The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
doi:10.1093/cjip/por005
Advance Access publication 17 March 2011
Equilibrium Analysis of the
Tributary System
Zhou Fangyin*y
Introduction
During the course of China’s continuing rise, Chinese scholars have developed different schools of thought on China and even greater interest in
ancient Chinese philosophy and diplomacy.1 Under this backdrop, research
into China’s tributary system has become a main academic focus.
Much controversy surrounds both the tributary system and the broader
concept of a tributary relationship. The term ‘tributary’ itself is often misunderstood to mean unilateral behaviour towards China among states in
China’s periphery, or even to imply that the tributaries direct the relationship.2 Some scholars are predisposed towards using concepts and terms
other than that of ‘tributary’, for example, the ‘Order of Rule by Rites’,3
y
1
2
3
The author would like to thank Zhang Yuyan, Gao Cheng, Feng Weijiang, He Kai, Pu
Xiaoyu, Zhang Feng, Sun Xuefeng, and Xu Jin, all of whom contributed valuable comments and suggestions to an earlier draft of this article. The author remains solely responsible for any errors or shortcomings in this article.
Zhou Fangyin is Associate Research Professor at Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese
Academy of Social Science.
For example, Qin Yaqing, ‘Guoji guanxi lilun Zhongguo xuepai shengcheng de keneng he
biran’ (‘The Possibility and Inevitability of the Emergence of a Chinese School of
International Relations Theory’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and
Politics), No. 3 (2006), pp. 7–13; Ye Zicheng, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi de Zhongguo waijiao
sixiang (Chinese Foreign Policy Thinking during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States
Periods) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong shehui kexue chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2003); Zhao
Tingyang, Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun (The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for
the World System) (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005); Yan Xuetong, Xu Jin, et al.,
Wangba tianxia sixiang ji qidi (Thoughts on World Leadership and Inspirations) (Beijing:
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2009).
Chen Shangsheng, ‘Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi yanjiu chuyi’ (‘Opinions on
Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations Research’), in Chen Shangsheng, ed., Zhongguo
chuantong duiwai guanxi de sixiang, zhidu yu zhengce (Traditional Chinese Foreign
Relations: Theory, Institution and Policy) (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2007), p. 18.
Huang Zhilian, Tianchao lizhi tixi yanjiu: Yazhou de huaxia zhixu—Zhongguo yu Yazhou
guojia guanxi xingtai lun (Research on the Order of Rule by Rites: The Chinese Order in
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected].
ß The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]
148 Zhou Fangyin
the ‘lord and vassal’,4 and ‘grant and tribute’ relationships;5 and the ‘Clan
and Vassal Institution’, the ‘Suzerain – Vassal’ and ‘Clan and Vassal
Systems’, and the ‘Huayi Order’.6 Zhang Feng argues in observing the
wide range of terms and concepts used in the literature that there is
strong need for a systematic rethinking of the concept of the tribute system.7
The debate surrounding the tributary system has undoubtedly enriched
our understanding of the Chinese ancient diplomacy and the international
system predominant in East Asia in earlier times. Regardless of what term
we use to describe this system or institutional configuration that it existed
for the greater part of East Asian history is indisputable. This article uses the
term tributary system in reference to the regional institutional configuration
founded on China’s superior position with respect to its neighbours. This
should not be taken to mean that China’s superior position was static or
absolute—on the contrary, during certain historical periods China lost its
primacy, and the Asia region transitioned into a bipolar or even multi-polar
regional system that changed to a great extent the institutional fabric of the
regional framework and state actors’ mode of behaviour.8 Such periods,
though, are the exception rather than the rule. China’s superior position
4
5
6
7
8
Asia—A Theory of Relations between China and the States of Asia) (Beijing: Zhongguo
renmin daxue chubanshe, 1992).
Gao Mingshi classifies tributary regions as those which received titles from Chinese
Emperors and paid tribute, and those that paid tribute without receiving titles. See Gao
Mingshi, Tianxia zhixu yu wenhuaquan de tansuo (The World System and Explorations of
the Culture Circles) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008), p. 30.
For example, Li Jinming, ‘Mingchao ZhongLiu fenggong guanxi lunxi’ (‘An Analysis of
the Tributary Relations between Ming China and Ryukyu’), in Chen Shangsheng, ed.,
Rujia wenming yu Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi (Confucianism Civilization and
Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations) (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2008), pp.
260–70. In comparison with tributary system, the concept of a grant and tribute system
better expresses the two way nature of the relationship in that it refers both to the granting
of a title and the payment of tribute.
See Sun Hongnian, Qingdai Zhong Yue zongfan guanxi yanjiu (A Study of Sino-Vietnam
Court-Vassal Relations during the Qing Dynasty) (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe,
2006); Zhang Cunwu, Qing Han zongfan maoyi 1637-1894 (Trade in the Qing-Korean
Court-Vassal Relations, 1637-1894) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo,
1978); He Fangchuan, ‘Huayi zhixu Lun’ (‘On the Huayi Order’), Beijing daxue xuebaozhexue shehuikexue ban (Journal of Peking University-Social Science Philosophy Edition),
No. 6 (1998), pp. 30–45.
It is important to note that Zhang Feng’s point of view is developed from the perspective
of the ‘British School of International Relations Theory’. See Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking the
‘‘Tribute System’’—Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics’,
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No.4 (2009), pp. 545–74.
For example, during the early Western Han Dynasty, the Western Han and the Xiongnu
represented a bipolar system; at times ‘the Southern Song and Jin’ could be characterized
as a bipolar system, ‘the Northern Song, Liao, Western Xia and Jin’ could be characterized
as a multi-polar system. See Morris Rossabi, ed., China among Equals (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983); Wu Xiaoping, Songdai waijiao zhidu yanjiu
(Research on Foreign Policy Systems of the Song Dynasty) (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2006); Sun Lizhou, ‘Xihan shiqi Dongya guoji tixi de liangji geju fenxi’ (‘An
Analysis of the Bipolar International System in East Asia during the Western Han
Period’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 8 (2007), pp.
17–25; Hu Bo, ‘Gudai Dongya guoji guanxi tixi de zhaoshi’ (‘The Beginning of the
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 149
within Asia was the norm throughout history, and had direct influence on
the expectations and diplomatic behaviour of regional actors, moulding the
region’s unique institutional arrangement. The theoretical value of analysing
the behaviour of states under this arrangement should be obvious.
The goal of this article is to analyse the stability of the tributary system.
As an institutional framework, the existence of the tributary system depends
on such factors as its conceptions of foreign policy, the specific contents of a
foreign policy strategy, and underlying strategic considerations. The tributary system itself is hence more than just a conceptual construct—it is also
an actual set of policies. The system existed as a continuous set of abstract
principles that were applied to both diplomatic strategy and foreign policy
over several thousand years of Chinese history.9 This implies that the tributary system has its own rational on both the strategic and policy levels; it
would not otherwise have experienced historical continuity as such, and
likely have been replaced by an evolving institutional framework, instead
of reaching an acme of sophistication during the waning years of the Ming
and Qing Dynasties and of the feudal system. The tributary system is a
world model, which combines both ideals and reality.10 Considering it on
only the ideational level is hence insufficient. The value of research into the
tributary system lies in its being not just an imagined system or a conceptual
construct, but an actual configuration of institutions.
There exists significant literature which discusses the tributary system and
tributary institutions, but mostly from a historian’s perspective. Its focus is
on the historical evolution, the key components, and conception structure of
the system.11 This work, though, is limited to discussions of specific Chinese
concepts such as the Huayi concept, that of the Middle Kingdom and of All
Under the Heavens, and to textual analyses of the System of Five Ranks and
of Nine Ranks as it appears in the Shangshu (Documents of the Elder),
Guoyu (The Monarchs’ Remarks), and Zhouli (the Rites of Zhou). None
provides anything that approaches a full understanding of the tributary
system. By the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period,
9
10
11
System of International Relations in Ancient East Asia’), Waijiao pinglun (Foreign Affairs
Review), No. 1 (2008), pp. 50–9.
By the Western Han Period, the Tributary System had taken its basic form and shape. The
historical roots of the Tributary System can be traced back to early Qin period. See Li
Yunquan, Chaogong zhidu shilun (On the History of the Tributary System) (Beijing: Xinhua
chubanshe, 2004).
Chen Tingxiang and Zhou Ding, Tianxia, shijie, guojia (Under the Heavens, the World, The
State) (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 2008), p. 3.
For example, Li Yunquan offers a history and analysis of the tributary system, while Chen
Shangsheng discusses the concept of Tianxia or ‘all under the heavens’, the concept of
Wangba, the concept of Huayi, the concept of Yili, and other concepts related to foreign
affairs from the Confucian perspective. See Li Yunquan, On the History of the Tributary
System; Chen Shangsheng, ‘Shilun rujia wenming zhong de shewai linian’ (‘A Theory of
the Confucian Concept of Foreign Affairs’), in Chen Shangsheng, ed., Confucianism
Civilization and Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 1–20.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
150 Zhou Fangyin
the System of Five Ranks had in reality ceased to function as a working set
of institutions. Its collapse demonstrates that conceptual constructions used
at the policy level do not resolve the problem of continuity.
J. K. Fairbank and his collaborators present the tributary system in their
discussion as a quid pro quo trade of interests, arguing that Chinese rulers
established tributary relationships because external tributary states added
prestige to their rule. Tributaries were willing to make tribute as by doing so
they could gain access to trade with China.12 The deeper questions of
whether such a trade-off was sufficient to maintain tributary relations, or
whether it represented the primary motivation of the actors in tributary
relationship, however, remain unanswered.13
This article sets out, using incentive mechanisms as a starting point, to
analyse the equilibrium state of the tributary system and to gauge its stability. As an institutional arrangement, the tributary system is supported by a
number of basic rules, principles, and regulations, but the stability and the
continuity of the system do not necessarily follow from these. In the sense
that there was no higher level power to impose the tributary system upon the
region, the system represents a spontaneous order,14 an endogenous and
self-enforcing institutional arrangement of East Asia which appeared and
reproduced as an outcome of continuous strategic interaction among actors
within the region. It could be understood as a compressed representation of
the salient, invariant features of an equilibrium path.15 We cannot simply
assume that the tributary system represents the Middle Kingdom’s use of
hard power to force demands on its neighbours in the periphery.
