NOBILITY, BOURGEOISIE AND THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN
BELGIUM
THE CIRCULATION OF ELITES IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE NINE-
teenth century has often been cited by sociologists to illustrate the
effect of large-scale economic transformation on class structure. It is
generally believed that the development of industrial capitalism
brought about a redistribution of wealth and power, which undermined the position of the traditional landed aristocracy and elevated
a new industrial 61ite to the summit of the social order.
Although it is impossible to deny that industrialization in western
Europe had a profound impact on the class structure, there is reason
to believe that its effect was not as straightforward as most scholars
once assumed. Many historians now hold that the old order declined
more slowly than was formerly thought; a recent synthesis of the
relevant literature claims that it was alive and well in 1914.1 More
disturbing still is the realization that the rate of change in different
European countries did not conform to the pace of industrialization.
True, the decline of the old order was more rapid in western than
in eastern Europe, where industrialization came later. Yet within
western Europe the pattern was more complex. The landed aristocracy remained wealthy and powerful in Britain longer than it did in
France, though it is generally accepted that Britain industrialized
earlier. At the end of the nineteenth century the old order was much
stronger in Germany than in France, though Germany had by that
time surpassed France in economic development.
Belgium has been largely neglected in this debate, except of course
by the Belgians. Most writers who have felt that this small country
has any significance for the issue have generally used it to support
theories of economic determinism, or at least to illustrate the very
direct effect that industrialization can have on the circulation of 61ites.
Compared to other Continental countries, Belgium industrialized
rapidly; as a consequence, many writers have assumed, the industrial
bourgeoisie rose to the top of the class structure in a relatively early
period of time and took power more completely and confidently than
almost anywhere else. Marx once said that Belgium was the most
bourgeois country in Europe.
The purpose of this article is to provide a preliminary account and
1
Arno J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New
York, 1981).
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
141
explanation of the decline of the nobility and the rise of the bourgeoisie in Belgium during the nineteenth century. The article draws
heavily on research by Belgian historians that bears on this subject.
The state of this research is such that several important questions
will remain unanswered, but it is possible to provide a general outline
of the process and some tentative conclusions.
I
WEALTH, STATUS AND POLITICAL POWER UNDER THE OLD REGIME
To help organize our discussion we can use some of the concepts
developed by Max Weber for the study of social stratification. Weber
carefully distinguished between three types of power: economic
power; the power of rank or status; and a residual category of all
other types of power, most often conceptualized as "political power".
Differences in economic power give rise to "classes"; differences in
status give rise to "status groups"; and differences in political power
give rise to "parties".2 Few sociologists have found Weber's concept
of "parties" very helpful, but his model of stratification and the
other concepts he developed have had considerable influence.
There is, however, a problem that can arise with this model, or at
least with one line of argument which falls in the Weberian tradition.
It is often assumed that in pre-industrial Europe there were no classes
of any significance, only status groups, which were legalized as
"estates" or "orders". Two distinguished exponents of this thesis
are Roland Mousnier and Jerome Blum.3 Mousnier believes that a
society of orders is based on status differentiation resulting from the
greater esteem or honour granted to certain social functions, such as
the military profession, which may have no connection with the
production of material goods.4 Social classes, in contrast, are found
in societies with a market economy where the production of material
goods and the creation of wealth are judged to be the most important
social functions; classes are formed according to the relative contributions made by different social groups to this function.5 Seventeenthand eighteenth-century France was essentially, though not exclus2
H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New
York, 1958), pp. 180-95.
3
Roland Mousniei's views are developed in a number of works, but the most
comprehensive is his Social Hierarchies: 14SO to the Present (New York, 1973). For
Jerome Blum, see his The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe (Princeton, 1978).
Few sociologists have carefully examined the estate/class dichotomy, but many have
made brief references to it. For examples of such references, not all of which accord
with Mousnier and Blum, see K. B. Mayer, Class and Society (New York, 1955), pp.
16-21; T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modem Society (London, 1965), p. 15; Irving
Krauss, Stratification, Class and Conflict (New York, 1976), pp. 17-20; Louis Kriesberg, Social Inequality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979), p. 47.
4
Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, p. 49.
'Ibid., p. 35-
142
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
ively, a society of orders; what emerged in the nineteenth century
was a society of classes. Weber did not develop the argument so fully,
but he clearly believed that in some historical periods stratification by
status predominated over stratification by class.6
Mousnier's interpretation of the old order in France is not consistent with a large body of literature,7 and has met with sharp criticism.8
Critics have suggested that it takes as real what was actually an
ideology maintained by Elites to justify their position. They argue
that this ideology does little to help us understand how the rest of
the society was stratified, since the great majority of people enjoyed
few if any privileges and were differentiated from one another primarily (though not completely) in economic terms. We can, of course,
debate whether or not this economic differentiation constituted class
differentiation; the side one takes probably depends largely on how
one defines social class. My conception of social structure leads me
to the view that social classes exist wherever patterns of inegalitarian
economic relationships are repeated over and over again in a society.
Yet other definitions abound. Some writers, for example, restrict the
concept of class to collectively organized groups. Aside from the fact
that such a definition would mean that classes can come and go,
many historians would not accept, even by this definition, that
France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was without
social classes. Furthermore, even if social classes did not exist for
this reason, it still would not support Mousnier's argument, which is
that classes were insignificant because functions other than economic
production were more highly valued in the society. The fact that
economic production was predominantly agricultural and from our
perspective technologically backward does not mean that less value
was attached to it than is true today. Numerous scholars have pointed
out that economic production was critical to all segments of preindustrial society. Most nobles, like the majority of people in any
age, preferred to spend money rather than make it, but nevertheless
depended heavily on significant control over the major source of
6
Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 193; Max Weber, Economy and
Society, 2 vols. (New York, 1968), i, p. 306.
7
For example, see Boris Porchnev, La soulevements populaires en Franc* de 1623
a 1648 (Paris, 1963); Charles Tilly, The Vendee: A Sociological Analysis of the
Counterrevolution of 1793 (New York, 1967 edn.); Francois Lebrun, Le XVII' siecle
(Paris, 1967); A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629
(Cambridge, 1968); Pierre Goubert, The Anden Rtgvne: French Society, 1600-1750
(New York, 1973); Georges Durand, "Prescance, cohesion, hierarchic sociales a Lyon
en 1789: contribution au dtbat sur socie'te' d'ordres et sodite de classes", Rtvue
d'histoire modeme et contemporaine, xxiii (1976).
" Pierre Goubert, "L'ancienne soti£t4 d'ordres: verbiage ou reah'tf?", in Colloque
franco-suisse d'histoire (conomique et tociale (Geneva, 1969); Charles Tilly, review of
Mousnier, Social Hierarchies, injl. Mod. Hist., xlvi (1974); Armand Arriaza, "Mousnier and Barber: The Theoretical Underpinning of the 'Society of Orders' in Early
Modern Europe", Past and Present, no. 89 (Nov. 1980).
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
143
wealth in the society, which was land, to enable them to maintain
the style of life considered appropriate to their rank. Consequently,
while they no doubt regarded certain types of economic activity as
derogatory, economic power was just as important to them as it was
to any other group in the society.
It would be rash, however, to dismiss the arguments of scholars
of the calibre of Mousnier and Blum entirely. France was certainly
stratified differently in the eighteenth century than it was in the
nineteenth. Is there not some validity to their notion that in the
earlier period it was a society of orders?
My suggestion would be that status is equally important in all
societies. What varies from one society to another are the following:
first, the extent to which status corresponds or correlates with the
other two dimensions of power — that is, the extent to which people
who are high in status also rank high economically and politically;
second, the extent to which the prevailing distribution of status is
institutionalized or, in other words, is supported by values and
norms, perhaps even by laws; and third, the extent to which status
is ascribed rather than achieved. What was distinctive about the old
regime in France was that the three types of power were relatively
well (though not perfectly) correlated, that certain status groups
were highly institutionalized, and that status was usually (though
not always) ascribed. In so far as Mousnier and Blum make this kind
of argument, they are in my view correct in asserting that the old
regime was a society of orders. But I believe they are seriously
mistaken in so far as they insist that there were no social classes or
that social classes were unimportant in comparison with those found
in other societies. On the contrary, the relationship between class
differentiation and status differentiation was one of the most significant features of the old regime. Sociologists today would say that
there was then a relatively high degree of "status consistency" or
"status crystallization", by which they would mean that in general
a person's rank on one dimension of stratification was at the same
level and wasreinforcedby his rank on other important dimensions.9
9
The meaning of "status" as used in this context is not the same as the meaning
I have given it. In the literature on status inconsistency it means simply rank or
position on any dimension of stratification (income, occupation, education, prestige
and so on). As I use the term in this article, status refers to people's rank or position
on one dimension of stratification — that is, the prestige, esteem or honour dimension.
"Status" is the most common translation of the German Stand, which has a number
of connotations, including not only rank or position, but also estate or order. Weber
used Stand to convey several ideas; in some contexts "prestige" or "esteem" would
be an acceptable translation, in other passages "rank" or "position" would be suitable,
while in still other places "order" or "estate" would be appropriate.
There is a considerable body of literature on status consistency and inconsistency.
See, for example, Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status", Amer. Sociol. Rev., xix (1954); Elton F. Jackson, "Status
Consistency and Symptoms of Stress", Amer. Sociol. Rev., xxvii (1962); J. A.
Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance", Social Forces, xlvi (1967); D. S. Eitzen, "Status Inconsistency and Wallace
Supporters in a Midwestern City", Social Forces, xlviii (1970).
144
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
Although it appears difficult to argue that under the old regime
stratification by status predominated over stratification by class, it is
possible to say that certain specific status groups predominated over
other groups in the society by holding a disproportionate share of all
three types of power and by successfully institutionalizing their
position and privileges. Our first task, therefore, is to evaluate
the extent to which the highest status group in eighteenth-century
Belgium, the nobility, predominated in this sense.
Most of what is now Belgium was then known as the Austrian
Low Countries and had been under the control of the Austrian
Habsburgs since 1713. Some parts of present-day Belgium were
semi-autonomous principalities outside the Austrian Low Countries,
the largest of which was the principality of Liege. Collectively we
can refer to what is now Belgium as the Southern Low Countries.
This region was characterized by a legally recognized nobility
more closely resembling those found at that time in France and
other Continental countries than the aristocracy in England. By the
eighteenth century the nobility in the Southern Low Countries had
either given up or lost most of their legal privileges, but they still
enjoyed a few.10 Some of these werefiscalin nature; for instance, in
certain provinces they were exempt from various taxes. Others were
judicial; for example, in some provinces they had the right to be
tried by the provincial council.11 In addition, of course, those who
were seigneurs also enjoyed seigneurial rights. These varied greatly
from one province to another. In general they were not as burdensome
on the peasantry as they were in France, but they did provide
numerous benefits to lords in many areas.12
10
Paul Janssens, "De Zuidnederlandse adel tijdens het ancien regime, i7*-i!P
eeuw: problemen en stand van het onderzoek", Tydschrift voor geschiedems, xciii
(1980), pp. 451-6. This article, and several others by the same author cited below,
constitute the most authoritative works on the Belgian nobility in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Also essential is Jos De Belder, "Adel en burgerij, 1840-1914",
in Algemene gachiedems der NederUmden, 15 vols. (Haarlem, 1977-83), xii. Two other
relevant works which I did not have the opportunity to consult before writing this
article are: M. Van Damme, Adel (Ghent, 1982); Roland Mortier and Herve Hasquin
(eds.), Etudes sur le XVIII' siicle, 9 nos. (Brussels, 1974- ), no. 9, La noblesse belgt au
XVIII' siecle.
