6
The civil service in Italy
Elio Borgonovi and Edoardo Ongaro
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Italy entered a phase of continuing political and policy change since the
biennium 1991–2, when the party system started to collapse (Bull and
Rhodes 1997; Radaelli and Franchino 2004; Ongaro 2009 and 2011). The
dynamics of the political system determined over the 1990s and the 2000s
a number of substantial reforms that deeply reshaped the civil service.
This chapter focuses the transformations that occurred over the last two
decades and gives the reader a picture of the civil service in Italy at the end
of the 2000s. The features of the civil service before the 1990s are briefly
presented since they represent the background against which the transformations that occurred over the subsequent two decades can be better
understood, but they no more provide an adequate picture of the Italian
civil service.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: initially the broad historical
characteristics of the civil service are outlined (section 6.2); then a description of the status of the Italian civil service at the end of the 2000s is provided, encompassing aspects like the size, the reward and the functions
of the civil servants (section 6.3); the reforms of the civil service occurred
over the 1990s and the 2000s are illustrated, and interpretations of the
transformations that occurred are proposed (section 6.4); finally, some
insights into the more profound implications of the modifications of the
‘deal’ between politicians and bureaucrats are proposed, and the dialogue
of the ideas and the positions of major streams of thought present in the
Italian public debate on the topic of civil service reform are highlighted
(section 6.5).
6.2 THE ITALIAN CIVIL SERVICE BEFORE THE
REFORMS OF THE 1990S AND THE 2000S
In the ‘global’ map of state models and the underlying administrative
traditions (Painter and Pierre 2010), Italy fits quite easily in the cluster of
Napoleonic countries, the French model of state having been inherited ‘via’
the Piedmont State, the predecessor of modern Italy. Characteristics of the
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Napoleonic model of state include (Ongaro 2010): a unified civil service,
with its own specific and detailed regulation, that set it apart from private
employment and the general labour regulation; a tenured career (life-long
civil servants); recruitment through open public competition emphasizing
the technical preparation of candidates, formal requisites for admission,
and the ‘objectivity’ of the selection procedures1 (the so-called concours à
la française, French-type of public competitions); the promotion mainly by
seniority and qualifications (a certain number of years in service and formal
qualifications usually being in such systems pre-requisites for admission to
public competitions for the promotion to upper positions); and the structuring of the public service into corps and grands corps – though this final
aspect points to a difference between the French and the Italian system,
corps having historically been less influential in Italy. Accountability of
civil servants is in the Napoleonic states primarily to the law, and a hierarchy of special administrative courts (administrative tribunals and the
council of state) and a web of supervisory bodies (the court of accounts,
various committees of control) provide the oversight system.2
In a number of respects, however, the Italian civil service used to differ
from the French one. There has traditionally been a limited interchange
of careers between politicians and civil servants: politicians ‘by profession’ used to be in office in elective positions, while career public officials, though with the obvious important exceptions, tended to remain
life-long in the ranks of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the bureaucracy
has not traditionally represented that kind of ‘general-purpose elite’ that
French graduates from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) and
the other grandes écoles represent for the French public sector. A major,
though apparently temporary, breakthrough in this tradition was represented by the two technical governments that ruled Italy in 1993 and
1995, in the aftermath of the sudden crisis of the political system that
occurred at the beginning of the 1990s; such governments were filled with
top level civil servants as well as academicians. To complete the picture,
we should introduce another feature of the Italian administrative system
which is instead in common with the French one: the presence of large
ministerial cabinets.
Another trait of the civil service regards its composition in terms of the
origin of civil servants. The Italian bureaucracy has a very peculiar composition: the vast majority of civil servants comes from Southern Italy.3 This
is an effect of the economic disparity between the North and the South of
the country. In such a context, becoming a civil servant has always been
considered by young southerners an opportunity (sometimes the only
one) to get a job. This phenomenon may have a plurality of effects, whose
exploration is well beyond the purpose of this chapter.4
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We can now shift the focus from the inheritance of the past to the
characteristics of the Italian civil service at the time this book goes to
press, which, as we shall see, have been affected by a series of reforms
that occurred in the context of a profound re-shaping of the politicoadministrative system. As a first step, we turn to examine the size and
functions of the civil service in Italy, as well as the key institutionalorganizational actors in the field of personnel policy. This task is carried
out in the next section.
6.3 SIZE AND FUNCTIONS AND OTHER
FEATURES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
The Italian public sector employs about three million people, approximately distributed as follows: around 250 000 in the central government;
about 100 000 in executive agencies. At the central level, the army and the
three police forces (there are different branches, ranging from polizia, the
state police, to carabinieri, the army police, to guardia di finanza, for
the prevention of fiscal offences) amount to about 500 000 people, also
including specialized corps (like the corpo forestale dello stato, or ‘forest
corps’); healthcare5 employs a staff of more than 600 000; local and
regional6 government about 600 000; the sector of education (ranging from
primary and secondary school to higher education) employs more than
1 000 000 people. The so-called grands corps or other specific categories of
public officials are profoundly influential on the functioning of the public
sector, but limited in terms of absolute size (ranging from the around 1800
prefects to the little more than 100 state councillors).
