citizens, preservation of cultural
heritage and identity of the Hungarian nation. (The National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 2004)
The 2004 Strategy does not divide Hungary’s national interests into vital,
important and secondary, as it is common practice, but it lists ten national
security interests (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Hungary, 2004): (1) the preservation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity
and constitutional order, as well as the implementation of democracy,
political pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of enterprise, and of human
rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) the country’s stability and its
economic, social and cultural development, the unfolding of its
opportunities, the all-encompassing and rapid development of its economic,
technological and human resources, its rapprochement to the level of the
developed industrial nations, sustainable economic growth, the promotion of
the security and prosperity of its citizens and the development of a security
environment facilitating the fulfilment of these goals in a multi-fold manner;
(3) the maintenance of international peace and security, and the prevention
and resolution of regional, inter-state and intra-state conflicts in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and standards of
international law; (4) the widening and deepening process of the European
Union’s integration, the equality of rights and solidarity between the Member
States, the enhancement of community methods, the increase of the
effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the
enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a
means of CFSP, and the integration of Hungary in the institutional structure
The original title of the document is A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, adopted on
March 31, 2004.
60
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of the European Union, as well as the enhancement of its capabilities to
assert its interests; (5) the durable preservation of NATO’s central role in the
Euro-Atlantic security system, the adaptation of NATO’s activities to the
changed security policy environment of the 21st century and the increase of
its effectiveness, as well as transatlantic cohesion, including the United
States’ military presence and its active engagement in Europe, NATO’s
further enlargement on the basis of common values and interests serving the
enhancement of collective security, and the enhancement of Hungary’s role
as an allied nation; (6) the general prevalence of democratic values, including
their spreading beyond the Euro-Atlantic region; (7) durable stability and
Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe on the basis of the set of democratic values, and of the
countries neighbouring Hungary in particular, and the broadest possible
implementation of the rights of the Hungarians living in neighbouring
countries; (8) durable stability based on the set of democratic values of
Ukraine and Russia and their rapprochement to the organisations of EuroAtlantic integration; (9) durable stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, a
comprehensive settlement of conflicts in the region and the suppression of
threats to the security of the region, in particular terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (10) constructive co-operation
between all international actors - states, international organisations, as well as
national and international non-governmental organisations, and the
development of co-operation in bilateral, regional and multilateral
frameworks, as well as that of multilateral economic co-operation.
When assessing the security environment the Strategy differentiates
between the global and regional security environment, and lists the following
threats and challenges for Hungary (The National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Hungary, 2004):
Global security challenges:
- Terrorism, connected also with the organised crime and its
accompanying activities such as illegal arms sales, human trafficking
and the like;
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - not only nuclear
but also biological and chemical weapons, which may cause permanent
damage to the population and the country;
- Unstable regions and failed states - causing waves of migration and
possibly the development of organised crime;
- Illegal migration - as a member of the Schengen area Hungary claims
responsibility for guaranteeing security of its borders;
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- Economic instability - In contemporary globalised society Hungary
sees potential problems that may arise from the interdependence of
markets;
- Challenges of the information society - it stressed the importance of
the protection of critical infrastructure from unwanted attacks and
misuse;
- Environmental problems - i.e. global natural, man-made and medical
sources of danger; given the geographic position of Hungary in the
Carpathian Basin potential natural disasters originating from
neighbouring countries may have serious consequences for Hungary.
In the context of regional security environment, Hungary has defined
four basic geographical zones, i.e. Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe,
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS countries), and the
Mediterranean, Near and Middle East, from where potential sources of
danger may originate. Regional threats and challenges are therefore classified
according to region.
Central Europe – as a result of integration of these countries into the EU
and NATO the region is stabilised, adheres to common values and goals;
Hungary perceives this development as a way forward also for other regions
to achieve their stabilisation.
South-Eastern Europe – the strategy points out that the neighbouring
South-Eastern countries have subscribed to attempt to join the European
and transatlantic structures, which significantly induced stabilisation and
reduction of intrastate conflicts; the ultimate resolution of potential threats is
seen in their full integration to these structures.
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS countries) - the
transformation processes in the successor states of the former Soviet Union
have not yet been completed, new economic and political structures are yet
to be definitively shaped; however, the first signs of consolidation are already
visible. If, however, the full consolidation in these countries does not take
place, threats such as organised crime, illegal migration may arise, which
requires special attention. Ukraine is committed to Euro-Atlantic integration
and Hungary is interested in its successful integration and transformation
into independent and democratic state.
Mediterranean, Near East and Middle East - in this region several
countries are characterised by poverty and failure to adapt to the process of
globalisation. This, in turn, paves the way for migration and the spread of
terrorism. Major religious and ethnic differences bring numerous negative
phenomena in world politics; therefore, Hungary is a member of NATO and
the EU vows to further seek to solve problems in these remote areas.
Among internal security threats and challenges are listed the following:
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- Organised crime - the strategy points to the necessity to address this
serious problem;
- Illegal economy and corruption - the two phenomena are mutually
reinforcing and it is important to fight them in a coordinated way;
- The spreading of drugs - the country has traditionally been considered
a transit country, but it increasingly becoming also a target state;
therefore, it is necessary to put pressure on the society and prevent
this negative phenomenon from spreading;
- Political and religious extremism - extremist political and religious
groups may be using social tensions to disrupt the functioning of
society;
- Demographic challenges - the country finds itself in an unfavourable
situation; therefore, it is necessary to address this problem whether by
changes in social policy but also by the means of the ancillary issue of
pension reform.
In the third chapter entitled “Objectives and tasks”, Hungary is trying to
point out its commitments to its partners, but at the same time it sees them
as a means of achieving stability in its neighbourhood. It also emphasises the
importance of strengthening the transatlantic cooperation as well as keeping
good relations with the United States and as a prominent element of the
security of the country figures the stabilisation of the Balkans and the
possible involvement of stable NATO and EU countries in the region.
Hungary considers the United States to be its strategic partner, but not to a
degree described in the 2002 Strategy; therefore, Hungary seeks the means of
multilateral cooperation. An important factor in maintaining security in the
region are also good neighbourly relations and, therefore, the strategies of
good neighbourly relations are considered to be one of the guarantees of
maintaining security in the surrounding area. (The National Security Strategy
of the Republic of Hungary, 2004)
In the penultimate chapter the strategy addresses several aspects of how
to achieve the stated objectives. This chapter elaborated on the tools that
Hungary has available and how it can make the best use of them. Apart from
the above-mentioned international organisations a great emphasis is put on
the economic stability that the country desperately needs, it is important to
close the gap with advanced Western economies as much as possible and to
achieve their economic level. Hungary furthermore has to focus on building
effective protection of the external borders of the Schengen area, and, last
but not least, it should achieve well coordinated national security forces to
cope with natural and other disasters. (The National Security Strategy of the
Republic of Hungary, 2004) The last chapter builds on the previous sections
and suggests that the respective tasks should be included in individual
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sectors - areas of the state - to be further developed and applied in practice.
