Beveridge and the Election of 1912:
Progressive Idealist or Political Realist
James R. Parker*
In 1912 the Republican party was in serious trouble both
on the national level and in such key states as Indiana. The
difficulty was rooted in the growing insurgency within its
ranks. Some of its most important leaders were dissatisfied
with the party leadership and particularly with President
William Howard Taft. The conflict became so acute that
before the end of the year it split the Republican party into
two organizations, the regular Republicans and the new Progressive party. Each offered a slate of candidates and a
platf o m .
One of the significant converts to the Progressive party
caught up in the turmoil was former Republican Senator
Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana. Beveridge had become a
United States Senator in 1899, won re-election in 1904, but
in 1910 experienced defeat a t the polls. In that year Beveridge
found that he could not control his own party organization.
The national GOP organization gave him little support and
conservative administration supporters of Indiana, the party
“regulars” intrigued against him, eroding intraparty cooperation.
By 1912 it appeared that Beveridge’s political career was
a t a crossroads. The Republican nominating convention again
chose Taft as its presidential candidate and endorsed conservatism. Former president Theodore Roosevelt, who had
become disillusioned with Taft’s policies, bolted the Republicans and formed the Progressive party. Roosevelt became
the new party’s presidential nominee and the Republican
split was complete. Beveridge now faced the alternative of
either leaving the Republican party or abandoning his political
future with the increasingly progressive-minded Indiana
electorate. Theodore Roosevelt’s new party afforded a possible solution. Thus, the former senator seized upon the opportunity to promote various reform ideas and thereby salvage
and advance his political career. Beveridge’s need to keep
*James R. Parker is a graduate assistant at the University of
Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
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Indiana Magazine of History
pace with his constituency for purposes of political survival
seemingly was as much responsible for his bolt to the Progressive party as his professed motives of personal friendship
or idealistic convictions.l
The Democratic party with Woodrow Wilson, the governor of New Jersey, as its presidential candidate took advantage of the Republican split and rode the reform wave
to victory. The Progressives never recovered from their
defeat and in 1916 Beveridge returned to the Republicans,
thus ending a short and futile chapter in his political career.
Beveridge’s difficulties with his Republican colleagues
began in 1904. In both the state and national organizations
these conflicts destroyed political cooperation and opened a
breach between Beveridge and Taft’s administration.2 These
differences centered on federal patronage and on the Hoosier’s
tendency to align himself with the Senate insurgents who
opposed such legislation as the Payne-Aldrich Tariff .s Beveridge’s commitment to Theodore Roosevelt, due to their
similar political philosophies and bond of personal friendship,
also damaged the senator’s political relationship with Taft.
These issues contributed to Beveridge’s defeat in November,
1910. His memory of the bitter conflict during the campaign
tended to make the senator more critical of his party and
promoted a n inclination to doubt his future in it.
Beveridge encountered his first major problem in Indiana
in 1910. He met the wrath of the administration when he
opposed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Taft had promised a
lower tariff, but when it emerged the rates were higher than
Beveridge honestly could support. He stated that “he had
never seen anything to compare with the popular hatred of
this tariff bill.”* His constituents encouraged his support
of a more scientific, non-partisan method of tariff making.
1 In Beveridge and the Progressive Era (Cambridge, Mass., 1932),
421-23, Claude Bowers assesses and ascribes the motives in Albert J.
Beveridge’s decision to join the Progressive party. Bowers stresses
the senator’s idealistic professions and ties of personal friendship in
that decision. He states that Beveridge chose his course reluctantly and
in order to create the ideal of a truly liberal national political party.
The reader is left with Bower’s acceptance of Beveridge’s idealism as
a primary motivation for his decision.
ZIbid., 258, 259, 283, 284.
8 Ibid., 296.
4Beveridge to Amos Pinchot, March 24, 1910, Beveridge Papers
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
Beveridge and t h e Election of 1912
106
Thus, the senator believed he could not straddle the tariff
issue for it might cost him his re-election.6
Beveridge worked for a resolution condemning the PayneAldrich Tariff at the Indiana Republican State Convention.
Anything less than condemnation would indicate a lack of
unity and support for the senator. He knew that the regular
wing of the party, the Taft supporters, would oppose such
a resolution and he feared their success because of their
close connections to powerful “interests” with a “good deal
of money.”6 Moreover, he thought his enemies would even
try to secure an endorsement of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff
in the state platform.’