We now turn our attention to the crucial role of the managers: those
wielding a managerial function within the public sector. We adopt an
economic and organizational notion of managerial function, intended as
the role of coordination and direction within an organization aimed at
combining resources in processes of ‘production’ of outputs: it may be
noted that reform laws during the 1990s determined an alignment between
the economic and the juridical notion, since such laws formally recognized
a number of roles in the public sector as being ‘managerial roles’. A vast
amount of data about managers in the public sector is reported in Table
6.1. Some interesting issues emerge. A first consideration is that there is
a large variety of managerial roles in the public sector besides the figure
of the ‘office head’ in a ‘traditional’ bureaucratic structure. A number of
categories of professionals were also charged with an explicitly managerial
role, for example the head teachers, that since 1999 were assigned a managerial role, with a corresponding status, after the compulsory attendance
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Table 6.1
Number, economic reward, type of contract and age of public
managers in Italy*
Central
government
Regional
government
Local
government
1. Number of top executives in
executive core governments:
includes those holding a
position at the apex of the
organizational hierarchy,
like heads of ministerial
departments, secretaries
general, director generals/
city managers in provinces/
municipalities
2. Number of heads of offices
in ‘diretta collaborazione
politica’ (direct collaboration
of the elected officials):
includes heads of cabinets of
ministers, presidents, mayor
of large cities, other staff
offices
3. Number of top executives
of agencies and other semiautonomous public bodies:
includes heads of executive
agencies, local healthcare
units, head teachers of
schools
4. Total number of managers
(only executive core
governments)
115*
20*
(director
general/
secretary
general)
1500*
60*
50*
300*
300* (central
government)
10 000*
(head
teachers)
600*
1000*
455 (general
managers)
3573
(managers)
4350
(approx.)
1782
(Provinces)
5992
(municipalities)
5. Total number of managers
with administrative positions
(excluding professionals)
in other public bodies like
executive agencies, state
universities, research entities, chambers of commerce,
etc.
2500*
(functional autonomies like state
universities and chambers of commerce
conventionally attributed to central level)
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Table 6.1
(continued)
6. Number of ‘professionals’ in
managerial roles (includes
technologists, researchers
in research entities, head
physicians and other medical
figures, etc.)
7. Number of ‘professionals’
whose salary scheme is
comparable to the one
of managers in elective
governments (includes
technologists, researchers
in research entities, head
physicians and other medical
figures, etc.)
8. Type of job contract (data
refer only to executive
core governments): openended (tenured officials) vs
temporary contracts [%]
9. Public managers (data
refer only to executive core
governments): average salary
[euro]
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Central
government
Regional
government
Local
government
2000*
5000*
–
(mainly
healthcare)
5500*
115 000*
–
General
managers:
72.1%
(tenured
officials)
27.9%
(temporary
contract)
Managers:
93.5%
(tenured
officials)
6.5%
(temporary
contract)
161 250
(general
managers)
77 824
(managers)
4.2%
(directors
general)
85.6%
(tenured
officials)
10.2%
(temporary
contract)
Provinces:
80% (tenured
officials)
20% (directors
general +
temporary)
158 782
(directors
general)
81 598
(tenured
officials)
94 922
(temporary
contract)
Provinces:
123 015
(directors
general)
81 709
(tenured
officials)
73 033
(temporary
contract)
Municipalities:
80% (tenured
officials)
20% (directors
general +
temporary)
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Table 6.1
(continued)
Central
government
10. Performance pay component 7.4% (general
managers)
as percentage of total salary
(includes only ‘retribuzione 4.3%
(managers)
di risultato’: Retribution
on results; ‘retribuzione
di posizione’; retribution
for holding a position not
considered
11. Average age of public
managers [year]
12. Possibility of access to
managerial roles for
external, non-career civil
servants
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54.2 years
Regional
government
Local
government
Municipalities:
82 013
(directors
general)
76 345
(tenured
officials)
64 414
(temporary
contract)
Provinces
12.9%
10.3%
(directors
(directors
general)
general)
9.3%
8% (tenured
(tenured
officials)
officials)
6% (temporary
10.5%
contract)
(temporary
contract)
Municipalities:
5.6% (directors
general)
7.8% (tenured
officials)
6.2%
(temporary
contract)
53.8 years
Provinces:
51.4 years
Regions:
Ministries:
YES (with
YES (with
some
ceiling
restricon total
tions)
number
and some
restrictions)
Municipalities:
50.7 years
Provinces and
Municipalities:
YES (with
restrictions);
NOT for
secretaries
general
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Table 6.1
(continued)
Central
government
Regional
government
Local
government
Healthcare
Agencies,
Units: YES
state
(restricted
universities,
to top
etc.: YES
positions)
(with
constraints)
Schools (head
teachers):
NO
Note: Values with * are estimates – values refer to 2006 (estimates) or 2004, values in rows
1 and 3 for central government refer to 2011.
Source: Elaborated in Ongaro, 2009, drawing on Cristofoli et al. 2007, and Rebora
1999.7
of an executive education course in public management (similar paths
occurred in healthcare organizations, concerning the managerial role
attributed to head physicians). At another level of analysis, new organizational designs required new managerial figures, like that of the city
manager, the apex figure in many municipalities and provincial governments since the 1990s – a function that previously did not exist (individual
managers used to directly address the councillor competent on the subject
matter, without the coordinating role assured by a unifying figure at the
top of the administration).
