Social Facts, Social Groups and Social Explanation
Author(s): John D. Greenwood
Source: Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 93-112
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3506206 .
Accessed: 12/01/2014 12:45
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Noûs.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
NOUS 37:1(2003)93-112
Social Facts, Social Groupsand Social Explanation
JOHN D. GREENWOOD
CityCollegeand GraduateSchool
of New York
CityUniversity
1. Introduction
In thispaper' I offera tentativeanswerto a questionhistorically
associated
withDurkheim,namely,whatis, or are, the"distinctive
of
characteristic(s)"
social phenomena,or "social facts" (Durkheim,1895a, p. 50). The answer
whichis Durkheimianin spirit,2shedssome lighton thedistinctive
offered,
natureof social groups,and on therelationbetweensocial and psychological
factsand formsof explanation.On this account it turnsout that thereis
a substantiveexplanatorydisputebetween"holists" and "individualists",
althoughit is a disputethatdoes not have a unitaryanswer,and one that
can onlybe determinedby social scientific
research.
Durkheim'squestionhas been surprisingly
neglectedin twentieth-century
of
social
which
has
tended
to considerquestionsabout
science,
philosophy
of any criticaldiscussionof
social ontologyand explanationindependently
the constitutivedimensionsof the social. Rosenberg(1995) and Kincaid
(1996), for example,effectively
ignorethis question,and followthe traditional equation of social factswithholisticsocial entities(Kincaid, 1996,
pp. 6-7; Rosenberg,1995,p. 131).Whenaccountsofthesocialare offered,
they
tendto be highlysuperficialand inadequateas a basis forcriticalanalysesof
the relationbetweensocial and psychologicalphenomena and formsof
explanation.For example,the two introductory
essays in the recentMIT
Press collectionReadingsin the Philosophyof Social Science (Martin and
McIntyre,1994) definesocial phenomenamerelyas "the resultsof [motivated] human action" (Machlup, 1994, p. 9) and as "intentionalphenomena.., .identifiedin termsof theirmeanings"(Fay and Moon, 1994,p. 33).3
Two points are worth noting before launchinginto the Durkeimian
account of the social offeredin thispaper. AlthoughDurkheimraised the
c 2003 BlackwellPublishing
Inc., 350 Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA,
andP.O. Box 1354,9600Garsington
Road,Oxford,
OX4 2DQ, UK.
93
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
94 NOUS
of "social facts",he
criticalquestionabout the"distinctive
characteristic(s)"
failedto answerit directly.Durkheimreasonablymaintained,in Chapter1
of TheRules ofSociologicalMethod,that"it is importantto knowwhatare
thefactstermed'social' ", in orderto distinguish
sociologyas an autonomous
disciplinedistinctfromthe sciencesof biologyand psychology,whichhave
theirown "separatesubject-matters"
(Durkheim,1895a,p. 50). He believed
that social facts are "separable, because of theirdistinctcharacteristics,
from those that form the subject matterof other sciences of nature"
(Durkheim,1895a,p. 50).
In his analysisof social facts,Durkheimcitedtwo properties4
thathe held
to be commonto all social facts:theyare independentof an individual's
consciousnessand will,and exerta causal influenceon his or herbehavior.
He thusdefinedsocial factsas:
ofacting,
andfeeling
external
to theindividual,
whichare
thinking
... manners
witha coercive
invested
ofwhichtheyexercise
control
overhim.
powerbyvirtue
1895a,p. 52)
(Durkheim,
and causal
However,thesetwoavowed propertiesof social facts,externality
influence,are not propertiesthatdistinguishsocial phenomenafromnonsocial phenomena,such as merelypsychological,biological and physical
theyare propertiessharedbyall theobjectsof
phenomena.On thecontrary,
and
psychological,biological
physical sciences: by other psychological
bodies,
acids, ball bearings,and electromagnetic
hydrochloric
beings,Golgi
fields.
A similarproblemarisesforDurkheim'scharacterization
of social facts
as statisticalfactsabout social groups (Durkheim,1895a, p. 55), such as
statisticalfacts about differential
rates of suicide betweendifferent
age,
and
gendergroups [the typesof factsdocumented
professional,religious
in his own classic workon Suicide(Durkheim,1897a)]. Social factsdo not
appear to be social by virtueof theirstatisticalnature,sincethereare plenty
ofnon-socialstatisticalfactsabout floraand fauna,theweather,and nuclear
reactions.This suggeststhat statisticalfactsabout certainpopulationsare
social by virtueof theirbeingstatisticalfactsabout social groups,but this
of social phenomenasuch
presupposessome independentcharacterization
as social groups.
Durkheim'sfailureto directlyaddresshis own questionis probablybest
aim to establishsociologyas a legitimexplainedin termsof his overriding
This
ate scientific
discipline.
explains,forexample,his continuedemphasis
on the "reality"or "thinghood" of social facts,ratherthan theirsocial
natureper se: "we do not say thatsocial factsare materialthings,but that
theyare thingsjust as materialthings"(Durkheim,1901,p. 35). That is, the
thatDurkheimcitedas commonto socialfactsare thoseproperties
properties
that he held to be common to scientificobjects,ratherthan common to
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation95
social facts per se. However, as I will suggestin this paper, a superior
account of social factscan be gleaned fromhis writingsthat covers the
intuitively
examplesof social factsthathe providedand
plausibleillustrative
and causal influence
makesreasonablesenseof his appeal to theexternality
of "social facts".
The second pointto note is thatnothingin theDurkheimianaccountof
social factsthatfollowsdependsupon the thesisthatsocial groupsexistas
supra-individuals"over and above" the individualswho compose them.
Durkheimis oftencharacterizedas a paradigmaticholist,who held that
with respectto social entities,"the whole does not equal the sum of its
parts" (Durkheim,1895a, p. 128), and who maintaineddogmaticallythat
social phenomenacould in consequenceonlybe explainedsocially:"every
timea social phenomenonis directlyexplainedby a psychologicalphenomenon,we mayrestassuredtheexplanationis false"(Durkheim1895a,p. 129).
Whilethereare groundsforsupposingthatDurkheimdid believethatsocial
groups have emergentproperties,this doctrine plays no role in the
Durkheimianaccountof social phenomenaand social explanationdeveloped
in thispaper.
