Soviet Spies and the Fear of Communism in
America
Reactions of Congress to the Alger Hiss Case, 1948-1960
Mémoire
Brigitte Rainville
Maîtrise en histoire
Maître ès arts (M.A.)
Québec, Canada
© Brigitte Rainville, 2013
Résumé
Le but de ce mémoire est de mettre en évidence la réaction des membres du Congrès
des États-Unis dans le cadre de l'affaire Alger Hiss de 1948 à 1960. Selon notre source
principale, le Congressional Record, nous avons pu faire ressortir les divergences
d'opinions qui existaient entre les partisans des partis démocrate et républicain. En ce qui
concerne les démocrates du Nord, nous avons établi leur tendance à nier le fait de
l'infiltration soviétique dans le département d'État américain. De leur côté, les républicains
ont profité du cas de Hiss pour démontrer l'incompétence du président Truman dans la
gestion des affaires d'État. Il est intéressant de noter que, à la suite de l'avènement du
républicain Dwight D. Eisenhower à la présidence en 1953, un changement marqué
d'opinions quant à l'affaire Hiss s'opère ainsi que l'attitude des deux partis envers le
communisme. Les démocrates, en fait, se mettent à accuser l'administration en place
d'inaptitude dans l'éradication des espions et des communistes. En ayant recours à une
stratégie similaire à celle utilisée par les républicains à l'époque Truman, ceux-ci
n'entachent toutefois guère la réputation d'Eisenhower. Nous terminons en montrant que le
nom d'Alger Hiss, vers la fin de la présidence Eisenhower, s'avère le symbole de la
corruption soviétique et de l'espionnage durant cette période marquante de la Guerre Froide.
iii
Abstract
This masters thesis examines the reactions of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate to the Alger Hiss case starting in 1948 until the end of 1960.
Through analysis of the Congressional Record, a striking contrast in political opinions
emerged. While Northern Democrats denied the possibility of Soviet infiltration during the
HUAC hearings, Republican‟s used the Hiss scandal to demoralize the Truman
administration. The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952 changed
the way both parties reacted to the communist issue and the repercussions of the Hiss case.
Whereas Democrats had previously contradicted accusations of Soviet espionage in the
State Department, they began criticizing the Republican administration of being soft on
communism in an attempt to recreate the same atmosphere of distrust that had plagued
Truman‟s time in office. By the end of Eisenhower‟s presidency in 1961, Alger Hiss‟ name
came to represent Soviet espionage of the Cold War era.
v
Table of Contents
Résumé ............................................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................. xi
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 1-A Traitor in their Midst: Hiss, Chambers and the Conspiracy Revealed to the House
Un-American Activities Committee, 1948 .........................................................................................19
The path towards communism: Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers ...........................................21
1.1-House of Representatives .........................................................................................................27
1.1.1-Democrats .........................................................................................................................27
1.1.2-Republicans .......................................................................................................................35
1.2-Senate .......................................................................................................................................38
1.2.1-Democrats .........................................................................................................................38
1.2.2-Republicans .......................................................................................................................40
CHAPTER 2-Seeing Red: Congressional Reactions to the Infamous Hiss Perjury Trials, May 1949January 1950 ......................................................................................................................................45
2.1-House of Representatives .........................................................................................................45
2.1.1-Democrats .........................................................................................................................46
2.1.2-Republicans .......................................................................................................................49
2.2-Senate .......................................................................................................................................63
2.2.1-Democrats .........................................................................................................................64
2.2.2-Republicans .......................................................................................................................65
CHAPTER 3-Alger Hiss, the New Benedict Arnold: His Evolution from State Department Red Spy
to Symbol of Cold War Treachery, 1950-1960 ..................................................................................71
3.1-House of Representatives .........................................................................................................72
3.1.1-Democrats .........................................................................................................................72
3.1.2-Republicans .......................................................................................................................83
3.2-Senate .....................................................................................................................................104
3.2.1-Democrats .......................................................................................................................105
3.2.2-Republicans .....................................................................................................................109
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................123
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................................129
vii
In loving memory of my grandfather Earl
Larocque. Your strength will always be an
inspiration.
ix
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Bernard Lemelin for his invaluable
insight, suggestions and encouragement throughout this process.
Thank you to my parents, Gilles and Colette and to my siblings, Amélie and Joey.
Your support and long distance phone calls kept me connected to home from so far away.
Thank you to my best friends, Breigh and Karah. Though we may not see one
another often, our enduring friendship means everything to me.
Finally, a big thank you to Louis, whose humor and boundless support these last few
years made accomplishing this goal that much easier. This journey would not have been as
enjoyable without you. Je t‟aime.
xi
Introduction
Anti-communist sentiment ran rampant in the United States during the years of the
Cold War. This „anti-red‟ hysteria was the product of both internal fears and external
struggles such as the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, the Berlin blockade and the
Cuban missile crisis. Nonetheless, the abhorrence of socialist principles in the U.S. can
also be explained by the subversive activity of Communist party members. Several „red‟
spies succeeded in attaining prominent government positions for the sole purpose of
stealing classified intelligence. Well-known agents include Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,
who were executed for sending atomic secrets to the Soviet Union1, Elizabeth Bentley, who
defected from the communist underground and supplied information to the American
authorities2, as well as Judith Coplon, a Department of Justice employee suspected on
several occasions of transferring restricted material to a Soviet contact.3
Similar to the notoriety of the Rosenberg case, the perjury trials of ex-State
Department official and New Deal lawyer Alger Hiss forced Americans to rethink their
preconceived notions of „red‟ spies. His extensive career was put into question after he was
publicly accused in 1948 of subversive activity for the Communist party based in
Washington. His accuser, Whittaker Chambers, had been a member of the same covert
organization, conducting courier duties between sources and his superiors, only to leave in
the late 1930‟s once he realized his principles no longer aligned with the party‟s objectives.
Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev‟s The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in
America-The Stalin Era recounts that Chambers began collecting stolen documents from
his informants before his break in order to use as insurance to protect his life and his family
in the event the Communist party leaders sought retribution for his betrayal. Consequently,
1
Alan Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of the American People, New York, McGrawHill, 2008, p. 776.
2
John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials that Shaped American
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 60-66.
3
The FBI placed wiretaps on Coplon‟s telephone and followed her on several occasions while she met with a
Soviet delegate named Valentin Gubitchev. On one occasion, it seemed as though Coplon and Gubitchev
were attempting to evade the FBI and even though there was no exchange of secret material, Coplon was
arrested. She was found guilty during her first trial but then was awarded a new one when her appeal revealed
that the FBI had used illegal wiretaps. She was convicted a second time. This verdict was also overturned
because she had been arrested without a warrant and the FBI had ruined the wiretap evidence. The Supreme
Court reviewed the case and ruled in her favor. William K. Klingaman, ed., Encyclopedia of the McCarthy
Era, New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1996, p. 93-94.
1
the stolen files became crucial as the case progressed. The classified evidence made their
first appearance at the Baltimore libel suit4 and were known from then on as the „Baltimore
Papers.‟ Hidden in a dumbwaiter shaft at Chambers‟ nephew‟s home, the cache was
comprised of typewritten and handwritten notes of secret State Department files along with
several rolls of undeveloped microfilm. While he turned over the typed and written notes,
Chambers chose to keep the film in case the „Baltimore Documents‟ were not well
received.5
The House Un-American Activities Committee‟s involvement6 combined with the
incriminating „Baltimore Documents‟ and newly discovered „Pumpkin Papers‟, essentially
led to Hiss‟ perjury trial which began in 1949. Opening statements in the first courtcase
focused on two themes. The prosecution put emphasis on Chambers‟ story and the stolen
papers while the defense used Hiss‟ career to demonstrate his credible reputation. In large
part, specifics of the suit were overshadowed by the public uproar surrounding judge
Samuel H. Kaufman‟s bias in favor of the Hiss defense. Details that did emerge probed the
main points such as Chambers‟ reasons for keeping documents as a „life preserver‟ and the
timing of his accusations coinciding with the 1948 presidential campaign. Through a
careful analysis of the „Pumpkin Papers‟, experts were able to prove three things: all, except
one, came from originals sent to the State Department, Francis B. Sayre‟s7 secretary
disproved Hiss‟ explanation of the office‟s procedures for handling classified material and
they had all been typed on the Hiss‟ Woodstock typewriter. 8 The trial ended in an 8-4
deadlock for conviction.
4
Hiss sued Chambers for defamation after he repeated his charges on the radio program Meet The Press on
September 4th 1948. Ibid., p. 62.
5
Chambers had placed the rolls of film inside a hollowed out pumpkin at his Maryland farm for safe keeping.
The House Un-American Activities Committee issued a subpoena for any other documents Chambers may
have had in his possession; he was left with no other choice than to surrender the files to the committee. The
story of the microfilm‟s location added intrigue to an already popular case. From that point on, the secret
State Department documents would be known as the „Pumpkin Papers.‟ Ibid., p. 62.
6
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) –congressional committee created in 1938 to investigate
subversive activity. Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., The Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia, Boston, G.K. Hall & Co.,
1989, p. 162.
7
Francis B. Sayre was appointed to the position of Assistant Secretary of State by Roosevelt in 1933.
Biographical Encyclopedia of America, New York, The Colonial Press Inc., 1940, p. 830.
8
Experts were able to determine that the characteristics of the Hiss standards were identical to those of the
stolen State Department documents. The Hiss standards were four documents given to the FBI by Alger and
Priscilla Hiss for comparison. They included a letter written in 1931, a detailed personality description of
2
Contrary to the controversies of the first lawsuit, the second was much more
subdued. This does not mean the public lost interest, only that the finer points of the
proceedings were at the forefront of discussions instead of a scandal surrounding the
propriety of a judge‟s rulings. Both the defense and the prosecution made reference to the
credibility of Hiss‟ version of events and the importance of the documentary evidence in
their opening statements.9 Judge Henry W. Goddard permitted both sides to include new
testimony previously refused by Kaufman.
Therefore, the purchase of Chambers‟
Westminster, MD farm10 was used to exhibit his friendship with Hiss. His reasons for
hiding the microfilm in a hollowed out pumpkin were finally disclosed along with the
details of the transaction of Hiss‟ Ford with a poor communist organizer.
Judge Goddard also allowed witnesses to testify who had previously been refused.11
While the prosecution questioned a maid employed by Chambers from 1935-1936, she
divulged that her employers solely had two visitors. She pointed to Alger and Priscilla
Hiss. This demonstrated once again that the friendship between Alger and Whittaker ran
much deeper than a simple lease arrangement between strangers 12.
Unlike the
disappointing end of the first trial, Hiss was convicted of perjury in 1950, sentenced to five
years in Lewisburg Penitentiary in 195113 and was released in late 1954.
Although the Hiss case drew the attention of ordinary American citizens, journalists
and scholars, it was viewed by members of the United States Congress as an important
topic of discussion as well.
In relation to the Hiss/Chambers affair, representatives
Priscilla‟s son Timothy for admittance to the Landon School situated in Maryland and typed in September of
1936, Priscilla‟s president‟s report of 1936-1937 as well as her 1937 application for admission to the
University of Maryland, Baltimore. Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, Toronto, Random
House of Canada Limited, 1997 (1978), p. 262 and 390.
9
Defense attorney Claude B. Cross concluded his opening statement by claiming that Chambers had stolen
the Woodstock typewriter and then typed the documents himself between April 1938 and November 1948.
Ibid., p. 422.
10
Unbeknownst to the first jury, Chambers saw the farm for the first time with Hiss in 1935 who wished to
purchase it for his wife Priscilla. When Hiss changed his mind, Chambers decided to buy it in 1937. The
prosecution used the Westminster farm as a way to demonstrate the closeness between the two men (who
would bring a stranger to view a property one was thinking of buying?). Ibid., p. 422-423.
11
Hede Massing corroborated Chambers‟ story that Hiss was part of the communist underground. Julian
Wadleigh testified that Chambers‟ appearance had not changed significantly since the day he first met him 13
years prior; thus making Hiss‟ inability to recognize Chambers at the HUAC hearings an obvious stalling
tactic. Ibid., p. 174.
12
The Hiss‟ had sublet their apartment to the Chambers‟ after moving to a new house. Ibid., p. 27-28.
13
Ibid., p. 446, 464. Hiss was released from prison in 1954 after serving three years and eight months.
3
demonstrated an avid interest in all aspects of the case while senators considered the details
of the ordeal to measure its national and international impact. Party opinions were similar
in both legislative houses.
Whereas Democrats continued to doubt the severity of
communist infiltration, Republicans used the case to their advantage to damage Truman‟s
credibility, to gain seats in Congress and to win the next presidential elections.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
The study of American political history has evolved since the nineteenth century.
According to Michael Kammen14, historians began to realize that the study of America‟s
past was much more complex than was previously believed.15 It evolved in the 1970‟s and
a new younger group began to scrutinize the intricacies of the subject. This new class
replaced the older more distinguished scholars who had been preeminent until the 1960‟s.
By the 1970‟s, academics were more analytical and descriptive and began to study subdisciplines such as social and political history in addition to foreign relations.16 A „reexamination‟ of the field was done in the 60‟s and 70‟s. Whereas past studies focused on
the wealthy, the newly invigorated method consisted of gaining a deeper understanding of
the working class and their impact on significant events.17 Kammen‟s The Past Before Us
includes a collection of essays by various historians who impart their own views on the
field‟s recent changes. Allan Bogue‟s18 contribution entitled „The New Political History in
the 1970‟s‟ is of particular interest to students of the U.S. political system. Structured as a
historiographical account of American political history and its evolution in the 1900‟s,
Bogue introduces the growing methodological trends of the 60‟s and 70‟s and the key areas
of study of those adhering to the „new political history.‟19
For their part, Jean Heffer and François Weil explain that this „New History‟ sought
to incorporate other disciplines; social history borrowed theories from sociologists and
Michael Kammen, The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, London,
Cornell University Press, 1980, 524 p. Michael Kammen is Professor Emeritus of American History and
Culture at Cornell University p. 508.
15
Ibid., p. 20.
16
Ibid., p. 22, p. 30, p. 206 and p. 355.
17
Ibid., p. 24-25. By examining the working class in conjunction with the elite, historians were able to
determine their influence on class systems and the human interaction between both groups.
18
Allan Bogue is Professor Emeritus of American History at the University of Wisconsin. Ibid., p. 505.
19
Ibid., p. 231-237.
14
4
anthropologists, political history drew inspiration from political science, etc.20 Heffer and
Weil‟s 1994 book Chantiers d’histoire américaine, gives the reader a French perspective of
America‟s past. Like Kammen‟s collection of essays, Heffer and Weil have incorporated
dissertations by different French authors in order to deliver what they believe is an unbiased
rendition of the historical progression in the U.S.21
In particular, the chapter on the
country‟s politics written by Jacques Portes and Catherine Pouzoulet reviews the various
topics of interest emerging after the Second World War. These include debates regarding
the Constitution between the “historiens progressistes […] [et les] historiens
consensuels,”22 as well as the study of parties and the electorate.23
Steven M. Gillon‟s “The Future of Political History” published in 1997 in the
Journal of Policy History presents a similar opinion to that expressed by Heffer and Weil‟s
study. He admits that the field declined in popularity starting in the 1960‟s due to a
generation dissatisfied with their political leaders and the way they chose to handle
international conflicts such as the war in Vietnam.24 Nonetheless, Gillon points out that the
last decade has seen a rise in the study of political history as scholars began to adapt ideas
and methodologies according to those used by colleagues of other subdisciplines.25
Meg Jacobs‟ 2003 book entitled The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in
American Political History is one of the latest studies to examine the development of
America‟s political past. Expanding on what is expressed in Gillon‟s article, Jacobs‟ own
contribution to the multi-authored volume describes a “revitalization of American political
history”26 in which scholars of diverse specialties have come together to conceive two new
methodological approaches: new institutionalism27 and sociocultural political history.28 In
20
Jean Heffer et François Weil. Chantiers d’histoire américaine, Paris, Belin, 1994, p. 18-19.
Ibid., p. 15-16.
22
Jacques Portes et Catherine Pouzoulet, “Déclin et renouveau de l‟histoire politique,” dans Chantiers
d’histoire américaine par Jean Heffer et François Weil, Paris, Belin, 1994, p. 93-94.
23
Ibid., p. 97.
24
Steven M. Gillon, “The Future of Political History,” Journal of Policy History 9, 2 (1997), p. 241.
25
Ibid., p. 249.
26
Meg Jacobs et al., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 2.