A second consideration is that there are wide differences in terms of the
number of managers in individual public sector organizations between
administrations in the south and in the north of Italy; for example, using
the rough indicator of the number of managers per 100 000 residents, five
out of the seven regions with a lower ratio are in the north, one in the
centre of Italy and only one in the south, the other eight regions all belonging to the centre-south of Italy,8 a phenomenon that reflects probably a
persistent difference in the conception of public employment as a social
policy in different parts of the country.
Third, wages especially at the top can be considered in many respects
‘competitive’ compared with the commercial, private sector,9 which was
not the case before the reforms of the 1990s.
Fourth, though the large number of managers has a permanent job
contract, the number of public managers hired on a temporary basis
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represents a significant share of the total – especially when contrasted with
a past period in which it was almost nonexistent.
Fifth, after the reform of the 1990s there is a range of possibilities of
accessing directly to managerial positions for non-career civil servants,
whilst previously direct access was almost impossible (though this trend
towards increased side entry was partly reversed during the 2000s – see
next section).
An element that seems to have remained stable, instead, throughout 15
years of reforms is the influence of the so-called figure di diretta collaborazione politica, or ‘figures of direct collaboration with elected officials’,
those appointed officials filling ministerial cabinets, or the cabinet of the
mayors of big cities.
Besides the numbers, it is worth exploring the role and functions performed by managers. There have been so profound modifications over the
1990s that it may be useful to illustrate the functions of public managers
by comparison with the previous state of affairs. They can be summarized
under the following headings (see Rebora 1999):
●
●
●
definition of competences and powers of public offices: previously
this used to be a competence of political organs, which used to set
the detailed competences of public offices; alternatively, it was the
law that imposed uniform organizational designs for the same type
of public sector organization throughout the country; currently, the
definition of competences and powers of public offices is to a significant extent under the remit of public managers10 (whilst the setting
of the goals of the public sector organization remains to the elective
bodies);
the management of expenditures/appropriations: it is now under the
responsibility of individual managers, whilst previously such deliberative powers were for the most part under the remit of political
organs; a guiding idea in the reforms of the 1990s was that of setting
a clear demarcation line between the ‘political’ and the ‘managerial’ sphere: in the new dominant ideology the former concerned
the setting of goals and the detailed objectives, and the control over
managers; the latter concerned the employment of resources for
achieving the goals and objectives;
the management of the staff: it is another function which through
the reforms of the 1990s was moved under the responsibility of
managers; although the influence of elected politicians over managers has been in many respects increased due to the enhanced
powers of appointment and removal of managers, especially at
the top hierarchical tier (see next section), the transfer under the
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remit of public officials of significant competences in personnel
management enabled them to control a wider range of levers for
the running of the organization – though these legal provisions
clashed in certain periods with the limits put by harsh cutbacks in
the public budget.
This descriptive section is concluded by an illustration of the actors
institutionally in charge of the personnel policy. The most important
institution is the Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica, or public administration department. It is a department of the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers (not the Finance Ministry, differently from what can be found,
for example in Scandinavian countries) under the political responsibility
of a minister for public administration. Three offices of the public administration department have especially significant competences in this regard.
First, the ‘office for the personnel in the public administration’11 has the
following tasks: the general planning of the recruitment of personnel at
the central government level; the coordination of mobility within the
public sector; and the improvement of job conditions in the public sector
in general. Second, the ‘office for the training of the personnel of the public
sector’12 is in charge of planning the training of human resources in the
public sector. It is also in charge of the steering and control of FORMEZ,
an agency for the training of personnel, as well as other instrumental
bodies delivering training services. In this field, another important institutional actor is the Scuola Superiore di Pubblica Amministrazione, or High
School of Public Administration: it provides executive education and
training; it also administers the so-called corso-concorso, a competitiveentry course whose graduates have direct access to the managerial role,
after one and a half year of training13 and a final examination. In principle
patterned on the French model of the ENA, it however does not enjoy the
same status and prestige, nor the same influence over the functioning of
the public sector.14
Third, the ‘office for the relations with the trade unions in the public
sector’15 is the official interface of the government with the Agenzia per la
Rappresentanza Negoziale del Pubblico Impiego, or Civil Service Contract
Negotiation Agency (ARAN, following the Italian acronym), the agency
in charge of negotiating the labour contracts of the public sector with the
trade unions. Such agency was established in 1993 by the same act which
introduced a major reform of the public employment.16 The agency has the
exclusive representation of all public sector entities (the central government
as well as regional and local governments) in their capacity as employers in
the negotiation with the trade unions. The other main task of the agency
is providing assistance to all public sector entities for the nation-wide
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uniform application of the labour contracts of the civil service. In short:
it first negotiates with the trade unions the national labour contracts, on
behalf of all public entities, and then ensures their uniform application
throughout the country.17 ARAN is an influential institutional actor in
the personnel policy, although observers have pointed out that this agency
has often been ‘squeezed’ between the political part and the public sector
trade unions, raising doubts about its ultimate capacity to have a say in
a decisive way in negotiation processes, especially when sensitive matters
are at stake.
