Activism or Slacktivism? The Role of Social Media in Effecting Social Change
A Research Paper
in STS 4600
presented to the faculty of the
School of Engineering and Applied Science
University of Virginia
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science
by
Christopher Jones
March 3, 2013
On my honor as a University student, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this
assignment as defined by the Honor Guidelines for Thesis-Related Assignments.
signed: __________________________________________
date: ________________
approved: ________________________________________ date: ________________
Kent Wayland, Science, Technology and Society Program,
Department of Engineering and Society
INTRODUCTION: ACTIVISM VS. SLACKTIVISM
Both Facebook, which now has more than one billion active users, and Twitter, with 500
million users, have become major hubs of American online activity (Zuckerberg 2012; Dugan,
2012). Some have claimed that this proliferation of social networks has lowered many of the
barriers to civic involvement and has increased individuals’ political efficacy (Mukherjee, 2010;
Flanagin et al, 2010). Although civic engagement takes many forms, its proponents have flocked
to social networking websites like Facebook and Twitter. Activists and organizers seek to
maximize their impact, and the internet provides one such avenue. Modern activist organizations
find the prospect of online activism promising and have begun to spend significant money and
resources on social media. These organizations have limited supplies, so they must decide
whether to focus on social media: at best, investment in online activity could bring in whole new
sets of committed activists, and at worst it can distract resources that could otherwise be effective
through traditional means. To make this decision, they must answer the question, “What is the
role of social media in effecting social change?”
Activists are people and organizations that work to promote social or political changes,
and the internet is one of many outlets for their work. As summarized by the now-cliché mantra
“the internet makes everyone a publisher,” the internet has lowered the barriers to contentcreation and content dissemination. Modern web technology lowers the barriers to civic
engagement through technologies like listservs, social networking tools, and website creation
(Kutner, 2000). Today citizen journalists document natural disasters faster than traditional media,
presidential debates are moderated by YouTube.com users, lenders on Kiva.org can make
personal loans to artisans in developing nations, and activists can gain support through epetitions on Change.org. Social media has also expanded activism to new demographics such as
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the elderly or disabled (Mukherjee, 2010), and given voices to those in countries that have
restrictive expression laws. Social networks are also effective methods for harnessing the power
of these and other new volunteers and recruiting them to existing movements (Gonzalez-Bailon
et al, 2011).
To skeptics of online political activity, “slacktivism” describes the replacement of
effective real-world activism with ineffective online activism (Christensen, 2011). Although
online civic activity is prolific, its impacts are disputed. Borge, Cardenal, and Malipica
concluded that “skilled internet users do not need to be motivated or interested in politics in
order to participate in at least one online political activity” (2012). While some (such as those
that support the “Kony 2012” campaign) claim that these trends have effectively mobilized
advocates of social change, others note that online social and political activity often fails to
achieve real-world change (Conroy et al, 2012). Critics of social media argue that “on Twitter
success is a re-Tweet instead of taking real action. Something we all need to guard against is
making sure it doesn't stop real action" (Kavner, 2012).
To understand the real-world impacts of online activity, this paper will examine three
high-profile cases of activist groups that committed themselves to social media with varying
degrees of success. The first case, the Iranian “Green” Revolution of 2009, was dubbed “The
Twitter Revolution” because of its successful use of Twitter to organize rallies, recruit protesters,
and disseminate information around the world. The second case is Kony 2012, an attempt by the
nonprofit Invisible Children to harness the power of social media that resulted in mixed success.
Finally, Occupy Sandy, an offshoot of the Occupy Wall Street movement, harnessed the power
of Social Media to aid disaster recovery in New York and New Jersey following Hurricane
Sandy in the Summer of 2012. Each of these cases demonstrates the impacts of online activism
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in a different part of the world, but by examining their successes and failures, future activist
organizations can learn how best to harness the power of social networks to promote real-world
social change.
CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF TWITTER IN THE 2009 IRANIAN REVOLUTION
Following a corrupt election in the summer of 2009, Iranian protestors took to the streets
to express their discontent with their government. Although the protests were peaceful, their
strategies varied dramatically from hacking the government’s websites to parades and
demonstrations. The government used force against the protestors on several occasions, killing at
least 72 citizens (AFP, 2009). The seven-month revolution was not successful in deposing
President Ahmadinejad, but it did succeed in gaining international attention and support. This
revolution spurred the larger “Green Movement” which fought to promote transparent elections
in Iran.
The Effects of Social Media
Throughout the Iranian Revolution, protests were organized, information disseminated,
and hacks were coordinated through Twitter. Iranians used Twitter to share pictures and videos
of human rights abuse, and supporters from around the world used Twitter to show support for
the protests. The publicity that came with internal and external communications between
revolutionaries is credited with inspiring other successful revolutions such as those in Tunisia
and Egypt during the Arab Spring (Shirky, 2010). The role of Twitter was so widely accepted
that Twitter announced special efforts to maintain connectivity in Iran and the US State
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Department publically encouraged Twitter to delay an upgrade that would disrupt
communication during Iranian protests (Pleming, 2009).
One major event in the protests was the death of 26 year old Neda Agha-Soltan, a
university student protestor who was shot in the chest on June 20, 2009 at a protest in Tehran.
Her violent death was recorded by three different people on camera phones and published on the
internet (deathtokhamenei, 2009). The video was disseminated around the world through social
networking websites. Neda, a Persian word meaning “voice” became a rallying cry for
protestors, and was referred to as “The Voice of Iran.” The Twitter hashtag #Neda became the
most-used hashtag on all of Twitter on the day of her death. One representative example of the
thousands of tweets referencing Neda said, “RIP NEDA, The World cries seeing your last breath,
you didn't die in vain. We remember you” (Slunecny, 2009).
Limitations of Social Media
Twitter is distributed both through the internet and SMS, so throughout the conflict, the
Iranian government responded by attempting to block cellular signals and network traffic
throughout the country. Exploiting this vulnerability did hinder communication and organization
temporarily (Washington Times, 2009). After the dust settled from the Iranian Revolution,
studies showed that a majority of the Iran-related Twitter traffic during the revolution was from
America and European countries instead of from Iran (Gaffney, 2010). Skeptics used this
evidence to argue that the role of Twitter and other social networking platforms in the revolution
was overblown.
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Conclusion
Twitter in the Iran revolution achieved two important goals – organizing protestors in a
rapidly-changing local movement and soliciting support from around the world. Gaffney’s
analysis of Twitter traffic assumes that Twitter traffic from outside Iran was not useful because it
could not have helped with the first goal, but it had a huge effect on the second goal. The impacts
of support from outside Iran varied from encouraging protestors (seeing Tweets from all over the
world validated protestors’ efforts) to encouraging political pressure from other governments
such as the diplomatic support provided by the US Department of State. Although the 2009
Iranian protestors were not successful at overthrowing their government, the social networking
platform Twitter was vital to their internal organization and helped solicit support from around
the world. The fact that much of the Iran-related Twitter traffic was from outside Iran shows the
strong role of social networks in documenting and disseminating human rights abuses around the
world and the power of social networks to allow supporters and revolutionaries to interact from
thousands of miles away (Batty, 2011).
CASE STUDY: THE RISE AND FALL OF KONY 2012
“Kony 2012,” is a video that was widely circulated online in March 2012. This 30minute video produced by the nonprofit Invisible Children Inc exposes Joseph Kony, the leader
of the Ugandan guerilla warfare group the Lord’s Resistance Army for a series of war cimes
including the use of abducted child soldiers (Kony, 2012). It used music from popular artists,
captivating stories, and interviews with LRA victims to motivate viewers while increasing
awareness of the cause, of Invisible Children’s history of political movements, and calls to
action. The video included a proposal for a public campaign called “Cover the Night” on April
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20, 2012. Despite the fact that 3.5 million people pledged online to support the “Cover the
Night” campaign, it failed due to low turnout (Carroll, 2012). The Invisible Children Foundation
was well-known before the video and has continued to have significant success since, including a
United States Senate Armed Services Committee bill in 2012 that pledged $50 Million to support
the campaign against Joseph Kony (Browdie, 2012).