2. Social facts
Durkheim'squestion may be answeredby offeringa modifiedversionof
Durkheim'sdefinitionof social factsas:
Mannersof acting,thinkingand feelingengagedby individualsbecause
and on conditionthatothermembersof a social groupare represented
and feeling.6
as engagedin these(or other5)ways of acting,thinking,
On this account, a beliefis a social beliefif and only if it is held by an
individualbecause and on conditionthatothermembersof a social group
are represented
as holdingthat(or another)belief.The beliefby a member
of a millenniumsectthat"The Guardians" willdescendfromspace to save
themon a particularday is a social beliefifand onlyifit is heldbecause and
as holdingthat
on conditionthatothermembersof thesectare represented
belief.7A behavioris a social behaviorif and onlyifit is engagedin by an
individualbecause and on conditionthatothermembersof a social group
are representedas engagingin that (or another)social behaviorin similar
conditions.Wearing blue jeans is a social behavior if and only if this
behavioris engagedby an individualbecause and on conditionthat other
as wearingblue jeans.
membersof a social group are represented
It is criticalto stressthatsocial formsof cognition,emotionand behavior
are social byvirtueof themannerin whichtheyare heldor engaged.Theyare
not social by virtueof theircontentsor objects,or by virtueof theirbeing
held or engagedby social groupsas opposed to individuals.A social belief
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
96 NOUS
or attitude,forexample,is a beliefor attitudethatis held by an individual
(or individuals)socially; that is, because and on condition that other
membersof a social groupare represented
as holdingthatbeliefor attitude.
An individualbeliefor attitudeis a beliefor attitudethat is held by an
individual(or individuals)individually;
thatis, independently
ofwhetherany
memberof a social groupis represented
as holdingthatbeliefor attitude.
An individualCatholic'sbeliefthatabortionis wrongis a social beliefifit is
held socially,ifit is held because and on conditionthatotherCatholicsare
representedas holding this belief. An individual Catholic's belief that
abortionis wrongis an individualbeliefif it is held individually,if it is
held forreasons or causes independentof whetherany otherCatholic (or
as holdingthisbelief:if,for
anymemberof any social group)is represented
example,it is held because the personhas acceptedrationalargumentsor
evidencein favorof thisbelief.8
Since the difference
betweensocial and individualbeliefsor attitudesis
a difference
withrespectto how beliefsor attitudesare held,an individual
may hold one belief or attitudesocially and another belief or attitude
individually,or one and the same belief or attitudeboth socially and
individually.An individualmay hold one beliefor attitudesocially,qua
memberof a social group, and another or different
belief or attitude
without
reference
to
social
To
individually,
any
group.
adapt William
James'sexample(James,1890,p. 294), as a magistratethemagistratemay
condemntheprisoner,but as a man he maypityhim.Or an individualmay
hold one and the same beliefor attitudeboth socially,qua memberof
a social group,and individually,independently
of any social group. Some
Catholicsmay disapproveof abortionboth because and on conditionthat
otherCatholicsare represented
as disapprovingof abortion(at leastin part)
and because theyhave been convincedby rationalargumentsand evidence
(at least in part).9
A concreteillustrationof the distinctionbetweensocial and individual
beliefsand attitudesmaybe givenbyreference
to a famousstudyconducted
Schanck
the
forformsof baptismamong
by
(1932), concerning preferences
Methodists and Baptists. Among the Methodists, for example, 90%
expresseda preferencefor sprinkling(as opposed to immersion)when
asked for a statementof theirattitudeas churchmembers,whereas 16%
for sprinklingwhen asked fora statementof their
expresseda preference
ownprivatefeelings.Thus we maysay thatwhilemostMethodistsheld this
social preference
(held thispreference
socially),onlya fewheld thisindividual preference(held this preferenceindividually)-a good many held
a different
individualpreference.Given the figures,we may also say that
some Methodistsheld thispreference
both as a social and as an individual
that
both
and
preference: is,
socially
individually.
On this account, social beliefsand attitudesare not restrictedin any
way by theircontentsor objects: theycan have any contentor object
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Social Facts, Social Groupsand Social Explanation 97
whatsoever,so long as the beliefor attitudeis held socially.In particular,
social beliefsand attitudesare not restrictedto beliefsor attitudesabout
social objects such as otherpersons,or social groupsor institutions
(such
as Muslims or the Federal Government),common as these beliefsand
attitudesmay be. One may have social beliefs or attitudesabout the
weather,snakes,the EiffelTower,and the orbitsof theplanets,so long as
thesebeliefsand attitudesare held socially.On thisaccountsocial beliefsor
attitudesare not the beliefsof social groups as opposed to individuals,
although social groups may properlybe said to have social beliefs or
attitudes,namely,whenmanyor mostof theirmembershold certainbeliefs
or attitudessocially.
In relation to this last point, it is importantto stressthat it is not
sufficient
fora beliefor attitudeto be social thatit is held by themajority
of membersof a social group,far less a merepluralityof individuals.To
adapt the earlierSchanck (1932) example,most Methodistswill maintain
a preference
forsprinkling
qua Methodistsif theyhold thisbeliefsocially,
forsprinkling
is held sociallyby Methodists
and the factthata preference
or commonaltyamong Methodists.However,all the
explainsits generality
membersofa congregationofMethodistscomingout ofchurchon a Sunday
morningmay also believethatit is raining,by virtueof the liquid evidence
fallingfromtheskies,or theymay all believethatNew York is East of Los
on all available
Angeles,because thisis how theirpositionsare represented
not
for
are
Yet
these
beliefs
are
social
beliefs,
they
(presumably)not
maps.
held by Methodistsbecause and on conditionthat other Methodistsare
as holdingthem.
represented
That is, many common beliefs are held individually,even among
membersof social groups.Conversely,a social beliefneed not be restricted
to membersof a particularsocial group.Some Catholicsmayhold thebelief
thatabortionis wrongsocially(becauseand on conditionthatotherCatholics
are representedas holdingthisbelief),but otherCatholicsmay not (some
may hold this belief only individually),and many Methodistsmay also
hold this beliefsocially (because and on conditionthat otherMethodists
are representedas holdingthis belief).
As Durkheimput it, social beliefsare generalbecause theyare social
(held socially): they are not social just because they are general. For
Durkheim,a social fact,includinga social formof cognition,emotion,or
behavior:
butitis veryfar
becauseitis collective
... is general
(i.e.moreorlessobligatory);
It is a condition
ofthegrouprepeated
frombeingcollective
becauseitis general.
in individuals
becauseitimposesitself
1895a,p. 56)
uponthem.(Durkheim,
Indeed the whole point of Durkheim'sanalysis was to distinguishsocial
factsfromotherpsychologicalfactsthat are also generalor common in
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
98 NOUS
society,such as factsabout eating,drinking,sleepingand reasoning.Moreover,it was preciselythisconceptionof thenormativeorientationof social
formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorto the cognition,emotionand
behaviorof membersof social groupsthatgroundedDurkheim'sdenial of
Gabriel Tarde's (1890) equation of social formsof cognition,emotionand
behavior with "imitated" forms of cognition,emotion and behavior.
Durkheiminsistedthatalthoughmanysocial formsof cognition,emotion
and behaviorare a productof imitation,theyare not social because theyare
imitated.Rather, they are imitatedbecause they are social (Durkheim,
1895a, p. 59).10
Analogous pointsmay be made about social behavioror social action
social emotion,social learningand so forth).On this
(and, mutatismutandis,
account,a behavioris social ifand onlyifit is engagedsocially:ifand only
if it is engaged because and on conditionthat othermembersof a social
as engagingin this(or another)formof behaviorin
groupare represented
a similarsituation.A behavioris individualifit is engagedindividually:ifit
is engaged independently
of whetherany memberof any social group is
as engagingin such behavior(or anotherbehavior)in a similar
represented
situation.
