17.261/262
Congressional Politics II
Spring 2014
Tuesday, 1–3
E53-485
Charles Stewart III
E53-449
617-253-3127
[email protected]
The purpose of this class is to prepare graduate students for professional research into
congressional politics in particular and legislatures more generally. When the semester is
finished, you should be well enough acquainted with the sweep of the congressional literature,
both historical and contemporary, that you could do well on a PhD general exam question about
Congress.
We will be reading eight books more-or-less in their entirety. Therefore, you should buy them
(usually used and cheap), rather than just check them out of the library, and bring them to class
when we discuss them. Please buy hard copies, not Kindle editions. Here are the books you
should buy:
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John Kingdon. 1973. Congressmen’s voting decisions.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. Legislative leviathan, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge University Press.
Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 2013. Congress Reconsidered, 10th ed.,
CQ Press. [NB: Make sure you are using the 10th edition. No other edition will do.]
Keith Krehbiel. 1998. Pivotal politics, University of Chicago Press.
Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America:
The dance of ideology and unequal riches, MIT Press.
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. 2012. It’s even worse than it looks: How the
American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism, Basic Books.
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology and Congress, Transaction
Publishers.
David W. Rohde. 1991. Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives,
University of Chicago Press.
I will also make available to everyone the second edition of my textbook, Analyzing Congress, at
no cost. I expect everyone to be familiar with all of the material covered in the book, since it is
the textbook (based on my lectures) that forms the basis of 17.251 (Congress I), which is the
prerequisite of this subject.
Assignments
There are three assignments.
1. Attend all classes, with all the reading done, ready to discuss. I will assign class
members to take responsibility for keeping the discussion going, on a rotating basis.
There is a lot of reading. Don’t get behind.
2. Discussion agenda memos. You will write brief, one-page memos, circulated by 5pm on
the Monday before each class meeting, about the points you want to discuss at the next
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day’s seminar. A list of bullet points is fine. The goal is to get us thinking ahead of time
about the topics that interest you.
3. Seminar paper. You will write an empirical paper on one of the topics covered by the
syllabus, or any other topic related to Congress that interests you. This should be the first
draft of a paper you might want to present at a conference or submit to a journal for
publication. You must get my approval of the topic no later than March 14. The paper is
due at the end of the semester.
Reading Schedule
All readings not in the “additional readings” sections of each week are required. The “additional
readings” are for your use, in case you are interested in diving in deeper, or you have read some
of the required readings before. Mostly, the “additional readings” are intended to group together
classic readings we don’t have time to get to into the major topics of the class.
You will notice that most weeks have a selection of readings from Dodd and Oppenheimer’s
most recent edited volume. The intention is to get you up to speed on current developments in
Congress, so that we have a common base of knowledge about recent history. I don’t expect
detailed discussion of these readings, unless something catches the fancy of seminar participants.
February 4. First class meeting. Organizational matters.
February 11. Congressional representation
Dodd and Oppenheimer, chapters 4 (Erikson and Wright) and 10 (Volden and Wiseman)
Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. American
Political Science Review, vol. 57, pp. 45–56.
Richard F. Fenno. 1977. U.S. House members and their constituencies: An exploration.
American Political Science Review, vol. 71, pp. 883–917. [The book-length
treatment is Home Style, which you should be familiar with eventually.]
Christopher H. Achen. 1978. Measuring representation. American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 22, pp. 475–510.
Robert S. Erikson. 1978. Constituency opinion and congressional behavior: A
reexamination of the Miller-Stokes representation data. American Journal of
Political Science, vol. 22, pp. 511–535.
Richard Born. 1990. The shared fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members may
run from Congress, but they can't hide. Journal of Politics, vol. 52, pp.1223–41.
Larry M. Bartels. 1991. Constituency opinion and congressional policy making: The
Reagan defense buildup. American Political Science Review, vol. 85, pp. 457–
474.
James A Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. Dynamic
representation. American Political Science Review, vol. 89, pp. 543–565.
3
Charles Cameron , David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. Do majority-minority
districts maximize substantive black representation in Congress? American
Political Science Review, vol. 88, pp. 794–812.
Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. Explaining
congressional approval. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, pp. 175–
207.
Seth J. Hill. 2013. Do Primary Electorates Polarize Congress? Working paper.
Additional readings
Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies.
Richard F Fenno. 1978. Home style: House members in their districts.
William T Bianco. 1994. Trust: Representatives and constituents.