27
New institutionalism examines the impact of institutions on events or certain situations. Like „old‟
institutionalism, the „new‟ method studies the effect of an institution on political matters. The evolution of
political institutions as well as the belief that the state is an “autonomous actor” is also an integral part of this
21
5
comparison to the 1994 and 1997 works of Heffer, Weil and Gillon, Jacobs‟ The
Democratic Experiment contradicts previous fears of the subject‟s “intellectual death”29 and
instead demonstrates that it was simply forced to evolve and work alongside other areas of
study (social history, sociology and political science) in order to thrive.30
Since the 1980‟s several books and articles were published focusing their studies on
the functions and dynamics of U.S. political parties and the structure of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches (Mark D. Brewer, Jeffrey M. Stonecash, etc.). 31 Thus, the
importance of the United States Congress in our masters thesis has made the study of its
historiography a necessity. Political scientists and historians alike have demonstrated a
keen interest in the examination of America‟s bicameral chamber. Historians such as
Roland Young32 and Ellen Greenberg33, scholars like Claire-Emmanuelle Longuet34 and
political scientists like Edmond Orban35 have released helpful studies to introduce students
to this crucial aspect of American government. Significant subjects in these books include
the requirements for running a successful legislature, the selection of its members, the
difference between House and Senate procedures and the evolution Congress has
undergone since its creation by the founding fathers.
Since 2000, however, scholars have chosen to concentrate on more specific facets of
the bicameral body. In “Five Factions, Two Parties: Caucus Membership in the House of
Representatives, 1994-2002”, DeWayne Lucas and Ellen Dutchman take a closer look at
the various factions within the House of Representatives and the way in which these
new methodological approach. David Brian Robertson, “The Return to History and the New Institutionalism
in American Political Science,” Social Science History 17, 1 (1993), p. 2-3, 19-21.
28
Ibid., p. 3.
29
Ibid., p. 3.
30
Ibid., p. 1-3.
31
For more information on American political history, see Mark D. Brewer and Jeffrey M. Stonecash‟s
Dynamics of American Political Parties, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 242p.; Stephen J.
Farnsworth‟s “Patterns of Political Support: Examining Congress and the Presidency” in Congress & the
Presidency 28, no. 1 (2001)
32
Roland Young, The American Congress, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958, 333p.
33
Ellen Greenberg, The House and Senate Explained: The People’s Guide to Congress, New York, W. W.
Norton & Company, 1996, 173p.
34
Claire-Emmanuelle Longuet, Le Congrès des États-Unis, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1989,
127p.
35
Edmond Orban, Le système politique des États-Unis, Montréal, Presses de l‟Université de Montréal, 1987,
344p.
6
divisions affect voting and disagreements within parties. Others have concentrated on the
relations between the presidency and the legislature and the effect of public opinion
regarding foreign policy in Congress.
Robert David Johnson‟s 2006 study entitled Congress and the Cold War is
reminiscent of our own research topic. Starting in the mid-1940‟s, Johnson considers the
way in which both the House and Senate responded to international and domestic issues
during the Cold War period until its end with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The power
exerted by Congress in the post World War II years is presented as an anomaly but that the
special circumstances of the Cold War forced politicians to take an active stand. Johnson‟s
source material consists of the journals and archived papers of congressmen during the post
War years.
American anti-communism has seen several trends since the early 1950‟s. Like the
study of the Cold War, the traditionalist movement was prominent from the 1950‟s to the
mid-1960‟s. Historian Marc J. Selverstone36 affirms that this first wave of anti-communist
scholars treated the American Communist party as an ally of the Soviet Union and that their
research rejected the legitimacy of the group because they [Communists] planned to corrupt
the integrity of the very American organizations that supported their existence.37
Furthermore, revisionist scholars of the late 1960‟s to the mid-1970‟s focused their analysis
on those who staunchly opposed communists. Members of this school of thought were firm
believers that the „witch hunt‟ led by McCarthy38 was uncalled for in relation to the
Communist party‟s role and impact on American society.39 There was also a third and
36
Marc J. Selverstone, “A Literature so Immense: The Historiography of Anticommunism,” OAH Magazine
of History (October 2010), p. 7-11.
37
Ibid,. p. 7.
38
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Wisconsin) grew in prominence in 1950 with his crusade against
communism. His famous speech to the Republican Women‟s Club in Wheeling, West Virginia on February
9th, 1950 during the Lincoln Day celebrations was the start of his dedication to the removal of „reds‟ in the
United States. He claimed to have a list of 205 State Department employees working on foreign policy and
known for being members of the Communist party. The number of communists on his list changed drastically
as he travelled through the country delivering his impassioned speech. While effective in creating widespread
hysteria, Klingaman explains that McCarthy‟s speech was simply a plagiarized version of one given by
Nixon combined with testimony from the Senate Judiciary Committee and newspaper articles. He was
eventually censured after repeated conflicts not only with members of the opposition, but his own party and
the administration. The term „McCarthyism,‟ influenced by McCarthy‟s actions in the early 1950‟s, came to
signify the communist witch hunt of the early cold war era. Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 253-260.
39
Selverstone, loc. cit., p. 7.
7
fourth wave in anti-„red‟ historiography.
The third generation, as characterized by
Selverstone, began in the late 1970‟s and attained its peak by the end of the Cold War in the
early 1990‟s. While this phase is said to have included „traditionalist‟ and „revisionist‟
aspects, most were severe in their analysis of anti-communism and its connection to U.S.
political life and foreign policy.40 The fourth and final stage is said to be inspired by the
end of the Cold War conflict. Archives previously closed to the public (European and
Asian) were released, making a powerful impact on post World War II literature.41
Noteworthy historians include Athan Theoharis42, David Caute43, André Kaenel44
and Ellen Schrecker45. Athan Theoharis‟ Seeds of Repression takes an in-depth look at
anti-communism and McCarthy‟s rise to prominence during Truman‟s administration.
Using a vast amount of primary source material such as presidential papers, congressional
committee files, debates presented in the Congressional Record along with articles from ten
different newspapers, Theoharis begins by depicting the outbreak of the first Red Scare
after World War I and thoroughly inspects the progression of the fear of communism until
McCarthy‟s fall from grace during Eisenhower‟s presidency. While Truman‟s ascension is
portrayed as a catalyst for the power McCarthy was able to wield, Eisenhower is
represented as the antithesis; he is the reason for the Senator‟s downfall.46
David Caute‟s book The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman
and Eisenhower portrays anti-communist sentiment in America during the early years of the
Cold War. Caute includes a vast array of sources such as interviews, newspapers, legal
documents and court cases, biographies about spies like Elizabeth Bentley, Whittaker
40
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid., p. 8.
42 Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism, Chicago,
Quadrangle Books, 1971, 238p. and The Yalta Myths, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1970, 263p.
43
David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower, New York,
Simon and Schuster, 1978, 697 p.
44 André Kaenel, Anti-Communism and McCarthyism in the United States (1946-1954): essays on the politics
and culture of the Cold War, Paris, Éditions Messene, 1995, 189 p.
45
Ellen Schrecker, “History in Red-and White and Blue,” Radical History Review 93, (2005), p. 159-169.
Other articles and books by Ellen Schrecker include: “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of
Communism,” Social Research 71, 4 (2004), p. 1041-1086. ; “Archival Sources for the Study of
McCarthyism,” The Journal of American History, (1988), p. 197-208. ; Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse
of History After the Fall of Communism, New York, The New Press, 2004, 359 p. ; and with Maurice
Isserman, “The Rights‟ Cold War Revision,” The Nation, (2000), p. 22-24.
46
Ibid., p. 3-10 and 182-189.
41
8
Chambers and Alger Hiss, congressional publications and movies to demonstrate the
phenomenon that was the „Great Fear‟ in America.47
André Kaenel‟s Anti-Communism and McCarthyism in the United States (19461954) is a collaborative study and includes historians such as Ellen Schrecker, Hartmut
Keil, Jean-Marie Bonnet and John G. Blair. The book follows a chronological structure
with each scholar presenting key facts of the McCarthy period.48 Published in 1995, Kaenel
states that McCarthyism remains a relevant and sensitive topic and evokes many to question
historical interpretation and their national identities.49
Schrecker‟s expertise is demonstrated in her string of articles on anti-communism
and McCarthyism, the majority of which have been published in the past decade. Her focus
has been on representing the movement, its structure and the types of individuals that
emerged during Senator McCarthy‟s popularity. She also exposes the intense apprehension
of American citizens towards socialist ideals. They were under the impression that a
Communist party member‟s dedication to the Kremlin inevitably meant espionage and
betrayal.50
Other authors who have dedicated their time to the study of the effects of Soviet
doctrine in the United States include Albert Fried whose 1997 book focused on the
American government‟s actions during the red scare of the 1950‟s. Harvey Klehr and John
Earl Haynes have contributed to the historiography with their interesting article on
revisionist theories regarding the socialist ideological surge during the post War period.
Still, Jennifer Delton‟s51 2010 article gives a different perspective then most on the battle
against „red‟ infiltration. Her work, unlike Schrecker, has focused on anti-communist
measures undertaken by liberals such as Truman‟s administration before the advent of
conservatives like McCarthy and his radical methods of rooting out Soviet spies. Rather,
47
Caute, op. cit.,
Ibid., p. 9-17.
49
Ibid., p. 12.
50
Schrecker, loc. cit.,p. 1051.
51
Jennifer Delton, “Rethinking Post-World War II Anticommunism,” Journal of the Historical Society X, no.
1 (March 2010), p. 1-41.
48
9
she concludes that historians should study the efforts of liberals during the red scare instead
of always relegating these initiatives to the same category as McCarthyism.52
Scholars have been fascinated with subversive activity in the U.S. during the Cold
War. The last decade has produced a large amount of books and articles by authors like
John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr53, whose primary field of research include the
American spy cases, the Venona cables54 and the rise of communist subversion in the
United States. James M. Boughton‟s55 work focuses on another supposed Soviet spy
named Harry Dexter White who was linked to Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers and
Elizabeth Bentley. Kristie Macrakis,56 on the other hand, analyses the various styles of
espionage in her 2010 article, demonstrating the simplicity of Soviet integration into the
United States (since the U.S. was perceived by Soviet officials as an easily penetrable, open
society).
Finally, historians have been captivated by the Hiss case since Whittaker Chambers
uttered his first accusations in 1948. John Chabot Smith‟s57 book (published in 1976) on
the debate presents a „pro-Hiss‟ attitude as he attempts to put forward the possibility of
forgery by typewriter, one of the main tactics used by Alger‟s defense team. Contrary to
Smith, Allen Weinstein‟s58 1997 Perjury:The Hiss-Chambers Case is seen by scholars as
the most authoritative and accurate rendition of the scandal. While he does not broach
congressional opinions on the proceedings, Weinstein‟s purpose is to expose the details of
52
Ibid., p. 41.
Books and articles by these authors include: “Alexander Vassiliev‟s Notebooks and the Documentation of
Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States during the Stalin Era,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, 3
(2009), p. 6-25.; Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009,
650 p.; Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, 487 p.;
Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 2006, 251 p.
54
The Venona cables are Soviet messages decrypted by the American government; they are said to reveal the
culpability of many American spies, their code names and positions in government. See John Earl Haynes
and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999,
487 p.
55
James M. Boughton, “The Case Against Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven, History of Political
Economy 33, 2 (2001), p. 219-239.
56
Kristie Macrakis, “Technophilic Hubris and Espionage Styles during the Cold War,” Isis 101, 2 (2010), p.
378-385.
57
John Chabot Smith, Alger Hiss: The True Story, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, 485 p.
58
Allen Weinstein became the 9th Archivist of the United States in 2005 and leads the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). See Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, Toronto, Random House of
Canada Limited, 1997 (1978), 622 p. for more information on the Hiss case.
53
10
the controversy and trials to enable the reader to make their own assessment of Hiss‟
reliability. Interestingly, he explains the evolution of his own thoughts on the case while
collecting data for Perjury. On one of his last meetings with Hiss, Weinstein recounts how
he was compelled to admit that the emerging evidence had swayed his previous beliefs
regarding Alger‟s innocence. According to Weinstein, the controversy still emits heated
debates between both camps five decades after the fact. To Perjury‟s author, a positive or
negative review of a book on the trials will never resolve the ongoing battle for the truth
between Hiss‟ defenders and anti-communists.
Both Smith and Weinstein used credible sources in order to convey an authentic
depiction of the ordeal.
They were composed of interviews, case files, newspapers,
transcripts of congressional committees and FBI files. Others, such as James Barros59
sought to draw connections between Hiss and other notable spies like Harry Dexter White
and Canadian spy Igor Gouzenko. Although the evidence submitted during Hiss‟ trial has
more than proven his guilt, there are still those who believe he was wrongfully convicted
such as Kai Bird and Svetlana Chervonnaya‟s60 2007 article entitled “The Mystery of Ales:
The Argument that Alger Hiss was a WWII-era Soviet Asset is Flawed: New Evidence
Points to Someone Else.”
It is important to acknowledge Patrice Tremblay‟s61 2002 masters thesis entitled “La
faillite du libéralisme et le consensus anticommuniste : l‟opposition au McCarthysme à la
Chambre des représentants, 1950-1954.” The focus of his thesis is to demonstrate the
House of Representatives‟ opposition to McCarthy and his anti-„red‟ crusade. Tremblay‟s
use of the Congressional Record as one of his primary sources corroborates the significance
of the congressional minutes in the examination of the opinions of representatives and
senators. While he does include a section on the Hiss case in his first chapter, Tremblay‟s
purpose is to use the incident as an example for the growing contempt for communism, the
failure of liberalism and the eventual progression towards McCarthyism. In comparison,
our subject studies the development of opinions in Congress in relation to the Hiss case, the
59
James Barros, “Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White: The Canadian Connection,” Orbis, (1977), p. 593-605.
Kai Bird and Svetlana Chervonnaya, “The Mystery of Ales: The Argument that Alger Hiss was a WWII-era
Soviet Asset is Flawed. New Evidence Points to Someone Else,” American Scholar 76, 3 (2007), p. 20-35.
61
Patrice Tremblay, “La faillite du libéralisme et le consensus anticommuniste : l‟opposition au
maccarthysme à la Chambre des représentants, 1950-1954,” mémoire de maitrise, Université Laval, 2002.
60
11
differences in party attitudes and the overall representation of Alger Hiss a decade after his
conviction.
PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS
Our masters thesis will examine the United States Congress‟ opinions and attitude
regarding Hiss‟ betrayal and subsequent perjury trials. We will also place further emphasis
on the way Republicans used the scandal to dominate discussions in both legislative houses
for the purpose of demoralizing and discrediting their opposition. Democrats, on the other
hand, articulated two separate opinions based on their geographic locations. While those
from the South62 expressed beliefs reminiscent of their Republican colleagues, Northern
Democrats either ignored the issue completely or denied there was a problem. In addition,
assessing congressional discussions from 1948-196063 will permit us to establish the
evolution of the meaning of the Hiss case. The purpose of our time frame is twofold. First,
we are not only able to analyze congressional reactions from the start of the HUAC
hearings of 1948 to Hiss‟ eventual conviction in 1950 but the transformation and
symbolism of the case in the decade following the guilty verdict as well. And second,
Eisenhower‟s departure from the presidency coincides with the end of our time period.
This allows us to analyze the change of opinions in Congress as the 20 year reign of two
Democratic administrations comes to an end. We are able to observe the widespread
change of party reactions during Eisenhower‟s administration from 1953 to 1961.
Therefore, our time period permits us to study the effects of two very different
administrations. Both had individual impacts on the Cold War and influenced the sway of
opinions in Congress. This being said, our hypothesis examines the shift of these opinions
starting in 1948 during the Truman presidency until the end of Eisenhower’s time in office.
62
When referring to the South, we include the 11 states of the Confederacy: the seven lower states (Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and South Carolina) and the states in the upper south
(Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia). Michael Perman‟s study explains that these 11 are
generally accepted by all scholars as „Southern‟ states. Nonetheless, border states are often included to the
original 11. For our purpose, we will take into account the influence of the Southern states on the opinions
expressed by politicians of the border states (Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware).
See Michael Perman, Pursuit of Unity: A Political History of the American South, Chapel Hill, The University
of North Carolina Press, 2009, p. 1-3.
63
It is important to note that though Eisenhower leaves the Presidency in January of 1961, we have only
included debates in the Congressional Record until the end of the year 1960. While we have consulted
January of 1961 for any mention of Hiss (there was none), we felt that ending our study at the end of 1960
with the impending end of President Eisenhower‟s time in office appropriate.
12
The beginning of the controversy is viewed as a betrayal of the highest order as well as a
black mark on the Democratic party for their failure to remove the threat when Chambers
came forward with his story in 1938. With the Hiss conviction and the progression of
years, however, we see a gradual change in the way he is portrayed. While still personified
as the ultimate American traitor, we will attempt to demonstrate that his deception and case
has come to represent Soviet espionage during the Cold War period.
SOURCES
The primary source used for this thesis is the Congressional Record which is
situated at the library of l‟Assemblée Nationale du Québec.
The library has the
Congressional Record on microfilm beginning in 1933-1985 and 1989.
The U.S.
Government Printing Office64 website has published the Congressional Record online from
1994 to present. As demonstrated by Richard J. McKinney in his article “An Overview of
the Congressional Record and Predecessor Publications,” the Record is printed on a daily
basis by the Government Printing Office (GPO).65 McKinney characterizes the Record as
containing congressional floor proceedings.