No scholar has yet considered the tributary system from the standpoint of
a game-theoretic equilibrium. To discuss its rationality, however, researchers
working on the tributary system must ultimately consider the system from
the vantage point of interests and not just of Chinese values. Fairbank
argues that once one considers the emperor’s assertion of ruling under authority of a Heavenly Mandate, the objectives of past dynasties’ trade with
tributaries becomes very clear. Fairbank observes, ‘Tribute had prestige
value in the government of China, where prestige was an all-important
12
13
14
15
J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, ‘On the Ch’ing Tributary System’, Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1941), pp. 135–246.
It is helpful for the analysis later in this article to point out here that trade interests under
the tributary system were not sufficient to prevent opportunism among neighbouring
states when it came to security affairs. That is to say that economic measures were not
enough to overcome political and security challenges.
On the notion of the system as a spontaneous order, see Friedrich August von Hayek,
Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order Vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1973).
On the notion that institution is a compressed representation of an equilibrium path, see
Aoki Masahiko, Towards a Comparative Systems Analysis (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
2001), p. 26.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 151
tool of government.’16 He proposes that the gifts of tribute that foreign
rulers presented to the Chinese emperor provided him with much needed
authority, and gave legitimacy to his rule, thus consolidating Chinese society. In addition to giving supremacy to the ‘celestial emperor’, tributary
relations also carried the benefit of mollifying foreign states, allowing
China to eliminate external pressures by adopting a conciliatory position.17
This valuable analysis suggests several important lines of thinking. One
problem with it, though, is that it is obviously a China-centred approach18
and as such one that does not take into account the responses of peripheral
states. It fails to think of the tributary system as the outcome of an interactive game, which makes it difficult to consider seriously the strategic interaction among actors, thus greatly oversimplifying the analysis. Discussions
so far by no means constitute an exhaustive analysis of the tributary system,
and represent only a starting point for consideration of it as a diplomatic
mode.
Primary Argument and Basic Model
This article asserts that the Middle Kingdom and the periphery states
engaged in ongoing strategic interactions throughout the history of the
tributary system. In international politics, the choices that actors make are
often strategic—that is to say that when actors make decisions, they must
consider how other actors will respond to their resultant actions. At the
same time, actors are never presented with a single strategy choice, because
when one actor changes its strategy, another might respond in a different
way.
The analysis in this article is based on two general assumptions: (i) that
China is in a position of power advantage with respect to countries in the
periphery; and (ii) as long as the Chinese regime is stable, the overall objective of its foreign policy will be defensive in nature, or it will at least be
very cautious about making aggressions.19 Based on these assumptions, we
16
17
18
19
John K. Fairbank, ‘Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West’, Far Eastern
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1942), p. 135.
Zhang Weihua, ed., Zhongguo gudai duiwai guanxishi (A History of Ancient Chinese
Foreign Relations)(Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993), p. 356; Yu Jiansheng and
Liu Chunrui, Luori de wange—19 shiji wanqing duiwai guanxi jianlun (The Elegy of the
Sunset: A Simple Theory of Late Qing Foreign Relations in the 19th Century) (Beijing:
Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003), p. 32.
For a critique of the China-centred approach, see Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in
China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past Book Description (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
As to whether or not China’s strategic objectives are defensive in nature is a complicated
issue on which it is not possible to arrive at a simple conclusion. But the author tends
towards arguing that the strategic objectives of any relatively stable dynasty were highly
defensive in their characteristics. Methodologically speaking, instances where China’s strategic objectives have not been defensive in nature have no impact on this article’s analysis,
but rather narrow the range of applicability of the model herein. For more on China’s
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
152 Zhou Fangyin
Peripheral State
Harassment
Conciliatory Policy
China
Punitive Expedition
Submission
A
B
C
D
Fig. 1 Strategic Interaction between China and a Peripheral State under
Asymmetric Distribution of Power.
construct a game as follows: we assume that China has two strategic
choices—it can play a conciliatory strategy or a strategy of punitive expedition, each of which, respectively, represent peace or war. Meanwhile, a
periphery state also has two options: it can either engage in border harassment or submit.
Based on these assumptions, we obtain the game presented in Figure 1.
We must point out that although broadly speaking a conciliatory strategy
and a punitive expedition strategy are representative means, respectively, of
peace and war, conciliation is not a general peace strategy, but one which
shifts the distribution of benefits in favour of the periphery state to both
appease and loose-rein it. Similarly, a punitive expedition strategy is not a
general war policy, and also has its own specific context.20 This unpacks the
unique features of the peaceful and warlike measures employed by the ancient Chinese polity.
From this game, it should be easy to see the following:
(1) If B is a Nash Equilibrium, the tributary system is a self-implementing
stable equilibrium;21 this is to say that once the players enter this state,
in the absence of external intervention, neither player has incentive to
depart from the equilibrium (i.e. the equilibrium is self-realized and
self-sustaining). The behavioural implications of this equilibrium are
20
21
strategic objectives, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and
Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Huiyun
Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making (London and New
York: Routledge, 2007); Li Xiaoyan, ‘Zhongguo Mingdai zhanlue wenhua yu rujia
wenhua de yizhixing yanjiu—yu Jiang Yi’en shangque’ (‘Comparative Research on
Chinese Strategic Culture in the Ming Dynasty and Confucian Culture—A Discussion
with Alastair Iain Johnston), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economic and Politics), No.
10 (2008), pp. 66–76; Zhu Zhongbo and Wang Ning, ‘Discourses on Salt and Iron and
China’s Ancient Strategic Culture’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2,
No.2 (2008), pp. 263–86.
From a Confucian perspective, the emperor’s punitive expedition of feudal princes is but
the way of maintaining order under the heavens. It is a punishment for a violation of the
heavenly honour (Li). The logic behind this is found in classical expressions such as ‘A
breech of ritual is treated as a criminal offence’ and ‘Use military might against a major
crime.’ Because punitive expeditions have such characteristics, there are many historical
examples wherein ‘Once peripheral states apologized the Chinese army retreated.’
Because a Nash Equilibrium implies that every action a player makes is the optimal
response to the move of the other player, this means that as long as one player does not
change his mode of behaviour, the other player will have no incentive to change his.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 153
that China maintains a stable conciliatory policy to which the periphery state submits, as discussed above.
(2) If C is a Nash Equilibrium, the tributary system will not be sustainable on its own. The periphery state will engage in border harassment,
and China will go on a punitive expedition against the periphery state.
(3) D is a somewhat unusual situation in which a periphery state submits
to a China which is going on a punitive expedition. This causes China
to shift to a conciliatory policy. D represents a short-term, transitional
phase in the bilateral relationship.
(4) A is the troublesome situation in which China adopts a conciliatory
policy towards the periphery state, but where the periphery state nonetheless opportunistically engages in border harassment to obtain more
benefits.
One characteristic of the tributary system is that China’s adoption of a
conciliatory policy towards a periphery state leads not just to a behavioural
logic of, ‘When the remote people are not submissive, all the influences of
civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so’,22 and
‘the Emperor does not govern the barbarian peoples, their tribute shall not
be refused, but they shall not be subjected to governance outside of the
Middle Kingdom’,23 but also a representation of China’s ancient strategic
thinking, ‘Maintain the centre and govern the frontier.’ The following passage from Ban Gu does a very nice job of illustrating the interests and logic
behind conciliatory policies and policies of loose-rein:
It is not possible to till the lands of barbarians (Xiongnu), neither will barbarians subject themselves to your rule; so we should keep them outside not inside,
to alienate them so as not to be close with them; we cannot administrate over the
barbarians, and the edicts, decrees and our calendar cannot be applied to the
barbarians; if the barbarian invades, we shall defend ourselves and punish them;
if they leave away, we shall be prepared and defensive. If the barbarians desire to
pay tribute to China and follow the customary rituals, their tribute shall be
received properly, and we shall give unto them in return. We shall appease
and bind them for the long time, and never lose our propriety. This is the
customary way that has prevailed since ancient times, and the accepted way
of handling the barbarian peoples.24
‘It is not possible to till the lands of barbarians, neither will barbarians
subject themselves to your rule.’ This implies that there is no need to rule
22
23
24
Analects—Jishi
Su Shi noted in The Emperor Does Not Govern the Barbarians that, ‘China cannot govern
the barbarians. Attempting to do so shall result in great chaos under the heavens.
Emperors who understood this logic would never attempt to govern them. Not governing
is just the right way of governing them.’
Hanshu (Chronicles of the Han Dynasty), Scroll 94, Xiongnu zhuan.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
154 Zhou Fangyin
Peripheral State
China
Harassment
Submission
Conciliatory Policy
a11, b11
a12 , b12
Punitive Expedition
a 21 , b21
a 22 , b22
Fig. 2 Strategic Interaction between China and a Peripheral State under
Asymmetric Distribution of Power.
territories outside of China, and that it is indeed impossible to govern such
territories. In modern language, this might be expressed as, ruling these
areas is not cost-effective, and there are no benefits to be obtained
by doing so. As such, binding and constraining these territories and maintaining stability along the frontier such that all can exist peacefully is
sufficient.
Generally speaking, the guiding tendencies of Chinese strategy are
loose-rein and conciliatory.25 It is not, however, clear whether a conciliatory
strategy is a strictly dominant strategy over punitive expedition.26
We can consider the payoff matrix (Figure 2).
Here, aij represents the payoffs that China receives from the set of behaviours (i, j), while bij represents the payoffs that the periphery state obtains
from the set of behaviours (i, j).
Generally speaking, b11 > b21 and b12 > b22 . This implies that given a fixed
strategy on the part of the periphery state, the periphery state receives
greater payoffs when China selects a conciliatory strategy over a strategy
of punitive expedition. In other words, the periphery always prefers China to
adopt a conciliatory strategy, regardless of whether it engages in border
harassment or submits to China.
At the same time, a12 > a11 , and a22 > a21 , implying that regardless of the
strategy that China adopts, it is always in China’s interests for the periphery
state to submit.
In addition, a12 > a22 , implying that China is more willing to be conciliatory than it is to adopt a war policy when the periphery state submits to
China. In reality, this is one of the inmost requirements of the tributary
system.
25
26
For a discussion of the objectives sought by ancient Chinese rulers, see also Feng Weijiang,
‘Xia yi wu fan jin—Zhongguo gudai zhili xingtai bianqian beihou de jingji luoji’ (‘Warriors
Violate Prohibition with Their Violent Ability—the Economic Logic Behind the Evolution
of Ancient Chinese Governance), Jingjixue (China Economic Journal), Vol. 8, No. 2 (2009),
pp. 465–99.