We can now turn our attention to the reforms that occurred during the
1990s and the 2000s to the civil service.
6.4 REFORMS OVER THE 1990 AND THE 2000S18
Three major events characterized the reform of the civil service in Italy.
First, the 1993 reform package,19 initiated and promulgated under the
Amato government and put into effect during the Ciampi government.
The reform produced major changes: the overarching transformation
was that public employment became subjected to the general rules of
private employment.20 From a juridical point of view, managers were
no longer appointed on the basis of an administrative law act, but were
‘accepting a hiring proposal’, exactly in the same way as their private
sector colleagues do.21 As a consequence of the privatization of the public
employment, labour contracts, negotiated between the government in
its capacity as the employer (operating through ARAN) and the unions,
became a major source of regulation of the civil service.22 The innovation
considered by the advocates of this reform to be the core of the reform
package was the introduction of the distinction between the ‘managerial sphere’ and the ‘political sphere’: the paradigmatic model becomes
one in which the political tier sets the objectives of the administration,
allocates the resources and ‘evaluates the efficacy of the results achieved
by managers’ with the support of specialized advisory bodies, while managers are in charge of making all the decisions about the utilization of
resources for achieving the chosen objectives (only managers can commit
the administration to legally binding acts). With an interpretation widely
shared by commentators in Italy (see Rebora 1999), the political and the
administrative/managerial spheres were distinguished, and management
by objectives was interposed between the two spheres. Performance pay
was introduced, and managers could be removed in case of poor performance.23 Managerial levels were reshaped through the introduction (at the
central government level) of only one major distinction between dirigenti
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generali, or ‘general managers’ – that is the top executives – and dirigenti,
all the other managers, that had a partly different regulation prior to these
reforms. Previously, there were three levels of organization of managers in
the Italian public sector, with only the managers in the upper tier enabled
to occupy the top positions in the organizational pyramid.
A second major reform occurred in 1998, under the ‘Olive’ centre-left
government, during the stint of Franco Bassanini as minister for public
administration. The reform package (Legislative decree 80/1998) introduced a form of ‘spoils system’ (political organs appointing top executives), restrained only to top level positions (55 top executive positions,
whose incumbents could be replaced within 90 days since the vote of
confidence to the new government24). Another major change regarded
managerial appointments, that all became temporary (ranging between a
minimum of two and a maximum of seven years), with confirmation of the
incumbent in principal subject to an appraisal of the performance of the
manager in his/her stint. Such appraisal is based on the measurement of
performance (and in this respect a reform in 1999 of the system of internal
controls can be interpreted as an interconnected reform intervention). In
order to better understand the significance of this innovation, it should be
beheld that previously all appointments were for life: once a position was
assigned to the winner of a public competition (or, in the case of top positions, after the appointment was approved by the council of ministers),
the only way to replace the incumbent was because of retirement, or in
case of blatant mismanagement (ascertained according to well-codified
procedures), or – promoveatur ut amoveatur – by promoting him/her to a
higher position (quite often, a place in the Council of State or the Court
of Auditors) in order to remove him/her from the current one. It was also
made easier to appoint managers picked from outside the administration,
be they non-career civil servants picked from the private sector or the
academia, or officials seconded from other administrations – a practice
that was already spreading at the local level (where some mayors introduced the figure of the ‘director general’, or city manager, appointed on
a private law contractual basis), though a ceiling to the total number of
non-career civil servants having a managerial stint was defined (in the
central government, the ceiling was 5 per cent as a proportion of the total
number of managers); also for the lower ranks, new flexible contractual
arrangements for the employment of personnel were introduced. At the
local level, a ‘market’ of public managers, especially of general directors,
was emerging in a bottom up way, a process in which some schools of
government (or schools of public management, as the word ‘government’
has different nuances if translated into Italian) were important actors. At
the central government level, a top down attempt was made for creating
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a sort of ‘market’ of managers: the legislative decree 80/1998 introduced
the ruolo unico (single role): central government managers were no more in
the payroll of the specific administration they were working for, but there
was a single role for all managers (as if the central government as a whole
became the only employer). The intended goal was strengthening horizontal mobility by creating a market of the (central government) public
managers. Also ‘vertical’ mobility was enhanced. Last, but certainly not
least, a number of provisions strengthened managerial decision powers on
the allocated budget and on the internal organization of the office – indeed
‘completing the 1993 reform’ in terms of empowering public managers in the exercise of their function was one of the ways the reform was
communicated.
Other changes were introduced over the period 2001–2 (Law 145/2002
on the regulation of personnel in the central government). Some of these
provisions further strengthened, to some extent ‘stretched’ up to the limit,
provisions contained in previous reforms. The most ‘visible’ intervention
was the extension of the spoils system. Other influential interventions
concerned the repeal of the minimum length of the appointment of managers (previously set to two years), which meant (and in some instances
it did occur) that some managers were appointed to a stint for just a
few months, subject on renewal – a form of job precariousness totally
unknown to civil servants in Italy; and the enhancement of the proportion
of the managerial positions that could be attributed to non-tenured officials, hired from outside the administration: the ceiling was set to 10 per
cent for top executives and 8 per cent for the other managers. It should be
observed that at the same time restraints to the access to the roles of managers were introduced – while after the 1998 reform individuals holding
a PhD or with other relevant qualifications could also apply for a public
competition for a position as manager, after the reform only staff with
a seniority of some years in the public sector could apply for a tenured
managerial position; the only alternative way of access to the managerial roles in the public sector for ‘outsiders’ being the corso-concorso (the
competitive-entry course whose graduates have direct access to the managerial role after completion of the course and a final examination). To
sum up, the domain of application of the spoils system was enlarged, thus
enhancing political control (see next section); and concerning the access
to the role of managers in the public sector for tenured civil servants (that
is outside the spoils system), after the 2002 reform the main path became
the entry from the lower ranks whilst according to the previous reform
there were two main paths – entry from the lower ranks and then promotion through competition, and entry directly in the managerial role after a
career outside the public sector.
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Other provisions represented an at least partial reversal of previous
reforms; they include: the reintroduction of the distinction between the top
tier of managers (general managers) and the other managers; the repeal of
the ruolo unico (single role) for central government’s management; and the
appointment of managers (including the specification of the conditions of
their stint in terms of functions, length, etc.) as an administrative law act,
while the private law contract remained the source of regulation of the
economic reward (this is one of the reasons why public employment in
Italy is in many respects a hybrid between a distinct, administrative lawbased system and a fully-normalized, private labour law-based system).
In 2007, the law 145/2002 was declared partly unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court – though it obviously produced effects during the
five years in between. A subsequent reform intervention during the same
legislature (Law 168/05) reintroduced a minimum length of the duration of
the appointment of managers to a stint, set in three years for both managerial levels, as well as setting the maximum length of the appointment to
five years.
A further reform was passed in 2009/10. Its objectives included: the
strengthening of transparency, through measures like, for example, the
publication of payroll of public personnel on the webpage of the Public
Administration Department; the redesigning of the system of controls to
enhance public employees’ accountability; and the re-launching of performance measurement in the public sector. One of the qualifying traits of
the reform, which was also accompanied by a harsh campaign conducted
in first person by the minister of public administration, Renato Brunetta,
against the allegedly ‘idle’ civil servants, was the re-launching of performance-related pay through forms of forced-ranking (for an overview of the
reform, see Ongaro and Bellé 2010). The effects, however, cannot at the
time this chapter goes to press be assessed, also because the provisions
concerning performance-related pay were largely frozen by provisions of
containment of public expenditure that were deployed to counteract the
impact of the financial crisis started in 2007–08 on Italian public accounts.
We can now turn to outline the overall trajectory of reform in personnel
management. Table 6.2 performs this task by employing a quite common
scheme that considers, first, the relationship of public employment to
private sector employment, then the career path of civil servants, the ways
they are appointed and rewarded, and the issue of who is in charge of
managing human resources in public sector organizations.
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Table 6.2
Trajectory of personnel management in Italy
‘Component’ of the
personnel policy
reform trajectory
Beginning of the 1990s
Distinctiveness of
the public service
Labour in the public sector
subject to norms and rules
distinct from commercial
sector; unified civil service;
national framework of terms
and conditions for all civil
servants.
Career paths
Decision powers
of managers;
stability of position
and appointment
procedures; and
reward
Responsibility
on personnel
management and
training
End of 2000s
Mixed: private
labour regulation
as broad reference,
but appointment of
civil servants and
others; procedures are
administrative acts;
administrative judiciary
oversight system remains
central.
Access to the public service Possibility of entry
directly at middle or top
mainly from the lower
ranks; seniority and formal level positions (though
re-limited since 2002); all
qualifications central in
managerial positions are
career progression; party
temporary; wide scope of
affiliations influential, but
spoils system.
no spoils system.
Quite substantial decision
Limited decision-powers
and little influence on policy powers; instability of
job position (political
formulation; very high
stability of job position; low appointment); high
mobility; middle-high
rewards.
rewards.
Tenured officials
‘Central regulators’ and
responsible for personnel
political organs mainly
management.
responsible for personnel
management (micromanagement of economic
incentives, career paths,
procedures for the allocation
of tasks and responsibility,
etc.).
Source: Ongaro, 2011.
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6.5 THE CIVIL SERVICE IN ITALY: CURRENT
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
What are, if any, the deepest implications of the new state of affairs determined by the reforms of personnel management over the 1990s and the
2000s? In other words, have there been more profound modifications in
the ‘deal’ between politicians and administrators, some kind of deep and
radical change in the dynamics of public service bargain (intended as the
explicit and informal understandings regarding the relationships between
politicians and senior bureaucrats – on the point we follow Hood 2002;
Hood and Lodge 2006)? It is this question that we now address.