11
Edmond PoulJet, "Les constitutions rationales beiges de l'ancien regime a
l'epoque de l'invasion francaise de 1794", Mtmoires courwmes et mures memoires de
VAcadtrme nyale des sciences, des leans et des beaux-arts de Belgique, xxvi (1875), PP190-1, 214-15; Xavier de Ghellinck Vaernewyck, "La noblesse de Belgique", in
L'ordre de la noblesse, 5 yob. (Paris, 1978-82), i, p. lxxi.
12
P. Verriest, Le rtgime seigneurial dans le comti de Hainaut du XI' siicle d la
Rtvolunm (Louvain, 1917); Paul Verhaegen, La Belgique sous la domination francaise,
1792-1814, 5 vols. (Brussels, 1922-9), ii, pp. 489-91; Robert Devieeshouwer, "Les
droits feodauz et leur abolition en Belgique", Annales hisloriques de la Revolution
francaise, xli (1969); Claire Perissino-Bulen, "Des campagnes sous le joug des traditions", in Hervi Hasquin (ed.), La Wallonie: le pays et les homines — histoire,
economies, sociites, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1975-6), i.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
145
(i) Political Power
The political power of the Belgian nobility was far out of proportion to their numbers. There is no denying that by the middle of
the eighteenth century their position had weakened significantly
in comparison with earlier periods, but their authority was still
impressive. The most obvious and important source of strength was
representation in the Provincial Estates. The constitution of these
bodies varied from one province to another,13 but in most cases
spokesmen for the nobility (not the entire nobility) enjoyed real
power by virtue of this representation. The Estates had important
rights with respect to taxation and constituted the principal power
base for the resistance of the provinces of the Austrian Low Countries
to the centralizing efforts of the Habsburg administration.14
Provincial governors were chosen from the high nobility, but they
had lost much of their authority.1S In some provinces judicial councils
still had a number of seats reserved for the nobility.16 At a more
local level the political power of the nobility could be awesome,
though it varied from place to place. In some towns, such as Verviers,
local government was in the hands of non-nobles, but in many
centres, like Bruges and Antwerp, the noble element was stronger.17
Even greater was the power of the nobility in villages and in the
countryside.18 Almost every rural district was dominated by a noble
seigneur. His prestige alone made him the most influential person
in a small community. In addition he possessed certain specific
political and judicial rights, including in many areas control over
local courts (the droit de justice) and the right to appoint local officials,
specifically the bourgmestre, grejfier, and ichevins.19
(ii) Wealth
There were fewer poor nobles in the Southern Low Countries than
in France. According to one contemporary source, the income of the
wealthiest members of the Third Order equalled that of the average
13
For example, in Flanders all three orders convened only rarely, while the Third
Estate met regularly to vote taxes. Among the latter, however, one could often find
nobles.
14
Poullet, "Constitutions nationales beiges", pp. 157-63; W. W. Davis, Joseph
II: An Imperial Reformer for the Austrian Netherlands (The Hague, 1974), pp. 14-16.
13
Janssens, "Zuidnederlandse adel tijdens het ancien regime", p. 462; and sources
he cites.
16
Ibid., p. 462; and sources he cites.
17
Pierre Lebrun, L'industrie de la lame d Verviers pendant le XVIII' et le dibvx du
XIX' stick: contribution & Vlmde des angina de la Rtvolutm industrielie (Liege,
1948), p. 86; Yvan Vanden Berghe, Jacobijnen en traditionalisten: de rtacties van de
BruggeUngen in de rroolutiedjd, 1780-1794, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1972); K. Degryse,
"Stadsadel en stadsbestuur te Antwerpen in de 18* eeuw: een sociaal-economische
benadering", Tydsckrift voor geschiedenis, xciii (1980).
19
For Liege, see Ivan Deforce, Les classes rurales dans la principauU de Liegt au
XVIIf siicle (Liise, 1945), PP- io6-7» 161-2.
19
Verhaegen, Belgique sous la domination francaise, ii, pp. 122, 490; PerissinoBilkn, "Campagnes sous le joug des traditions".
146
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
aristocrat. The lowest annual revenue of a Brussels noble in 1794
was reportedly 3,000 florins, which a member of the bourgeoisie
would have regarded as a handsome income. The median noble
income in Brabant was an impressive 12,000 florins, but some of the
wealthier noble families — for example, the Arenbergs and the
prince de Ligne — had incomes of 400,000 florins.20 One historian,
who argues that an annual income of 4,000 to 5,000 florins was
sufficient for a small family to live a luxurious life in Antwerp in the
eighteenth century, classifies the administrative nobility of this city
into four levels, the lowest of which earned less than 50,000 florins
per year and the wealthiest of which reaped more than 500,000 florins
per year.21 One can also cite a study done many years ago by Jan
Lewinski. Using tax data from 1794, he concluded that in the cities
of Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent the nobility as a group was at least
several times as wealthy as the riches bourgeois.22 A reanalysis of
these and other tax data for Brussels has challenged Lewinski's
conclusions, but even the newfiguresshow an impressive amount of
wealth in the hands of the nobility: more or less than half of the
taxable wealth.23 Relative to their numbers, the Belgian nobility also
possessed a remarkable amount of land. The proportion owned by
the nobility generally ranged from 10 to 25 per cent, depending on
the region, while the proportion owned by the far more numerous ,
bourgeoisie ranged from 10 to 35 per cent.24 The nobility did not
monopolize wealth in eighteenth<entury Belgium, but it was vastly
over-represented among the rich.
(iii) Status
The nobility possessed greater esteem or prestige than any other
social group. Indeed it was the admiration and deference that the
nobility commanded which most separated them from the rest of
society. This prestige was symbolized by numerous honorary privileges, which had no political or economic advantage, but served
simply to remind people of their status.25 It is true that in the
Southern Low Countries the outward distinctions between the nobil20
Janet Polasky, Revolutionary Brussels, 1787-1793 (Brussels, 1984).
Degryse, "Stadsadel en stadsbestuur te Antwerpen".
Jan Lewinski, L'tvolution industrielle de la Belgique (Brussels, 1911)1 pp. 107-9.
23
Ida Ilegems, "Les structures sociales et les fortunes au dibut du regime francais ,
in Jean Stengers (ed.), Bruxelles: croissance tfune capitale (Antwerp, 1979). The data
are based on three taxes imposed by the French. For each tax we have the percentage
of taxable wealth possessed by the three orders. The nobility held 59 per cent, 51 per
cent and 45 per cent.
24
Ivan Delatte, La vente des Hens nawmaux dans le dtpanemtnt de Jemappes
(Brussels, 1938), pp. 21-2; Delatte, Classes rurales dans la prindpavti de Liige, p . 70;
J. Ruwet, Lagncidaart
a les classes ntrales au pays de Htrve sous Panaen rtgtme
(I~iige> !943)> P- 226; L . Van Buyten, "Grondbezit en grondwaarde in Brabant en
Mecnelen, volgens de onteigeningen voor de aanleg der verkeerswegen in de achttiende
eeuw", Btjdragm voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, xviii (1963), p. 103.
25
GheUinck Vaernewyck, "Noblesse de Belgique", p. lxxii.
21
22
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
147
ity and the bourgeoisie had become less sharp by the eighteenth
century, and that the Belgian nobility had considerable difficulty in
keeping the bourgeoisie from usurping its honorary privileges.26 But
this usurpation is only further evidence of the nobility's prestige. It
was imitated because it was unanimously recognized as the highest
status group in the society.
The nobility was not, however, the only high-status group. There
was also, of course, the clergy; indeed some ecclesiastical dignitaries
enjoyed greater prestige than most nobles. And several other significant criteria of status can be identified as well, such as mastership in
a guild or membership in the legal bourgeoisie of the towns.27
Language was also an important basis for status distinctions, Latin
and French speakers enjoying higher rank than Flemish speakers.
Again, those who held these statuses were relatively more powerful
economically and politically than those who did not. The guilds, for
example, enjoyed the benefits of monopolies in the manufacture and
trade of many goods. In most towns the guilds also held more
than their share of municipal political power. And in some towns,
including Brussels, they controlled the representation of the Third
Order in the Provincial Estates.28
My argument is that in the Southern Low Countries during the
eighteenth century there was a tendency for the distribution of status
to correspond to the distribution of other types of power. To leave
it at this, however, is to overlook what may have been the most
important development occurring at this time. Some interpretations
of pre-revolutionary France imply that this correspondence was
breaking down in that country during the eighteenth century. One
explanation of the French Revolution is that it resulted from the
frustrations of a rising bourgeoisie, which had reached or even
26
Janssens, "Zuidnederlandse a d d tijdens het ancien regime".
Here the word "bourgeoisie" is being employed more narrowly than it will
generally be used in this paper. Most of the time when I talk about the bourgeoisie,
I mean the upper and middle classes of society, outside the clergy and the nobility.
(Within this broad category there were of course a number of segments, or "fractions"
to use Poulantzas's term, such as the professional bourgeoisie, the administrative
bourgeoisie, the commercial bourgeoisie, and the industrial bourgeoisie.) In the
eighteenth century, however, the word bourgeoisie was often used to refer specifically
to an urban status group which possessed special privileges. O n this subject, see
Poullet, "Constitutions rationales beiges", p p . 183-4, 2 I 4> G. Crutzen, "Pnncipaux
difauts du systeme corporatif dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens a la fin du XVIII* siecle",
Rtvue de rinstruction publiqut en Belgime, z z z (1887), p. 369; Juliette RouhartChabot and Etienne Hieiin, "Comment devenait-on bourgeois de la citt de Liege?",
Bulletin de Plnsana archeohgique li/tgeois, Lxxvi (1963); Micheline Zanatta, "L'admission de nouveaux bourgeois a Venders au XVIII* siecle", Bulletin de la Soctiti royale:
le vieux Liege, viii (1972).
11
Janet Polasky, "Revolution, Industrialization and the Brussels Commercial
Bourgeoisie, 1780-1793", Rttnu beige d'histoirt contemporaine, l i (1980), p. 208.
27
I48
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
surpassed most nobles in wealth or power, but had not attained
commensurate status.29
Whether or not we accept this explanation of the French Revolution (and I for one am dubious), it does suggest that we should
ask if such an inconsistency was developing in the Southern Low
Countries. Unfortunately it is not a question that can be answered
satisfactorily until much more research is done. In the meantime I
can only point to some scattered evidence that this process was indeed
taking place. By the late eighteenth century the guilds, for example,
had clearly lost much of their former predominance, and their
monopolistic control over trade and industry had been substantially
weakened.30 In the case of the nobility a similar trend may have
occurred, though it was certainly less pronounced. As already mentioned, the aristocracy had given up or lost many of its legal privileges, and much of its political authority had been weakened. This
was especially true in institutions of the central government.31 A
significant feature of the Belgian nobility was its separation (isolation
would be too strong a term) from the non-Belgian political authorities
who ruled from Vienna over the Austrian Low Countries. These
rulers were not altogether without sympathy or respect for Belgian
nobles, but they did not have the close ties with them that would
have existed if the monarchy had been indigenous. The power of the
Belgian nobility in the Habsburg bureaucracy may have been further
eroded by the late eighteenth century as a result of the growth of
this administrative apparatus. Though still small by later standards,
it had become too large even in the Low Countries for the nobility
to staff, with the result that the majority of government and judicial
appointments went by necessity to commoners, even though the
authorities often preferred nobles.32 The shortage of qualified nobles
to fill state positions stood in sharp contrast to an over-supply
29
This kind of argument is consistent with the sociological literature on status
consistency and inconsistency discussed above in n. 9. T h e conventional view is that
status inconsistency creates strain and promotes political liberalism or alternatively,
as some sociologists have argued, political extremism. This contention has faced
considerable criticism in recent years. See, for example, R. W. Hodge and P. M.