A conciliatory policy is a strictly dominant strategy which implies that regardless of what
strategy the periphery state takes, China receives the maximum utility from playing this
strategy. For more on strictly dominant strategy, see Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole,
Game Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 6–8.
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Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 155
Peripheral State
Harassment
China
Submission
Conciliatory Policy
x,2
2, 1
Punitive Expedition
-1, -2
0, -1
Fig. 3 Tributary Game.
Given that all of the five assumptions above hold, if b11 < b12 , then as long
as China adopts a conciliatory policy, it will be in the interest of the periphery state to submit in lieu of engaging in border harassment, i.e. {China
conciliatory, Periphery State submits} constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
game. In this case, the tributary system has a self-sustaining, stable equilibrium.27 But in reality, b11 < b12 does not hold true under many situations.
Under the situation that China adopts a conciliatory policy, the periphery
state will usually receive more benefits by engaging in border harassment. It
is hence more likely that b11 > b12 holds.
Let us now consider a game with specific payoffs that satisfy all six of the
conditions listed above (the sixth condition is that b11 > b12 ):28
First, in the tributary game shown in Figure 3, {China conciliatory,
Periphery State submits} is not a Nash equilibrium, because if China
adopts a conciliatory strategy, the periphery state can increase its payoff
from 1 to 2 by shifting from the strategy of submission to the strategy of
harassment, meaning that ‘submission’ is not an optimal response to China’s
conciliatory policy.
Second, in this game, the value of x is a critical factor. If x > 1, then
given that the periphery state engages in border harassment, the optimal
response on China’s part is still to play ‘conciliatory’, and under such conditions, {China conciliatory, Periphery State engages in border harassment}
becomes a Nash equilibrium. If x < 1, then given that the periphery state
engages in border harassment, China’s rational response is to go on a punitive expedition, and there is no Nash equilibrium in this case. Regardless
of the value of x, {China conciliatory, Periphery State submits} is never a
Nash equilibrium.
Returning to ancient international relations in East Asia, it is easy to
discover that x is a variable and not a constant. Under the tributary
system, periphery states can keep their incitements within a certain range,
27
28
This was in fact the case in China’s relationship with Korea during the Ming Dynasty. This
case will be considered in the section of Case Analysis.
The values in Figure 3 above were assigned for purposes of illustrating the structure of the
relationship. While there is a degree of randomness in the values assigned, there is a
linkage between the values and reality, and they should not be seen as entirely arbitrary.
The values also help us engage in a deeper analysis of the relationship.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
156 Zhou Fangyin
A
A
C
D
C
D
B
B
B
Fig. 4 Strategic Cycles of the Tributary Game.
i.e. to say, keep them controlled within the point in Figure 1 at which China
prefers A to C, i.e. the point at which China cannot quite muster the resolve
to go on a punitive expedition. The periphery state can still engage in modest
incitements in the border area (that is, in the areas that are too far away
from the power centre of China, which makes the decision-makers in the
capital feel powerless to intervene), while at the same time paying tribute and
maintaining the façade of a tributary system, keeping China at a point of
difficulty in assessing the trade-off between war and peace. Such a situation
is not uncommon in the history of the tributary system.
Another factor to consider is that of the accumulation over time of
China’s growing costs in dealing with periphery incitements. Given the decision set {China conciliatory, Periphery States engages in border harassment}, the value of x will decrease over time, and the Middle Kingdom will
find it more and more difficult to ignore such harassment. At some point,
the Middle Kingdom will likely develop the resolve to initiate a punitive
expedition, resolving at root problems in border regions. Of course, the
reality of the case is that it is often China’s expectation of the value of x,
and not its actual value, that matters. This is to say that when China believes
that unrest along the frontier has become a serious problem, or a long term
nuisance, it might adopt responsive measures.
In the game in Figure 1, we will at times observe cycles in decision sets.
For example, first we observe the decision set A {China conciliatory,
Periphery State engages in border harassment}. Next, China painfully
works up resolve to engage in a punitive expedition, and we obtain decision
set C. In the face of suppression from China, the periphery state submits,
and we obtain decision set D; now that the periphery state is once again
paying patronage, China resumes its strategy of conciliation, resulting in
decision set B. Once in B, it is possible for the two players to play these
strategies for a number of rounds of the game—this being a stable period in
the tributary system. It is also possible, though, that the players once again
enter into A, at which point the cycle above repeats itself. The dynamic
process of this game is shown in Figure 4.
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Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 157
Case Analysis
In this section, we use several historical examples to illustrate the mechanism
and processes of the above model, thereby demonstrating that the model is
more than just an abstract construct, and that it can be useful in explaining
historical occurrences. Some of the basic information gleaned from the abstract model is at the same time useful towards gaining a better understanding of the characteristics of the tributary system.
We focus primarily on three cases extending across different time periods.
In the course of conducting case analyses, we are forced to abstract away
large amounts of rich detail and concentrate on the key mechanisms and
models of the tributary system which are of particular relevance. Examining
the development and evolutionary process of the tributary system will help
us see clearly the logic behind the system and related modes of behaviour.
Qing Dynasty Relations with Burma under the
Qianlong Emperor
The Qing Dynasty policy towards Burma was based on a careful reflection
of that of the preceding Ming Dynasty, which might be defined as, ‘Increase
the number of vassals so as to weaken each one.’29 Ming Dynasty rulers
hoped to attain stability and peace in the border area by establishing
Pacification Superintendencies (Xuanweisi) which created checks and balances. Separatist regimes in the border area hoped at the same time to advance their struggles by leaning on the authority of the Qing Dynasty. Since
the establishment of the Burmese Toungoo Dynasty, however, the Ming
Dynasty policy had ceased to be effective. The Toungoo Dynasty had rapidly unified various separatist regimes and incorporated what were originally
the Mu-bang and Mengyang Divisions, which submitted to the Ming
Dynasty, into Toungoo territory. Even the Chinese Tusi on the Yunnan
border began to pay tribute to the Toungoo.30 After the reign of
Longqing Emperor (1567–1572), the Burmese Army launched and maintained relentless attacks across the Yunnan border through to the collapse
of the Ming Dynasty.31 The game in Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of behaviour the Burmese Army exhibited. It demonstrates that when China
29
30
31
Ren Yanxiang, ‘Qianlongchao dui Mian zhengce lunshu’ (‘A Discussion of Qian Long’s
Policy Towards Burma’), in Chen Shangsheng, ed., Confucianism Civilization and
Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 310.
Yang Yuda and Yang Huifang, ‘Huamali—16-19 shiji Zhong Mian bianjie de zhuquan zhi
zheng’ (‘Huamali – The Sino-Burmese Dispute over Sovereignty in the Border Region
from the 16th-19th Centuries’), Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu (A Study of the History
and Geography of the Chinese Frontier), No. 2 (2004), pp. 72–80.
Yu Dingbang and Huang Zhongyan, eds., Zhongguo guji zhong youguan Miandian ziliao
huibian xiace (A Collection of Chinese Historical Documents Concerning Burma Volume II)
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), p. 1053.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
158 Zhou Fangyin
adopts a conciliatory policy and fails to counter incitements in the border
region, it is in the general interests of periphery states to engage in such
border region incitements.
After coming to power, the Qing Dynasty carefully assessed the existent
policy towards Burma and moved towards a new one. This change became
apparent during the 14th year of the reign of the Qian Long Emperor, when
the Mu-bang Division asked to become part of China. The Qing government
rejected this request because it had recognized Burmese rule over the division since the end of the Ming Dynasty, and was not willing to provoke a
dispute with Burma over the matter.
In the 15th year of the Qian Long Emperor, the Magistrate of Yunnan
opposed establishing vassal relations with Burma, pointing out that ‘the
Ming saw regular payment of tribute, but decades of harassment along
the border.’32 The categorization of the Ming’s relations with Burma as
‘regular payments of tribute, but decades of attacks along the border’, parallels the decision set A in Figure 1. This policy had continued for a number
of decades under the Ming Dynasty, and constituted a stable equilibrium in
its later years. The newly established Qing Dynasty used the territories that
the Ming Dynasty had, and which Burma now controlled, as the boundary,
and consolidated its rule in Chinese territories, basically leaving Burmese
controlled territories to handle their own affairs.
During this period, the Burmese Toungoo Dynasty gradually slipped into
a beleaguered position. From the 13th year of the reign of the Qian Long
Emperor, the Toungoo proactively sent regular envoys to China to try to
pay tribute in attempts to attain support from the Qing Dynasty for their
kingdom. It was in the sixth month of the 16th year of the Qian Long
Emperor (the year 1751 CE), that Burmese envoy Xiliguetian arrived in
Beijing and the Qian Long Emperor accepted tribute from him.33 This acceptance represented the formal establishment of vassal relations between
the Qing Dynasty and the Burmese Tuongoo Dynasty. It is evident that the
Tuongoo had a specific objective in submitting to China, and that this instance does not represent payment of tribute in the classical sense of a
tributary.
In the year 1752, the Taliang ethnic army invaded the Burmese capital of
Ava, and the Tuongoo Dynasty collapsed. The Taliang army was swiftly
defeated by the Alaungpaya, and several years later, the Alaungpaya by and
large unified all of Burma. The attitude of the Qing towards the change in
the Burmese polity was steadfastly to guard the border and not interfere.
32
33
Zhao Lian, Xiaoting zalu—Miandian guicheng benmo (Records Collected by Zhao Lian—
the Submission of the Burma) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 113.
Qingshilu (The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty)—Records of Qian Long Emperor,
Scroll 393.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 159
After establishment, the Alaungpaya Dynasty attacked to the north
against the Mu-bang Division. In the 27th year of the Qian Long
Emperor, the Alaungpaya army attacked Gengma and demanded tribute,
its aim to assert sovereignty over Gengma—a serious matter. The
Alaungpaya forces were, however, defeated on their way back from battle
by the Gengma Tusi troops. The following is a report by the Governor
General of Yunnan and Guizhou Wu Dashan to Emperor Qian Long:
‘The Mu-bang barbarians have looted Gengma, but they have already
been routed by our troops.’ No mention is made here of Burma’s request
for tribute; the report says only that barbarians were looting and pillaging.