A way to characterize the deal between politicians and administrators
in Italy is as follows. First, the ‘old’ deal has been depicted (for example,
Cassese 1981) as one in which tenured officials receive security and stability
and avoid risk (in both the juridical-administrative and the managerial sense)
and blame (provided they strictly comply with formal norms) in exchange of
power exclusion and a low salary. Exclusion is intended both as exclusion
from ‘substantive’ policy advice, the remit of ministerial cabinets, as well
as exclusion from the management of politically sensitive administrative
issues, micro-managed in a direct way by the staff of the minister. Following
the categories of analysis employed by Hood and Lodge (2006), the situation of public officials in Italy before the reforms can be depicted as follows:
reward was low, but the progression predictable; competency required of
civil servants was centred more on dealing with cases and paperwork (and
only to a very limited extent centred on advisory skills, as access to political
decision-making was limited, at least compared to the UK case discussed by
Hood and Lodge); loyalty was characterized by a form of serial loyalty to the
minister of the day and did not entail full access to the highest level of political decision-making, though it did entail safe rewards. After the waves of
reforms of the 1990s and the 2000s, the deal was transformed into increased
decision powers and higher salary25 ‘in exchange of’ instability (Cassese even
argues about a ‘domination of politicians over bureaucrats’ – Cassese 2002,
pp. 682–3), a higher degree of risk,26 and the concrete likelihood of being
blamed if things go wrong. In the terms of Hood and Lodge (2006), reward
became high(er), but (especially in the top positions) unpredictable; competency became of a ‘delivery’-type, in the sense of managerial capabilities in
producing particular policy outputs and outcomes; loyalty became increasingly (but only to a certain extent) to a specific party or group or political
master (‘personal-loyalism’), to which the fortunes of the career of the civil
servant became more and more attached, or, more often, loyalty was given
to the government in charge in exchange of confirmation in the appointment,
but partly to the expense of the actual exercise of the managerial autonomy.
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A consequence of this transformation, according to Cassese (2002), is the
‘demise’ of a neutral civil service (based on ‘trustee-loyalty’, or loyalty to the
constitution by the civil servants), that became instead under the domination of the government of the day; following Cassese, this transformation is
deemed to have been an effect of the 1998 and 2002 reforms, while the 1993
reform was intended to enhance the autonomy of the administration by
distinguishing the ‘political’ sphere from the ‘managerial’ one while maintaining the appointment by public competitions. The basic assumption
underlying the argument by Cassese is that the mechanism of the public
competition as a procedure for promotion, and especially the immovability
of civil servants once appointed to a position, can shelter administrators
from political interference on administrative issues. Autonomy matched
with evaluation of performance of managers completes the proposed
picture of a neutral while at the same time effective civil service. As to the
evidence and the elements of knowledge provided for underpinning this
argument, Cassese had a direct experience as minister of the public function in 1993, and was an influential scholar as well as adviser of a number
of elected and especially tenured officials. His position was undoubtedly
influential among career civil servants;27 the ideological core of this position
– the central value – is ‘re-establishing the neutrality of the civil service’.
Cassese’s is however but one interpretation of the outcome of management reforms in the area of personnel. A more complete picture can
be provided by considering other interpretations recurring in the debate
in Italy about the state of affairs resulting from more than 15 years of
reforms. The second alternative interpretation is the one proposed by
another incumbent as minister of the public function, Franco Bassanini
(1996–8 and 2000–1, who was also undersecretary at the Council of
Ministers in between his two stints as minister). In this perspective, the
direct appointment of top executives in the public sector after the vote of
confidence to a new government represents the ‘natural’ link between politics and administration in a context characterized by a more autonomous
administration endowed with significant decision powers.28 The possibility to appoint non-career civil servants to executive positions – the argument goes on – is a way to introduce the necessary skills and expertise for
the modernization of the public sector, and the confirmation or removal
of a manager at the end of his/her stint on the basis of an assessment of
performance (conducted by specialized evaluation bodies, the nuclei di
valutazione, established by the 1993 reform) is considered in this perspective a condition for putting pressures towards enhanced efficiency and
effectiveness of the public sector (‘making managers manage’). Increased
career mobility within the public sector completes the picture outlined by
this second argument.
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The third position is the one developed by a number of scholars in the
field of public management – whose roots can be found in the Italian
research tradition/programme of the economia aziendale, the Italian
‘variant’ of the management discipline, which assumes as the object of
the analysis the principles and the criteria that determine the functioning
of the ‘units’ in which the economic activity takes place (be it a business,
a public entity, or a not-for-profit organization), and specifically the economia delle aziende pubbliche (the Italian public management discipline),
which investigates the economic dimension of the individual institutions
of the public sector and their economic relations; this research tradition
took shape during the 1970s and the 1980s (for a conceptualization,
Borgonovi 1984, pp. 21–2 in particular, drawing also on Masini 1979, pp.