Siegel, "Nonvertical Dimensions of Social Stratification", in E. O. T .unman, P. M.
Siegel and R. W. Hodge (eds.), The Logic of Social Hierarchies (Chicago, 1970);
M. E. Olsen and J. C. Tulry, "Socioeconomic-Ethnic Status Inconsistency and
Preference for Political Change", Amtr. Sociol. Rev., xxxvii (1972).
30
Jean Dupont, "L'evolunon du corporatisme en Hainaut sous Marie-Therese",
Armalet du 33? congris de la FMiration archiologupu ex hutoriqiu de Btlgique (1951);
Crutzen, "Pnncipaux deTauts du systeme corporatif", pp. 2 8 2 - 3 , a n c ' t n e continuation
of this article in Revue de Fins/ruction publique en Belgique, xxxi (1888), pp. 12-15.
31
This point is made well in Davis, Joseph II, pp. 28-9, though I think Davis
overstates the decline in the political power of the nobility.
12
On this subject see Poullet, "Constitutions rationales beiges", p. 191; Joseph
Lefevre, "La haute magistrature beige du XVIII' siecle", Revue gintrale beige,
bcrrvii (1952), pp. 946-8; Cecile Douxchamps-Lefevre, Let procureun gtntraux du
Constil de Namur tout It regime autrichien (Namur, 1961), esp. pp. 211-12; Ghellinck
Vaernewyck, "Noblesse de Belgique", p. Ixxii.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
149
of qualified non-nobles. The qualification required for most state
functions was legal training. Visitors to Brussels frequently remarked
on the large number of lawyers in the city; in 1784 at least 400
lawyers were licensed to practice before the Council of Brabant.33
Most of them did not actually practice law, but instead held or
aspired to hold state functions.
Turning to economic resources, we find no evidence of a decline
in noble wealth, but we do have reason to believe that non-noble
wealth was increasing. Commercial capitalism was comparatively
advanced in the Southern Low Countries before the eighteenth
century. Industrial capitalism was slower to evolve. It was hampered
by poor transportation faculties, tariffs, tolls, regional particularism,
and Dutch control over the Scheldt estuary. Nevertheless the "Industrial Revolution" that we shall discuss shortly was far more gradual
than has often been recognized; its roots lie unmistakably in the
eighteenth century. Most of the industry at this time was domestic,
but there was some concentration of ownership and control,34 clearly
enough to give rise to a small group of industrialists with substantial
fortunes. Several historians have called attention to this affluence
and have provided a few remarkable examples.35 In addition, a
significant number of prosperous merchants could be found, especially in Brussels, Bruges, Ghent and Antwerp.36 It has been shown
that some members of the business bourgeoisie of Brussels were very
rich, the richest of all being the wholesalers, manufacturers and
bankers who did not belong to any of the guilds.37 Moreover even
when technically they had fewer assets, many industrialists and
merchants possessed greater economic power because they had more
direct control over their economic resources than did the landed
aristocracy over the peasantry. Now it is important to understand
that some nobles also participated in non-agricultural economic
activity, especially in Hainaut and Namur.38 On the whole, however,
it was dominated by non-nobles.
33
Polasky, Revolutionary Brussels. She has a good discussion of lawyers in Brabant
during the late eighteenth century.
34
H . Coppejans-Desmedt, Bijdrage tot de studie van de gegoede burgerij u Cent in de
XVIII' etuw: de vorming van ten nieuwe sociaal-economuche stand ten tijde van Maria
Thtresia (Brussels, 1952), p. 67; Pierre Lebrun el al., Essai sur la Revolution
industrieUe en Belgique, 1770-1847 (Brussels, 1979), PP- 78-9, 84; Lebrun, Industrie
de la laine d Verviers, pp. 277-87, 350; Herve Hasquin, Une mutation: It 'pays de
Ckarleroi' aux XVII' et XVIII' slides: aux engines de la Revolution industrieUe en
Belgique (Brussels, 1971), pp. 146-56.
3
* Lebrun, Industrie de la laine d Verviers, pp. 350 n. 4 , 371-3; Hasquin, Mutation,
pp. 112-14. It is worth noting that in Verviers the woollen capitalists did not
accumulate great wealth until the last half of the eighteenth century.
34
For Ghent, see Coppejans-Desmedt, Bijdrage tot de studie van de gegoede burgerij
te Gent, pp. 23-4. She provides comparative figures for Brussels and Antwerp.
37
Polasky, Revolution, Industrialization and the Brussels Commercial Bourgeoisie", p p . 208-9.
31
Robert-J. Lemoine, "Classes sociaJes et attitudes revolutionnaires: quelques
inflexions sur un chapitre d*histoire beige", Amtales d'hxstout tconomique et social*,
vii (1935). PP- 167-9.
150
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
Although we can be certain that most Belgian nobles still enjoyed
economic and political power commensurate with their status, the
preceding discussion suggests that, relative to the bourgeoisie, they
may have lost ground economically and politically by the end of the
eighteenth century. If so, then we have been discussing the first
phase of a process that developed more fully after 1790.
II
THE RISE OF NEW ECONOMIC ELITES
The term "Industrial Revolution" was first coined in reference not
to England, but to Belgium. Statistically Belgium was second only
to the United Kingdom in large-scale industrial development (as
measured by steam power per capita) until the end of the nineteenth
century, when both countries were overtaken by the United States.39
Economic innovation was concentrated in three regions: Liege and
Verviers; Mons and Charleroi; and Ghent. The greatest change
occurred in metallurgy, textiles and coal-mining. In 1812 the per
capita production of iron in the Southern Low Countries was estimated at 10 or 11 kg. as compared with 20 kg. in the United Kingdom
and 4 kg. in France. In the same year coal production was probably
450 kg. per capita, as compared with 600 kg. in the United Kingdom
and 40 kg. in France.40 English influence was a major factor. Most
of the technological innovation and even some of the entrepreneursbip and skilled personnel came from England.41
The social backgrounds of the new industrial entrepreneurs were
diverse. In the textile industries of Ghent and Verviers they were
mostly eighteenth-century capitalists (or their descendants), generally cotton-printers in Ghent and woollen manufacturers in Verviers.
Coal entrepreneurs in the Borinage were drawn mainly from the
ranks of bankers, coal merchants and local industrialists. Coal and
iron entrepreneurs in Charleroi were eighteenth-century ironmasters
and glass-makers (or their descendants). In Liege, coal-mining and
metallurgy were developed partly by woollen manufacturers, but
also by technicians, some of whom were from modest backgrounds,
while others were related to old industrialists. Technicians of this
39
PauJ Bairoch, "Niveaux de developpement economique de 1810 a 1910", Annales. E.S.C.,
xx (1965).
40
Jan Craeybeckx, "Les dibuts de la Revolution industrielle en Belgique ct les
statistiques de la fin de PEmpire", in AUlanges offerts i G. Jacquemyns (Brussels,
1968), p p . 122, 133-4.
41
T h e best-known illustrations of English influence are afforded by William
Cockerill, an English immigrant who revolutionized secondary metallurgy in Verviers
and Liege by manufacturing textile machinery, and Lieven Bauwens who initiated
the cotton industry in Ghent by smuggling a spinning mule out of England in pieces.
Good discussions of Cockerill appear in Lebrun, Industrie de la Urine & Verviers, and
of both m e n in Lebrun a a/., Essax tur la Revolution indtatrielle tn Belgique.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
15I
kind were also important in the Ghent cotton industry and in the
Charleroi metallurgical and coal industries.42 In general only a
portion of the entrepreneurs came from very rich families, and at
least some came from quite modest ones. There were more than a
few nobles, but they did not constitute a significant percentage of
the total.
The number of new industrial entrepreneurs was not large. It has
been estimated that altogether in the period 1770 to 1847 there were
1,000 to 1,500 of them, composed of three generations, thefirstof
which probably included only 100 to 200 persons.43 In addition,
of course, industrialization gave rise to growth in the number of
merchants, financiers and rentiers. Yet it remains significant that the
industrial bourgeoisie itself was small.
Unfortunately little systematic research has been done on the
distribution of wealth in Belgium during the nineteenth century.
Two useful studies do exist. The first is based on two lists of
prominent persons or "notables" drawn up in 1814 and 1815 for
use in connection with a new constitution. Table 1 provides an
occupational breakdown of those on the list for 1814. The category
of persons with the highest average annual revenue consists of
bankers, with 26,000 francs, but they are very small in number. If
we overlook them for the moment, the highest earning occupational
group is that of proprietors, with a mean revenue of 19,700 francs,
followed at a considerable distance by rentiers, officials, and the
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.
The second study is based on a register of persons who were
qualified for election to the Belgian Senate after 1830. Until 1893
most political rights in Belgium were restricted to adult males who
paid a sufficient cens — that is, a sufficient amount of certain specified
taxes. For a candidate seeking election to the Senate the cens was set
at the enormous sum of 1,000florins(2,116 francs), which effectively
restricted this political right to a small and extremely wealthy upper
stratum. Table 2 gives for each province the percentage of "eligibles"44 who were nobles in 1842 and 1892.
Both studies seem to indicate a remarkable persistence in the
wealth of the landed aristocracy during the nineteenth century. In
interpreting this finding we should first note that the nobility contin42
A good s u m m a r y of t h e origins of early entrepreneurs can b e found in J a n
D h o n d t a n d Marinette B r u w i e r , " T h e L o w C o u n t r i e s , 1700-1914", in Carlo M .
CipoUa ( e d . ) , The Emergence of Industrial Societies ( F o n t a n a Economic History of
E u r o p e , iv p t . 1, L o n d o n , 15)73), p p . 353-4; see also L e b r u n tl al., Essax sur la
Revolution industrielle en Belgupu, p p . 80-105, 151-2, 457-64.
43
L e b r u n et al., Essai sur la Revolution industneUe en Belgique, p p . 6 4 4 n . 1, 6 5 0 .
44
This was the term generally employed to refer to those qualified to run for the
Senate.
152
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
TABLE 1
THE OCCUPATIONS AND WEALTH OF THE BELGIAN NOTABLES OF 1 8 1 4 *
Occupations
Numt
Proprietors
498
Rentiers
Commerce or industry
Officials
Lawyers
Bankers
Farmers, cultivators
Notaries
Physicians, pharmacists
Others
All occupations
266
307
310
33
6
76
31
39
52
1,818
Mean annual
revenue
(in francs)
19,700
12,300
9»3°o
11,100
5,600
26,000
4,200
4,300
4,500
6,300
12,582
* Notes and sources: adapted from Lee Soltow, "The Distribution of Wealth in
Belgium in 1814-1815", 71. European Earn. Hist., x (1981). The data come from
F. G. C. Beterams, The High Society beigo-luxembourgeoise au dibut du gouvernemeni
de Gtaliaume ler, roi da Pays-Bat, 1814-181S (Wetteren, I973)- This Table is based
on the list for 1814 with the exception of the departments of Escaut and Ourthe, for
which the list of 1815 was used.
ued to own a large proportion of the land.45 Second, the economic
benefits of urbanization and industrialization were not restricted
to the industrial bourgeoisie because the demand for agricultural
products rose and population growth intensified competition for
land. The nineteenth century saw a general increase in the value of
land, which doubled between 1830 and 1880. Rents were also high,
much higher in Belgium than in England.46 Third, although only a
very small number of Belgian nobles played an entrepreneurial role,
a greater number were willing to invest in new industries and not a
few nobles became, as we shall see, active on the boards of business
corporations. For all of these reasons the Belgian landed aristocracy
did not decline in wealth as rapidly as many writers have assumed.