Qian Long’s response: ‘Such remote barbarian lands are certain to be ripe
with thieves and bandits; such a situation can but only be dealt with in this
way.’34 Hence, in the face of Burmese aggression, the Emperor Qian Long
demanded only that the Burmese be expelled from Chinese territory, and
Yunnan’s response held steadfast to this demand. General Commander of
Field Operations Tian Yunzhong authorized troops to pursue the Burmese
Army, but Wu Dashan chided him for his hastiness, and ordered the army to
withdraw from the front line.35
Along the border, Emperor Qian Long’s demands were similarly no more
than that the area be consolidated and enemy forces driven back across the
border. This, however, emboldened the Burmese Army. Over the long term,
the policy resulted in ever-greater difficulty in maintaining peace and stability along the border. Under the terms of Figure 1, this implies that, over
time, maintaining a status quo ‘A’ became more difficult.
In the 30th year of the Emperor Qian Long, Burmese Army raids became
more frequent. In August of that year, the Burmese entered Menglian demanding tribute, and a rebellion later erupted at the Meng-gen Prefecture.
Meng-gen rebel Zhao San united with the Burmese Army in a plan to attack
the troops of Zhao Mengrong, the Meng-gen Prefecture Tusi, and kill him.
In October, the Burmese Army and Zhao San’s Army split into two flanks
and readied for an attack on Cheli (Jinghong, Yunnan).
Under the influence of reports from local Yunnan officials, the Qian Long
Emperor mistakenly believed that foreign bandits, and not the Army under
the command of the new Burmese Kingdom, were behind the border aggressions. Qian Long commanded the Governor General of Yunnan and
Guizhou Liu Zao to mobilize troops and weed out the aggressors: ‘Use all
means necessary to eliminate the bandits, completely annihilate them,
wiping out their very roots so that the border can return to tranquillity.’
According to the logic of this policy, the Qian Long Emperor’s concern was
that, ‘If we are lenient once again, it will be difficult to prevent future
34
35
The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty—Records of Qian Long Emperor, Scroll 680.
Yu Dingbang, Zhong Mian guanxi shi (A History of Sino-Burma Relations) (Beijing:
Guangming ribao chubanshe, 2000), p. 126.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
160 Zhou Fangyin
violations of the border. We must give our attention to this disturbance in
order to prevent future troubles.’36 The Qian Long Emperor wanted an end
to the ongoing disturbances along the border with Burma, and hoped to
bring about a permanent solution to the problem. He did not, however,
approach it as a war, but rather as a campaign against bandits. The
Emperor authorized an intellectual, Liu Zao, to lead the troops, but Li
failed to live up to the assignment and the Burmese army commander
forced his way into China. These battles took place primarily on
Yunnanese territory.
The Chinese troops fought a passive war throughout the extent of Liu
Zao’s assignment, and the Qian Long Emperor dismissed Liu from his post
in the 31st year of his reign, replacing him with Yang Yingju. Upon arrival
in Yunnan, Yang Yingju divided his troops into three regiments for a counter attack against Burma. They regained Cheli and conquered Zhengqian
and Meng-gen Prefecture, and advanced to Pu’er, driving the Burmese
troops into a rapid retreat across the border. Zhao San, however, who
had aligned with the Burmese Army in the border offensive, escaped. In
June of the 31st year of his reign, Emperor Qian Long so commanded his
grand minister, ‘The core strength of the bandits has been destroyed . . . if we
are to dispatch great numbers of troops to capture the remaining bandits, it
will be a lengthy process requiring extensive resources. Even if such resources are made available, there is little value in such an undertaking.’
According to Qian Long’s wishes, the ordeal was considered closed—even
though Zhao San and his supporters had not been captured, ‘We should
withdraw our forces from the border, and determine other means of dealing
with the remaining bandits.’37
However, Yang Yingju, who carried out the order, attempted to bring
about an even more pronounced effect. In the course of routing out the
bandits, he suggested that Qian Long establish Zhengqian and Meng-gen
Prefecture as domestic Tusi. He did not know that Zhengqian was already a
Burma Tusi, and that although the Meng-gen Tusi outside of China had yet
to be consolidated into Burmese territory, Burma already considered them
as such.
Qian Long’s decree, issued in the 31st year of his reign, and a letter from
Yang Yingju, reveal the thoughts of both the Emperor and his Minister on
the matter. Qian Long’s decree observes:
Burma . . . is remote and far from China. Any matters involving this area should
be considered prudently before proceeding. Should action be determined in the
future, immediate success might be achieved through military operation at a
proper time. If a great number of troops are not needed, then we can take this as
a good time and opportunity to take action; but if a great number of military
36
37
The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty—Records of Qian Long Emperor, Scroll 741.
Ibid., Scroll 756.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 161
and economic resources are needed, or if success is not certain, this is not the
appropriate way of handling the border situation.38
A letter from Yang Yingju in September states:
In managing affairs related to the Burmese bandits, I would not dare take unnecessary action to attain credit. Yet there have been numerous assaults against
our border, and should we fail to respond to this opportunity, there is a risk of
long term unrest along the border.39
Yang Yingju’s letter received praise and approval from the Qian Long
Emperor. Here, the thinking and behavioural logic of the Qing Dynasty
rulers is evident. The Qian Long Emperor believed that Burma was a
remote area, and that a prudent approach should be taken with respect to
waging war, i.e. that ‘Any matters involving this area should be considered
prudently before proceeding.’ At the same time, war should be waged on the
condition that ‘a great number of troops are not needed’, and should the
effort require ‘a great number of military and economic resources’ then such
efforts were to be avoided. For his part, Yang Yingju discusses the other
element of this logic; if China did not take this opportunity to deal with this
issue, Burmese invasions would likely go on, creating general unrest in the
border region. It is obvious, however, that Yang Yingju’s logic is premised
on the condition raised by the Emperor Qian Long—that ‘a great number of
troops are not needed.’ This situation is reflected in the game in Figure 1,
which implies that, from the perspective of the Middle Kingdom, when faced
with A, it is hard to transform conciliatory policy into the strategy of punitive expedition. Punitive expedition is predicated on the assumption that
only a limited number of troops will be required, and that costs will not be
too high. If the peripheral state controls its aggressions along the Chinese
border to within a limited range, a shift from point A to point C is unlikely
to occur.
Despite the fact that Yang Yingju’s offensive strategy was predicated on
the assumption that the costs of war would be low, it resulted in the expansion of the war between the Qing and Burma. He never expected the
Burmese Army to engage in a widespread counterattack.40 The Burmese
Army galloped through the garrisons at Shenhu and Wanren, surrounded
Zhanda (Yingjiang, Yunnan), Husa (Longchuanbei, Yunnan), Mengmao
(Ruili, Yunnan), and raced through the other Qing border posts.41 As the
war developed, it became obvious that China had entered a situation far
beyond the expectations of Emperor Qian Long and his Minister Yang
38
39
40
41
Ibid., Scroll 765.
Ibid., Scroll 768.
Yu Dingbang and Huang Zhongyan, eds, A Collection of Chinese Historical Documents
Concerning Burma Volume II, p. 1108.
Chinese Military History Editorial Group, Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng nianbiao, xiace
(Chronology of China’s Ancient War, Volume II) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003),
p. 460.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
162 Zhou Fangyin
Yingju. The Emperor Qian Long was most dissatisfied with this battle, and
issued a decree declaring that, ‘The Burmese Army dares invade our lands,
and resist our military officials. We have no choice but to send a punitive
expedition, and render a tremendous punishment upon them.’42
In the 32nd year of his reign, the Qian Long Emperor found Yang Yingju
to be in dereliction of duty, and had him removed from his post and placed
under an imperial order to commit suicide. Ming Rui, experienced general,
decorated, and celebrated Manchu aristocrat, and close ally of the Qian
Long Emperor, was appointed to the General Command of Yunnan and
Guizhou provinces.43 Ming Rui’s appointment implies that the Qian Long
Emperor had begun to place greater importance on the war with Burma, a
change of attitude that broadened the scope of the war. In the leap seventh
lunar month of the 32nd year of the Qian Long Emperor, he issued a decree
to the grand ministers that made clear his strategic and political
considerations:
Our troops are on the campaign against Burma . . . the campaign will certainly
progress smoothly, victory should be achieved rapidly, so that peace will be
restored permanently to the south western border. Considering, however, that
Burma is a remote and undeveloped mountainous region of unfamiliar climate
and with different languages and modes of behaviour, once peace is restored to
the area, it would be very difficult to set up counties there as in the domestic
area . . . . Further, the climate is inhospitable, and disease spreads quickly; it is
inappropriate for our troops to stay there for a long time . . . it would be more
appropriate to establish tribal chieftains according to the different size of towns,
and empower each to protect his part of the land, but among whom there are no
relationships and so that they do not unite and threaten China. In this way,
tribal chieftains will be divided, and each will be weakened, which might avoid
trouble to China. At the same time, each of the tribes will pay tribute to China
and get a title from China; this will make it easier for us to appease and bind
them . . . . In terms of who will lead these tribes, people who are loyal to China
and who can be trusted and who have sufficient talent shall be selected. Local
people will be governed by these divisions. They should protect themselves for
the long term and share the glory of our Empire . . . . Once the campaign is
successful, this will be the measures we must prepare and take.
Here we can see the Qian Long Emperor’s calculations regarding relations
between the Qing and Burma and his ultimate plans. The key parts are: (i)
Burma is remote, and even if it is conquered, there would be no plans to
establish counties and consolidate it into China; (ii) the goal of the war was
to bring about peace along the border, ‘A plan for long-lasting peace.’; (iii)
after the war, relations with Burma would be handled as during the Ming
Dynasty—that is tribal chieftains would be established, and a policy of appease and bind carried out. That way, local residents could protect their own
42
43
The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty—Records of Qian Long Emperor, Scroll 781.
Ming Rui, son of Queen Fu Cha’s eldest brother, hence nephew to the Qian Long
Emperor, and a military genius.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 163
lands and keep check on one another, thereby neutralizing the nuisance
along the border.
When comparing Emperor Qian Long’s previous policies with this policy
plan, Qing Dynasty policy towards Burma appears about to go full circle, as
shown in Figure 4. It transitioned from A {China conciliatory, Burma engages in border harassment}, to C {Burma engages in border harassment,
China goes on a punitive expedition}, and once Burma was defeated,
planned to shift to D (what the Emperor Qian Long expected, but what
did not actually occur). According to Emperor Qian Long’s plan, once
Burma was defeated, it was important to reinstate the conciliatory policy
predominant during the Ming Dynasty, or, in terms of the game above,
return to B. This would represent completion of the policy cycle as depicted
in the dynamic process of the tributary game. The Qing Dynasty policy
towards Burma itself represented a re-assessment of the Ming dynasty
policy. As the policy gradually evolved, however, the Ming policy became
reinstated on the agenda. It would appear from this process that a certain
logic or stable force was driving the evolution of the policy.