Paul S. Herrnson. 1995. Congressional elections.
David C. Kimball and Samuel C. Patterson. 1997. Living up to expectations: Public
attitudes toward Congress. Journal of Politics, vol. 59, pp. 701–728.
Jane Mansbridge. 1999. Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A
contingent “yes.” Journal of Politics, vol. 61, pp. 628–657.
February 18. Monday classes today. No class meeting.
February 25. Congressional elections
Dodd and Oppenheimer, chapters 5 (Jacobson) and 6 (Bernhard and Sulkin).
Edward R. Tufte. 1973. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems.
American Political Science Review, vol.67, pp. 540–554.
David R. Mayhew. 1974. Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals.
Polity, vol. 6, pp. 295–317.
Edward R. Tufte. 1975. Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional
elections. American Political Science Review, vol. 69, pp. 812–826.
John A. Ferejohn. 1977. On the decline of competition in congressional elections.
American Politics Review, vol. 71, pp. 166–176.
Gary Jacobson. 1978. The effects of campaign spending on congressional elections.
American Political Science Review, vol. 72, pp. 769–783.
Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. Salvation for the spendthrift incumbent:
Reestimating the effects of campaign spending in House elections. American
Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, pp. 884–907.
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes. 1998. The hydraulics of campaign finance
reform. Texas Law Review, vol. 77, pp. 1705–38.
Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. Out of step, out of
office: Electoral accountability and House members’ voting. American Political
Science Review, vol. 96, pp. 127–140.
Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2003. Why is
there so little money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17,
pp. 105–130.
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Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. Unintentional gerrymandering: Political
geography and electoral bias in legislatures. Quarterly Journal of Political
Science, vol. 8, pp. 239–269.
Additional readings
Gary C. Jacobson. 1983. The politics of congressional elections. [NB: The latest edition
is a comprehensive view of the congressional elections literature.]
Gary C. Jacobson, 1990. The effects of campaign spending in House elections: New
evidence for old arguments. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, pp.
334–362.
Paul S. Herrnson. 1995. Congressional elections: Campaigning at home and in
Washington.
Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz. 2002. Elbridge Gerry’s salamander: The electoral
consequences of the reapportionment revolution.
March 4. Congressional candidates, careers, and the incumbency advantage
Anthony Downs. 1957. The economic theory of democracy, chap. 8.
Robert S. Erikson. 1971. The advantage of incumbency in congressional elections. Polity,
vol. 3, pp. 395–405.
David W. Rhode. 1979. Risk-bearing and progressive ambition: The case of members of
the United States House of Representatives. American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 23, pp. 1–26.
Gary C. Jacobson. 1978. The effects of campaign spending in congressional
elections. American Political Science Review, vol. 72, pp. 469–491.
Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1984. The constituency service
basis of the personal vote for US representatives and British members of
parliament. American Political Science Review 78, pp. 110–125. [NB: This is
essentially the same argument as the Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina book, The
Personal Vote, in the “additional readings.”]
Gary C. Jacobson. 1989. Strategic politicians and the dynamics of U.S. House elections,
1946–1986. American Political Science Review, vol. 83, pp. 773–793. [NB: This
is essentially the same argument as the Jacobson and Kernell book, Strategy and
Choice, in “additional readings.”]
Andrew Gelman and Gary King. 1990. Estimating incumbency advantage without bias.
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, pp. 1142–1164.
Richard L. Hall and Robert P. Van Houweling. 1995. Avarice and ambition in Congress:
Representatives’ decisions to run or retire from the US House. American Political
Science Review, vol. 89, pp. 121–136.
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2000. Old voters,
new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency
advantage. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 44, pp. 17–34.
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. Candidate
positioning in U.S. House elections. American Journal of Political Science, vol.
45, pp. 136–59.
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Additional readings
Gary C. Jacobson, and Samuel Kernell. 1983. Strategy and choice in congressional
elections, 2nd edition [available online for free download from the authors].
Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. Explaining challenger quality
in congressional elections. Journal of Politics, vol. 47, pp. 510–529.
Bruce E. Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. The personal vote:
Constituency service and electoral independence.
Gary W. Cox, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. Why did the incumbency advantage in US
House elections grow? American Journal of Political Science, vol. 40, pp. 478–
497.
March 11. No class today
March 18. Committees
Dodd and Oppenheimer, chapter 8 (Aldrich, Perry, and Rohde).
Richard F. Fenno. 1973. Congressmen in committees, chaps. 1–4.
Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in
multidimensional voting models. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23,
pp. 27–59.
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The institutional foundations of
committee power. American Political Science Review, vol. 81, pp. 85–127.
Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall. 1988. The industrial organization of
Congress: Or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132–163.
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. Organization of informative committees
by a rational legislature. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, pp. 531–
564. [NB: The core of this article’s argument is further developed — along with a
comprehensive critique of then-extant theories of legislative organization — in
Krehbiel’s book, Information and legislative organization, in the “additional
reading” section.
Douglas Dion and John D. Huber. 1996. Procedural choice and the House Committee on
Rules. Journal of Politics, vol. 58, pp. 25–53.
Charles Stewart III. Congressional committees in a partisan era: The end of
institutionalization as we know it? in New Directions in Congressional Politics,
ed. Jamie Carson, pp. 85–110.
Additional readings
Christopher Deering and Steven S. Smith. Committees in Congress. Last edition
published in 1997.
Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective decisionmaking and standing
committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 3, pp. 287–335.
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Richard L. Hall, and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The committee assignment process and the
conditional nature of committee bias. American Political Science Review, vol. 84,
pp. 1149–1166.
Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying time: Moneyed interests and the
mobilization of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science
Review, vol. 84, pp. 797–820.
Keith Krehbiel. 1991. Information and legislative organization.
March 25. Spring break. No class today
April 1. Parties and leadership I
Dodd and Oppenheimer, 10th ed., chapter 7 (Smith and Gamm)
David W. Rohde. 1991. Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives.
Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady. 1981. Institutional context and leadership style: The
House from Cannon to Rayburn. American Political Science Review, vol. 75, pp.
411–425.
David W. Brady. 1985. A reevaluation of realignments in American politics: Evidence
from the House of Representatives, American Political Science Review, vol. 79,
pp. 28–49.
Jason M. Roberts and Steven S. Smith. 2003. Procedural contexts, party strategy, and
conditional party voting in the US House of Representatives, 1971–2000.
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, pp. 305–317.
Additional readings
D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The logic of delegation.
Barbara Sinclair. 1998. Legislators, leaders, and lawmaking: The US House of
Representatives in the postreform era.
John H. Aldrich. 2011. Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in
America, 2nd ed. [While not about Congress, per se, it provides a framing for
parties that is embraced by most students of Congress.]
April 8. Parties and leadership II
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. Legislative leviathan, 2nd ed.
Keith Krehbiel. 1993. Where’s the party? British Journal of Political Science, vol. 23,
pp. 235–266.
Keith Krehbiel. 1999. Paradoxes of parties in Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly,
vol. 24, pp. 31–64.
Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. Uncovering the hidden
effect of party. Journal of Politics, vol. 61, pp. 815–831.
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Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The effects of
party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 26, pp. 533–72.
Additional reading
Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The hunt for party
discipline in Congress. American Political Science Review, vol. 95, pp. 673–688.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the agenda: Responsible
government in the U.S. House of Representatives. [NB: This book has a similar
article to their Legislative leviathan, the 2nd edition of which is assigned this
year.]
David W. Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1979. The decline of party in
the US House of Representatives, 1887–1968. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol.
4, pp. 381–407.
April 15. Decisionmaking
Dodd and Oppenheimer, 10th ed., chapter 9 (Koger).
John Kingdon. 1973. Congressmen’s voting decisions (chaps. 1–8).
Keith Krehbiel. 1998. Pivotal politics, excerpts
Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. The statistical analysis of roll
call data. American Political Science Review, vol. 98, pp. 355–370.
Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. D-NOMINATE after 10 years: A
comparative update to Congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting.
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, pp. 5–29.
Additional readings
Duncan Black. 1958. The theory of committees and elections
Richard D. McKelvey. 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some
implications for agenda control. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 12, pp. 472–
482.
Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political resource allocation, controlled
agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice, vol. 33, pp. 27–43.
Steven S. Smith. 1989. Call to order: Floor politics in the House and Senate.
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. Patterns of congressional voting, American
Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, pp. 228–278.
James M. Snyder, Jr. 1992. Artificial extremism in interest group ratings. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, pp. 319–342.
Wendy J. Schiller. 1995. Senators as political entrepreneurs: using bill sponsorship to
shape legislative agendas. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, pp.
186–203.
Daniel Kessler, and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. Dynamics of cosponsorship. American
Political Science Review, vol. 90, pp. 555–566.