This includes debates, discussions, bills,
committee reports and any other inclusions deemed important by members of the House
and Senate.66 Any conversations, remarks or introduction of legislation is recorded and
reproduced in book form. The Congressional Record is a crucial source to study as we are
able to see exactly how and why the American government reacted to certain issues.
Moreover, it permits historians to gain an inside perspective of the different measures taken
by the American government to deal with key political concerns.
The following congressional sessions will be consulted for this masters thesis: the
th
80 (1947-1948), 81st (1949-1950), 82nd (1951-1952), 83rd (1953-1954), 84th (1955-1956),
85th (1957-1958) and the 86th (1959-1960). The 80th session will only be consulted starting
in 1948-the year Alger Hiss is accused of subversive activity by Whittaker Chambers.
Using the Congressional Record as our sole primary source is what brings originality to this
thesis. Although many aspects of the Hiss case have been studied, authors such as Allen
64
U.S. Government Printing Office. Congressional Record. http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/index.html.
Richard J. McKinney, “An Overview of the Congressional Record and Predecessor Publications,” Law
Library Lights, (winter 2002), p. 17.
66
Ibid., p. 17.
65
13
Weinstein and John Chabot Smith have not used this fundamental source in their studies;
choosing instead to base most of their research on the Hiss case files and FBI documents.
Thus, by using the Record, this study will put emphasis on the reactions of the U.S.
Government‟s legislative branch.
McKinney‟s “An Overview of the Congressional Record” illustrates the Record‟s
growth over the years; that by 1970, 40 000 pages per session was a normal occurrence.67
These thousands of pages make manually searching through the Record illogical and
extremely time consuming; thus, an index is provided for each year which permits a more
efficient perusal. Keywords, names, places, events and bills are accompanied by page
numbers for discussions and debates in the Congressional Record. Although the House of
Representatives and Senate‟s speeches are published in separate sections, the index is not
divided in this way. As a result, some topics or themes may have been discussed in greater
detail in the Senate for example, but it is impossible to be positive until the pages specified
are consulted.
Unfortunately, there is still a slight limitation to this primary source. As stated by
Howard Mantel, the contents of the Record are not meant to be exact duplications of the
speeches presented by congressmen68 even though it is reliable in depicting what happened
in the House and Senate.69
The root of this disadvantage is described in Donald A.
Ritchie‟s article “Beyond the Congressional Record: Congress and Oral History.” The
problem is that senators and representatives are given the opportunity to review their
dialogue after they have been delivered to their colleagues to make changes to them prior to
publication in the Record.70 This editing most often takes place when a congressman
wishes to censor a section that is damaging to his character or to change a passage that was
stated poorly in the heat of debate on the House or Senate floors. Moreover, any comments
made in conjunction with those of an associate cannot be altered to ensure the meaning of
67
Ibid., p. 17.
Howard N. Mantel, “The Congressional Record: Fact or Fiction of the Legislative Process,” Western
Political Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1959), p. 982.
69
Ibid., p. 987.
70
Donald A. Ritchie, “Beyond the Congressional Record: Congress and Oral History,” Maryland Historian
13, no. 2 (1982), p. 7.
68
14
the conversation is not lost.71 This demonstrates that the discussions included in the Record
are not always exact transcriptions of what was said. Be that as it may, these „corrected‟
debates and speeches still reflect the main ideas and opinions of the representatives and
senators since they are the ones editing their own words. Consequently, it is a relatively
accurate rendition of Congress‟ attitude towards the issues being considered. Finally,
Tremblay72 and Belhumeur‟s73 use of the Congressional Record in their masters thesis has
established the appropriateness of this source when studying congressional standpoints.
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study is to determine the responses of the U.S. Congress towards
the Hiss case with an emphasis on Republican perspectives. We will explore the reactions
of the members of the House and Senate, to see why various congressmen were more
outraged than others and take note of the decisions that were made in conjunction with the
Hiss accusations, trial and conviction. In order to efficiently appraise the congressional
mindset, a qualitative method of research will be employed followed by content analysis.
As defined in Alex Mucchielli‟s Dictionnaire des méthodes qualitatives en sciences
humaines et sociales, using a qualitative method of research during data retrieval allows us
to scrutinize and explain historic events.74 Thus, the main points of a text (debate or
discussion in the case of the Congressional Record) must be taken into account before any
in-depth inspection is performed.
Prior to our research in the Congressional Record, various themes based on our
topic needed to be selected to facilitate a more efficient classification. Also, each phase of
the Hiss ordeal was assigned to corresponding congressional sessions and in turn delineated
the contents of our chapters. The 80th Congress covers the HUAC hearings (Chapter 1), the
81st Congress considers the period of both perjury trials and the conviction of January 1950
(Chapter 2), and the second half of the 81st Congress starting in February 1951 until the
86th Congress studies the aftermath and evolution of the case (Chapter 3). These categories
71
Ibid., p. 7.
Tremblay, loc. cit.,
73
Andréa Belhumeur, “Le débat au Sénat Américain entourant l‟adhésion des États-Unis à la cour permanente
de justice internationale de janvier 1935,” mémoire de maitrise, Université Laval, 2007.
74
Ibid,. p. 11 and Alex Mucchielli, Dictionnaire des méthodes qualitatives en sciences humaines et sociales,
Paris, Armand Colin, 2009. 303p.
72
15
were used to ensure only relevant information was chosen from the Record. The key words
consulted in the index to attain the appropriate debates and discussions included: Alger
Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, communism, communists, subversion and House Un-American
Activities Committee.
Using Microsoft Office OneNote, an extensive analytical journal was produced. A
separate section was created for the House of Representatives and Senate by year for our
time period (ex: 1948-House, 1948-Senate, 1949-House, 1949-Senate, etc.). A third section
was included for the speeches in the Record‟s Appendix75 for each congressional period.
Each section is also subdivided into various pages (by date of discussions). Each page
(date) contains an analytical table into which key points of the relevant debates of the
Congressional Record are inserted. The fields of each column include the page numbers of
the discussion, the date, the speaker and state, their political affiliation, the subject and
opinion expressed within their speech. There is a final column to insert any additional
notes or impressions while reading the discussion. Although it may seem a lengthy process,
a proper dissection of these debates is necessary in order to properly review the material.
Once all data was inserted in the tables, the compilation of information was analyzed and
used to establish our hypothesis.
It is very important to note the obvious difference in the amount of Democratic and
Republican speeches throughout this masters thesis. The decline is most noticeable in
Chapter 2 (the period of both perjury trials). Northern Democrats are relatively silent with
the majority of speeches given by members of the Southern faction of their party. In
comparison, Republicans dominate discussions in all three chapters.
This lack of
information in the Congressional Record is not an error in our research method but the
Democratic party‟s reaction to the incriminating evidence revealed in both trials. Their
silence seems to be an acknowledgement of the damage done to their party‟s reputation. As
expounded in George A. Dondero‟s (Michigan) July 13th, 1949 speech, a Hiss guilty verdict
75
The Congressional Record‟s Appendix is comprised of the inclusions (newspaper articles, legislation
details, etc.) that could not be incorporated in the speeches of senators and representatives due to the time
constraints during debates in the House and Senate.
16
is essentially a guilty verdict for the Democratic party, for the New Deal and for the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations. 76
PLAN
As mentioned, our masters thesis is comprised of three chapters, focusing on the
important phases of the Hiss case in chronological order. This distribution assists in
demonstrating the evolution of party opinions and attitudes regarding the case in a concise
and organized manner. Each chapter contains sub-sections starting with an examination of
the reactions expressed in the House of Representatives followed by those within the
Senate. The House appears first since it is more invested in discussing the case in large part
because of its committee on Un-American Activities. Its members expose details of their
hearings to put emphasis on the importance of their work; that without them, Hiss would
not have been apprehended. While members of the Senate still debate the Hiss/Chambers
scandal, they are less committed in light of their responsibilities in national affairs. An
influx in senatorial discussions does occur in later years as members of the Un-American
Activities Committee are elected to the upper house (most notable is Karl E. Mundt of
South Dakota). Each party is studied individually in the House and Senate subsections. As
a result of their minimal participation in the Congressional Record, the Democrats are
viewed first. Those who do contribute are mostly from the South and emit Republican-like
reactions to Hiss‟ betrayal. Their Northern brethren are either completely silent or in favor
of Truman‟s „red herring‟ statement; that the fear of communist infiltration sweeping the
nation is implausible. The Republican party is studied last in light of the overwhelming
amount of speeches retrieved from the Record as well as to emphasize their dedication to
the eradication of communism during our time period.
In Chapter 1: A Traitor in their Midst: Hiss, Chambers and the Conspiracy Revealed
to the House Un-American Activities Committee, 1948, we look at the initial attitude in
Congress as the details of Hiss‟ betrayal begin to unfold. While Northern Democratic
disbelief is at an all time high, the HUAC hearings and subsequent libel suit validate
Republican claims of Soviet infiltration. Chapter 2: Seeing Red: Congressional Reactions
to the Infamous Hiss Perjury Trials, May 1949-January 1950 studies the way in which
76
Congressional Record, July 13th, 1949: p. A4470.
17
Republicans and Democrats responded to the emerging details of the case. Judge Samuel
H. Kaufman‟s obvious favoritism for Hiss is of utmost importance in Congress in the first
half of the chapter; it is used by the Republican opposition as further evidence of the
executive‟s leniency towards communist ideology.
In the second half, congressmen
dedicate their time to the denunciation of Supreme Court Justice‟s as character witnesses
and the injudicious remarks of Secretary of State Dean Acheson after the pronouncement of
the guilty verdict in January 1950. Chapter 3: Alger Hiss, the New Benedict Arnold: His
Evolution from State Department Red Spy to Symbol of Cold War Treachery, 1950-1960
considers the aftermath of his conviction and the way in which opinions in Congress
experience a gradual transformation over the following decade. The case is viewed less as
an immediate threat to national security and is instead seen as a part of Cold War history; a
lesson for future generations learning about the post War period. Finally, the conclusion
will revisit the main points of this masters thesis in order to demonstrate the way in which
the Alger Hiss case helped shape the Cold War period.
18
CHAPTER 1-A Traitor in their Midst: Hiss, Chambers
and the Conspiracy Revealed to the House Un-American
Activities Committee, 1948
Evidence of Soviet espionage initially gripped North America‟s attention with the
emergence of the Gouzenko affair in Canada in 19451. Further proof of subversive activity
surfaced after documents provided by Igor Gouzenko‟s defection leaked the identities of
several strategically placed intelligence agents in the United States and Great Britain. The
files alluded to a spy in a key role of the American government; assistant to the assistant
Secretary of State.
Furthermore, the information gathered claimed that the man had
accompanied President Roosevelt to Yalta2. Although the material did not divulge any
names, the detailed description of the position occupied by the Soviet agent seemed to point
to a man named Alger Hiss.3 Canadian authorities notified the U.S. government regarding
the suspected State Department employee however; nothing was done to apprehend the
alleged traitor.
Thus, this chapter will focus primarily on the opinions of Democrats and
Republicans in the House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the interrogations of
Whittaker Chambers and Alger Hiss by the House Un-American Activities Committee. We
will study their confrontation before the Committee and the libel suit that inevitably lead to
1
Though the Gouzenko scandal originated in Canada in 1945, it was only made public in the United States in
1946. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 48-57.
2
The Yalta Conference was a February 1945 meeting between U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin for the purpose of discussing the
future of Europe and Asia in the aftermath of the War. The Yalta Charter was an agreement between the three
Great Powers in which they promised to help countries formerly under Nazi rule. The Charter specifically
stated that all political and economic matters be solved in a democratic way and demanded that the citizens of
the former occupied countries have the right to choose their form of government. Unfortunately, the Soviet
Union did not take the Charter seriously and to conservative politicians, the Yalta Conference became
synonymous with the loss of freedom of the Eastern European countries within the Soviet sphere. Klingaman
ed., op. cit., “Yalta Conference,” p. 404.
3
Republican Senator William E. Jenner (Indiana) was a strong advocate of educating the American citizens
regarding the dangers of adhering to communism which would inevitably lead to the loss of basic American
civil rights. Regarding the Hiss-Chambers case, Jenner demonstrates the way in which Hiss has become a
symbol of Soviet espionage in America when he states: “When we Americans think of the Red underground,
we think of that news photograph we have all seen: Alger Hiss whispering to the dying Franklin Roosevelt at
Yalta.” Congressional Record, May 14th, 1958: p. 8691.
19
the divulgence that Hiss was not simply a strategically placed communist sympathizer in a
high ranking government position, but a „red‟ spy.
By 1948, the growing hysteria of a Soviet takeover was consuming the United
States.4
Though initial probes during the Second World War focused on fascist
organizations, the Cold War and the fear of widespread communism gave the House UnAmerican Activities Committee a new target to chase. William O‟Neill refers to HUAC‟s
members as a group of random politicians struggling for popularity and power. 5 More
often than not, their investigative methods were portrayed as lacking moral standards and
their incessant search for „reds‟ in government often led to innocent people being
wrongfully accused.
The panel of representatives included Chairman J. Parnell Thomas
(New Jersey), who would eventually be convicted for salary fraud, John E. Rankin
(Mississippi), whose comments in the House were often infested with racism and bigotry6
and Karl E. Mundt, who demonstrated an extreme dedication to the capture of subversives.
The newest member, Richard M. Nixon (California), used the Alger Hiss accusations by
Whittaker Chambers in August 1948 as a way to reinstate the Committee‟s reputation and
to propel himself into the political limelight.
Although HUAC was actively trying to find and convict Soviet agents,
Representatives Mundt and Nixon were simultaneously trying to pass a law in the House
that would impair underground communist activity. This new legislation, entitled the
4
A Soviet invasion was perceived as a real possibility by 1948 after the „coup de Prague‟ in February
followed by the Berlin Blockade in June. To many U.S. government officials, their inability to prevent the
„coup de Prague‟ was considered a serious failure. Igor Lukes‟ “The 1948 Coup d’État in Prague Through the
Eyes of the American Embassy” gives a detailed rendition of the months leading up to the communist coup in
Prague. While British and French ambassador‟s in Czechoslovakia were well aware of the rising tensions
between democrats and communists, American ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt was absent for most of his
time in office. His reports to the State Department were devoid of any mention of political crisis.
Unfortunately, he was misinformed by his Chargé d’Affaires, John H. Bruins (in Czechoslovakia at the time)
who was unaware of any upheaval and instead reassured the ambassador that the democrats would win the
upcoming elections (any issues that arose were brushed aside and thought to be rumours). By February 20th,
democrats were resigning from their posts in government claiming that their opponents “were preparing a
dictatorship.” Two days later, armed soldiers patrolled the streets of Prague, citizens were banned from
traveling and communist committees had taken over aspects of everyday life in the city (enterprises, media,
etc.). The „coup de Prague‟ and the Berlin blockade legitimized the fear of a communist takeover in the
United States. Igor Lukes, “The 1948 Coup d’État in Prague Through the Eyes of the American Embassy,”
Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, 2011, p. 431-442.
5
Kirkendall ed. op. cit., p. 162.
6
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 309.
20
Subversive Activities Control Bill, or H.R. 58527, is outlined by Klingaman as prohibiting a
foreign power from taking any kind of political control in the U.S.8 The bill would force
the Communist party to register its members with the Department of Justice9 as well as
ensure that all propaganda be labeled to notify readers of its controversial contents.
Consequently, fear of communism was a part of Cold War culture in 1948 and was widely
discussed by civilians and politicians alike. Although many would profess that there was
no imminent danger to the American way of life, it is this tense atmosphere that would
make the Hiss/Chambers controversy one of the biggest spy scandals in United States
history.
The path towards communism: Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers
Alger Hiss was born on November 11th, 1904 in Baltimore. Allen Weinstein‟s
Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case informs us that his father, Charles Alger Hiss, had been
unemployed and charged with supporting not only his own family, but his deceased
brother‟s six children as well.10 In his desperation, he committed suicide in 1907 and left
his wife, Mary, with the responsibilities he was unable to fulfill.11 Though widowed, she
was determined to give her children the kind of upbringing they deserved. John Chabot
Smith‟s Alger Hiss: The True Story illustrates her intense devotion to Alger and his siblings
by depicting her daily activities and long hours of work managing her household; she spent
many evenings making her own clothes and ensuring her children‟s wardrobes were well
mended and pressed.12 She volunteered in their community, started a „Mother‟s Club‟ and
took part in other groups which essentially taught her family the importance of aiding local
charities and organizations.13
7
H.R. 5852 is also referred to as the Mundt-Nixon Bill; named for its two authors. Congressional Record,
June 19th, 1948: p. A4403.
8
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 270.
9
All official political parties must register their members with the Justice Department. Therefore, having the
Communist party register its members would not only give the government access to the names of
communists in the United States, but also force the Communist party to behave like a real political party of the
United States; ensuring that no foreign power has control over the American Communist party‟s political
decisions. Congressional Record, May 14th, 1948: p. 5849.