The strategy sums up that without effective coordination of all areas of the
state a comprehensive approach towards security cannot be achieved, and
the desired results would fail to materialise.
The biggest difference between the two documents was the perception of
NATO – EU relations and in the perception of responsibility for its own
internal security. The 2002 Strategy highlighted the burden that the
admission to the EU may bring in this area (such as capabilities or personnel
contributions to joint actions). In terms of internal security it considered
reliance on purely indigenous state resources as a top priority, while in the
area of external security state might be able to rely on NATO as well. There
was certain scepticism in this area towards the EU and its capabilities in the
security area. The adoption of the amended 2004 Strategy shifted thinking in
this area, especially in relation to the EU, because membership in this
organisation has been acknowledged as a means to bring comparative
advantages in multidimensional threats such as migration or organised crime.
This marked the beginning of confidence in the integrated EU policies in the
area of security. The position towards Russia has been also different in the
two documents. The 2002 Strategy, in particular, highlighted the negative
aspects of Russia and considered it to be a factor of instability and potential
threats; the 2004 Strategy, however, has also pointed out some advantages of
cooperation with Russia and did not cast it in purely negative terms. On the
one hand, Russia is seen as providing certain guarantees to the stability in the
region; on the other hand, however, it continues to represents a source of
instability. An interesting point is also the appearance of the agenda of
energy security, which has not been previously included in any of the
strategic documents.
The third document subject to our analysis is the 2009 Hungary’s National
Military Strategy61, which was adopted by the government’s decision as an
expression of responsibility for national defence and defence of Hungary’s
allies within the system of NATO collective defence. It identifies the major
development trends affecting the security environment as the ongoing
economic security and economic crisis and the ongoing transformation of
the armed forces. These main tendencies are associated with low probability
of major armed conflict on the area of continental Europe and the continued
integration of neighbouring countries into NATO and the EU, thus
stabilising the adjacent regions and strengthening security of the entire area.
The document, however, also refers to the presence of constant problems in
61 The original title of the document is A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája, adopted in
January 2009.
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neighbouring countries (ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts) which may
undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Hungary. (A Magyar
Köztársaság Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája 2009, p. 6-8) Consequently, the
presence of international forces in some countries of the Balkans is deemed
necessary to control these problems.
Hungary defines its major role as participation in such missions and
operations that directly or indirectly reduce the risk of breaches of security
and stability of the country or the region. Strategy makers are of course
aware of the broader concept of security, not only of its political and military
aspects, i.e. including economic and financial aspects, protection of human
rights and minorities, ensuring energy independence, cyber-terrorism, as well
as environmental, demographic and other dimensions of security. Therefore,
it is necessary to adapt the military industry as well as armed forces to be able
to cooperate effectively with Hungary’s allies in these areas. Hungary
considers NATO to be the main guarantor of the country’s defence.
Therefore, the development of military equipment and capabilities should
focus on: protection of critical infrastructure, especially in relation to the
information exchange and processing; ensuring the sustainability of the
armed forces, modernisation of arms, ammunition and other technological
equipment as well as upgrading technology of the air force and air transport
options. (A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája 2009, p. 10)
Military strategy was adopted more than after ten years of absence of
such a document (previously it was adopted as part of the Basic Principles of
Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary in 1998) and after a
long-term debate about the need to set the framework for the restructuring
of the armed forces of the country to adapt to the future challenges and
requirements. (Hungarian Security Policy, 2012) The Strategy identified the
main trends in the development of military tasks of Hungary and the main
directions of development of the Hungarian Defence Forces in the long run,
which were hitherto significantly absent.
Third period from 2010 to the present has been in the area of security
affected in particular by the quest for answers to the question of the status of
the United States as a strategic partner within the framework of the EU’s
relations with NATO, and the search for answers to the cooperation /
dualism of the security and defence policy of the EU and NATO, which
brought new insight into the development of Hungary’s security policy.
The last period was affected by the new policy of V. Orbán in the area
of foreign policy and security priorities, which could be characterised by the
following three key aspects: the opening to the world in the field of foreign
policy; greater focus on Eastern Partnership Policy; and the adoption of new
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strategic documents. (Balogh, 2013, p. 1) These plans were translated into
real security policy of Hungary; in 2012, for instance, the government
approved an increase in defence spending and the concept for the build-up
of the Hungarian Defence Forces for the years 2013-2022, and two new
documents in the field of security and defence were adopted.
In the official statements of the political leaders of Hungary, as well as in
the analysed documents and implemented measures, NATO continues to be
perceived as the guarantor of country’s defence. Hungary also clearly
articulates the position of the United States as a major player within the
Alliance, and also acknowledges that any efforts for greater NATO-EU
cooperation must accordingly be understood as bringing the influence of the
United States into these relationships.
In the first half of 2011, Hungary held the Presidency of the Council of
the European Union, during which it has sought to demonstrate its
capabilities as a fully fledged EU member state. Thorough preparation and
the Presidency itself influenced the perceptions of the EU in the field of
security. Especially in relation to internal policy and internal security the
influence of the EU is increasingly present and acknowledged, and especially
in recently adopted security documents (analysed below) the EU is perceived
as the guarantor of national identity, non-discrimination of Hungarian
minorities in neighbouring countries and as a guarantor of ensuring internal
security when trans-national threats such as illegal migration, drug
trafficking, or organised crime are involved. This trend represents a clear
adherence to the guarantees of the EU also in the field of security.
During the recent period two strategies were adopted in Hungary; the
first document was the 2012 Hungarian National Security Strategy, and the
second was the 2012 Hungarian National Military Strategy. Changes brought
about were mainly related to the incorporation of complex issues arising
from membership in NATO and the EU and the goal of enacting a
comprehensive reform of the Hungarian Defence Forces.
The first analysed document is the Hungarian National Security Strategy62 of
2012. The introduction defines the importance of adopting a new security
strategy for Hungary, due to the fact that since the adoption of the 2004
Security Strategy several important changes occurred and new challenges
arose, and Hungary as a successful member of two organisations had to cope
with and adapt to new roles and responsibilities. The introductory section
defines the core values and interests based on the principles of traditional
political and defence policy. Of particular importance is the protection of
62 The original title of the document is A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, adopted in
February 2012.
