Société québécoise de science politique
Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power
Author(s): Julian Schofield
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 33,
No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 747-777
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politique
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Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power'
JULIANSCHOFIELD Concordia University
Introduction
Arms control and the balance of power are seemingly mutuallycontradictory processes. They share a subtle relationship that can produce
either peace or war, a relationshipthat depends largely on how uncertainty is managed.Certaintyplays a vital role in armscontrolbecause it
permits a regularityof interactionthat promotes co-operation among
states.Uncertaintyplays an equally vital role in the balance of power
by restrainingstates throughthe fear of third-partyinterference.As the
degree of uncertaintydecreaseswhen a system tends towardbipolarity,
so arms control becomes more salient. Consequently,the balance of
power will likely contributedisproportionatelymore than arms control
in a multipolarenvironmentthanin a bipolarone. An importantconsequence of this relationshipis that there are circumstanceswhere a successful armscontrol agreementmay actually increase the likelihood of
war by impairingthe restraininginfluenceof the balance of power.
The purposeof this article is to produce a systematic explanation
of the failure of arms control agreementsin preventing wars that are
linked to the effects of the balance of power. Arms control failure can
mean two very differentthings: It can mean the failure to formulateor
maintain compliance with an agreement (this will form part of the
explanationfurtherin the discussion); more importantly,it means the
failure to achieve the stated objective of reducing the likelihood of
war. These two failures are linked, because attempts to make arms
control more attainablealso make war more likely by disabling the
1 I thankStan Chan for comments on earlier drafts of this article, and the anonymous refereesof this JOURNAL
for theirhelpful comments.
Julian Schofield, Departmentof Political Science, Concordia University, Montreal,
Quebec H3G 1M8; [email protected]
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique
XXXIII:4 (December/Decembre 2000) 747-777
O 2000 CanadianPolitical Science Association (l'Association canadiennede science politique)
and/et la Soci&tC
qu~bbcoisede science politique
748
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
balance of power mechanism.This discussion does not attemptto provide a comprehensive explanation,but ratherfocuses on this possible
dysfunction of armscontrol. The article will provide a definitionof the
key concepts of arms control and the balance of power, their link to
war causation, a discussion of armscontrol failuresand a surveyof the
role of the balance of power and arms control on six proposed functions of armscontrol.
In this article,the definitionof arms control and disarmamentfollows Hedley Bull: "[armscontrol]comprisesthose acts of militarypolicy in which antagonisticstates cooperate in the pursuit of common
purposes."2The purpose of arms control is the enhancementof international security in orderto reduce the incident of inter-stateconflict.3
An arms control agreementis defined somewhatbroadly as a bilateral
or multilateralpolicy which attempts to regulate, limit or eliminate
existing arsenals and prevent new ones, througheither tacit or formal
agreement, in order to reduce the incidence of inter-stateviolence.4
According to Thomas Schelling and MortonHalperin,"the essence of
arms control is some kind of mutual restraint,collaborativeaction, or
exchange of facilities between potential enemies in the interest of
reducing the likelihood of war, the scope of war if it occurs, or its
consequences."' It thereforeencompassesdisarmamentpolicies, which
seek the completereductionof a single class of arms,as well as nonproliferation policies, which try to avert the geographic spreadof certain
weapons.6
The definitionof balanceof powerhere is basicallyan international
system of three or more states in which the tendencyto balanceagainst
emerging threatscounterbalancesany would-be hegemon, therebypreserving the independenceof states.7The balance of power mechanism
works by either deterringor ensuring that no war begun for the purpose of dominatingthe system can succeed. Anothereffect is that any
2
3
4
5
6
7
Hedley Bull, The Controlof the Arms Race: Disarmamentand Arms Controlin
the Missile Age (London:WeidenfeldandNicolson, 1961), xiv.
I am interestedhere in arms control whose primarypurposeis the preventionof
war, and will not discuss second-ordereffects such as hegemonic dominance,
the maintenance of systemic stability or other domestic political objectives
(Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, 30; and for arms control and hegemony,
see James Fergusson, "The Changing Arms Control Agenda: New Meanings,
New Players,"Arms Control 12 [1991], 191-210).
For definitions, see Bull, The Controlof the Arms Race, 30; and Ralph A. Hallenbeck and David E. Shaver,On Disarmament:The Role of ConventionalArms
Controlin National SecurityStrategy(New York:Praeger,1991), 71.
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New
York:TwentiethCenturyFund, 1961), 77.
Bull, The Controlof the Arms Race, 31.
StephenWalt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1987),
18n, 21-22.
Abstract. The purposeof the armscontrolprocess is to minimizethe likelihoodof war
while preservingthe securityof states.Whenarmscontrolceases to be a methodof solving co-operationproblems,and becomes a regulatorof internationalpolitics, it undermines the abilityof statesto balanceagainstpreponderantthreats.This study focuses on
the ways that arms controlcan potentiallyshort-circuitthe peace-enhancingaspects of
the balance of power system. It concludes with an examinationof the contrastingand
complementarycontributionsof thatsystem andof armscontrolin six policy areas.
R~sumi. Le but du processusde contr8ledes armementsest de minimiserles risques
de guerretouten
le contr6ledes armementssert,
des
la
prrservant srcurit6 ltats. Lorsque i
non plus Asolutionnerles problimes
de cooperation,mais rrgulerla politiqueinternationale, il affaiblitla capacit6des Itats Acrderun 6quilibredes forces qui les protege
contreles principalesmenaces Aleur srcuritd.Cette 6tude se concentresur les modalitrs
d'utilisationdu contrrle des armementssusceptibles d'empicher l'6quilibre des puissances de sauvegarderla paix. En conclusion, il examine les effets contradictoireset
complrmentairesdu systime d'6quilibredes forces et du contr8le des armementsdans
cinq domainesde la politiquegouvernementale.
state considering starting a war must take into account the potential
interferenceor exploitation by third-partystates, a restraintGeoffrey
Blainey has termed the "waterbirddilemma."8This definition is not
free of controversy,but it captures the principal criticism that arms
control attemptsto freeze a given distributionof power, thereby weakening the ability of status quo states to balance against emerging
threats, and undermining the stabilizing influence of third-party
intervention.9
Arms Control and the Causes of War
Contemporaryarms control is a response to rapid arms accumulations
made possible by the impact of the industrialrevolution on military
production.10Arms control is seen as desirable either because it
reduces the likelihood of a war desired by neither adversary, or
because it reduces costs in deterrenceagainst it. Both the League of
Nations and the United Nations have assumed that weapons are a
major facilitatingelement of conflict, so by regulatingtheir availability, peace can be engineered: "Disarmamentis expected to contribute
8 GeoffreyBlainey, The Causes of War(3rd ed.; New York:Free Press, 1988), 58;
and Scott Sigmund Gartnerand Randolph M. Siverson, "War Expansion and
WarOutcome,"Journalof ConflictResolution40 (March 1996), 4-15.
9 For criticism of this conception of internationalrelations by other realists, see
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus 93 (1964),
881-909; RandallL. Schweller, "Bandwagoningfor Profit,"InternationalSecurity 19 (1994), 72-107; and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War
Ledger (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1980).
10 Iain McLean, ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress, 1996), 142.
750
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
greatly to peace by erasing the tools of war,erasing interstateconflicts,
and curbing the willingness or ability of governments to treat the
threat or use of force as legitimate."" This is the popularpromise of
arms control and disarmament,and is generally widely accepted even
if it is not well explained.12
Critics of arms control argue that its essential problem is its lack
of theoreticalcontent.Their firsttargetis the belief in the links between
weapons and war. "Because wars are waged with weapons, the latter
are presumed,in some mysteriousbut still significantfashion, to cause
the former."13 The critics argue that war is caused for political ends,
and that weapons per se have never been a significantcause of conflict
between states: "lethal instruments are not unimportant,but they
acquire their significance from politics."•4 This is based on Clausewitz's dictum that "war is policy by other means."5 RichardBetts has
arguedthat "thereis no evidence that reductionof worldwidetotals of
arms sales services any of the axiomatic goals of armscontrol:to save
money, reduce the probability of war, or reduce destruction in the
event of war."16He bases this on a simple lack of evidence, and argues
that "high arms levels are not destabilizing, especially if they are in
balance."17 Whether war that threatens the independence of states
becomes more or less likely, depends on how arms control affects this
militarybalance.
11 PatrickM. Morgan, "Disarmament,"in Joel Krieger,ed., The OxfordCompanion to the Politics of the World(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), 246.
12 Alan Platt, The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance P-6825
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1982), 3; and for an exception to this tendency, see
Keith Krause,KennethEpps, William Nelson and David Mutimer,Constraining
ConventionalProliferation:A Rolefor Canada (Ottawa:Departmentof Foreign
Affairs and InternationalTradeCanada,1996), 61, 96.