These studies do not, however, tell the whole story. In both cases
the data on which they are based were biased in favour of landed
wealth. The annual revenue reported for each notable on the list of
1814 included (so far as we know) all types of wealth, but the
composition of the list itself was biased; most persons found a place
on it by virtue of being among the six hundred most heavily taxed
in their department, and the taxes in question were predominantly
land taxes. The same problem obtains with the register of eligibles.
The calculation of the cens was heavily weighted in favour of land
taxes. The major exception was the droit de paterae, which was a tax
45
The impact of the French Revolution on noble landownership is discussed on
pp. 158-9 below.
** B. Seebohm Rowntree, Land and Labour: LessonsfromBelgium (London, 1910),
pp. 146-8.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
153
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLES WHO WERE NOBLES, 1842 AND 1 8 9 2 *
Province
Antwerp
Brabant
West Flanders
East Flanders
Hainaut
Liege
Limbourg
Luxembourg
Namur
Belgium
1842
1892
Total number Percentage who Total number Percentage who
of eligible!
were nobles
of eligibles
were nobles
40
85
57
63
106
130
58
35
60
46
59
55
48
50
85
74
64
80
38
44
40
51
39
75
12
58
19
74
0
0
9
44
67
33
52
77
412
58
551
50
* Notes and source: adapted from Jean Stengers et al., Index da ilgibles au ttnai,
1831-1893 (Brussels, 1975), p. i n . For liege the figures for 1891 have been used
instead of those for 1892; and for Limbourg the figures for 1843 have been used
instead of those for 1842. These are eligibles who paid the full cens of 1,000 florins.
The constitution also provided that in a province where the number of citizens paying
1,000 florins did not reach the proportion of I in 6,000, the highest cens payers in that
province would be included among the eligibles until 1 eligible per 6,000 persons
had been attained. Those who qualified by paying the full cens were known as iligibla
a cms complet, while those who paid less than 1,000 florins were known as iligibla
compUmentaira.
on certain occupations, particularly in commerce and industry. But
paying land taxes was the principal means by which people accumulated the cms and therefore qualified to run for the Senate.47 Consequently only those wealthy bourgeois who owned large amounts of
land were able to become eligibles. The Belgian commercial and
industrial bourgeoisie did indeed have an interest in buying land,
but not in great quantities, and most of their wealth remained in
other forms. A few examples can illustrate the point. In 1806 only
i8-5 per cent of the wealth of Jacques-Joseph Simonis, a well-known
woollen capitalist in Venders, consisted of landed property.48 When
William CockeriU's son John died in 1840, he left a large estate
consisting of his metallurgical works at Liege, Seraing and Tilleur,
and numerous other industrial properties. In addition his industrial
stocks, personal property and other assets were worth 13,500,000
francs. In contrast, the value of his buildings, landed properties and
woods totalled 375,000 francs.49 When the Liege industrialist and
politician Fre"d6ric Braconier died in 1912, his assets amounted to
19,000,000 francs, of which only 15 per cent was composed of landed
property.50
47
Jean Stengers et al., Index des iligibles au senat, 1831-1893 (Brussels, 1975), pp.
36-40.
*' Robert DemouUn, GuiUaume Ier et la transformation (conomique da provinca
belga, 1815-1830 (Liege, 1938), p. 243.
* Lebrun et al., Essai sur la Revolution industrielle en Belgique,p. 296.
50
Nicole Caulier-Mathy, "Industrie et politique au pays de Liege: Frfdiric Braconier, 1826-1912", Revue beige d'histoire contemporame, u (1980), p. 80.
154
PAST
AN15 PRESENT
NUMBER 105
As the century progressed, the wealth of the country shifted from
land to commerce and industry. It has been estimated that the landed
property which represented 60 per cent of the national fortune in
1846, constituted only 20 per cent by 1913.51 Obviously, therefore,
the increase between 1842 and 1892 in the number of non-nobles
among the eligibles must greatly underestimate their advance into
the wealthy upper class. Indeed when the biases in the data are taken
into account, the rise that did occur appears rather impressive.
Overall non-nobles moved from 42 to 50 per cent of the eligibles, but
in the three provinces in which commercial,financialand industrial
development was largely concentrated (Brabant, Liege and Hainaut),
they rose from 42 per cent in 1842 to 61 per cent by 1892. Elsewhere
in the country the nobility still constituted the majority of the highest
cens payers, and perhaps even a majority of the wealthiest by any
criterion. But in the regions of greatest economic development they
had definitely lost this position by the late nineteenth century.
So far the discussion has focused on personal assets. Yet this is
only one measure of economic power. It can also be measured in
terms of control over labour and non-personal capital. This is a vast
subject on which insufficient research has been done. I shah1 limit
my remarks to control over capital. As noted above, there was some
concentration of ownership in the eighteenth century. Yet it cannot
be denied that economic capital at that time was, on the whole, highly
dispersed. Most enterprises were small. Banking was important in
Ghent, Brussels and Antwerp. But taking the country as a whole,
banks were poorly developed; it has been estimated that there were
probably not more than sixty private bankers in the Southern Low
Countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century.52
Initially the Industrial Revolution did not change this situation,
at least not very noticeably. The new industrial enterprises were
relatively small and localized. Economic corporations began to
emerge, however, after the Napoleonic Wars. Twenty-three sociitis
arumymes in various sectors were formed in the period 1819-30. In
the years 1833-8 growth accelerated enormously: 130 sociitis arumymes were founded in this period, putting Belgium well ahead of
Britain and France in corporate development. By 1873 over 500
sociitis anonymes had been established, more than 300 of which were
51
Jean Barrier, "Partis politiques et classes socialcs en Belgique", Res publica, x
(1968),
p. 93; and sources he cites.
52
Julienne Laureyssens, "De Societf generale", Spiegel hisuriael, vii (1972). and
private communication with the author; cf. Rondo Cameron, Banking in the Early
Stages of Industrialization: A Study in Comparadvt History (Oxford, 1967), p. 131; V.
Janssero, "Geld-en bankwezen in de Zuidelijke Ncderlanden, 1650-1800 , in Algemene gnchiedrms da Nederianden, viii.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE I N BELGIUM
155
53
still in existence. At the same time, and in many cases by means
of sociitis anonymes, industrial concentration increased dramatically,
most notably in coal-mining and metallurgy, but also in textiles.54
Insurance companies were the most common sociitis anonymes to
be formed, especially in the early years. But the two most important
were banks: the Soci6t6 g6n£rale and the Banque de Belgique. The
Soci6t6 g6n6rale, founded in 1822, came to represent an unprecedented concentration of capital. In its first decade its lending practices
were conservative, with the result that it did not play a significant
role in Belgian industrial development. In the 1830s, on the other
hand, through a variety of methods the Soci6t6 g6n£rale began
to acquire control over businesses in metallurgy, coal-mining and
transportation, converting individually owned enterprises into
sociitis arumymes and then controlling them through subsidiaries.55
In 1835 the Banque de Belgique was set up as a rival and began to
engage in the same kind of activities.56
The directors of these big banks formed the core of the economic
61ite of the country. They were rich men. We have already seen that
the occupational group with the highest mean income among the
notables of 1814 were bankers.57 These notables were private bankers, but the directors of the new public banks were also very wealthy.
In 1836 no less than thirteen of twenty-three directors of the Socie"t6
glnlrale, the Banque de Belgique and their two major financial
subsidiaries were eligible for election to the Senate; in 1865 nine of
twenty-two directors were qualified.58 Their personal fortunes were,
however, trivial in comparison with the capital they administered.
One need not exaggerate the point and try to claim that the directors
of the great banks controlled the Belgian economy — which they
did not — in order to recognize that vastly more economic power
was concentrated in their hands than had ever been held by any
group in the country's history. Already by the late 1830s the Soci6t6
g£n£rale had participated directly in the creation of thirty-one industrial sociitis anonymes with a capitalization of 102 million francs, and
53
Louis Frtre, Etude faswrique des sociitis anonymes beiges, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1938),
i, p. 127.
54
Lebrun et al.,, Etsai sur la Revolution industrielle en Belgique,
g q , p . 185;
5; Dhondt
116 Kurgan-Van Hentenryk "Banques
3 4 6 ; G"
G" 11.^
^ 116
and Bruwier
Bruwier, "Low Countries"
Countries", P
P-346;
Hentenryk,
et entreprises", in Hasquin (ed.), wallonie, ii, pp. 37-9, 45-6; Hubert Watelet, line
industrialisation tans dtoeloppement: le bastin de Mons et le charbonnage du GrandHomu du milieu du XVIII' au milieu du XIX' siide (Ottawa, 1980), esp. pp. 250-2.
55
For a good examination of the effect of this process on the coal industry in the
Mons basin, see Watelet, Industrialisation sans diveloppement, pp. 260-70.
56
T h e Society generale and the Banque de Belgique are discussed in Frtre, Etude
hstorique des sociitis anonymes beiges; R. J. Morrison, "Financial Intermediaries and
Economic Development: T h e Belgian Case", Scandinavian Econ. Hist. Rev., xv
(1967); Laureyssens, "Soctete' generale"; Joel Mokyr, Industrialization in the Low
Countries, 1795-1850 ( N e w Haven, 1976), p p . 65-6.
37
See Table 1 above. .
58
Stengers et al., Index des iligibles au senat, p. 132.
156
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
the Banque de Belgique in twenty-four industrial sociitis anonymes
with a capitalization of fifty-four million francs.59
The e"lite that ruled over these empires came from a very restricted
social milieu. Some members, like Ferdinand Meeus, governor of
the Socidte' ge'ne'rale from 1831 to 1861, were bankers; others, like
Frederic Basse, were successful industrialists. 60 The number of
nobles generally varied with the administrative level. Both governors
of the Soctete" g£n6rale between 1831 and 1877 were commoners when
they were appointed, but were subsequently ennobled. 61 Among the
nineteen directors of the SociCte" ge'ne'rale who held office between
1831 and 1865, none came from "old" noble families. Noble representation was considerably greater among the commissioners. If we
exclude those who were ennobled after 1830, one-third of the commissioners who held office between 1831 and 1865 were nobles. 62 This
figure reflects more closely the percentage of nobles among the
shareholders of the Socie'te' ge'ne'rale, which fluctuated greatly, but
reached as high as 39 per cent at one point in the 1830s.63 The
strength of the nobility was significantly less at the general meetings
of the largest stockholders, where they made up 10 to 20 per cent in
the 1830s.64 In the Banque de Belgique in 1835 one of the four
directors was an old-regime noble, but none in either 1858 or 1865,
while one out of five commissioners were nobles in each of these
years. Unfortunately, easily accessible information on the strength
of the nobility in other banks and in insurance companies is lacking.
But we have good data on 162 industrial soci&Us anonymes. In these
companies, noble representation among directors averaged 13 per
cent and among commissioners 14 per cent during the 1830s to
i86os. 6s
The interpretation of these statistics depends partly on one's
expectations. Those who had assumed that Belgian nobles were
banished to an economic wilderness by the Industrial Revolution
59
Morrison, "Financial Intermediaries and Economic Development", pp. 64-5;
the data came from Frere, Etude hutorique des tociiUs anonymes beiges, p. 4 1 .
60
Lebrun et al., Essai tur la Revolution induttrielle en Belgique, p. 503-4 n. 1;
Patricia Scholliers-Vanden Eeckhout, "Een vertegenwoordiger van het opkomend
industriekapitalisme: Frederic Basse, van katoendrukker tot beheerder van N . V . ' s " ,
Revue beige d'hiuoire contemporaine, vii (1976).
61
Unless otherwise indicated, all the figures in the remainder of this paragraph
have been computed from information provided in Julienne Laureyssens, Industnile
naamloze vermoottchappen in Belgii, 1819-1857 (Louvain, 1975).
61
Commissioners were members of an auditing board chosen from major shareholders and meeting once or twice a year. They did not have nearly as much control
over the business as the directors.
63
Luc Francois, "De readies van de aandeelhouders van de Sotiete generale op
de Revolutiegolf van 1830", Revue beige d'tauoirt contemporame, xii (1981).
"Ibid.
65
T h e source of data on these 162 industrial companies is again Laureyssens,
Industriile naamloze vennoouchappen. I would like to thank Professor Laureyssens
for permission to use her data.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
157
will find the percentages surprisingly high. Clearly some members
of the Belgian nobility played an important role in Belgian industrialization. On the other hand it is important not to exaggerate the
strength of the nobility, particularly tie "old" nobility. They tended
more often to invest in business than to control it. This was especially
true in the most powerful of all the companies, the Soci6t6 g6n6rale,
where old-regime nobles constituted a fairly large percentage of
shareholders but held none of the directorships. Further research
might uncover sectors in which they had more control, but it is not
likely to alter the basic conclusion to be drawn from the information
we have: the unprecedented concentration of economic power that
developed in Belgium during the first half of the nineteenth century
fell largely into bourgeois hands.
Ill
THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL ELITES
The political decline of the Belgian nobility came about largely as a
result of four revolutions. A proper understanding of these revolutions is fundamental to any explanation of this process.
(i) The Liige Revolution of 1789
It is tempting to explain this revolution as a result of the comparatively developed state of the Liege economy in the late eighteenth
century. It occurred, it has been said, because there was a "larger,
more independent middle class" in Liege than elsewhere in Belgium,
and also because there was a "more advanced proletariat".66 While
there is some truth to this line of argument, it overlooks a number
of facts. First, the revolt in Liege had deep historical roots; conflict
between elements in the population and the ruling prince bishops
could accurately be described as traditional rather than modern.
Second, in so far as the revolution of 1789 was modern, it derived
most of this characteristic from French influence.67 Third, although
the vanguard of the revolution was certainly the urban bourgeoisie,
it was not primarily the commercial or industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed
significant elements within this social group, such as the haute
bourgeoisie of Venders and Huy, were prominent in the opposition
to the revolution.68
(ii) The Brabant Revolution of 1789
This uprising was more complicated. In general terms it was a
struggle against absolutist centralization of power. More specifically
it was a reactive revolt against reforms proposed by Joseph II in the
66
67
68
F . E. Huggett, Modem Belgium (London, 1969), p. 14.
Paul Harsin, La R&oolutton liigeoiu dt 1789 (Brussels, 1954), pp. 23-9, 33-4.
Ibid., p p . 94-8; Lebrun, Industrie dt la laine d Vervien, p p . 87-8.
I58
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
late 1780s that would have significantly weakened the position of
privileged groups in the society, particularly the clergy but also the
nobility and the guilds. A direct royal attack was made on the power
of the Provincial Estates. Opposition to these changes in the duchy
of Brabant came from those groups whose privileges were threatened:
members of the nobility and the high clergy, government lawyers,
and the artisans and shopkeepers who enjoyed privileges through
membership in the guilds and as representatives of the Third Estate.69 The revolution itself was led by lawyers and waged by artisans
and small shopkeepers.70
All this is straightforward enough. What made matters complicated was the emergence of a more progressive faction in the revolutionary movement (known as the Vonckists), who were greatly
influenced by French political thought and deeply affected by the
French Revolution. In contrast to the reactive faction (known as the
Vandernootists), the more radical Vonckists drew their support
primarily from those members of the middle and upper classes who
were opposed to traditional privileges: intellectuals and professionals
(especially lawyers who did not hold government positions), and
bankers, manufacturers and wholesale merchants who were opposed
to the monopolistic power of the guilds. The Vonckists also had the
support of some members of the highest nobility and the lower
clergy.71 On the whole the Vandernootists were the stronger of
the two factions. The objectives of the Vonckists were soon to be
realized — indeed surpassed — but only with the help of the French.
(iii) The French Revolution
From a legal standpoint the effect of the French Revolution was
cataclysmic. As a result of French conquest and a series of measures
that extended French legislation to the Southern Low Countries,
virtually all the legal privileges enjoyed by various groups in the
society were suppressed; the nobility and the seigneurial system were
abolished; clerical land and the properties oiimxgrii were confiscated;
guilds and indeed all trade associations were made illegal; and the
clergy were persecuted and religious institutions closed.
The least consequential were the economic effects of the revolution. The nobility lost their privileges, including their seigneurial
rights, but they managed to preserve their principal source of wealth,
which was land. Most of the land confiscated in the Southern Low
Countries and sold as biens nationaux was church property, not that
of nobles. Moreover the amount of property sold was small; regional
studies suggest that it probably represented about 10 per cent of all
69
70
Polasky, Revolutionary
Ibid.
"Ibid.
Brussels.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
159
72
land. If anything was significant, it was not the quantity of land
sold, but the social characteristics of the purchasers. They were
mostly wealthy bourgeois.73
The political impact of the revolution was more shattering. The
old political institutions were destroyed and in the early years after
the French take-over the old leadership was largely forced out of
politics. The Provincial Estates were abolished and power became
more centralized. After 1800 the old elite, including members of the
nobility, gradually began to return and in many cases they grudgingly
co-operated with the French administration.74 Nevertheless, as in
France, the Napoleonic period saw the rise of a new 61ite of notables,
among whom could certainly be found many persons who were
powerful under the old regime, but also a large number of new faces,
including, in the view of several historians, an ample representation
of bourgeois groups.75 This supposition is supported by the lists of
notables drawn up in 1814 and 1815. I have already used these lists
to demonstrate the wealth of the landed 61ite during the period.76
This is certainly the right conclusion to be drawn from the average
revenue of each occupational category, but a look at the frequency
distribution reveals considerable heterogeneity in the social composition of the Napoleonic notability. Although proprietors were numerically the largest single group, they comprised only a little more than
a quarter of the e"lite. The professional and administrative bourgeoisie
was not far behind, with 21 per cent of the total; and the commercial
and industrial bourgeoisie constituted 17 per cent of the notables.77
Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of the French Revolution was
that it abolished the formal basis for the social structure of the old
regime. Even if this social structure itself was not transformed in the
years 1792 to 1814, the legal apparatus that had preserved it was
11
Ivan Delatte, "La vcnte des biens nationalist dans l'arrondissement de Namur",
Armeies de la Sociiti archtologique de Namxtr, xl (1933), p. 2 3 3 ; Delatte, Vente da
biens nationaux dans le dtpartemeni dejemappts,
pp. 77, 86-7.
73
Delatte, "Vente des biens nationaux dans Parrondissement de Namur", pp. 2337, 241-2; Delatte, Vente des biens nationaux dans le depanemenx dejemappes,
p p . 7782; Lebrun, Industrie de la lame a Verniers, p. 9 6 ; Lebrun et al., Essai svr la
Revolution mdustrieUe en Belgiaue, p p . 99 n. 2 , 139, 382-4.
74
Verhaegen, Belgique sous la domination franqaist, iv, pp. 642-4.
73
Marcel Deneckere, Histoirt de la langue franfaise dans Us Plandres,
1770-1823
(Ghent, 1954), pp. 271-2; John Gilissen, I^regmereprtsentatif
tn Belgique depuis 1790
(Brussels, 1958), p. 4 8 ; Marie Araould, "Idees politiques et classes sociales au sein
du pouvoir communal a Mons de 1785 a 1835", Revue beige fhistoirt
contemporaine,
JX (1980), p p . 321-3.
76
See Table 1 above.
77
I have included "officials", "lawyers" and "notaries" in the professional and
administrative bourgeoisie. It should be noted that Soltow's method of classification
tends to underestimate non-proprietary representation. In cases where "proprietor"
as well as some other occupation was given for an individual, he was coded as a
proprietor. Furthermore these lists would, if anything, underestimate the strength of
new men during the Empire since they were put together after the fall of Napoleon,
though based on earlier lists of notables drawn u p by the French.
l6o
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
severely damaged, leaving the way open for a gradual but no less
decisive erosion of the social structure of the old order. In this sense
it was, as in France, a bourgeois revolution, but not in the sense that
a capitalist-oriented class seized power from the reactionary classes
of the old regime. In Belgium, as in France, the role of capitalistoriented classes in the overthrow of the old order was decidedly
secondary. Why this was the case is not entirely clear. With respect
to France, some historians have attributed it to the fact that industrialization was not sufficiently advanced by the late eighteenth century.78
These scholars may, however, be underestimating economic development in France.79 Certainly this explanation is not applicable to tie
Southern Low Countries, parts of which were economically well
developed by this time, and yet the revolutionary upheavals of the
late eighteenth century did not result from the rise of the commercial
and industrial bourgeoisie. If they resulted from the rise of any social
group, it was, again as in France, the professional and administrative
bourgeoisie.
The causes of the three revolutions considered here were complex
and by no means identical, but they do have a number of features in
common. The most basic are: first, a political crisis caused by a
government attempt to make demands or assert rights which it did
not have sufficient military capacity or enough support among vested
interests in the society to enforce; and second, a struggle for power
among various active collectivities in the society, some of which
(drawn mainly from the nobility and the clergy) were reactive —
that is, they were trying to defend traditional political rights —
while others (drawn mainly from the professional and administrative
bourgeoisie, and to a lesser extent from the commercial and industrial
bourgeoisie) were proactive — that is, they were interested in undermining traditional privileges. In all three revolutions urban unrest
played a decisive role, while in two (Liege and France) peasant unrest
was an important factor. In the French Revolution the financial
insolvency of the state played a critical role, but this was not the
case in the other two revolutions. In two (Brabant and France) state
centralization and the conflicts to which it gave rise were major
variables, though in France centralization was far more advanced
than in Brabant. Looking at the three revolutions together one cannot
78
Alfred Cobban, The Myth of the French Revolution (inaugural lecture, University
College, London, 1955), p. 13; George Taylor, "Non-Capitalist Wealth and the
Origins
of the French Revolution", Amer. Hist. Rev., bmi (1967).
7
* Richard Roehl, "French Industrialization: A Reconsideration", Explorations in
Economic History, xiii (1976); Rondo Cameron and C. E. Freedeman, "French
Economic Growth: A Radical Revision", Social Science Hist., yii (1983). One of the
problems with this revisionist literature is that it focuses attention almost entirely on
economic prosperity and growth to the neglect of economic innovation. There is no
denying, however, that the strength of the French economy in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries has been underestimated.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
l6l
escape the conclusion that common influences must have affected all
three places at once to bring about revolutions in the same year.