10
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 64.
11
Ibid., p. 64.
12
Smith, op. cit., p. 35.
13
Ibid., p. 35.
21
Fortunately, the loss of his father did not prevent Alger from growing into a
successful young man. After high school, he enrolled at Johns Hopkins and participated in
several extracurricular activities (editor of the school newspaper, president of various clubs
and was part of numerous sports teams). Following the completion of his B.A. in political
science (1926),14 he was accepted into Harvard Law School and thrived under the tutelage
of Felix Frankfurter15. Regrettably, Alger‟s early adult life was marked by more tragedy
with the death of his older brother Bosley in 1926 from Bright‟s disease16 and the suicide of
his sister Mary Ann in 192917. Soon after graduating from Harvard Law School, he began a
one year internship as clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and married Priscilla
Fansler Hobson shortly after assuming his new post18.
His career began to flourish after he was married. In 1930, he took a job with a
Boston law firm, Choate, Hall and Stewart. The Hiss‟ moved to New York in 1932 and
Alger commenced work for Cotton and Franklin19. It is during this crucial period of the
Depression that the young couple began to explore socialism. Weinstein depicts Alger‟s
introduction to the writings of Karl Marx and his newfound preoccupation for labor law
while Priscilla became dedicated to humanitarian work linked to Socialist organizations20
and her eventual membership in the Socialist Party in 1930. She volunteered periodically
and often brought her husband to several meetings. By 1934, they relocated to Washington
for Alger‟s new job in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration; part of Roosevelt‟s
New Deal initiative. His work in the AAA was followed by four months as part of the Nye
Committee.21 At the end of his contract, he found a job with the Justice Department which
14
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 173.
Felix Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court by president Roosevelt in early January of 1939, was
unanimously accepted on the 16th and took his oath of office on January 30th. Liva Baker, Felix Frankfurter,
New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969, p. 206-211.
16
Bright‟s disease is described in Weinstein‟s Perjury as “a degenerative kidney ailment, […] malignant and
crippling.” Weinstein, op. cit., p. 67.
17
Ibid., p. 68.
18
Ibid., p. 69.
19
Ibid., p. 84-85.
20
Ibid., p. 85.
21
The Nye Committee was a senatorial committee chaired by Republican Senator Gerald Nye (North Dakota).
This Committee was charged with investigating the impact of munitions manufacturers in the U.S. and abroad
on American policy during and after the First World War. Alger Hiss accepted a position as part of the legal
staff for the Nye Committee in 1934. See Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood:
Soviet Espionage in America-The Stalin Era, New York, The Modern Library (2000), p. 40.
15
22
kept him in frequent contact with the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis B. Sayre (who
had also been Hiss‟ professor at Harvard Law School). Although earning a handsome
wage, Alger became interested in a job opening as Sayre‟s assistant in the State
Department.
Whereas Hiss‟ upbringing was filled with family outings and religious activities to
supplement the void of his father‟s passing, Whittaker Chambers‟ childhood was drab, with
no theological beliefs and a distant father who chose to forgo his parental duties. Jay
Vivian Chambers, later known as Whittaker Chambers22, was born on April 1st, 1901 to Jay
Chambers and Laha Whittaker Chambers. Unfortunately, his parent‟s relationship was
nowhere near perfect, creating a constant atmosphere of fear and discontent during
Whittaker‟s early years. The eventual separation of his parents, though welcome for the
absence of fighting, is depicted by Weinstein as an apprehensive period of time for
Whittaker and his younger brother Richard.
Smith‟s The True Story demonstrates Laha‟s unwavering strength in spite of the fact
that she was left with the care of two young children after the departure of her husband.
Jay‟s refusal to contribute financially forced her to use creative means to provide for her
family; she baked goods, grew vegetables in her garden and raised chickens to sell for
profit.23 Though Jay eventually returned, he isolated himself in a separate bedroom and
was unsuccessful in reaching out to his two sons who, out of loyalty to their wronged
mother, were compelled to dislike him.
Even though the early years of Whittaker‟s childhood were wrought with distress
emanating from his parents‟ failed marriage, he grew up in a household dedicated to the
arts. When referring to Laha and Jay, Whittaker exclaimed that they were “the intellectuals
of that period.”24 Religion held no place in their home and instead focused on languages,
literature and fine art. Weinstein makes reference to Whittaker Chambers‟ book Witness in
which he depicts the fact that Les Miserables by Victor Hugo taught him about Christianity
and political upheaval. To Chambers, revolution was a logical reaction for those in despair
22
While Chambers‟ real name is Jay Vivian, we will always refer to him as either Whittaker or Chambers
since it is how he was known during our time period.
23
Smith, op. cit., p. 312-313.
24
Ibid., p. 73.
23
and admits to relating to such a state of mind during his childhood.25 Therefore, Whittaker
was attracted to revolutionary ideals at an early stage in his upbringing and education.
After high school, he left his childhood home to find work. It is at this point that he
began to use pseudonyms instead of his own name to acquire employment. With an
unsuccessful stint as a laborer and a futile attempt to join the navy, Whittaker returned
home and was hired as a file clerk at his father‟s advertising firm. Jay did not want his
coworkers to know that Whittaker was his son and introduced him using a different alias.26
These two experiences of using fabricated identities made relinquishing his life as Jay
Vivian effortless once he immersed himself in the communist underground. Although
initially enrolled at Williams College27, he withdrew after the first day and registered at
Columbia College28 where he spent most of his time writing poems and short stories for the
college magazine and eventually became editor of the publication.
His path towards communism began the summer of 1922 during a trip to Europe
with two Columbia friends where he was able to gain firsthand knowledge of the
destruction and economic upheaval caused by World War I.29 While his voyage opened his
eyes to the desolation caused by the war, Weinstein reports that this was not essentially the
catalyst that induced Whittaker Chambers to join the Communist party. Instead, his 1925
acceptance into the communist fold was put into motion after various incidents in his
personal and family life left him with nowhere to turn.30 After a brief affair with a married
woman and re-enrollment at Columbia in the fall of 1924, Whittaker dropped out of college
for the second time and was forced to watch over his unstable family members (“senile
grandmother; his reclusive father; his possessive mother; and his suicidal brother”).31
Weinstein‟s Perjury chronicles his brothers repeated efforts to take his own life and its
impact on Whittaker‟s state of mind.32
25
Ibid., p. 75.
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 77.
27
Williams College is in Williamstown, Massachussetts.
28
Ibid., p. 77.
29
Ibid., p. 81.
30
Ibid., p. 81.
31
Ibid., p. 81.
32
Ibid., p. 83-84.
26
24
Whittaker‟s ideology tended to sway towards the negative during this period of
time. He was a strong believer that the events surrounding his upbringing and his brother‟s
struggle with depression were a sign that the „American Dream‟ and democracy were
failing institutions, soon to be replaced by a totalitarian form of government; the answer to
the worlds recent catastrophes.33 He became a member of the party in 1925 and immersed
himself in his duties (meetings, delivering The Daily Worker, reading communist literature,
etc.).34 Unfortunately, in September 1926, Whittaker‟s younger brother Richard committed
suicide. This tragedy, as explained by Weinstein, seems to have refocused Whittaker‟s
dedication and he worked tirelessly as a journalist for The Daily Worker and received
several translation contracts.35 Regrettably, 1929 was a decisive year with the death of both
his grandmother and father, coinciding with the power struggle between the American
Communist party‟s leaders. His new superiors attacked his contributions to The Daily
Worker which prompted him to sever all ties with the organization later that year.36
His relationship with Esther Shemitz began in 1930 and they married on April 15th,
1931. Though not a member of the Communist party, Esther took part in rallies while
working for the Amtorg Trading Company37 (known for its connection to the Soviet
government).38 The newlyweds eventually moved to New Jersey and Whittaker‟s literary
abilities permitted his reintegration into the Party. His stories, published in The New
Masses, impressed Soviet leaders and he was eventually offered a position in the
communist underground.39
Weinstein and Vassiliev‟s The Haunted Wood: Soviet
33
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Whittaker Chambers,” p. 60.
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 88.
35
Ibid., p. 90-93.
36
Struggles between two party factions reached a climax in 1929 with the dominant group led by Jay
Lovestone and Benjamin Gitlow against a group led by William Z. Foster and Earl Browder. Foster and
Browder‟s rebel group (comprising of only a small fraction of Party membership) were able to take control of
the Communist party with the help of Soviet leaders. Those following Lovestone became known as the
Lovestoneites and were promptly expelled from the Party. Chambers was not associated with this group
however, his work on the paper was criticized (particularly by Browder‟s brother-in-law who worked for the
same newspaper). Therefore, it is most likely that Chambers‟ work was associated with the Lovestoneites as a
way to remove him from his position at The Daily Worker. Ibid., p. 94.
37
Weinstein and Vassiliev‟s The Haunted Wood describes the Amtorg Trading Company as a legitimate
trading company created and run by the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the legal business was also used as a
cover for their espionage activities. See Weinstein and Vassiliev, op. cit., p. 23.
38
Ibid., p. 95.
39
Ibid., p. 95-96.
34
25
Espionage in America-The Stalin Era claim that July 1932 was the point at which
Chambers commenced his six year stint as a courier for the Washington based apparatus.40
Although the childhood and career aspirations of both Hiss and Chambers varied
immensely, they had several things in common. They were plagued with tragedy and
despair at a young age and again as adults. They were raised by strong women who took
charge of their families after the betrayal and loss of their husbands. Education was a
priority in both households and, although Chambers never graduated from college, his
upbringing was filled with the desire to learn several languages and a passion for literature
which permitted him to work as a journalist and a successful translator. The destruction
caused by the First World War and the onset of the Great Depression marked them, perhaps
a reminder of their familiarity with loss. Even though they were both employed, the
poverty and destitution surrounding them could not be overlooked.
This in itself
encouraged Hiss and Chambers to dedicate their lives to the improvement of the United
States, albeit in their own way. Hiss, as a New Deal lawyer, and Chambers, following the
communist ideals of the period. Unfortunately, fifteen years after their first meeting (in
1934),41 Hiss‟ participation in a secret communist apparatus and his friendship with
Chambers would lead to his eventual prosecution.
While both branches of Congress discussed the Hiss scandal in 1948, the House of
Representatives was more invested in large part because of the involvement of its
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Their dedication to the eradication of
subversive activity in the U.S. played an important part in unraveling the facts of Hiss‟
treason. The only Democratic mention of the affair for the 1948 period takes place in John
E. Rankin‟s presentation of a HUAC report (December 1948) in which he takes an in-depth
look at the investigations and the details made public after the libel suit. Republicans, on
the other hand, refrain from making any statements on the betrayal. 42 We can surmise that
the time frame of the accusations coupled with the Committee hearings and legal
proceedings led many congressmen to remain silent until further details were made
40
Ibid., p. 99.
Ibid., p. 125.
42
Republican Committee members such as Nixon and Mundt were involved in the investigation and still
searching for decisive evidence which explains their silence at this juncture of the ordeal.
41
26
available at the end of the year (HUAC report and subsequent perjury trials in 1949).
While the story of an underground apparatus became a crucial topic of American interest in
August 1948, Democrats and Republicans began the year analyzing the pros and cons of the
Subversive Activities Control Bill (H.R. 5852).
1.1-House of Representatives
Before the Chambers revelations in the summer of 1948, members of the House
were in the process of discussing the Mundt-Nixon bill; a piece of legislation seen by many
as a necessity for the protection of the American democratic system. Nonetheless, the
appearance of Whittaker Chambers before HUAC and his subsequent disclosure that Alger
Hiss was a communist changed the course of debates in Congress.
No longer were
subversives unknown entities taking part in clandestine missions to overthrow the U.S.
government; they now had a face and the reality of the situation was much worse. Hiss was
not a lowly American citizen but the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, an ex-State Department official who had accompanied President Roosevelt to Yalta
as assistant to the assistant Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius Jr.43, as well as named
Secretary General of the San Francisco Conference to draft the United Nations Charter.
Furthermore, while working for Sayre, Hiss had access to classified material. Acquiring
this confidential information was one of the main tasks given to „red‟ spies in high ranking
positions.
In 1948 the House of Representatives focused their discussions on the
accusations made before HUAC; the more damaging details would eventually be divulged
with the onset of the libel suit.
1.1.1-Democrats
As stated earlier, debates concerning subversive activity in early 1948 largely
surrounded the exploits of HUAC and H.R. 5852. Specifically, deliberations on the
Subversive Activities Control Bill took precedence in the House from May 1948 until the
end of June 1948. A large majority of Democratic representatives from the Northeastern
43
Edward Stettinius Jr. began his career in government as head of the War Resources Board as well as taking
part in the Office of Production Management. He was eventually appointed to take charge of the Lend-Lease
program in 1941. By 1943, he became under secretary of State followed by Secretary of State from October
1944 to July 1945. Regarding the creation of the United Nations, Stettinius chaired the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference in 1944 and took part in the San Francisco Conference of 1945. He was replaced by James F.
Byrnes as soon as Truman became president. Kirkendall ed., op. cit., “Edward Riley Stettinius Jr.”, p. 341.
27
part of the country were disapproving of the bill. To many of them, this communist
hysteria sweeping the nation was caused by a combination of Republican motives and the
Committee‟s incessant need to uncover a conspiracy. On May 14th, 1948 Adolph J. Sabath
(Illinois) stated:
Six months ago, the Republican leaders, having no issue to present to the people
in order to obtain their vote, decided to make communism the issue for the
Presidential campaign and have endeavored to insinuate and even charge that
the Democratic Party is receiving support from groups you have designated as
communistic fronts.44
This opinion was uttered by several members of the Democratic party during Truman‟s
administration. Most were convinced that their Republican opposition had created this
„red‟ infiltration problem as a political tactic for the 1948 presidential campaign.
Opposition to the bill was entrenched in the belief that it was unconstitutional and went
against basic American civil rights. Representatives Mary T. Norton (New Jersey) and
Helen Gahagan Douglas (California) promoted the use of social reform to combat
communism instead of passing vague legislation. Those who agreed with Norton and
Douglas presumed that Soviet ideology was adhered to by those living in destitution who
had nowhere to turn but to a party claiming to fight for a better, more equal world.
Although conditions in the United States were nowhere near as dire as those in the Soviet
Union and Germany after the Second World War, Douglas believed that passing housing
regulations and fixing the inflation problem would go a long way in discouraging American
citizens from turning to alternative political ideals.45 To others, such as George G.
Sadowski (Michigan), the Mundt-Nixon bill was compared to the kind of law passed by
Hitler in Germany.46 This new widespread Democratic opinion regarding the improvement
of programs was shared by several party members residing in the North and West of the
country. They encompassed a more contemporary group, most of which were younger than
their New Deal counterparts, who strove to encourage a modernized version of politics
based on mutual participation and a change in party interactions.47
44
Congressional Record, May 14th, 1948: p. 5840.
Congressional Record, May 18th, 1948: p. 6031.
46
Congressional Record, May 14th, 1948: p. 5880.
47
Nicol C. Rae, Southern Democrats, New York, Oxford University Press, (1994), p. 14.
45
28
Whereas the Northern Democrats expounded their outrage at what seemed to them a
violation of civil rights, their Southern associates praised the members of HUAC for their
hard work and initiative in writing such a necessary extension to the American Constitution.
Richard Nixon, in particular, is commended extensively throughout the May 1948 debates
for introducing to the House a bill that would essentially remove the threat of communism
in the United States.48 Estes Kefauver (Tennessee), John S. Wood (Georgia) and E.E. Cox
(Georgia) advocated the importance of a program that would discourage Americans from
joining a political party whose main goal consisted of replacing capitalism with a
totalitarian regime.49 Their quick acceptance of H.R. 5852 is in large part representative of
their allegiance to the Southern conservative faction of the Democratic party. These
congressmen tended to side with the Republican party concerning issues affecting their
Southern territory.50 Such was the case when President Truman began proposing civil rights
legislation and created the President‟s Committee on Civil Rights51. Consequently, they
were in favor of the proposed solution to circumvent the communist ploy and encouraged
the passing of the Mundt-Nixon Bill. Reactions to this legislation has demonstrated that for
many politicians during the first half of 1948, subversive activity was a real and present
danger. While some may have had political motives for their promotion of the bill, it would
not have been such an important topic of interest had Soviet espionage simply been a
Republican fabrication.
By August 3rd 1948 debates regarding H.R. 5852 where overshadowed by the
appearance of Whittaker Chambers before HUAC. His presence before the Committee,
nonetheless, was not by his own initiative. He had been named by Elizabeth Bentley52, a
48
Congressional Record, May 14th, 1948: p. 5858.
Congressional Record, May 16th, 1948: p. A1658.
50
Rae, op. cit., p. 12-14.
51
For more on the creation of the President‟s Committee on Civil Rights and their famous report entitled To
Secure These Rights, see Senator W. Lee O‟Daniel‟s (Texas) opinion on the Committee on page 38-39. Also,
Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten‟s Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman
Administration gives a detailed rendition of the Truman presidency‟s accomplishments regarding civil rights
in the U.S.