13 Colin Gray,House of Cards: WhyArms ControlMust Fail (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1992), 46.
14 Colin Gray, "Arms Control Does Not Control Arms," Orbis 37 (1993), 333.
See also, Colin Gray, WeaponsDon't Make War:Policy, Strategy,and Military
Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Richard K. Betts,
"Systems for Peace or Causes of War:Collective Security, Arms Control and
the New Europe,"InternationalSecurity 17 (1992) 5-43; and RobertD. Blackwill, "Conceptual Problems of Conventional Arms Control," International
Security 12 (1988), 28-47.
15 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976; firstpublished 1832), 605.
16 RichardBetts, "The Tragicomedyof Arms TradeControl,"InternationalSecurity 5 (1980), 83.
17 Ibid., 86.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
751
Peace and the Balance of Power
Arms control, by fixing states into rigid security commitments, may
actually underminethe flexibility of the balance of power mechanism
in the internationalsystem. According to its proponents,the balance of
power system maintains internationalpeace and preserves the independence of states by ensuringthat no one power accumulatesenough
resourcesto dominatethe entire system. It does this two ways: first, it
balances the majority of states within a multipolarity against the
largest single threat to the system;18second, it acts as a restrainton
states that seek war because of uncertainthird-partyreactions. Arms
control agreements inhibit the operation of the balance of power by
locking states into regularpatternsof behaviourand by robbing them
of the flexibility to rebalance against a new threat.'9 Arms control
weakens the responsivenessof democracies,typically guardiansof the
status quo, thereby increasing the belief among aggressors that they
will not interferein war.20Even in its main purpose of reducing the
effects of arms upon an inter-staterelationship,arms control may have
less effect than the balance of power. Dan Reiter has argued that the
uncertaintyof a third-partyreaction is the principal reason that preemptive attacks rarely happen.21Robert Jervis has argued that even
underconditions of offensive advantage,states will realize that no single state can prevail against a coalition.22As long as the power a state
could get from an alliance is greater than the benefits obtained by
strikingfirstin an attack,the balance of power will renderpre-emptive
and preventivewars costly.
According to RichardBetts, "the function of a security system is
to producesecurity,and the system should be judged by how it does so
ratherthan by other things associated with it."23This points to an old
assumptionof balance of power theory,that states must practice tradeoffs between the independenceof states, the avoidance of major systemic war, and the avoidance of minor adjustmentwars. Minor wars
that permit the readjustmentof the system are necessary because of
18 Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House,
1962); EdwardV. Gulick, Europe's Classic Balance of Power (Ithaca:Cornell
University Press, 1955); and Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power," World
Politics 5 (1953) 442-77.
19 Michael J. Mazarrand RichardK. Betts, "Correspondence:A Farewellto Arms
Control?"InternationalSecurity 17 (1993), 188-200.
20 Gray,"ArmsControlDoes Not ControlArms," 342.
21 Dan Reiter, "Explodingthe Powder Keg Myth: PreemptiveWarsAlmost Never
Happen,"InternationalSecurity20 (1995), 5-34.
22 Robert Jervis, "ArmsControl, Stability, and Causes of War,"Political Science
Quarterly108 (1993), 252.
23 Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War,"1992, 8.
752
JULIANSCHOFIELD
what Robert Gilpin has identified as the law of uneven growth:states
will develop at different rates and are tempted by this advantageto
expand their influence.24Failure to readjustthe system will lead to a
divergence between the distributionof power and the distributionof
benefits, which could culminate in a major war.25From this point of
view, arms control agreements are interpretedas being too narrowly
focused on the incident of adjustmentwars at the expense of achieving
systemic stability and independence.26
There are, however, a number of objections to this view. Neorealists argue that bipolarity is the more stable internationalstructure
(less prone to war) because it reduces the uncertainty,that is the principal cause of war. Classical realists have tendedto arguethatmultipolarity is the more stable because uncertainty engenders caution.27
There are, therefore, two differing conceptions of the effect of certainty on conflict occurrence.28The neo-realist argumentthat uncertainty in multipolarityprovides incentives for war is best capturedby
the notion of powers that seek to exploit opportunitiesin a system by
inducing alliance buck-passing in their opponents.29But this is not
mainly because of uncertainty.A typical example of this was Adolf
Hitler's attemptto play the Soviet Union againstthe United States long
enough for him to consolidate his gains duringthe Second WorldWar.
Buck-passing is very risky and rarely successful when sufficienttime
is provided for the potential balancers to solve burden-sharingdisputes. Neo-realists are right that a bi-polarized multipowersystem is
24
25
26
27
28
29
Robert Gilpin, Warand Change in WorldPolitics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), 94.
Robert Powell, "Stability and the Distribution of Power," WorldPolitics 48
(1996), 239-67; Walter Korpi, "Conflict, Power, and Relative Deprivation,"
American Political Science Review 68 (1974), 1569-78.
On the distinction between adjustmentand systemic wars, see Manus I. Midlarsky, "Systemic Wars and Dyadic Wars: No Single Theory," International
Interactions 16 (1990), 171-81; Jack Levy, "AnalyticProblems in the Identification of Wars," International Interactionsl14 (1988), 181-86; and Jack Levy,
"Big Wars, Little Wars, and Theory Construction,"InternationalInteractions
16 (1990), 215-24.
Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "MultipolarPower Systems and International Security," in James N. Rosenau, ed., InternationalPolitics and Foreign
Policy (New York:Free Press, 1969), 315.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Towarda Scientific Understandingof International
Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly 29 (1985), 131;
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "MeasuringSystemic Polarity,"Journal of Conflict
Resolution 19 (1975), 90; and RichardN. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity,Multipolarity, and the Future," in James N. Rosenau, ed., InternationalPolitics and Foreign Policy (New York:Free Press, 1969), 329-30.
Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarityand Hitler's Strategy of
WorldConquest(New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1998); and Dan Reiter,
book review,AmericanJournal of Political Science 93 (1999), 243-44.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
753
more prone to have intra-alliancefree-riding.To compensate for this,
states will tend to chain-gangby providingunconditionalcommitment
to weaker allies and their minor disputes, which makes conflicts in
these systems extremely intensive.30 In effect, uncertaintyis an incentive to war when it involves the unsure commitment of one's allies,
which only occurs in extremely bipolarized multipower systems (an
ideal type that was approached but only weakly captured by the
alliance structuresimmediatelyprecedingthe First WorldWar and during the Cold War).Rather,when we speakof uncertaintyhere, we mean
the tendency of uncommittedthird-partypowers to balance against
emerging threats, and the flexibility that permits them to do so. The
uncertaintydisincentive for war is therefore stronger than the uncertainty incentivefor war.
Another objection is that arms control agreements do not inhibit
flexibility because it has never been convincingly established that the
balance of power actually ensures peace, rather than simply a warenforced equilibrium.3'In his study of internationalwars since 1700,
Blainey found that decisive victory broughtaboutby an overwhelming
coalition did more to promote a durablepeace than the frequent and
indecisive engagements typical of a balance of power system.32He
points out that there are no empirical studies that have demonstrated
the reputedbalance of power-peacelink, and that, therefore,the theory
is really an axiom for nationalindependence.However,Blainey can, at
best, only point out thatthe balance of power, like any collective structure, is prone to market failure (and alliance balancing to collective
action problems). This is what happened prior to the Second World
War.Even he has affirmedthe peacekeeping benefits of the threat of
third-partyintervention,which forms the basis for the inclination of
states to balance againstemergingthreats.Consequently,even if a balance of power system did not pertain, there is theoretical reason to
believe that arms control could still inhibit peaceful change by undermining the flexibility of states to bandwagon,and redrawalliances in
orderto deal with an emerging threatto the system. The aspect of the
balance of power that is relevantfor the purposes of inhibiting war is
therefore the uncertaintyof third-partyreactions created by the tendency for states to balance againstemergingthreats.
Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,"in Steven E.
Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jonesand Steven Van Evera, eds., Military Strategyand
the Origins of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991), 109-33.
31 Paul W. Schroeder,"QuantitativeStudies in the Balance of Power,"Journal of
ConflictResolution21 (1977), 5.
32 Blainey, The Causes of War,108-24.
30
754
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power
The implementation of arms control is an attempt to reduce the likelihood of wars and allow the independence of states by reducing uncertainty and thereby enabling co-operation. However, in helping states
achieve co-operation, arms control may undermine the balance of
power and its disincentives for war. A well-designed arms control
agreement must avoid interfering with the balance of power mechanism, and must, therefore, neither inhibit the threat of third-party intervention nor bind states so that they lose the flexibility to respond to
emerging threats. Ideally, an arms control agreement would be designed
to complement these two effects rather than cancel them out. An impli-
cation of this is that disarmamentis often incompatiblewith the arms
control objectives of peace and security. Arms control may therefore
fail to preventwar when it succeeds in reducingthe uncertaintynecessary for the effective operation of the balance of power mechanism, or
when it fails to secure an agreement where the balance of power had
little effect. The first of these will be discussed in this section.