As WilliamJamesnoted,whenactionsare sociallyengagedit is common
for a certain situationto engenderone form of social behavior from
membersof one social group, but a quite different
social behaviorfrom
membersof othersocial groups.That is, the appropriatesocial behavioris
conditionalupon represented
social groupmembership:
withcholera;buta priestor
....Thus a laymanmayabandona cityinfected
a doctorwouldthink
withhishonor.A soldier's
suchan actincompatible
honor
whereanotherman can
requireshim to fightor die undercircumstances
apologizeor runawaywithno stainon hissocialself.(James,1890,p. 295)
Like social beliefsand attitudes,social behaviorsare not restricted
to any
type of purpose or object. So long as they are engaged socially, their
or destructive,
purposemaybe constructive
benignor malevolent,generous
or miserly,and so forth;and social behaviorsmaybe directedtowardother
personsand othersocial groups,or towardanimals,rivers,and the sun or
moon.
A behavioris not socialjust because it is directedtowardanotherperson
or social group,or engagedin by a pluralityof membersof a social group,
eitherat the same place and time,or at different
places and times.Some
interpersonalbehaviors-behaviors directed toward another person or
persons-are not social behaviors,evenwhentheyare engagedby a plurality
of members of a social group. Acts of aggression and rape are interpersonal
behaviorsbecause theyare directedtowardotherpersons(the victims),but
they are not social behaviors if they are not engaged because and on
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation99
conditionthatothermembersof a social groupare represented
as engaging
in suchbehaviorsin similarcircumstances;
if,forexample,theyare products
of spontaneousaggressionor lust (groundedin prolongedfrustration,
for
example).Many or mostof thetradeunionistsassembledto electtheirlocal
presidentmayrushoffto thenearesthardwarestoreto buycandlesand salt
whentheyhear word of theimpendingwinterstorm,but theiractionis not
social iftheydo not engagein such behaviorbecause and on conditionthat
othersmembersof the trade union are representedas doing so (as would
seem unlikely).
In contrast,some social behaviorsmay not be directedtoward other
persons,and may be engaged by single individualsin physicalisolation
fromothermembersof a social group.The practiceof solitarygenuflection
in frontof a cross may be engaged because and on conditionthat other
membersof a religiousgroupare represented
as behavingin thisfashionin
the presenceof this religioussymbol.Solitarygolfersmay take as much
pride in theirfairwayachievementsas those who preferthe proximityof
othergolfersand may adhereto the conventionsof the game as closelyas
themoregregarioustypes."
Of course,manysocial behaviorsare also interpersonal
behaviorsand are
oftenengagedin by a pluralityof membersof a social group,sometimesat
thesame place and time,and sometimesat different
places and times.Thus
an interpersonal
act of aggressionor rape is also a social behaviorwhenit is
an instanceof "gang warfare"or "gang rape": when membersof a gang
engage in this form of behavior because and on condition that other
membersof the gang are representedas engaging in it. Trade union
membersalso oftenassemble outside a workplaceto forma picket line
because and on condition that other trade unionistsare representedas
doingso. Many social behaviorsare also engagedby a pluralityof members
of a social group:genuflecting,
withdrawing
moneyfroma bank,attending
a funeral,and so forth,at different
timesand in different
places, and at
the same timeand in the same place. However,such social behaviorsare
not social just because they are engaged by a pluralityof membersof
a social group. Rather,theytendto be engagedby a pluralityof members
of a social group because theyare social, because theseformsof behavior
are normatively"imposed" upon membersof social groups,as Durkheim
would have said.
One immediatevirtueof this Durkheimianaccount of social formsof
cognition,emotionand behavioris thatit appears to coverall theillustrativeexamplesof social phenomenaprovidedby Durkheim,such as family
and the
obligations,legal codes, religiouspractices,financialinstruments
like (Durkheim,1895a,pp. 50-51). Such phenomenawould not existabsent
socially held and engaged formsof cognition,emotion, and behavior.
Anothervirtueof thisaccountis thatit can accommodatethe"externality"
and "constraint"of socialfacts,in termsoftheconditionality
and normativity
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
100 NOUS
of socialformsofcognition,
emotionand behavior,withoutanyappeal to the
of
social
supra-individuality
groupsor theirproperties.
A further
virtueof thisaccountof social formsofcognition,emotionand
behavioris that it seems to cover prettymuch what bothDurkheimand
Weber had in mind when they attemptedto delineate the fundamental
dimensions of the social, despite the fact that Durkheim is usually
as a paradigm"holist"and Weberas a paradigm"individualist".
represented
Weber maintainedthatthe subjectmatterof sociologicalscienceis "social
action", definedas any action (or intentionalbehavior)whose "subjective
meaningtakesintoaccountthebehaviorof othersand is therebyorientedin
its course" (Weber, 1922, p. 4). Althoughthis definitionis oftenread as
equating social action and interpersonalaction, it may also be read as
social action as sociallyengaged action.12Like Durkheim,
characterizing
Webermaintainedthatactionsmerelybased upon imitation-suchas learning how to gut a fish by observinga stranger-are not social actions.
Actionsbased upon imitationonlycountas social actionswhen"the action
of othersis imitatedbecause it is fashionableor traditionalor exemplary".
For similarreasonsWeberdeniedthatmerelycommonactions,such as the
actionsof a crowdofpersonsraisingtheirumbrellasto avoid therain,count
as social actions(Weber, 1922,pp. 22-24).
Although,contraDurkheim,Weberfamouslydeniedthatsocial groups
are supra-individual
collectivities
(Weber, 1922, p. 14), withDurkheimhe
of
clearlyacknowledgedthe normativepotencyof shared representations
social groups:
ofcollective
in themindsofindividTheseconcepts
.havea meaning
entities..,
ual persons,
as actuallyexisting,
with
partlyas something
partlyas something
normative
(Weber,1922,p. 14)
authority.
That is, aside fromtheir"holist" and "individualist"rhetoricabout the
of social groups,Durkheimand Weberappear to have
supra-individuality
shared the same fundamentalconceptionof social formsof cognition,
emotionand behavior:as formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorheld
or engagedbecause and on conditionthatothermembersof a social group
are represented
as holdingor engagingin these(or other)formsof cognition,emotionand behavior.
These social formsof cognition,emotion,and behaviorare characterized
as social because theysharethefundamental
dimensionof sociality:theyare
orientedto thecognition,emotionand behaviorofothermembersofa social
group. Absentthisdimension,therewould be no need forany conceptof
the social or talk about the social. Absentthisdimension,all thework of
describingand explaininghumancognition,emotionand behaviorcould be
done byconceptsofand talkaboutindividual(individually
heldand engaged)
behavior.
psychologicalstatesand interpersonal
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation101
3. Social groups
Social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorhave been characterizedas
formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorheld or engagedbecause and on
conditionthatothermembersof a social group are represented
as holding
or engagingin these(or other)formsof cognition,emotionand behavior.