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fundamental values such as peace, security, stability, sovereignty, democracy,
rule of law, free enterprise, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, as well as prosperity and development of its citizens, but also the
preservation of cultural heritage and identity of the Hungarian nation. Due
to the processes of globalisation and integration processes, many national
interests can and must be implemented within the framework of EuroAtlantic integration. (Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012)
When defining security environment the Strategy does not differentiate
into global, regional and internal security environment as was the case in
2004 Strategy, but defines the main development trends in the world with
implications for Hungary. In this context it mentions the following trends:
understanding security as a complex phenomenon based on the current
theoretical understanding of the concept of security; the impact of
globalisation and inequality in the development worldwide and in Hungary
itself; the possibility of a conventional attack (by means of conventional
weapons) on Hungary is considered to be minimal; linkage of the security of
Hungary to the Euro-Atlantic security issues; the need to use crisis
management to control internal problems; the impact of the financial and
economic crisis on the Euro-Atlantic region and the need for cooperation of
Hungary in its resolution. (Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012, p. 45)
The second chapter is dedicated to the definition of national security
interests and the principles of operation of the security policy of Hungary.
Similarly to the 2004 Strategy, security interests are not divided within
specific categories, but sixteen national security interests are listed, which
sometimes resemble rather statements of security policy principles directed
towards Hungary’s allies and partners rather than achievable security policy
goals. These may be summarised as follows: (Hungary’s National Security
Strategy, 2012, p. 5-9)
- Hungary does not consider any country to be its adversary and it vows
to address any conflicts in accordance with the UN Charter;
- Preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order,
political pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of establishment and the
human rights and fundamental freedoms, stressing in particular respect
for minority rights;
- Efforts to uphold the international peace and security through actions
at the UN, contribute to the effective prevention of conflicts and
crises by upholding and promoting the norms of international law,
while stressing the role of the OSCE;
- NATO and the EU provide a basic framework of security policy of
Hungary; the Euro-Atlantic integration represents a value-based
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community, where Member States form a political-military alliance
based on solidarity. Through its active membership Hungary may
achieve its national interests, and it would continue to support the
development of strategic partnership of both organisations;
- In the Euro-Atlantic security system NATO serves to ensure collective
security, which is the basis for the security of Hungary;
- Further integration of the European Union and cooperation of the
Member States in the security field (CFSP, CSDP) is regarded as an
essential framework for achieving security in the European area, which
provides a framework for joint external actions, and internal
coordination;
- The protection of individuals is of great importance – especially in
relation to children and women; problems in this area may be solved
only through effective cooperation in international crisis management;
- The basis for effective transatlantic cooperation is the presence of the
United States, considered as a key/strategic partner by Hungary;
- Effective cooperation between all international actors in bilateral,
regional and multilateral frameworks;
- Long-term stability and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the countries
bordering Hungary provides the basis of security of the country;
- Ensuring the widest possible exercise of the rights of Hungarians
living in neighbouring countries under the applicable international
rules and standards;
- Seeking a comprehensive solution to the conflicts in the region and
restraining threats to security in the region.
In the third chapter the Strategy also elaborates on the threats and
challenges for Hungary, which, unlike the previous 2004 Strategy are no
longer divided by region. They are only listed with stating their implications
both internally and externally, while trying to define effective means to
address them.
As the document states, threats and challenges are arising from the
content of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s Strategic Concept, the Lisbon
Treaty and the European Security Strategy, while in the text the Strategy
seeks to identify national ownership of their solutions: (Hungary’s National
Security Strategy, 2012, p. 9-18)
- The threat of armed military attack on the country over the past
decade has reduced;
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- Regional conflicts combine several problems within the external and
internal environment - poverty, instability, drug trafficking, arms
smuggling and human trafficking;
- The proliferation of WMD - not only nuclear but also biological and
chemical WMD, which may cause permanent damage to the
population and the country;
- Terrorism, which also combines the effects of organised crime and its
accompanying activities such as illegal arms sales and human
trafficking;
- Ensuring financial security which has been disrupted by the economic
crisis as well by as economic instability, which brings possible
problems in contemporary globalised society arising from the
interdependence of markets;
- Cyber-security - a functioning of a state and society, but also
economics, public administration and national defence is and will be
increasingly based on information technology; it is therefore necessary
to support the fight against cyber crime; challenges of the information
society point to the important role of protection of the critical
infrastructure from harmful attacks and abuse;
- Energy security will be crucial for Hungary, because the country is
dependent on energy imports, it is necessary to achieve determined
level of supply as well as to search for new sources; nuclear energy is
considered to be a crucial factor in the future of energy selfsufficiency;
- Unstable regions and failing states - causing waves of migration and
possibly the development of organised crime;
- Environmental problems – due to geographic position of Hungary in
the Carpathian Basin potential natural disasters originating from
neighbouring countries may have extremely serious consequences for
Hungary;
- The impact of natural and technological accidents on national security;
in this context, the need for a functional crisis management is stressed;
- Organised crime which is connected to the unofficial/black economy
and corruption - these phenomena are mutually reinforcing, therefore,
it is important to address them in a coordinated way; Hungary will
have to make an effort to curb not only by its own resources but also
through effective international cooperation and coordination with
relevant institutions;
- Distribution of drugs - the country has traditionally been considered a
transit country, but it is increasingly considered also a target country,
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hence the need to put pressure on the society and suppress this
negative phenomenon; prevention should take place not only at
national level but also at the level of international cooperation;
- Migration - as a member of the Schengen area Hungary has claimed
responsibility for ensuring security of its borders; previously, the
country has been known mainly as a transit country for migrants,
recent developments, however, point out that in the future it may
become a destination country for migrants;
- Political and religious extremism - extremist political and religious
groups may be using social tensions to disrupt the functioning of the
society; the main problem for national security in this regard is posed
by the pursuit of appropriate legitimacy of state power by these
groups.
In the fourth chapter, entitled “Ways and Means to Implement Security
Strategy” the strategy addresses several aspects of how to achieve the set
goals, what tools Hungary has at its disposal and how they can use them.
Hungary has also diplomatic, cultural and political tools at its disposal to
achieve defined interests; however, it needs to build an effective armed
forces capable of effective interoperability. (Hungary’s National Security
Strategy, 2012) Among important factors in maintaining security in the
region are also good neighbourly relations; therefore, the strategy considers
good neighbourly relations as one of the guarantees of maintaining security
in the surrounding region.
In evaluating the strategy, we may say that it is based on transnational
security documents of alliances and organisations to which Hungary is a
member. Of particular importance of the strategy is its capacity to
successfully connect various security challenges to opportunities it offers
Hungary to partake in their prevention, as well as an indication of the
possibility to use membership in these organisations for the elimination of
indicated threats and risks. The strategy also suggests that the different roles
of national security should be included in various sectors - areas of the state
competence - to be further developed and applied in practice in the form of
sectoral strategies, because without effective coordination of all areas of the
state comprehensive approach and its expected results cannot be achieved.
(Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012, p. 23)
All activities of various state institutions must comply with the National
Security Strategy, while the document also expects a progressive approach to
evaluation of the strategy and regular revision of sectoral strategies as
outlined in the relevant provisions of the National Security Strategy. One of
the first steps for the application of this principle is the adoption of the
National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary in March 2013, which elaborates on
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the aspect of cyber-security, and adoption of the Military Strategy in
December 2012.
The final document of this period analysed for our purposes is the
Hungarian National Military Strategy63 of 2012, which is the result of a series of
meetings and, comments from across the political spectrum, with the
participation of NGOs and academic circles. Its basic assumptions are the
stabilisation of the budget on defence spending, stabilisation of the
capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces and preparation for their longterm development. Chief development trends in the field of defence are
summarised as follows: in the long-term, no military conflict on Hungarian
the territory is expected; the current guarantees of the defence of the country
are provided by NATO; the EU is perceived as a guarantor of security in
Europe in the long term; and the UN is considered to be principal actor in
maintaining the world peace. The key point of this strategy should be
presenting the identity of the armed forces towards partners. (Hungary’s
National Military Strategy, 2012)
The main objectives of the strategy are: to ensure the independence,
territorial integrity and integrity of the airspace, to minimise the negative
military threats from abroad for which it is necessary to build an effective
armed forces using at the same time the guarantees of international
organisations to which the Hungary is a member. (Hungary’s National
Military Strategy, 2012, p. 3, 10) Additional requirements for the armed
forces relate to the purpose of their participation in the operations and
missions abroad; the strategy sets out the number of 1,000 troops deployable
at any time in the operations upon the request of the allies. (Hungary’s
National Military Strategy, 2012, p. 11) The long-term goal of the Hungarian
Defence Forces is, therefore, to adapt to current trends and to develop the
armed forces in a way that they would be able to respond not only to military
threats, but also to other problems associated with cyber security, energy
security, as well as environmental security, as well as participate in resolution
of problems and crises associated with natural or industrial disasters.
The basic trend in the development of security and defence is holistic
understanding, and the Hungarian theorists consider such understanding to
be one of the positive aspects of this strategy. The actual formulation of
future threats to the country in the context of their global and regional
interconnection and mutually reinforcing correlations brings a new
perspective to the future and the role of the armed forces and their place in
the defence of the country. (Balogh, 2013, p. 8) On the other hand, a serious
The original title of the document is A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiája, adopted in
December 2012.
63
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drawback of the strategy is to be seen in the insufficient relation between the
proposed goals and aims when compared against the resources allocated to
these ambitious goals from the state budget.
***
Security policy of the V4 countries is a policy that developed within
specific environment. Countries of Central Europe in the past often
described as a cordon sanitaire, i.e. as a space that forms a barrier between the
territorial empires, and later on between ideological blocs. Cultivating
strategic culture in the past has been marked by this specific feature. In the
early 21st Century security situation in Europe has changed dramatically;
previous territory of the cordon sanitaire has ceased to exist and a new spatial
organisation ensued, mirroring the new boundaries set by expansion of
NATO into the countries of former Eastern bloc.
Countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland were
swift to adapt to these new realities for several reasons. Ongoing internal
political crises taking place in these countries since the 1950s indicated that
they imagined their security in different terms as it was determined by the
provisions of the Warsaw Pact. In all countries, there was growing
opposition against the Communist regime, in most cases supported by
massive manifestations of public opinion. Inclination to the West had several
reasons - economic, ideological, cultural, and social. In order to continue
with the effective transformation of these countries to democratic regimes,
expecting the future involvement in economic integration it was necessary to
develop new security environment. V4 countries became the first former
Eastern bloc countries that have met the criteria required by NATO to join
the Alliance, and eventually became NATO members - Hungary, Poland and
Czech Republic in 1999, and Slovakia in 2004. Since then, they have begun
to develop security policies in line with the NATO Strategic Concept, as well
as in the context of cooperation between NATO and the EU.
Security policies of the V4 had to deal with several problems both from
ideological and procedural perspective, as well as to respond to changes in
the security environment that was characterised more by indirect than direct
threats. These included, for instance, requirements related to migration,
human rights, economic instability, the rise of radicalism and extremism.
Former territory of the cordon sanitaire has become transit territory from the
Eastern states and the Schengen area, thus requiring new security guarantees.
These changes, however, were not reflected only in the documents on
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national security. They had also induced institutional changes related to
decision making, the state apparatus and the various ministries, as well as
changes in the degree of their participation in terms of national security and
defence.
Joining NATO as a priority of security policy of all V4 countries also
brought a change of the basic orientation on the transatlantic systems and
structures, the question of the compatibility and interoperability of the
armed forces, and changes in the soft and hard security. The need for
education of professional cadres that would meet the professional
requirements of NATO also emerged, and had to be completed as soon as
possible. Unfortunately, military education in the V4 countries not respond
to this requirement adequately, and, consequently, professionalism in the
armed forces was provided especially by NATO itself. It was also necessary
to strengthen the civilian academic sector to allow for the education of
specialists - analysts dedicated to security policy. All these efforts took some
times, and as can be seen in the preceding text, the cooperation of law,
government departments, academia and military professionals has developed
gradually. The result of this cooperation may be seen also in increasing
analytical and conceptual quality of adopted security strategies of V4
countries, and in improving quality of national security policy as such.
We may state that the security policy is a process, not a permanent
condition. Its changes, reducing or increasing quality of related documents,
systems and implementation depends on many factors.
Security environment of the V4 countries is very similar; all V4 countries
contribute with their security policies to regional stability, but also to the
stability of the wider environment towards the east and south. Security policy
is primarily aimed at eliminating those factors which come from the external
environment and may have strong destabilising effects precisely because they
are non-military, and as such cannot be address by the classical military
defence measures. The most important task of national security policy of V4
countries, however, remains the cooperation between NATO and the EU,
which is being well implemented in all V4 countries due to the fact that their
pro- Euro-Atlantic feeling is not just an empty proclamation but the basic
paradigm of their security. From the perspective of goals, there are some
differences in security policies, given the state preferences stemming from
the economy, political stability and finances allocated to the defence. To sum
up, we may state they are as follows:
- Czech Republic
security policy in the Czech Republic remains ambivalent in the
question of the attitude towards the EU’s ESDP/CSDP;
expands the agenda of societal and energy security;
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
- Hungary
improve security relations, environment and cooperation in the
wider Central Europe;
reduce the isolation of Hungary in the international arena by
eliminating the excesses of internal security;
resolve disputes arising out from the dilemma of nationalism
versus transatlanticism, which are manifested in Hungary since
its admission into the EU and NATO, thereby reducing certain
inflexibility of the current strategic culture;
- Slovakia
redefine the threats and risks taking into consideration specific
geographic area of the Slovak Republic, instead of applying
universal transnational perspective;
create conditions for further cooperation in the region towards
the east and south-west;
create conditions for functional and not only declaratory
cooperation of the V4 countries in the field of defence and
security in the area of forming a common strategic culture as
well;
- Poland
stressing compromise rather than confrontation in partnership
with the Eastern neighbours as an important component of
future strategic culture;
strengthening relations with the Euro-Atlantic community on
the basis of multilateral cooperation and collaboration, not only
with the United States as the principal partner.