The prime objective of both arms control and the balance of
power as policy is to maintain security (the preservation of a state's
independence), and second, to avoid war. Use of arms control attempts
this by solving co-operation problems between states, thereby minimizing the occurrence of sub-optimal outcomes. The balance of power
process preserves the independence of states and staves off war either
by balancing or by threatening uncertain outcomes on any state seeking preponderance or considering to attack. The systems complement
one another when arms control does not interfere with the operation of
the balance of power mechanism. The consequence of easy realignment
of states is that aggressors are wary of the reaction of third parties and
must incorporate this uncertainty into their calculations.33 As the uncertainty of third-party behaviour is greater in an international system
with many states, so a balance of power is more likely to dissuade
warfare in a multipolar than in a bipolar environment. Consequently,
arms control is more likely to weaken the balance of power mechanism in a multipolar environment and is more prominent a disincentive
for war in a bipolar one.
In contrast, arms control seeks to enhance the security of states
by helping them co-ordinate their defence postures, and thereby
reduce the fear they induce in their potential adversaries. Arms control
33 Deutsch and Singer, "MultipolarPower Systems and International
Security."This
is in contrastto KennethWaltz, who argues that bipolarityis the most stable. It
is, however, more likely that the stabilityWaltz describes is betterexplainedby
the presence of nuclear weapons than by the dynamics of the internationalsystem.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
755
enhances co-operationbetween states by prescribingrules and restrictions that are characterizedby their regularity.It is this agreed-upon
imposition of consistency on the security environment of two states
that generates trust and makes reciprocity possible. Arms control
achievesthis throughno-warpacts, limits on the deploymentby number
or type of military forces, by resolving insecurity by removing
secrecy, and by puttingcosts on realignmentwith other states. It is this
same inflexibilitythat can make states unwilling to subscribe to arms
control: it is often perceived to rob states of their ability to defend
themselves. On the systemic level, this inflexibility may inhibit the
ability of states to adjust to emerging threats in the security environment, and may encourage aggressor states by removing the uncertaintyof third-partyreactions.
From a policy standpoint,arms control is more likely to succeed
in avoiding war if focused on security issues that are a function of cooperationproblems, and less likely to succeed if it obstructs the free
functioning of the balance of power. Arms control increases in its
effectiveness and the balance of power mechanism decreases in effectiveness as the internationalsystem moves from multipolarto bipolar.
A badly designed arms control agreementis, therefore, one that inappropriatelybalances the disincentives for war in the balance of power
mechanism with the planned disincentives in an arms control agreement. A well-designed arms control agreement is one that complements ratherthan obstructsthe war disincentives inherent in the balance of power mechanismand third-partythreatsof intervention.
Arms Control Failure and Co-operation
The popularexplanationfor arms control failure, whether a failure to
sign or comply, is that it is unfair,or protects cheaters. Arms control
failurecan manifestitself in a numberof ways. Some agreementssimply fade away, while others fail dramatically.Still others are never formulated because they are viewed, correctly or incorrectly,as infeasiAn arms control agreement can,
ble, impracticalor inappropriate.34
therefore, fail because an agreement that would have otherwise
broughtmutualbenefit could not be secured because of mutual suspicion. At other times, arms control can fail for good reasons: either it
was inappropriateto the situation,or it seriously disadvantagedone of
the signatories.This sort of failure may or may not be based on a correct perceptionof the agreement.
34 On balancingthe political and technical aspects of an arms control agreement,
see James F. Keeley, "Containingthe Blast: Some Problems of the Non-Proliferation Regime," in Robert Boardman and James F. Keeley, eds., Nuclear
Exportsand WorldPolitics (London:Macmillan, 1983), 218.
756
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
Failure of arms control compliance can occur because one party
has incentives to cheat on its co-signatory, or because third-party
behaviour creates incentives to leave an agreement.Complianceis, to
a large extent, determinedby the co-operative and adjustmentstructure of the relationshipbetween the states involved in the agreement.35
The menace of third-partyunderminingof arms control agreementsis
one of the principalincentives for the pursuitof multilateralregulatory
arms control. The logic is that if all states in a system can be subordinated to the same regime, then defection through insecurity (rather
than for exploitation) will not occur. However, as already discussed,
this also disables the benefit of the same threatagainstthe initiationof
war. Therefore, arms control agreementsthat make co-operationless
hazardous while permitting adjustment to third-partyreactions are
more likely to succeed.
Vally Koubi has found that armscontrolagreementsare only feasible underthreeconditions:when trade-offsare comparable,when verification is reasonably accurate, and when existing weapons are easily
For example, the United States legislaturehas made it
reproducible.36
increasingly unlikely that chemical or biological weapons inspectors
will be given access to verify its treatycompliance because this would
expose civilian chemical research.The US has also begun to circumvent the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, however stealthily, in
order to pursue its ballistic missile defence programme.Here there is
no comparabletrade-offwith Russia, since the latteris unlikely to produce a comparablesystem, verificationis difficult, and such a system
promises to be costly.
The first problem of arms control compliance is one of co-operation. The central problem of co-operation in internationalrelations is
how to overcome the effects of anarchy,in which there is no overriding sovereign to guaranteeany agreementand punish cheating.37How
do statesensureco-operationin armscontrolagreementswithoutendangering theirsecurity?In securityaffairs,statesareextremely sensitive to
the relative distributionof benefits from an agreement,and are liable
to defect if they see that they are at a relative ratherthan an absolute
disadvantagethat may eventually weaken their security.38Arms conStephen M. Meyer, "Verificationand Risk in Arms Control," International
Security 8 (1984) 111-26.
36 Vally Koubi, "Disarmament:A TheoreticalAnalysis,"InternationalInteractions
19 (1994), 263.
37 David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism,Neorealism, and WorldPolitics," in David
A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The ContemporaryDebate
(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1993), 4.
38 Charles Lipson, "InternationalCooperationin Security and Economic Affairs,"
WorldPolitics 37 (1984), 1-23. If capabilitiesmatterin internationalsecurity,as
35
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
757
trol negotiation can be likened to a Prisoner's Dilemma, a game in
which two states seek agreement over a common interest; or to the
game of Chicken,in which two states seek to avoid a common point of
aversion(see Figure 1).39Because a point of common aversionis more
easily negotiatedthan a point of common interest(it has fewer equilibria), the game of Chicken is paradoxically easier to negotiate to an
agreementthan a Prisoner'sDilemma game.40 However, the Chicken
game is plagued by a contradiction:the need to instill trust while not
underminingthe credibility of the threat to use (possibly nuclear)
force.41 For example, it is probablyeasier to come to a nuclear arms
agreement,becauseof the commonfearof nuclearwar,thanto distribute
burdensharingwith an ally.
FIGURE1
Games in Arms Control
Prisoner'sDilemma
(CommonInterest)
Co-operate
Co-operate
Defect
3,3
4,1
Chicken
(Common Aversion)
Defect
Co-operate
1,4
Co-operate
2,2
Defect
3,3
4,2
Defect
2,4
1,1
In a Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which a rational single-play
strategy would be to defect for both sides, leaving all players worse
off, co-operationis possible. First, arms control agreements should be
reduced to smaller transactions,both across and within time, so that
defection or cheating has lesser consequences. This would provide an
added incentive to co-operate,because it would create expectations of
future benefits. For example, the advantages of issue linkage would
suggest that a state is less likely to cheat if violation of one arms control agreement would undermine its standing in another current or
Grieco attests, then arms control should focus on levels of arms as a source of
insecurity(JosephM. Grieco, Cooperationamong Nations [Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1990], 27-50, 498-500). Also, Charles S. Glaser and John C.
MatthewsIII, "Correspondence:CurrentGains and FutureOutcomes,"International Security21 (1997), 186-97.
39 Glenn H. Snyder, " 'Prisoner'sDilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International
Politics," InternationalStudies Quarterly15 (1971), 68-73, 82-87.
40 Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic
World,"in Baldwin, ed., Neorealismand Neoliberalism,35-41.
41 Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models," 84.
758
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
prospective agreement it considers valuable.42Second, transactions
should be regularizedand provided with some form of verification.43
Third, increasingthe numberof participantsto an agreementdecreases
the importanceof relative gains because it reduces the cost of any single member defecting, thereby increasing co-operation (although it
also appears that the ease of collective punishmentmay be offset by
the ease of free-riding, called the "sanctioning problem").44For
example, the Non ProliferationTreaty (NPT) tends to generate world
reaction to noncompliants.However,it is probablethat armscontrol is
easier to manage between fewer parties, since side-paymentscan be
more easily calculated.
In a game of Chicken, where outcomes are zero-sum but where
players still face a common aversion(a collision or nuclearwar),structuring the transactionhas far less effect. The purposeof arms control
here is establishing a norm of restraint.Schelling argued that states
"win" relativeto their own value system, not to that of their opponent.