Yet nothinghas been said so far about social groups themselves.In this
sectionit is suggestedthat social groups are best characterizedas populations bound by shared social formsof cognition,emotionand behavior
(where "shared" implies that such forms of cognition, emotion and
behaviorare represented
by membersof a social groupas held and engaged
by othermembersof the social group).
Now thesecharacterizations
mightappear to be objectionablycircular,
since social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorare characterizedby
reference
to social groups,and social groupsare themselves
characterizedin
termsof sharedsocial formsof cognition,emotionand behavior.However,
it is not
althoughthereis circularityinvolvedin these characterizations,
vicious but entirelynatural. It is merelya reflectionof the fact that the
holdingor engagementof social formsof cognition,emotionand behavior
and theconstitutionof social groupsare generallytwo aspectsof the same
psychologicalprocess. As Simmelaptlyput it, withrespectto the constiwiththe others
tutionof social groups: "the consciousnessof constituting
a unityis actuallyall thereis to thatunity"(Simmel,1908,p. 338).
Moreover, the circularityinvolved in these characterizations,while
entirelynatural,is not strictlynecessaryand can be readilyeliminated.
Thus social formsof cognition,emotion,and behaviorcan be characterized
as formsof cognition,emotion,and behaviorheld or engagedbecause and
on conditionthatmembersof a populationare representedas holdingor
engagingin these(or other)formsof cognition,emotion,and behaviorin
Social groupsthemselvescan be characterizedas
particularcircumstances.
those populationswhose membershold or engage in formsof cognition,
emotion,and behaviorbecause and on conditionthatothermembersofthat
as holdingor engagingin these(or other)forms
populationare represented
of cognition,emotion,and behavior in particularcircumstances.I have
includedstrictlyunnecessaryreferences
to social formsof cognition,emotion, and behavior and social groups in the respectivecharacterizations
because I wantto emphasizethegenerally
joint natureof theirconstitution.
of social formsof cognition,emotionand
However,thejoint constitution
behaviorand of social groupsis onlygenerallybut not invariablythecase.
An individual (or set of individuals)may misrepresenta population as
bound by sharedsocial formsof cognition,emotionand behavior:thatis,
an individual (or set of individuals)may misrepresenta population as
a social group.Thus an individual(or set of individuals)may misrepresent
membersof a population definedby a common propertyas bound by
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
102 NOUS
shared social formsof cognition,emotion and behavior: for example,
a disabledpersonor personsmay misrepresent
the populationof disabled
social
of
as
bound
shared
forms
by
persons
cognition,emotionand behavior.
it
is
a
for
whole
Indeed,
possible
population of individualsdefinedby
a commonpropertyto misrepresent
themselvesas bound by sharedsocial
formsof cognition,emotion and behavior. Thus many or most of the
or women-may
population of disabled persons-or African-Americans
misrepresentthemselvesas bound by shared social formsof cognition,
emotionand behavior:thatis, theymaymisrepresent
themselvesas a social
group.13
social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviordo not
Furthermore,
entailthe existenceof social groups,althoughas a matterof facttheyare
generallycausally tied to them. This is because the distinctionbetween
social as opposed to individualformsof cognition,emotionand behavior
is based upon howsuchformsof cognition,
emotionand behaviorare heldor
engaged:that is, it is based upon whethertheyare held or engaged by
to a represented
reference
social group,or independently
of any represented
social group.It is onlynecessaryfortheholdingor engagementof a social
formof cognition,emotionor behaviorthatan individualrepresentsthat
formof cognition,emotionor behavioras held or engagedby membersof
a represented
social group:it is strictly
immaterialwhethermembersof the
representedpopulationdo in fact hold or engage in the relevantformof
cognition,emotion or behavior, or indeed in any shared social form
of cognition,emotion or behavior (whetherthey do in fact constitute
a social group). In otherwords,the term"social group" occurs opaquely
in the characterizationof social formsof cognition,
not transparently
emotion,and behavior.14
Giventhesequalifications,
thosepopulationsthatconstitute
social groups
fromthosepopulationsthatdo not. Populationsthat
may be distinguished
constitute
social groupsare thosepopulationswhosemembersare bound by
sharedsocial formsof cognition,emotion,and behavior.Plausibleexamples
in thisfashionwould includethepopulationsof
of social groupsconstituted
accountants,gays, historians,Gaelic speakers,the Azande, the Mafia,
of Singapore
feminists,
Protestants,
Democrats,thecitizensof thecity-state
(possibly)and of theUnitedKingdom(doubtfully).
Populationsthatconstitute only aggregategroups are those populationswhose membersmerely
sharea commonproperty,
includinga commonformof cognition,emotion
or behavior.Plausibleexamplesof such aggregategroupswould includethe
populationsof personswho have a mole on theirleftshoulder,who were
bornon November22, 1943,who werein theparkyesterday
between3:00pm
and 3:15pm,who employimagesin theirabstractthought,
who are afraidof
spiders,or who walk witha skipin theirstep.'5
This seemsto be the distinctionthatDurkheimwas drivingat whenhe
betweena genuinesocial group,on theone hand,and a "mere
distinguished
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation103
sum of individuals"(Durkheim,1895a, p. 129) on the other,or between
social groupsand what he called "contingentand provisionalaggregates"
thatthisdistinction
between
(Durkheim,1895a,p. 108). It is worthstressing
social groupsand aggregategroupsis not made on the groundsthatsocial
groups constituteemergentsupra-individualswith emergentproperties,
whereasaggregategroups do not, but is made on the groundsthat social
groups are bound by shared social forms of cognition,emotion and
behavior, whereas aggregategroups are not. Thus both the American
PsychologicalAssociation and the population of personswho are afraid
of spidershave propertiesthatnone of the individualsthatcompose them
do: bothcan physicallyoccupysixmajorcityhotelseventhoughno individual memberof these populations can. Yet the American Psychological
Associationis a social groupand thepopulationof personswho are afraid
of spidersis not,because themembersof the formerpopulationare bound
by shared social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorand the latter
are not.
That is, Durkheim provided a reasonable and plausible affirmative
answerto whatmightbe termedthe"horizontal"versionof theontological
dispute between so-called "holists" and individualists":the question of
whethera social group can be said to be distinctfrom a "mere sum
of individuals".16 He maintainedthat a population of individualsthat
constitutea social group differsfrom a population of individualsthat
comprisea "mere sum of individuals",or aggregategroup, by virtueof
thefactthatmembersof theformertypeof populationare bound by shared
social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorwhereasthelatterare not.