The Emperor Qian Long’s war policy was based on the assumption that
waging war would achieve swift and smooth progress. The realities of the
war, however, turned out to be the exact opposite. In September of the 32nd
year of his reign, the Qing Army was divided into two regiments. As Ming
Rui’s troops advanced deep into Burmese territory, however, the second
regiment remained in Kuangton and, supposedly to lure the enemy into
battle, dropped its position back to the Hanta garrison, providing no support for Ming Rui’s troops. As the war progressed, Ming Rui’s troops
fought alone without a stable supply of provisions. In February of the
33rd year of the Qian Long Emperor, rations and gunpowder were almost
exhausted. Ming Rui mustered his troops for a breakthrough, but was himself mortally wounded, and died.44
In the face of an increasingly unfavourable war, Qian Long dispatched the
grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat Fu Heng to Yunnan to lead the
troops. In April of the 33rd year of Qian Long, Burma released eight Qing
prisoners of war, who returned to Yunnan bearing letters from Burma requesting that the Chinese authorities, ‘Follow the ancient rites, accept tribute and issue due title; stop fighting forever, and let peace between our states
reign.’45 In reality this could be seen as an expression of hope to return to the
44
45
See Chinese Military History Editorial Group, Chronology of China’s Ancient War,
Volume II, pp. 460–1; Huang Zuwen, ‘Qingdai Qianlong nianjian Zhong Mian bianjing
zhi yi’ (‘The Sino-Burma Border War during the Reign of the Qing Dynasty Qian Long
Emperor’), Sichuan daxue xuebao-zhexue shehuikexue ban (Journal of Sichuan
University-Social Science Philosophy Edition), No. 2 (1988), pp. 87–95; Ren Yanxiang,
‘A Discussion of Qian Long’s Policy Towards Burma’, p. 325.
Qingshigao (The Draft Hisotry of the Qing Dynasty), Scroll 528 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1977), p. 14672.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
164 Zhou Fangyin
equilibrium decision set B, in which Burma submits and China plays a conciliatory strategy by being first to withdraw its forces. The Emperor Qian
Long, however, felt that the Burmese authorities were, ‘using surrender as a
means of deception to advance their cause as they have done in the past.
They have on many occasions so deceived Yang Yingju and other Chinese
officials.’ In Qian Long’s view, therefore, unless the Burmese dispatched
senior officials in a ‘clear display of their sincere will’, the letter did not
merit a reply.46
In what followed, the Qing Army suffered heavy losses. In October of the
34th year of the Qian Long Emperor, the Qing Army attacked Kuangton,
where Burmese Army defences held steadfast under a lengthy offensive. The
Qing troops were moreover not accustomed to local conditions. Deputy
Commander in Chief A Ligun and Admiral Ye Xiangde died of illness,
and Fu Heng reported that of 30 000 Qing troops, only 13 000 or so remained. Upon receiving Fu Heng’s report, Qian Long issued the edict:
‘Given the current state of affairs, it is best to withdraw.’47 In November
of that same year the Burmese king, also concerned about the heavy losses
Burmese troops sustained in the numerous battles with the Qing, dispatched
an envoy to sue for peace. Both sides then ceased military operations.
The battle outcomes thus gradually pushed Qing–Burma relations back to
the traditional status quo of Burma submitting and China adopting a conciliatory policy. The Burmese fundamentally implemented the provision of
the treaty they had signed which provided that there, ‘shall be no aggressions
against the border of the Heavenly Kingdom’. From this point on, Burmese
expansion into the Yunnan border area ceased, and lasting peace returned to
the Chinese–Burmese border. In the 35th year of the Qian Long Emperor,
the Burmese King Bodawpaya dispatched an envoy to pay tribute and to
take Yang Zhongying and other Chinese soldiers and civilians who had
remained in Burma back to China. When, in the 55th year of the Qian
Long Emperor, Bodawpaya dispatched another envoy to pay tribute and
wish the Emperor longevity, and to request that the Emperor grant a title,
relations between the two states drew closer to the mainstream relationship,
characterized by B in Figure 1. The evolution of the policies of the two
actors is expressed in Table 1.
From this case, the following should be apparent: (i) China’s costs of
sending punitive expeditions to remote periphery states were high—often
much higher than the Chinese Emperor’s initial estimates. According to
Chinese historical records, by the time the last battle was fought, only
13 000 of the original 30 000 Qing troops remained. Most died of subtropical
46
47
The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty—Records of Qian Long Emperor, Scroll 808 and
809.
Ibid., Scroll 817.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 165
Table 1 Strategic Cycles in Qing–Burma Relations
Strategy set A
C
D
B
War results in a rapid The Qing musters the
Qing-Burma During the late Ming Instability along the
drop in benefits for
relations
period, Burmese
resolve and power
border grows, i.e.
Burma, and the
invasion along the
necessary to
the value of x bedesire for peace
border is constant,
comes more and
engage in a punigrows. The players
but the Ming takes
more difficult for
tive expedition on
enter into decision
no effective action
China to accept. In
Burma. The concilithe 30th year of the
set D. This is, howin response, i.e. A is
atory policy that
ever, only a transiEmperor Qian
a Nash Equilibrium
China carries out
Long, the Qing detional phase.
of the Game.
results in the strattermines to resolve
egy of submit,
the border probwhich maximizes
lem, and the playBurma’s benefits.
ers enter decision
B becomes an
set C.
equilibrium state.a
a
Even though Burma was proscribed in the 55th year of the Emperor Qian Long from paying tribute more than
once every 10 years, it nonetheless paid tribute three times during the final five years of the Qian Long
Emperor’s rule and five more times from the 3rd through to the 14th year of the Daoguang Emperor. The
frequency with which Burma paid tribute during the 18th century of Qing Dynasty, however, did not compare
with that during the 19th century, as the Qing Dynasty declined. This might be attributable to the trade
benefits that the tributary state received during this period. See Li Yunquan, On the History of the Tributary
System, p. 146.
diseases, including Fu Heng, who died of illness the year after the war ended.
Meanwhile the, ‘total cost of the war was 3 million silver taels’.48 As such, a
punitive expedition was not an attractive policy. It is important to point out,
however, that a conciliatory policy was attractive at that time not because it
offered any particular inherent advantage, but because it incurred limited
costs; (ii) Burma’s launching of raids against China in the border area was
premised on the assumption that China would not counterattack. In
the event of war, and regardless of whether China could win due to the
marked asymmetry of belligerents, the costs from the vantage point of the
peripheral state were extremely high. As Maung Htin Aung noted, Burma’s
costs relative to China’s in such a war were low, but taking into account the
disparity in size of population of the two countries, of far greater significance to Burma.49 (iii) Occasional occurrences of war enabled neighbouring
states in the periphery to recognize China’s resolve, thus altering their subjective estimation of the probability that China might use force against them.
Recognition of this likelihood of a counterattack, however small, therefore,
made peripheral states more cautious in their actions, and consolidated the
equilibrium of the game. In this respect, war might be seen as a process of
first modifying and then stabilizing expectations.
48
49
Wei Yuan, Shengwuji (Military History of the Qing Dynasty, Vol. 1) (Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 1984), pp. 266–74.
Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
p. 183.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
166 Zhou Fangyin
Sui-Tang Relations with the Korean Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula was an important part of the ancient Chinese World
System, and China’s most critical vassal state during the Tang and succeeding Song, Ming, and Qing Dynasties. It was during the Tang Dynasty that
court–vassal relations between the Korean Peninsula and China normalized
after a decade of instability and frequent outbreaks of war.50 In his later
years, Emperor Hongwu, founding Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, listed in
guidelines to his heirs the 15 states ‘not to be conquered’. Korea was top of
the list.51 Upon establishment, the Korean Lee Dynasty raised a policy of
sadaeju’ui or ‘deference towards the greater’, wherein Korea honoured
China as a super power and accepted responsibilities as a vassal state.
During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Korea appeared as the most respectful and submissive of China’s vassal states, and is regularly referred to in
Qing Court records as a ‘model vassal state’.52
Expressed in terms of an equilibrium outcome, the equilibrium between
China and the Korean Peninsula was unstable during the Sui Dynasty and
Tang period preceding the Tang Emperor Gaozong, and relatively stable
during the Ming and Qing Dynasties.53 This equilibrium is represented by
strategy set B in Figure 1 {China conciliatory, Korea pay tribute}. The key
questions to be answered here are those of how a relatively stable equilibrium appeared in the strategic interaction between China and Korea, and
how this stability grew.
We consider these questions through two case studies: (i) China–Korea
relations during the Sui and Tang Dynasties; and (ii) relations between the
Ming Dynasty and Korea through an examination of the fate of
Gwanghaegun.
The Sui Dynasty replaced the Zhou Dynasty in the year 581, and in the
year 589, South China came under Sui control. China was thus reunified
after almost 400 years, a period during which the Koguryo kingdom had
taken opportunity to expand its territory and influence. The Sui’s rapid rise
alerted Korea, which ‘prepared for a probable attack from the Sui, training
its troops and stockpiling grain.’54
In the year 598, the Korean King Gao Yuan led a cavalry force of 10 000
troops in an attack on Western Liaoning. Furious, Emperor Wen of Sui
50
51
52
53
54
Sun Weiguo, Daming qihao yu xiao Zhonghua yishi (The Ming Dynasty Banner and the
Small Chinese Consciousness) (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2007), p. 20.
Zhu Yuanzhang, Huangming zuxun (The Clan Rule of Ming Taizu), (Beijing tushuguan
chubanse, 2002), Chapter 1.
James Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the MacCartney Embassy
of 1793. (Durham, Duke University Press, 1995).
During the power-shift phase from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, as the players in the
game changed, the original equilibrium broke down, and a new one was established. This
might be seen as a temporary interlude.