Therefore, in situations of common aversion, relative gains is least
likely to matter.45Arms control in the form of a regime such as one
dealing with inhumaneweapons, could lower transactionand verification costs by establishing a common standardof agreement of the
identificationand path towardthe common point of aversion.46
One approachto the difficulty of obtaining agreementsis to use
feasibility as a guiding principle of treatydesign by emphasizingverifiability. Arms control is plagued by the fundamentalparadoxthat the
agreementsthat are most needed are the most difficult to get, and the
agreements that are the easiest to get are the least consequential.
Declaring difficult agreementsas unfeasibleignores the possible benefits of attempts to mitigate the danger of various arms competition
processes.47The conservativedanger,therefore,is where no attemptis
even made to come to an agreement because of the incorrectlyper42
Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies," WorldPolitics 38 (1985), 1-24.
43 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperationunder Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,"in Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 91-92.
44 Punishment here should be read as withdrawingfuture offers of co-operation
rather than imposing coercive sanctions (Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and
the Pattern of InternationalCooperation," in Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and
Neoliberalism, 171).
45 Thomas Schelling, Strategyof Conflict(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press,
1960), 4-5.
46 Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving CooperationunderAnarchy: Strategiesand
Institutions,"87-98.
47 This is precisely what Colin Gray does in his first paradox of arms control
(Gray,House of Cards, 2-3).
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
759
ceived political costs of failure. Critics tend to point to the wasted
efforts at strategic arms reduction that had to wait for a fundamental
reductionin Cold War rivalrybefore they could culminate in START
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty).48Feasibility is thus a legitimate
criterionfor treaty signature,but it is less clear that it is for the arms
controlprocess in general.
States may not only fear cheating from their co-signatory, but
exploitationby third and n-th parties. The same third-partyinfluence
that generates caution in a multipolar environment also undermines
the viability of bilateral agreements between states. In multipolar
internationalsystems, agreementis more difficultbecause of the anticipation that either side might be tempted to violate the agreement in
orderto avoid being taken advantageof by a thirdparty.This can lead
to a conflict between the inflexible stabilizingpurpose of an arms control agreement and the constantly changing distributionof power in
the internationalsystem.49Consequently,collective arms control agreements tend to become less relevantand manageableover time.50 There
are two factors that counteractthis tendency.First, it may be the concern with a third party threat that leads initially to an arms control
agreement.Second, defection from an arms control agreementfor fear
of third-partyexploitation may compromise a state's reputation for
reliability.
Evidence for the fear of third-partyexploitation can be found in
the failures to obtain arms control agreements since the early 1990s.
Among these are nucleartesting by India, which is driven by China's
arsenal, and Pakistan,which may have seriously weakened the longterm viability of the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). The existence of a few pariahsto the internationalconsensus
on arms control, such as Iraq, is usually expected. Increasingly,however, multilateralarms control policies have been flaunted by major
powers concerned with ongoing military commitments. Russia, China
and the United States chose not to sign the 1997 Ottawa Landmine
Treaty, mainly out of concern for the credibility of their extended
deterrentsto key allies. The same countries have avoided sincere discussions on the "zero-option"for the complete eliminationof nuclear
weapons, and have "unfairly"decided not to give India and Pakistan
nuclearweaponstatuswithinthe NPT.
Dan Caldwell and United States Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, Arms
Controland DisarmamentAgreements(London:TransactionBooks, 1984).
49 Eric Chauvistr6, "Faites vos Jeux: Arms Control or Confrontation,"Security
Dialogue 26 (1995), 294.
50 Richard Dean Burns, "Supervision, Control and Inspection of Armaments:
1919-1941 Perspective,"Orbis 15 (1971), 947.
48
760
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
Noncompliance occurs mainly because states see opportunitiesto
cheat, or because they fear third-partyexploitation. In the first case,
arms control agreementsmust ensure a reliable method of verification.
In the second, they must attain a level of flexibility that permitsthem
to adapt to prevailing circumstances. Arms control is useful in its
structuralform in Prisoner's Dilemma situations, and is useful in a
normativeform for games of Chicken.
Arms Control Functions and the Balance of Power
The purpose of a survey of arms control functions is to assess the relative incompatibilityof arms control and balance of power to the prevention of war. If the underlying belief of arms control is that arms
competition and accumulation can have significant political effects,
then the focus should be on these assumptions. Therefore, for arms
control to work, we need an explanationthat links the treatmentwith
the illness. According to RobertJervis, "if the main objective of arms
control is to make war less likely, then any theory of arms control
must rest on a theory of the causes of war.""51
This alleged causal link
between weapons and war is neither trivial nor direct and needs to be
specified, because the simple assertion that weapons lead to war has
enough exceptions that it does not suffice as a useful predictor.The
validity of these functions must also be assessed in order to place in
perspective their contributionto peace. Most arms control policies are
multifunctional,in the sense that they are designed with a numberof
different policy objectives, some of which are contradictory.These
policies are disaggregated to the alleged cause of war to permit an
identificationof their individualeffects.52
Function Type1: ConflictSpiralAlleviatingPolicies
A conflict spiral-drivenarmsrace is an action-reactionprocess in which
two states are competitivelyengaged in the build-upof arms,concomitant with an increase in insecurity-generatingmisperceptions.53The
51
Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," 239. See also Jack S.
Levy, "The Causes of War:A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E.
Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern and Charles Tilly, eds.,
Behavior; Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 277-89.
52 For a similar typology of arms control and disarmamentpolicies, see Schelling
and Halperin,Strategyand Arms Control.
53 RobertJervis,Perceptionand Misperceptionin InternationalPolitics (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976), 58-95; and George W. Downs, "ArmsRaces
and War,"in Philip Tetlock, ed.,
and Nuclear War(New York:
Behavior,Society
Oxford UniversityPress, 1989), 90.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
761
action-reactionof the conflict spiral is driven by deterrencelogic, in
which both are committed to demonstrating resolve in order to
prevail.54This follows Vegetius's doctrine of si vis pacem, para
bellum.55In conflict spirals, adversariestend to act on the perception
of rapidlyclosing windows of opportunity,thereby escalating the dispute and increasingthe likelihood of pre-emptiveor preventivewars.56
Windows result from the fact that most arms-drivenaction-reaction
processes are actually erraticand uneven responses to an adversary.57
The conflict spiral-drivenarms race link to war has received strong
substantiation,even if it is not theoretically well explained.'58 A conflict spiral-alleviatingarms control agreementre-establishesnormality
in an inter-staterelationshipby reducing the intensity of the actionreactionprocess.
The internationalsystem has two naturalmechanisms for dealing
with conflict spiral incentives to war: the threat of third-partyintervention raises costs for states contemplatingmilitaryaction; and states
tend to balance against other states that are seeking to amass power.
Arms control will undermineeither mechanism throughgeneral disarmament, or througheffective regulationof the internationalsystem it
underminesthe freedom of states either to defend themselves or inter54 George W. Downs, "The Rational Deterrence Debate," World Politics 41
(1989), 225-38; RichardNed Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," WorldPolitics 41(1989), 208-24;
and R. J. Overy, "Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before
1939," Journalof StrategicStudies 15 (1992), 73-101.
55 If you want peace, preparefor war.
56 James D. Morrow,"A Twist of Truth:A Reexaminationof the Effects of Arms
Races on the Occurrenceof War,"Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (1989),
500-29.
57 JamesR. Schlesinger,Arms Interactionand Arms ControlP- 3881 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), 5.
58 Lewis F. Richardson, "Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting?" Nature
(1951), 567-68; Michael D. Wallace, "Armamentsand Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," InternationalStudies Quarterly26 (1982), 37-56; Paul F.
Diehl, "Arms Races and the Outbreakof War 1816-1980," Ph.D. dissertation,
Universityof Michigan, 1983; RandolphM. Siverson and Paul E Diehl, "Arms
Races, the Conflict Spiral, and the Onset of War,"in Manus I. Midlarsky,ed.,
Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993),
195-218; Susan Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the
Debate," The Journal of Peace Research 34 (1997), 21; Susan Sample, "Arms
Races and the Escalation of Disputes to War ," Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1996, 151-52; for theoreticalexaminationand criticism of the link,
see Colin Gray, The Soviet-AmericanArms Race (Farnborough:Saxon House,
1976), chap. 2, 96-127; and Stephen J. Majeski, "The Arms Race Noninteraction Puzzle: The Effects of Concept Choice and MeasurementErroron the Estimation of the US-USSR Arms Race," International Interactions 12 (1985),
133-49.
762
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
vene in a conflict. An example of an arms control agreement that dis-
abled the flexibility in the international system to respond to an
aggressor was the 1922 WashingtonNaval Treaty.By seeking to regulate the distribution of capability within an international system, it created incentives for the fastest-growing states, Japan and Italy, to defect
later from the agreement. Security would have been better preserved if
the status quo states in question had not been so reliant on such an
agreement. A complementary arms control arrangement would preserve the stabilizing deterrent force of status quo states while minimizing the escalatory potential of individual conflicts among them. This
type of arms control agreement is necessarily of limited scope: it does
not attempt to dictate changes in the distribution capability. An example of this is any bilateral security arrangement between adversaries
that permits consultations and formal adjustment or exit procedures.