The Effects of Social Media
Kony 2012’s success hinged on its ability to persuade the video’s viewers that the situation in
Uganda was important and accessible, and that their own actions could have real impacts on the
lives of people in Uganda.
[Kony 2012] appealed to the growing sense of connectedness between human beings that
was first made possible by the Internet. It tapped into the common empathy of a group of
people all focused on one screen, impelling them to move beyond the solitude of sitting at
their computers towards telling everyone they know, and donating… [Online activism] is
a new and powerful type of activism, all the more so because it combines the efforts of
millions of people (Bailyn, 2012).
Kony 2012 became the most rapidly-spread video in the history of the internet after
receiving 100 million views in its first six days, largely due to its spread through social media
networks like Facebook and Twitter (Visible Measures, 2012). Because of its unprecedented
success at raising awareness and generating publicity, Kony 2012 was viewed by many as proof
of the effectiveness of online activism, and a precedent for all future social and political
campaigns (Keeter, 2012).
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Limitations of Social Media
Shortly after the peak of Kony 2012’s online success, social networks were saturated with
negative coverage of both the Invisible Children Foundation and the implications of the video.
Discussion of these events and criticisms spread through social media just as quickly as the video
itself did and hindered the turnout to the cover the night campaign. Invisible Children used the
video to encourage donations and sell “Kony 2012 Action Kits” which included t-shirts, stickers,
and wristbands, but critics attacked Invisible Children for spending only 35% of its budget on
projects in Africa (Dorell, 2012). Others accused the video of over-generalization, dramatization,
and disregard for the conflicts in surrounding countries (Edmondson, 2012). The government and
citizens of Uganda also spoke out against the video. One showing of the video in a northernUganda village impacted by the Lord’s Resistance Army ended when rocks were thrown at the
screen by “angry and offended” Ugandans who felt that the film mischaracterized the situation
(Webb 2012). This negative press led Kony 2012’s supporters to feel misled by the video, which
was a major cause of the failed “Cover The Night” event that the video sought to promote.
Conclusion
The Invisible Children Foundation used the Kony 2012 video to reach a level of
awareness and outreach that would never have been possible without social media. Its success
was largely driven by its ability to convince viewers that their support could bring real-world
impacts. Although critics argue that the failure of the “Cover the Night” campaign was indicative
of the failures of online activism, those results can be attributed to the negative press surrounding
Invisible Children foundation in the days leading up to the campaign. Although it is easy to
dismiss Kony 2012 as a failed attempt at online activism, all of its shortcomings can be
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explained by attributed failures of its sponsoring organization and not of its online participants.
This is consistent with the general rule that the most successful examples of online activism all
exist to augment successful off-line campaigns. In the case of Kony 2012, the success of the
online campaign was inhibited by the failures of its real-world sponsoring organization.
CASE STUDY: SOCIAL MEDIA DRIVEN DISASTER RESPONSE
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey and caused severe
damage across the eastern United States. This severe damage was concentrated in New York and
New Jersey, where homes and transportation infrastructure were damaged and power was lost. In
the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the destruction was too wide-spread for standard
Aid organizations like the American Red Cross or FEMA to handle, so activists took it upon
themselves to provide their own emergency aid through an informal online movement called
“Occupy Sandy.” An offshoot of Occupy Wall Street, it set up ad-hoc feeding and supply
stations in New York and New Jersey neighborhoods. The organization has received more than
$700,000 in donations (NY State Office of the Attorney General, 2012) and has had significant
impacts on New York disaster recovery (Feuer, 2012).
The Effects of Social Media
Through thousands of tweets with messages like, “CALL TO ACTION: Red Cross is
delivering pallets of supplies to the GB Cares Site on Gerritsen Avenue. Please come...” (GB
Sandy Relief, 2012), Occupy Sandy was created, promoted, organized, and advertised through
social networking sites. When a location with a large need was identified, volunteers with
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necessary resources (such as extra food, a car with gas, or free time) would meet at a specified
location and start providing help (Hempel, 2012). The real-time broadcasting abilities of social
media platforms meant that Occupy Sandy was able to launch small-scale targeted relief efforts
very quickly, which more closely meets disaster-relief needs than traditional relief groups like
the Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Kavner, 2012). Occupy Sandy
volunteers set up a “wedding registry” through Amazon.com where supporters who may not be
geographically close to those in need can contribute resources and supplies as they are needed.