Although similar economic conditions could have played a part, the
spread of ideological opposition to royal absolutism and the example
of political crisis in France in the late 1780s must be included in
any explanation. In none of the three revolutions does economic
development — certainly not industrialization — seem to have had
a direct effect.80
(iv) The Dutch Regime
When the Napoleonic era came to an end, it was once again the
fate of the Belgians to have their future determined by others. Hardly
had they been liberated from the French (a liberation for which they
could claim no credit) than they were handed over to the Dutch. A
united Dutch kingdom would, it was thought, act as a buffer against
another attempt at expansion by the French.81
From 1815 until 1830 the Northern and Southern Low Countries
were joined together under one sovereign, William I. During this
period there was a partial restoration of the nobility. Certain noble
privileges were granted, though most of the rights that the nobility
had enjoyed before the revolutions were not restored. Nor was all
the nobility recognized, as happened in France. William insisted on
verifying the claims of each family, and only those who received
official recognition enjoyed noble privileges. A large number —
mostly lesser nobles — were not recognized.82
William accorded a few minor privileges to the recognized nobility,
such as the right of chase, but the major one given them was
special political representation. Although most political power was
concentrated in the hands of the sovereign and his administrative
staff, the Dutch regime was technically a constitutional monarchy
with representative institutions. The General Estates were composed
of an upper house selected by the king and a lower house chosen by
members of the Provincial Estates, who were themselves elected by
three "orders": the nobility, the towns and the country. Nobles in
the Provincial Estates were elected by an ordre iqueztre, whose members were appointed by William from among the recognized nobility.
80
On the French Revolution, see Georges Lefebvrc, The Coming of the French
Revolution ( N e w York, 1957); Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French
Revolution (Cambridge, 1964); F. Furet and D . Richet, La Revolution franchise, 2
vols. (Paris, 1965); Colin Lucas, "Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French
Revolution", Past and Present, no. 60 (Aug. 1973); Theda Skocpol, States and Social
Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979); William Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution
(Oxford, 1980).
81
T h e unification was first agreed to by treaty in London in June 1814, and then
ratified at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 by the five great powers — Russia, Prussia,
England, Austria, and France.
83
Paul Janssens, " D e restauratie van de adelstand in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden", Revue beige cfhuurirt contemporaine, zii (1981).
162
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
The effect of all this was to give considerable political representation to the nobility.83 William, however, received little thanks for
these favours. Most Belgian nobles sided politically with the clergy
against the Dutch administration, which they regarded as a threat to
traditional institutions and values, as well as their own interests.
They were unhappy with the secularism of Dutch policy, the favouritism accorded to industrial over agrarian interests, and the heavy
taxation on land.84 In contrast William enjoyed considerable support
from the business community, mainly because the thrust of government policy was to support the activities of this group.8S
(v) The Revolution of 1830
Opposition to Dutch rule grew steadily throughout the 1820s and
reached a peak in 1830. Again, as in 1789, revolution in France
served as an example to the Belgians, even if it is hard to establish
any direct connection between the two insurrections. Once more we
find both reactive and proactive collectivities undermining established authority. Indeed in this revolution a loose political alliance
was formed between active collectivities representing traditional
interests and those representing a variety of more forward-looking
elements. Both factions were opposed to the Dutch administration,
though for different reasons. It is also important not to overlook the
co-operation which the new regime received from Britain and France.
It was French military intervention in August 1831 that repelled an
attempt to retake Belgium by the Dutch, but the French themselves
had designs on Belgian territory and withdrew their troops only
under pressure from Britain.86
The vanguard of the revolutionary movement was drawn from
what one historian calls the "intellectual elite", by which she means
primarily the professional bourgeoisie, as well as several other
groups, such as students, artists and the clergy.87 It received some
support from the business bourgeoisie, but also considerable opposition. Many businessmen felt that an independent Belgium did not
have sufficient markets to prosper economically; some were afraid
that popular elements in the revolution would get out of hand; and
still others were in sympathy with the anti-clerical policies of William
83
Ibid.; see also Els W i n e , "Changes in the Belgian Elite in 1830: A Provisional
Study", Ada hiswriae ntcriandicae, xiii (1980), p. 96; and sources she cites.
84
Els Witte, "La politique financiere des revolutionnaires beiges, 1830-1831",
Revue beige cThuunre comemporaine, xii (1981), p. 665; Michel M a g i u , " D e sociopolitieke samenstelling van de Volksraad (10 november 1830 - 21 jufi 1831)", Revue
belgt (fhistoire coraemborame, xii (1981), p . 590.
" Demoulin, Gwllaume
Ier.
86
Joseph Lefevre, L'Angleterre ex la Belgique & traven la cinq dermers nicies
(Brussels, 1946), PP- 197-8.
87
W i n e , "Changes in the Belgiin Elite in 1830", p p . 104-13. T h e labouring classes
played an extremely important role in street fighting See J. W. Rooney Jr., "Profil
du combanant de 1830 , Revut beige (Phistoire contemporaine, xii (1981).
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
163
I. Opposition to the revolution was strongest in Flemish cities,
though the reasons were primarily economic rather than ethnic.
There was also strong opposition among industrialists in Wallonia,
most of whom favoured reunion with France, but some of whom,
led by John Cockerill, wanted to preserve the Dutch connection.88
As it became clear that the insurrection would succeed, many businessmen sided with it. Shortly after the revolution, a National
Congress was elected to draw up a new constitution: 184 per cent
of the members of this Congress were merchants, bankers or industrialists.89
The success of the revolution was also made possible by the
opposition to Dutch rule that prevailed among the nobility and
clergy. Like the bourgeoisie, however, the members of these groups
were far from unanimous in their attitudes towards the uprising.
Many members of the old established nobility opposed it.90 Even
nobles who favoured a change in government could not find much
comfort in the radicalism of the young intellectuals who were leading
the revolution. Yet, like the business elite, the nobility decided that
its participation was essential to safeguard its interests. It was very
well represented in the National Congress: according to one historian, no less than 38 per cent of the deputies were nobles.91
This participation in the National Congress was sufficient to secure
for the nobility considerable advantages under the new regime,
but not enough to prevent certain changes that would eventually
undermine their position. In the new constitution the king was given
the right to recognize and appoint nobles. They were not, however,
to be accorded any legal privileges; nor were they to have any special
political representation, as they had enjoyed under the old regime
and during Dutch rule. The central government of the new state was
to consist of a monarch, a senate and a chamber of representatives.
The most significant feature was that the distribution of political
power was much broader than before, but it was restricted, formally
at least, to adult males paying a sufficient cens. This requirement
applied to candidates for the Senate and to voters for both houses,
though the minimum was naturally much higher for senatorial
candidates than for voters. The cens was first introduced by the
French and then maintained by the Dutch, but its importance was
M
Jean Stengers, "Sentiment national, sentiment orangiste et sentiment fran^ais a
l'aube de notre independence", Revue beige de pkilologie et tfhistoire, zxviii (1950)
and xxix (1951); see also W i n e , "Politique financiere des rfvolutionnaires beiges".
89
Magits, "Socio-politieke samenstelhng van de Volksraad", pp. 590-1.
90
Stengers, "Sentiment national, sentiment orangiste et sentiment francaij".
91
Magits, "Socio-politieke samenstelling van de Volksraad", p. 590 n. 22. A lower
figure is given in L . de Lichtervelde, Le Congrh national de 1830: ituda et portraits
(Brussels, 1922), p. 64.
164
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
limited under these earlier regimes because the powers of representative institutions were then extremely limited.
The principles underlying such a system are obvious. The cens
was an attempt to allocate political power, not to those with the
highest status, but instead to those with the most wealth. More
specifically, it could be argued that the objective was to grant political
recognition to those members of society on whom the state depended
for tax revenue. Not all taxpayers, however, were to count equally,
and we should not jump to the conclusion that adoption of the cens
represented the triumph of the capitalist bourgeoisie. The calculation
of the cens, as already indicated, was heavily weighted in favour of
land taxes. Variations in the level of cens required also favoured
landed wealth; under the Dutch a higher cens had been necessary in
rural than in urban areas, but this differential was now reversed to
the disadvantage of the urban bourgeoisie. The urban bourgeoisie
was also penalized by the exclusion of ilecteurs capacitaires — that
is, voters who qualified by virtue of education rather than payment
of taxes. A provision for such voters had been included in the rules
for the election of the National Congress, but it was now eliminated.92
The extremely high tax requirement for election to the Senate
granted considerable political power in Belgium to the wealthy
nobility,93 while it left the remaining members of this group with
no more political rights than the bourgeoisie. This was a compromise
between liberals and conservatives that denied any special political
privileges to the nobility per se, but gave an important segment of this
group real power. At the same time other aspects of the constitution,
especially the establishment of the Chamber of Representatives and
the powers accorded to it, brought about a major transfer of political
power. The critical fact was now that the members of both houses
were to be chosen by an electorate which, if not ideal from the point
of view of the bourgeoisie, was nevertheless composed overwhelmingly of members of this group. We should be very clear, however,
as to which bourgeoisie we are talking about. The cens for voting was
sufficiently high to restrict this right to a small group. The electorate
in 1831 constituted only about 5 per cent of the male population
aged twenty-five years or older.94
The Revolution of 1830 brought a new political 61ite into power.95
92
Gilissen, Riginu reprisenlanf en Belgique depuis 1790, pp. 91-2.
See Table 2 above, where it was appropriate to include only iligibles & ctns
complet since we were then interested in identifying the highest taxpayers in the
country. N o w , however, we are interested in who actually had the right to run for
the Senate and so iligibles compUmenXaires should be included. The effect would be
to raise the proportion of non-nobles by a few percentage points.
94
In 1831 there were 46,000 eligible voters. See Gilissen, Riginu reprisenlarif en
Belgupu depuis 1790, p. 188. Along with the tax requirement, the franchise was
restricted to males twenty-five years old or older.
95
W i n e , "Changes in the Belgian Elite in 1830", pp. 108-9.
93
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
165
Nobles sympathetic to the new regime replaced nobles who were
opposed to it. The same kind of circulation occurred within the
bourgeoisie. The relative strength of the two social groups changed
less abruptly, but over the long run this too underwent a major shift.
The upper house during the Dutch period had been composed almost
entirely of nobles; 90 per cent of the seats in the new Senate were
held by nobles in the years 1831-4, but by 1840 the figure had fallen
to 61 per cent. And whereas the majority of the deputies in the Dutch
lower house had been nobles, in the new Chamber of Representatives
only 22 per cent of the deputies in 1831-4 and 10 per cent in 1840
were nobles.96 The social group that experienced the most upward
mobility was the professional and administrative bourgeoisie, which
not only advanced in the state bureaucracy, but also came to hold
no less than 66 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Representatives
in 1831-4. The business bourgeoisie, in contrast, remained poorly
represented in the central parliamentary institutions, where they
held only 13 per cent of the elected seats.97
It could be argued, however, that we obtain a much better sense
of what the business bourgeoisie gained from the Revolution of 1830
if we focus not on the political positions they came to hold, but on
the power they acquired in statefinancing.The new government was
financially vulnerable both because it lacked support in the financial
community and because it was forced, in order to secure political
popularity, into costly policies which could only be carried out
through heavy borrowing. As a result it did everything it could to
win the co-operation of the financial elite of Brussels, and through
this elite to obtain credit from the internationalfinancialworld. The
most important assistance was a loan obtained from the Rothschilds
at the end of 1831. This loan saved the new regime from collapse,
but also inaugurated a period of government dependency on the
European financial world, which lasted throughout the nineteenth
century.98
(vi) The Bourgeois State
Belgian politics during most of the nineteenth century was dominated by a struggle between two political groups, known as the
Catholics and the Liberals. In general terms, the Catholics represented the relatively religious, conservative and rural elements in
the society, while the Liberals represented the more secular, more
progressive and more urban middle-class elements. Ideologically,
Liberals can be regarded as descendants of the Vonckists and similarly inclined active collectivities of the 1790s; even in the mid94
Ibid., pp. 96, 98-9; Bartier, "Partis politiques et classes sociales", p. 49; and
sources they cite.