Sui Shi (History of the Sui Dynasty)–Korea.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 167
issued a decree demanding that the invaders be crushed.55 A total of 300 000
troops, including the army and navy, were dispatched, but army logistics
could not keep pace, and disease spread throughout the ranks. The navy also
suffered heavy losses, exacerbated by gale-force winds. King Gao Yuan was
nonetheless shocked at the magnitude of the Sui army’s response to the
attack, and lost no time in dispatching an envoy to present an apology,
using the title, ‘Humble Minister of Eastern Liao’ (literally the Minister of
Fecal Matter of Eastern Liao).56 Upon receiving the apology, Emperor Wen
of Sui withdrew his troops.57 The same year, Emperor Wen of Sui said in an
edict to the King of Baekje:
In past years, Koguryo has failed to pay tribute and not respected the rites, and
we in turn mobilized our forces on a punitive expedition against it. Fearful of
this attack, Gao Yuan acknowledged the mistake of his ways, and we hereby
condone him, and shall not engage in further expeditions.58
Emperor Wen of Sui assuredly had two reasons for launching an expedition on Koguryo. The first was in response to the invasion of Western Liao;
second was the failure of Koguryo to pay tribute. As soon as Koguryo
displayed willingness to submit, therefore, the Sui withdrew his troops.
We might also express this process in terms of the tributary game in
Figure 1: from the invasion by the periphery state (A), to China’s policy
of punitive expedition (C), the periphery state pays tribute, and the players
shift to (D); China withdraws its troops and shifts to a conciliatory policy,
and the players shift to decision set (B); thus we see a full cycle from A to B.
It later became evident, however, that Koguryo’s submission was not sincere, but rather a temporary strategic consideration. This triggered Emperor
Yang of Sui’s launch of three more expeditions against Koguryo, and the
beginning of a new round of the cycle.
Koguryo paid tribute to the Sui Dynasty for the three years from 598 to
600. During the 12-year period from 601 to 612, however, the kingdom paid
tribute just once, in the year 609.59 In other words, from the later years of
Emperor Wen until Emperor Yang of Sui took the throne, Koguryo did not
follow the rites of tribute. It would be ridiculous to argue that Emperor
Yang’s three campaigns against Korea had no connection with this fact.
In 610, Emperor Yang of Sui discovered a Koguryo envoy in the tent of
the Turkish Khan Kai Man. A possible alliance between Koguryo and the
Turks was a cause of grave concern to the Emperor Yang of Sui, who immediately warned the Koguryo envoy: ‘Upon your return, tell the Koguryo
55
56
57
58
59
Ibid., Scroll 2, Scroll 81.
Ibid., Scroll 81(Korea).
Ibid.; Chinese Military History Editorial Group, A Chronology of Ancient Chinese Wars,
Volume 1, pp. 434–5.
History of the Sui Dynasty, Scroll 81 (Baekje).
This data is taken from Gao Mingshi’s analysis of historical records. See Gao Mingshi,
The World System and Explorations of the Culture Circles, pp. 140–2.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
168 Zhou Fangyin
King that he should pay tribute as soon as possible and without hesitation.
If he comes, we shall treat him as we treated the Turkish Khan Kai Man.
Should he fail to pay tribute, I shall make a tour of inspection of your lands
with the Turkish Khan Kai Man.’60 The logic of his warning was that if the
Koguryo did not come to China to pay tribute, China would very likely
launch an expedition against it, but that if a Koguryo delegation actually
came to China, there would be no war.
A potential alliance between the Koguryo Kingdom and the Turks was a
serious threat in the eyes of the Sui Dynasty. Moreover, since the establishment of the Sui Dynasty, Baekje and Silla had paid tribute and received
titles, but Koguryo continuously expanded southward, attacking the Baekje
and Silla kingdoms, and threatening the international order that the Sui had
established. Baekje and Silla had repeatedly requested the assistance from
the Sui government and punitive action against the offensive. Failure on the
Sui’s part to act would directly influence its prestige within the international
system.
In 611, Emperor Yang issued an edict calling for an expedition against
Koguryo. The Emperor mobilized a force of 1.13 million troops, claiming
they stood two million strong. They were organized into 24 regiments, dispatched at a rate of one each day and spaced 40 kilometres apart. From start
to finish, the line of Sui troops extended across 960 li (480 kilometres) of
territory. If the two million logistical personnel are included, it might be said
that Chinese forces were sufficient to cover every hill and valley in Eastern
Liao.61 The logic behind Emperor Yang’s extraordinary military response
was that sending an overwhelming signal of intent of deterrence would intimidate the Koguryo into surrendering. The Sui would hence be victorious
without having to fight. To achieve this end, Emperor Yang placed an envoy
in each of 24 regiments, charged with accepting Koguryo surrender, bidding
them: ‘You shall maintain the order of the Emperor to accept surrender, and
shall not be restricted by senior generals.’62 Taking orders directly from
Emperor Yang gave these envoys tremendous power, to the extent that
they could influence the orders of the battlefield commander. At the same
time, Emperor Yang gave the strict orders to the entire army: ‘Should the
Koreans surrender, accept and treat them nicely and do not attack.’63 The
Koguryo took full advantage of this restraint. As soon as its city walls were
threatened, the kingdom claimed surrender. As, under such circumstances,
the Sui troops were under orders to cease war operations and wait for a
formal surrender, the Koguryo armies had time and opportunity to regroup,
60
61
62
63
Zizhi tongjian, ‘610 Year’, p. 5653.
Han Sheng, Dongya shijie xingcheng shilun (A Historical Discussion of the Evolution of East
Asia) (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2009), p. 189.
Zizhi tongjian, ‘First Month of the Eighth Year’, p. 5660.
Ibid., pp. 5662–3.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 169
repair city walls, and resume war. This ploy resulted in a lot of setbacks for
the Sui army.64
Here, we see similarities between the pre-war expectations of Emperor
Yang of Sui and the Qian Long Emperor with respect to the outcome of
the war. Both Emperors thought that victory would be attained easily, and
ascertained as soon as the army was dispatched. As a result, both failed to
make adequate military preparations. Emperor Yang placed limitations on
his military operations and waited, confident of the Koguryo surrender. The
Chinese Emperor’s failure to accept reality, however, incurred disastrous
military losses. After suffering devastating defeats, only a few thousand of
the 300 000 Sui troops that had crossed the Liao River returned.
In 613 and 614, the Sui sent two more expeditions against Korea. By the
year 614, the Koguryo had been continuously waging war for several years,
its war-weary troops struggling to maintain their positions. The Koguryo
King hence issued an apology, upon which the Sui withdrew their troops.
Superficially, the Sui was victorious, but in reality the war had sparked off
internal rebellions against it. Both sides had reached a point where it was
impossible to carry on waging war, and thus reached a stalemate.
After the establishment of the Tang Dynasty, summoning the resolve to
mount an expedition against Koguryo was no easier. In 624, founding
Emperor Gaozu of the Tang Dynasty told his near officials:
As is in name, so should be in action. Koguryo claimed to be a tributary state of
the Sui, yet it eventually rejected Emperor Yang of Sui, and demonstrated its
unwillingness to submit. How can this be regarded as the behaviour of a vassal?
I have respect for all things and don’t want to boast, but Koguryo must ensure
that its people live in peace and happiness, as it is not the Emperor that needs to
obtain respect and honour from its tribute. You can compile a document that
clearly expresses my meaning.65
Emperor Gaozu’s argument was that although Koguryo had ostensibly
paid tribute to the Sui, the kingdom did not behave at all like a tributary
state. The issue was not simply whether or not tribute was paid, but if the
two states could co-exist in harmony. Emperor Gaozu had obviously learned
a lesson from Emperor Yang of Sui’s expeditions against Korea, which had
resulted in the collapse of the Sui Dynasty. The lessons of history thus had
important impact on the equilibrium of the game. Analysing Emperor
Gaozu’s statement from another perspective, it would imply that as long
as Koguryo did not take any extraordinarily aggressive actions, and remained a tributary state in at least nominal terms, the Tang preferred to
desist from mounting a punitive expedition on the kingdom.
64
65
Han Sheng, A Historical Discussion of the Evolution of East Asia, p. 190.
JiuTangshu (Old History of the Tang Dynasty)—Records of Gaozu.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
170 Zhou Fangyin
In 626, Silla and Baekje sent an envoy to China expressing grievances
against the Koguryo Kingdom, which had ‘blocked access to the roads,
rendering it impossible for us to pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom. At
the same time, we are having disputes with Koguryo, and it frequently attacks us.’ Emperor Gaozu’s response was simply to dispatch an envoy to
mediate the conflict.66
During this period, the international order in Northeast Asia underwent a
change. Of the three kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula, Koguryo and
Baekje had traditionally been rivals. After Emperor Yang of Sui failed to
suppress Koguryo, however, Baekje gradually became its ally. Silla, meanwhile, was under tremendous pressure from Koguryo, and Baekje was also
its enemy. In the face of aggression from both Korean kingdoms, therefore,
Silla gradually drew closer to the Tang Dynasty, and proactively pursued its
help. In efforts to balance against Koguryo and Baekje, Silla went to the
extreme of introducing the Tang political, legal, and cultural systems, and
instituting major domestic reforms.67
In 641, the 10th year of Emperor Taizong of Tang, the Baekje King Uija
ascended the throne. He launched an expedition against Silla, conquering
more than 40 cities, and formed an alliance with Koguryo. In the year 643,
Koguryo imprisoned and tortured Tang Dynasty Envoy and Minister of
Agriculture Li Xuanjiang.68 The same year, Silla requested urgent assistance
from the Tang. Emperor Taizong expressed clearly his resolve to support
Silla, and in 645 personally led an expedition against Koguryo. He was able
to recover Eastern Liao, but did not accomplish the broader strategic goal of
forcing Koguryo to submit. Baekje took this opportunity to conquer seven
cities in Silla, and Koguryo remained recalcitrant. Historical records state:
‘Upon the Emperor’s return from Korea, Koguryo Generalissimo
Gaesomun became even more arrogant. The language of the statement he
sent to the Emperor with an envoy did not show due respect to the Royal
Court; at the same time he treated the Tang envoy with barbarity, and is
constantly scheming to attack our borders. He frequently ignored the
Emperor’s decree and launched countless offensives against Silla.’
Emperor Taizong hence decided not to accept tribute from Koguryo, and
discussed mounting a punitive expedition.69
In 660, Emperor Gaozong of Tang ordered Su Dingfang to lead 130 000
troops against Baekje, and Silla dispatched troops to support the Tang
armies. The allied Tang and Silla forces advanced rapidly on the capital
of Baekje, which collapsed under the offensive. In the year 668, the Tang–
Silla forces advanced on and took Pyongyang, and Koguryo fell.