Of course,Durkheimis also wellknownforhavingavowed an affirmative
answerto what mightbe termedthe "vertical"versionof the ontological
dispute between so-called "holists" and individualists":the question of
whethera social groupcan be said to exist"over and above" a "meresum
of individuals"."7That question is not addressedin this paper, since it is
doubtfulif it representsa distinctively
social scientificphilosophicalquestion. However, what should be noted is that the Durkheimiananswer
offeredto the "horizontal" versionof the dispute does not dependupon
any prior answerto the "vertical"versionof the dispute.Specifically,the
distinctionbetweensocial groups and aggregategroups does not depend
upon any claim to the effectthatsocial groupsconstituteemergententities
or supra-individuals
whereasaggregategroupsdo not.18
Given the qualificationsabove, social groups may be characterizedas
thosepopulationsconstitutedby sharedsocial formsof cognition,emotion
and behavior. These social groups may be justly regarded as the
fundamentalsocial constituents
of the social world:theyare the elemental
"buildingblocks"fromwhichthewholecomplexfabricofparticularsocieties
are constitutedand historicallyconstructed.These social groups also
deserve to be characterizedas the fundamentalsubject matterof social
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
104 NOUS
science.However,thereis moreto thesocial worldand thesubjectmatterof
social sciencethantheseoriginalsocial groups(and associatedsocial forms
of cognition,emotionand behavior).Many otherphenomenaare characterizedas social derivatively,
by virtueof the relationstheybear to, or the
to
them
relationsborne
by,originalsocial groups.
Perhaps the best way to illustratethe derivativeemploymentof the
term"social" is by notingthat some of the populationsthat are familiar
objects of social scientificstudy,such as the populations of women,the
unemployed,the divorced,the retiredand victimsof AIDS, do not (or do
not obviously) constitutesocial groups bound by any distinctiveset of
shared social formsof cognition,emotion and behavior. However, the
propertiesof being a woman, unemployed,divorced,retiredand a victim
of AIDS (unlike the propertiesshared by persons who happen to have
a mole on theirleftarm,or werein thepark between3:00pm and 3:15pm
yesterday)are representedas socially significantby membersof social
as social derivatively,
groups.Thus, suchaggregategroupsare characterized
by virtueof the relationborne to them by originalsocial groups, who
representthecommonpropertiesof themembersof such aggregategroups
as sociallysignificant.
Of course,many originalsocial groupsare also characterizedas social
derivatively,since membersof social groups such as Protestantsand
Democrats are usually also representedas sharing socially significant
of such groups.However,
properties,by both membersand non-members
social groupsare originalsocial groups:thepropertiesof
not all derivatively
but
beinga womanor unemployed,forexample,maybe sociallysignificant,
thepopulationsofwomenand theunemployeddo not(or do not obviously)
set
constituteoriginalsocial groups(theyare not bound by any distinctive
of sharedsocial formsof cognition,emotionand behavior).19
Derivativelysocial groups are legitimateobjects of social scientific
inquiry,as are the varietyof relationsholdingwithinand betweenoriginal
characterized
as "social
socialgroups,oftengenerically
socialand derivatively
are
relations"or "social structures".Some of theserelationsor structures
whileothersare derivatively
themselves
originalsocial relationsor structures,
social. The relationsbetweenpartnersin a marriage,betweenemployersand
employees,and betweennationsbound by treaty,forexample,are original
social relations,as are the relationsbetweenmembersof originalsocial
groupsthatconstitutethemas originalsocial groups(shared social forms
of cognition,emotion,and behavior),and authorityand power structures
groundedin them(such as the systemsof role relationsrecognizedwithin
are derivatively
familiesand religiousgroups).Otherrelationsand structures
social, includingsome of therelationsbetweenoriginalsocial groups.Thus
social relationssuch as economicinequalities,asymmetric
powerrelations,
or divorceratesare not
employment
geographicaldistance,and differential
originalsocial relations,because theyare not constitutedas relationsof
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation105
economicinequality,asymmetric
powerrelations,geographicaldistanceand
differential
or divorceratesby sociallyheld or engagedforms
employment
of cognition,emotionor behaviorby membersof social groups.
While some formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorare originalsocial
formsof cognition,emotionand behavior,othersare derivativelysocial.
Social behavioris behaviorengaged socially,but behaviormay be characterizedas social derivatively,
by virtueof being directedtoward original
social or derivatively
social groups,or theirmembers,such as policemenor
women. Social cognitionand emotion are cognitionor emotion held or
engaged socially,but cognitionor emotionmay be characterizedas social
derivatively,
byvirtueof beingcognitionor emotiondirectedtowardoriginal
or derivativelysocial groups,or theirmembers,such as Catholics or the
social formsof cognition,emotion
unemployed.Whethersuch derivatively
and behavior are also original social formsof cognition,emotion and
behavior is an empirical matter. Some derivativelysocial aggressive
behaviorsdirectedtowardpolicemenmay also be originalsocial behaviors,
whenengagedbymembersof theProvisionalIRA. Otherderivatively
social
aggressivebehaviorsdirectedtowardpolicemenmaynotbe, as in thecase of
theviolentdrunkventinghis frustrations
on the firsthumanopportunity.
4. Social explanation
The explanatorydisputebetweenso-called"holists" and "individualists"is
generallypresentedin termsof the question of whether,or in what sense,
social explanationsreduceto psychologicalexplanations,to explanationsin
termsof the psychologicalstates and dispositionsof individuals(Lukes,
1968; Rosenberg,1995). However,it oughtto be clearby now thatgiventhe
of phenomenathatmaybe legitimately
characterizedas social,
multivariety
both originallyand derivatively,thereis no reason to expect a unitary
philosophicalanswer to this question. Let us considerjust some of the
possibilities.
Consider first explanations that referenceoriginal social relations
or social structure,groundedin social formsof cognition,emotion and
behavior.These social explanationsdo reduceanalyticallyto psychological
explanations,butnotto individual
psychological
explanations.Theyreduceto
socialpsychologicalexplanations:thatis, to explanationsreferencing
socially
held or engagedformsof cognition,emotionand behavior.
Explanationsof theaggressiveactionsof soccerhooligans(in theUnited
Kingdom)in termsof sociallyacceptednormsof statusachievementtiedto
membershipand positionswithinsocial groups-or gangs-of hooligans
ratesof divorceamong
(Marsh, Rosser,& Harre, 1978),and of differential
Protestantsand Catholics in termsof differences
in sociallyheld attitudes
toward divorceamong Protestantsand Catholics,are social psychological
explanations: they referencesocially held and engaged cognition and
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
106 NOUS
behavior.In contrast,explanationsof humanaltruismin termsof biologicallyinherited"evolutionarystablestrategies"(Dawkins, 1976),and explanations of differentialsuicide rates among men and women due to
of men and
differential
biochemistry
depressionrates(due to the different
women)are individual
psychological
explanations:theyappeal to individually
held and engagedcognitionand behavior(to cognitionand behaviornot
social
orientatedto the cognitionand behaviorof membersof represented
groups).