All V4 countries are trying to provide its residents with the greatest sense
of security within their country as possible; this involves not only issues
related to security but in many cases also the country’s stability and
economic success. To ensure these objectives all countries significantly rely
on their membership in both the European Union and NATO, thus
acquiring a sense of security guarantees based on collective defence. In
contrast, not all countries precisely designate in their strategies also resources
to achieve their goals (if we disregard vague statements about signing up to
the responsibility to participate on the resolution of global security
problems). Experience has shown, however, that countries can contribute to
the various tasks that derive from membership, though some of them only
with great effort. All countries have changed their strategy after admission
into some of the international organisations and responded only to the
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Jaroslav Ušiak
changed security environment in which they find themselves. If we compare
the identified security threats on a global level, we find the complete
similarity with both the European Security Strategy and the NATO Strategic
Concept of 1999 and 2010. Significant differences can be found primarily in
the regional and internal security environment; each country has its own
characteristics and deems it necessary to incorporate them into its strategy.
Great attention is dedicated to the security and stability in neighbouring
areas, foremost the Balkans (Hungary devotes greatest attention and
importance to the stability in Balkans from all V4 countries, because it is an
immediate neighbour). Specific feature in all these strategies are mainly two
aspects: energy self-sufficiency and corruption. Energy self-sufficiency is to
the linkage of these countries to their main energy partner and supplier, i.e.
Russia (historically formed during the bipolar era). Corruption is a topic
typical foremost for the post-Soviet countries. It is interesting to note that
analysed strategies of V4 countries are concerned with the collapse of EU
integration (incorporated in the strategies of Poland or the Czech Republic,
which already in 2003 contemplated the possible involvement in the project
of U.S. missile defence). Phenomenon that most troubled in recent years the
Czech Republic but also Slovakia – extremism – is explicitly addressed only
in the security strategy of Hungary. Analysis of security interests shows great
similarities in all countries, especially due to the fact that they based their
definition on their national constitutions, which they take as source
framework to determine their national and also security interests. In a
detailed analysis of the security system we concluded that most countries
have problems with building effective and functioning security system and
its involvement in NATO and EU structures.
Security policy of V4 countries in the past was, today is and in the future
will be based mainly on ideas, not on historical succession of battles and
wars. The ideas were the base that in the past determined foreign and
security policy of the V4 countries; ideas were behind the strategic interests
of empires/states. Contemporary security cooperation between the V4
countries is based primarily on geographical proximity, the sharing of
common values and active participation in those organisations to which they
are members.
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Conclusion
In the field of security, the last decade of the 20th Century and the first
decade of the 21st Century are characterised by adoption of numerous new
strategic concepts. Most theorists explain such development by pointing out
to the wider societal needs. The disappearance of bipolar world order
triggered changed views on the nature of global and regional security, were
new threats and risks appeared. The political climate has changed as well.
New countries with democratic regimes were established in a peaceful way,
though a series of the so-called velvet revolutions. Other states were created
after the more or less violent demise of larger units, as was the case of the
Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia or some African countries. The dissolution
of such multicultural, multi-national and multi-confessional conglomerates
was dramatic and often accompanied by violent conflict. A new world order
developed; a new international system that ensued was more diversified than
in the 2nd half of the 20th Century, complicated also by the emergence of
non-state actors as well as non-military problems and conflicts.
Consequently, many threats of the past acquired a global character.
Compared to the past, if we consider only the situation after the World
War II, strategies adopted at the turn of the 20th and 21st Century pointed to
a significant development. They were not based on time, territorially and
ideologically defined doctrines, which in the past shaped the foreign and
security policy of states in the long-term. New strategies were based on the
analysis provided by epistemic communities that work in all fields of politics,
science, military affairs, international law, economy, human rights, sectoral
security, as well as public opinion. In this situation the adoption of new
strategic concepts proved to be highly relevant. One of the first
organisations to respond to this trend was the UN and its Agenda for Peace
from the late 1990s. Although it was not a strategic concept typical to
regional security organisation, it raised many important issues. It was
particularly the requirement of peaceful resolution of conflicts through nonmilitary means; introduction of stricter regime of humanitarian intervention;
emphasis on cooperation and partnership of states; but in particular the
requirement that future conflict resolution and crisis should always be in
accordance with the rules of international law. Although these ideas were not
new and accompanied the UN activities since the establishment of the UN,
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Jaroslav Ušiak
today we may say that the Agenda for Peace greatly influenced the future
strategic culture.
This led to overcoming the period of understanding security in terms
typical for the Cold War era, during which strategies were focused more on
offense than on defence. In this way have been formulated the Shield and
Sword doctrine (NATO), the Truman Doctrine, the Hallstein doctrine, the
Brezhnev doctrine etc. Definition of the enemy presumed the elaboration of
retaliatory action or, more precisely, the elaboration of offensive strategy and
intervention by military means. (Hrabě, 1971, p. 58-59) The leitmotif of
contemporary strategies is conflict prevention, crisis management, and smart
defence, and they are heavily based on international cooperation. This
creates a new strategic culture with security environment in particular as a
specific subject of analysis. Contemporary analyses of the security
environment of the state (region / security complex / geopolitical change),
however, tend to avoid the element of strategic culture as a part of the
analysis, which would prove to be beneficial to the understanding of the
overall security framework of the analysed unit.
Nowadays, the fundamental problem arises from the extent of influence
exerted on the national security policy by transnational concepts –
transnational security policies. The EU in its 2009 Lisbon Strategy outlined a
new concept in the field of external relations, affecting the foreign, security
and defence dimension64. These changes have brought new or renewed
obligations such as the use of operational capabilities for missions conducted
outside the EU focused on peacekeeping and conflict prevention;
development of common defence in the event that the European Council
decides so unanimously. It also introduced new tools such as the Office of
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which
should provide a united approach to the non-EU countries; the European
External Action Service, which is responsible for coordination of the civilian
and military aspects of joint actions of the EU and is leading the European
Defence Agency which also has the responsibility over the EU Military Staff
and Satellite Centre; Petersberg Tasks have been extended together with the
EU defence. (Danics, 2012) NATO as well in its operational activities
brought about fundamental changes with the introduction of its 2010
Strategic Concept. Some concepts have been extended as a confirmation of
further expansion of the partnerships through tactical expansion and
The concept of the CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy, which in the years 2002-2009 until
the Lisbon EU Summit represented the so-called second pillar of European policy and was
complemented by ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy. The ESDP was after the adoption of
Lisbon Treaty renamed as CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy, and today forms an integral
part of the CFSP.
