Benefit Sharing as a mechanism for improving Transboundary
Water Governance: the case of the Eastern Nile Sub-basin
E. Mapedzaa∗, T. Tafesseb A. Haileselassiec, F. Hagosa, M. McCartneya and S. Bekelea
a
International Water Management Institute, b Addis Ababa University, College of
Development Studies and c International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).
∗
Author for correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected]
Abstract
Transboundary Rivers have often been a source of disagreement for riparian
states. Sadoff and Grey (2002) after analyzing the conflicts amongst riparian countries
proposed that using the Benefit Sharing Framework would broaden the scope of
discussion transcending beyond the sharing of physical water quantities to the sharing of
benefits coming from water within the river basin. Hence, benefit sharing goes beyond a
Zero Sum Scenario (ZSS) to a Positive Sum Outcome (POS) where all the parties in the
river basin will benefit from cooperation. Research conducted by the Stockholm
International Water Institute (SIWI, 2008) further proposed the use of Transboundary
Waters Opportunity (TWO) analysis to overcome the problem paused by limiting the
focus of transboundary water management to physical water quantity. This study looks at
the potential mechanisms of implementing benefit sharing within the Nile River Basin,
specifically focusing on the Eastern Nile Sub-basin. The study was part of a bigger
project that aimed at analyzing the broader upstream and downstream linkages and their
implications for the different riparian countries. The results of the study showed that
whilst the Benefit Sharing Framework is a practical way of looking at transboundary
water governance, it still has gaps in terms of quantifying the benefits, the need to
discount benefits over time, the changing relative importance of benefits over time, the
differential values associated with different costs and benefits and more importantly, the
political economy of transboundary institutions. In view of these gaps, this study
addresses the mechanisms of establishing transboundary river basin institutions
especially in the current context of the paucity and contested nature of data which is
supposed to help in quantifying the magnitude of the benefits to be shared within the
river basin.
Key Words: Benefit sharing, Eastern Nile Sub-basin, Nile, Transboundary institutions.
1. Introduction
Benefit Sharing is increasingly gaining currency as a mechanism to engage
riparian countries to look beyond physical water allocation to the allocation of benefits
coming from water (Sadoff 2002; Sadoff 2005). Such an approach in transboundary
water governance is seen as being better positioned for the riparian countries to perceive
river basin discussions beyond the Zero Sum Scenario (ZSS) to Positive Sum Outcomes
(PSO) where all stakeholders benefit from cooperation. The Zero Sum Scenario has
largely been perceived as undermining collective action with a gain by one actor or
country being directly related to a loss by another actor or country (Chayanov 1986;
Murphree 2000; Ostrom 2002). Under such a scenario, the size of the cake to be shared is
perceived to be fixed. This Scenario can, broadly, be equated to the Malthusian
arguments which view the land resources and productivity as being fixed in the face of an
increasing population. Benefit Sharing has generated a lot of debate as to how institutions
can be configured in such a way that benefits beyond the physical water quantities can be
shared at transboundary river basin level. Benefit Sharing could also be viewed in the
Boserupian lens since it argues on the possibility of expanding the basket of benefits
beyond water that can result in more benefits for everyone (Tiffen 1994; Fairhead 1996;
Mehta and Scoones 1999; Leach 2001; Gichuki 2002). Some researchers have argued
that although benefit sharing sounds simple and logical, the Benefit Sharing framework
has major problems in translating it into practice (Tesfaye 2001; Nicol 2003; Zeitoun
2005; Turton 2008). This study contributes to such a dialogue which aims to assess how
transboundary institutions can be configured to take into account benefit sharing using
the Eastern Nile River Basin as an example.
This study focuses on benefit sharing within the Eastern Nile River Basin
countries which include Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Eritrea is not included since it has
opted for an observer status during the ongoing transboundary negotiations process that
are being spearheaded under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Benefit
sharing is an attempt to avoid what (Scheumann 2008) and Scheuman et al (2008) refer to
as a ‘race to the pump house’ in the context of transboundary aquifers in Africa. Benefit
sharing could also be viewed in terms of the broader literature which wants to address
cooperation at international level in order to address the ‘tragedy of the commons’
(Ostrom 1990; Murphree 1991; Agrawal 2000; Ostrom 2002). These literature focus on
shared resources such as transboundary rivers, extended forests, bio-regions and climate
change (Chaumba 2003). For instance, during the 2003 World Parks Congress, the
transboundary approach was promoted as ‘benefits beyond boundaries’ (Wolmer 2003).
Some researchers have commented that ‘nature rarely notices political boundaries and
hence there is a need to have integrated resource management which might stride across
national boundaries’ (Zbicz 1999). Benefit sharing is not uni-modal but rather takes
various configurations along a cooperation continuum, varying from communication and
notification to joint investment (Sadoff 2005).