The principal arms control method of managing conflict spirals is
to slow it down by specifying limits on the number of weapons procured. An important distinction is between what Colin Gray has termed
operational arms control, which regulates behaviour, and operational
Examarms control, which regulates the types and quantity of arms."59
are
the
Antarctica
of
arms
control
measures
1959
ples
operational
Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1971 Seabed Treaty,
which all sought to keep the Cold War conflict spiral from leading to
the deployment of nuclear weapons in remote areas. Typical of structural arms control agreements are naval and strategic arms control. In
the first category, there is the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817, which
limited the number of British and American naval forces on the Great
Lakes and Lake Champlain; the 1856 Russo-Turkish Convention,
which limited naval armaments in the Black Sea; and the 1902 ChileArgentina Convention, which limited naval armaments generally. In
the second category, the strategic arms agreements, include the 1972
Interim Offensive Arms Agreement, which placed limits on the ICBM
and SLBM stockpiles of the superpowers, as did the 1979 START II
Treaty (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II) (which was adhered to
despite never being ratified), and the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty. Similar reductions were prescribed by START (which
entered into effect in 1994), START II (signed in 1993 but with
delayed ratification), and possibly START III negotiations by 2007
(which would reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 2,700 per
party).
Often arms control agreements seek to legislate against changes
in the distribution of power. An example of this is the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, that attempted to limit the principal vessels of the
59
Gray,House of Cards,x.
Arms ControlFailure and the Balance of Power
763
major powers to a ratio and thus made its members vulnerable to
defectors and third parties, while inhibiting the counterbalancing
mechanism.RichardBetts, in a warningagainst neglecting the balance
of power,has remarkedthat "Germanyjunked the arms control provisions of the Versailles Treaty long before 1939, and Japanrenounced
the 1922 Naval Treatyfive years before Pearl Harbour.While abrogation may provide political warning of crisis, it is misguided to count
on the monitoringprovisions of arms control agreements to provide
strategicwarningof war or tactical warningof attack."60 Similarly disastrousarms control may be the result of the multilateralreductionof
forces in the 1990 Paris Treaty,that has made "it legally difficult to
revert to former force levels and postures."61However, draw-downs
should not be taken as guaranteesof disarmament:agreed force totals
do more to legitimize current force levels than to preserve stability.
"The CFE [ConventionalForces Europe] negotiations, some argue,
may be not only increasinglyirrelevantto the emerging political order
in Europebut might actually become a definite obstacle to the further
evolution of political change, notably by legitimizing levels of Soviet
troop presence in Eastern Europe."62 However, this inflexibility has
less to do with draw-downsper se than the design of treaty flexibility
in general.63
An evaluation of arms control agreements by Vally Koubi has
found that between 1815 and 1987, agreements designed specifically
to avertimpendingwars by containing their conflict spirals were more
effective thanthose that sought to preservea general peace. This offers
clear evidence that armscontrol does better at facilitatingco-operation
when there is clear and common equilibria, that is the avoidance of
war, than in managing security communities, which is best left to the
balance of power. Examples of war-avertingtreaties are the Declaration of St.Petersburg(1868), the First Hague Conference (1899), and
the Second Hague Conference (1907). Conversely, there is little evidence that general arms control agreementsreduce competition.64 A
corollary is that it is only after an action-reactionprocess has been
slowed that confidence-buildingmeasures are effective. The threat of
third-partyinterventionin an ongoing rivalry certainly has some evi60 Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War,"40.
61 InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 1993-1994
(London:Brassey's, 1994), 194.
62 IISS StrategicSurvey1989-1990 (London:Brassey's, 1990), 207.
63 AndrewJ. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1982), 284.
64 Vally Koubi, "MilitaryBuildups and Arms Control Agreements,"International
Studies Quarterly38 (1994), 617; and Koubi, "InternationalTensions and Arms
ControlAgreements,"AmericanJournal of Political Science 37 (1993), 148.
764
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
dence for creating this effect. The British and American rivalry after
the 1895-1896 Venezuela crisis and the British-French rivalry after
Fashoda 1898 were both reduced or even reversed entirely, by the
emerging threat of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. It
was the threat of third-party exploitation rather than the threat of escalation that induced restraint and, eventually, understanding. In fact,
some action-reaction process is indicative of adjustment that closes
windows of opportunity. Jervis has argued that under some circum-
stances it makes sense to ensure that states have a credible and sufficient deterrent,not so much against external attack, but so that they
feel secure and therefore do not act recklessly.65However, there are
two problems that arise in any dyadic competition for deterrentsecurity. The first is sufficiency-how much is enough: parity,parityplus,
or preponderance?Second, if neither side can agree, a conflict spiral
may ensue.
Arms control agreementsdesigned to managedyadic action-reaction processes are peace-enhancing when they facilitate dyadic cooperation without encouraging third parties to take advantageof the
reduced military preparednessof either party. Multilateralarms control agreementsthat set limits on the quantityof arms are more likely
to interfere with the balance of power because they are unlikely to be
able to adjustto the changes in the distributionof capabilitiesbetween
the parties. War could be the outcome of a lack of preparednessby
some of the parties to the agreement, with a party either internal or
external to the agreement.This seems to be a hazardmore of a bipolar
than a multipolarsystem, since even a state with a fixed militarycapability can seek to adjustby realigning itself. Conflict-spiralalleviating
arms control and the balance of power mechanism therefore have a
high probabilityof mutual interference.They are complementaryonly
insofar as the arms control agreement assists states in avoiding suboptimal outcomes by aggravatingconflict spirals that are the product
of the security dilemma.
Function Type2: MilitarizationAlleviatingPolicies
Militarization theory argues that as the armed forces increase their
influence in government, the state becomes more likely to adopt an
aggressive foreign policy.66"The militarizationof a society may cause
leaders and followers alike to conclude that war is inevitable rather
65
66
Jervis, Perception and Misperception (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976), 80.
Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and InternationalConflict,
1816-1976," Journal of ConflictResolution33 (1989), 30-1.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
765
than merely possible."'67Jack Snyder has argued that groups sympathetic to military interests often form log-rolled coalitions with other
groups in society sympatheticwith an expanded militaryrole.68These
typically include groups with interests that lie outside the state; thus
external interests become tied to military expenditures, leading to
adventurism.69Studies by David Stevenson and David Hermannconfirm that the militarizationof diplomacy was a significant contributor
to the cause of the First WorldWar.70A state's militarizationtends to
manifest itself in an aggressive and coercive foreign policy, which in
the internationalsystem typically leads to the formationof a counterbalancing coalition of status quo states. The principal arms control
measureagainst militarizationis security dialogue that, throughconfidence buildingmeasures,moderatesthe state by improvingits perception of its security and makes it aware of the benefits of co-operation.
Here at least, armscontrol and the balance of power are not only fully
complementary,but often mutuallyreinforcing.
Confidencebuilding is a learningprocess where, throughsecurity
dialogue with an adversary,a defence establishmentbecomes receptive to new approachesto security and becomes sensitive to the concerns of other states.71 Often, though, the principalbenefit of an arms
control agreementis not substantive,the improved relations between
opponents by the mere process of formulating an agreement are.
Examples include the 1986 Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmamentin Europe (CDE), and the 1967
Harmel Report,that led to the formationof the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe(CSCE), and the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction(MBFR) forum,that culminatedin the ParisTreatyof
1990.72
67 StuartA. Bremer, "DangerousDyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of
InterstateWar,1816-1965," Journalof ConflictResolution 36 (1992), 318.
68 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress, 1991), 31-60.
69 Jack S. Levy, "The DiversionaryTheory of War:A Critique,"in Midlarsky,ed.,
Handbookof WarStudies, 259-88; and for criticism see Blainey, The Causes of
War;73.
70 David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and David G. Herrmann, The Arming of
Europeand the Makingof the First WorldWar(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1996).
71 James Macintosh, "Key Elements of a Conceptual Approach to Confidence
Building," in James A. Boutilier, ed., Arms Control in the North Pacific: The
Role for Confidence-Buildingand Verification(Ottawa: Verification Research
Unit, Non-Proliferation,Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External
Affairsand InternationalTradeCanada,1993), 65.