This appearsto have been Durkheim'sown consideredview,at leastwith
respectto thisformof social (psychological)explanation:
and
I haveneversaid thatsociologycontainsnothingthatis psychological
I fully
it
a
distinct
from
individual
.that
is
but
psychology.
psychology,
accept..,
1895b,p. 244)
(Durkheim,
All thathe seemsto have meantin claiming,forexample,that"statesof the
nature fromthe states of the
collectiveconsciousnessare of a different
individualconsciousness",and that"the mentalityof groupsis not thatof
individuals;it has its own laws" (Durkheim, 1901, p. 40), is that the
thoseformsofcognition,emotion
governing
principlesof social psychology,
of "thewayin whichindividualsassociating
and behaviorthatare a function
togetherare formedin groups" (Durkheim, 1897b, p. 171), are distinct
from,and cannotbe presumedto be equivalentto, theprinciplesof individual psychology,governingthoseformsof cognition,emotionand behavior
thatare not (thatare groundedin biologyor non-sociallearning).That is,
all thatDurkheimseemsto have maintainedis thatthedynamicsof socially
held and engaged formsof cognition,emotion and behavior cannot be
heldand engaged
presumedto be equivalentto thedynamicsof individually
formsof cognition,emotionand behavior.
This was not an unreasonablespeculation.It does not appear obvious,
abouttheefficacy
ofpsychotherapy,
forexample,thatourbeliefsand attitudes
the rightto bear arms,or the moralityof abortionsare solelya function
of the dynamicalprinciplesof our common cognitivearchitecturesqua
human beings,and have nothingto do with our being committedmembers of distinct(and distinctive)social groups,such as the populationsof
professionalpsychologists,Republicans or Catholics. All that Durkheim
seemsto have reasonablycontendedis thatit cannotbe presumedthatthe
dynamics of our belief and attitude formationqua cognitive beings
simpliciterand qua (original) social beings (membersof original social
groups) are equivalent.
Moreover, Durkheim's oft quoted pronouncementto the effectthat
"everytimea social phenomenonis directlyexplainedby a psychological
we mayrestassuredtheexplanationis false"(Durkheim,1895a,
phenomenon,
of
notas a statement
less objectionablewhenit is interpreted
is
much
p. 129)
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation107
a dogma, but as a reasonablepredictionabout theexplanatorypotentialof
the individualistic"associationist"psychologyof his own day. Durkheim
actuallyallowed thatthelaws governingthecombinationand development
of "collectiverepresentations"
mightturnout to be equivalentto thelaws of
individualpsychology,but noted thatuntilan adequate social psychology
was developed,thereweresimplyno groundsforsupposingthis:
So longas someoftheselawsremainundiscovered,
itwillclearlybe impossible
to knowwithcertainty
whether
theydo or do notrepeatthoseof individual
1901,p. 42)
(Durkheim,
psychology.
As he justlycomplained,in his own day, social psychologyamountedto
littlemorethan"a name,withouta definitesubjectmatter,and includingall
sortsof generalities,
diverseand inexact"(Durkheim,1901,p. 42).
Now this account of the distinctionbetweensocial psychologicaland
individualpsychologicalexplanationsuggeststhatmuchof theexplanatory
disputebetweenso-called"holists" and "individualists"is simplya matter
of conflicting
intuitionsabout whethercertainphenomenawill turnout to
have social psychologicalexplanationsor individualpsychologicalexplanations. Yet this is a substantivesocial scientificquestion that cannot be
answeredby referenceto competingintuitionsand supportingarguments,
butis rathera properobjectof empiricalinquiry.It is an open and empirical
question whetheracts of aggression,inflation,differentialsuicide and
divorce rates betweendifferent
social groups,economic domination,and
thelikewillturnout to have social psychologicalexplanationsor individual
psychologicalexplanations.20
Moreover,althoughsome social explanationsreduce to social but not
individual psychologicalexplanations,some social explanations do not
appear to reduceto any formof psychologicalexplanation.Some explanations in termsof derivatively
social relationsor social structure,
such as
explanationsin termsof economic or power relationsbetweendifferent
social groupsthatappeal to differential
accessto water,oil, or raw materials,
do not appear to reduce to any formof psychologicalexplanation,but
appeal to factsthat directlyenable, promoteand constraincertainforms
of behavior.
Of course, many explanationsin termsof derivativelysocial relations
or social structuredo presupposecertainfacts about the psychologyof
individuals.Some explanationsin termsof differential
economicor power
relations presuppose that the actions of individuals are influencedor
constrainedby theirrecognitionof,or failureto recognize,such differential
poweror economicrelations:such explanationspresupposethattheactions
of individualsare influencedor constrainedby theirperceptionof powerlessness,or failureto recognizetheirexploitation.However,thisis onlyto
grantthatsuch factsabout thepsychologyof individualsare theproximate
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
108 NOUS
social economicor
to derivatively
causes of actionsexplainedby reference
powerrelations.It is notto grantthatsocialexplanationsofthesephenomena
in termsof such relationalcauses alwaysreduceto psychologicalcauses, in
with
theusual sensethatsuchrelationalcauses can be analyticallyidentified
psychologicalcauses,and in thefashionthatoriginalsocial relationalcauses
withsocial psychologicalcauses, althoughnot
can be analyticallyidentified
withindividualpsychologicalcauses.
Considerthefollowingquestion.Whydo people in the SouthernUnited
Statestake farfewerprecautionsthanpeople in theNorthernUnitedStates
whentornadowarningsare broadcast?Theremightbe social psychological
reasons for this,or course, but it mightalso be the case that,given the
higherincidenceof tornadoesin the South as opposed to the North,and
thus more frequentexperienceof theirwanton destruction,many SouththanNorthcome to believe(and moreSoutherners
ernershave individually
in
erners)that takingprecautionsis futile.This explanationof differences
theirbehaviorwould referencea distal cause of the individuallyengaged
responsiblefortheirbehavior.21
psychologicalstatesimmediately
On the otherhand, some social explanationsin termsof derivatively
social relationsor structuresdo analyticallyreduce to individualpsychologicalexplanations.Whydo theprofessionalconventionsof theAmerican
PsychologicalAssociation have much betterchild-carefacilitiesthan the
professionalconventionsof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation?One
possibleansweris as follows:thereis a muchhigherratioof womento men
in the American PsychologicalAssociation (around 48:52) than in the
AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation (around 22:78). The explanationof
in child-careprovisionmightsimplybe that thereare more
differences
womenin the AmericanPsychologicalAssociation,who consequentlycan
enforcetheirdesireforchildcare,a desirethatmayverywellbe individually
ratherthansociallygrounded(a productof non-sociallearningor biology).
If this were the case, then the derivativelysocial relationalor structural
explanation would analyticallyreduce to an individual psychological
explanation.