66
67
68
69
Old History of the Tang Dynasty Volume 1, Scroll 199.
Han Sheng, A Historical Discussion of the Evolution of East Asia, p. 211.
Dongguo Tongjian, Scroll 6, cited in Han Sheng, A Historical Discussion of the Evolution of
East Asia, p. 225.
Zizhi tongjian, ‘Zhen Guan Year Twenty (646)’.
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Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 171
Having eliminated Baekje and Koguryo, the Tang government established
the Ungjin Commandery in former Baekje territory, and set up the Andong
protectorate in Pyongyang. At the same time, King Munmu of Silla was
appointed magistrate at Jilin, thus completing the loose-rein system on the
Korean Peninsula.70 The Tang Dynasty had at first assumed that after the
war the three states on the Korean Peninsula might maintain their original
independent status. Its battlefield ally, the state of Silla, however, presented
a main obstacle to this plan, and one which the Tang had not taken into
consideration. Silla had in the war against Baekje and Koguryo maintained
a somewhat passive presence on the battlefield, so as to conserve its strength,
but had meanwhile rapidly advanced on and claimed Baekje and Koguryo
territory.
The state of Silla had thus from the start masked its true intentions. It
became more open in its intentions after the fall of Koguryo, to the point of
directly confronting Tang Dynasty forces. From 668 until 676, Silla turned
against and gave battle to the Tang Army in both North and South Korea.
To curtail the extent of the war, the Tang made significant concessions in
Baekje to appease the Silla Kingdom and encourage it to behave more like a
vassal. These concessions, however, demonstrated to Silla the Tang’s reluctance to wage a protracted war. Thus emboldened, it launched an
offensive.71
In 674, the Tang government made a decisive response to Silla’s rebellious
actions. It appointed Prime Minister Liu Rengui as Charge De Affaires of
Jilin, and launched an expedition against it, at the same time revoking the
Silla King Munmu’s officially assigned post of Magistrate. The appointment
of Liu Rengui, however, signalled the Tang’s limited objectives in waging
war to halt the Silla offensive. After achieving certain gains on the battlefield
which compelled Silla troops to withdraw and regroup, Liu Rengui left his
Deputy Li Jin in command on the frontline and returned to the capital and
his post as Prime Minister.
Perceiving the Tang’s strategic intent, Silla immediately dispatched an
envoy to China to pay tribute and issue an apology. Emperor Gaozong
thereupon announced a pardon for King Munmu of Silla, and restored
his official post as Magistrate of Jilin. As their actual behaviour began
more closely to parallel one another’s mutual expectations, relations between the two states stabilized. The equilibrium of {Tang Dynasty conciliatory, Silla submits}, thus, emerged as a stable equilibrium.
There are several important factors to point out as we consider the process
through which the Tang Dynasty and the Silla Kingdom reached a stable
equilibrium. (i) First, the Tang’s main objective was not to expand the scope
70
71
Old History of the Tang Dynasty, Scroll 39 (Geography).
Han Sheng, A Historical Discussion of the Evolution of East Asia, p. 271; Gao Mingshi, The
World System and Explorations of the Culture Circles, pp. 146–7.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
172 Zhou Fangyin
of the war. As long as Silla did not threaten the Tang position within East
Asia, and even though developments on the Korean Peninsula did not meet
its expectations, the Tang was nonetheless unwilling to fight a major war;
(ii) Having unified the Korean Peninsula, the Silla Regime at no time overtly
opposed the Tang Dynasty. During the years 668–676 when the two states
were not at peace, the Silla still sent envoys to the Tang Court to issue
apologies and offer explanations through various channels. As late as the
year 675, King Munmu sent an envoy to pay tribute and present an apology,
which Emperor Gaozong accepted and restored to the Silla king his title as
Magistrate of Jilin. (iii) Most important was that the two states had largely
compatible goals. The King of Silla maintained the unification of the
Korean Peninsula as an internal matter, and did not raise it as threat to
the Tang Dynasty. And at precisely the moment King Munmu was roundly
resisting the Tang Dynasty, he still used a Tang calendar. From the Tang
perspective, therefore, as long as the Korean Peninsula was within the
China-dominated East Asian Regional system and the borders remained
peaceful, it was possible for the Tang to accept Silla’s behaviour.
Thus, after almost a hundred year’s struggle that began in the reign of
Emperor Wen of Sui, China and Korea finally settled into stable
equilibrium.
The Fate of Gwanghaegun and the Stability of the Equilibrium
Gwanghaegun (Yi Hon), second son of King Seonjo and 15th King of the
Joseon Dynasty, was king of Korea from 1608 to 1623. An examination of
his fate is useful towards understanding the stability of the equilibrium of
the tributary system.
During the Imjin War (the Japanese Invasion of Korea) period, King
Seonjo hoped to install Gwanghaegun as crown prince in lieu of
Imhaegun, his eldest son, whom he believed incompetent. In King
Seonjo’s view, Gwanghaegun was, ‘Studious from youth, intelligent, diligent, untempted by luxury, and desirous of a simple, prudent life.’ The
Ming Dynasty, however, held to the dictum, ‘According to the family
order, most respect is paid to the eldest son.’ ‘It should therefore be the
eldest son who takes the throne, as order is disrupted if a younger son
assumes this role.’ The Ming, therefore, refused to give Gwanghaegun the
title of crown prince.72 Gwanghaegun held kingly authority for more than a
decade, but lacked the proper title, and could not induce the Ming Wan-li
Emperor to grant it. After the death of King Seonjo, Gwanghaegun became
Ruler of State Affairs. Emperor Wan-li continued to insist that the eldest
son rule the country, but agreed to consider the matter further before
72
Lichao Xuanzu shilu, Scroll 181, November of the 37th Year of the Xuanzu (Xinchou
year), p. 380, cited in Sun Weiguo, The Ming Dynasty Banner and the Small Chinese
Consciousness, p. 60.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 173
making a decision. The night before the Ming envoy to Korea charged with
conveying the title arrived, Gwanghaegun decided to avoid further complications by killing his elder sibling. The Ming Dynasty hence had no option
but to issue Gwanghaegun the title of king. This incident meant heavy repercussions for Gwanghaegun though, and compelled him to dissociate himself from the growing distance between the newly proclaimed Later Jin
under Nurhaci and the Ming Dynasty, in efforts to avoid the looming
Jurchen threat.
Sun Weiguo argues that Gwanghaegun was the only Korean King overt in
his failure to subordinate Korea to the Ming, and to harbour a deep hatred
of China.73 In the year 1619, shortly before the Battle of Sarhu, the Ming
ordered Korea to deploy its army. Korea’s response under the dissociate
policy of Gwanghaegun was to stall and prevaricate while continuing to
engage in dialogue with the Later Jin through secret emissaries. Under pressure from the Ming Dynasty, Gwanghaegun finally commanded Marshall
Gang Hong-rip to lead a force of 13 000 troops to assist in Eastern Liao.
Gang Hong-rip, however, was slow in leading his forces into the region.
Upon discovering that the Ming Army was suffering defeat on the battlefield, Gang Hong-rip entered into a pact with the Later Jin, and the majority
of Korean troops under the command of Gang Hong-rip surrendered to
Nurhaci, the Jurchen leader.
Prior to the Battle of Sarhu, Gwanghaegun had sent a message to Nurhaci
through travelling merchants that the Ming was forcing Korea to deploy
troops: ‘My state has been forced by the Chinese Court to dispatch troops;
But our troops will arrive late and be deployed behind the Chinese army,
you should understand this.’74 Nurhaci understood, and replied: ‘My state
understands the intent of your country.’75 On learning that Gang Hong-rip
had surrendered to the Later Jin, the Korean Court and the Bibyeonsa (the
Border Defense Council) demanded the arrest of Gang’s entire family. As
Gang Hong-rip’s actions were according to Gwanghaegun’s intention, however, Gwanghaegun failed to meet these demands.
Gwanghaegun’s policy of playing the two powers off of one another was
effective in avoiding military losses, but violated the traditional Korean
policy of ‘deference towards the greater power (China)’, the orthodox and
widely held-to belief of most Koreans at the time. In February of 1623,
Gwanghaegun was dethroned in a coup at the Korean court, and first confined to Ganghwa Island, and was later sent to Jeju Island, where he died in
exile at the age of 67.
73
74
75
Sun Weiguo, The Ming Dynasty Banner and the Small Chinese Consciousness, p. 69.
Zhao Qingnan, ‘Luanzhong zalu’ in Pan Zhe, et al., eds., Qing ruguan qian shilian xianji
(A Collection of Pre-Qing Historical Documents Vol. 3) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue
chubanshe, 1991), p. 269.
Li Minhuan, ‘Zhazhong rilu’, in A Collection of Pre-Qing Historical Documents Vol. 3,
p. 453.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
174 Zhou Fangyin
On the abrogation of Gwanghaegun, Queen Dowager Inmok remarked:
Our kingdom has served the Ming Dynasty for over two hundred years, and the
relations between the Ming Dynasty and our kingdom are like those of Emperor
and Minister, of father and son. The favour we gained during the Renshen year
should never be forgotten. The previous king reigned for forty years, and
throughout his reign he deferred to the Ming Dynasty with great sincerity,
never doing anything to violate the trust of the Ming Dynasty. Gwanghae’s
behaviour paid no heed to morals or ethics, and did not follow the heavenly
mandate. He was not true to the Ming Dynasty, and stealthily contacted the
Barbarians . . . . . . Given his cruel and evil nature, what right does he have to rule
the people? What right does he have to take the throne? What right does he have
to pay respect to the gods? His title as king should be removed, and he should be
assigned a place that matches his status.76
Before Gwanghaegun ascended the throne, the Ming Dynasty had a classical Court–Vassal relationship with Korea, i.e. {China conciliatory, Korea
submits}, which maintained a stable equilibrium between the two states. In
Huangming Zuxun (The Clan Rule of Ming Taizu), Emperor Hongwu says:
All barbarians are isolated from the Middle Kingdom by mountains and oceans,
and live in remote regions. Even though we get their land, the land is not productive; Even though we get their people, the people cannot be governed. If they
do not to consider carefully their actions in launching assaults on our frontiers,
it will be inauspicious for them. If, on the other hand, we dispatch troops to
attack them without being provoked, this will be inauspicious for us.77
A policy against expedition is thus set as a basic principle of Court–Vassal
relations. This implies in the game in Figure 1 that punitive expedition is
generally excluded as a strategy, and considered only when another state
‘invades China’s borders’. Conciliatory policy, on the other hand, is the
mainstream policy choice for China in this game. Korea topped Emperor
Hongwu’s list of the 15 states that should not be conquered. Moreover,
upon establishing the Joseon Dynasty, Lee Seong-gae issued a policy of
subordination to China that became the core policy for generations.
