Employment Law
C O M M E N TA RY
VOL. 16, NO. 6
JUNE 2004
A REVISED ROADMAP FOR
D I S A B I L I T Y A C C E S S I N C A LIFORNIA
by James E. Boddy, Jr. and Lindsay E. Harris
Introduction
T
laws. As interpreted by the court, California law now incorporates the ADA’s barrier removal obligations and, unlike the
itle III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
federal law, provides for damages if those obligations are not
imposes substantial obligations for those who own
met. The implications are sobering. Those who own, lease,
or lease facilities open to the public. Not only must
purchase, or operate places of public accommodation face
newly constructed and altered facilities meet exacting stan-
substantial exposure to liability if they do not take steps to
dards for disability access, but so, too, must existing facilities
ensure that their facilities not only complied with applicable
be free of barriers to access to the extent that is “readily
law when built or altered, but also are presently free of
achievable.” To mitigate the impact of these obligations,
“readily” removable barriers to access.
Title III remedies are limited to injunctive relief and attorney’s
fees. Damages are not available. Predating the ADA by
Overview of Title III of the ADA
over two decades, California law has imposed similar disability access requirements, with two important differences:
Title III prohibits “discrimination” against the disabled
remedies include damages and, until recently, there was no
with respect to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
obligation to remove barriers from existing facilities. Thus,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
with barrier removal obligations, the ADA had greater reach,
tions of any place of public accommodation by any person
while with damages the state law created greater financial
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
exposure.
1
public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.201(a). In general, “public accommodations” are facili-
More recently, an amendment to the state legislation as
ties which are open to the public such as hotels, restaurants,
interpreted by a federal court has effectively merged the two
theaters, and professional offices. Title III applies only to
private, as opposed to public (i.e., governmental), entities.
If you own, operate, or lease to a business that serves the
INSIDE
5
public, and you are not a governmental entity, then you are
covered by Title III of the ADA.
LABOR BOARD REVERSES FIELD ON NON-UNION
DISCIPLINARY INTERVIEWS
As relevant to facility design and construction, Title III
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imposes three types of obligations:2 (1) new facilities
The regulations to the ADA define an alteration broadly as
must be designed and constructed so that they are read-
“a change to a place of public accommodation or a com-
ily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities (42
mercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of
U.S.C. section 12183 (a) (1)); (2) altered areas of existing
the building or facility or any part thereof.”3 According to
facilities must be readily accessible to and usable by people
the Federal Register preamble to Title III, “the Act requires
with disabilities (“alterations obligation”) (42 U.S.C. sec-
the concept of ‘usability’ to be read broadly to include any
tion 12183(a)(2)); and (3) architectural barriers in existing
change that affects the usability of the facility, not simply
facilities, whether altered or not, must be removed if read-
changes that relate directly to access by individuals with
ily achievable (“barrier removal obligation”) (42 U.S.C.
disabilities.”4 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), (v)).
the following examples of alterations: installing a new
display counter, moving walls in a sales area, replacing
New Construction and Alterations
fixtures, carpet or flooring, and replacing an entry door.
Simple maintenance, such as repainting a wall, is not con-
Title III requires that public accommodations and com-
sidered an alteration. See ADA Guide for Small Businesses,
mercial facilities designed and constructed for first
DOJ, www.ada.gov.
occupancy after January 26, 1993, be “readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.
Existing Facilities: Barrier Removal
§ 12183(a). Accessibility guidelines (“ADAAG”) exist
which set forth the technical standards for accessible
A lesser standard of compliance — the so-called “barrier
design. See “Standards for Accessible Design,” located at
removal” standard — applies to all buildings, includ-
Appendix A to 28 C.F.R. Part 36.
ing those constructed prior to the effective date of the
ADA. In such facilities, the ADA requires the removal of
Likewise, the ADA provides that, where alterations are
architectural barriers and communication barriers that
undertaken on or after January 26, 1992, the altered
are structural in nature,5 where such removal is “readily
portions of the facility must be readily accessible to and
achievable.”6
usable by individuals with disabilities.