This study also looked at the problems of operationalisation of the Benefit
Sharing Concept in the same way as equity was defined by the Helnski Rules in 1966 and
the UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Water Courses in
1997. Neither the Rules nor the Convention have helped in removing the ambivalence
enveloping the application of the term ‘equity’ in African river basins (Klaphake 2006;
Lautze 2008). It is against the above-stated backdrop that Whittington (2002) argues that
transboundary river basin cooperation is important. The major challenge facing ‘benefit
sharing’ is how to put theory into practice taking into account the power and interest
asymmetries within the river basins, such as the Eastern Nile River Sub-basin (Waterbury
2002; Conway 2005).
2. Study Methodology
The methodology of this study makes use of the Benefit Sharing Framework
proposed by Sadoff and Grey (2002; 2008). The paper will also briefly comment on
SIWI’s 2008 Transboundary Waters Opportunities Analysis (TWO) that seeks to extend
and help in the quantification of variables within the Benefit Sharing Framework. The
research approach also included literature review on Benefit Sharing Framework as
complemented by key informant interviews especially with the Nile Basin Initiative.
2.1. The Benefit Sharing Framework
In this section, attempts will be made to illustrate the underlying set of ideas or
frameworks of benefit sharing in terms of typologies. As stated by Sadoff and Grey
(2002), with better management of the ecosystems cooperation can provide ‘benefits to
the river’; with cooperative management of shared rivers, benefits can be accrued ‘from
the river’ (e.g. increased food production and power); with easing of tensions between
riparian states costs ‘because of the river’ could be reduced; and with cooperation
between riparian states leading to economic integration comes ‘benefits beyond the
river’.
As exemplified in Table 1, there are challenges and opportunities embedded in the
aforementioned benefits. Transboundary cooperation could enable basin states to
overcome various challenges, such as degraded watersheds, increased demand for water,
tense regional relations and regional fragmentation and furnishes opportunities, such as
improved water supply, soil conservation, more agricultural and power production,
cooperation and integrated regional markets and cross border trade.
Table1: Types of cooperation and benefits on international rivers
Types of cooperation
Type 1: increasing
benefits to the river
The challenge
Degraded water quality,
watersheds, wetlands, and
biodiversity
The opportunities
Improved water quality, river
flow characteristics, soil
conservation, biodiversity and
overall sustainability
Type 2: increasing
Increasing demands for
Improved water resources
benefits from the river
water, sub-optimal water
management for hydropower and
resources management and agricultural production, flooddevelopment
drought management,
environmental conservation and
water quality
Type 3: reducing costs
Tense regional relations and Policy shift to cooperation and
political economy impacts
development
because of the river
Type 4: increasing
Regional fragmentation
Integration of regional
benefits beyond the river
infrastructure, markets and trade
Source : Sadoff and Grey. 2002: 393
Some real world examples of economic and non-economic benefits that can be
accrued as a result of cooperation endeavors will be mentioned hereunder (summarized
from Sadoff and Grey, 2002).
(a) ‘Benefits to the River’ (‘Ecological River): Cooperative efforts to restore and protect
shared river basins have been exemplified by Rhine River (ibid). Due to the pollution of
the Rhine, Salmon (fish)1 disappeared from the river in the 1920s. In due cognizant of the
problem, the Ministers of the eight riparian states met in 1987 and came up with a plan to
repopulate the river with Salmon under the motto ‘Salmon 2000’. As a result of the
concerted efforts made by the basin states and the allocation of enough fund, Salmon
resurfaced in Rhine as planned in 2000. The lessons one can draw from this example is
how cooperation on shared water resources yields ecological benefits to the river.
(b) ‘Benefits from the River’ (Economic River2): in this context, two examples could be
given. The first one refers to the Senegal River where Mali, Mauritania, Guinea and
Senegal are cooperating to regulate river flows and generate hydropower using common
resources and designing fair benefit sharing mechanisms. The Senegal River Basin
Organization’s (OMVS) achievements to date include: (a) the construction of two dams
and hydropower plants, (b) implementation of environmental management projects, (c)
creation of the observatory of the environment and (d) adoption of a water charter
(ENTRO 2007).
The second example takes us to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)
that has been designed to harness the Orange River for the benefit of both Lesotho and
South Africa. As noted by Vincent Roquet & Associates Inc. (2002: 50), LHWP had dual
purposes: (i) to control and redirect a portion of the water of the Orange River from the
Lesotho mountains to the Vaal River basin through a series of dams and canals for
utilization in the Guateng Province of South Africa, (ii) to take advantage of the head
differential between the highlands and lowlands of Lesotho to generate hydropower in
Lesotho to meet its own needs (Vincent 2002).
In order to attain both purposes, the two parties have agreed to share the cost of
construction in rough proportion to the share of their anticipated benefits. According to
the agreements reached between the two countries, South Africa has agreed to pay
Lesotho royalties for water transferred for 50 years (it currently accounts for 5% of
Lesotho’s GDP) and Lesotho will, in turn, receive all the hydropower generated by the
project. Both parties have considered the water and power deals as equitable allocations
of benefits (Sadoff et al, 2002a).