When the Republican state convention met in April, 1910,
Beveridge delivered a speech in which he condemned the
stand-pat element of the party for allegedly destroying the
essence of his proposed non-partisan tariff commission. The
senator went further in attacking the Payne-Aldrich Tariff
as an unjust measure.8 In assailing administration legislation
and the regular members of the party, Beveridge carried
the convention in the battle against the pro-Payne-Aldrich
forces, but he opened a political breach for himself that would
never entirely heal. The “Old Guard” in the party would
remember its defeat.
After his success in gaining a rejection of the tariff act
at the state convention Beveridge experienced defeat and
embarrassment. The party leaders of each of Indiana’s
thirteen districts met separately in March to consider an
endorsement of the state platform. Under the influence of
party regulars, three of the thirteen districts endorsed the
tariff act rather than the state platform’s resolution condemning it.8
Within the GOP nationally, the senator’s insurgency on
the tariff made him unpopular with Taft. The President
sought advice on Indiana affairs from Beveridge much less
frequently than previously.1° The Hoosier blamed this diminBeveridge to Edwin Lee, March 24, 1910, ibid.
Beveridge to Albert Shaw, March 9, 1910, ibid.
7Beveridge to John C. Shaffer, March 10, 1910, ibid.
*Beveridge, Platform Speech, Box 303, ibid.
9 Bowers, Beveridge and t h e Progressive Era, 389.
10Beveridge to Harry W. Bennett, March 16, 1910, Beveridge
Papers; Beveridge to Mrs. Beveridge, June 29, 1910, quoted in Bowers,
Beveridge and t h e Progressive Era, 377.
6
6
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Indium Magazine of History
ishing influence on regular Republicans who circulated
critical personal rumors about him.ll Beveridge, and for
well-founded cause, suspected that Taft intended to punish
him for his insurgency on the tariff. I n early March, 1910,
the President and Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island
privately discussed the Hoosier’s activities. They agreed that
Beveridge’s opposition to administration proposals warranted
a loss of patronage with an implied goal of forcing him out
of the party.12 Shortly afterwards, Taft and Speaker of the
House Joe Cannon concluded that all the insurgents were out
to “make trouble.” Both Aldrich and Cannon agreed to
support the President if he opposed them.ls Secretary of
the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh, a close friend of Beveridge,
asked Taft to aid the Hoosier in his re-election bid. The
President refused the request because he feared that if he
aided Beveridge he would lose Cannon’s legislative support
for his ~ r 0 g r a r n s . l ~
I n June, 1910, the rift between Taft and Beveridge
broadened. I n a personal confrontation the President angrily
denied the senator a patronage request, stating it was because
Beveridge had opposed his administration.15 The Hoosier
pretended he could not “fathom Administration patronage
policy” and branded it “alien and repugnant.” Up to this
point he had not encountered much patronage discrimination,
but that experience was an ominous indication that he was
“to suffer from this time on.”16
As the 1910 campaign approached, the breach between
Beveridge and the regular wing of the party threatened to
grow wider. The senator, understandably, feared the power
of the regulars. He thought he might lose the election if they
convinced other Republicans that he should be punished for
his independent attitude.17
llBeveridge to R. B. Breed, April 14, 1910, Beveridge Papers;
Beveridge to John Hayes, April 12, 1910, ibid.; Beveridge to Rudolph
Leeds, April 3, 1910, ibid.
12 [Archibald W. Butt], T a f t and Roossvelt: The Intimate Letters
of Amhie Butt, M i l i t m y Aide ( 2 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1930), I, 301.
18 Ibid., 303.
Ibid., 355, 356.
15Beveridge to Mrs. Beveridge, June 29, 1910, quoted in Bowers,
Bevel-idge and the Progressive Era, 383.
16Beveridge to Albert Cummins, July 12, 1910, Beveridge Papers.
See also Cummins to Beveridge, July 7, 1910, ibid.
17Beveridge to Ray Stannard Baker, August 11, 1910, ibid.
Beveridge and the Election of 1912
107
Under the circumstances Beveridge turned more and more
toward Theodore Roosevelt for both direct and indirect help.