This registry “include[s] fleece blankets, coolers, extension cords, flashlights, trash bags, diapers,
and even clothing items like socks and underwear,” and all of the donations are sent to the
church building that is acting as the makeshift headquarters for the Occupy Sandy organizers
(Duerson, 2012).
Occupy Sandy was able to rely on the distributed infrastructure and thousands of
supporters that were earned by its supporting organization, Occupy Wall Street. Occupy Wall
Street used social media to rally supporters to its many massive protests, and to solicit support
and communicate successes to supporters and to similar organizations throughout the world.
Occupy Sandy relied on this infrastructure built by Occupy Wall Street, and its usage of social
media allowed it to broadcast relevant messages quickly and to attract new volunteers. Occupy
Sandy also mastered the call-to-action; each of its messages indicated exactly what interested
volunteers could do to help.
Limitations of Social Media
Because Occupy Sandy had no structural hierarchy, it struggled to meet some of the
functions that are expected of traditional nonprofit organizations. Occupy Sandy has struggled to
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keep track of donors’ statements about where they want their money to go and has failed to
identify how it will spend much of its unallocated funds (Neuhauser, 2013). This lack of
organization has led to criticism from traditional relief organizations like the Red Cross and the
Federal Emergency Relief Agency.
Conclusion
Occupy Sandy has harnessed the power of social networks to identify needs and
appropriate responses to real-time problems in a massive natural disaster. Its success at using the
internet to recruit volunteers has demonstrated that online participation can translate to realworld activity, and its donation record has proven that donors trust entirely volunteer-based
social networking initiatives. As the guinea pig for online social media driven disaster relief,
Occupy Sandy is not perfect, but it is effectively proving the potential of online activism to
evoke real-world social progress.
CONCLUSION
Each of the case studies presented in this paper demonstrates the role of social media in a
major social movement. Although their success varied significantly (Kony 2012 experienced
extreme short-term success followed by ultimate long-term failure, while Occupy Sandy rapidly
established a successful donation and distribution network), they each demonstrate the ability of
the internet to revolutionize offline social and political action in a way that was never possible
before. Invisible Children harnessed the power of the Internet to spread their message across the
world faster than any message has ever travelled, while Occupy Sandy and the Iranian
Revolutionaries uses their social networks to organize local, real-time responses to rapidly10
changing local environments and to orchestrate valuable support from concerned citizens all over
the world.
Future social movements seeking to harness the power of social media can learn a lot
from the lessons learned in each of these case studies. Together, those lessons provide a minimal
set of requirements for a successful online activism movement. The most important of these rules
is that successful online activism campaigns exist to augment successful offline campaigns. In
many cases, this means that the online campaign must grow after the offline campaign becomes
successful, like Occupy Sandy growing out of the success of Occupy Wall Street or Kony 2012
growing out of the success of Invisible Children. This is not always the case; the social media
campaign in the 2009 Iranian revolution developed alongside the offline protests. Kony 2012
also showed that the success of the online campaign can be jeopardized by falling support for the
offline campaign – as Invisible Children’s reputation fell, so too did the success of its online
campaign.
Each of the campaigns presented in this paper also included concrete, real-world calls-toaction. This aspect is necessary to successful online campaigns and defines the difference
between online activism and “slacktivism.” In the Iranian revolution, the online activity centered
on the rallies and protests that made up the revolution. For Occupy Sandy, each Tweet or
Facebook message included a specific call to action. Some of Kony 2012’s failures can be
attributed to its calls to action which included the “Cover The Night” campaign that took place
more than a month after the peak of the video’s popularity and the purchase of “Kony Action
Kits” that fuelled criticism about Invisible Children’s use of donation money.
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Although there are many challenges and shortcomings associated with online political
engagement, the internet provides a valuable platform for awareness programs that can promote
offline activity to make real-world change in unique ways that are not possible through
traditional means.
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