(c) ‘Because of the River’ (Political River): the costs incurred due to the presence of
shared water resources have remained higher in rivers flowing through arid and semi-arid
1
Salmon (fish), common name applied to fish characterized by an elongated body covered with small,
rounded scales and a fleshy fin between the dorsal fin and tail Mcrosoft. (2004). "Microsoft Encarta
Encyclopedia." 2009, from http://www.answers.com/topic/microsoft-encarta-encyclopedia-standard-2004.
2
The word ‘economic’ is applied here in its literal sense denoting the utilization of rivers for irrigation,
power etc
environments, such as the Jordan, Nile and Euphrates-Tigris. Tensions and disputes,
which have long remained the norms than exceptions in these river basins, inhibited
regional integration and facilitated fragmentation. As noted by Sadoff et al (2002a: 398)
with reference to the above-stated rivers, “little flows between the basin countries except
the river itself – no labor, power, transport or trade”.
(d) ‘Benefits beyond the River’ (Catalytic River): it envisages other flows than the river
itself, such as improved communication and trade (ibid). The same authors (2002a: 399)
stated that “cooperation on shared river management can enable and catalyze benefits
‘beyond the river’, more directly through forward linkages in the economy and less
directly through diminished tensions and improved relationships”. A good example for
such a benefit is the Mekong Basin. During years of conflicts in the region, Laos always
provided hydropower to Thailand. Similarly, Thailand has always purchased gas from
Myanmar and Malaysia and hydropower from Laos and China. In effect, the riparian
transactions brought about mutual dependency.
2.2. Transboundary Waters Opportunity (TWO) Analysis
The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) published Report number 23
in 2008 which looked at developing a conceptual framework and methodology aimed at
meeting the Positive Sum Outcome Scenario. The framework is based on a matrix which
looks at development opportunities comprising of:
•
•
•
•
Hydropower production and trading
Primary production
Urban and Industrial development
Environmental and ecosystem services
The two main factors addressing water resources are:
• New Water
• Efficient Use and Management of water
This framework heavily relies on the Benefit Sharing Approach proposed by
Sadoff and Grey (2005). However, the TWO analysis also suffers from the contested and
political nature of the values allotted to different benefits. The SIWI team is further trying
to refine the measurements of the different variables which could be important for
riparian states. One of the objectives of the TWO analysis was to generate different
scenarios that would help the riparian countries to select different policy options (SIWI
2008).
3. International Transboundary Water Governance experiences
This section draws upon international experiences on Transboundary water
governance. The examples used are Columbia River, Senqu/Orange River, the Senegal
River and the Mekong River.
3.1. Columbia River
Columbia River is 1,952 kilometers long and has its source in the Canadian province
of British Columbia and flows into the American state of Washington. It is the fourth
largest river in North America, having tributaries in both Canada and the United States.
All in all, the Colombia River Basin covers 640,000 square kilometers (Paisley 2002). It
also gathers a lot of inflow from melting snow that at times causes serious flooding along
the river course, mostly downstream in the United States of America. At the time of the
Columbia River Basin negotiations, there were lots of hydraulic projects downstream,
including hydroelectric development, flood control and regulation downstream in the
United States of America.
The first basin agreement was signed between Great Britain (for Canada) and the
United States of America on 11 January 1909. In 1961, the United States of America and
Canada (later passed its responsibility to the British Columbia state) signed the Columbia
River treaty which was further ratified in 1969 (Wolf 1999). The treaty was signed for 60
years with a re-negotiation window being left open after a lapse of 30 years.
The dam developments of Duncan (1968); Keenleyside (1969) and Mica (1975)
included calculations on how much economic rent would come form the dam
developments and further explicitly included the participation of local communities.
Under the agreement Canada was to build three additional dams to provide flood control
and hydroelectric benefits to the USA. In return, Canada got the discounted value of
benefits downstream USA and the rights to half of the electricity generated as a result of
the added storage and flood regulation (Wolf 2009). The 30 year electricity rights were
then sold by the British Columbia for US$254 million and were part of the costs for the
new dam infrastructure. Currently, British Columbia is getting it’s tranche for the second
thirty year period. In 1973, the USA also built the Libby Dam within its territory.
Lessons Learnt
The Colombia River agreement is a clear demonstration of the Canadian
government’s efforts (upstream) to set a precedent and reciprocity through a
transboundary agreement (Wolf 1999; Jones 2001; Wolf 2003). The Colombian case also
illustrates the importance of benefit sharing that emanates from infrastructural
investment. A revenue Sharing Trust Fund was set up under the Columbia Basin Trust in
1995 with an endowment of 295 million Canadian dollars. The main aim of the Trust is
to make sure that the 170,000 residents, who are negatively impacted by the treaty, would
get some benefits. A total of 250 million Canadian Dollars was invested in power
projects with 45 million invested in non-power investments. The Trust also received 2
million Canadian Dollars for operational costs between 1991 and 2010 (ÉGRÉ 2007).