72 Hallenbeckand Shaver,On Disarmament,1, 6.
766
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
The conservative interpretation of the confidence-building pro-
cess is that it can lead to improvedrelations where the adversariesare
no longer satisfied with the status quo.73 This sort of change can come
from a variety of sources, including fatigue in continuing a rivalry,
domestic opposition to the burdens of defence, or profound political
change. Its basis is that "in an enduringly antagonisticmilitary relationship, without the change of something more fundamentalthan
enhanced transparency,more informationis not necessarily going to
result in reduced tensions and a better, more stable relationship."'74
The liberal interpretationof the confidence-buildingprocess is that a
security dialogue typical of arms control negotiationscan be the cause
of change. In this interpretation,the gradualmollificationof the Soviet
Union duringthe Cold Warwas due indirectlyto the complex learning
process made possible by the continuousdialogue with its main adversary, the US.75 Whereas realpolitik interpretationsof world politics
posit interests defined in terms of power, constructivistsassume that
interests can become disconnected from power (althoughlargely indeterminateabout which ideas will prevail).76
However, even agreeing to seemingly innocuous security dialogues can have repercussions.Confidence-buildingmeasurescan distributebenefits unequallybecause of asymmetriesin the partiesto it.77
In these cases, the prospect of dyadic co-operationis underminedby
the unpredictabilityof third-partyreactions. Security is better maintained in these circumstances by the threat of third-partyreactions
than by managerial-type arms control, thus reducing the prospect for a
meaningful security dialogue. Security dialogue in the Middle East is
inhibited by the fact that Israel is particularly vulnerable to third-party
exploiters, and cannot therefore even discuss disarmament until it is in
communication with all its potential adversaries.'78The same situation
73
74
75
But costs of going to war are still greaterthan the statusquo.
Macintosh, ConfidenceBuilding, 3.
Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization48 (1994), 289; and Thomas Risse-Kappen.
"Ideas Do Not Float Freely: TransnationalCoalitions, Domestic Structures,and
the End of the Cold War,"InternationalOrganization48 (1994), 186.
76 Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation:National Epistemic Communities and the InternationalEvolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,"
InternationalOrganization46 (1992), 101; and G. MatthewBonham, VictorM.
Sergeev and Pavel B. Parshin, "The Limited Test-Ban Agreement:Emergence
of New Knowledge Structuresin InternationalNegotiation,"InternationalStudies Quarterly41 (1997), 238.
77 Marie-FranceDesjardins, Rethinking Confidence-BuildingMeasures: Adelphi
Paper 307 (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1996), 16, 29.
78 GeraldM. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Controland Regional Security,"Survival 36 (1994), 128; and Sharon A. Squassoni, "Beyond the Superpowers:
Regional Arms Control," in Lewis A. Dunn and Sharon A. Squassoni eds.,
Arms Control:WhatNext? (Boulder:Westview, 1993), 84, 89.
Arms ControlFailure and the Balance of Power
767
was apparent on the Korean peninsula (with respect to the North
Korean fear of the US). In South Asia, limited arms control success
has been counterbalancedby India's perception of China as a thirdparty threat.79 Third-partythreats dim the prospect of arms control,
which in turndiminishesthe chances for a securitydialogue.
The balance of power mechanism tends to balance against the
threat of militarized states if these are perceived to pose a threat to
peace or the independenceof states. Arms control and the balance of
power are thereforefully compatible and complementarywhen managing militarized states. The security dialogue and confidence-building measuresof arms control do not interferewith the balancing function of states because they are at the decision-makinglevel. There are
rarecircumstances,however,when confidence-buildingmeasureshave
little prospectfor success because of a general belief that arms control
itself is beyond reach.
Function Type3: Lateral ContagionAlleviating Policies
Lateralcontagion occurs when a rivalryor conflict spreads to include
the participationof other states, or when a given weapon system
spreadsto their arsenals. Arms embargoes are the principal means of
limiting the contagion of a rivalryor a conflict. Multilateralnonproliferation policies are the principal arms control measures for limiting
the spread of a weapon system.8s Their contradictionto the natural
tendency to diffuse militarytechnology is evident in the fact that proliferationpolicies never do much more than slow down the processnor is it easy to disentanglethe hegemonic interestsof the dominantly
armedstates from the genuine peace-enhancinggoal of a nonproliferation policy. If an egalitarianaim can be distilled from nonproliferation
practices, it is that war is made more likely by the diffusion of certain
weapon systems, and less likely if they remain in the possession of a
minority of states. Even if this proposition were true, proliferation
policies make third-partyintervention the privilege of dominantly
armed states. As long as these states support the status quo, and
respect the independence of other states, there is no increase in the
likelihood of war.The balance in the internationalsystem, while occasionally susceptible to "marketfailures," tends to limit the diffusion
of conflict by the threatof third-partyinterventionand counterbalanc79 Sumit Ganguly, "Discord and Cooperation in India-PakistanRelations," in
Kanti P. Bajpai and HarishC. Shukul, eds., InterpretingWorldPolitics: Essays
for A.P. Rana (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), 407, 409.
80 Consequently,this is the only arms control function that does not need to rely
on the co-operationof the antagonists,but on the co-operationof external parties (Schelling and Halperin,Strategyand Arms Control,29).
768
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
ing alliances. This mechanismis enhanced,ratherthanretarded,by the
diffusion of security-enhancingmilitary technology. It is, therefore,
difficult to construct a nonproliferationregime that is in accord with
the balancing mechanismof the internationalsystem.
Nonproliferationcomes from the post-SecondWorldWarconcern
with peacekeeping,conflict resolutionand containmentof regionalwars
which, in turn,stems from fear of a catalyticwar that would escalateto
include superpowerinvolvement,and eventually,a nuclearexchange.81
Studies have found that small wars are more likely to diffuse geographically than large wars, and that this diffusion occurs most often
across borders.82There is some disagreementover whether alliances
assist or retard this diffusion.83Diffusion has also been found more
likely when there is an absence of internationalconsensus on the status quo, as, for example, happened following the collapse of postNapoleonic peace that lead to the CrimeanWar.This implies thatcontagion is manageable (but not that arms are linked to contagion).84
Attempts to contain conflicts through arms embargoes include the
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Korean War (1950-1953), the
Iran-IraqWar (1980-1988), the PersianGulf War(1990-1991) and the
conflicts in the formerYugoslavia(1991-1999).
The principaltechnical countermeasureto the spreadof a rivalry
is a limitation on weapons with the range to reach distant opponents
(for example, the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime). This
could include limits on long-range missiles, amphibious craft and
long-range aircraft,which could inadvertentlythreatenthe interestsof
non-involved parties to the conflict, bringing them in as participants.
Some have argued that, historically,the diffusion of conflicts is much
more a consequence of arms races than of instability.85The two main
81 LincolnP. Bloomfieldand Amelia C. Leiss, "ArmsControland DevelopingCountries,"WorldPolitics 28 (1965), 2-3.
82 B. A. Most, H. Starr,and R. M. Siverson, "The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of InternationalConflict," in Manus I. Midlarsky ed., Handbook of War
Studies (Ann Arbor:University of MichiganPress, 1993), 111-39.
83 G. Liska, Nations in Alliances (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1962); O. R. Holsti, P. T. Hopmann, and J. D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: Wiley, 1973), 274; and John A.
Vasquez, "Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity,Interaction,or Territoriality?"
Journal of Peace Research 32 (1995), 277-93.
84 Roslyn Simowitz, "Evaluating Conflict Research on the Diffusion of War,"
Journal of Peace Research 35 (1998), 211-30; and Harvey Starrand Randolph
M. Siverson, "Cumulation,Evaluationand the Research Process: Investigating
the Diffusion of Conflict,"Journal of Peace Research35 (1998), 231-37.
85 William A. Schwartzand CharlesDerberwith the Boston NuclearStudy Group,
The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter and WhatDoes
(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1990), 1, 17; and GregoryMcLauchlan, "Does the Nuclear Arms Race Matter?"Journal of Peace Research 28
(1991), 325-30.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
769
incentives for the proliferationof nuclear arms are security and prestige, while the two greatest disincentives are alliance guaranteesand
economic vulnerability.86
Nonproliferationregimes, epitomized by the 1968/1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty, seek to contain the spread of weapons through a
combination of supplier controls, technology access incentives and
multilateralco-ordination.
Critics of arms control have argued that contagion can actually
enhance security because it brings into play the balance of power.
According to balance of power theory the internationalsystem is selfregulating,so that if any one state becomes too powerful, the remaining key states will balance against it to minimize its possible gains.
Blainey has argued that the single most importantreason rivalries do
not eruptinto war is that would-be aggressorsare deterredby the presence of unpredictablethird-partystates; he calls this the "waterbird
dilemma."87States thereforerely on the contagion effect of conflicts
to thirdpartiesto deter attackson themselves. By containing a conflict
geographically,arms control may remove this disincentive for aggression.
Balance of power can both increase and decrease the spread of
rivalries and war. As long as there are third-partystates (typical of a
multipolar environment), states will restrain competition with their
primary rivals to avoid exploitation. But as a system tends toward
bipolarity,the balance of power may actually increase the possibility
of war as states become locked into alliances that can be triggeredby
their small-power members. Offers of extended deterrence may halt
weapons proliferation,decrease incentives for pre-emptive and preventive wars, and limit furthersearch for external allies. But similar
behaviourby a competitorcan force smaller states to balance or bandwagon, as appropriate,thereby denuding the internationalsystem of
significantthird-partystates and theirrestraininginfluence.