Korean Confucian master Yulgok observed, ‘The policy of deference towards the greater power defines the difference between Emperor and
Vassal. No matter under what situation and no matter if it is in or against
our interests, we should follow this policy with great sincerity.’78
From the perspective of norm internalization, if it is said that following a
policy of deference towards the greater power (the Ming Dynasty) is the
result of the ‘the difference between Emperor and Vassal’ and according to
natural principle, such a conclusion is not obtained through a comparison of
76
77
78
Lichao Renzu shilu, Scroll 1 (The Third Month of the First Year of the Renzu Emperor 3),
cited in Sun Weiguo, The Ming Dynasty Banner and Chinese Consciousnes, pp. 69–70.
Zhu Yuanzhang, The Clan Rule of Ming Taizu, Chapter 1.
Li Er, Ligu quanshu shiyi, Scroll 4 (Tributary Policy), cited in Sun Weiguo, The Ming
Dynasty Banner and Chinese Consciousness, pp. 58–9.
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Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 175
power or a consideration of interests but, it might be argued, of the principle, ‘No matter under what situation, no matter if it is in our interests or
against our interests, we should follow this policy with great sincerity.’
Thought of in this light, this would seem to approximate what the
Constructivist Wendt refers to as the highest level of internalization of a
norm.79 In other words, following the norm is done for its own sake because
it represents a suitable mode of behaviour, and not because of force or
considerations of costs and benefits. Internalization of the concept of the
tributary system is thus useful in generating a stable equilibrium. Although
the words of the Confucian master obviously have idealist undertones, according to Queen Dowager Inmok, ‘The previous king reigned for forty
years, and throughout his reign he deferred to the Ming Dynasty with
great sincerity, never doing anything that violated the trust of the Ming
Dynasty.’ This implies that throughout the previous 40 years the tributary
system between the Ming Dynasty and Korea had a stable equilibrium at B,
and that Korea had absolutely no incentives to shift from this equilibrium.
Gwanghaegun’s shift away from the equilibrium placed his throne in
danger—a threat that would undoubtedly act as a constant deterrent to
future kings to repeat such mistakes, and hence to maintain the stability
of the Korean regime under the tributary system. The case of Gwanghaegun
demonstrates that peripheral states absorb and internalize Chinese culture,
institutions, and values and institutionalize them in their own states, and
that doing so generates a force that stabilizes the equilibrium of the tributary
system. As domestic preferences shift in this way, and when faced with a
China that follows a conciliatory policy, peripheral states carry out submission strategies in lieu of border harassment strategies. This gradually becomes an interest in and of the peripheral states, and returning to Figure 1,
decision set B, can become a stable equilibrium.
Conclusion
This article represents an analysis of equilibrium of the East Asia tributary
system. It is based on the following consideration: from a historical discourse perspective, the tributary system has remained relatively unchanged
throughout the history of China’s relations with its neighbouring states.80
Sharply distinct from political discourse, in practice, the system likely underwent periodic, complicated changes. Even though states in the periphery
79
80
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 250.
See Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking the ‘‘Tribute System’’’, p. 571. Zhang Feng argues that this is
because of considerations of political legitimacy, but just how much impact does the
tributary discourse have on political legitimacy? (For example, the Song Dynasty reversely
paid tribute to the Liao and Jin). Why make this a fixed means of obtaining political
legitimacy? These are all questions worth considering.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
176 Zhou Fangyin
superficially submitted to China under China’s conciliatory policy of ‘giving
more and getting less’, we cannot simply conclude that such a relationship
was given, but instead consider it the result of rational choice and strategic
interaction among China and its neighbouring states. Changes in relative
power distribution and domestic politics and situations of neighbouring
states generated corresponding changes in their behavioural strategies,
even at times when the distribution of power between states was relatively
fixed. Within this highly realistic, dynamic foreign policy struggle, neither
side could convince the other through words alone.
Generally speaking, the analysis in this article is based on two basic assumptions. The first is that China is in a relatively dominant position;
second, that as long as China remains unified and its domestic authority
stable, the country’s foreign policy objectives are defensive in nature, or at
least not overtly aggressive.81
On the surface, these two assumptions suggest the following conclusion: a
conciliatory strategy guides Chinese foreign policy, or least represents a
general strategic intent. This point of view, however, is flawed in presenting
a gross oversimplification which leads to another misconception: that neighbouring countries do not dare wage war against China because of its dominant position, and that as China’s objectives are defensive in nature, the
interaction among China and its neighbour countries results in a stable
equilibrium of {China conciliatory, Periphery State submits} which is easy
to maintain.
As the game-theoretic analysis of China’s relations with peripheral states
illustrates, though, such equilibrium could by no means be taken for
granted, was often not stable and did not occur as a matter of course.
From an evolutionary perspective, China’s conciliatory policy had characteristics of self-defeat. Maintaining such a policy over the long term enabled
China’s neighbours to pinpoint its true strategic intentions, which generated
opportunistic incentives among these peripheral states. Although such opportunism could be checked through occasional punitive expeditions from
the Middle Kingdom, there was no guarantee that states would not again
enter the cycle of yet another round of border invasions and expeditions. As
such, this analysis makes apparent the respective advantages and disadvantages of the tributary system as a strategy for maintaining border stability.
The comparative analysis of relations among the Sui and Tang Dynasties
and Korea, and between the Ming Dynasty and Korea helps us to understand how equilibrium evolved under the tributary system, and illustrates
the complexities involved in arriving at that equilibrium. At the same time,
81
See also M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining
China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2
(2005), pp. 46–83 and ‘Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in
Territorial Disputes’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007/2008), pp. 44–83.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System 177
the comparison also makes clear that the institutionalization within periphery countries of China’s system, culture, and regulatory framework played
an important role in bringing about equilibrium. These elements are critical;
the cases of the Sui and Koguryo, the Tang and the Silla, and the Ming and
Korea all illustrate that it is not possible to explain fully this process of
equilibrium solely through considerations of power distribution among the
states.
Relations between China and the peripheral states were much more complex than J. K. Fairbank could ever have imagined when he theorized that
the tributary system was based on a trade-off of interests, wherein China
received legitimacy in exchange for trade concessions to the peripheral
states. It is highly unlikely that such a trade-off could result in B in
Figure 1 becoming an equilibrium outcome of the game. China’s objectives
in maintaining a regional order based on the tributary system extended far
beyond considerations of obtaining legitimacy. It was more often the very
practical considerations of maintaining stability in the border regions at
minimum cost that drove China’s strategy.82 Fairbank’s theory represents
an interesting direction for researchers to consider, though, and an equilibrium analysis of the tributary system follows naturally from his general
logic. This is useful for deepening our understanding of the tributary system.
Studies of historical experience, for example, the Qing study of Ming
Dynasty policy towards Burma, Korea’s consideration of the ultimate outcome of Gwanghaegun’s actions, and the lessons later emperors learned
from Emperor Yang of Sui’s mistakes in his expeditions on Korea, all
played a role in stabilizing the equilibrium, or at least in having impact on
the game’s progression. To a certain extent, therefore, the equilibrium was a
path-dependent outcome.83
It is useful to observe in the game depicted in Figure 1 that when A {China
conciliatory, Peripheral State engages in border harassment} becomes the
equilibrium of the game, the tributary system actually fails in all but name.
Under such circumstances, the tributary system is maintained on the surface—that is, to say we continue to see the rites, rituals, offerings, and rewards associated with the system. The actual behaviour of actors, however,
has already drifted far from the tributary system logic. The existence of ‘A’
82
83
See Fang Tie, ‘Lun Zhongguo ‘shouzhong zhibian’, ‘shou zai siyi’ de chuantong zhibian
sixian’ (‘A Study on the Thoughts of Borderland Administration in Ancient China’), in
Chen Shangsheng, ed., Theory, System and Policy of Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations,
(Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2007), pp. 35–48.
For example, in the year 965, Zhao Kuangyin, Founding Emperor of the Song Dynasty,
rejected the suggestion of Wang Quanbin to ‘take advantage of the opportunity to take
Yunnan’, ‘however considering that the Tang Dynasty suffered serious setbacks in
Nanzhao during the Tianbao period, I think it would be better to give the surrounding
areas over to Nanzhao: ‘‘There is no need for these areas.’’’ The determination of such a
peaceful policy was obviously based on a study of historical experience, and it is difficult to
explain in terms of offensive or defensive tendencies. Xu zizhi tongjian, First Month of the
Third Year of Qian De (Ding You), Scroll 4.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178
178 Zhou Fangyin
demonstrates the importance of a trade-off of actual interests with the tributary system, and that it is a fundamental and necessary complement to the
system.
Stepping back for a moment, this article represents only a starting point
for research into the tributary system. Future research needs to look deeper
into several issues. They are: (i) This article only considers the situation of
asymmetric distribution of power between players. The impacts of changes
in state capabilities and of dynasties on equilibrium and its stability need to
be studied in greater depth. (ii) Analyses in this article show that under most
circumstances {China conciliatory, Peripheral State submits} is not a classical equilibrium. The tributary system was nonetheless maintained throughout most of Chinese history. What was the objective behind this system?
What interests and causal mechanisms were at work in maintaining the
system? These are questions worth exploring. (iii) The case studies presented
in this article are not comprehensive, exhaustive, or systematic, and it is
difficult to obtain from them the full ethos and richness of the tributary
system. In this respect, it might be thought of less as the result of a research
project, and more as the initiation of a new research agenda.
The article nevertheless illustrates that the policies of China and peripheral
states under the tributary system were constantly undergoing change, and
that it was by no means a rigid mode of behaviour or a unilaterally imposed
status quo, but instead a complex and dynamic diplomatic phenomenon. By
creating a somewhat simple game-theoretic model, this article has been able
to analyse the logic behind this dynamic complexity, help us towards a better
analysis and understanding of the tributary system, and provide a perspective for a better understanding of China’s contemporary foreign relations.
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, 2011, 147–178