One also needs to note the uniqueness and strong institutional capacity of both parties to
reach this agreement (Wolf 1999).
3.2.
Senegal River Basin
The Senegal River is 1,800 kilometers long and originates from Futa Jallon Highlands
in Guinea and ends up in the Atlantic Ocean through Senegal. It covers a total area of
300,000 square kilometers with a population of 2.7 million people. The four Senegal
River Basin countries are Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The Senegal River
basin organization focuses on Joint Management and Expansion of water supplies within
the basin (cf. Lautze and Giordano 2007). The Senegal River Basin Commission was
formalized in 1958 after Guinea’s independence. The Senegal River Inter-State
Committee (Comité Inter-Etats pour le Développement du Bassin du fleuve Sénégal) was
formed on 26 July 1963 in Bamako, Mali. After independence, the cooperation was seen
as a way of coordinating studies on hydrological investments in the Senegal River Basin.
In 1968, in response to the Pan African calls for cooperation, the Organization of the
Riparian States of the Senegal River, namely, the Organisation des Etats Riverains du
bassin du fleuve Sénégal (OERS), was formed by the four riparian states. The objectives
of OERS were not clearly defined at the outset. Later, in 1972, Mali, Mauritania and
Senegal formed the Senegal River Basin Development Organization (OMVS), with the
aim of harmonizing irrigation water investments and mitigating the impact of droughts in
the region that were induced by erratic and low rainfall. The 1972 Agreement is still
operational and aims ‘to promote the coordinated exploitation of the Senegal River basin
resources in order to increase the sustainability of the income of the basin inhabitants, to
decrease the vulnerability of the economies of members states to climate variability, and
to accelerate economic and inter-state cooperation’(Sadoff Undated).
In 2002, a Water Charter was signed which advocated for sustainable development.
The Charter broadly advocates the application of Integrated Water Resource Management
(IWRM) principles on issues, such as participation and equity. Benefits have accrued to
the three member countries in terms of irrigation, hydro-power and river navigation. Over
1 Billion United States Dollars have been raised to fund dam construction, irrigation and
for institutional support.
Lessons Learnt
The Senegal River Basin is considered one of the success stories for establishing a
good transboundary river basin institution. It has also succeeded in distributing the
benefits from the river fairly and squarely amongst the three riparian countries. However,
it still faces problems in terms of negotiating for water within the drier Sahelian Region.
Guinea’s new membership will also entail benefit sharing re-configuration. More also
needs to be done to mitigate the negative impacts of dams which resulted in the increase
of water related diseases such as malaria and bilharzia. This has important implications in
terms of costs and benefits that should be addressed while assessing the values in other
contexts such as the Eastern Nile River Basin (Sadoff Undated).
3.3. Mekong River Basin
The Mekong River has its source in the Tibetan plateau in China to the South
China Sea covering about 4,909 square kilometers with a population of over seventy
million people. The six Mekong River Basin countries are China, Myanmar, Laos PDR,
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. They have actively promoted new investment into the
Mekong River Basin through the Mekong River Commission leadership. With the
assistance of the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong River Basin has been a basis for
mobilizing international finance and investment in the Mekong River Basin countries
(Stensholt 1996). Hydroelectric power is largely perceived as the engine for economic
growth with twelve hydro-electric projects planned in the Mekong River Basin area.
The effort towards the Mekong Transboundary cooperation can be traced back to the
post Second World War era with the need for reconstruction and to curb the threat of the
expansion of communism (Mekong 1989. ). The developments and cooperation efforts in
the Mekong can be summed using the following key events:
1. Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin Mekong Committee (MC) (1957 – 1978) (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam);
2. Interim Committee For Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin Interim Mekong Committee (IMC) (1978 – 1995) (Laos, Thailand and Vietnam);
3. Mekong River Commission (MRC) (1995 to present) (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Viet Nam as members; China and Myanmar as dialogue partners).
The current Mekong (1995) states want a ‘shared vision of an economically
prosperous, socially equitable, and environmentally sound Mekong River Basin’ (Wolf
2001). The Mekong River Commission is mandated with the Mekong River Basin
Development and Strategic Development plans in order to “promote, support, cooperate
and coordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable benefits to all
riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of the MRB waters, with emphasis and
preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and basin programs (1995
Agreement, Article 2), (Mekong 1995).
Lessons learnt
One of the key lessons learnt for the realization of benefit sharing is the need for
political willingness to share benefits. Regional institutions alone are not a guarantee for
effective cooperation. Even the provision of financial resources has to be linked with
political willingness for benefit sharing to be meaningful. The quantification of benefits
at national level, for instance amongst the states (hydropower, transportation), local
fishermen (fisheries) and environmental non-governmental organizations - do not always
match. At a regional level, the complexity of mapping the different benefits then becomes
a key dilemma (Sneddon 2008).
3.4. Lesotho Highlands Project
The Lesotho and South African governments signed an agreement for ‘the mutual
benefit . . . to be derived from the . . . equitable sharing of the water resources of the
Senqu/Orange River and its effluents’ in 1986 (cited in Lautze and Giordano 2008: 97).
The major aim of the Lesotho Highlands Project is to generate power and regulate water
provision to South Africa’s Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria) area. Lesotho maintains
the benefits of hydroelectric power with South Africa also getting water. The costs of the
project were shared proportionally to the distribution of the anticipated benefits.
Lesson learnt
The key lesson emanating from the Lesotho Highlands project is a case in point
where the shared benefits went beyond just the physical water. South Africa also offered
to assist Lesotho to acquire the necessary foreign currency required to meet Lesotho’s
obligation in the project.
4. Research Findings
4.1. Nile Basin Initiative
Attempts at cooperation and benefit sharing within the Blue Nile Basin go back to
the 1960s. The 1959 Water Sharing Agreement allocated the Nile waters as follows:
Egypt 66%, Sudan 22% and surface evaporation and surface seepage at the High Aswan
Dam at 12%. Ethiopia3 was not included in this water sharing agreement (FAO 2008).
In 1967, the Hydrometeorological Survey of the Equatorial Lakes (Hydromet)
was launched with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and aimed at enhancing collection of hydrometeorological data in the equatorial lakes
area. Hydromet operated until 1992. In 1993, the Technical Cooperation Commission for
the Promotion and Development of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) was formed with the
intent to promote development (World Bank 2005). In 1993, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) funded 10 Nile 2002 conferences which aimed at
promoting dialogue and cooperation within the Nile Basin. In 1995, CIDA had supported
the development of a Nile Basin Action Plan within the auspices of TECCONILE. In
1997, the Nile Basin Council of Ministers requested the World Bank to lead and
coordinate their donor activities (WorldBank 2005). In 1997, with UNDP support, the
riparian countries also established a forum for dialogue on a ‘Cooperative Framework
Agreement’ for the Nile Basin, selecting three representatives from each riparian country.
In February 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) succeeded the TECCONILE.
The NBI is spearheaded by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin
states (Nile Council of Ministers or Nile-COM). ‘The NBI seeks to develop the river in a
cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional
peace and security’ (NBI 2001a). The NBI started with a participatory process of
dialogue among the riparian countries that resulted in their agreeing on a shared vision: to
“achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and
benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources,” and a Strategic Action Program
to translate this vision into concrete activities and projects’ (WorldBank 2005).
The Nile Basin Initiative has embarked on the Shared Vision Programme (SVP).
The SVP’s mission is the creation of a “coordination mechanism and an enabling
environment to realize the shared vision through action on the ground” (Council of
Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States 2001). In June 2001, an ICCON
(International Cooperation Consortium on the Nile) Meeting took place in Geneva with
possible donors for NBI. In the forum, project proposal documents were presented to
solicit funding for shared vision projects. The outcome of the Meeting was the
3
By then, Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia de facto in 1991 and de jure in
1994.
establishment of the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) to finance the SVP with support from
the World Bank, Global Environment Facility (GEF), European Union (EU) Water
Initiative, African Development Bank (ADB) and bilateral donors. The SVP projects and
host countries are shown in Table 2 below. The seven projects are interconnected and are
expected to build a strong foundation for regional cooperation and to forge a common
vision within the Nile River Basin (Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile
Basin States, NBI 2001).
Table 2. Shared Vision Program projects and project management unit locations.
Project Name
Location
Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Uganda (NBI Secretariat)
Nile Basin Regional Power Trade
Tanzania
Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production
Kenya
Nile Transboundary Environmental Action
Sudan
Water Resources Planning and Management
Ethiopia
Applied Training
Egypt
Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing
Uganda
Source: Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States, 2001
The SVP is a multi-country, multi-sectoral, grant-funded program of collaborative
action, exchange of experience, and analytical work that is intended to build a strong
foundation for regional cooperation (WorldBank 2005). The following section gives a
brief overview of the seven Shared Vision Projects:
1. Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement
According to the NBI ‘The Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement
Project is one of the thematic projects being implemented basin-wide to help establish a
foundation for trans-boundary regional cooperation and create an enabling environment
conducive to investments and action on ground within an agreed basin-wide framework’
(NBI 2009).
2. Nile Basin Regional Power Trade
Nile Basin Regional Power Trade aims at establishing institutional means to
coordinate power development and markets through the Nile River Basin Power Forum.
The Nile Basin Power Forum looks at issues such as regional power concerns and also
aims to increase access to power in the region as a mechanism of reducing poverty and
integrating the regional economies.
3. Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production
“The Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production (EWUAP) project is using
the services of national and international consultants to examine agricultural water use in
the Nile Basin. Rapid baseline assessment reports, completed by national consultants
earlier in the year, set out the situation in most of the member countries to establish the
overall situation relating to agricultural water use in the basin” NBI Website. The major
aim of this component is to have the most efficient water use so that more riparian states
could benefit from the available water resources within the Nile River Basin. Whilst the
focus on benefit sharing is looking at benefits beyond water, it is still important to
efficiently make use of most of the water for irrigation, for instance. A consultant study
has identified best irrigation practice and the best irrigation sites within the Nile Basin.
4. Nile Transboundary Environmental Action
The Nile Basin Transboundary Environmental Action Project provides the
strategic framework for the management of transboundary water and environmental
challenges. This component realizes the importance of transboundary impacts of
environmental issues within the Nile River Basin system.
5. Water Resources Planning and Management
Water resource planning has four components: (a) Water Policy Good Practice
Guides and Support, (b) Project Planning and Management Good Practice Guides and
Support, (c) Nile Basin Decision Support System and (d) Regional Coordination and
Facilitation. Water Resources Planning and Management have a budget of US$32.86
million over six years (NBI website). The aim is to develop water laws and guides and
also train national staff in the Nile riparian countries on project planning and
management. All the national level water resources have to be interlinked within the
broader River Basin.
6. Applied Training
“The Applied Training Project is one of the thematic projects to be implemented
basin-wide to help establish a foundation for trans-boundary regional cooperation and
create an enabling environment conducive to investments and action on ground within an
agreed basin-wide framework.” (NBI website) The major aim of Applied Training is to
jointly train regional water resource experts as per the requirement of member
governments. This would also offer mechanisms of joint training and joint information
sharing.
7. Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing
The Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing (SDBS) Project aims to
strengthen the Nile River Basin-wide socioeconomic cooperation and integration. US$9
million has been budgeted for over 6 years. This project also offers an opportunity to
incorporate some compensation arrangements for costs incurred upstream in improving
benefits downstream.
Subsidiary Action programs
The implementation of the SVP is complemented by the Subsidiary Action
Programs (SAPs). The SAPs are premised on the subsidiarity principle which notes that
actions and decisions are supposed to be taken at the lowest appropriate unit of
governance. This has resulted in the creation of two SAP action plans: First, the Nile
Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) comprising Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Egypt, with
Ethiopia participating as an observer; and Second, the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action
Programme (ENSAP) comprising Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan (Tesfaye 2001).
The SAPs have 15 major projects covering water supply and sanitation, river
regulation and flood management, irrigation and drainage, fisheries, hydropower, water
hyacinth and weeds control. Governments identify local needs and actions whilst the SAP
focuses on activities with transboundary implications. All the local and national level
activities should integrate upward ‘to form a basin-wide development’ (NBI 2001a: 12).
The intention is to come up with a win-win situation at a basin level. This has seen the
development of the Integrated Development Programme of the Eastern Nile (IDEN),
which is also commonly referred to as the ENSAP Project (Tessera 2006).
In 2002, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) was set up as an
international organization in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as an operational arm of ENSAP.
The Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Programme (ENSAP) calls for cooperation within
the Blue Nile River Basin. They have also identified hydraulic projects for which
watershed management has been identified for fast-track preparation and implementation.
The proposed projects under the Integrated Development of Eastern Nile (IDEN) include
the following:
ƒ Eastern Nile Planning Model sub-project (fast-track);
ƒ Baro-Akobo Multi-purpose Water Resources Development subproject;
ƒ Flood Preparedness and Early Warning sub-project (fast-track);
ƒ Ethio-Sudan Transmission Interconnection sub-project (fast-track);
ƒ Eastern Nile Power Trade Investment Program;
ƒ Irrigation and Drainage sub-project;
ƒ Watershed Management sub-project (fast track)
Four of the proposed projects have been setup for fast-track, meaning that they will be
given priority for implementation since they are believed to promote regional integration.
The vision of NBI sounds credible but its operationalization will determine its
success or failure. Sharing of costs and benefits within the Eastern Nile Sub-basin
amongst the three ENSAP member countries will result in the overall improvement of the
river basin and poverty alleviation in the member countries.
A ‘Cooperative Framework Agreement’ (CFA) for the Nile was approved by the
Nile Basin Council of Ministers (Nile–COM) on 26 June 2007. The CFA was adopted in
Kinshasa and is now waiting to be signed by the Nile River Basin Member countries. If it
is ratified by member countries, it will become international law and serve to establish a
permanent Nile River Basin Commission. The nine co-basin countries seem to be
agreeing on most issues except on the issue of ‘water allocation and water security’. The
latter are included in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) under Article 14b.
Be that as it may, upstream countries like Ethiopia which uses about 1% of the Nile water
are thinking in terms of equity in water allocation, whereas downstream countries like
Egypt are viewing the same issue in terms of ‘no appreciable harm’ to existing
downstream water usage (Waterbury 1998). As a result of such a divergence of interest,
the CFA is currently at a deadlock.