“Readily achievable” is nominally defined as “easily
In addition, when alterations affect or could affect the
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
usability of or access to an area of the facility containing
difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). Whether
a so-called “primary function,” the entity must also make
barrier removal is readily achievable depends on a balanc-
the alterations in such a manner that the path of travel
ing of the difficulty and expense of the proposed project
to the altered area and the bathrooms, telephones, and
and the overall financial and other resources of the entity.
drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily
As this plays out in practice, it can include substantial
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
expense where there are substantial available resources.7
The entity may be relieved of this requirement, however,
where the alterations to the path of travel or the bath-
The obligation to engage in readily achievable barrier
rooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the
removal is an ongoing duty. The DOJ recommends that
altered area are disproportionate to the overall altera-
public accommodations establish procedures for ongoing
tions in terms of cost and scope (as determined under
assessments. Various architects, engineers, and disability
criteria established by the Attorney General). 42 U.S.C.
consultants, among others, have the necessary expertise
§ 12183(a)(2).
to conduct these surveys.
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Where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of
to new buildings and building upgrades, while not requiring
a barrier is not readily achievable, Title III still requires
extensive retrofitting of existing buildings.
making goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations available through alternative meth-
State Law Access Claims
ods if such methods are readily achievable. See 42 U.S.C.
State disability access law historically was similar to the ADA,
§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and (v).
with two important exceptions. First, until recently California
did not impose a barrier removal obligation for existing
Damages
buildings. Second, damages were (and still are) available
Remedies under Title III are limited to reasonable attorney’s
under state law.
fees and injunctive relief, including orders to alter facilities to
make them accessible, orders to provide auxiliary aids and
Framework of California Law
8
services, and orders to modify policies. Although damages
are not available under Title III, injunc-
In 1968, the California Legislature
tive relief can also impose drastic costs.
enacted Civil Code § 54, et seq.,
For example, in successfully defending
itself in California for Disability Rights
vs. Mervyn’s, Mervyn’s presented evidence that the alterations sought by
plaintiffs — widening of spaces between
fixtures — would reduce selling space
to such an extent that it would cost
the company $30 million in lost profits
annually.
9
Summary
The ADA … strikes
a balance between
requiring full access with
respect to new buildings
and building upgrades,
while not requiring
extensive retrofitting of
existing buildings
In sum, the level of access required
entitled the “Blind and Other Physically
Disabled Persons Act” (“Disabled
Persons Act”). The Disabled Persons
Act confers on disabled persons a right
of full and equal access to places of
public accommodation. Cal. Civ. Code
§ 54.1(a). In order to give content
to the Disabled Persons Act, the
Legislature enacted two additional laws
in 1968 and 1969. First, in 1968, the
Legislature enacted Government Code
§ 4450, to ensure that all buildings
constructed with public funds be
under the ADA depends on when a building was constructed
“accessible to and usable by the physically handicapped.”
and when significant alterations were undertaken. Buildings
The law directed the State Architect to develop standards
constructed after passage of Title III are, on the whole,
for making buildings accessible to persons with disabilities
required to be fully compliant with ADAAG’s technical access
(see Cal. Gov’t Code § 4450) and adopted as an interim
standards. Buildings altered after that date must comply with
standard the American Standards Association Specifications
the same standards within the altered areas and in regard
A117.1/1961 (“ASAS”). See Cal. Gov’t Code § 4451(d).
to the path of travel leading to the altered area. Buildings
In 1969, the Legislature also enacted Health and Safety
which were constructed prior to Title III are not held to such
Code § 19955, to ensure that public accommodations
a standard. In such buildings, the lesser “barrier removal”
constructed with private funds “adhere to the provisions
standard applies. (As discussed below, however, such
of [Gov’t Code § 4450, et seq.].” Cal. Health & Safety
buildings may be subject to California access laws, which
Code § 19955. This law became operative on July 1, 1970.
preceded the ADA by more than 20 years.) The ADA thus
In 1971, the Legislature enacted Health & Safety Code
strikes a balance between requiring full access with respect
19959, which clarified that section 19955 did not impose
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an obligation to retrofit existing buildings: “Every existing
Effective January, 1997, this well-settled approach was called
public accommodation constructed prior to July 1, 1970 …
into question when the Disabled Persons Act was amended
shall be subject to the requirements of this chapter when any
to add the following provision: “A violation of the right of
alterations, structural repairs or additions are made to such
an individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
public accommodation. This requirement shall only apply to
1990 (Public Law 101-336) also constitutes a violation of
the area of specific alteration, structural repair, or addition
this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed
and shall not be construed to mean the entire building or
to limit the access of any person in violation of that act.”
facility is subject to this chapter.”
Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d), added by Chapter 498, S.B. 1687.
While no California court has interpreted this amendment
In 1981, the California Office of the State Architect adopted
in regard to barrier removal, a federal district court has
the first set of state standards for access to replace the ASAS.
concluded that the amendment permits a plaintiff to seek
These regulations took effect in 1982 and were codified
damages under the state Disabled Persons Act for failure to
at Title 24 of the California Code of
Regulations. Under Title 24, buildings
were required to comply with access
standards only when newly constructed,
or when certain triggering alterations
were undertaken. See “Accessibility for
Existing Buildings,” Cal. Code Regs.
Title 24 § 1134B.1, 2 (provisions apply
only to “existing buildings and facilities,
when alterations, structural repairs or
additions are made to such buildings
or facilities…”). Title 24’s treatment of
triggering alterations is similar to their
remove barriers to access as required
Existing facilities
should be assessed on
a continuing basis to
determine whether there
are access barriers, and
such barriers should
be removed where it is
readily achievable
treatment under the ADA, with requirements to make accessible the path of
to do so
Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort,
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1709. *21-*22
(E.D. Cal., Jan. 17, 2002) (Lodge was
exempt from Title 24, because no alterations, structural repairs, or additions
had been made since it was constructed in 1973; the 1997 amendment
to the Disabled Persons Act, however,
permitted plaintiff nonetheless to seek
damages for alleged failure to remove
barriers). Although there are good
arguments as to why the 1997 amendment should not be construed to create
state barrier-removal obligations,10 the
travel, as well as the facilities, serving
an altered area. See Cal. Code Regs. Title 24 § 1134B.2.1.
by the ADA. Pickern v. Best Western
question would have to be viewed as unsettled. Accordingly,
public accommodations in California face potential exposure
For years, it was well established that no barrier removal
to damages under state law with regard to barrier removal.
obligation existed under California’s public accommodations
laws (including Cal. Civ. Code § 54, et seq., Cal. Gov’t Code
One who violates the Disabled Persons Act is liable “for each
§ 4450, et seq., and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955,
offense for the actual damages and any amount as may be
et seq.). Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Circuit, Inc., 64 Cal.
determined by a jury, or the court sitting without a jury, up
App. 3d 881, 888 (1976) (affirmative conduct to modify
to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages
facilities “is only required when directed by those sections
but in no case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) .…”
dealing with construction of new facilities or with the repair
Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3. In addition to damages, remedies
and alteration of existing facilities.”)
facilities (emphasis added);
for violations of the Disabled Persons Act include injunctive
Deukmejian v. CHE, Inc.,
Inc. 150 Cal. App. 3d 123, 133 (1983)
relief (Cal. Civ. Code § 55) and attorney’s fees (Cal. Civ.
(reaffirming Marsh).
Code § 54.3).
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the facility containing dates of construction and alterations,
and an analysis, in consultation with an access expert, or
Faced with the well-established barrier removal obli-
whether their building complied with state and federal
gations under the ADA and the potential exposure to
requirements in existence at the time the projects were
damages under state law for failure to comply with these
undertaken.
obligations, owners, lessees, and operators of public
accommodations should consider taking steps to reduce
this exposure.
Conclusion
11
State and federal disability access laws entail substantial obliExisting facilities should be assessed on a continuing basis
gations for existing facilities as well as for new construction
to determine whether there are access barriers, and such
and alterations. Recent judicial construction of these laws
barriers should be removed where it is readily achievable
effectively has combined the greater scope of the ADA with
to do so. In most cases, professional guidance is advis-
the broader remedies under state law. Prudent owners and
able. In addition, the DOJ publishes a useful “Checklist
operators of facilities used as public accommodations, as well
for Readily Achievable Barrier Removal” which is designed
as those contemplating acquiring such facilities, may want
to help people identify accessibility problems and solu-
to take this as an occasion to reassess their compliance with
tions in existing facilities in order to comply with the ADA.
these laws.