The Hoosier tried to get the former president to join other
anti-administration forces in opposition to the Payne-Aldrich
Tariff but failed to get this s ~ p p 0 r t . l ~
Roosevelt agreed to give Beveridge only one day of his
campaign time but when he reached Indiana unscheduled
delays forced him to pass up several meetings. His trip
was a fiasco for another reason. Before campaigning in
Indiana, Roosevelt declared his support f o r the tariff act at
the New York Republican State Convention.lg Moreover, he
later declared his support for an administration regular,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.2o Thus
Roosevelt’s influence probably was not beneficial.
The campaign was bitterly fought and centered around
the question of who was the truer progressive. Beveridge’s
strategy was to attract the votes of progressive Democrats,
but the record as a progressive of the Democratic nominee,
John Worth Kern, prevented the senator from diverting these
votes to himself.
After Kern defeated him in November, 1910, Beveridge
assessed his role in the GOP and concluded that regular
Republicans impeded his success.21 He thought the defeat
was partially his party’s and Taft’s responsibility. I n a more
cynical mood he wrote that “the administration did not throw
us more than six or seven billion votes.”22
Kern’s victory reaffirmed Beveridge’s earlier views of
the trend in American politics. Beveridge believed in the
power of “progressive” ideas. He thought his constituents
supported policies which would end corruption and tended
to give greater opportunity, protection, and security to the
individual. Any candidate who supported these ideas would
have the greater opportunity for election.23 “[Progressivism]
18Beveridge to James A. Garfield, July 13, 1910, ibid.; Beveridge
to Theodore Roosevelt, April 21, 1910, ibid.
19 Indianapolis Star, September 28, 1910.
ZoZbid., October 23, 1910.
21 Beveridge to Shaw, September 6 , 1910, Beveridge Papers;
Beveridge to Cummins, September 16, 1910, ibid.; Beveridge to Samuel
Blythe, September 2, 1910, ibid.
22Beveridge to William H. Lorimer, November 17, 1910, ibid. See
also Beveridge to Blythe, November 11, 1910, ibid.; Beveridge to
Philander C. Knox, November 11, 1910, ibid.
2sBeveridge to Blythe, September 20, 1910, ibid.; Beveridge to
Lorimer, September 2, 1910, ibid.
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Indium Magazine of History
is a great historic movement,” wrote Beveridge, “which will
exalt any man who represents i t and crush any man who
gets in its way.”24 The Indiana voters were not completely
in accord with these views since they were not as committed
to progressive ideas as were Wisconsin voters, for example.
Then, too, Beveridge’s isolation from Taft prompted him to
inflate the power of Progressivism. Nevertheless, progressive
ideas did have appeal in Indiana and the profession of such
concepts was necessary for political success. Beveridge realized
this fact, especially after his 1910 defeat.
Throughout 1911 and into 1912 Beveridge insisted that
he had retired from politics. He spent part of 1911 vacationing in Canada and Switzerland. Publicly he maintained a
neutrality in political feuds. When questioned about possible
presidential aspirations, Beveridge replied that he had been
commissioned to write articles, had little time for politics,
and considered such speculation as an “absurd p r o p o ~ i t i o n . ” ~ ~
“I am out of politics,” wrote Beveridge, “and hope to be
permitted to stay out.” He would not return unless the “call
of sheer duty” compelled his return.2G
Nevertheless, Beveridge’s private actions were not those
of a retired politician. In December, 1910, he had tried to
restore his relations with the administration. He met with
Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock in an attempt to solve
patronage problems and thought he had been
The next month he met with President Taft, and the senator’s
advisors felt this discussion had improved their political
relations.28 But by December, 1911, relations between the
President and the former senator had deteriorated again. Taft
ignored Beveridge and his supporters in Indiana, an affront
which Beveridge thought unreasonable. “Nobody,” wrote
Beveridge, “knows why Mr. Taft does the things [he does]
and admits to other things he does not do.”Z9 As a result,
the Hoosier was “not feeling too friendly to Mr. Taft.”ao
Beveridge to Gifford Pinchot, March 24, 1910, ibid.
Gilson Gardner to Beveridge, December 1, 1911, ibid.; Beveridge
to Gardner, December 5, 1911, ibid.
z6 Beveridge to Fred Miller, December 19, 1911, ibid.
27 Beveridge to Hayes, December 13, 18, 1910, ibid.
28 Hayes to Beveridge, January 11, 1911, ibid.
29Beveridge to Thomas E. Hibben, December 29, 1911, ibid. See
also Beveridge to Robert DePauw, December 20, 1911, ibid.; Beveridge
to Shaffer, December 19, 1911, ibid.
80 Beveridge to Hayes, May 1, 1911, ibid.
24
25
Beveridge and the Election of 1912
109
The ex-senator’s friends thought Taft’s future with the
national electorate would be a poor one and considered him
an unsatisfactory choice as the Republican standard-bearer
in 1912.31 These friends suspected Taft’s policies would prevent his r e n ~ m i n a t i o n . ~ ~
Beveridge did not want to lose the influence he had
acquired in Indiana. He proposed that the Republicans in the
state assembly develop their own legislative program based
upon such popular ideas as the initiative, referendum, and
direct primary; and he implied a willingness to lead the
campaign for the adoption of these principles in Indiana.33
None of these actions depicted a retired politician.
In 1911 the party schism in the state organization continued. Beveridge’s goal in these factional feuds was to remain aloof. John Hayes, Beveridge’s secretary and one of
his most trusted advisors, made a suggestion. He feared
Beveridge would become involved in controversies that could
only work to his disadvantage if he were in Indiana. The
secretary thought there was a regular Republican plot to
“annihilate” Beveridge politically. Hayes counseled him to
stay in Switzerland until October to preserve his political
independence and Beveridge followed this advice.34 Even when
he returned to Indiana in mid-October 1911, Beveridge remained formally uncommitted to any course of action that
might jeopardize his independent position. Nevertheless,
rather than becoming less involved in political action, the
Hoosier became committed to a reorganization of his Indiana
corps of followers.35 This was not political retirement.
Beveridge’s activities from 1910 to 1912-his grip on
his organization, his avoidance of feuds and commitmentsportrayed a politician waiting to see the direction in which
the political winds blew. Yet he continued to insist that he
had retired from the political arena. He had not the “slightest
thought of being a candidate . . . for any other office.” “Public
questions interest me profoundly,” he wrote, “but the pulling
and hauling of politics interests me not at all.”3s
31 Gifford Pinchot to Beveridge, November 26, 1910, July 18, 1911,
ibid.; Cummins to Beveridge, July 3, 1911, ibid.
32 George Perkins to Beveridge, July 13, 1911, ibid.; Gifford Pinchot
to Beveridge, July 18, 1911, ibid.
38 Beveridge to Hayes, December 20, 1910, ibid.
34 Hayes to Beveridge, September 8, 1911, ibid.
36 Beveridge to Gardner, November 29, 1911, ibid.
86Beveridge to 0 . G. Atherton, January 14, 1912, ibid. See also
Beveridge to Ernest Bross, January 27, 1912, ibid.
Indiana Magazine of History
110
By February of 1912 the pressures on Beveridge to declare his political stand began to increase. He clearly could
not support Taft. Senator Robert M. La Follette, the Wisconsin progressive Republican, also had presidential ambitions, and his campaign managers had been trying to persuade
the ex-senator to support their candidate. But La Follette’s
momentary illness took him out of the race. Even after
Roosevelt declared himself a candidate f o r the Republican
presidential nomination on February 21, the ex-senator remained uncommitted to any course of action. Theoretically,
the choice was Taft, Roosevelt, or true retirement. Since
Beveridge was personally attached and politically indebted to
Roosevelt, there was, in reality, little choice. On February 29,
1912, Beveridge declared his support for Roosevelt’s Republican ~ a n d i d a c y . ~ ~
Beveridge soon completed the break with Taft. He commented acidly on his belief that Taft forced his officeholders
to oppose Roosevelt with the threat of dismissal from office.38
I n one particular speech Beveridge declared that he owed
Taft no support because the President had failed to become
a n adequate party leader.SB “The trouble is not with Mr.
Taft’s conservativism,” Beveridge wrote, “but with his peculiar variability and his inability to get things done.”*O With
these remarks Beveridge made it almost impossible ever to
regain the President’s confidence were Taft renominated.
Aware of the fact that his image would suffer if Taft
received the nomination, and he were tied to the President,
Beveridge could not support him. A man who could neither
lead nor win votes for the party deserved no consideration.
Beveridge was “absolutely convinced” that Taft could not
“possibly be elected.””l “The Lord knows,” he wrote, “how
I am going to line up for Taft if he is nominated . . . but
doubtless [the Lord] will show me.”42 It seemed nothing
could force Beveridge to commit the political suicide that
would almost certainly ensue after a rapprochment with Taft.
Indianapolis Stw,March 1, 1912.
Beveridge to Richard W. Knott, March 4, 1912, Beveridge Papers;
Beveridge to J. C. O’Laughlin, March 4, 1912, ibid.
99 Beveridge, Chicago Speech, March 19, 1912, Box 304, ibid.
40 Beveridge to John B. Cooner, March 22, 1912, ibid.
41 Beveridge to R. S. Taylor, March 23, 1912, ibid.
42 Beveridge t
o S. L. Brengle, March 22, 1912, ibid.
37
38
Beueridge and the Election of 1912
111
I n March, 1912, Indiana held its state primaries in which
each of the thirteen districts elected two delegates to the
national party convention. The initial results showed Roosevelt
delegates outnumbering Taft supporters by a five to four
ratio, but both Taft and Roosevelt managers contested the
count in several districts. Although he had no evidence,
Beveridge blamed the Republican regulars for the lack of
a clear-cut Roosevelt victory and accused them of corrupt
and unethical practice^.'^
The Indiana Republican State Convention met in April
and chose four Taft delegates-at-large to attend the national
Republican convention. Beveridge ascribed this choice to
questionable political practices, but again he could not prove
his allegation^.^^
A t the end of April and in early May Beveridge went
on a campaign tour for Roosevelt through the western states.
Upon his return the Hoosier stated that he thought he had
fulfilled his obligations to Roosevelt and repeated his assertion
that he was “through with p01itics.”~~
If Beveridge wished to remain in politics, as his actions
seem to indicate, the realities of the situation required alliance
with Roosevelt. “I decline [to campaign] ,” Beveridge wrote,
“then comes Theodore Roosevelt himself and there is nothing
As the Republican national convention
to do but to
approached, Beveridge reaffirmed his loyalty to Roosevelt.
“I shall stand by Roosevelt,” he wrote, “until the last gun is
fired and the last ounce of powder is e x h a u ~ t e d . ” ~ ~
The nomination of Taft in June, 1912, at the Republican
National Convention threw Beveridge into a quandary. Despite his desire to remain in politics, his split with the regular
Republicans seemed irreparable. Since his future with the
Taft wing of the Republican party was very insecure, the
only successful political future available to Beveridge seemed
to be alliance with Roosevelt. The latter’s decision to bolt
the Republican party and form the Progressive party added
4JBeveridge to J. A. Kaotz, March 29, 1912, ibid.; Beveridge to
Shaffer, March 28, 1912, ibid.; Beveridge to C u m i n s , April 6, 1912, ibid.
44Beveridge to Edgar Baldwin, April 1, 1912, ibid.; Beveridge to
Arthur J. Little, April 2, 1912, ibid.
45Beveridge to Shaw, May 16, 1912, ibid. See also Beveridge to
Frank Knox, May 19, 1912, ibid.
46Beveridge to Lorimer, May 25, 1912, ibid.
47 Beveridge to Chase Osborn, June 10, 1912, ibid.
Zndiana Magazine of History
112
another element to an already confused situation. Nevertheless, i t presented Beveridge with a clear choice: remain with
a politically unattractive candidate and party from which he
had been alienated, or join a colleague to whom he had a
personal and political attachment and the new Progressive
party. In view of what Beveridge believed about the public
opinion of his constituents, the Republican platform was too
conservative for political success.
Edwin Lee and Leo Rothschild, two of Beveridge’s political lieutenants, contributed contradictory opinions to him. Lee
suggested that to avoid joining Roosevelt’s party would be
a tacit alignment with the “Old Guard” machines, and to
refuse a commitment either way would certainly mean political death.ls Rothschild counseled Beveridge to “lay low for
a considerable time” since his decision would, in reality, depend upon whom the Democrats might nominate. Rothschild
distrusted Roosevelt and he even urged the former senator
to avoid news interviews. The regulars figure, wrote Rothschild, that if you leave the Republican party, “it will put you
in such a position that they will not have to contend with
you in the
Beveridge temporarily chose to follow
Rothschild’s advice while deciding upon whom he would support. Although hesitant, there was no question of his involvement; he had not retired.
With the Democratic convention’s nomination of Wilson
in July, 1912, Beveridge’s friends and advisors pressured
him for a decision. One supporter felt that to remain silent
would be tantamount to “playing
Lee continued
to encourage Beveridge to join Roosevelt’s Progressives.