52
Elizabeth Bentley, known as the „Blond Spy Queen‟ in the media (her alias was „Clever Girl‟ and „Myrna‟
from Haynes, Klehr and Vassiliev, op. cit., p. 639), was a Soviet spy and courier from 1938 until her defection
in 1945. Her final years dealing in communist affairs consisted of managing two large espionage networks,
the Silvermaster group and the Perlo group. Notable Silvermaster sources included Harry Dexter White (not a
member but a Soviet sympathizer) who worked for the Treasury department and Lauchlin Currie (also a
Soviet sympathizer) who was an aide in the White House during Roosevelt‟s administration. By the summer
49
29
witness who had been called by the Committee on July 31st, 1948 in relation to their
investigation into spying within government departments.53 As illustrated by Richard M.
Nixon in the House on January 26th, 1950, Chambers was issued a subpoena in order to
verify the details of Bentley‟s testimony.54 For their part, Democrats remained steadfast in
their silence after the first accusations were uttered. The sole contribution by a member of
their party is on behalf of John E. Rankin who presented a HUAC report to the House of
Representatives on December 31st 1948. Despite the fact that it is not included in the
Congressional Record, Rankin endeavors to give a detailed description of its contents.
Starting with an introduction of the newly discovered spy ring in the State Department, he
proceeds to illustrate the finer points conceded at the hearings. Evidence and statements
collected proved that these agents had stolen secret military and diplomatic information.
Rankin makes it a point to draw a link between the files and the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.
From the very beginning of his speech, his goal is to exhibit the severity of Soviet
reconnaissance and to expose the consequences of these actions. Although the concern
over a communist coup grew in popularity with the start of the Cold War, the report
specifically states that the Soviet espionage system had been in place for the last twenty
five years.55
The presentation of the published results of the Committee hearings effectively
allows us to gain firsthand knowledge of their perception of Hiss and Chambers and gives a
detailed description of the information supplied to the House. Starting with aspects of
Chambers‟ background, his break with communism on August 23rd, 1939 after the RussoGerman pact56 is examined followed by his attempt to warn the President of the ongoing
of 1948, Bentley had left the organization and had accused over 30 people of committing espionage.
Unfortunately, none were tried and convicted save two minor players (one of which was William Remington).
Until the release of the Venona transcripts and Russian archives, most thought Bentley had been lying. She
was finally vindicated in the 1990‟s as access to previously classified files revealed the names of those she
had accused. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 60-89.
53
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950: p. 1000.
54
Ibid., p. 1000.
55
Congressional Record, December 31st, 1948: p. A5351.
56
As explained in Alan Brinkley‟s The Unfinished Nation, before the start of the Second World War in
Europe, Britain and France had pledged that they would come to Poland‟s rescue should Germany attempt an
invasion. Unfortunately, they did not approach the Soviet Union in a timely fashion. Stalin, fearing an attack
from Germany and certain that the West would not come to his aid should the need arise, agreed to a pact with
Hitler (August 1939), which also assured the Germans that they would not need to protect their Eastern front
from the Soviets. See Brinkley, op. cit., p. 714.
30
conspiracy. Meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle57, he claimed to have
enumerated the details of his involvement with a Washington based apparatus and named
several prominent government employees including Alger and his brother Donald Hiss.
According to Chambers‟ testimony, Berle took handwritten notes for over an hour and a
half. Rankin depicts Roosevelt‟s indifference once he was notified of the controversial
accusations. In 1941, he was summoned by representatives of the Justice Department
where he once again told his story and named Hiss as one of the members of his spy ring.
While Rankin‟s speech gave extensive facts on Chambers‟ defection and subsequent
confessions, his speech lacks Hiss‟ side of these early allegations.
This deficiency is rectified in Allen Weinstein‟s Perjury. From the 1939 Berle
interview to the eventual more public HUAC charges in August of 1948, Hiss58 was
periodically questioned by the FBI and his superiors on whether or not he was sympathetic
to the communist cause. Interestingly, Weinstein‟s study claims that FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover59 and high ranking members of Congress and the State Department had been slowly
trying to ease him out of his post as early as 1945.60 His decision to leave his career with
the government was done some time after being asked about his possible communist
leanings to avoid making it seem as though he was leaving out of a sense of guilt.61 On
February 1st, 1947 Hiss began his new career as President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Unfortunately, allegations of disloyalty did not cease and culminated
in his resignation during the perjury trials.
57
Adolph Berle was an unofficial advisor to President Roosevelt and helped shape the New Deal. His
specialty, however, was in Latin American affairs and he eventually became Assistant Secretary of State in
the late 1930‟s. Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Adolf A. Berle Jr.,” p. 26-28.
58
Allen Weinstein conducted several interviews with Alger Hiss in which he gained valuable information
surrounding the case.
59
John Edgar Hoover was the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and held the position for
48 years until his death in 1972. He was dedicated to the investigation of radical organizations and often
employed questionable techniques to apprehend criminals. By the 1940‟s, Kirkendall explains that Hoover‟s
importance was akin to that of the president. And by Truman‟s administration, he had successfully ensured
that his authority could not be questioned and supplied intelligence not only to the White House, but to
conservative politicians such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy. By the late 1960‟s members of
Congress began questioning the Bureau‟s actions, several even demanding Hoover‟s resignation. He died
before he could be reprimanded and by 1975-76, the release of official FBI records supported congressional
claims that Hoover had abused his power. Kirkendall ed., op. cit., Athan Theoharis “John Edgar Hoover,” p.
159-161.
60
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 316.
61
Ibid., p. 328.
31
Additionally, Chambers‟ accusations on August 3rd did not strictly focus on Hiss but
included several other prominent government employees such as Lee Pressman, Nathan
Witt, John Abt, Henry Collins and Harry Dexter White62. Klingaman‟s Encyclopedia of
the McCarthy Era illustrates how these men were recruited by the Soviet Union for the sole
purpose of influencing legislation in their favor in the hopes of promoting the spread of
communism. The group was not initially considered an espionage ring and Klingaman
affirms that their work eventually evolved to encompass subversive activity. 63 Hiss,
however, was the only one to contact HUAC the next day to refute the charges64 and was
asked to appear on August 5th. He emphatically stated that he was not, and had never been
a communist, denied any acquaintance with a man named Whittaker Chambers and used his
extensive professional background to demonstrate his credibility.65 Even though a large
majority of Committee members present believed he was telling the truth, others were not
convinced and endeavored to question Chambers further on August 7th in order to
determine the extent of their supposed friendship.66
Rankin illustrates the Committee‟s dedication to uncovering the true story of their
association. While Hiss consistently denied ever knowing someone by the name of
Whittaker Chambers, on August 16th, he did admit to having contact with a George Crosley
during the time period prescribed by Chambers.67 On August 17th, 1948 they confronted
one another before HUAC and after examining Chambers‟ teeth and asking him several
questions, Hiss identified him as Crosley.68 The report specifies Hiss‟ assertiveness when
62
These men held various positions in government. Lee Pressman was the former Assistant General Counsel
for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration followed by the Counsel for the Works Progress
Administration as well as Counsel for the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations). Nathan Witt was the
former Secretary of the National Labor Relations Board. John Abt was a former Labor Department attorney.
Henry Collins had a position in the Labor Department as well as with the U.S. Occupation Forces in
Germany. Harry Dexter White was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. See Richard M. Nixon, Six
Crises, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., (1962), p. 3-4.
63
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Whittaker Chambers,” p. 60.
64
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950: p. 1000.
65
Ibid., p. 1000.
66
Ibid., p. 1001.
67
Congressional Record, December 31st, 1948: p. A5352.
68
Though Hiss most likely used the examination of Chambers‟ teeth as a way to prolong identifying
Chambers as George Crosley; this infamous episode of the HUAC hearings only proved to Committee
members that Hiss and Chambers had had an intimate relationship during the time period described by
Chambers. See Weinsten, op. cit., p. 31 and Smith, op. cit., p. 219.
32
stating that he had never been aware, or suspected that Crosley was a communist.69 To the
Committee, acknowledging an association with his accuser was more relevant then whether
or not he had known him as „Carl‟ or „Crosley‟.70
His ever changing testimony made Chambers‟ relatively non-changing story more
plausible and convinced many HUAC members of Hiss‟ guilt. Rankin‟s speech of
December 31st, 1948 recounts Hiss‟ threat71 followed by Chambers‟ appearance on a radio
program where he repeated his charges against his old friend. By including this aspect to
his discourse, Rankin effectively demonstrates the differences in character of both men.
Chambers‟ religious upheaval seems to have changed his moral outlook and motivated him
to tell the truth at all costs. And even though Hiss did eventually seek legal retribution,
Rankin expressly states that there was a 30 day interval between the radio accusations and
the finalized decision to press charges. This hesitation is not the reaction of an innocent
man. Had he ignored the „Meet the Press‟ interview, his supporters would have realized he
had something to hide while the skeptics would have been vindicated. Yet, by delaying the
suit, Hiss seems to have been considering his options, his credibility and his chances of
winning the trial. The 30 day delay is suspicious in its own right and seems to be further
evidence of Hiss‟ less than honest motives.72
When referring to Chambers‟ cache of stolen material, Rankin accentuates the
classified nature of their contents and the fact that they originated from Hiss‟ office while
working for Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre. By characterizing the files as a
danger to American national security, he is able to effectively portray Hiss‟ actions as
severe and traitorous crimes against the country; this amplifies the fear and dread of the
Cold War atmosphere.73
69
Ibid., p. 1001.
Congressional Record, December 31st, 1948: p. A5352.
71
Hiss challenged Chambers to make the same accusations away from the Committee hearings and their
protection in order to sue him for libel. See Smith, op. cit., p. 224.
72
Ibid., p. A5352.
73
Congressional Record, December 31st, 1948: p. A5352.
70
33
The controversy that emerged after the „Baltimore Documents‟ were made public
are included in the HUAC report74. Nixon and Stripling‟s subpoena for any remaining data
in Chambers‟ possession led to the subsequent retrieval of the „Pumpkin Papers‟ and added
intrigue to the case. The presentation of the report was purposeful in its methods as it
continually established the importance of the Committee; it put a spotlight on their work,
justified their behavior and was their way of showing Congress that the case would not
have progressed as it did without their drive to uncover subversive agents in government.75
Rankin appraises the impact of the evidence and according to government officials
with access to the originals, the secret codes used to write them would permit the Soviets to
read future communications.76 Once again, he introduces facts that highlight the
seriousness of Hiss‟ espionage. While the details presented are accurate, the way in which
they are displayed evokes a very „anti-Hiss‟ image and seems to be HUAC‟s way of trying
to gain the irrevocable endorsement of their House colleagues. He includes a concise list of
other stolen papers as presented by Chambers in his testimony (details on new naval
technology, the identities of foreign agents, etc.).77 Finally, Rankin illustrates the depth of
subversive activity by emphasizing that the „Pumpkin Papers‟ were composed of a week‟s
worth of transferred files.78 Consequently, hundreds of pages of restricted material were
turned over to the enemy. The documents currently in the possession of the House are a
fraction of what was taken. This amplifies the depth of Hiss‟ betrayal. The HUAC report
likely contributed to the silence of Northern Democrats; arguing or denying the evidence
disclosed at the hearings would be tantamount to admitting practicing communist ideology
in the eyes of certain conservative politicians.79
Though Rankin gave extensive details on December 31st, 1948 there is an extreme
lack of discussion in the House regarding the Hiss/Chambers confrontation, the libel suit
74
While the case eventually went to trial, Weinstein, Smith and Rankin‟s speech in the Congressional Record
describe the Justice Department‟s claims that the „Baltimore Documents‟ did not contain sufficient evidence
to indict Hiss. Republicans viewed this as a Democratic tactic to sweep the controversy „under the rug‟ and
forced HUAC members Nixon and Stripling to issue Chambers a subpoena. Ibid., p. A5352.
75
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950: p. 1002.
76
Congressional Record, December 31st, 1948: p. A5353.
77
Ibid., p. A5354.
78
The report reveals that Chambers‟ operation was comprised of weekly deliveries to the Soviets. Ibid., p.
A5353.
79
Ibid., p. A5353.
34
and the revelation of the „Baltimore Documents‟ and the „Pumpkin Papers‟. He is also the
sole Democrat to include a speech in the Congressional Record referring to the scandal in
1948. Considering HUAC‟s dwindling reputation before the Hiss controversy came to
light, it is very plausible that the Committee chose to wait to divulge any facts until they
were absolutely positive that he was guilty and that a case could be built against him.
Moreover, they respected the legal proceedings during the libel suit period and refused to
release any data to the House. This preserved the integrity of the trial; witness testimony
was received as though heard for the first time and all the evidence presented came from the
Justice Department without the interference of any conflicting information put forth by
members of HUAC. Hiss was charged for having perjured himself by the Grand Jury on
December 15th, 1948. Rankin‟s speech on December 31st indicates that Hiss‟ indictment
was the point at which the Committee was satisfied with the way in which the case was
progressing, making it possible to release the long awaited notes on the hearings to their
colleagues.
The absence of Democrats is representative of the overwhelming belief by the „New
Deal‟ faction of the party who believed that the communist issue was simply a Republican
fabrication; an over-exaggeration to create frenzy in the U.S. Furthermore, many
prominent Democrats were still hesitant to believe that one of their own had betrayed them.
Republican contributions closely reflect those of their opposition. They too review
the appropriateness of H.R. 5852. Although a larger percentage encourages the passage of
the proposed legislation, there are still a few who object to some of the clauses and the
language used to write it. Similarly, there is no reference to Hiss or any direct references to
the HUAC investigations save for a short entry alluding to the statements made by excommunists (i.e. Bentley and Chambers). The early stages of the case and the minimal
amount of details officially released by HUAC are a logical reason for this deficiency.
1.1.2-Republicans
The Republicans are much more vocal when discussing H.R. 5852. Although there
still is a slight division of opinions, most favor the passing of the bill. Those who oppose
the legislation demonstrate different variations of opinion.
John W. Heselton
35
(Massachusetts) and Thomas L. Owens (Illinois) allege that specific clauses are
unconstitutional and if amendments could be acknowledged, then it would be acceptable.
Others, like Representative William Lemke (North Dakota)80, believe that the measure is
un-American and would strengthen the communist movement in the United States.
Principally, the opposition focuses their discontent on whether or not H.R. 5852 would
make the Communist party illegal. Mundt makes it clear that the law will simply force its
members to act like a real political party; one that is not under foreign control. 81
Representative William J. Miller (Connecticut) states that the way it is composed goes
against American rights as expressed within the Constitution.82 Although Nixon and Mundt
extensively defend their bill throughout these debates, they do admit that modifications
would ameliorate these controversial clauses in the Subversive Activities Control Bill. In
Miller‟s opinion, H.R. 5852 is not fit to be presented before the House if its own authors are
recommending changes to what they have drafted.
Contrary to their opposition, Republican party members in favor of the act
encompass a very large majority of those considering the impending legislation.
In
particular, Richard Nixon and Karl Mundt endorse the need for this law, answering
questions and addressing the concerns of those worried about the legality of the bill.
Representatives Clifford P. Case (New Jersey) and Fred E. Busbey (Illinois) are strong
supporters of the Mundt-Nixon proposition and express their fervor by commending the
extraordinary work of Richard Nixon. Representative Busbey‟s remarks on the floor of the
House on May 18th is representative of Republican enthusiasm for Nixon‟s success thus far
and the work he will surely accomplish in the future: “The chairman of the subcommittee,
the gentlemen from California [Mr. Nixon], who, in my opinion, and I know many
Members of this House concur in it, from the record he is making in his first term in this
body, is one of the most outstanding men that has been sent to the House of
Representatives.”83 Here we see Nixon‟s growing popularity with conservative politicians
80
Lemke was the Union Party‟s presidential candidate in 1936.
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000238
81
Ibid., p. 5849.
82
Congressional Record, May 14th, 1948: p. 5864.
83
Congressional Record, May 18th, 1948: p. 6038.
36
advocating the need for anti-communist legislation.
Thus his dedication to the Hiss
investigations was the logical next step for his crusade against subversives.
In August 1948, there is a contrast in Republican participation in discussions in the
House. Unlike the Democrats and John E. Rankin‟s long speech on the HUAC report, there
is only one short entry by George A. Dondero made on August 5th. Surprisingly, he focuses
strictly on the government‟s ineffective security system after the revelations made by
Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz84 and Whittaker Chambers. There is no specific reference
to Alger Hiss and his potential involvement in communist affairs.
The absence of any dialogue by key Republican and HUAC members Richard
Nixon and Karl Mundt can be explained by the fact that from August 3rd to Hiss‟ indictment
on December 15th, they were deeply involved in questioning witnesses and gathering
evidence to prove that the State Department had unknowingly been employing a „red‟ spy.