The checklist counsels the following priorities for planning
readily achievable barrier removal projects: (1) accessible
James E. Boddy, Jr. is Of Counsel in the San Francisco office
approach and entrance; (2) access to goods and services;
and can be reached at 415-268-7081. Lindsay E. Harris is an
(3) access to restrooms; and (4) any other measures neces-
attorney who was formerly in the San Francisco office.
sary. Checklist for Readily Achievable Barrier Removal, p. 3,
located on the DOJ website at http://www.ada.gov.
LABOR BOARD REVERSES FIELD ON NON-UNION
DISCIPLINARY INTERVIEWS
Leases and contracts should be reviewed to specify who
has responsibility for ensuring compliance with access
standards, for defending disability actions, and for
indemnifying other parties for any liability. While such
contractual allocation of responsibilities does not provide
a defense against state or federal disability access claims,
it can allocate the burdens of defense and/or liability as
among the potential defendants to such an action.
By James E. Boddy. Jr.
F
or the third time in 22 years, the National Labor
Relations Board has changed its mind on whether
employers must accede to requests from non-union
employees to have co-workers present for investigatory
interviews that may lead to discipline. In its most recent
encounter with the issue, the Board held in IBM Corp., 341
Those who contemplate purchasing or leasing public
NLRB No. 148 (2004) that non-union employers have no
accommodations in California (including through mergers
such obligation. Accordingly, if a non-union employee asks
and acquisitions where real assets are involved) should
to have a co-worker present during an investigatory inter-
consider including ADA/Title 24 access issues in their
view, the employer has no obligation under the National
due diligence. This might include both assessing “readily
Labor Relations Act to grant the request. Though the
achievable” barrier removal and determining whether
employer now has no obligation to accede to the request,
new construction and alterations complied with applicable
the employee still has a right to ask, and so cannot be disci-
standards. This generally requires a construction history of
plined for making the request.
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The tortured history of this issue begins with the Supreme
employee’s request for the presence of a co-worker during
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 627
an investigatory interview.
(1975). There, in a union setting, the Court held that
an employer violates section 8(1) of the National Labor
Three years and several political appointments later, the
Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),
Board reversed itself in Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 NLRB
if it denies an employee’s request to have a union repre-
230 (1985), holding that Weingarten rights do not apply
sentative present at an investigatory interview which the
in a non-union setting. In Sears, the Board concluded that
employee reasonably believes could lead to discipline. The
such rights are not grounded in section 7, but in other
Court’s analysis began with section 7 of the NLRA, which
provisions of the Act dealing with union representation.
gives employees the right to engage in concerted activity for
To award unrepresented employees the right to have a co-
mutual aid and protection. Requesting
worker present, the Board held, would
a union representative, the Court held,
be inconsistent with the right of the
was a form of concerted activity and
thus protected by section 7. Denial
of such a request thus interferes with
an employee’s section 7 rights, and
interference with section 7 rights is
an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(1) of the Act. The employer thus
violated section 8(a)(1) when it denied
the request for representation. The
Court also noted that requiring employers to accede to such requests served
important policy goals under the NLRA.
The presence of a union representative safeguards not only the particular
employee’s interest, but also those
In the non-union setting,
“an employer’s right
to conduct prompt,
efficient, thorough, and
confidential workplace
investigations”
outweighs the right of a
non-union employees to
have a coworker present
during an investigatory
of the entire bargaining unit; it elimi-
interview
employer, in the absence of a union,
to deal directly with its employees.
Thus, the extension of Weingarten
rights to non-union employees was
not a permissible reading of the Act.
The rationale, but not the result, of
Sears was modified by the Board in
E. I. DuPont & Co., 289 NLRB 627
(1988), where it determined, contrary
to Sears, that extending Weingarten
rights to non-union employees would
be a permissible reading of the NLRA,
but held for policy reasons that this
should not be done.
In 2000, the Board reversed field
nates a perceived imbalance of power
yet again in Epilepsy Foundation of
between labor and management; and it
Northeast Ohio, 331 NLRB 676 (2000)
provides knowledgeable assistance which may facilitate the
and held that Weingarten rights do extend to non-union
investigation. The Court did not address whether the obliga-
employees. In reaching this result, the Board noted that such
tion extended to non-union settings.
rights are grounded in section 7 of the Act and that section
7 applies to both union and non-union employees. Thus, the
The Board first addressed the non-union setting in Materials
Board concluded, there was no statutory basis for having
Research Corp., 262 NLRB 1010 (1982) where it held that
one rule for union employees and a different rule for non-
Weingarten rights extend to non-union employees. Like
union employees. See Bergstrom and Schloss, “NLRB Rules
employees represented by a union, non-union employees
Non-Union Employees Are Entitled to Have a Co-Worker
have a right under section 7 to engage in concerted activ-
Present During an Investigative Interview,” 12 Emp. Law
ity for mutual aid and protection, the Board held, and an
Comm. (August, 2000).
employer violates that right when it denies the non-union
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Now, four years later, in IBM Corp, the Board has reverted
to seek such representation.” You may ask, but you shall not
to its position in E. I. DuPont & Co., holding once again
receive. If you ask, it shall not be held against you.
that Weingarten rights do not extend to the non-union
setting. This time the Board acknowledged that the NLRA
James E. Boddy, Jr. is Of Counsel in our San Francisco office
can be read either to grant such rights or not to grant such
and can be reached at 415-268-7081.
rights. Both are permissible readings of the Act. Which to
choose, therefore, is primarily a policy decision, and the
current Board finds that the better policy arguments lie on
the side of not extending Weingarten to the non-union
setting. In support of its holding, the Board reviewed the
various policy arguments presented in Weingarten itself
and concluded that they do not apply in the absence of
union representation. For example, co-workers, unlike
union representatives, do not represent the interests of the
entire workforce, but only those of the employee under
investigation. Co-workers cannot redress the imbalance
of power between employers and employees. Co-workers do not have the same skills as union representatives in
resolving disputes, and the presence of co-workers may
compromise the confidentiality of investigations. Further,
the Board found, circumstances have changed since its
earlier decisions, such that employers must conduct confidential investigations more often than in the past, as
with sexual harassment claims and to maintain a drug-free
workplace. Important among the changed circumstances,
in the Board’s view, is the “aftermath” of September 11,
which provides “a new vitality” to these policy considerations. Thus, in the non-union setting, “an employer’s right
to conduct prompt, efficient, thorough, and confidential
workplace investigations” outweighs the right of a nonunion employees to have a co-worker present during an
investigatory interview.
Accordingly, at least for the time being, a non-union
employer does not violate the NLRA by denying an
employee’s request for the presence of a co-worker during
an investigatory interview. There is a caveat, however.
While holding that the non-union employer has no obligation to accede to such a request, at the same time the
Board held that employees do have the right to ask. Thus,
employees “cannot be disciplined for asserting … the right
1
Several years prior to the ADA’s passage, for example, a jury
awarded $556,000 under California’s disability access laws to a disabled college student who could not obtain access to a restaurant.
More recently, a visually disabled plaintiff received $1.37 million in
settlement of her California state law claims against a restaurant
for disability access violations and negligence. And just last year,
an onerous disability access settlement played a role in the decision
to close a popular pancake restaurant, founded in San Francisco’s
Union Square in 1938.
2
Title III also identifies other behaviors which constitute discrimination, such as the failure to modify policies, practices, or procedures
(42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b) (2) (A) (ii)) and failure to provide auxiliary
aids and services (42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iii)). These additional
bases of liability are beyond the scope of this article.
3
28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b).
4
Appendix B to Part 36 — Preamble to Regulation on
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities (July 26, 1991) at
627.
5
The DOJ limits the application of this phrase to “those barriers that
are an integral part of the physical structure of the facility.” Part 36,
App. B, 28 C.F.R. 36.304. Examples include permanent signage,
alarm systems, and “the presence of physical partitions that hamper
the passage of sound waves between employees and customers.”
Id. An entity may also have an obligation to provide communication
equipment such as TDD’s and assistive listening devices, but such an
obligation is appropriately determined under the requirements for
auxiliary aids and services at 28 C.F.R. 36.303. Id.
6
Title III’s barrier removal obligations became effective on January
26, 1992. See 28 C.F.R. 36.508.