However,where antiproliferationmeasuresdeny access of certain
weapons to third-partystates, they may actually increase insecurity by
intensifying the covert search for these prohibited weapons. In their
attempt to preserve the status quo, antiproliferationmeasures may
actually increase the probabilityof war. Arms control agreementsthat
attemptto limit the spreadof rivalriesmay also increase the probability of war by denying the entry of a stabilizingextended deterrence.In
86 Julian Schofield, "The Systemic Sources of India's and Pakistan'sProliferation
Decision," in Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, O. P. Dwivedi, Carole Farber,
Stephen Inglis, JayantLele, eds., InterfacingNations: Indo/Pakistani/Canadian
Reflectionson the 50th Anniversaryof India's Independence(Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1998), 340.
87 Blainey, The Causes of War,58.
770
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
a bipolar environment, arms control and balance of power measures
against the lateral contagion of rivalry or war are, by definition, irrelevant. In a multipolar environment, the tendency of arms control to
limit the entry of stabilizing thirdparties must be weighed against the
tendency of the balance of power mechanism to transform the system
into a bipolar one. This arms control function is therefore both circumstantially complementary and contradictory with the balance of power
mechanism.
Function Type 4: Stabilization Policies
Stability-enhancing policies focus less on force totals between states
than on how the composition of forces may create incentives for striking first. These policies seek to eliminate weapons systems whose performance characteristics make them war prone, either because they
have tremendous force multipliers when used in attack, or because
they are vulnerable in defence, like exposed nuclear missiles.88 Certain
weapons are destabilizing because their operating preference for
attack rather than defence can lead to pre-emption.89 If a state fears
attack, it will strike first; knowing this, the other state will seek to do
the same.
As mentioned above, though, if destabilizing weapons (with firststrike advantages) do not compensate for the contingency of thirdparty intervention, then they are easily deterred. This is why pre-emptive wars, taking advantage of the first-strike operating preferences of
weapons, are so rare. Dan Reiter identifies only three (Arab-Israeli War
[1967], Chinese intervention in Korea [1950], and Russo-German mobi-
lization in the FirstWorldWar),and in each, attacksonly occurredafter
the threat of third-party intervention was defused.90 The tendency of
states to balance against the most immediate threat, especially those
reliant on technology for first-strike attacks, confronts aggressors with
overwhelming coalitions that more than compensate for the benefits of
a surprise attack.
For weapons, see Wargaming Directorate, Weapons Effectiveness Indices/
Weighted United Values III (Bethesda: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency,
1979) 13-7/13-8; and Stephen D. Biddle, "The Determinantsof Offensiveness
and Defensiveness in ConventionalLand Warfare,"Ph.D. dissertation,Harvard
University, 1992, 3, 85.
89 Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A
Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 28
(1984), 219-38; CharlesL. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,"Whatis the OffenseDefense Balance and Can We Measure It?" InternationalSecurity 22 (1998),
44-82.
90 Reiter, "Explodingthe Powder Keg Myth," 15.
88
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
771
This calculusmay work for conventionalweapons,but the destructive potentialof nuclear weapons may overpowerany deterrentthreat
inherentin the balancing function of the internationalsystem. Albert
Wohlstetterhas arguedthat with certain technologies, such as nuclear
weapons, stabilityis far more delicate than commonly believed.91It is
here that the logic of secure deterrentforces and arms control can
compensatefor the weakness of the balance of power. In this context,
arms control policies enhance the security of both parties in a rivalry
by stabilizing their forces.92 By stabilization I mean the creation of
deterrentpostures and procurementsthat do not encourage surprise
attacks or first strikes, decapitation attacks, pre-emption, offensive
advantages, a launch-on-warningresponse system, military action
without confirmation, weapons which are difficult to control, fait
accompli attacks,or the deploymentof vulnerableuse-it-or-lose-it systems. These measuresmay be taken unilaterally,as in the deployment
of secure second-strikesystems (this is the justificationfor the deployment of nuclear missile-armed submarines).Other measures may be
taken co-operatively,such as the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty,that actually sought to minimize instabilityby preserving the status quo vulnerabilityof the superpowercountervalue targets.
Arms control that makes pre-emptiveescalation or war impossible may, perversely,lead to still greaterconflict. This is because it is
the fear of a conflict escalating to a nuclear war that creates fear, and
therebyrestraint.93Glenn Snyder'sstability-instabilityparadoxhypothesizes thatperfectstrategicstability(certainretaliation)creates opportunities for violence at lower levels.94 The practice of informal arms
control measuresby India and Pakistanin Kashmirhas not stemmed
the persistentinfiltrationsand exchanges of artilleryfire between these
two nuclear-armedstates. Arms control must, therefore, never undermine the threatof escalationthatcreates the fear of initial provocation.
91 Citedin MarcTrachtenberg,
Historyand Strategy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1991), 20.
92 Marlies Ter Borg, "Reducing Offensive Capabilities: the Attempt of 1932,"
Journal of Peace Research 29 (1992), 149, 153; and Marion William Boggs,
Attemptsto Define and LimitAggressive Armamentin Diplomacy and Strategy
(Columbia:Universityof Missouri Press, 1941), 62-93.
93 Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,"248; and Gray, "Arms
ControlDoes Not ControlArms," 335.
94 Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,"in Paul
Seabury, ed., Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 185-86;
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon(Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1989), 19; Aaron L.
Friedberg,"Why Didn't the United States Become a GarrisonState?" International Security 16 (1992), 119n; and Schelling, Strategyof Conflict, 187-203.
772
JULIANSCHOFIELD
Arms control can also increase the likelihood of war if it prohibitsan
offensive weapon that a state needs to guaranteethe extended deterrence of an ally.
Balance of power enhances the stability of military forces, even
when the weapons themselves are unstable. As long as the added
power a state is able to obtain from a third-party state, whether a formal or potential ally, is greater than the benefits of a pre-emptive or
preventive attack, then war is irrational. Only nuclear weapons against
an enemy without retaliatory capacity would make this worth the cost,
and this assumes that third-party states do not retaliate on its behalf.
An exception is in a security environment where threats work, and
therefore bandwagoning is prevalent, but this has little empirical validation. The balance of power mechanism decreases as a stabilizing
influence as the international system tends toward bipolarity. Arms
control and balance of power tend to be complementary in all cases
except bipolarity, where arms control has the greater influence.
Function Type 5: Control Promoting Policies
Control-promoting policies help avoid conflicts that result from accidental, unintended or unauthorized weapons acquisitions, or use by
subordinates or third parties.95 In the first instance, units cut off from
outside communication may launch an attack in fear that the order was
given but never received. In the second, the unauthorized use of strategic weapons obtained by a hostile third party might trigger an
unwanted war. Control issues are entirely beyond the influence of the
balance of power system, and come under the domain of arms control.
The classic bilateral (and ultimately multilateral) example of a
control-promoting agreement is the sharing between the US and the
Soviet Union of the Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology. This
guarded against the unauthorized use of nuclear warheads by requiring
a code to activate the weapon. The Hotline Agreement between the
superpowers also helped ensure that no loss of control led to escalation. Further measures were adopted at the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material in 1979.
Avoiding decapitation attacks can also control escalation and stop
wars, since the destruction of an enemy state's decision-making appa-
ratus would make it difficult to arrange a cease-fire. Buffer zones
95
Schelling and Halperin, Strategyand Arms Control, 14. See also See David J.
Karl, "ProliferationPessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International
Security 21 (1996/1997), 93n; Bruce G. Blair, The Logic ofAccidental Nuclear
War (Washington:The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Bradley A. Thayer,
"The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay," Security Studies 3
(1994), 428-93.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
773
(including peacekeeping operations)and proceduresfor encountering
foreign ships and aircraftmay also help reduceclashes. Unilateralpolicies typicallyreferto communicationand authorizationprocedures,and
the redesignof retaliatorysystems to avoid accidents.96By strengthening command and control, for example, miscalculated escalation in a
war may be averted. Control is also a function of the dispersal of
friendly forces; de-concentrationcan lead to weapon insecurity or
commandinaccessibility.
States have never starteda war by accident;rather,they may start
wars unintentionallyby incorporatinguncertaintyinto their plans. If
they face a use-it-or-lose it dilemma (a stability issue) or a use-it-orlose-control-of-it dilemma (a control issue), their plans will come to
reflect these factors in their political calculations. If these factors were
not incorporated,then the states were not aware that they were in a
dilemma. From a theoreticalpoint of view, there is no evidence that
there has ever been a purely accidentalwar.Nor has there ever been an
unauthorizeduse of a nuclear weapon, though the high readiness of
nuclear arsenals,and their ease of concealment after theft, makes this
a constantsource of danger.