10–13 and 18 in particular; see also Borgonovi et al. 2008). Though differentiated, there seems to be a fundamental accordance in the positions
of these authors when it comes to interpreting some broad traits of public
management reform in Italy.29 The very basic premise can be searched in
the emphasis on the centrality of management as a function (much in the
line of Mintzberg 1994, see also Mintzberg 1971) whose legitimacy ultimately derives from its capacity to ensure the long-term sustainability of
the organization the managers are running.30 The legitimacy of management derives from its capacity to effectively accomplish this fundamental
function.31 Moving from these premises, for outlining the position of the
aziendalisti,32 we can start from the previous argument by Cassese and
highlight the main differentiating elements. The first one is probably the
consideration of the limited efficacy of the ‘traditional’ public competition
procedures of recruitment in Italy, mainly based on seniority and formal
qualifications; in many argumentations proposed within this stream
of thought, competitive procedures are deemed to be very formalistic,
incapable of selecting candidates endowed with skills like the ability to
‘manage persons’ (while the skills usually tested by these competitions are
the general knowledge of the law and the ability to prepare documentation in a formally irreproachable way), and ultimately also amenable to
manipulation (with winners quite often de facto known in advance of
the competition). It follows from this assumption that for selecting good
managers a requirement is not the ex ante assessment of formal qualifications, but the ex post confirmation or removal of a manager on the basis
of responsibility on results; moreover, discretion in the selection and
appointment process has to be accepted, provided the process is transparent (for example the CV of the candidates are published on the web, etc.)
and, crucially, accountability on results of the individual office and of the
overall public sector organization is provided (Del Vecchio 2001; Pezzani
2003, 2005). In this perspective, differently from the position of Cassese,
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aspects like the possibility of removal of managers is, all in all, assessed
in a positive way – for immovable bureaucrats in some key positions may
create gridlocks – as is positively assessed the insert of professionals from
outside the public sector (side entrants33), especially when the capacities to
lead organizational change processes are required.34
It seems that an important part of what occurred in Italy over the last
two decades regarding the reform of the civil service reflected also the
struggle of ideas among these streams of thought concerning the conception of the civil service and the relationship between administration and
politics, whilst other positions in Italy seem to be more a matter of emphasis on specific components of these main conceptions and arguments than
alternative doctrines about how the civil service should be organized. It
remains an open question which doctrine will (temporarily) win – very
likely, the struggle is bound to go on for some time to come.
NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
There is an important qualification, however, to the extent public competitions are
utilized for staff recruitment in Italy, which is represented by the phenomenon labelled
‘titularization’ (Cassese 1993). Titularization is a process relatively common especially
in Southern European countries (see Sotiropoulos 2004), though certainly not entirely
unknown to the public sector of many other nations, and involves hiring personnel
to meet temporary labour shortages in the public sector and then granting to these
personnel the status of civil servant or the functional equivalent. The phenomenon,
widespread especially in the South of Italy, probably became less relevant – at least
in absolute size terms – following up the retrenchment of the public sector during the
1990s, but remained an element characterizing the public sector in Italy.
A related cultural trait concerns the status and prestige associated with working for
the different tiers of government. A legacy of the Napoleonic administrative tradition
in Italy is, broadly speaking, a higher status associated with working for the central
government (on the point and its implications, see Ongaro 2006a).
To our knowledge, the latest available complete survey dates back to 1995, when the
percentage of civil servants from southern regions in central administration was 73 per
cent on the total amount. This figure is even more surprising for what concerns top civil
servants: in the same year, 93 per cent of them came from the South of Italy (Cassese
1999).
Beyond any sociological analysis on the effects the values, culture, style of conducting
personal relationships, etc. characterizing society in the South of Italy can have on the
functioning of the bureaucracy at large, the most evident effect seems to be on a component of the reforms that occurred in Italy during the 1990s: devolution. The argument (originally elaborated in Fedele and Ongaro 2008) is that the ‘southernization’ of
the administration may influence the process of devolution in different ways. First, it
may be argued that many southerners are not ‘friendly’ towards devolution, since this
process could increase regional disparities and weaken the redistributive policies of
the central state. Second, the north-south gap is not only economic, it also includes a
strong disparity in the administrative capacity (Putnam 1993). Southern civil servants
at the central level of government could be sceptical, because of their direct knowledge,
about the capacity of regional governments to run the devolved functions; thus, they
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
could be sceptical about the overall benefits of devolution reform, and ultimately
oppose it.
Italy features a National Healthcare Service, in many respects patterned on the British
NHS.
The core government, excluding healthcare organizations that are in Italy functionally
dependent on the regions.
Rows 1–6: our estimates drawing on Cristofoli et al. (2007) and Rebora (1999). Rows
8–11: elaboration by Cristofoli et al. on data of the General Accounts Office relative to
the year 2004. The estimates are made on the basis of available data as of the year 2006.
Values in rows 1 and 3 for central government are the result of web search conducted
by David Galli within the frame of the FPA project “COCOPS”.
See Cristofoli and Turrini, p. 52. Data regard only the 15 ordinary statute regions.
Though of course such comparisons between public and private are problematic due to
a number of other dimensions to be taken into account.
Though with limitations: the broad organizational design can be determined only by
primary or secondary law adopted by political organs.
The Ufficio per il personale delle pubbliche amministrazioni.
The Ufficio per la formazione del personale delle pubbliche amministrazioni.
Training combines class teaching and on-the-field activities.
Other schools are linked to specific ministries. In particular, the ministry of the interior,
the ministry of the economy and finance, the foreign ministry, and the army and the
police have specialized schools for the training of their staff.
The Ufficio per le relazioni sindacali delle pubbliche amministrazioni.
Legislative decree 29/93. The description of the Civil Service Contract Negotiation
Agency follows Ongaro (2006b); for an analysis of this agency within the broader
context of executive agencies in Italy, see Fedele et al. (2007).
As of 2006, the agency staff (about 50 people, all working in the same building in Rome)
were civil servants coming from different public administrations all over the country.