64
176
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
strengthening of collective defence. Some concepts have created new
challenges by enhancing cooperative security by cooperation with nonmember state with similar interests as those of the Alliance. The strategy of
the fight against terrorism and cyber-terrorism has been strengthened,
focusing on the definition of tools that can modify or eliminate societal
threats or improve energy security, and supported the idea of strengthening
security through crisis management. The strategies, generally, also stressed
the concept of deterrence and put a great emphasis on reform and
transformation as a means of building effective armed forces of the Alliance
/ the European Union.
Strategic culture and security policy have certain common aspect, since
both are often implemented through power (power over something, e.g.
territory, ethnic group, way of life, the power to create and enforce specific
value system), but also through the defence of the same categories, namely
territory, ethnic group, life, values, but also language, identity, property, and
resources. This at first sight is not very obvious similarity is characteristic for
the present modern or, more precisely, postmodern period. The territory of
V4 countries nowadays does not need individual defence (generally speaking)
because its member states are the EU and NATO members and as such
have their security system and secured defence. In a democratic state the
protection of life, freedom, property and other rights are granted. States have
sovereignty, language, culture, and identity, meaning that we are equally
valuable state, comprising all the nationalities, as other EU and world
countries. This is guaranteed by international law wherever we are members
of the particular treaty regime or a signatory country. Recently, however,
quite the opposite situation is becoming the problem, i.e. these privileges and
rights are taken for granted and seem to lose their value. Security and
national defence are taken lightly; participation of the armed forces of the
country in foreign missions is viewed rather as demonstration of the prestige
of the country. We are losing our own identity; we are unable to define the
objectives and limits of our own security environment, thereby endangering
ourselves as a nation, nationality and the state.
These trends are reflected also in the foreign and security policy of V4
countries, from the 1990s focused on integration and cooperation. Primary
foreign policy objectives, i.e. to establish itself within the framework of the
United Nations, the OSCE were achieved on the assumption that countries
which were established after the collapse of the Soviet bloc would eventually
transform themselves into democratic states further strengthening their
democratic institutions in the process of transition. Moreover, both the UN
and the OSCE are inclusive security organisations, i.e. no requirements were
to be met as a precondition for membership. The principle of succession has
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Jaroslav Ušiak
also been applied, i.e. succession of the states that were established after the
division of a unitary member state (this was the case of former Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic). V4 countries have become part of these
organisations, identified themselves with their objectives, and in a figurative
sense we may say that they identified with their strategies and strategic
culture.
Ten days before the demise of the Warsaw Pact, i.e. on February 15,
1991, three countries – the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Republic
of Poland and Hungary signed the Joint Declaration on the coordinated
procedure for admission to the EC and NATO. Such coordinated approach
has been seen as the possibility to speed up the admission process of these
post-Communist countries to NATO and the EC. Even today this form of
cooperation has its rationale. Currently the V4 countries are trying to
coordinate their policies, among others also their security policies, including
the cooperation on various projects such as the joint air defence of V4, or
proposals to create a joint V4 Battlegroup65. Nowadays, however, the
framework for ensuring the security and defence of the state has
fundamentally changed. It is necessary to reflect this situation in the area of
priorities so as to provide for the effective enforcement of security interests
under changing economic circumstances. The V4 countries have been
seeking the security cooperation for a long time, often unsuccessfully, but in
times of crisis the pressure on cutting expenditures and finding economical
alternatives increases, thus forcing states to cooperate. Here we see the real
possibility of substantiating the cooperation in the future.66 The recent
development in this direction is signing an agreement establishing a common
V4 Battlegroup, discussed is the question of establishing a common Czech Slovak air force unit. We assume that this trend would intensify, perhaps in
the form of joint defence of V4 countries. The discussions on cooperation
are under way also in the non-military aspects of security, most importantly
There are several examples of relatively successful security and defence cooperation within the regional
approach such as: Baltic cooperation, Nordic cooperation, cooperation of the Benelux countries and so
forth.
66 We should not, however, make the mistake in assuming that once our partner has specific capabilities
at his disposal we do not need to further contribute. Each Party shall contribute on the pro rata basis.
England and France proceeded in a similar way, looking for common options and once they found them
they were able to invest saved expenses in other areas. Even in our country, the money saved could be
used to invest, for example, in military research or other areas of social life. There are several possibilities
for cooperation (used Pooling and Sharing, or preferred concept of Smart Defence), which opened up in
the field of security policy (security and defence cooperation) after our accession to NATO and the EU.
Therefore, it is essential that they are continuously explored and expanded in order to ensure both
external as well as internal security of Visegrad countries.
65
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Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
the plans to ensure common energy self-sufficiency, common solutions and
mutual assistance in crisis management, security and societal problems.
Security cooperation itself can be divided into two areas - military and
non-military. In the non-military area a significant role of coordinator of
activities aimed at elimination of these non-military threats is played by the
European Union. Through adoption of its policies the EU creates the
framework for the cooperation, and the V4 countries are no exception /
have no choice but implement transnational regulation / measures against
the defined regional threats. In the military area the decision falls within the
exclusive competence of nation states, leaving them space to decide on
mutual cooperation. Such cooperation could become operational security
and defence subsystem within NATO and the EU. There is a possibility of
cooperation, and many V4 experts from academic and military circles agree
on that. There are already proposed solutions and designs of such
cooperation and if they could be substantiated by cooperation also on the
issue of financing this cooperation it would strengthen the mutual trust
between the V4 countries, which has always been and will always be the
basis of any international cooperation.
