LSE IDEAS
Programme in Focus
include a round table on the theme of “What next for
Lebanon?” on April 28. The programme has quickly found
an audience: the vast majority of attendees at these events
are policymakers.
The programme has also been organising a number of
reports prepared for policymakers, journalists, and the
public. A November 2009 report included pieces on the
future of political Islam, the possibility of a transformation
for Hamas, and Jordan’s role in the Middle East peace
process. (The whole report can now be accessed online
here: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/
SU003.aspx ) The programme has also been running a
succesful blog, Shifting Sands. The blog, edited by Amber
Holewinski, is a forum where young academics can
publish their analysis of ongoing events along more
established commentators.
Middle East
International Affairs
Programme
T
here is no region in the world today that gets as much
attention as the Middle East. Between the Arab/Israeli
conflict, Iran’s nuclear programme, the war in Iraq, and the
seemingly perpetual political crisis in Lebanon, the Middle
East never leaves the front pages. And yet it is also the most
misunderstood region; between the dozens of insta-experts
offering superficial commentary and the often passionately
held beliefs on every problem in the region of politicians,
journalists, and ordinary citizens in the rest of the world, the
area can seem positively impenetrable to someone looking
for sober, balanced analysis.
Officially launched last November, the Middle East
International Affairs programme has had a busy and
succesful first year. Under the leadership of Professor Nigel
Ashton of the Department of International History, the
programme has run a series of events along the theme
of “What next for the Middle East?” Among the most
well-attended events were “What next for Afghanistan,”
featuring Dr Antonio Giustozzi of the Crisis States Research
Centre, Dr Toby Dodge of Queen Mary speaking on Iraq,
and Professor Gilles Kepel of Sciences-Po and the current
holder of the Philippe Roman Chair at LSE IDEAS giving
a talk on Muslims in modern Europe. Upcoming events
16
So what’s next for the Middle East programme? More
events and publications to be sure, drawing on the ever
growing network of top scholars and researchers in the
field. The programme also recently secured funding from
HEIF 4 fund and the British Institute for the Study of Iraq
to hold a major conference on the Iran-Iraq war. The
conference expects to be the first to bring together
the academic, diplomatic and intelligence community to
appraise the Iran-Iraq war 30 years after it took place by
presenting new information, documents and insight that
has since become available, according to Ranj Alaaldin, one
of the co-organisers of the conference.
Chris Phillips, who oversees day-to-day operations, says
that his motivation in working on the programme comes
from a long-standing desire to change the way the
region is perceived in the west. He has lived in Syria and
Jordan, teaching English in Aleppo and later setting up an
organisation that sends British graduates to the region to
work in schools. “The vast majority of people in the Middle
East are not living in conflict, yet the region is constantly
portrayed as one giant war zone,” he says. ■
Programme Head: Professor Nigel Ashton
Department of International History
Programme Assistant: Chris Phillips
A
Boeing 727 loaded with cocaine of Latin American provenance sets ablaze
in Goa, north of Mali. Six European citizens are kidnapped by Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM; a coup topples a government in Niger, and an
assassination takes place in Algiers: indeed the situation in the Maghreb and the
sub-Saharan Sahel region, which includes parts of Mali, Niger, and Berkina Faso,
has been volatile in recent months. Now it is under the spotlight, the focus of a
new game for influence and resources being played by the US, China, France,
and Germany.
For decades, the Sahel region has had the reputation of being the Maghreb’s
“Wild West,” where governments in Maghrebi and sub-Saharan African countries
had little control. Partly due to its remoteness and the weakness of the state,
the Sahel evolved as a lawless, almost self-governing entity where Touareg
tribal chieftains enjoyed authority recognised not only by their tribesmen but
also the central governments. In the 1990s, as Algeria descended into its
decade of political violence and terrorism, the Sahel region served as a logistical
support base for the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)
terrorist group. By the end of the decade a nexus emerged between Latin
American drug trafficking cartels and AQIM terrorist activities. Today this has
several geopolitical and security repercussions for the international community.
The governments in the region, the EU, the US and China are all understandably
very concerned about events in the Sahel region. The US has been trying a
carrot and stick approach. A number of top US Pentagon generals, including
AFRICOM commander General William E. Ward, and State Department officers
have recently been to Algiers and all delivered the same message: Algeria is the
‘privileged partner’ of the US in the war against AQIM. Then in January, in the
aftermath of the failed Detroit Christmas bombing, Washington issued a black
list of 14 countries, including Algeria, whose citizens must undergo special
security clearance for visa issuance and control measures at US airports. Algiers
was infuriated and the shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Algiers has
intensified since then.
Although US officials have argued that the decision to include Algeria on the list
was rooted in counterterrorism efforts, many Algerian journalists and politicians
see it differently. They believe that between the AFRICOM commander’s visit to
Algiers in late November and the blacklist decision a development with strategic
implications for both parties has taken place. In their view, Washington asked
for Algerian permission to use the soon to be completed military air base in
the Touareg region’s capital Tammenrasset.The base is well placed to launch
interventions in the area; Morocco is willing to share its facilities, but the
location there is not as attractive for US defense officials. The Algerian leadership
has so far been resisting this request. Is the blacklist decision a blackmailing
measure to force Algeria’s hand? The answer to this question might be crucial
to understanding the current standoff between the Algerian presidency and the
military establishment.
The
New
Gold
Rush
in the
SubSaharan
Sahel
By Lakhdar Ghettas
PhD Candidate, Department of International Relations
On the web: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/
programmes/middleEastProgramme/Home.aspx
Shifting Sands Blog: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/
programmes/middleEastProgramme/blog.aspx
The EU also has a direct interest in the Sahel turmoil. Its citizens, who visit the
region as tourists, have been the AQIM’s preferred targets, primarily because
European governments are prepared to pay ransoms to see their citizens freed,
to the fiercest protest and dismay of Algiers. This was the case with a French aid
worker who was released in a deal where AQIM got four of its members held in
custody in Bamako freed one week after Bernard Kouchner and Sarkozy paid a
visit to President Amadou Toure. But Paris is not only worried about the safety of
17
its citizens abroad: of great interest are yellow cake deposits
in Niger. As reported by Le Monde and other French
news outlets, the aid worker was in fact a ranking French
intelligence field officer who was gathering information on
AQIM. This probably explains the immense pressure Sarkozy
exerted on President Toure to free his officer. Sakozy’s plan
to jump-start France’s economy includes an emphasis on
the sale of French 3rd generation EPR nuclear reactors to
Arab countries, and on exporting electricity to the whole of
the EU. The Sahel yellow cake deposits, where the French
company AREVA has been very active in sealing generous
contracts with President Josef Kabila in the DR of Congo,
MamadouTandga in Niger, as well as in Bourkina Faso, are
vital for Sarkozy’s economic recovery plan. Paris cannot
tolerate the slightest AQIM threat to safe-guard access to
those deposits. Therefore, Paris had to obtain intelligence
on AQIM’s activities. Having elbowed out France in the
Magreb, is the US willing to offset French influence in the
sub-Saharan African countries as well?
Meanwhile, Germany is promoting its Desertech renewable
energy project in what appears to be an attempt to offer a
rival supply of solar energy for Europe. Desertec, which has
been criticised by Sarkozy, is still in the design and feasibility
phase. It aims to set up a network of interconnected
solar energy panels in the Algerian desert as well as parts
of Western Sahara. The electricity produced would be
exported to Europe via Algeria and Morocco. Paris is already
contracting with Maghreb and other Arab Gulf countries
for nuclear energy projects estimated at $3,000 billion,
Desertec is not good news for Sarkozy at all, and he has
been campaigning against it in the Maghreb. China is in
the Sahel as well and that is not good news for Washington
either. The new gold rush to secure access to Africa’s natural
resources has intensified. Beijing plans to build 30 nuclear
reactors by 2020 to secure energy to its growing industry;
that is three reactors every year from now. This means that
besides oil, China will be looking at the Sahel’s uranium
deposits, where Niger is the world’s third producer after
Australia and Canada. Will the historical divisions between
the Arabs and the Touareg get so exacerbated that they
become utilised in this new gold rush? Will Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi restrain from meddling in Touareg affairs
now that the repercussions can reach Tripoli?
This chess game is very disturbing news for the leadership
in Algiers. Already a number of military measures have
been taken following the Sahel’s Chiefs of Staff meeting
held last August in Tammenrasset, where the Council of
the Sahel Chiefs of Staff of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad,
Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya was created. Algeria has
also restricted cross-border traffic with Niger, Mali and
Mauritania to 7 or 8 customs outposts only. Furthermore,
following the release of the four AQIM terrorists in return
18
for the French aid worker as well as reports of ongoing
negotiations between Madrid and Rome with AQIM to
free the rest of the kidnapped ones (three Spanish and two
Italians), Algeria played host in mid March for a meeting of
the Sahel region’s foreign ministers in order to coordinate
efforts for a joint concrete operational response to the
security challenge AQIM poses. Both the Quai d’Orsay and
the State Departments have welcomed the agreement. It
is believed Algiers rushed to convince the region’s leaders
to put some order in their houses following growing
French and US pressure and suggestions of direct military
intervention.
Morocco, a Maghreb country and a crucial link in drug
trafficking from the Sahel to Europe has been absent from
all this. Algerian-Moroccan relations are hostage to tensions
left over from the Cold War in the Western Sahara. Borders
have been closed since the mid-1990s. Algeria’s reluctance
to grant Washington military concessions presented Rabat
with an opportunity. It is believed that negotiations are
underway to construct an AFRICOM base by 2016 in
Moroccan Ras Dari region on its borders with Western
Sahara. King Mohamed VI thinks this AFRICOM-for-Western
Sahara deal could win Washington’s support for Rabat’s
regional autonomy plan it has proposed for the POLISARIO.
As long as the Western Sahara problem is not resolved
the Maghreb-Sahel joint efforts to combat AQIM would
continue to face challenges. AQIM is a new element in the
geopolitics of the Western Sahara conflict, and Christopher
Ross, the UN Special Envoy, who was in the region this
March, will have to take that into consideration in his report
for the UN.
Given Algeria’s size, central location in the heart of North
Africa, and importance for the EU’s energy security, nothing
can be done in the Maghreb-Sahel region without its
consent. Rabat could jump on the AFRICOM opportunity or
the Desertec project but it cannot offer a viable substitute
for Algeria: objective geographical considerations, among
others, are at play here. Would Algeria give concessions to
AFRICOM? The very recent history tells us that such a move
could undermine the whole ruling establishment in Algiers.
During the Cold War, Algiers resisted the USSR’s attempts to
gain privileged access to the Mers-El-Kebir naval base and
its nuclear-proof facilities, constructed by the French. “The
past is not dead. In fact, it is not even past”, said William
Faulkner, Obama’s favourite author. The Cold War years in
North Africa have many lessons to offer for current policy
makers and advisers dealing with geopolitics of the region.
***
Lakhdar Ghettas is a Cato Stonex scholarship holder at
LSE IDEAS and a PhD candidate in the Department of
International History at the LSE. He is writing on USAlgerian relations in the 1970s.
BLOGS@IDEAS
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/blog
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19