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Steven D. Levitt. 1996. How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter
preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. American Economic Review,
vol. 86, pp. 425–441.
Keith Krehbiel. 1997. Restrictive rules reconsidered. American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 62, pp. 144–168.
James J. Heckman and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1997. Linear probability models of the
demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences
of legislators. Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 28 (sp. iss.), pp. S142–S189.
Douglas Dion and John D. Huber. 1997. Sense and Sensibility: The role of rules,
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, pp. 945–957.
Timothy Groseclose, Steven Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1999. Comparing interest
group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the US
Congress. American Political Science Review, vol. 93, pp. 33–50.
Gregory Koger. 2003. “Position-taking and cosponsorship in the U.S House. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 225–246.
Richard L. Hall. 2006. Participation in Congress.
Gregory Koger. 2010. Filibustering: A political history of obstruction in the House and
Senate.
Barbara Sinclair. 2011. Unorthodox lawmaking: New legislative processes in the US
Congress, 4th ed.
April 22. Patriot’s Day. No class meeting
April 29. Policymaking and interbranch relations
Dodd and Oppenheimer, 10th ed., chapters 11 (Binder and Maltzman), 13 (Thurber), and
15 (Kriner and Howell).
Barry R. Weingast. 1979. A rational choice perspective on congressional norms.
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23, pp. 245–262.
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. Political preferences for the pork
barrel: A generalization. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, pp. 96–
111.
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight
overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 28, pp. 165–179.
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative
procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization, vol. 3, pp. 243–277.
John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan. 1990. Congressional influence on bureaucracy.
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 6, pp. 1–20.
Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1994. Congressional elections and the pork
barrel. Journal of Politics, vol. 56, pp. 377–399.
Steven D.Levitt and James M. Snyder. 1995. Political parties and the distribution of
federal outlays. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, pp. 958–980.
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Nolan M. McCarty and Keith T. Poole. 1995. Veto power and legislation: An empirical
analysis of executive and legislative bargaining from 1961 to 1986. Journal of
Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 11, pp. 282–312.
Jeffrey A. Segal. 1997. Separation-of-powers games in the positive theory of Congress
and courts. American Political Science Review, vol. 91, pp. 28–44.
Additional readings
Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. The political
economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive
politics. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89, pp. 642–664.
Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic discretion or congressional
control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 91, pp. 765–800.
Charles M. Cameron. 2000. Veto bargaining: Presidents and the politics of negative
power. [NB: A condensed version of the argument can be found here: Charles M.
Cameron and Nolan McCarty. 2004. Models of vetoes and veto bargaining.
Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 7, pp. 409–435.]
Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2006. Delivering the goods: Legislative
particularism in different electoral and institutional settings. Journal of Politics,
vol. 68, pp. 168–179.
May 6. History
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. Ideology and Congress, excerpts TBA.
(Update and re-release of Congress: A political-economic history of roll call
voting [1997].)
Nelson W. Polsby. 1968. The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.
American Political Science Review, vol. 62, pp. 144–168.
Samuel Kernell. 1977. Toward understanding 19th century congressional careers:
Ambition, competition, and rotation. American Journal of Political Science, vol.
21, pp. 669–693.
Sarah A. Binder. 1996. The partisan basis of procedural choice: Allocating parliamentary
rights in the house, 1789–1990. American Political Science Review, vol. 90, pp.
8–20. [NB: This is a boiled-down version of her book, Minority rights, majority
rule, in the “additional readings” section for this week.]
Eric Schickler and Gregory Wawro. 2004. Where’s the pivot? Obstruction and
lawmaking in the pre-cloture Senate. American Journal of Political Science, vol.
48, pp. 758–774. [NB: This is a boiled-down version of their book, Filibuster, in
the “additional readings” section for this week.]
Jenkins, Jeffery A. and Charles Stewart III. 2013. Fighting for the speakership: The
House and the rise of party government, excerpts TBA.
Additional readings
Barbara Sinclair. 1989. The transformation of the U.S. Senate.
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Jonathan N. Katz and Brian R. Sala. 1996. Careerism, committee assignments, and the
electoral connection. American Political Science Review, vol. 90, pp. 21–33.
Sarah A. Binder. 1997. Minority rights, majority rule: Partisanship and the development
of Congress.
Eric Schickler. 2001. Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of
the U.S. Congress.
Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler. 2006. Filibuster: Obstruction and lawmaking in
the US Senate.