179
Jaroslav Ušiak
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194
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Index
A
Buzan, B. 14
Afghanistan 95, 119, 135, 142, 156
Africa 122, 143, 175
Alexander the Great 11
Antagonism 52, 66, 81
Antall, J. 150
Anti-ballistic Missile Defence 100
Armed Forces of the Czech Republic 95,
97, 98, 100, 101, 105
Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic 116,
118, 119, 123, 125
Atlanticism 85, 92, 140, 141
Austria 40, 41, 45, 47, 54, 55, 65, 66, 68,
77, 116
Austria-Hungary 40, 41, 68
Austro-Hungarian army 46, 48
Avars 45
C
Caesar 11
Central and Eastern Europe 71, 82, 108,
128, 156
Central European Initiative 116, 122
Chelčický, P. 37
China 49
Churchill, W. 59
Clausewitz 12, 31
Cold War 27, 72, 78, 80, 81, 111, 176
Collective Security 83, 84, 90, 94, 102,
113, 121, 123, 137, 160, 167
Common Foreign and Security Policy 82,
84, 85, 92, 100, 144, 159, 167, 176
Common Security and Defence Policy 82,
84, 85, 96, 99, 100, 105, 142, 144, 149,
167, 172, 176
Commonwealth of Independent States
108, 112, 116, 122, 158, 161
Communism 74, 77
Communist Party 43, 50, 59, 60, 69, 70,
75-77, 85
Cooperative Security 83, 90, 177
Council of Europe 81, 122, 151
Crisis Management 89-91, 116, 125, 133,
136, 147, 166-168, 176, 177, 179
CSCE 9, 77, 80, 81, 82, 86, 106, 129, 132,
149
Cyber-terrorism 83, 103, 145, 164, 177
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic 85,
178
Czech Republic 9, 35-42, 44-48, 52, 63,
67, 73, 74, 78, 84-89, 91-106, 114, 127,
128, 134, 138, 149, 150, 171, 172, 174,
178
B
Bach, A. 40, 67
Barnett, M. N 13
Basic Principles and Aims of the National
Security of the Slovak Republic 107,
109
Basic Principles of Defence of Hungary
151, 152
Basic Principles of Security and Defence
Policy of the Republic of Hungary 151,
153, 164
Basic Principles of Security Policy of
Hungary 150, 151
Battlegroups 105, 143, 118, 178
Beneš, E. 41, 50
Bethlen, G. 46, 66, 67
Bipolarity 9, 10, 13, 26, 33, 50-52, 81, 127,
154, 174, 175
Bishop Adalbert 63
Boleslaw I. 52
Bosnia 63, 100, 135
195
Jaroslav Ušiak
Ferdinand Habsburg 38, 46
Ferdinand II. 46
Fico, R. 99, 123, 124
France 37, 42, 47, 51, 55, 58, 72, 73, 178
František II. Rákoczi 47
Frederick I. (Fridrich Falcký) 38
Frederick II. 54
Czechoslovakia 35, 42-44, 49-52, 59, 60,
68, 70-77, 80, 85, 105, 130, 150
D
Danics, Š. 14
Deák, F. 67
Defence Doctrine of the Republic of
Poland 127, 128
Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic
107, 108, 110
Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic
89, 104
Defence Strategy of the Republic of
Poland 133, 134, 138, 146
Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic
112, 117-119, 123
Democracy 17, 41, 43, 59, 77-79, 87, 90,
121, 140, 159, 166
Détente 51, 72, 78, 80
Dzurinda, M. 111, 112, 113
G
Germany 39, 40, 42, 49, 58, 59, 60, 69, 81,
128, 132
Globalisation 114, 120, 161, 166
Gomulka, W. 60
Gorbachev, M. 81
Gottwald, K. 50
Great Moravia 35, 36, 45, 62
Gromyko, A. A. 50
Grotius, H. 31
Gyurcsány, F. 157
H
E
Hammarskjold, D. 51
Hannibal 11
Havel, V. 92, 150
Herodotus 31
Hodža, M. M. 47
Humanitarian operations 19, 91, 156, 175
Hungarian armed forces 60, 71, 152
Hungarian minority 41, 165
Hungarian National Military Strategy 165,
170
Hungarian National Security Strategy 165
Hungary, 9, 35, 36, 39, 41, 46, 47, 59, 6178, 80, 83, 114, 124, 128, 130, 134, 138,
148-174, 178
Hurban, J. M. 47
Hus, J. 37
Hussite Movement 36-38
Habsburg Empire 36, 38, 46-48, 65, 68, 74
Eastern Europe 53, 81, 137
Economic Prosperity 110, 144
Energy Security 101, 102, 126, 142, 163,
168, 170, 172, 177
EU enlargement 120, 156
Euro-Atlantic integration 158, 160, 161,
166, 167
Euro-Atlantic structures 82, 84, 87, 106
European Commission 111
European Security Strategy 84, 119, 146,
159, 167, 174
European Security and Defence Policy 82,
85, 91-94, 99, 100, 105, 112, 118, 142,
144, 146, 147, 149, 156, 159, 172, 176
European Union 9, 34, 35, 78, 82, 83, 92,
96, 113, 119, 126, 134, 142, 144, 146,
153, 159, 165, 167, 173, 177, 179
Europeism 85
Extremism 126, 145, 162, 169, 171, 174
I
Independence 32, 34, 35, 48, 55, 57, 59,
66-68, 70, 73, 87, 109, 128, 132, 136,
140, 144, 147, 164, 170
F
Failed States 103, 120, 140, 145, 160
Fascism 58, 75
196
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
Membership Action Plan 112, 150
Middle Ages 17, 18, 53, 65, 72
Migration 56, 62, 73, 90, 103, 115, 116,
120, 131, 137, 145, 158, 160, 161, 163,
165, 168, 169, 171
Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic 85
Military Strategy of the Czech Republic
87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 95, 98, 100
Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic
112, 117, 118, 123
Minorities 41, 78, 149, 150, 155, 164, 165
Modrzejwski, A. 78
Montesquieu, Ch. L. 18
Munich Agreement 42
International Community 9, 15, 19, 51,
115, 120, 151, 154
International System 10, 15, 16, 28, 29, 31,
90, 108, 175
Interoperability 87, 91, 107, 117, 157, 169,
172
Iraq 112, 135, 142, 156
Iron Curtain 59, 72
Istanbul Summit 119
Italy 42, 67
J
Jiří of Poděbrady 36, 37
John Paul II 60, 74
N
K
Nagy, I. 70
Napoleon 12, 55, 56
National Defence Strategy of the Czech
Republic 89
National Defence Strategy of the Slovak
Republic 107
National Security Policy 9, 11, 24, 25, 28,
29, 35, 80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 94, 98, 106,
121, 151, 155, 172, 176
National Security Strategy of the Republic
of Hungary 157, 159, 160, 162
National Security Strategy of the Republic
of Poland 134, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146
National Security 10, 16, 34, 145
Nationalism 17, 47, 49, 60, 69, 75, 120,
173
NATO Strategic Concept 93, 105, 119,
146, 150, 158, 159, 171, 174
NATO enlargement 87, 108, 128, 156
Neutrality 51, 81, 86, 106, 108, 134, 148
Nicholas I. 56
North Atlantic Cooperation Council 128,
131, 152