Joint Multipurpose Projects and Benefit Sharing
In the broader context of benefit sharing a number of Joint Multipurpose Projects
(JMPs) are envisaged as ways of demonstrating the potential of benefit sharing within the
Eastern Nile. The JMP is envisaged “ …..to demonstrate the benefits of a cooperative
approach to the management and development of the Eastern Nile" (ENSAP JMP
Executive Summary, 2008). It has been launched a suite of basin-wide projects to build
trust and capacity (Sneddon 2008). The JMP was launched in 2005. JMP, it is hoped,
will result in the move from unilateral action to joint action as shown in Figure 1 below
(Sadoff 2005)
Figure 1.
The Cooperative Continuum (Sadoff 2005)
JMP is a joint undertaking by the three EN countries, namely Egypt, Ethiopia and
Sudan, to use the shared resources as entry points to foster economic integration through
multi-purpose projects that go beyond the water sector (ENTRO 2008a). Its immediate
development objective is to undertake cooperative and sustainable development and
management of the shared Blue/Main Nile water resources through multipurpose
storage/dam and power systems infrastructure, watershed and floodplain management
and the ‘selective’ development of irrigation systems. According to ENTRO (2007), four
elements are included under JMP: (i) watershed and environmental management, (ii)
enhanced agricultural production, (iii) infrastructure with linked river and power systems,
and (iv) leveraged Growth and Integration (ENTRO 2007).
It has been recognized by ENTRO that cooperative development and management
of the Eastern Nile Basin, as one river system, offers tremendous opportunities for
economic development. This could be achieved through a multi-country, multipurpose
program of activities that could increase power supplies, build reservoir capacity and
enhance agricultural production that can mitigate natural resource degradation, alleviate
poverty and support more sustainable livelihoods for the peoples of the EN sub-basin.
According to Blackmore and Whittington (2008), a large dam with over-year storage on
the Abbay (Blue Nile) is suggested to achieve the aforementioned benefits. The same
authors believe that a large multipurpose dam on the Abbay4 would meet the criteria for
JMP investments, including the generation of multipurpose benefits to all the three EN
countries in terms of hydropower, irrigation, flood control and regional cooperation. Put
in a nutshell, such JMP activities “would make better use of the Blue Nile water to
produce more food and fiber, while at the same time reducing sedimentation and
enhancing environmental values” (Ibid:73).
Blackmore and Whittington (2008) have also itemized the benefits that can be
accrued to all the three EN countries after the construction of a large dam on the Blue
Nile (Blackmore 2008). The authors mentioned that Ethiopia stands to benefit in financial
terms from the sale of large amounts of hydropower to downstream riparian countries;
Sudan would benefit in several ways, including flood control, improvements in seasonal
navigation and reduction in sediment loads reaching Sudanese reservoirs, while Egypt
benefits from upstream storage by receiving alternative sources of reliable power and
increased opportunities for trade, regional integration and cooperation.
Of the various projects of the JMP, special attention has been given to the
development of sustainable watershed management due to the existence of close interrelationships between watershed, environmental management and enhanced agricultural
production. ENTRO asserted that in the absence of watershed management interventions,
soil erosion, environmental degradation and deforestation will continue at accelerated
rates, reducing agricultural productivity and increasing the numbers of households falling
at and below the poverty line (ENTRO 2008b).
The JMP and other ENTRO projects should however consider a number of things
related to the identification of bundle of benefits (water and non-water related ‘basket of
benefits’) and the realization of the ‘equitable sharing of benefits’ to the Eastern Nile
countries. In the context of benefit sharing, the power benefits in Ethiopia should be
weighed against the bundle of downstream benefits in terms of flood control, availability
of more water downstream that could be used for irrigation due to regulated release as
well as watershed management in Ethiopia. Thus, for example, the downstream co-basin
states should generate benefits for Ethiopia, if the latter releases flows which could
otherwise be utilized upstream (at least theoretically).
Under the joint development program, i.e. JMP, there must be (a) a benefit
sharing treaty of the EN countries that should entitle the three riparian states to a lump
sum payment for various downstream and upstream benefits, (b) a sound financial
framework for transboundary water resources development which includes, among
others, methods for equitable sharing of the costs, the benefits and the risks and (c)
building financial mechanisms for joint ownership of assets. It should also be borne in
mind that the perception of benefits (and their usefulness) will alter over time, and any
international agreement based on benefit-sharing scenarios will need to take account of
this.
The challenge appears not only in the identification of benefits but also to put
them in a realistic framework as funded and agreed upon by EN governments on
4
Studies have been conducted on four possible dams on Abbay (Blue Nile). These include Border (1780
MW installed capacity), Mandaya (1700 MW), Karadobi (1600 MW) and Mabil (1400 MW). No decision
has yet been made on the specific dam site that will be selected for the JMP activities.
multilateral basis. Once this is done, the next important step would be to treatise benefit
sharing. Efforts should hence be made to come up with the Eastern Nile Basin Benefit
sharing Treaty rather than restricting ourselves to the Eastern Nile Basin Waters
Agreement.