“Your silence at this critical time,” wrote Lee, “will be taken
advantage of by your enemies and the seeds of suspicion
against your sincerity will . . be sown.”61 In a second letter
Lee indicated that in Indiana the Progressive party could
expect between 80 and 95 percent of the Republican vote,
10 to 30 percent of the Democratic vote, and a majority of
the independent
.
Lee to Beveridge, June 28, 1912, ibid.
4QL. G. Rothschild to Beveridge, July 3, 4, 5, 1912, ibid,
6o Lorimer to Beveridge, July 8, 1912, ibid.
61Lee to Beveridge, July 5, 1912, ibid.
62 Lee to Beveridge, July 18, 1912, ibid.
4s
Beveridge and the Election of 1912
113
Beveridge continued to postpone a decision. Throughout
early July he received letters either urging him to join the
new party or requesting his reasons for remaining silent. In
answering these letters he revealed some of his real political
motives. The former senator had joined Roosevelt’s campaign
for the Republican nomination because his constituents
believed in progressive ideas. He was also well aware of the
political debt he owed Roosevelt as a result of the former
president’s aid in his 1910 senatorial campaign. But he protested that he had stood by Roosevelt only because of the
ex-president’s pressures and
Beveridge admitted
that he feared the Progressive party had only one unifying
base: Theodore Roosevelt. The Hoosier concluded his
thoughts with a statement that he wished to remain inactive.c4
Still Beveridge was inclined to adhere to the new movement because i t carried a greater promise of political success
than if he remained in the Republican party. In late July
the Hoosier sought guarantees from the Progressive party
leadership that the new party would develop an appealing
program of social reforms and become a permanent party,
whatever the November election results. His close friends
John Shaffer, publisher of the Chicago Tribune and Indianapolis Star, and George W. Perkins, associated with United
States Steel and International Harvester, among others,
promised the fulfillment of these condition^.^^ This agreement
seems to have been the final factor in Beveridge’s decision to
join the Progressive party.
On July 25 Beveridge made his decision public. He published a letter in the Indianapolis Star setting forth the
reasons for his decision. He justified his choice on idealistic
grounds. He stated that frauds in the old party and the
promise of a better system through Roosevelt’s party were
in part responsible. The Progressive party presented the opportunity to join a truly national, liberal, and nonsectional
party. The contemporary party organizations based on
sectionalism, without a coherent and consistent philosophy,
and influenced by boss systems, were illogical and dangerous.
Because of these considerations Beveridge wrote that he had
Beveridge to Leeds, July 15, 1912, ibid.
54Beveridge to Lee, July 12, 1912, ibid.
5 5 Bowers, Beweridge and the Progressive ETa, 423.
53
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Indiana Magazine of History
abandoned the Republican party to become a member of the
Progressive party.56
These reasons, viewed critically, were designed for
popular appeal. Almost all were the remarks of a politician
skilled in appealing to his constituents. The historian, however, on the basis of such evidence, must be careful in ascribing motives. Those which Beveridge professed had some
bearing on his decision, but they must remain secondary.
Nor is the fact that some of Beveridge’s closest friends were
involved in the new party enough to account for his choice.
Beveridge split with his party at the state and national levels
and refused to accept Taft as the party’s presidential nominee.
He became politically attached to Roosevelt and acquired a
strong belief in the power of progressive ideas and programs
with his constituents. These factors, plus an abiding desire to
remain a politician, and his belief that political success could
now come to him only in the Progressive party certainly must
have carried more weight than his professed motives. To
remain in the Republican party would have appeared to the
electorate as an abdication of principle. If he were to continue in politics Beveridge really had no choice but to join
the new party. First and foremost he was a politician. It
is closer to reality to believe that it was primarily for these
latter reasons, rather than those he publicly professed, that
Albert J. Beveridge joined the Progressive party of 1912.
56 Beveridge to W. H. Dye, quoted in the Indianapolis Stm, July 25,
1912 ; Beveridge, “The Launching and Wrecking of the Progressive
Party,” Box 305, Beveridge Papers. This article, written in June, 1916,
was intended for publication in the Saturdag Evening Post. In it
Beveridge maintains essentially the same position regarding his reasons
for joining the Progressive party. See also Beveridge to Joe Bristow,
December 28, 1912, ibid.; Beveridge to Shaffer, June 19, 1916, ibid.;
Beveridge to Lorimer, June 16, 1916, ibid.