Ironically,some of Durkheim'sown favoredexamplesof "social facts",
such as the statisticalfactscited in Suicide (Durkheim,1897a), may be of
in the suicideratesformen and women(or theold
thisnature.Differences
and young)may be bestexplainedin termsof individuallyengagedpsychological states:more womenthanmen (or more youngthan old) may have
or may have become
higher ratios of predisposingneurotransmitters,
forms
of
non-social
to
suicide
learning.
through
disposed
All of theseexamplesare of courseentirelyspeculativeand employedfor
illustrativepurposes only. Furthermore,they may not exhaust all the
the fundamentalpoint that
However,thatmerelyreinforces
possibilities.22
whetheror not a social explanationreducesto a psychologicalexplanation,
and if it does, whetherit reducesto a social psychologicalor individual
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SocialFacts,SocialGroupsandSocialExplanation109
question,
psychologicalexplanation,is alwaysa substantivesocial scientific
to be determinedby empiricalinquiry.There is simplyno unitaryphilosophicalanswerto thisquestion.23
Notes
1Thanks to Chong Kim Chong, JulietFloyd, Margaret Gilbert,Rom Harr6,Michael
Levin, Joe Margolis, Tuan Nuyen, Dave Shein, Charlie Smith, Chin Liew Ten, and
audiences at City College of New York, CUNY Graduate School, Southern Society of
Philosophyand Psychology,APA WesternDivision, the National Universityof Singapore,
and the Universityof North Carolina at Greensboro for theircriticalresponses to earlier
versionsof this paper.
2 1 believe thatthisDurkheimianaccount was also Durkheim'sown account, although
I don't argue the historicalcase in any detail in this paper. The adequacy of the account
offeredis independentof the historicalquestion.
3There have been some useful recentphilosophical treatmentsof social phenomena,
such as Gilbert(1989), Searle (1990, 1995) and Tuomela (1995; Tuomela and Miller, 1988);
but these have tended to focus on contemporaryissues in analyticphilosophyof mind and
action, and social and political philosophy,ratherthan on traditionalissues of ontology
and explanation in social science (none of thisworkis cited or discussed in the Martin and
McIntyre, Kincaid or Rosenberg volumes, for example). For this reason I have not
betweenmy own account and the accounts offered
explored the similaritiesand differences
by Gilbert,Searle and Tuomela, althoughI hope to do so in a separate paper. The primary
differencelies in the fact that Gilbert,Searle and Tuomela delineate social phenomena in
termsof the distinctivecontentsof certain beliefs,attitudes and intentions(which supposedlyreferencea collective"we" ratherthan an individual"I"), whereasmyown account
delineatessocial phenomenaprimarilyin termsof the mannerin whichformsof cognition,
emotionand behaviorare held and engaged,independently
of theircontents.See Section2.
4Durkheim also cited "generality" as a common propertyof social phenomena,
but denied thatit is a "distinctivecharacteristic",since he recognizedthatmostpsychological and biological phenomena (such as reasoning and thirst) also have this property
(Durkheim, 1895a, p. 55).
5 The referenceto "other" formsof thinking,feelingand acting is designed to cover
instances of cooperative, competitive and combative forms of thought, feeling, and
behavior: whereI push (only) when you pull, whereI return(only) when you serve,where
I fightyou (only) when you insultme, and so forth.
6This definitionrequires some qualification, but sufficesfor the purposes of this
section. The most significantqualificationsare made in the followingsection.
7 For thisexample, see Festinger,Riecken, & Schachter(1956).
8It is perhaps worth stressingat this point that the various examples of social
cognition,emotion and behaviorcited in this paper are employedforillustrativepurposes
only. Whetheror not any particularcognition,emotionor behavioris a social or individual
cognition, emotion, or behavior is a matter that can only be determinedby empirical
research:the examples employedare selected simplyfor theirprimafacie plausibility.
9 For this
reason, fashion representsperhaps the purest-if also perhaps the least
noble-form of socially held or engaged cognition,emotionand behavior. Certain fashion
items (e.g. rings throughthe nose) are worn for no reason other than the fact that other
membersof a social group are representedas wearingthem.
10 Max
Weber, oftenrepresentedas Durkheim's "individualist" nemesis,also insisted
upon this distinction.See Weber (1922, pp. 22-24).
' The solitarygolferexample comes fromLa Piere (1938, p. 8).
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
110
NOUS
12That is, the "orientation" of social action may be read as oriented toward the
behavior of others membersof a social group, ratherthan oriented toward the person
(or persons) to whom an action is (interpersonally)directed.While textualsupportcan be
found for both readings,it is only on the formerreading that Weber's claim that social
collectivitiessuch as states,familiesor armycorps are nothingbut sequences of "actual or
possible social actions by individualpersons" (Weber, 1922, p. 14) is remotelyplausible, as
MargaretGilbertastutelynotes (see her discussion of the "mushroom-pickers"in Gilbert,
1989, pp. 36-41).
13Whether or not the populations of disabled persons, or African-Americansor
women,do in facthold or engage in shared formsof social cognition,emotionor behavior
is of course an empiricalquestion. These examples are employedfor illustrativepurposes
only,since it seems doubtful(to the author at least) if any of thesepopulations are bound
by shared social forms of cognition, emotion and behavior. This question is quite
independent of the question about the degree of empathy that disabled persons, or
African-Americansor women, feel for other disabled persons, or African-Americans
or women.
14It is also worthnotingthatsocial formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorneed not
be restrictedto formsof cognition,emotion and behavior oriented to social groups of
whichthe individualis an actual member.Thus aspiringrecruitsmay adopt certainbeliefs
or attitudessocially by referenceto social groups (e.g. combat groups) of which theyare
not (or not yet) accepted members(Stoufferetal., 1949). The term"referencegroup" was
introducedin social psychologyearly on to designate those representedsocial groups to
whichindividualsorienttheircognition,emotion and behavior,independentlyof whether
theyare actual or potentialmembersof therelevantsocial group (Hyman, 1942). Of course
in practicemost social formsof cognition,emotionand behaviorare orientedtowardsocial
groups of whichindividualsare members.A person's referencegroupsare thususually,but
not invariably,equivalent to theirmembershipgroups.
5 The distinctioncorresponds to the manner in which social groups are sometimes
delineated withinsocial science. Thus Theodore Newcomb, for example, maintainedthat
shared normsdistinguishmembersof social groups "froma numberof persons at a street
intersectionat a given moment,and also froma mere category,such as all males in the
State of Oklahoma between the ages of 21 and 25" (Newcomb, 1951, p. 38). Compare
Solomon Asch's distinctionbetweena genuinesocial group and a mereclass or collection
of individualswithcommonproperties,such as "persons who are fiveyearsold or theclass
of divorcedpersons" (1952, p. 260). See also Bar-Tal (1990, p. 41).
16 There is also an
explanatoryversionof this dispute,whichwill be discussed in the
final section of the paper. It should be noted that these "horizontal" and "vertical"
fromthe "horizontal" and "vertical"
versionsof the ontological disputeare quite different
questions of social ontologydiscussed by Jacksonand Pettit(1992) and Pettit(1995).
17It may be questioned whether Durkheim really was committed to the supraindividualityof social entities,but the historicalcase is not developed in his paper.
18As noted earlier,both social groups and aggregategroups may properlybe said to
have propertiesthat the individualswho compose themdo not, and any generalmereological theoryof how wholes relate to theirparts will have to deal withboth social groups
and aggregategroups. David Copp, for example, maintains that both social groups and
aggregategroups are "mereological sums of collective states linked by a unityrelation"
(1984, p. 265).