May 13. Party polarization and the new “New Congress”
Dodd and Oppenheimer, chapters 1 (Sinclair).
John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. 1997. The transition to Republican rule in the
House: Implications for theories of congressional politics. Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 112, pp. 541–567.
Sarah A. Binder. 1999. The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947–96. American
Political Science Review, vol. 93, pp. 519–533.
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. 2012. It’s even worse than it looks, excerpts
TBA.
Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America:
The dance of ideology and unequal riches, excerpts TBA.
Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2009. Does gerrymandering
cause polarization? American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, pp. 666–680.
Thomas L. Brunell and Justin Buchler. 2009. Ideological representation and competitive
congressional elections. Electoral Studies, vol. 28, pp. 448–457.
Bertram Johnson. 2010. Individual contributions: A fundraising advantage for the
ideologically extreme? American Politics Research, vol. 38, pp. 890–908.
Additional readings
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. The polarization of American politics.
Journal of Politics, vol. 46, pp. 1061–1079.
David R. Mayhew. 2005. Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking, and
investigations, 1946–2002.
Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron. 2010. Leapfrog representation and extremism: A
study of American voters and their members in Congress. American Political
Science Review, vol. 104, pp. 519–542.
Sean M. Theriault. 2008. Party polarization in Congress.
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Some Ways to Think about the Most Important Congressional Literature
The 20 most important books about Congress to have read to understand contemporary
scholarship.
John H. Aldrich 1995. Why parties? The origin and transformation of political parties
R. Douglas Arnold. 1990. The logic of congressional action.
Bruce E.Cain, John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. The personal vote: Constituency
service and electoral independence.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative leviathan.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2004. Setting the agenda.
Lawrence Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Congress reconsidered (many editions—keep
current with the most recent)
Richard F. Fenno. 1973. Congressmen in committee.
Richard F. Fenno. 1978. Home style.
Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. Representatives, roll calls, and constituencie.
Gary C. Jacobson. 2001. Politics of congressional election.
Gary C. Jacobson. 1990. The electoral origins of divided government: Competition in U.S. House
elections, 1946–1988.
Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell. 1981. Strategy and choice in congressional elections
D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The logic of delegation.
John Kingdon. 1973. Congressmen’s voting decisions.
Keith Krehbiel. 1991. Information and legislative organization.
Keith Krehbiel, 1998. Pivotal politics.
David R. Mayhew. 1974. Congress: The electoral connection.
David R. Mayhew. 2005. Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking, and investigations,
1946–2002.
Keith T. Pool and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A political-economic history of roll call
voting
David W. Rhode. 1991. Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representative.
Woodrow Wilson. 1885. Congressional government.
The 10 most important articles that are not associated with these books:
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked:
Police patrols versus fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, pp. 165–
179.
Richard D. McKelvey. 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some
implications for agenda control. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 12, pp. 472–482.
Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. American
Political Science Review, vol. 57, pp. 45–56.
Nelson W. Polsby. 1970. The institutionalization of the US House of Representatives. American
Political Science Review, vol. 62, pp. 144–168.
Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas,
and the status quo. Public Choice, vol. 33, pp. 27–43.
Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional
voting models. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23, pp. 27–59.
12
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The institutional foundations of committee
power. American Political Science Review, vol. 81, pp. 85–104.
Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control?
Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 91, pp. 765–800.
Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall. 1988. The industrial organization of Congress; or,
why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 96, pp. 132–163.
Winners of the Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Prize from the Legislative Studies Section of the
APSA (and some of the competition that didn’t win):
2012. Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative
Institutions in Multiparty Governance (Oxford University Press).
2011. Gregory Koger. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate.
(University of Chicago Press).
2010. Frances Lee. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate.
(University of Chicago Press).
2009 Damon C. Cann. Sharing the Wealth: Member Contributions and the Exchange Theory of
Party Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives. (SUNY Press).
2008. Simon Hix, Abdul G. Noury, and Gerard Roland. Democratic Politics in the European
Parliament (Cambridge University Press).
2007. Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler. Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S.