According to the NBI website, ‘the JMP Launch Phase has produced a series of
what might be termed 'socio-political' achievements in Eastern Nile development
cooperation and collective commitment to common goals. From the initial impetus of the
enlightened Nile Basin Initiative, the Water Ministers of the Eastern Nile countries have
demonstrated with their instruction to launch Composition of JMPl, with a clear belief in
the virtues of working together to achieve something that could not be realized by
working alone. There are many indications that this start is having a growing and
cumulative effect’ (NBI 2001a).
The NBI is now looking at joint investments in irrigation, hydro-power generation
and trade, river basin and watershed management and flood mitigation, bringing tangible
benefits to the people of the basin. ‘Despite the inherent difficulties of multi-country
cooperation, serious efforts are being made to identify optimal solutions – with regional
assessments ‘removing borders’ to identify best options, to identify benefit sharing
mechanisms, and to ensure good social and environmental practice.’ (Sneddon 2008).
The way things are moving now the initiative might offer hope for improved
Transboundary River Basin cooperation in the Eastern part of the Nile River. In August
2007 a Regional Parliament Review further called for increasing further cooperation by
calling for the ‘acceleration of cooperation and a scaling-up of coordination and joint
action’ (NBI 2001b).
5. Policy Implications
Zero Sum outcomes are likely to occur when riparian countries act in a unilateral
manner. It is hence incumbent upon co-basin countries to go beyond that and apply a
positive sum outcome if they opt to share the benefits coming out of water. The first step
in this direction would be to establish transboundary river basin institutions which will
offer a platform for such an engagement. However, the virtue of just establishing such an
institutional architecture may not guarantee the success of cooperative action. Benefits,
costs and information have to be continuously shared amongst the different stakeholders
in order to build trust and confidence. The latter is not an event but rather a process which
should be continuous and built on an iterative way. Once a few practical steps have been
achieved, such as the JMP for instance, it is then possible to take bigger steps. Whilst
benefit sharing as it appears is a noble conceptual framework, the question may always
arise on its operationalization. Somehow mechanisms should be sought by which the
established transboundary institutions re-configure existing hegemonies, such as in the
case the Eastern Nile River basin where there are clear power asymmetries (Waterbury
1998; Nicol 2003; Zeitoun 2006). Looked at another perspective, the fact that there are
power asymmetries should not be hindrance towards a transboundary river dialogue.
On the other hand, the fluidity of the concept of Benefit Sharing framework could
be useful where one or another riparian will then have to develop a common
understanding of what the benefits are. This is an attempt that the Stockholm
International Water Institute (SIWI 2008) has begun but there is still a long way to go.
What makes this process more complex is that it’s not just a case of valuation of benefits
and costs – but the different political entities could value the same resource differently.
This can be further illustrated with the differential understanding of the term ‘equity’
within the Eastern Nile Sub Basin. For instance, Ethiopia insists that this should be
viewed in terms of changes in the status quo with regards to the utilization of water in the
Nile, while Egypt prefers that equity should be weighed in terms of not upsetting the
current physical water allocation. Such discussions on what constitutes ‘benefits’ and
‘costs’ are no longer the preserve for the riparian countries only. Other non-riparian
states, funding agencies and non-state actors are also adding more complexity to the
already complex negotiations (Sneddon 2008). The ‘developmental’ role of the state also
affects the complexity of transboundary river politics (Fox 1998; Sneddon 2008).
6. Conclusions
Benefit Sharing offers a better opportunity to move away from a stalemate in
contested transboundary River Basins such as the Eastern Nile. Whilst the framework is
appreciated by most riparian countries, it is only when you reach at the stage of the
operationalisation of the ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ to be shared that several questions begin to
emerge. The quantification of benefits which is based on ‘contested’ figures and
assumptions is further compounds the problem
One of the major advantages of the Benefit Sharing Framework is that it brings riparian
countries together to open up dialogue and discussions amongst themselves. Once such
an engagement begins, it gains a momentum of its own and this might result in some
compromise and agreements in the long term. Power asymmetries are bound to be a
factor in any hegemonic or neo-hegemonic arrangements. The transboundary river basin
institutions might even provide fora for a common understanding and shared knowledge.
More recently, Egypt’s new Minister of water Resources offered to train Ethiopian Water
Resource Specialists.
Joint Management Projects are a good start with the Eastern Nile since they focus
attention on cooperation. Such cooperation is then more likely going to evolve into
increased Nile River Basin cooperation once all riparian countries realize that there are
more benefits to be reaped from cooperation than when fighting against each other within
the basin. The JMP might offer an opportunity for confidence building and data sharing.
Within the eastern Nile River Basin for instance the evidence of the impact of
upstream and downstream linkages are evident. In Sudan dams such as the Rosaries are
losing their water holding capacity due to sediment accumulation, much of which comes
from Ethiopia. Such evidence offers opportunities for transboundary cooperation since
what happens upstream has impacts downstream. This then calls for dialogue across the
borders. How this is done, remains a watery mirage.
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