They were selected through an open process aimed at identifying top level officials,
already in the payroll of a public sector organization, willing to be reallocated to the new
agency and whose distinctive skills were up to the role and the tasks of the new agency.
The agency is steered by a corporate board, which is composed of five members (three
of them are appointed by the central government, whilst the other two members are
chosen by representative institutions of local and regional governments). The president
is chosen within the three members appointed by the central governments. Indeed, this is
the only kind of ‘direct’ influence the executive government at all levels (central, regional,
local) can wield over the agency, which for the remainder is autonomous in defining
the contents of the national labour contracts it is going to negotiate with the unions.
However, it should be added that the global amounts of money for each labour contract
are determined within the general budgeting process of the government, a circumstance
that surely weakens the negotiating position of the agency in front of the unions, as the
total amount of money ‘available’ is already known to the counterpart (after approval of
the annual budget): hence the room for manoeuvre of the agency is restrained to obtaining the most in terms of contractual conditions improving productivity and flexibility
of personnel. There are also other formal (committees) and informal ways by which the
‘employers’ at all levels of government may influence the process by which the agency
determines the contents of the regulation of the labour relations in the public sector. The
funding system for the functioning of the Civil Service Contract Negotiation Agency is
rather peculiar. It is based on a compulsory transfer from every public administration,
at all levels of government. Every public entity, in fact, transfers a fixed yearly quota
(mainly determined by the number of employees) to the Agency. This determines a high
degree of financial autonomy of the agency (Fedele et al. 2007; Ongaro 2006).
This and the subsequent section draws on Ongaro 2009, chapter 3.
Embodied in the legislative decree 29/93, following up the legge delega 421/92, that is, the
delegation by the parliament to the government to issue a law within given guidelines.
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20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Some ‘corps’, like diplomats, prefects, the police, et al., made an exception.
On the point, see also Bellè (2007).
A two-tier labour contract system (one national, articulated into several distinct contracts according to sectors, and one at the level of the individual public sector organization) was set up; in the subsequent years, and especially during the first two rounds
of negotiation (contracts regarding the period 1994–7 and the 1998–2001) important
innovations were introduced through private law labour contracts (for example, the
possibility of rewarding ‘team performance’, quite a novelty for the Italian public
sector). This reform has been partly reversed by another reform in 2010, which reduced
the scope of labour contracts.
Though this lever was in practice used to a very limited extent. Removal of managers
could be done also in the case of mismanagement and abuses – procedures for removal
were in this respect already present in the system and were simply partly revisited.
We should add that the qualification of this reform as introducing the ‘spoils system’
in Italy was heavily criticized by the author of the reform, Bassanini, who vehemently
rejected this label as a way of characterizing his reform.
Commentators (for example Cassese 2002) agree that retributions, especially at top
level, have substantially increased over the period since the end of the 1990s to the first
half of the 2000s at a rate superior to what occurred over the previous decades.
Both in terms of administrative risk and in terms of safety of reward.
See for example the position papers and other documents of the Associazione dei
Dirigenti Generali, ADIGE, or association of general managers: www.adige.org –
accessed October 2007.
It should be noted that a large expansion of what is commonly referred to as the
‘Italian-style spoils system’ throughout all managerial layers, and the reduction of the
minimum length of appointment, was introduced in 2002, after Bassanini’s appointment, though it was later also significantly reverted through a successive reform intervention in 2005).
A wide review of these works and positions is in Ongaro (2009).
Where sustainability can be defined broadly as in Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, chapter
5; see also Boyne et al., 2003) as the long term satisfaction of stakeholders – in the case
of public organizations encompassing all the public needs that are addressed – matched
with the accretion or at least the maintenance of the tangible and intangible assets of the
organization – an instrumental but crucial condition for sustainability to develop over
the long term.
Management is in this respect a function distinct from the setting of the institutional
goals (that once set must be pursued by the management).
Those, it should be noted, that in the public debate over the 1990s were looked at as the
‘interpreters’ of an approach they theorized over the previous couple of decades and
that was at that time dominating the reform talk.
Which might occur partly through the spoils system and partly through a pre-selection
based on public competition, with the selected staff, subject to confirmation in the roles
of the public sector on the basis of demonstrated performance after a given probationary period.
To better understand this point, it should be noted the interesting phenomenon of the
emergence of a new occupational domain during the 1990s, the profession of ‘managerialized’ administrators, exemplified but not exclusively represented by the ‘directors
general’ at the local level, more skilled in management disciplines (rather than law) and
more orientated to risk-taking than the previous ‘generation’ of officials, and in a relatively strong position vis-á-vis regional/local politics, partly because of the emergence of
a ‘market’ of general directors – and managers in general – with local governments, even
run by different party coalitions, contending for some highly reputed, skilled general
directors, and partly because this group had a significant internal cohesion (a role in
this respect was probably played by the representative association, the Associazione
Nazionale Direttori Generali Enti Locali, or national associations of general directors
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of local governments, as well as by some schools of public management/schools of
government that profoundly contributed not just to develop managerial skills but more
fundamentally to create a self-perception by directors general, and public managers
more at large in regional/local governments, of their status and role).
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