Function Type6: Restraintand PrecedentSetting Policies
Restraintpolicies are unilateraltacit or negotiatedagreementsfor preventingthe use of certaintypes of weapons deemed particularlyabhorrent or unpleasant, because they are indiscriminatory,exceedingly
destructiveor unnecessarilypainfulto theirvictims. Policies that seek to
establisha global norm againstthe use of certaintypes of weapons are
precedentsetting.97Agreements are more likely to work when states
can identify themselves as being a meaningful part of a larger
community.98However,too great an abhorenceof a given weapon can
increase the political cost of its use to such an extent that it loses its
deterrentvalue. This has the effect of underminingthe defensive credibility of certain states, reducing the value of the threat of third-party
intervention,and therebypotentiallyencouragingaggressors.
96
Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization,Accidents, and Nuclear
Weapons(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993), 28.
97 ElizabethKier and JonathanMercer, "Setting Precedentsin Anarchy,"International Security 20 (1996), 77-106; "Moving Beyond Veneer of Agreements to
Global Norms," The Disarmament Bulletin 23 (1993-1994), 14; and Joseph
Levitt,Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmamentand Arms Control
Negotiations, 1945-1957 (Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress, 1993), 7,
265.
98 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in WorldPolitics (New
York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1977).
774
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
An example of normativerestraintincludes the nuclear taboo,
which is an unwritteninternationalprohibitionagainstthe use of nuclear
weapons, and forms the moralbasis for abolitionistand nonproliferation
policies.99The abolitionists, in particularthe InternationalPugwash
Movement, Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Instituteand the
Stimson ResearchProject,supportedby the InternationalCourtof Justice, seek to eliminate nuclear weapons on the basis that they are
immoral.'00Some argue that the nuclear taboo seems to exert little
independenteffect on decisions to acquirenuclear weapons. Whereas
John Mueller credits the culturalobsolescence of war with the almost
continuous period of peace between the greatpowers since 1945, John
Lewis Gaddis is far more convincing when he gives credit to the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons.'0 Nonetheless, James Keeley has
argued that norms increase conformity to an agreementby increasing
the cost of violation.'02 Taboo-supportersalso face the contradiction
that while most people supportthe abolition of nuclear weapons generally, they also tend to supportmaintainingnationalnuclearcapabilities. There are thus strong pro-nuclearconstituencies in as allegedly
peaceful societies as Japan,Sweden, Switzerlandand Australia.'03
Paradoxically,the most abhorrentweaponsare often the best deterrents. During the Second World War, Great Britain was able to deter
Germany'schemicalweaponstockpilefrombeing used with its own
This fact is parbiologicalandallegedchemicalweaponsstockpile.•"4
99 T. V. Paul, "NuclearTaboo and WarInitiationin RegionalConflicts,"Journal of
ConflictResolution 39 (1995), 696-717.
100 IISS, Strategic Survey 1997/1998 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998),
45-47, 50.
101 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar
InternationalSystem," InternationalSecurity 10 (1986), 120-21; Carl Kaysen,
"Is WarObsolete? A Review Essay," InternationalSecurity 14 (1990), 43; and
John Mueller, Retreatfrom Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War(New
York:Basic Books, 1989), 13.
102 James F. Keeley, International Atomic Energy Safeguards: Observations on
Lessons for Verifyinga Chemical Weapons Convention (Ottawa: The Arms
Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and InternationalTrade
Canada,1988), 20.
103 Kei Wakaizumi,"The Problemof Japan,"in AmericanAssembly, eds., A World
of Nuclear Power? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 80; George
Schwab, "Switzerland's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy," Orbis 13 (1969),
913; and Jan Prawitz, "Sweden: A Non-Nuclear Weapon State," in Johan Jorgen Hoist, ed., Security, Order and the Bomb (Oslo: Universiteforlaget,1972),
61.
104 Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," 245; Jeffrey W. Legro,
"Cooperationwithin Conflict:Submarines,StrategicBombing,ChemicalWarfare
and Restraintin WorldWar II," Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof California,Los
Angeles, 1992; and John Ellis van CourtlandMoon, "ChemicalWeapons and
Deterrence:The World War II Experience,"International Security 19 (1994),
25-28.
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
775
ticularly salient if one recalls that the Second World War was originally to be fought along the lines of Emilio Douhet's vision of chemical-ladenbombersstrikingat populationcentres on the opening day of
the war.'05In fact, the push to eliminate stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons is made possible by the very effectiveness
of nuclearweapons as deterrents.
If the weapon system in questionis responsiblefor the successful
deterrenceof a state,or the successfuldeterrenceof the enemies of one's
allies, then its prohibitionor devaluationmight underminesecurity and
lead to war.Inabilityto maintainthe credibilityof an extendeddeterrent
might contributeto the lateralcontagion of a rivalryor to war. Arms
control might also permit the eliminationof uncertaintybetween two
rivals armed with prohibitedweapons, and thereby increase the likelihood of conflictby decreasingthe deterrentvalueof each arsenal.
Conclusion
Armscontrolpolicies seek to avoid sub-optimaloutcomes while the balance of powerpreservesthe independenceof statesby balancingagainst
preponderantthreats. Policy makers should be aware that security
involves theirplaying the balanceof power "game" as much as it does
the solving of co-operationproblems.Thereis no overarchinglegislative
solutionto the anarchyof the internationalsystem withoutsome form of
enforcementthat implies hegemony. Rather,arms control should aim
towards solving co-operation problems. Arms control can actually
enhancethe equilibriumof the balanceof power among statesby facilitatingco-operationamong them. Thereforearms control and balance of
powerperformbetterthanarmscontrolalone in avertingwar.While neither mechanismremovesthe underlyingcauses of rivalryand war, in a
well-balancedtandem,they make statesbetteroff.
Expecting arms control to prevent war during periods of acute
internationalchange is perhapsunrealistic.Under these circumstances,
states normallyrenegotiateor abandontreatiesnot to their liking. Only
forumsthatpermita continuoussecuritydialogueoffer the adjustmentto
internationalchange necessaryto escape conflict. It is more realistic to
demandof statesan awarenessthatarmscontrolagreementsare susceptible to change, and that they should periodicallybe renegotiated.In a
multipolarenvironmentwhere co-operationbecomes particularlydifficult, policy makersshouldbuild armscontrolsupon the existing balance
of the internationalsystem.
105 Giulio Douhet and Dino Ferrari,trans., The Commandof the Air: 1927 Edition
(Washington:Office of Air Force History, 1983), 174.
776
JULIAN SCHOFIELD
So what are the basic rules that governthe mix between armscontrol and the balance of power?Dependingon its function,the prospects
of an arms control agreement,both in formulationand effect, depends
on its interactionwith the balance of the internationalsystem and the
importantrole of the threatof third-partyintervention(see Table 1).
TABLE1
Arms ControlPolicy Functionsand the BalancingMechanism
Policies
Interactionwith the BalancingMechanism
Conflict spiral alleviating
Militarizationalleviating
Disruptiveif it underminesa state's deterrent
Securitydialogue complementstendencyto
balance against threats
Potentiallydisruptiveif it underminesthreatof
third-partyintervention
Arms controlcomplementsbalancingmechanism
Lateralcontagion
alleviating
Stabilization
Controlpromoting
Arms control;no effect from balancingmechanism
Restraintand precedent
setting
Disruptiveif it underminesdeterrentfunction
of a weapon
An incorrectmix between arms control and the balancingmechanism does not necessarily explain most agreement failures. Failure,
whether in formulation,compliance or in function (avoiding war and
preservingindependence),has a multitudeof causes. This may be manifest in agreementsthat are never formulated,or agreementsthat are
never violatedbut at the same time did not preservepeace. Arms control
agreementsmay have otherunintendedeffects, such as moralhazard.By
creatinginstitutionsthat safeguardagainstescalationand other dangers
of an arms race, states may become careless and actuallyprovokethe
outcomes they seek to avoid.Arms controlmay,therefore,fail for a variety of inherentand extrinsicreasons;this discussionhas been an attempt
to focus on only a single cause.
The emphasis here has been to demonstratethat maximizingarms
controlis not withoutcosts thatmay, ultimately,underminethe intended
purpose of a policy. The assumptionthat arms controlas a form of cooperationis the ultimateconceptualsolution (for example, world government)to war and insecurityignores,and thereforedoes not attemptto
build upon, pre-existingpeace-enhancingstructuresin the international
system. The balance of power system, in its idealized form, has never
existed. Rather,it has persistedas a partiallyfunctioningrestraintagainst
preponderanceand, like all systemic effects, is prone to marketfailure
Arms ControlFailureand the Balance of Power
777
(war) and monopolization(hegemony).Arms control should be viewed
as a co-operativeenterprisein system managementwhereinthe balancing mechanismis regulatedand enhancedfor the purposesof ensuring
peace and security.