19Of course, the partiesto conventionsabout the social significanceof being a woman
conventionsabout the social significanceof
or unemployedmay be parties to different
being a woman or unemployed,by virtueof theirmembershipof differentsocial groups:
the social significanceof being a woman may be contested by psychologists,biologists,
feminists,Marxists,and Catholics, forexample.
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Social Facts, Social Groupsand Social Explanation 111
20It mightbe objected that this attemptto cast the dispute as an empiricalmatteris
already to give up the game to the individualist.Avowed individualistssuch as Jon Elser
(1989), forexample, mightcelebrate the fact that afterall, social (psychological) explanation turns out to be just a form of psychological explanation, so is not explanatorily
autonomous with respectto the psychologyof individuals. Yet although social psychological explanation is a form of psychological explanation, and although some social
phenomena may require both a social psychological and an individual psychological
explanation, social psychological explanations are logically autonomous with respect to
individual psychological explanations. The beliefs and behaviors of some individuals or
groups of individuals may be best explained exclusivelyby referenceto either social
psychological or individual psychological factors: some of the beliefs and behaviors of
individual Catholics or the population of Catholics may be explained solely in termsof
social psychological factors,and othersexplained solely in termsof individual psychological factors.
21 In actual fact it is doubtful if this is the best explanation (see Sims & Baumann,
1972), but this hypotheticalexample is employedfor illustrativepurposes only.
22I leave it open as to whethertheydo, although social and individual psychological
causes, distal causes, and directlyenabling,promotingand constrainingnon-psychological
causes appear to exhaust the possibilities. In particular, I leave open the question of
whether"functional" explanations, still popular in sociology and anthropology,reduce
to one or otherof theseformsof explanation,or representa distinctiveformof explanation
(or no formof explanation at all).
23It is also worth noting that particular instances of social explanation may not
reduce to any unitarysocial psychological,individual psychological,distal causal or nonpsychological explanation. For example, the best explanation of the differentiallevel of
precautionstaken by Northernersand Southernersduringtornado alertsmay be that it is
partly a functionof theirdifferentpsychological historiesin differentphysical environments,but also partlya functionof the socially held beliefsand attitudesof the different
typesof religiouscommunitiesof which theytend to be members.Part of the reason why
there are better child care facilitiesat the conventions of the American Psychological
Association than the American Philosophical Association may be because of the greater
numberof women who are individuallycommittedto the provision of child care (because
of their individuallyengaged needs), but it may also be in part because of the greater
number of feminists(or higherratio of feministsamong women psychologists)who are
socially committedto the provisionof child care.
References
Asch, M. (1952) Social Psychology.Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Bar-Tal, D. (1990) GroupBeliefs. New York: Springer.
and legal theory".Dialogue, 23,
Copp, D. (1984) "What collectivesare: agency,individualism
249-269.
Dawkins, R. (1976) The SelfishGene. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Durkheim,E. (1895a) The Rules of Sociological Method,in StevenLukes (ed.), W. D. Halls
(Trans.), Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on
Sociology. New York: Macmillan (1982).
Durkheim, E . (1895b) "The psychological characterof social facts and theirreality". In
Lukes and Halls, op. cit.
Durkheim,t. (1897a) Suicide. J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson (Trans). New York: Free
Press (1951).
Durkheim, E. (1897b) Review of A. Labriola, Essays on the Materialist Conceptionof
History.Revue Philosophique.
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
112 NOUS
Durkheim,E . (1901) Preface to the Second Edition of The Rules of Sociological Method.
In Lukes and Halls, op. cit.
Festinger,L., Riecken,H. W., and Schachter,S. (1956) WhenProphecyFails. Minneapolis:
Universityof Minnesota Press.
Elster,J. (1989) Nuts and Boltsfor theSocial Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Fay, B., and Moon, J. D. (1994) "What would an adequate philosophy of social science
look like?" in M. Martin and L. McIntyre(eds.), Readings in the Philosophyof
Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gilbert,M. (1989) On Social Facts. London: Routledge.
Hyman, H. (1942) "The psychologyof status". Archivesof Psychology,No. 269.
Jackson,F., and Pettit,P. (1992) "Structuralexplanation in social theory".In D. Charles
and K. Lennon (eds.), Reductionismand Anti-Reductionism.Oxford: Oxford
UniversityPress.
James,W. (1890) The Principlesof Psychology.New York: Holt.
Kincaid, H. (1996) Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences. Cambridge:
Cambridge UniversityPress.
La Piere, R. T. (1938) CollectiveBehavior.New York: McGraw-Hill.
reconsidered".BritishJournalof Sociology,
Lukes, S. (1968) "Methodologicalindividualism
19, 119-129.
Marsh, P., Rosser, E., and Harre, R. (1978) The Rules ofDisorder.London: Routledgeand
Kegan Paul.
Machlup, F. (1994) "Are the social sciencesreallyinferior?"In M. Martinand L. McIntyre
(eds.), Readings in thePhilosophyof Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Martin, M., and McIntyre,L. (eds.) (1994) Readings in the Philosophyof Social Science.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Newcomb, T. M. (1951) "Social psychological theory:integratingindividual and social
approaches". In J. M. Rohrer and M. Sherif (eds.), Social Psychologyat the
Crossroads.New York: Harper.
Pettit,P. (1995) The CommonMind. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
Rosenberg,A. (1995) Philosophyof Social Science. (2nd ed.) Boulder, CO: WestviewPress.
Schanck, R. L. (1932) "A studyof a communityand its groups and institutionsconceived
as behaviors of individuals". PsychologicalMonographs,43. No. 195.
Searle, J. (1990) "Collective intentions and actions". In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and
M. E. Pollack (eds.), Intentionsin Communication.Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford
Books, MIT Press.
Searle, J. (1995) The Constructionof Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Simmel,G. (1908) "How is societypossible?"In K. H. Wolff(ed.), GeorgSimmel,1858-1918.
ColumbusOhio: Ohio State
A CollectionofEssays,withTranslations
anda Bibliography.
Press(1959).
University
Sims, J. H., and Baumann, D. D. (1972) "The tornado threat:coping stylesof the North
and South". Science, 17, 1382-1386.
Stouffer,S. A., Suchman, E. A., De Vinney,L. C., Star, S. A., and Williams Jr.,R. B.
(1949) The American Soldier.: AdjustmentDuring ArmyLife (Studies in Social
Psychologyin World War II, Vol. 1). Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Tarde, G. (1890) Les Lois De L'Imitation. Paris: Alcan. Translated E. C. Parsons, The
Laws of Imitation.New York: Holt (1903).
Tuomela, R. (1995) The Importanceof Us. Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress.
Tuomela, R., and Miller, K. (1988) "'We' intentions".PhilosophicalStudies,53, 367-389.
Weber, M. (1922) Economyand Society. (2 vols.) G. Roth and C. Wittich(eds.). Berkeley:
Universityof California Press (1978).
This content downloaded from 198.11.25.44 on Sun, 12 Jan 2014 12:45:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions