Background to Korean War 2
Men of Task Force Smith, I report we
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February 19, 2008
Background History - Why was Darrigo there?
(Continued)
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Lieutenant Commander Edward Porter Clayton, USN, (center, back to
camera) Commanding Officer of Underwater Demolition Team 21, receiving
the first sword surrendered to an American force in the Japanese Home
islands. The surrender was made by a Japanese Army Coast Artillery major
(standing opposite LCdr. Clayton) at Futtsu-misaki, across Tokyo Bay from
Yokosuka Navy Base on 28 August 1945. Courtesy of Mr. Robert A.
Winters, Mine Advisory Committee, National Academy of Sciences, 1970.
Presented by U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.
MacArthur was understandably immersed in occupying Japan,
implementing his Operation Blacklist. This presents a
remarkable contrast to what the Soviets were doing and what
the Koreans wanted.
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The occupation of Japan began on August 28, 1945. US
minesweepers and underwater demolition teams moved into
Tokyo Bay, and US Airborne Forces began to arrive at Atsugi
airfield. Major fleet units started entering the bay on August 29
and a special naval task force began liberating Allied POWs in
the Tokyo area. MacArthur flew into Atsugi on August 30, and
set up his headquarters at Yokohama.
Marines of the 4th Regiment, 6th Division, come ashore at Yokosuka during
initial landings in the Tokyo Bay area, 30 August 1945. They are in full
battle gear in preparation for any treachery from the Japanese. Their LCVP is
from USS Waukesha (AKA-84), and they appear to be pulling a 75mm pack
howitzer. Presented by U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.
The 4th Marines came ashore at Yokusuka on August 30 as
well. The Japanese surrendered this major naval base to the
Americans this same day. However, the reality was that no one
knew for sure how the occupation forces would be treated
when they arrived in Japan. There was a possibility that a plan
to occupy might quickly deteriorate into a requirement to
invade, fight and occupy. As a result, and especially given the
low priority attached to Korea, the Americans felt they had a
lot on their plate and could not commit forces to Korea at this
time. Furthermore, General MacArthur had a long list of
objectives in occupying Japan, which included preserving the
emperor, caring for the people, rebuilding the country and
shape a new democracy. But what about Korea? Not in the
plan, Koreans saw that, and grew angry about it.
Notwithstanding all that was going on in Moscow,
Washington, and Tokyo, the Koreans pressed ahead with their
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nationalist goals. On September 6, 1945, the Committee for
the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) proceeded to
create the Korean People's Republic (KPR), headquartered in
Seoul. As we said earlier, the translation of independence "in
due course" from the Cairo Conference meant right away to
the Koreans. Forming the KPR had strong support from
Korean communists. It had no support from the US.
At this point, we need to comment a bit about the communists
in Korea.
Japanese-trained Korean National Police arrest a suspected communist.
Presented by US Military Government in Korea - 1945, Kimsoft.
There was a strong communist movement throughout Korea,
including the South. Many Koreans who vigorously opposed
the Japanese before and during the war were communists.
Bruce Cummings, a historian specializing in Korea, opined
that the communist movement came to mean the resistance
movement in the minds of many Koreans. Communism had
broad appeal, but the main appeal to Koreans was that
communism or "the left" meant anti-Japanese resistance more
than it meant all the ideology that tagged along with it. Korean
communists were quite splintered: some who stayed at home
and resisted the Japanese, some who worked for Mao Tse-tung
in China, some who worked for the Soviets, and those who
found communism to be alluring following liberation. The
unifying factor among them was they had no use for the
Japanese and they wanted their independence, which they felt
should be rightly theirs once Japan was defeated.
As events would transpire, the Americans had no use for the
communists, which created distrust of many Koreans among
the Americans. Add this to the fact that MacArthur would
occupy and rebuild Japan and form a democracy in Japan, and
by definition you had the Americans at odds with the Korean
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nationalist perspective. This would become a huge problem.
The Soviets reinforced the allure of communism. They talked
to the Koreans in terms of liberation and nationalist and
independence-minded ideals woven in with traditional
communist rhetoric about workers, peasants and land
appropriation. In addition, the Soviets had considerable
interest in Japanese factories, businesses, buildings and land,
and getting the Japanese out of there.
For the Americans, this was a real mess, one they did not want
to fool with. The Soviets occupied most of Korea north of the
38th parallel. They were setting up shop throughout the
country following the Soviet model, they had a sizeable armed
force in their zone, and they were harnessing control over
most Japanese in the country. On the other side, there were no
American forces in Korea south of the parallel and the US had
yet to take charge. In effect, the Japanese were still in charge
in southern Korea.
Japan's emperor surrendered by radio and letter on August 14,
the Soviet 25th Army had jumped the gun and was already in
country, and by late August controlled Pyongyang and
Hamhung. The Japanese officially surrendered on September
2, 1945 in a grand ceremony in Tokyo Bay. US forces had
already begun occupying Japan. But in Korea, it's now
September 6, no Americans had come to take the Japanese
surrender, the Soviets were organizing a political and military
machine in the North, and in Seoul, a group of Koreans had
declared themselves an independent state.
General Abe, again shown here,
warned the Americans in Japan
that Soviet actions could spread
to the South and urged that
American forces get over to
Korea in a hurry.
Japanese General Kozuki Yoshio,
who was negotiating his
surrender with the Americans,
warned the Americans that the
communists and other
anti-Japanese groups were going
to create a lot of trouble in
southern Korea. He even warned that US occupation forces
could face hostilities when they landed. He asked permission
to start destroying his own weapons so Koreans in the south
would not get hold of them. The Americans agreed, in effect,
joining with a Japanese general to prevent an uprising of
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Korean citizens against the US. The US was slipping to the
wrong side of the fence as far as the Koreans were concerned,
aligning more with the Japanese than the Koreans and that
sentiment grew over time.
An advance party of eight American officers and ten enlisted
men finally landed at Kimpo Airport in Seoul on September 4,
1945 to establish liaison, not with the Koreans, but instead
with the Japanese, another slap in the face for the Koreans.
An officer and soldier stand at a sign marking the 38th parallel, in English,
Russian and Korean. Photo presented by "Roaming Korea South of the Iron
Curtain," by Enzo de Chetelat, National Geographic, June 1950 edition.
At long last, on September 8, 1945, the US sent the XXIV
Corps to Korea to occupy it up to the 38th parallel, Lt. General
John R. Hodge in command. The XXIV Corps was a combat
corps, had been stationed in Okinawa, and was not prepared to
administer a country about which it knew nothing. In contrast,
US occupation troops in Japan received a great deal of help
from trained professionals with regard to dealing with the
Japanese people. General Hodge would take a beating from
historians for his failings in Korea. In his defense, he received
almost no instructions on how to handle South Korea, the
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Americans knew very little about the Koreans, and they had
almost no contact with them.
The 7th Infantry Division Band on the capital grounds in Seoul in 1945.
Photo from National Archives and Records Administration, John B. Wilson,
Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades
(CMH, 1998) Presented by Global Security.
XXIV Corps consisted of the 6th, 7th and 40th Infantry
Divisions, with the 7th Division arriving first. The 7th
Division immediately took positions in Seoul and along the
38th parallel to assure Soviet troops did not enter the
American zone. The 40th Division landed at Pusan later in
September and stayed in that region. A few months later, it
was decommissioned. The 6th Division arrived at Inchon and
took up positions in the southern half of South Korea. Hodge
reported to MacArthur rather than the commander-in-chief
Pacific or the JCS, not good given that MacArthur was
consumed by his occupation of Japan.
Writing “Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation
Decision,” for the Army’s Parameters, Winter 1955, Donald
W. Boose, Jr. said this:
“One of the few sources of intelligence was the Joint
Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea (JANIS 75),
which had been published in April 1945.”
He added that Hodge had no trained civil affairs specialists,
and precious little policy guidance. Hodge himself
acknowledged:
"Our occupation duties require considerable dispersion,
and there are many small isolated posts. Improvisation,
initiative and Yankee ingenuity are the order of the day."
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This is important: for Korea on the US side, there was no plan,
instead improvisation was the order of the day. For Japan on
the US side: a detailed plan, Operation Blacklist, and massive
support from the US. For Korea on the Soviet side: a plan, a
substantial presence, and a great deal of logistics support.
Harbor of Jinsen (Inchon), Korea, photographed from a USS Intrepid
(CV-11) aircraft, as Allied forces land there to begin the occupation of
southern Korea, 8 September 1945. Wolmi-Do island is in the lower right,
with a causeway connecting it to Inchon city. A U.S. Navy submarine chaser
(PC) is the larger vessel in the upper center. Landing craft are maneuvering
nearby. Presented by the Naval Historical Center.
On September 8, 1945, a month after the Soviet 25th Army
arrived in Korea, General Hodge's troops began landing at
Inchon, Seoul's main port. These troops were welcomed by
Japanese officials, not Korean officials. There were welcomed
by crowds of Koreans, but Japanese police were still on duty
and fired their rifles to maintain order. Not knowing what to
expect, the American troops thought the Japanese behavior
was supportive of their arrival.
Technically, the official purpose of the American landings was
to take the surrender of the Japanese in southern Korea. Based
on all the earlier big power agreements, there was no business
at this moment for the US to conduct with the Koreans. The
Americans would take the Japanese surrender and then remain
as an occupying power. Interaction with the Koreans would
come later.
The US accepted the official surrender of all Japanese forces
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south of the 38th parallel on September 9, 1945. We want to
show you three photos of the ceremony, held in Seoul.
Japanese surrender Korea to the Americans, Keijo (Seoul), Korea, September
9, 1945. Presented by Naval Historical Center.
Japanese surrender Korea to the Americans, Keijo (Seoul), Korea, September
9, 1945. Presented by Naval Historical Center.
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Japanese surrender Korea to the Americans, Keijo (Seoul), Korea, September
9, 1945. You see two men signing the agreement: just to the left of the
microphone is Lt. General Hodge, and to his left is Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, Commander Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area and
commander, US 7th Fleet. Presented by Naval Historical Center.
What is striking about these photos is Koreans are no where to
be seen. This was an US-Japanese event.
General Hodge wrote this:
"One of our first objectives was to disarm the Jap forces,
to get the Japs out of South Korea, and to bring back to
their native land Koreans who had been taken to Japan
and other Pacific areas by the Japs. We thought we had
completed a good job early in 1946, by which time we
had sent almost three-quarters of a million Japanese
civilians and soldiers to their homeland.
"But soon afterward, thousands of Japanese refugees
came across the 38th parallel into our hands from the
Russian zone in the north. Little or no effort was made
in the Russian zone to repatriate the Japanese until late
1946."
Note there is precious little in this statement of objectives
about Korea. It's all about the Japanese.
We mentioned earlier that the Koreans had declared the
Korean People's Republic (KPR) on September 6. On
September 14, 1945, the "Declaration of the Korean People's
Republic" was published. It talked about the Korean people
being emancipated and liberated. The document thanked the
world for having relieved Koreans of the "Japanese yoke." It
announced that Koreans intended to do the following:
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"Demolish Japanese imperialism, its residual influences,
antidemocratic factions, reactionary elements, and any
undesirable foreign influences in our state, and to
establish our complete autonomy and independence..."
Whether intended or not, General Hodge ended up more
tightly aligned with the Japanese than the Koreans. MacArthur
ignored direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and
ordered Hodge to keep Japanese General Abe in office. Hodge
allowed Japanese officials to remain in office, and only
reluctantly released General Abe after direct orders came
down.
Hodge also rejected the KPR and its declaration of
independence. The Americans saw this as a leftist movement.
Hodge was staunchly opposed to communism. Regrettably, he
did not appreciate that the Korean communists were largely
anti-Japanese resistors and very nationalistic. Instead, the
Americans grew close to the wealthy elite, who were that way
because they had cozied to the Japanese during the latter's
occupation. Complicating all this, Japan had ruled Korea for
so long and rose to so many prominent positions in
government and business that the departure of so many
following surrender left many voids in running Korea.
Violence would be a big problem for Hodge through most of
1946. His response was to build up the Korean police force,
known as the Korean Constabulary, and to use his American
forces to put down the violence. Here again, the Americans
appointed former Japanese officers to help form the
constabulary. Soon the the Korean people viewed the
Constabulary as something to be feared rather than as a source
of security and protection.
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Lt. Alfred Gale set sail for Inchon in September 1946 from Ft.
Lawton, Washington and was transported to the Replacement
Depot at Yongdongpo. He and many others were loaded on to
a train headed for the 6th Infantry Division at Pusan. His
memoir, which includes the above photo, says this:
"We got an indication that all was not peaceful when we
saw that our train had an empty flat car followed by
another one with a sand-bagged heavy .30 cal. machine
gun and crew in front of the engine. There was also
another one at the end of the train. It turned out that the
communists were making trouble wherever possible,
and there were frequent riots in various towns around
the country."
It's worth noting here that an Indochina independence
movement took hold in 1945 and civil war had broken out in
China in 1946. Both those events, plus what was happening in
Korea, would have an enormous impact on the US,
underscoring how incomprehensible it is that US foreign
policy elites failed to see what was happening over there.
The Americans arrived with no intention of unifying the
peninsula. Focused on rebuilding Japan, the Americans simply
felt that southern Korea could be built as a democracy along
the lines in which MacArthur was rebuilding Japan. In short,
South Korea would be built in the image of the model of a
rebuilding Japan. Once again the Americans built up distrust
among the South Koreans.
Koreans were not at all interested in following a Japanese
model. In fact, as pointed out earlier, they intended to
demolish the Japanese model in Korea. This in turn spawned a
great deal of political unrest in southern Korea. Up north, the
Soviets were sponsoring the communists and talking about
nationalism and independence, all the while placing a clamp
on any kind of protest, political turbulence, or moves toward
anything that might represent democracy.
On September 19, 1945
Kim Il Sung, shown here
giving an early speech in
Pyongyang, presented by
The Wednesday Report,
returned from exile along
with 40 colleagues and
was brought to Wonson in
the North by a Soviet ship.
This photo shows Kim at an October 14, 1945 mass rally
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welcoming his home-coming. Standing next to him is Colonel
Ignatiev, Soviet Army. Standing behind him is a group of
Soviet officers. Kim's driving mission was reunification, under
his leadership and flag.
Howard G. Chua-Eoan, writing "The Last Hard-Lines Kim Il
Sung 1912-1944," published in the July 18, 1994 Time
magazine, made this comment about his return:
"Kim Il Sung was a nobody when he arrived at the port
of Wonsan on September 19, 1945, at the end of World
War II and the beginning of chaos on the Korean
peninsula. He had lived the previous five years in
obscurity in the Soviet Union and returned to his native
land dressed in the uniform of a Soviet army captain.
Some people did not even believe he was who he
claimed to be."
A nobody perhaps, but an avid communist, avid Korean
nationalist, an avid resistance leader against the Japanese,
schooled in China, trained in espionage and signals
intelligence he was.
Koreans did not him well. There were rumors that he was not
even an ethnic Korean. Soviet Army Lt. Colonel Grigory
Mekler, chief of propaganda for the 25th Army, was tasked to
build up Kim's image in North Korea. Anatoly Medetsky
reported for the Moscow Times this way:
"Groom him for the job ... Mekler's task was to turn the
guerilla leader into a popular civilian leader."
In October 1945, General
MacArthur called for Syngman
Rhee to come to Korea, in part
based on a recommendation from
Chiang Kai-shek. He arrived on
October 16. This photo,
presented by dok1 at flickr,
shows Syngman Rhee speaking
on his return to Seoul in October
1945. Seated on the left side of
the photo is General Hodge, in
sunglasses.
We mentioned earlier that Rhee had led the Korean
Provisional Government in Exile in Shanghai, but was
relieved of that position. Prior to that, he was imprisoned for
opposing the Korean monarchy and then made his way to the
US and received a PhD from Princeton in International Law.
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Following his departure from Shanghai, he went to Hawaii,
and later to Washington, all the while trying to portray himself
as the leader of Korea's provisional government. Most
American officials did not take him seriously, though the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the CIA,
did take him on, hoping to get him to set up an espionage
network in Korea. In fact, MacArthur instructed Colonel
Preston Goodfellow of the OSS to send Rhee back to Korea to
take charge.
MacArthur told Rhee to form a democratic governing body.
Rhee had few friends in Korea, but was able to work with the
Americans. The Soviets also had started the process of
forming a governing body to administer North Korea in
October.
The political scurrying and tumult during this time are very
complicated, and very enlightening. The Americans had to
tolerate a certain amount of political turmoil in the south. They
had made their bed and would have to sleep in it, at least for
the time being.
The Soviet 25th Army headquarters in Pyongyang issued
orders that all armed resistance groups in the Soviet zone must
disband on October 12, 1945. The Soviets sent Koreans with
previous experience in the Soviet Army to organize a
constabulary to enforce the decision.
At the Moscow conference in December, 1945, Ernest Bevin (left), British
foreign secretary, V.M. Molotov (center), Soviet foreign minister, and James
F. Byrnes, U.S. secretary of state, agreed on a four-power commission to rule
Korea. Presented by Bevin Alexander.
In December 1945, the foreign ministers of Britain, the US
and USSR met in Moscow to address occupation issues
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following WWII. This became known as the Moscow
Conference. With regard to Korea, they agreed to set up a
Joint Commission to recommend how to establish a free
government in Korea.
Interestingly, the agreement said the Joint Commission would
consist of representatives from the US Command in Southern
Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, it would
consult with the Koreans, and it would assist the Trusteeship.
Several points rise to the top. First, the agreement confirmed
that Korea was under the control of two military organizations
- it was not free; second, the idea of northern and southern
Korea took on greater permanence; third, inherent in this
agreement was that a four-power trusteeship would have to
operate for five years first, before independence could be
obtained. So the independence addressed at the Cairo
Conference would have to wait at least five years, and even the
independence supposedly advocated by the Joint Commission
was not a done deal. This goes back to General Hodge's earlier
comments about the meaning of "in due course." Finally, the
Koreans would only be consulted.
Lt. General Hodge in his home in Seoul, meeting with Soviet Col. General
Terenty Shtikov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Soviet American
Commission, and the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, speaking through
an interpreter. Photo presented by "With the US Army in Korea," by Lt.
General John R. Hodge, USA, published in the June 1947 edition of National
Geographic magazine.
The Joint Commission began meeting in January 1946 to
implement the agreements made in Moscow.
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The flags of the US, Soviet Union and Korean Emblem fly at the US-Soviet
Joint Commission, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea. Photo presented by
"Roaming Korea South of the Iron Curtain," by Enzo de Chetelat, National
Geographic, June 1950 edition.
The Joint Commission met in Seoul. The advertised intent was
to select a cross-section of Korean leaders to set up a
provisional government that would cooperate with the
trusteeship. This joint commission reached a stalemate and
adjourned in May 1946. Historians argue to this day why that
was so and who was to blame.
Juergen Kleiner, in his book, Korea, a Century of Change,
wrote this:
"When General Shtikov (Shtykov) justified the breaking
off of the meeting, he told General Hodge that the
Soviet Union being a direct neighbor of Korea, was
interested in establishing a provisional democratic
government in Korea which would be loyal to the Soviet
Union."
That was fairly clear, remarkably clear.
So where are we? First of all, it's only 1946; we are still
several years away from the North Korean invasion of 1950.
The Soviets and US occupied the peninsula, they were hostile
toward each other, and each had different visions for what the
peninsula would be. Second, internal to the peninsula, Koreans
wanted their own state, they did not want to be occupied, they
were forced into political modes inimical to their objectives,
and there was built in hostility between North and South
Korea. Within South Korea, there was considerable political
disenchantment, especially with the Americans. Some
historians argue credibly that the roots of the Korean War
resided in the arrangements made by the Great Powers at the
end of WWII.
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This sounds right. The train toward the Korean War had left
the station, and would pick up speed.
General Hodge became the American occupation commander.
He governed southern Korea. His organization was known as
the US Army Forces In Korea, USAFIK. It consisted of the
10th US Army Headquarters, two infantry divisions, and
support elements. As soon as it set up shop, USAFIK began
organizing the ROK Constabulary Forces and trained it.
Kim Il Sung works out plans for building a new Korea at an office of the
Provisional People's Committee of North Korea. Presented by Red Banner of
Songun.
With Soviet support, Korean leaders in the north established
the Provisional People’s Committee in February 1946. Kim Il
Sung, not well known, was at least a loyal communist. The
Soviets appointed him as the Committee's leader. The
Committee became a de facto government structured after the
Soviet Union. The Soviets sealed the border at the 38th
parallel. Soviet forces began building fortifications. North
Korea as it came to be known rapidly grew into a military state
built aggressively by the USSR.
While the US was an occupation force in southern Korea, the
US wanted to disengage from Korea and make it a UN
problem. The US did want to prevent any further Soviet
expansion there. But, the intent was to get US forces out of
Korea and give the job of South Korean security to the UN
and a South Korean constabulary that would become an army.
Juergen Kleiner points out in his book that at a September 29,
1947 cabinet meeting, Secretary of State Marshall sought to
get American forces out of Korea without losing face. In a
memo of September 25, 1947, the JCS urged withdrawing all
US forces from South Korea. The JCS argued that Korea
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would be a liability if the US got into a war in the Far East,
and the troops stationed there were needed elsewhere. From a
military viewpoint, if the Soviets did extend their military
control of the peninsula to the South, the problem would not
be saving Korea, but rather the threat that such an event would
pose to Japan. Kleiner further highlighted that George F.
Kennan, an esteemed strategist of the time, saw Japan as the
power center with Korea only a peripheral interest.
Thus began the US policy of disengagement from Korea,
disengagement that would require a rapid build-up of South
Korean armed forces.
Pyongyangites welcome formation of the North Korean People’s Committee
on February 22, 1947. Presented by Choson Sinbo.
On February 22, 1947, the Soviets organized the North Korean
Peoples Committee, and Kim Il Sung was elected head of
state. This committee's job was to establish the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, the DPRK.
The UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)
arrived in Seoul in January 1948. Its job was to oversee free
and fair elections in Korea. The Soviets refused to recognize
it. Nonetheless, the UN determined that elections would be
held on March 31,1948.
On February 8, 1948, the Provisional Committee announced it
had formed the Korean People's Army, KPA. This
announcement came four months before the announcement of
a North Korean government.
The UNTCOK gave up on its idea of elections for all Korea on
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March 31, 1948.
On March 1, 1948, General Hodge announced that the
formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) would proceed and
its elections would occur in May 1948. These elections would
be sponsored by the UN and observed by the UN. This would
be a South Korean government. Unification of the peninsula
was off the American table. Our reading of history is that it
was, at this point, off the Soviet table as well.
After some American bungling and considerable South
Korean discontent with the course being taken, Hodge's
election was held, a National Assembly was formed, a
constitution approved and Syngman Rhee selected as
president.
Korean Armed Forces Parade in Seoul to celebrate the Republic of Korea's
first birthday, August 1949. The capital building at the far end of the avenue
was built by the Japanese. Photo presented by "Roaming Korea South of the
Iron Curtain," by Enzo de Chetelat, National Geographic, June 1950 edition
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The ROK government took power officially on August 15,
1948. The ROK government replaced the US Army Military
Government in Korea. Efforts officially began to convert the
ROK Constabulary to the ROK Army (ROKA). Many in the
constabulary’s ranks had served in the Japanese Army, the
Chinese Nationalist-supported Korean Restoration Army, and
the Chinese Liberation Army (communist) during WWII.
There was a rivalry between the South Korean National Police
and the Constabulary which would continue as the
Constabulary converted to an army.
The Pyongyang Mass Rally blessing the foundation of the DPRK in
September 1948. Presented by Choson Sinbo.
On September 9, 1948, the Soviets announced the formation
of the DPRK with Kim Il Sung as its leader. The Soviets
claimed the DPRK had jurisdiction over all Korea, though the
Soviets were not really itching for a fight. This idea was
promoted mainly by Kim Il Sung. The US did not recognize
this government and still has not.
Somewhere between 1945 and 1948, the Korean War began.
US troops loaded up in Korea, waiting for their ship to leave, June 1949.
Presented by The Korean War: The Story and Photographs, by Donald M.
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Goldstein, Harry J. Maihafer.
Once the two Koreas were in place, both the Soviets and US
began withdrawing forces. The Soviets withdrew their main
forces on December 25, 1948. However, the Soviet plan was
to leave behind advisers, build a large and heavily armed
Korean People’s Army, the KPA, supply it with Soviet
weapons, and build a communist political state. The Soviets
left an estimated 10,000 advisors, technicians and rear service
troops in North Korea and China supporting North Korean
forces. Normally, 15 Soviet advisors commanded by a colonel
were attached to each North Korean division.
The Americans left advisers as well,
but nothing like what the Soviets left.
The US established the Provisional
Military Advisory Group (PMAG) of
100 officers and men, Brigadier
General William L. Roberts the chief.
Its job was to advise the ROK on
military matters. By December 1948,
the PMAG increased to 241 officers
and men. The PMAG was assigned to
the US embassy, and therefore was not
in the military chain of command, but instead the State
Department chain. On June 30, 1948, the USAFIK was
terminated, the PMAG became the KMAG, General Roberts
remained at the helm, and US forces started to leave.
These officers are members of the US Korean Military Advisory Group
(KMAG) waiting for their families to arrive at Inchon, the port for Seoul.
Photo presented by "Roaming Korea South of the Iron Curtain," by Enzo de
Chetelat, National Geographic, June 1950 edition.
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While the officers assigned to KMAG were good men, this
was seen as a routine assignment. They received little-to-no
training for what they were supposed to do. They were often
junior to their ROKA counterparts, and they found it hard to
compete against other officers in units back in the US.
The American intent regarding the ROK military was not the
same as the Soviet intent with the North Korean military.
There was no great push to rapidly build a strong ROK
military. Indeed military support to the ROK was very
carefully controlled from the US. As a result, the ROK
military was not well equipped or trained. T.R. Frehrenach
summed the job up this way:
“Traditionally, a nation instructing another should send
its best men abroad, traditionally, from Athens to the
America of 1950, nations do not. There was little
prestige, promotion, or hope of glory with serving with
KMAG. The United States Army tended to forget these
men. Most officers who could avoid KMAG duty did so,
preferring to serve among their own troops, where food,
companionship, and the chances of recognition were all
considerably improved.”
All that said, Robert Ramsey III, who has written an
Occasional Paper (OP-18) designed to remind the Army about
history not well understood, entitled, “Advising Indigenous
Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El
Salvador,” quoted General Matthew B. Ridgeway saying this
about the KMAG advisors in Korea:
“No Army in modern times was ever subjected to the
battle stresses, strains, and losses to which the ROKs
were . . . in the beginning of the war ... officers in an
advisory capacity, unit advisors . . . really had a much
tougher job than fellows in the regular units, a much
tougher job.”
The ROKA and ROK Navy (ROKN) became official on
December 15, 1948. The ROKA had six divisions. In February
1949, three more divisions were created, one of which was
known as the Capital Infantry Division responsible for
defending Seoul.
In keeping with the US disengagement policy, on March 1,
1949 General MacArthur declared publicly that the Korean
peninsula was outside the US defense perimeter. The force
withdrawals that began in June 1948 were completed by June
30, 1949.
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To be clear, once the XXIV Corps was out, the senior US
military activity in the ROK was KMAG, a State Department
entity.
ROKA troops stand for inspection by the Korean Minister of Defense and
members of KMAG at Ch'unch'on in July 1949. Presented by Roy E.
Applemen, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.
On July 1, 1949, the Department of the Army reaffirmed
assigning the KMAG to the US embassy, attached to ROKA.
This reaffirmed that KMAG would remain outside the US Far
East Command in Tokyo led by General MacArthur.
Technically, MacArthur had no control over the KMAG.
Evgueni Bajanov, writing "Assessing the Politics of the
Korean War, 1949-1951, published by the Cold War
International History Project, produced by the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Winter
1995-1996 edition, is a good reference source for the decision
processes in train in Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang prior to
the war. It is based on documents that became available from
the Kremlin that shed new light on the war.
In early 1949, Stalin was worried
about a ROKA attack against
North Korea supported by the
US. He had little interest in
attacking the South. According to
Bajanov, he wanted to keep the
area peaceful. Kim Il Sung,
however, was anxious to attack
and unify the peninsula, and kept
badgering Stalin on the point,
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arguing that Koreans wanted to
be unified. Kim argued that US
forces had left, and the KPA was superior to the ROKA. He
even intimated that Koreans throughout the peninsula would
be upset if a chance to unify the country were missed. He told
Stalin the South had abandoned plans to attack the North.
Kim made an impact. On September 11, 1949, Stalin ordered a
reassessment. His embassy in Pyongyang was negative on the
idea. The Soviet Politburo rejected invasion, not so much
because it was a bad idea, but rather because it felt the North
was not well enough prepared. Thus, the military option
remained open. After continued badgering, and an expression
of Kim's concern that he might not be able to hold power if a
serious effort for unification were left to die, Stalin agreed to
meet on the subject.
T.R. Fehrenbach, in his book, This Kind of War: The Classic
Korean War History, said that Soviet and Chinese officials
began meeting in Beijing in January 1950 to plan the invasion
and decide what they had to do to cause it to succeed.
Kim led a delegation to Moscow in April 1950. Stalin agreed
to the invasion. His planners felt the invasion was feasible, the
Soviets now had the bomb and Mao had won in China with
little-to-no US reaction. He sensed the US had lost interest in
the Asian mainland. And, NATO was a thorn in his side.
Mao already had decided on his own that such an invasion
should occur. Kim met with and by the end of May had Mao's
formal approval. Given his defeat of the Nationalists, Mao
even decided he could let go of his Korean-speaking officers
and soldiers to join with the KPA. They would end up forming
30 percent of the KPA by invasion-time.
Stalin took charge of the initial stages of the invasion. Kim
decided he wanted to attack in June 1950. Soviet advisors
preferred July. Stalin would provide the requisite armaments,
by the boat loads. At this point in the process, the North
Korean invasion of the ROK was largely a Soviet-DPRK
endeavor.
The scuttlebutt in late 1949 in American and ROK intelligence
circles was that the North Koreans were planning to invade the
ROK. Kim Il Sung had been worried the word would leak to
the South, which is why he wanted to get on with it and invade
in June 1950. The American embassy and KMAG argued that
such an invasion was not likely, and, even if the North did
invade, they argued the ROKA could repel it. This view was
popular in Washington as well. As a result, the US had no plan
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to counter such an invasion. Korea remained outside the US
defense perimeter.
Not everyone agreed with these assessments. President
Truman was anxious. The spread of communism cast a
gloomy scenario. The "Europe first" crowd ruled the roost, but
by spring 1950 people such as John Allison, Dean Rusk, John
K. Emmerson, and John Foster Dulles were growing worried
about affairs in the Far East, with good cause.
Mao Tse-tung announces the creation of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) on October 1, 1949. Presented by Ohio State University.
Mainland China was under communist control. In February
1950, Mao and Stalin signed a strategic alliance treaty. Stalin
did that even though earlier he had signed a treaty saying
Chiang Kai-shek was the rightful ruler of China, but Chiang
and his crowd were out, Mao, a fellow communist, was in.
Mao was worried the US would attack and occupy key coastal
cities as a reprisal for the defeat of the Nationalists. He wanted
to attack Formosa, but Stalin would not support such a move.
The Chinese had always exercised strong influence on Korea,
the Soviets now did so as well, and both had visions of
worldwide communism.
Japanese workmen use American equipment to recap tires for Occupation
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vehicles, June 1, 1950. Presented by the US Army.
The American rebuilding of Japan following WWII had just
begun. Some policy-makers worried that Japan could swing to
the communists. They felt Soviet control of the Korean
peninsula would accelerate such an event. The Soviets now
had the bomb. There was a communist threat from within the
ROK. And finally, Ho Chi Minh in 1945 declared the
communist-governed Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the
fight was on against the French.
So, there was anxiety in Washington, but frankly, no one knew
what to do, other than to press ahead with rebuilding Europe
and Japan, and focusing military attention on the Soviets.
Despite the American outlook, Fehrenbach has told us that the
US embassy in Seoul, KMAG included, was the largest US
mission in the world, two thousand strong.