Even though Nixon was the leading member in the investigation, he refrained from
presenting the HUAC report himself. In Six Crises, Nixon‟s memoirs published in 1962,
we get the sense that he always knew exactly how to play both sides of the political
spectrum. Where many believed that Hiss was innocent in August 1948, Nixon convinced
the Committee to continue inquiring into Chambers‟ story by appealing to their sense of
duty. According to his account, he stated that “it was too late to turn back now, that I
myself [Nixon] honestly did not know which man was telling the truth, but that I thought
the Committee had an obligation to see the case through.”85 Stephen Ambrose‟s Nixon:
The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 reiterates the same concept as he demonstrates
Nixon‟s dedication to uncovering the facts surrounding the Hiss/Chambers scandal. Per
Ambrose‟s study of the famed politician, we learn that his plea for truth was a way to
protect HUAC from any negative reactions by fellow Republican party members should
their probe prove Hiss was innocent.86 Since the perjury trial had yet to commence by the
84
Louis Budenz (alias „Buben‟ from Haynes, Klehr and Vassiliev, op. cit., p. 639) was a reformed communist
who had been editor of the Daily Worker. His defection in 1945 was followed by interviews with the FBI in
which he detailed the goals and plans of the Party as well as supplied any information he had on the
communist underground. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 41.
85
Nixon, op. cit., p. 15.
86
Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962, New York, Simon and Schuster,
(1987), p. 173.
37
end of 1948, Nixon seems to have forgone analyzing the case in the House to preserve his
supposed „neutrality‟ and wait to see the outcome of the case in a court of law.
The following section will explore debates within the Senate. Whereas the House of
Representatives was preoccupied with H.R. 5852 in early 1948, the upper house discussed
the Soviet Union‟s influence in the international arena. Similarly, Chambers‟ accusations
in August 1948 are not deeply delved into because of the House Committee‟s involvement;
any details surrounding the HUAC hearings were gleaned from the media.
Instead,
senators scrutinized the way in which the Democratic administration dealt with the
emergence of the Hiss/Chambers affair. They were specifically outraged by Truman‟s
statement that the investigation of Hiss was a „red herring‟ and that the Committee accused
innocent people.87 Any extensive reference to the case became more widespread as the
years progressed and the eventual appointment of Karl Mundt to the Senate.
1.2-Senate
The Senate strictly looked into the effects of communism as a whole in 1948 instead
of targeting the spy trials. This was in part caused by the fact that details of Chambers‟
story exclusively appeared in newspapers; aspects of the Committee investigations were
only released at the end of the year as established by John E. Rankin and his presentation of
the Committee‟s report. Southern Democrats criticized the president and the influence of
Soviet ideology in government funded programs while declaring their disfavor for H.R.
5852. Northern Democrats were completely absent, making it quite evident that they were
not concerned when it came to the „red scare‟ sweeping the nation. While Republicans
demanded action from the United Nations regarding the Soviet Union‟s intricate espionage
networks, they spent the remainder of the year attacking Truman for his mocking tone in a
press conference after the first Chambers charges were leaked to the press.
1.2.1-Democrats
Democratic opinions are reminiscent of those embodied by their House colleagues
in early 1948. Their attention was drawn to the causes and cures of communism as well as
the living conditions of those residing in countries under Soviet control. W. Lee O‟Daniel
87
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Harry S. Truman,” p. 367.
38
(Texas) criticizes the President‟s Committee on Civil Rights88, claiming that the Soviet
Union is involved with the initiative. In his address before the Senate on February 5th,
1948, he strives to explicate the pattern used by the communist international to gain
influence in infiltrated countries. He claims that their ultimate goal is to create conflict and
encourage hate among the classes and races.89 Although a Democrat, O‟Daniel is not a
follower of the the Truman faction and instead invokes the anti-New Deal point of view of
those residing in the South.90
He is outraged that „red‟ spies have succeeded in
manipulating New Deal programs.91 His statement regarding the extent of the communist
infiltration into important government departments demonstrates that several politicians
were already aware of the conspiracy long before the eventual disclosures made by
Chambers in August 1948.
His critical analysis of the impact of Soviet ideology in
America effectively proves that it was not strictly a Republican argument but was likewise
perceived by many Democrats as a grave problem.
Elbert D. Thomas (Utah) is the sole senator to make reference to H.R. 5852.
Though he does not discuss the bill in detail, he specifies the reasons for his disapproval
and is particularly incensed with the vague language used to describe the main points of the
legislation.92 Thomas‟ assessment reflects those of Western Democrats striving for reform
of social standards instead of enforcing measures that could potentially violate American
civil rights.93 His introduction of a House bill before it has reached the Senate certifies that
he will garner further opposition to what he believes is unconstitutional.
88
Created by President Truman in December 1946, the Committee on Civil rights was comprised of 12
members tasked with reviewing racial problems in the United States. Gary W. Reichard, Politics as Usual:
The Age of Truman and Eisenhower, Illinois, Harlan Davidson, Inc., (1988), p. 31. Their report, To Secure
These Rights, encompassed four parts. The first delineated the basic rights of American citizens followed by
the rights in America; highlighting the inequality experienced by America‟s minorities. The third considered
the government‟s role in ensuring the rights of its citizens. The Committee members viewed the creation of
civil rights legislation as an integral aspect of the federal government‟s duties. The final part was comprised
of recommendations to eliminate discrimination against minorities in America. The report was denounced by
many Southern newspapers while those from the North applauded the unprecedented content of the report.
More than 600,000 copies of the report were sold and circulated through the press. Donald R. McCoy and
Richard T. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration, Manhattan, The
University Press of Kansas, 1973: p. 86-93.
89
Congressional Record, February 5th, 1948: p. 1120.
90
Rae, op, cit., p. 12-14.
91
Congressional Record, February 5th, 1948: p. 1123.
92
Congressional Record, June 4th, 1948: p. A3546-A3548.
93
Rae, op. cit., p. 14.
39
After the Chambers revelations, deliberations in the Senate are devoid of any
Democratic contributions in large part because of their noninvolvement with HUAC and
inability to access the hearing transcripts. Members of the upper house gained insight into
the case the same way the American citizens did; by way of the press and any statements
made by the House Committee. Nonetheless, Democratic senators also kept quiet for the
same reasons Nixon and Mundt did, though with different underlying motives. Many
believed Hiss had been wrongfully accused; most noteworthy was Eleanor Roosevelt who
incessantly defended him in person and in writing. For that reason, it is probable that they
chose to remain silent until more evidence was revealed. The Democratic administration
was already under fire for having harbored communists in the State Department and for
their incessant claims that the infiltration was a fabricated problem. Backing a guilty Hiss
would implicate the Democratic party in what their opponents regarded as a growing
subversive threat in the United States. Their absence is representative of their refusal to
stoop to the same level as their Republican colleagues. At this juncture of the case, most
Northern Democrats believed the Hiss accusations were a political ploy and Alger was the
scapegoat. They were more than confident that he would be vindicated and that their
opposition would be forced to come up with a new tactic to discredit the administration.
Contrarily, Republican senators used Truman‟s comments to their advantage,
portraying him as a „red‟ sympathizer and propagating the belief that he was unfit to lead.
1.2.2-Republicans
Before Chambers‟ accusations in August 1948, Republican senators believed a
confrontation between the United Nations and the Soviet Union was necessary. Ralph E.
Flanders (Vermont) speaks on two different occasions about this issue, claiming that the
Soviets should be placed before a UN tribunal for their subversive activity in several
countries. Moreover, he is a firm advocate for expulsion from the world organization if
they refuse to mend their relationships with the nations they have infiltrated. 94 Flanders
follows the typical Republican party line of the time period. Though his focus is on the
Soviet impact globally instead of within the United States, he encourages the UN to
discipline the socialist country regarding their efforts to control Eastern Europe. Unlike his
94
Congressional Record, April 6th and 7th, 1948: p. 4089-4090, 4145.
40
peers, he exhibits a preoccupation with communist influence internationally. This new
outlook permits us to analyze American political opinion in a context other then what is
occurring domestically. His obvious worry about Stalin‟s increasing authority in Europe
indicates that the fear of a totalitarian regime was not simply a U.S. phenomenon during the
early Cold War years but was seen by American congressmen as a worldwide problem.
Talk of the Soviet Union and the United Nations was swept away with the
statements made by Truman after HUAC‟s congressional hearings on spy activity were
made public by the press. He claimed that the inquiries were nothing but a „red herring‟95;
an imaginary concern the Republicans could latch onto for the coming Presidential
campaign. These words would haunt the executive as the Hiss case progressed. Those who
championed a new Republican administration claimed that the president‟s remarks were
proof that the Democrats had failed in protecting the United States from a communist
takeover.
In his speech of August 5th, 1948, Republican Senator Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin)
is outraged with the administration after the Chambers accusations are made public. Wiley
focuses on the lack of enthusiasm by the government to oust „reds‟ from public
employment which, the senator claims, makes it an integral part of the upcoming elections.
Wiley‟s inclusion in the Congressional Record denounces the executive for allowing the
enemy to infiltrate the United States while claiming that subversive activity is a fabricated
problem. He claims that “it has become obvious that the present administration, in spite of
its pious protests against communism, has served as a fertile breeding ground for Reds
during the last 16 years.”96 Furthermore, Wiley criticizes the presidency for their efforts in
the eradication of communism overseas while permitting Soviet spies in government to
collect classified information and influence policy.97 Consequently, the publication of
Chambers‟ charges coupled with Truman‟s comments has given Republicans what evidence
they needed to back their claims of Democratic negligence.
95
Congressional Record, August 6th, 1948: p. 9965.
Congressional Record, August 5th, 1948: p. A4867.
97
Ibid., p. A4868.
96
41
George G. Malone‟s (Nevada) August 6th contribution is a reaction to the „red
herring‟ declaration and focuses on promoting change in the executive. Republicans in the
Senate pushed for the appointment of a Republican President in the fall of 1948 who they
believed would rectify the growing Soviet problem. Wiley and Malone‟s reactions to
Truman‟s unwise remarks are yet another example of Republican discontent towards the
Democratic chief executive for not doing what was necessary to prevent espionage in the
United States. The Hiss/Chambers case is not brought up in the Senate in 1948. As
explained earlier, the fact that HUAC was a House committee made it impossible for the
upper house to gain any insight into the case until the details were made public at the end of
the year. Any disclosure of official facts during the libel suit was futile as the Justice
Department contemplated either prosecuting Chambers or dropping the charges against
Hiss altogether.
The dedication of HUAC members Nixon and Stripling forced an
indictment of Hiss after the „Pumpkin Papers‟ were turned over to the Committee. The
uncertainty of whether or not the scandal would go to trial in the second half of 1948
contributed to the absence of Senate discussions on the issue. By 1949 and 1950, however,
Republican senators make reference to the case repeatedly to justify their actions and use it
as an effective tactic in their quest for the presidency.
Thus, 1948 began with both legislative houses debating the communist issue and its
growing sphere of influence in American society. While a majority of Democrats believed
the hysteria was caused in part by the opposition‟s discontent with the executive, Southern
Democrats advocated the need for strong legislation to curtail the Soviet cause. The
appearance of Whittaker Chambers before HUAC brought subversive activity to the
forefront of discussions in Congress.
Republicans were vindicated when Chambers‟
revelations were made public; they had incessantly argued that communist ideals were
being adopted by a growing number of American citizens. Alger Hiss‟ high ranking
positions in the State Department, his participation at Yalta and San Francisco regarding the
creation of the United Nations, and his post as President of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace coupled with accusations of subversive activity, made the case a public
phenomenon. Although the perjury trials had yet to start (1949), the Committee hearings
and emerging evidence during the libel suit confirmed Republican claims that Soviet
espionage was not something to be ignored.
42
Chapter 2 will survey the details of the Hiss trials followed by his conviction in
January 1950. The reactions and heated debates of both Democrats and Republicans will
expose the extent to which these politicians were swept away by the controversy. In
particular, we will demonstrate that the Republicans of the House of Representatives and
the Senate dominated discussions surrounding the Hiss/Chambers affair in an attempt to
discredit Truman‟s leadership.
43
CHAPTER 2-Seeing Red: Congressional Reactions to the
Infamous Hiss Perjury Trials, May 1949-January 1950
Alger Hiss‟ indictment in December 1948 was perceived by many Republicans as
the precursor to the eventual downfall of the Democratic administration. Although HUAC
members Nixon, Mundt and Rankin believed the legal proceedings of May 31st, 1949
would result in an inevitable guilty verdict, the biased behavior of presiding Judge Samuel
H. Kaufman1 contributed in the jury‟s inability to reach a verdict on July 8 th. The second
perjury trial commenced on November 17th, 1949 and led to Hiss‟ conviction on January
21st, 1950. His conviction was applauded by Republicans and Southern Democrats of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. Democrats from the Northeast chose to either
remain silent or defended Truman‟s administration while trivializing the meaning behind
the Hiss conviction.
There is a contrast in political opinion from the early accusations in 1948 to the
perjury trials of 1949 and conviction in 1950. Whereas Democrats were openly discussing
the communist issue in 1948, by 1949-1950, their participation had noticeably lessened;
perhaps a reaction to the immense damage done to their party by the Hiss/Chambers
revelations. Their previous lack of concern regarding communist infiltration coupled with
Truman‟s „red herring‟ statement inevitably played a part in American discontent and made
the possibility of a Republican administration much more appealing.
For their part,
Republicans dominated discussions for the 1949-1950 periods where their condemnation of
Hiss seemed to have amplified. This was most likely a response to Dewey‟s loss to Truman
in the 1948 presidential election.
2.1-House of Representatives
While the trial took place on May 31st, members of the House began reviewing the
aspects of the case after the July 8th jury deadlock. Debates addressed the details of the
1
Although Kaufman‟s actions during the trial are recorded, Republican Harold H. Velde (Illinois) explains
that his bias was most apparent in the way he presented himself around certain witnesses. His body language
and his voice would take on a negative tone when confronted with aspects of testimony harmful to Hiss. His
actions were reported by several newspapers and were topics of discussion in social circles interested by the
trials. Congressional Record, July 18th, 1949: p. A4437.
45
proceedings such as witness testimony and the evidence presented as well as the
unacceptable behavior of Judge Samuel H. Kaufman. As expected, Democrats are silent
and only provide their opinions on eleven different occasions. Those from the South are
outraged by Kaufman‟s evident preference to rule on behalf of the defense while the
Northeastern and Western Democrats seek to make excuses for his actions and question
HUAC motives concerning a Hiss prosecution. In contrast, Republican members dominate
debates in the House as they scrutinize aspects of the perjury trials and the conviction with
34 inclusions in the Congressional Record. To them, Hiss is a traitor and they criticize the
Democratic executive for their failure to uncover the large amount of Soviet agents in
influential posts of the American government.
Though the majority of Democrats were reluctant to express their beliefs during the
legal proceedings, the 11 inclusions in the Congressional Record are a perfect example of
the North-South division of opinion within the Democratic party.
2.1.1-Democrats
Democratic representatives from the Northern and Western part of the country spent
June and July of 1949 trying to belittle the communist issue while criticizing the work of
HUAC and its key members. Eugene D. O‟Sullivan (Nebraska) chose to avoid discussing
the Hiss case on June 2nd and instead blamed the Republicans for denouncing liberal
thought in a free country. O‟Sullivan further expresses his disfavor with HUAC, claiming
its members were accusing innocent people, thus starting a modern day witch hunt.2
Unfortunately, his tactic did the opposite of what he was trying to accomplish. Their
unrelenting disbelief regarding communist infiltration in light of the Hiss case makes it
seem as though they are trying to conceal something whereas Republican speeches in the
Congressional Record suggests a dedication to uncovering the truth.
Cecil R. King‟s (California) contribution varies to that presented by O‟Sullivan as
he criticizes Nixon for disclosing aspects of other subversive cases to the public.3 To King,
Nixon‟s political ploy for attention was detrimental to his responsibilities as a member of
HUAC.
2
3
Wayne L. Hays‟ (Ohio) inclusion in the Record increases the feeling of
Congressional Record, June 2nd, 1949 : p. A3434.
Congressional Record, June 14th, 1949 : p. A3673.
46
Democratic discontent with the opposition as he questions the authenticity of Committee
members who, according to him, are using the Hiss case as a way to appear in newspaper
articles.4 While he criticizes them for the publicity they have gained by investigating the
scandal, his speech of July 14th endeavors to prove his devotion to the eradication of
communist thought in the United States. His effort to play both sides of political opinion
by claiming that no one else has fought as hard (in Ohio) to be rid of the communist
problem demonstrates that the Democrats were searching for a way to fix the damage done
to their party by this high profile case.
Francis E. Walter (Pennsylvania) makes reference to Judge Kaufman and his
performance during the first trial. Although he does not dispute the necessity for a second
courtcase, he incessantly demands that Hiss be tried by a new judge who will make his own
„unbiased‟ judgment. Many members of Congress believed that HUAC was contemplating
setting up a congressional committee to investigate Kaufman‟s tendency to favor Hiss.