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 9, 10,
12, 28, 34, 35, 50, 60, 78, 80-95, 96, 98100, 102, 103, 105-111, 113-120, 122,
123, 126-129, 131-142, 144-147, 149167, 170-173, 176, 177, 178, 179
Kaczyński, J. 143
Kadár, J. 71
Kaldor, M. 12
Kavan, J. 92
Klaus, V. 87, 92
Kolankiewicz, L. 59
Kościuszko, T. 55
Kossuth, L. 66, 78
Krejčí, O. 25
Kutuzov, V. I. 56
L
Lasicová, J. 8, 14
League of Nations 49, 58
Liberalism 12, 40
Lie, T. 50
Lokietka, V. 53
M
Madrid Summit 87, 108, 128
Marini, A. 37
Marxism-Leninism 44, 75
Masaryk, T. G. 41, 42, 74
Matúš Čák of Trenčín 45
Mečiar, V. 106, 124
Medvedev, D. 99
197
Jaroslav Ušiak
O
Russia 9, 35, 40, 48, 53, 55, 56, 57, 66, 67,
74, 99, 116, 122, 132, 137, 142, 143,
144, 154, 158, 160, 163, 174
Russian Empire 35, 54, 56, 57
Obama, B. 99, 143
OECD 116, 120, 122, 142
Orbán, V. 164
Organised Crime 90, 97, 103, 114-116,
120, 137, 140, 141, 145, 158, 160-163,
165, 168
OSCE 9, 11, 81, 82, 86, 88, 90, 94, 100,
102, 103, 106, 114, 120, 122, 131, 137,
151, 166, 177
Ottoman Empire 46, 63, 65, 66
S
Samo, Frankish merchant 45
Security 14-16
Security Policy of the State 16, 24
Security Strategy 28, 29
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic
87, 89, 91, 93, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103,
105
Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland 134, 135
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic
112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119
Schengen 145, 160, 162, 169, 171
Schmerling, A. von 67, 68
Slavs 36, 45, 48, 52, 62, 68
Slota, J. 124
Slovak Republic 5, 9, 28, 35, 37, 41-49, 52,
63, 65, 68, 73-75, 83-85, 99, 105-126,
150, 171, 173, 174
Smith, A. D. 17
Social Constructivism 12, 13
Solidarity Movement 60, 61, 77
South-Eastern Europe 94, 158, 161, 167
Soviet Bloc 8, 35, 43, 44, 50, 61, 70, 71,
72, 106, 129, 131, 132, 138, 177
Soviet Union 35, 42, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60,
70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83,
85, 106, 130, 132, 150, 156, 161, 175
State Security 16, 22, 29, 40, 44, 76, 106,
134, 152
Strategic Culture 24, 34, 36, 45, 52, 61
Suleiman the Magnificent 46
Széchenyi, I. 66
Štefánik, M. R. 41,
Štúr, Ľ. 47, 48, 68, 78
P
Palacký, F. 39, 78
Palach, J. 44
Pannonian 62
Papánek, J. 50
Partnership for Peace 9, 86, 88, 107, 108,
110, 114, 128, 137, 150
Petersberg Tasks 92, 176
Piłsudski, J. 57
Poland 9, 35, 36, 47, 48, 52-61, 67, 68, 7178, 80, 83, 99, 114, 126-134, 136-148,
150, 171, 173, 174, 178
Prague Summit 112
Prine Břetislav 63
Prince Mieszko 52
Principles of Poland’s Security Policy 129,
135, 138
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction 94, 97, 103, 114, 120, 122,
145, 160, 168
Prussia 35, 39, 41, 54, 55, 58, 66
R
Radičová, I. 124
Radl-Anastasius 63
Rapacki, A. 60
Realism 12
Referendum is Slovakia 108, 113
Regional Conflicts 64, 97, 103, 115, 145,
168
Religion 17, 36, 53, 65, 74, 129
Republic of Poland see Poland
Roman Empire 17, 36, 45, 63, 64, 65
Rome Summit 131
T
Terrorism 160, 168
Tisza, K. 67
Tošovský, J. 87
Transformation 10, 26, 52, 61, 76, 81, 82,
85, 86, 88, 91, 94, 106, 107, 110, 111,
198
Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries
W
115, 117, 118, 128, 130, 131, 137, 143,
150, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 163,
171, 177
Trianon 41, 68, 149, 154
Tusk, D. 143
Walesa, L. 59, 61, 127, 150
Warsaw Pact 34, 35, 43, 44, 50, 51, 59, 60,
75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 85, 106, 128, 131,
148, 150, 156, 171, 178
Warsaw Treaty 71, 80, 126, 129
Washington Summit 112, 150
Washington Treaty 95, 105
Wenceslas II. 36, 53
Western Balkans 122, 140
Western European Union 88, 92, 109,
131, 152
White Paper on Defence of the Czech
Republic 87, 88, 100, 101
White Paper on Defence of the Slovak
Republic 124, 125
White Paper on National Security of the
Republic of Poland 147
Wilson, W. 17, 57, 74
World War I 8, 17, 35, 41, 42, 48, 49, 50,
57, 58, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80,
105, 149, 175
World War II 8, 35, 42, 48, 49, 50, 58, 69,
70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 106, 175
Wycliffe, J. 37
U
Ukraine 53, 57, 116, 122, 130, 136, 137,
154, 160, 161
UN Charter 82, 97, 129, 136, 145, 166
UN Security Council 50, 51, 72, 81, 86,
97, 112
United Nations 9, 10, 34, 49-51, 60, 72,
81-83, 86, 88, 90, 94-97, 100, 102, 103,
112, 116, 120, 122, 129, 130, 131, 136,
137, 141, 142, 145, 151, 156, 159, 166,
170, 175, 177
United States 12, 18, 50, 51, 70, 72, 73, 85,
93, 96, 98, 100, 104, 111, 112, 118, 122,
128, 134, 135, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146,
156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 173
USSR see Soviet Union
V
V4 countries (group) 8, 9, 10, 34, 35, 72,
73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 91, 92,
98, 104, 122, 126, 137, 141, 171, 172,
173, 174, 177, 178, 179
Versailles system 33, 49, 58, 78
Vondra, A. 97
Z
Zápoľský, J. 46
Zeman, M. 87, 92
Zrinski, N. 66
Žídek, R. 30
Žižka, J. 37
199
This scientific monograph has been written as a part of research activity
University Grant Agency Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, UGA no.
I-11-004-06 „Comparative Analysis of the Security Policies of V4 Countries
(Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Republic of Poland, Hungary)“.
Title:
Security and Strategic Culture
of the Visegrad Group Countries
Author:
Mgr. Jaroslav UŠIAK, PhD.
Reviewers: prof. Pavel NEČAS, PhD.
assoc. prof. Jana LASICOVÁ, PhD.
Publisher: Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations
Amount: 250 copies
Range:
200 pages
Issue:
First
Year:
2013
This publication has been approved as a scientific monograph on the
meeting of the Editorial Committee at the Faculty of Political Sciences and
International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica on 17th
October 2012.
ISBN
978-80-557-0515-6