7
Examples of steps to remove barriers provided in the applicable
regulations include installing ramps, making curb cuts in sidewalks
and entrances, repositioning shelves, rearranging tables, chairs,
vending machines, display racks, and other furniture, repositioning
telephones, adding raised markings on elevator control buttons,
installing flashing alarm lights, widening doors, installing offset
hinges to widen doorways, installing accessible door hardware,
installing grab bars in toilet stalls, rearranging toilet partitions to
increase maneuvering space, insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to
prevent burns, installing a raised toilet seat, installing a full-length
bathroom mirror, repositioning the paper towel dispenser in a
bathroom, creating designated accessible parking spaces, installing
an accessible paper cup dispenser at an existing inaccessible water
fountain, removing high-pile, low density carpeting, or installing
vehicle hand controls. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b).
8
In any enforcement action by the Attorney General, however,
the court may award monetary damages or assess civil penalties.
Punitive damages are not permitted. 42 USC § 12188(B).
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9
VerdictSearch California Reporter, Verdict Date: 11/03/03,
Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s California Inc.;
No. 2002-51738. The court was persuaded that Mervyn’s presented
substantial evidence to substantiate a so-called “fundamental
alteration” defense, which permits a policy or practice to continue
if to modify it would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the goods
or services being provided. 42 U.S.C. 12182(2)(A)(ii). Morrison &
Foerster represented Mervyn’s in this action.
10
For example, similar language in another California disability
access law has been held not to impose a barrier removal obligation. Thus, since 1987, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code
Section 51 et seq., also has prohibited discrimination on the basis of
disability in public accommodations. Like the Disabled Persons Act,
the Unruh Act was amended (in 1992) to provide that “[a] violation
of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 … shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal.
Civ. Code § 51(f). While this amendment created some uncertainty
as to whether the Unruh Act requires barrier removal, at least one
court has held that it does not. See Arnold v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 444 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (in amending Unruh, the California Legislature intentionally declined to adopt
and incorporate any ADA standards requiring the physical modification of existing facilities and accordingly Unruh does not mandate
removal of barriers.)
This newsletter addresses recent employment law developments. Because of
its generality, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all
situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on
particular situations.
11
Editor: Lloyd W. Aubry, Jr., (415) 268-6558
Similarly for new construction and alterations, those subject to the
disability access laws should seek professional guidance to ensure
compliance with applicable laws. Various resources are also available
to assist compliance. For example, the DOJ operates a toll-free ADA
information line (800-514-0301 voice and 800-514-0383 TDD).
ADA specialists are available to discuss how the technical requirements pertain to individual situations. Online resources are also
available. See http://www.ada.gov. In addition, tax incentives are
available to businesses to help cover the cost of access compliance,
including a tax credit that is available for small businesses, and a tax
deduction that is available for businesses of any size. Fact Sheet 4,
“Tax Incentives for Improving Accessibility,” published online at
http://www.ada.gov.
SAN FRANCISCO
Elizabeth P. Allor
Lloyd W. Aubry, Jr.
James E. Boddy, Jr.
Judith Droz Keyes
James C. Paras
Linda E. Shostak
Walter M. Stella
PALO ALTO
David J. Murphy
Eric A. Tate
Raymond L. Wheeler
Tom E. Wilson
LOS ANGELES
Sarvenaz Bahar
Michael Chamberlin
Lisa von der Mehden Klerman
Timothy F. Ryan
Janie F. Schulman
B. Scott Silverman
Marcus A. Torrano
NEW YORK
Miriam H. Wugmeister
CENTURY CITY
Ivy Kagan Bierman
ORANGE COUNTY
Robert A. Naeve
Brian C. Sinclair
SAN DIEGO
Rick Bergstrom
Craig A. Schloss
DENVER
Stephen S. Dunham
Steven M. Kaufmann
Tarek F.M. Saad
LONDON
Ann Bevitt
Simeon Spencer
David C. Warner
(415) 268-6751
(415) 268-6558
(415) 268-7081
(415) 268-6638
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If you have a change of address, please write to Chris Lenwell, Morrison &
Foerster LLP, 425 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105-2482, or e-mail
him at [email protected].
on the web at www.mofo.com
© 2004 Morrison & Foerster LLP. All Rights Reserved.
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