Walter‟s demand to postpone an inquiry is a way to ensure that the new jury will not be
influenced by Kaufman‟s misdeeds. Additionally, Walter‟s speech in favor of the judicial
branch‟s right to look into the Kaufman controversy was his way of protecting the
Democratic party. While he does not claim to side with Hiss or Kaufman, he does state that
the new judge [in reference to his future ruling of the Hiss trial] should be free to make his
own assessment, regardless of any facts presented by an investigative body.5
His
underlying meaning is clearly to advance Democratic interests and to lessen any negative
backlash to his party after the events that transpired during the first trial.
In comparison, Democrats from the Southern part of the country reveled in the fact
that they had been right about communist infiltration in government. E. E. Cox represents
Southern Democrats in his examination of the case a few days after the July 8th jury
deadlock. He praises the work of the prosecuting attorney and questions whether or not
Frankfurter and Acheson are the appropriate choice for their important positions after
blatantly defending Hiss. When referring to Kaufman‟s bias, Cox believes the judge‟s
4
5
Congressional Record, July 11th, 1949 : p. 9224.
Congressional Record, July 12th, 1949 : p. A4439.
47
performance is a disgrace to his highly respected position.6
This sentiment conveys
perfectly the way in which the Southern faction felt about Kaufman during the first trial.
Their anti-Kaufman beliefs are completely contrary to those of their Northern colleagues
who made excuses for his actions and strove to downplay the severity of the circumstances.
Kaufman‟s conduct forced politicians to re-examine the way they viewed the judicial
branch. They were essentially obligated to choose a side in an argument that either upheld
Truman and his promotion of the controversial judge or sided with those pushing for an
investigation of the man‟s credentials and suitability to try such an important case in
American history.
Members of the Democratic party are silent during the second trial and finally begin
discussing Hiss after his conviction in January 1950. Their reluctance to comment is
understandable considering the fiasco of the first perjury trial and the disappointing
deadlock. To the „Truman Democrats‟ hoping to ameliorate their party‟s reputation after
the irreparable damage done by the Kaufman trial, the proper conduct of the second trial
judge and a guilty verdict would be a small step in the right direction. Those contributing
to the Record are solely those from the South. The refusal of Northern Democrats to
remark on the case or the verdict is unsurprising. Considering this faction was accused by
their opposition and members of their own party for their inability to deal with infiltrators
while trying to conceal and disregard the communist issue, any denial or change of heart
would have been hypocritical.
Furthermore, Southern Democrats are outraged that Hiss‟ prominent Democratic
supporters have not been penalized for their loyalty. James C. Davis (Georgia) is one of
these Southern Democrats who argues on three separate occasions that those who had
placed Hiss in such a prestigious position are still occupying prominent roles themselves.
To Davis, Justice of the Supreme Court Felix Frankfurter and Secretary of State Dean
Acheson are part of the communist problem for having trusted Hiss. Even though he was
tried and convicted, Davis insists that Hiss is the result of communist „brainwashing‟. Once
Soviet handlers are eliminated, the congressman believes people like Hiss would no longer
6
Congressional Record, July 11th, 1949 : p. 9224.
48
be tempted to betray their country.7 Davis also expresses his satisfaction that those who
disregarded warnings of Soviet infiltration can no longer ignore the facts now that the
details of Hiss‟ treachery have been exposed.8 The trials and guilty verdict were viewed as
a great achievement; they substantiated the claims of anti-communist politicians.
John E. Rankin addresses the House on January 24th and 26th after Hiss has been
found guilty.
In light of the conviction, the purpose of Rankin‟s discourse was to
encourage an investigation into what transpired at Yalta. Like Rankin, many congressmen
believed that President Roosevelt‟s ill health during the Yalta Conference coupled with
advice influenced by Hiss‟ „communist leanings‟ may have led to pro-Soviet agreements
that wouldn‟t have come to pass had the President been healthy.9 In comparison to his
presentation of the HUAC report in 1948, Rankin‟s inclusions in 1950 are astonishingly
short and to the point. And unlike his Republican colleagues Nixon and Mundt who use the
conviction and their hard work during the Hiss/Chambers HUAC investigations to further
their reputations, Rankin focuses solely on the repercussions of Hiss‟ involvement at Yalta.
To Rankin, the Hiss conviction is proof that there was a „red conspiracy‟ at the Yalta
Conference.10
Unlike the Democrats who were divided when it came to the Hiss/Chambers
debacle, the Republicans were of the same opinion in 1949 and 1950. Their debates
included extensive details of the trials and the verdict followed by an in-depth look at the
controversies that emerged during the judicial process.
Contrarily, Democratic
contributions were short and devoid of any details that could potentially harm their party.
2.1.2-Republicans
Unfortunately, aspects of the first trial were overshadowed by the scandal that arose
surrounding the actions of Judge Samuel H. Kaufman. The first remark on his behavior is
on July 11th by Charles E. Potter (Michigan). Potter questions the soundness of Truman‟s
decision to appoint Kaufman to such an important position in light of his bias during the
first perjury trial. Though he was nominated to the position by President Truman in the
7
Congressional Record, January, 1950 : p. 837.
Congressional Record, January 26th-27th, 1950: p. A614.
9
Ibid., p. 974.
10
Congressional Record, January 24th, 1950: p. 846.
8
49
spring of 1948, it was never confirmed by the Republican run Senate. In the meantime,
Kaufman received an interim position until his eventual confirmation by the Democratic
run Senate in 1949.11
His acceptance as a Federal judge fuels the anti-Democratic
sentiment expressed by Republicans in light of his apparent favoritism towards Hiss and the
defense team.
Representatives Leslie C. Arends (Illinois) and Harold H. Velde (Illinois) used their
time on the floor of the House to recount Kaufman‟ rise through the judicial ranks while
illustrating his behavior towards witnesses and the prosecuting attorneys. Kaufman‟s career
is depicted in an article entitled “Wheels Within Wheels” from the Washington TimesHerald which was included in the Record by Arends. This extra information allows us to
gain a deeper understanding of Kaufman‟s ties to the New Deal, first as a special counsel
for the Federal Communications Commission12 and then as part of the investigation of the
tragic events of Pearl Harbor. His appointment to the Federal bench was wrought with
controversy as both the Association of the Bar of New York City and the Federal Bar
Associations of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut refused to endorse Truman‟s
nomination.13 By including this point, Arends and Velde are trying to demonstrate that the
trial was bound to fail from the very beginning; that the disfavor surrounding Kaufman‟s
nomination even before the events of the trial is yet another black mark to add to the list of
growing Democratic blunders.
While Arends questions Kaufman‟s suitability to try the Hiss case, Velde illustrates
Kaufman‟s misconduct using six specific examples. The first details Chambers‟ testimony
in which he claimed that he had never used the name „George Crosley‟; that the Hiss‟ knew
him solely as „Carl‟. Once Esther Chambers took the stand, Kaufman interrupted the line
of questioning to claim that Chambers had testified to using the name „Crosley‟. Although
this statement was untrue, Kaufman conceded that it could remain in the official court
records thereby damaging the prosecution‟s case. Furthermore, Kaufman acquiesced to
11
Congressional Record, July 11th, 1949 : p. A4408-A4409.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was a communications act passed in 1934 to manage
radio broadcasting and other types of wireless communication. The Commission consists of seven members,
chosen by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Otis L. Graham Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander eds.,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times-An Encyclopedic View, New York, Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985, p.
131-132.
13
Congressional Record, July 11th, 1949 : p. A4418.
12
50
requests by the Hiss defense team to view the secret grand jury record; documents that are
normally inaccessible by either side. Perhaps one of the most outrageous events of the trial
involved the employment of a psychiatrist named Dr. Binger to observe Chambers‟
behavior and testimony during the proceedings.
The U.S. attorneys protested his
involvement and even though Kaufman claimed that Binger would not be a witness for the
defense, he was admitted to the stand once court was in session.14 Hiss‟ attorney spent the
next forty five minutes asking Dr. Binger a hypothetical question, essentially destroying
Chambers‟ credibility. Kaufman refused to include the question in the record, however, the
tactic used by the Hiss defense team was effective in harming the way in which the jury
viewed the prosecutions key witness.
Velde chronicles Kaufman‟s refusal to assent to questions about Hiss‟ father‟s
suicide while Chambers‟ brother‟s demise was extensively delved into. According to
Weinstein, the defense was able to use the tragic loss of his brother as probable cause for
his pathological tendencies. Any questions surrounding the rest of Chambers upbringing
were seen as having no bearing on the case.15 This ruling is yet another instance of
Kaufman‟s preferential treatment during the first trial; prosecuting attorney Thomas
Murphy is unable to introduce the influential events of Chambers childhood that led to his
eventual membership into the communist fold. This essentially made it more difficult for
the jury to relate to the atmosphere of the time period and Chambers‟ mindset during
critical moments of his young adult life. Moreover, he was denied the right to disclose the
reasons behind his break with the Communist party and instead was told to simply state that
he had left the organization.16
According to Velde, Kaufman‟s bias extended to important details surrounding
Chambers‟ and Hiss‟ first meeting made possible by notorious communists Harold Ware
and J. Peters.17 The jury wasn‟t given additional facts about the activities of these two men,
14
Congressional Record, July 12th, 1949 : p. A4437.
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 372.
16
Ibid., p. 374.
17
Frank B. Keefe (Wisconsin) describes Harold Ware and J. Peters in his speech of July 18 th, 1949. Keefe
explains that Ware was charged with leading the first New Deal spy ring in D.C. Peters, on the other hand,
was the head of a second ring whose members included Chambers and Hiss. Congressional Record, July 18th,
1949: p. 9718.
15
51
making it impossible for them to gain a full understanding of the severity of this first
meeting. Lastly, evidence emerged during the trial that the jury foreman was partial to
acquitting Hiss.
Although Kaufman was informed of this fact, the foreman was not
dismissed which inevitably led to the jury deadlock of eight to four for conviction.18
Velde‟s description of Kaufman‟s disrespect for the judicial process displays the extent to
which followers of Hiss went to ensure his exoneration. Moreover, his attention to detail
and description of Kaufman‟s conduct is in stark contrast to Democratic speeches during
this time. His thoughts bolster the impression that Republicans in the House are striving for
truth while the Democrats are struggling to recover from the scandal.
Similarly, George A. Dondero discusses the impressions recounted by five of the
eight jurors in relation to Kaufman‟s bias in favor of Hiss and his defense team. The jurors‟
recollections were published in the New York Herald Tribune and were included in the
Record of July 12th, 1949. Dondero‟s insertion further establishes the incessant Republican
need to disclose all aspects of the case.19 While their methods may have been simply to be
perceived in a more positive light in comparison to their Democratic counterparts, the result
gives us insight into the struggle for power between both parties and their use of the
Hiss/Chambers debacle to gain the upperhand. Whereas the Democrats speak little of the
case, the Republicans take advantage of the evidence; their transparency during the trials
and conviction becomes an asset and emboldens their chances of seeing one of their own in
the Presidency. Dondero‟s newspaper insertions in the Record are also representative of his
own opinions regarding the Hiss/Chambers trials. In his July 13th address to the House,
Hiss is portrayed as “the symbol of the Roosevelt era.”20 A guilty verdict would be
perceived by his advocates as a conviction of Roosevelt and all those involved with the
creation of the New Deal.21 Thus to many, the trial of Alger Hiss is not a typical Soviet spy
case; he represents the New Deal, President Roosevelt and the Truman administration‟s
failure to remove communists from government employment.22
18
Ibid., p. A4437.
Congressional Record, July 12th, 1949: p. A4455-A4456, 9300.
20
Congressional Record, July 13th, 1949: p. A4470.
21
Ibid., July 13th, 1949: p. A4470.
22
Ibid., p. A4471.
19
52
W. Kingsland Macy (New York) compares pro-Kaufman editorials on July 12th.
Both pieces were published in left-wing newspapers23 and express their disfavor with the
way Congress is reacting to the Kaufman controversy. An interesting passage in the second
editorial defends the judge‟s actions while portraying Chambers as a compulsive liar:
“Somebody must be guilty of something and, of course, it can‟t be the mob to whom the
lying Whittaker Chambers has become a White Knight leading a charge against the Red
Dragons. Ergo, the judge is guilty. Guilty of what? Guilty of presiding over a jury which
failed to agree that Hiss was a perjured conspirator fitting into the lurid and dramatic roles
Chambers‟ tortured imagination had assigned to him.”24 This quote embodies the role of
the communist propaganda machine; attempting to belittle Chambers‟ story while
maintaining the actions of a United States Federal judge. Macy‟s purpose is to demonstrate
that the unwavering approval of Kaufman displayed in these communist newspapers was
proof positive that Hiss was indeed a Soviet spy.
Details of the first trial are divulged in the Congressional Record on July 18th, 1949.
Frank B. Keefe enumerates the important aspects of the daily proceedings and defines the
issue presented in the case and the charges put forth by the prosecution. The charges were
based on testimony made by Hiss on December 15th, 1948 in which he stated that he had
never given classified State Department documents to Chambers and that they had not been
in contact after January 1st, 1937.25 There was no mention of espionage, treason, being a
member of the Communist party or taking part in any kind of subversive activity because of
the statute of limitations26 on the crime. Keefe‟s rendition confirms the notoriety of the
The first editorial is entitled „Convict-or be Convicted‟ from the Daily Worker of July 12th while the second
editorial is entitled „Smearing Judge Kaufman‟ from the Daily Compass of July 12th. The Daily Compass was
a left-wing newspaper and was published from 1949 until lack of funds forced them to cease production in
1952. “The Daily Compass Ends Publication: Left-Wing Paper Runs Out of Funds-Equipment is Sold After
Lamont Forecloses,” New York Times, November 4th, 1952, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York
Times (1851-2009), p. 37.
24
Congressional Record, July 12th, 1949 : p. A4442.
25
Congressional Record, July 18th, 1949 : p. 9713.
26
Richard Nixon‟s speech of January 26th, 1950 mentions his recommendations to curtail future cases such as
the Hiss/Chambers affair and explains that the statute of limitations at the time of the Hiss conviction was for
a three year period and should be extended to 10 years. See Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950: p.
1006-1007. Also, Alan Brinkley‟s The Unfinished Nation defines the statute of limitations as a law that
ensures individuals will not be charged for crimes committed seven years prior. Unfortunately, the Pumpkin
Papers were dated in 1938 and Chambers‟ accusations were only taken seriously in 1948, therefore it was
impossible to charge Hiss with espionage. His eventual conviction of perjury, however, was proof enough
that he had been involved in subversive activity for the Soviet Union. See Alan Brinkley, op. cit., p. 777.
23
53
case as the demand for a seat in the courtroom was such that the legal teams were forced to
issue tickets. Mostly dispensed by the Hiss defense team, the attending audience was
largely pro-Hiss and is described by Keefe as interrupting the proceedings to laugh or
comment whenever it seemed favorable to the defendant.27 Keefe‟s goal is to ensure that
no detail goes unmentioned. Unlike the Democrats who try to get by with including the
bare minimum, Republican‟s such as Keefe bring a transparency to their renditions of the
trial that is lacking in those of their opponents. Nonetheless, this seemingly innocent quest
for the truth is riddled with an undercurrent of blame and discontent with the Democratic
executive.
Keefe‟s description of the trial refers to the jury selection on the first day (May, 31st)
in which the jurors swore that they had no opinion regarding Hiss‟ innocence or guilt.28
The jury foreman‟s dishonesty and determination to sway the other jury members, the proHiss audience, and Kaufman‟s bias during the proceedings seemed to prohibit any hope at a
successful conviction. Keefe‟s description of opening statements made by Thomas F.
Murphy and defense attorney Lloyd Paul Stryker is similar to Weinstein‟s version. Though
Murphy endeavored to prove his client was telling the truth, Stryker dedicated his opening
statement to discrediting Chambers.29 Kaufman‟s bias is evident when Keefe reveals that
he left the judge‟s bench in favor of the witness stand, captivated by Stryker‟s impassioned
speech.30 Once again, the details included by Keefe send a very clear message: that a type
of Democratic conspiracy was at hand during the first trial in which members of the jury,
the audience and the judge expressed extreme bias in favor of a presumed traitor. His
portrayal of the first perjury trial evokes the sense that the Republican opposition was pitted
against a Democratic establishment making every effort to debilitate the prosecutions
progress in the case.
The foreman‟s pro-Hiss attitude is addressed on the third day of the proceedings
(June 2nd). Upon hearing about the juror‟s sympathies, Kaufman is depicted as refusing to
disqualify him on the grounds that it was hearsay. We gain a different insight into the jury
Congressional Record, July 18th, 1949: p. 9717.
Ibid., p. 9717.
29
According to Keefe, Stryker‟s opening statement claimed Chambers was a “thief, a liar, a blasphemer, and a
moral leper.” Ibid., p. 9717.
30
Ibid., p. 9717.