97
Witte, "Changes in the Belgian Elite in 1830", pp. 103 (and n. 60), 108-9.
98
Witte, "Politique financiers des rfvolutionnaires beiges", esp. pp. 671-4.
166
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
nineteenth century they still claimed to be fighting against the
classes priviligiies of the old regime.99 Over-represented among its
supporters were most bourgeois social groups, including the business
bourgeoisie. Most nobles and the bulk of the rural population
supported the Catholics. 10° For both groups, however, we are talking
about a very restricted body politic. The size of the electorate grew
in the last half of the century, but hardly more rapidly than the
population; the proportion of adult males enfranchised did not
exceed 10 per cent up to 1893.101 Until then, political power was
concentrated in the hands of a small ilite censitaire.
Within this 61ite nobles remained an influential element, but they
were greatly outnumbered and inevitably their power declined. In
some spheres it persisted longer than in others. They were favoured
in diplomacy and at the royal court. They also continued to enjoy
considerable local power and influence, at least in rural areas and in
small towns.102 On the other hand they had almost no voice in the
Chamber of Representatives. In the Senate their control of seats fell
from 61 per cent in 1840 to 48 per cent in 1850 and to not more than
a quarter by i9Oi.103From 1831 to 1865, during the reign of Leopold
I, twenty-two nobles held cabinet posts; from 1865 to 1909, during
the longer reign of Leopold II, only twelve ministers were nobles.104
Thus the country came to be governed by a political 61ite composed
overwhelmingly of non-nobles. Some were businessmen. Indeed, in
comparative perspective, one would have to say that a remarkably
large number of businessmen were active in Belgian politics during
the last half of the nineteenth century, many of whom made little
attempt to disguise the fact that they represented industrial interests.
A good example of this kind of businessman-politician was Fr&ie'ric
Braconier, who represented Liege, initially in the Chamber of Representatives and then for over twenty-five years in the Senate. He
entered politics because he believed that political activity was as
important as industrial initiative to the prosperity of his business.
He first campaigned for the Chamber of Representatives in 1861 as
the spokesman of industry and commerce; once elected he sought to
represent industrial interests, especially the coal-mining industry,
and to promote the building of railways. Repeatedly during his
career the left-wing press charged that he used politics for personal
gain and for advancing the interest of the capitalist industrial class.105
99
Bartier, "Partis politiques et classes sociales", p . 33.
Ibid., p . 8 8 .
Gilissen, Rtgimt reprisentatif en Belgique deptds 1790, p p . 188-9.
102
Rowntree, Land and Labour, p . 129; Stengers et al., Index des eligible* au ttnat,
p. 107; D e Belder, "Adel en burgerij".
103
Bartier, "Partis politiques et classes sociales", p p . 4 9 , 93; and sources he cites.
104
Georges H . D u m o n t , La vie quondienne en Bttgique sous It rigru de Leopold II,
186S-1909 (Brussels, 1974). P- +*•
>°3 Caulier-Mathy, "Frederic Braconier". Numerous references to businessmen
engaged in politics can be found in this article. For other examples, see Kurgan-Van
(amLmp. J67;
100
101
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
167
It is in this period that the over-simplified image of Belgium as a
society dominated by business leaders comes closest to the truth.
There was of course considerable regional variation. Certain districts,
such as Antwerp and Verviers, were particularly noted for sending
businessmen to represent them in Brussels, while in most districts
the business community had a very limited influence and only
occasionally managed to get a deputy elected.106 Thefinancierswho
made up the national business e"lite were usually well represented in
the government. In 1870, for example, five of the seven members of
the board of directors of the Soci6t6 glnlrale held a parliamentary
seat or a ministerial post.107
It goes almost without saying, however, that business politicians
alone could not represent the social group to which they belonged.
We are much in need of research on the relations among the various
fractions of the bourgeoisie in Belgium, especially in this period, in
order to assess whether or not the business bourgeoisie enjoyed
hegemony in Gramsci's sense.108 From what we do know, however,
it is clear that the business bourgeoisie in Belgium benefited greatly
from an alliance they were able to form with a specific element within
the professional and administrative bourgeoisie who shared their
world view. In the period from 1857 to 1884 this alliance was
personified in Walthere Frere-Orban, a lawyer from Liege who
married into the industrial family of Orban. Although businessmen
could sometimes still find reason to complain, in general the Liberal
governments that Frere-Orban headed were sympathetic to business
interests. By the mid-nineteenth century economic liberalism had
come to dominate the thinking of the Belgian political 61ite. This
liberalism sought above all to eliminate any obstacle to free exploitation of the labour-market, but it also tried to advance freedom
of trade, first by eliminating tariffs on agricultural produce and
subsequently by reducing them on industrial goods.109
Even the Catholics, though less responsive than the Liberals, by
(». 105 cow.)
Hentenryk, "Banques et entreprises", pp. 28, 3 4 , 51; Maurice van den Eynde, Rapid
Warocqui, seigneur de Mariemont, 1870-1917 (Morlanwelz, 1970); and Nicole CaulierMathy and P. Geiin, "Les senateurs elus dans la province de Liege durant le regime
censitaire, 1831-1893", Tijdschrifi voor geschiedems, xcii (1979).
104
Spokesmen for the textile industry of Verviers entered the Senate in an earlier
period than did leaders of the metallurgical industry of Liege; the wealth and power
of the latter developed more slowly with the result that they did not become a
significant political force until after 1850. See Caulier-Mathy and Gerin, "Senateurs
elus dans la province de Liege", p . 420.
107
Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, "Banques et entreprises", p . 5 1 .
105
Several good discussions of Gramsci's concept can be found in Jon Bloomfield
(ed.), The Commimut University of London: Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party
(London, 1977).
109
Such a policy was easier on Belgian industry than it was on Belgian agriculture,
and the agricultural crisis that came after 1880 led to a rcintroduction of some
agricultural tariffs. See B.-S. Chlepner, Cents ans d'kistoire sociale en Belgique (Brussels, 1956), esp. pp. 73-4.
168
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
and large protected the interests of business whenever they were in
power, at least until the late 1880s. Nobles were over-represented
in the Catholic party, but by no means dominated it. Moreover, the
conflicts that had once pitted the liberal bourgeoisie against the
nobility — for example, the hostility of the one side towards privileges and the bitterness of the other side over the purchase of biens
nationaux — issues such as these gradually came to seem less relevant,
while a number of common concerns, most notably the protection
of property rights, steadily brought opposing divisions of the ilite
censitaire together. Investment by nobles in business, noble membership on the boards of sociitfs anonymes, marriages between the
nobility and the bourgeoisie, and imitation of the noble life style by
successful non-nobles — all of these factors contributed to integration, though the distinction between the two groups has never been
erased.110
IV
THE DECLINE OF THE NOBILITY
Let us now try to assess in general terms what happened to the
Belgian nobility in the nineteenth century. To start with the obvious,
it did not disappear. During the French Revolution it was abolished,
but only legally, and even that was temporary. Under the Dutch the
nobility recovered its legal status, which it has retained ever since.
In the kingdom of Belgium nobles are recognized by the monarchy
and new ones are appointed in acknowledgment of outstanding merit
or services. Unlike the French nobility, the Belgian nobility is
legitimated by the state; it is illegal to assert nobility without official
recognition. Indeed noble status has if anything become more institutionalized since 1815 than it was under the old regime.111
If it has persisted as a legally based status group, has the Belgian
nobility declined numerically? Counting nobles is almost always a
hazardous undertaking, but estimates suggest that in the eighteenth
century there were 1,000 to 1,200 noble families in what is now
Belgium.112 A total of 760 "old" noble families were recognized
after 1830, of whom it would seem that about half survived to 1957.
In addition, there were some 630 ennoblements between 1815 and
1976, of which about 500 families have survived to the present.
110
Barrier, "Partis politiques et classes sociales en Belgique", p. 94; Caulier-Mathy
and Gerin, "Senateurs 61us dans la province de Liege", pp. 418, 423-4.
111
De Belder, "Adel en burgerijrF.
112
Verhaegen guessed 1,500 to 2,000 noble families, but this figure is rejected by
Paul Janssens, who suggests 1,000 to 1,150 Uncages or 9,000 to 15,500 persons for
the territories that now comprise Belgium. Verhaegen's estimate appears in his
Belgique sous la domination franfaise, iv, p. 662. An estimate by Janssens for the
Austrian Low Countries can be found in "La densiti nobiliaire dans les Pays-Bas
autrichiens a la fin de I'anden regime", Actes du congris de la Ftdtratxon da cercles
d'archeologie et d'hiuoirt de Belgiqut, xlvi (1982).
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
169
Altogether there were 889 noble families in 1976, including both
"old" nobility and families ennobled in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.113
It would seem, then, that the nobility of the old regime has
declined numerically since the eighteenth century. Two reasons
stand out. First, only a proportion of the "old" nobility was recognized after 1830. Unfortunately we cannot say precisely what proportion, since the estimates we have for the number of nobles in the
eighteenth century are at best approximate. Yet some decline plainly
took place at that time. Second, the fertility rate of Belgian noble
families has been low in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with
the result that they have been highly vulnerable to extinction.114 On
the whole, ennoblements have offset this natural decrease. Yet it is
worth noting that the number of ennoblements was initially small.
Napoleon granted only 11, William only 38, and Leopold I only 8
until 1840. After 1840 the number increased markedly: there were
85 from 1840 until the end of the reign of Leopold I in 1865, and
127 during the reign of Leopold II — that is, until 1909.115 Thus
the noble population suffered a decline in the first hah0 of the
nineteenth century, even if we do not consider the nobles of the old
regime who were not recognized. *16 In the last half of the nineteenth
century the size of the nobility increased, and ennoblements have
been sufficient in the twentieth century to assure that there are as
many recognized nobles in Belgium today as there were in the 1830s.
But the nobility is still smaller than it was in the eighteenth century.
If we also take into account the fact that the total Belgian population
more than doubled in the course of the nineteenth century and has
increased by another 50 per cent since 1900, we can be certain
that, as a percentage of the population, the nobility has declined
significantly since the old regime.
It would be helpful to know something about the social characteristics of those ennobled by the Belgian kings. One source provides
this information for 204 ennoblements between 1830 and 1957.
Almost two-thirds were persons who had served the state as politicians, military officers, functionaries, or judicial officers, while only
10 per cent were businessmen.117 Such a pattern of ennoblements
has probably done more to maintain the status and political power
associated with the nobility than to maintain its economic power.
113
Lucien Fourez, "De la necessity d'anoblissements pour le maintien d'une
noblesse nationale", Recueil de FOffice gtniologique el htraldique de Bdgique, ix
(1959); Ghellinck Vaemewyck, "Noblesse de Belgique", p. lxxvi.
114
Fourez, "De la necessity d'anoblissements"; Janssens, "Densitf nobiliaire dans
les Pays-Bas autrichiens"; and sources he cites.
113
Fourez, "De la necessity d'anoblissements", p. 29.
116
De Belder estimates that 134 families disappeared between 1825 and 1847. See
his "Adel en burgerij", p. 81.
117
Fourez, "De la necessity d'anoblissements", p. 25.
170
PAST AND PRESENT
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The recognition of a few outstanding businessmen, such as Ferdinand
Meeus and Edouard Empain, should not deceive us. On the whole,
there were few such cases. Nor was landed wealth infused into the
nobility to any great extent. Only twenty-nine of those ennobled
between 1842 and 1892 paid a cens high enough that they could run
for the Senate. n8 More significant, no doubt, was the enrichment of
noble families through marriages to the daughters of wealthy members of the bourgeoisie. We can be certain that there was a change
in the character of the Belgian nobility as a result of the Industrial
Revolution; a large number of nobles invested in industry and some
have even played an active role in the business world. This point
should not, however, be over-emphasized. As noted above, some
nobles were active in commerce and industry in the eighteenth
century. In both periods, moreover, the predominant characteristic
of those admitted to the nobility has been the same, namely state
service.