Senate (Princeton University Press)
2006. Tracy Sulkin. Issue Politics in Congress (Cambridge University Press)
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. Setting the agenda (Cambridge University
Press)
2005. Diana Evans. Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority
Coalitions in Congress (Cambridge University Press)
2004. Sarah A. Binder. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock
(Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
2003. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
13
2002. Eric Schickler. Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of the U.S.
Congress (Princeton University Press, 2001)
2001. Charles M. Cameron. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power
(Cambridge University Press, 2000)
2000. David Canon. Race Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of
Black Majority Districts (University of Chicago Press, 1999)
1999. Keith Krehbiel. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (University of Chicago
Press, 1998)
1998. No selection
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A political-economic history of roll call
voting (Oxford University Press, 1997)
1997. Richard Hall, Participation in Congress (Yale University Press, 1996)
1996. No selection.
John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as public enemy (Cambridge
University Press)
Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, leaders, and lawmakers (Johns Hopkins University Press)
1995. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, Quiet Revolution in the South (Princeton
University Press)
1994. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in
the House (University of California Press)
Carol Swain, Black faces, black interests (Harvard University Press)
1993. Frank Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)
1992. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (University of Michigan Press,
1991)
D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The logic of delegation (University of
California Press)
David R. Mayhew, Divided we govern (Yale University press)
David W. Rohde, Parties and leaders in the postreform House (University of Chicago
Press)
14
1991. R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (Yale University Press)
Jon R. Bond, The president in the legislative arena (Chicago University Press)
David T. Canon, Actors, athletes, and astronauts (University of Chicago Press)
Gary C. Jacobson, The electoral origins of divided government (Westview Press)
1990. Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Johns Hopkins University Press,
1989)
Steven S. Smith, Call to Order (Brookings Institution Press)
1989. No award
David W. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making (Stanford
University Press)
1988. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service
and Electoral Independence (Harvard University Press, 1987).
Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections (Little, Brown).
The 25 most-cited articles (on a per-year basis) in Legislative Studies Quarterly since 1973
Will Lowe, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. Scaling policy
preferences from coded political texts. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, pp. 123–
155.
Peverill Squire. 1992. Legislative professionalization and membership diversity in state
legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, pp. 69–79.
Richard E. Matland. 1998. Women's representation in national legislatures: Developed and
developing countries. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 23, pp. 109–125.
Simon Hix and Abdul Noury. 2009. After enlargement: voting patterns in the sixth European
Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, pp. 159–174.
Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. D-NOMINATE after 10 years: A comparative
update to Congress: A political-economic history of roll-call voting. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 26, pp. 5–29.
Michele L. Swers. 1998. Are women more likely to vote for women's issue bills than their male
colleagues? Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 23, pp. 435–448.
James D. King. 2000. Changes in professionalism in US state legislatures. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 25, pp. 327–343.
Peverill Squire. 2000. Uncontested seats in state legislative elections. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 25, pp. 131–146.
John M.Carey, Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief. 2006. The effects of
term limits on state legislatures: a new survey of the 50 states. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 105–134.
15
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barrry R. Weingast, eds. Positive theories of congressional institutions.
University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Lisa Baldez. 2004. Elected bodies: The gender quota law for legislative candidates in
Mexico. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 29, pp. 231–258.
Royce Carroll and Jason Eichorst. 2013. The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of
Partisan Electoral Competition. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, pp. 83–109.
Christophe Crombez. 1997. The co-decision procedure in the European Union. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, vol. 22, pp. 97–119.
William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. Divided
government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945-94. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 25, pp. 285–312.
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The effects of party and
preferences on congressional roll-call voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, pp.
533–72.
Eric D. Lawrence, Forrest Maltzman, and Steven S. Smith. 2006.Who wins? Party effects in
legislative voting. Legislative Studies Quarterly vol. 31, pp. 33–69.
Gregory Koger. 2003. Position-Taking and Cosponsorship in the US House. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 225–246.
John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. 2000. The costs of control: legislators, agencies, and
transaction costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, pp. 25–52.
David W. Brady, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2007. Primary Elections and Candidate
Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate? Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 32,
pp. 79–105.
Steven D. Levitt and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. Decomposing the sources of incumbency
advantage in the US House. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 22, pp. 45–60.
James M. Snyder Jr. 1992. Artificial extremism in interest group ratings. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 17, pp. 319–345.
Richard A. Smith. 1995. Interest group influence in the US Congress. Legislative Studies
Quarterly, vol. 20, pp. 89–139.
Anna Harvey and Barry Friedman. 2006. Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the
Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987–2000. Legislative Studies Quarterly,
vol.31, pp. 533–562.
Mario Bergara, Barak Richman, and Pablo T. Spiller. Modeling Supreme Court strategic
decision making: The congressional constraint. Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 28,
pp. 247–280.
Beth Reingold. 1992. Concepts of representation among female and male state legislators.
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, pp. 509–537.