By June 1950, KMAG had 100 officers and 290 enlisted men
in the ROK (we have seen figures as high as 500). On average,
five officers and three enlisted men were embedded in each
ROK division. The intent was to provide an American advisor
to every ROKA battalion. KMAG did not have enough people
to do that. Indeed, many KMAG people were tied up with
administrative duties at ROKA headquarters, training, and
logistics.
The ROKA now had 98,000 troops in eight divisions. They
lacked training, equipment, and many units were short-handed.
Four divisions had three regiments each, while the rest had
two regiments each. One regiment was assigned to each
province. The US Congress had already defeated an aid bill to
Korea. For its part, the KPA kept growing stronger with Soviet
training and equipment. It had already begun concentrating its
massive forces along the 38th parallel. The plan to invade was
on.
For its part, the KPA had 21 divisions in five corps on the
peninsula, and nine more divisions in three corps in
Manchuria, about 135,000 troops. The KPA was well equipped
with aircraft, artillery and tanks. Supply dumps and depots had
been built along the 38th parallel. KPA forces had received the
very best Soviet training. And, many in the KPA’s ranks had
received hardened combat training fighting for the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Manchuria, fighting
against the Chinese Nationalists.
On June 8, 1950, North Korean newspapers printed a
manifesto of the Central Committee of the United Democratic
Front. Fehrenbach wrote this:
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"The manifesto announced as a goal for the Central
Committee, elections to be held throughout both North
and South Korea, and the parliament so elected to sit in
Seoul no later than 15 August, fifth anniversary of the
liberation from Japan."
This manifesto was either not noticed in Washington or fell on
deaf ears. Fehrenbach goes on to report how the South and
North Koreans prepared.
All regular divisions of the KPA II Corps, some 80,000 men,
moved out of billets on June 15, 1950 and into positions along
their planned route of invasion just north of the 38th parallel.
They were all in position by June 23. How friendly
intelligence missed this is indeed depressing. These forces had
to move equipment, ammunition, tanks, supplies from the
Soviet Union to their locations along the 38th parallel. There
were reports, rumors and assessments, but no one seemed to
give them much credence, at least not enough to cause US
military forces to move.
Beginning on June 18, enemy intelligence had been tasked to
get the complete low-down on the disposition of ROK forces
and report results no later than June 24. The enemy depended
heavily on spies in the South, many of whom worked for
KMAG.
Operations orders were issued on June 22: three divisions
attack down the Uijongbu corridor toward Seoul, armor in the
lead, the rest to attack to the east. An estimated 90,000 KPA
troops were lined up, waiting for the order to go, along with
150 medium tanks and 200 aircraft, howitzers and
self-propelled guns.
Major General Chae Byong
Daek, deputy commander of
ROK Armed Forces, known to
many as "Fat," and ridiculed by
many, was worried. He had noted
that the North had been fairly
quiet since March. The
Americans he talked to about this
shrugged it off. Everyone seemed
to think the KPA to be no match
for the ROKA, even though the
ROKA had no medium artillery,
no 4.2 inch mortars, no recoilless
rifles, no combat aircraft. KMAG
was the outfit that should have
argued for such weapons, and it did but it was assigned to the
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State Department's embassy, and the embassy said no. The
embassy did not want anyone to think the ROK was growing
aggressive.
On the eve before the invasion, General Chae was at the
regular Saturday KMAG cocktail party, expecting his officers
to come to Seoul this evening and expecting that a good
number of leaves and passes would have been granted to
ROKA troops. KMAG officers thought it a good deal for troop
morale.
The KMAG commander, Brigadier General Roberts, was on a
boat to the US, his tour of duty over. Lt. Colonel W.H. Sterling
Wright was now KMAG's acting commander. British Captain
Vyvyan Holt, the first minister of the British Legation to the
ROK, had some three weeks earlier told British citizens to
leave Seoul. He shared General Chae's anxiety. The Americans
were aware of Chae's anxiety, but knew nothing about Holt's
instruction.
So, Captain Joe Darrigo, a KMAG officer assigned to the 12th
ROKA Infantry Regiment, was living in Kaesong, within
spitting distance of the 38th parallel, the only American on the
38th. The Americans had disengaged, the ROK was outside its
defensive perimeter, and the Soviets and Chinese had
conspired to organize and equip this invasion. Kim Il Sung
wanted to reunify the country under his leadership. The closest
US forces were in Japan. The invasion force launched off the
marker in accordance with the overall invasion plan during the
rainy early morning hours of June 25, 1950.
Go to next section:
What happened after he spotted the enemy coming down
the pike? Darrigo wakes up to artillery fire in Kaesong, within
spitting distance of the 38th parallel, the invasion is on, Air
Force and Navy air counter-attacks, as do naval ships at sea,
and Task Force Smith's 500 men get the nod to delay the
invasion force. The fight is on. The first week of the war.
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