In what sense is it valid to talk about the decline of the Belgian
nobility? First, it declined numerically. I would insist that in our
calculations the new nobility should be included as much as the old,
but even counting this way, one finds a numerical contraction since
the eighteenth century. Second, there was a relative decline in
economic power. Although still very affluent vis-i-vis the general
population, the personal wealth of the nobility probably compared
more favourably with that of the bourgeoisie in die eighteenth century
than it does today. More significantly, other groups have come to
hold greater economic power by controlling a larger share of capital
and labour. Third, there has been a relative decline in political
power. In both representative institutions and in the state administrative apparatus, the nobility has lost the enormous influence it once
enjoyed. Fourth, the nobility no longer enjoys the legal privileges
that formerly served to maintain its position. Lastly, the Belgian
nobility has no doubt experienced some decline in its status. Yet the
decrease in status has, I suspect, been less than the decrease in their
economic or political power. Aside from the great respect still
accorded to descendants of the "old" nobility, new members of the
nobility enjoy high prestige because they have been selected by the
king for special recognition.
In other words the nobility in Belgium has survived as a status
group, but a status group that has experienced a relative loss in its
political and economic power, and virtually a total loss in the legal
privileges that served to maintain this power. Nobility has not been
transformed from an ascribed into an achieved status. Although I
would not deny that there has been less ascription of status in
118
Stengers el al., Index dts iligibla
au stnal, p. 113.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
171
Belgium in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than took place
in the eighteenth century, the nobility constitutes an exception to
this rule. The rate of ennoblement has in fact been lower since 1815
than it was under the Habsburgs.119 Now and in the eighteenth
century, noble status has been both ascribed and achieved.
V
CONCLUSION
It is not all that easy to identify a direct causal link between the
economic rise of the bourgeoisie and its political rise. The business
bourgeoisie did not play a decisive role in the political transformations that occurred. Businessmen certainly took advantage of these
transformations, but that is not the same thing as causing them or
helping to cause them. To a certain extent it is possible to argue that
the economic power of the business bourgeoisie served to enhance
its political power. With reference to other European countries, it
has been suggested that in the nineteenth century the state became
dependent on the capitalist bourgeoisie as a source of credit and
tax revenue, and in return granted businessmen greater political
influence. This argument does find some support in the Belgian case.
We have seen that the new Belgian government formed after the
Revolution of 1830 was assisted by thefinancialelite of Brussels and
that the state became dependent thereafter on thefinancialworld for
credit. Similarly the political system established in 1830 granted
political rights according to wealth or, more precisely, according to
the taxes people paid.
There is no doubt considerable merit in this kind of explanation,
but several awkward facts get in the way. First, the reliance of the
state on the financial elite for credit was hardly a new phenomenon;
although the sums of money may not have been as large in earlier
periods, the degree of dependence does not appear to have been any
less.120 Second, the Belgian nobility remained, on the whole, very
wealthy during the Industrial Revolution. And third, the Belgian
constitution, in granting political rights to certain segments of the
population, strongly favoured landed wealth over other forms. Indeed the high cms requirement for the Senate was advocated by
conservative elements and adopted by the National Congress as a
concession to the nobility, not in order to transfer power to the
bourgeoisie. In so far as economic power played a role in Belgian
119
W e can compare the 630 ennoblements between 1815 and 1976 with 600
ennoblements by letters patent in the Austrian Low Countries during the eighteenth
century. For an analysis of eighteenth-century ennoblements, see Viviane Richard,
"Les anoblissements dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens" (University libre de Bruxelles,
memoire de licence, i960).
120
Davis, Joseph II, pp. 18-19; Janssens, "Geld-en bankwezen in de Zuidelijke
Nederlanden , p. 207.
172
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 105
parliamentary politics during the nineteenth century, its primary
effect was to enhance the strength of the landed class above what it
would otherwise have been, not the strength of the urban bourgeoisie.
The urban bourgeoisie came to enjoy greater representation in political institutions than the nobility not so much because of its wealth
(though this was certainly a factor), but rather because of its greater
numbers. It was primarily the establishment of a political system in
which this numerical advantage could be translated into power that
gave the bourgeoisie its political ascendancy, and this occurred as a
direct result of a revolution to which many businessmen were opposed. The numerical strength that the bourgeoisie thus acquired in
politics was not primarily a function of industrialization. Indeed the
proportionate number of voters was greater in non-industrial urban
centres, such as Brussels and Antwerp, than in industrial centres,
such as Ghent and Liege.121
One can of course turn the argument around and hypothesize that
political revolutions caused or at least permitted economic change
to occur. Some supporting evidence can be mustered for this view,
but not much. The French Revolution did enable the bourgeoisie to
buy land that formerly belonged to the church, but in Belgium we
are not talking about a lot of property. The new Belgian government
of the 1830s was somewhat more receptive to the formation of sociitis
anonymes than the Dutch government had been. Yet the Dutch rulers
could hardly be described as economically restrictive; it was William
himself who founded the Soci6t6 generate. We are on stronger ground
if we point to the abolition of tariff and guild restrictions by the
French. Still one wonders whether the earlier restrictions really
constituted a serious impediment to economic development in the
eighteenth century, serious enough that their removal explains the
Industrial Revolution. Their abolition clearly does not explain why
Belgium industrialized more rapidly than France.
Without rejecting these lines of argument altogether, I would
propose two additional reasons which, in my view, provide a better
explanation for the fact that the economic and political rise of the
Belgian bourgeoisie occurred over roughly the same period — that
is, from the late eighteenth century to the mid or late nineteenth
century. In part there was a direct causal relationship between the
two phenomena, but there was also a connection that can only be
described as indirect.
First, the direct causal link. As a result of the economic changes
that occurred in the late eighteenth century and throughout the
nineteenth century, the state increasingly looked to the new industries as the basis on which economic progress would be made and
121
De Belder, "Add en burgerij", pp. 86-7.
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
173
national wealth increased. The most striking illustration of this
attitude is that of the Dutch government, which ruled Belgium from
1815 to 1830. In many ways a reactionary regime that sought to
reverse the damage done to the old order by the French Revolution,
this government nevertheless saw very clearly that national wealth
would in future depend more on industry than on agriculture.
Consequently, though businessmen were not active in politics in the
1820s, the policies of those who were in power were highly favourable
to their interests, too favourable in the eyes of some members of the
landed 61ite. Naturally after 1830 such policies were even more likely
to be adopted by the governments in power, especially Liberal
governments in which the agrarian interest was relatively weak. It
was of course hardly unprecedented for the state to attach high
priority to wealth and prosperity. What was new was the importance
of industry to those goals: in the nineteenth century, to a greater
extent than ever before, industry expanded relative to agriculture as
a source of national wealth. If put in these terms, which emphasize
the strategic position of the industrial bourgeoisie rather than its
political authority, the argument that its economic power enhanced
its political power has considerable validity.
Yet even these considerations do not completely explain the coincidence of the Industrial Revolution and the multiple political revolutions that brought down the old order. If we want to arrive at a
satisfactory explanation we must look beyond the geographical confines of this essay at the larger European context. At various key
points in this article I have quite consciously invoked external factors
to account for events or developments in Belgium. For some three
centuries most of the Southern Low Countries formed part of the
Habsburg Empire. In the late eighteenth century the Austrian
Habsburgs tried to increase their control over these lands, but did
not have the military strength or the internal political support
necessary to do so. Nor, when the time came, did they have the
means to protect these provinces from the French, with the result
that the Southern Low Countries were subject to almost the full
impact of the French Revolution. The influence of France on the
Belgian provinces has been eternal and enormous. For the concerns
of this article the most important effects have been: first, the diffusion
of French political ideas; second, the example and direct consequences of the French Revolution; third, the example of the July
Revolution in 1830; and fourth, military intervention by the French
in 1831 against the Dutch. The Dutch of course also exerted a
significant impact on the Belgians, though like the Austrians they
did not have the strength or support necessary to rule them. Their
period of administration came to an end with yet another revolution,
which turned out to have profound repercussions for the old order.
174
PAST
AND PRESENT
NUMBER IO5
At the same time the Belgians have always been in a position to
experience British influences. The most important for our problem
was the spread of the British pattern of industrialization to Belgium.
In addition, while French political thought has had a much greater
impact on Belgium than have ideas from Britain, the example provided by British parliamentary democracy should not be overlooked.
Finally, Britain played a crucial role in the struggle for Belgian
independence. Britain and Prussia liberated the Southern Low Countries from France. Although Britain was a party to the unification of
the Low Countries, it was British and French support that enabled
the Belgian Revolution to succeed and prevented the recovery of the
new state by the Dutch. And it was British support that defended
Belgium from threats to its independence during the Franco-Prussian
War.
What stands out most of all is that Belgium has combined within
itself the industrial development that characterized England and the
political changes that characterized France. Industrial revolution
and political revolution came together in Belgium owing to the
simultaneous influences of its two largest neighbours. Yet the significance of intersocietal forces acting on Belgium goes further still.
Belgium has been inextricably entangled in the evolution of European national states and in rivalries among them. It has repeatedly
found itself at the centre of struggles over how the continent should
be carved up politically. Wars, treaties, victories and defeats have
all played leading roles in the story told in the preceding pages.
Indeed Belgium would not exist today if it were not for the failure
of three ventures in state-making — by the Austrians, the French
and the Dutch.
Any explanation of the rise of the Belgian bourgeoisie must take
into account the weaknesses of the successive states on which the old
order came to depend. There is an irony here that is not unique to
Belgium. In the eighteenth century the Belgian nobility was far from
unanimous in its support of Habsburg rule. Many nobles served in
government posts and some were even intensely pro-Habsburg, but
collectively the nobility, especially in Brabant, sought to resist
centralizaton of power and formed part of the reactive movement
opposed to the reforms of Joseph II. In doing so they contributed to
the weakness of the Austrian regime, a weakness that made it all the
easier for the French revolutionary armies to conquer the Southern
Low Countries and to deal a blow to the nobility far in excess of
anything the Habsburgs had had in mind. Similarly the nobility did
little to support the Dutch regime and many nobles even opposed
it, but it was the collapse of this regime which made possible the
constitutional changes that ultimately destroyed the political power
of the Belgian nobility. Yet it will not do to blame the nobility
NOBILITY AND BOURGEOISIE IN BELGIUM
I75
entirely for its own downfall. With or without noble support, the
Austrian and Dutch regimes were fundamentally unstable, and this
instability led to the political upheavals which had such enormous
consequences for the nobility.
This essay has sought to show that the Belgian nobility did not
decline as rapidly as many observers have assumed; Belgium certainly does not serve as a good example of a western European
country where the circulation of Elites occurred at a relatively early
point in time as a result of precocious industrialization. I have also
suggested that the most important feature of the social structure of
the old regime in Belgium was the relatively close fit between status,
economic power and political power, and that the nineteenth century
saw a breakdown in this consistency, at least for the Belgian nobility,
with its economic and political power declining more than its status.
And finally I have argued that there was more than a simple causal
relationship between those transformations that brought about the
economic rise of the bourgeoisie and those that brought about its
political rise. The relationship between these two processes is complex and cannot be understood without taking into account the
historical interplay between industrialization and state-making in the
larger context of western Europe.
University of Western Ontario
Samuel Clark