27
28
54
foreman controversy by reading Weinstein‟s Perjury in which he claims that Kaufman was
wrongfully accused by certain newspapers and that contrary to popular belief, he had in fact
offered to excuse the foreman for his bias in favor of Hiss.31 Therefore, Republican
speeches in the House incorporated negative aspects of the trials to further their crusade
against Truman‟s Democrats without first ensuring the veracity of their facts.
Similar to Velde‟s speech, Keefe delves into Kaufman‟s behavior while Chambers
was on the witness stand. Whereas some details put forth by Keefe are reminiscent of
Velde‟s rendition, his depiction of Chambers‟ testimony clearly demonstrates Kaufman‟s
need to protect Hiss. He is reputed to have used a disgusted and disrespectful tone when
speaking to Chambers while twirling in his chair, keeping his back to the prosecutions
witness whenever he opposed parts of his testimony.32 Keefe explains that this behavior
was witnessed by the jury and created an atmosphere of dislike and disapproval by
Kaufman.33 Notable inclination towards the defense can be seen in later days of the trial as
Kaufman took it upon himself to interrupt the proceedings to draw a link between facts and
evidence that the defense had not even broached. There were also instances in which he
would strike from the record incriminating statements made by Chambers before the
defense had time to object.34
Further facts are imparted regarding the secret State
Department documents and their ties to Hiss. As enumerated by Keefe, the defense was
unable to disprove two important aspects regarding the stolen papers. The first was that
some were in Hiss‟ handwriting and the second revolved around the Hiss family typewriter,
proven to have been used to type the remaining documents.35
Keefe concludes by
reminding the House that Federal judges are appointed by the President. 36 His statement is
an obvious effort to blame President Truman for his nomination of Kaufman to such an
important position of the judiciary branch.
Keefe‟s speech highlights an interesting pattern. He reiterates on several occasions
that Kaufman‟s most obvious bias, though rampant during the proceedings, could not be
31
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 417.
Congressional Record, July 18th, 1949: p. 9718.
33
Ibid., p. 9718.
34
Ibid., p. 9718.
35
Ibid., p. 9719.
36
Ibid., p. 9720.
32
55
entered in the official court record; it was his facial expressions, tone of voice and actions
when greeting particular witnesses that demonstrated a preference for the defense.37
Keefe‟s underlying motives seem to be a need to prove that a Federal judge (appointed by a
Democratic President) was openly supporting an accused spy when all the evidence pointed
to his guilt. His discourse evokes an overall impression of contempt regarding the first
court proceedings typical of Republican party members.
Republican criticism of Kaufman‟s actions is disregarded by the end of July 1949
and instead focuses on whether or not Supreme Court Justices Frankfurter and Reed should
have appeared as character witnesses on behalf of Hiss. While implied in passing by
Southern Democrats, Republican members Kenneth B. Keating (New York) and W.
Kingsland Macy‟s disapproval influenced the creation of a new bill. The bill, as written by
Keating, would prohibit Supreme Court Justices from testifying as character witnesses in
criminal cases.38 As it stood, a conflict of interest would arise if the Hiss defense appealed
the verdict; Frankfurter and Reed would not be able to try the case. Their unprecedented
appearance as character witnesses demonstrates the extent to which this case was affected
by the political divide. Weinstein makes an important point: that from the very beginning,
New Dealers and Democrats (excluding those from the South) were in favor of Hiss and the
administration while the Republican opposition backed Chambers.
It was only the
progression of the trials, the testimonies and evidence presented that eventually succeeded
in persuading some of Hiss‟ followers that he was guilty.39
The details of the first Hiss trial were replaced by other matters in the months
leading up to the second judicial proceedings of November 1949.
Criticism of the
th
Democratic executive was pushed to the forefront on September 26 with the revelation
that the Russians had succeeded in detonating their first atomic bomb. Harold H. Velde
37
Ibid., p. 9719. Another of Kaufman‟s deplorable actions included stepping down from the bench to shake
the hands of Supreme Court Justices Frankfurter and Reed. Keefe‟s disgust is evident when he states: “In all
my years at the bar, I have never seen nor heard of any judge in any court committing such an unjudicial act,
nor prejudicial act, as to shake hands with a witness in the presence of the jury when that witness was to
testify in a criminal proceeding […] it was degrading to the dignity of the bench. And I do not think I need to
add, because I am certain that every colleague of mine in this House feels as I do, that neither Justice
Frankfurter, nor Justice Reed, proved himself worthy of the highest tribunal in the land when they stepped
down to appear as witnesses for the defendant, Hiss.” Ibid., p. 9719.
38
Congressional Record, August 2nd, 1949 : p. A4998.
39
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 451.
56
uses the Hiss/Chambers affair as well as other notorious spy cases to blame Truman for the
advancements in Soviet nuclear arms. In another attempt to demoralize the Democrats,
Velde exclaims that:
The Russians undoubtedly gained 3 to 5 years in producing the atomic bomb,
solely because the American Government for the last 15 years had the official
attitude, from the White House down, of being highly tolerant of, and at times
even sympathetic to, the views of Communists and fellow travelers, with the
result that the Federal Government has been infiltrated by a network of spies, as
conclusively proven in the Hiss-Chambers and other cases.40
His accusations encompass the fact that the Government‟s policy of appeasement towards
the Soviets in addition to their disbelief regarding communist infiltration permitted
hundreds of spies to leave the country with sensitive material on the atomic bomb.41
Weinstein‟s Perjury agrees with Velde‟s rendition that the Soviet Union‟s explosion of an
atomic bomb and continued conflicts for control in China enhanced “a hardening of public
sentiment toward the treatment of domestic Communists.”42 Interestingly, Democratic
members of the House are silent during Velde‟s accusations directed at the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations. Their refusal to defend their party shows the extent to which the
Hiss case has damaged Democratic moral and seems to have emboldened Republican
pursuits for the executive.
From the start of the second trial to Hiss‟ conviction in January 1950, Republicans
are vacant from discussions in the House.
Like their Democratic colleagues, the
catastrophic first trial is likely the reason for their silence.
Careers and reputations
depended on the pronouncement of a guilty verdict and another jury deadlock would be
unacceptable. By January 21st, 1950 there is an influx in speeches over a 10 day period with
15 inclusions in the Record. Several congressmen criticize the actions of Secretary of State
Dean Acheson after the pronouncement of the guilty verdict. John J. Jennings (Tennessee)
reveals that the jury deliberated for 21 hours; their final decision being two counts of guilty.
Hiss was then sentenced to five years imprisonment. Jennings includes Secretary of State
Dean Acheson‟s reaction to the verdict at a press conference where he announced that even
though Hiss had been deemed guilty, he [Acheson] still stood by him and believed in his
40
Congressional Record, September 26th, 1949 : p. A5854.
Ibid., p. A5854.
42
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 419.
41
57
innocence.43
This statement was seen by many, such as Jennings, as proof that the
Democratic executive was overrun with corruption. James E. Van Zandt (Pennsylvania)
declared in his speech that Acheson‟s loyalty to Hiss was a violation of his oath of office.44
Consequently, congressmen‟s Van Zandt, Jennings, Robert Hale (Maine) and Walter H.
Judd (Minnesota)45 were all in favor of removing Acheson from his prestigious post for his
injudicious remarks and friendship with a convicted traitor.
Acheson‟s comments during the press conference are startling considering the state
of uncertainty surrounding the Democratic party at the time. His statement did nothing
more than add another reason for politicians and the public to doubt the leadership skills of
Truman‟s administration. Unsurprisingly, the Republicans of the House used Acheson‟s
allegiance as even more proof that a Soviet conspiracy was afoot in the State Department.
With the conviction of Hiss on January 21st, Republican congressmen sought to
applaud those who had a hand in uncovering the truth. Both Donald L. Jackson (California)
and W. Kingsland Macy praise the work of Richard Nixon and Karl Mundt. In Macy‟s
discourse, Nixon is the sole recipient of his admiration; he glorifies the congressman‟s
actions, character and intelligence (“[h]ad it not been for the tenacity […] coupled with his
unusual mental ability and supplemented by his thorough knowledge of the law, a broad
scale cover-up might have been effected in a far-reaching and important case that could
lead others into taking such further advantage of our Constitution”).46 Jackson seeks to
congratulate both Nixon and Mundt, claiming that they are the sole reason for Hiss‟
43
Congressional Record, January 31st, 1950 : p. 1183-1184.
Van Zandt includes the oath of office of the Secretary of State in his speech of January 1950: “I do
solemnly swear, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without
any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter, so help me God.” Congressional Record, January 1950: p. 1379.
45
Walter H. Judd was one of several leaders of the China Lobby. Known for its support and propaganda in
favor of Chiang Kai-shek of China, the group included businessmen, conservative Republicans, religious
leaders, members of the press as well as Nationalist Chinese politicians. According to Klingaman‟s
Encyclopedia of the McCarthy Era, the China Lobby attempted to gain congressional support (military and
financial) from 1945-1948 for Chiang‟s crusade. His defeat and retreat to Taiwan in 1949 made China Lobby
members seek any explanation for Chiang‟s failure and found it in the guise of the Truman administration.
They blamed Chiang‟s defeat on communist sympathizers in the State Department who had used their
positions to influence policy. See Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 69-70.
46
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950 : p. 1007.
44
58
indictment.47 These accolades spoken by several Republicans after the conviction are
reminiscent of the time period of the HUAC hearings. Their commendations served to
establish Nixon‟s reputation as a leader in the fight against communism; making it seem as
though the Republicans were doing the real work while the Democratic executive was
sitting idly by.
Considering Richard Nixon‟s participation and influence during the HUAC
hearings, it is surprising to note that he is absent in the discussions throughout the entire
period of both trials and only makes an appearance after the conviction. His silence can be
attributed to his need to preserve his credibility if the jury had not found Hiss guilty;
protecting his image as a HUAC investigator doing his congressional duty in search of the
truth. His speech of January 26th is extensive and includes details from the HUAC hearings
and aspects of the judicial proceedings. His goal is to teach the American people about the
case to prevent a future tragedy of this magnitude. He is very vehement when he exclaims
that the United States would not overcome another scandal like the Hiss case.48 Nixon‟s
rendition includes the names of several prominent Democratic officials who publicly stood
by Hiss during the trials and even after he was convicted of perjury. To Nixon, their
unwavering defense is a perfect example of the extensive reach and influence those part of
the conspiracy were able to wield and their power to conceal it for so long. 49 He also
addresses those claiming that Hiss‟ subversive behavior was done in a time when the Soviet
Union was a friend to the United States. Nixon disproves this excuse by demonstrating that
Chambers‟ story was brought to Adolph Berle‟s attention during the Hitler-Stalin pact. As
a result, Nixon presents himself as the expert in all matters relating to Hiss. His tone
evokes a sense of authority which he uses to convince his fellow representatives that the
lessons of the Hiss case should not go unheeded.
Although his speech includes a chronological rendition of the events of the early
accusations leading up to the eventual conviction, the dialogue is teeming with instances of
Democratic neglect whenever communism is the topic of discussion. He admits that some
administrations will sometimes refuse to bring up damaging facts (such as communist
47
Congressional Record, January 24th, 1950 : p. 843.
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950 : p. 999-1000.
49
Ibid., p. 1006.
48
59
employees) in an election year50 and he vehemently disagrees with the practice of purposely
censuring important information. His statement endeavors to appeal to those losing faith in
the chief executive.
Nixon‟s presentation gives the impression that the Hiss debacle had a big impact on
American society. Elaborating on five different recommendations, his goal is to ensure that
nothing similar is ever repeated. The first of his recommendations involve full cooperation
with the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover. He believes the FBI‟s dedication to the investigation of
subversive activity is an invaluable service that needs to be used to its full potential.
Additionally, he supports an extension of the statute of limitations from three years to 10.
Had this law been changed sooner, Hiss could have been convicted of subversive activity
instead of perjury. Furthermore, Nixon suggests that the House fully endorse HUAC since
it was their work that uncovered the finer details of the Hiss/Chambers scandal. Refining
the methods used to verify the loyalty of Government employees is proposed in his speech
followed by the creation of an education program to teach the American people about the
differences between communism and democracy.51
Nixon‟s other contribution to the Record is on January 31st in which Chambers‟
participation in the Washington spy network and his behavior during the trial is discussed.
The conviction in January 1950 was not only a victory for Republicans and their fight
against communism but a victory for Richard Nixon and the advancement of his career.
His early involvement in the case and determination ensured that it would go to trial when
many expressed skepticism as to Hiss‟ guilt. His participation after the conviction was his
way of acknowledging the verdict while reiterating the importance of his investigation that
enabled Hiss‟ eventual imprisonment. Furthermore, Alger Hiss‟ sentencing likely played a
part in Nixon‟s appointment to the Senate later that year52.
Judge Henry W. Goddard‟s actions and impartiality during the second trial is
referred to in Harold H. Velde‟s January 24th speech. Though Kaufman‟s behavior is
blamed on inexperience, Velde‟s praise for Goddard‟s unbiased ruling emphasizes the
Congressional Record, January 26th, 1950: p. 1006.
Ibid., p. 1006-1007.
52
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Richard M. Nixon,” p. 281-284.
50
51
60
embarrassment that was the first trial. The purpose of his inclusion is to demonstrate that
the prosecution of Hiss does not mean the end of subversive activity in the American
government.
For Velde, the Hiss case is a symbol of the communist threat that has
infiltrated the executive in the form of communist sympathizers and in some cases, spies.53
Velde‟s criticism extends to the administrations lack of initiative regarding the
pursuit of Hiss and their knowledge of his activities 10 years prior to the HUAC hearings of
1948. Had action been taken sooner, Hiss could have been prosecuted for espionage.
Velde is adamant that the administration and Hiss‟ advocates in prominent Government
positions take responsibility for their part in protecting a man who is often compared to the
notorious American traitor: Benedict Arnold.54
Velde‟s extensive participation in House discussions for the 1949-1950 period is
impressive. His commitment to the elimination of communism in the United States and in
government is the typical response expected of a Republican at this juncture of the Hiss
case. His longstanding opposition to communism can be traced back to his time as special
agent for the FBI in the sabotage and counter-espionage division.55 As demonstrated on
numerous occasions in the Congressional Record, Velde‟s contributions in the House seem
to have been a reminder to his Democratic opponents of their failure to act on an important
issue that would inevitably lead to their party‟s demise.
Statements made by Clare E. Hoffman56 (Michigan) and J. Harry McGregor (Ohio)
make reference to the next presidential election in order to advise American voters to align
themselves with candidates dedicated to the eradication of communism; a goal Hoffman
claims Truman failed to accomplish. Moreover, their speeches refer to the importance of
purging the administration and State Department of communists and Soviet sympathizers.
Congressional Record, January 24th, 1950: p. A508.
Congressional Record, January 27th, 30th, 31st, 1950: p. A601, A632, 1203.
55
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, “Harold Himmel Velde (1910-1985)”,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=V000082, Velde was a special agent for the FBI
from 1943-1946 and was eventually appointed chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee
(83rd Congress) where he continued his fight against subversive activity in the United States.
56
Clare E. Hoffman was an „ultra‟ conservative who supported isolationism, criticized „big‟ businesses and
government, campaigned against social reform and unions and was a staunch anti-communist. Donald Edwin
Walker, “The Congressional Career of Clare E. Hoffman, 1935-60,” doctoral dissertation, Michigan State
University, 1982, p. 2, 7.
53
54
61
The removal of subversives from Government employment is portrayed by Hoffman,
McGregor and Velde as the number one priority of the Republican party.57 Even though
the Hiss/Chambers affair is not specifically mentioned, the subject choice of both men is an
obvious response to the issues plaguing the legislative body.
Their allusion to the
upcoming presidential campaign is presented with a sense of urgency, making it seem as
though they are in an election year when in reality Truman is midway through his term in
office. They seem to have refused to believe that a Democratic executive could possibly
„clean up‟ the State Department and instead are already encouraging American citizens to
make an informed decision when voting for their next president. In particular, they present
the removal of reds in government as the deciding factor when choosing the appropriate
candidate and that a Republican in particular will be capable of accomplishing such a goal.
The opinions emanating from the House of Representatives varied from the start of
the first trial in 1949 to Hiss‟ eventual conviction in January 1950. Democrats were divided
with those from the South adopting anti-Hiss and anti-Truman ideals reminiscent of their
Republican colleagues. Northern Democrats avoided discussing the Hiss/Chambers affair,
using their time on the floor of the House to criticize HUAC and the actions of its members.
Republicans were consistent when discussing the case in the House. Using the irrevocable
damage done to the Democrats to their advantage, Republicans exposed every scandal and
controversy that emerged during the first trial with Kaufman and extensively emphasized
the chief executive‟s failure to protect the United States from Soviet intruders. Unlike their
opposition, Republicans revealed details of the trial such as witness testimony and the
evidence presented, exposing Hiss‟ treasonous activities.
Statements made by Dean
Acheson after the guilty verdict was seen as another reason to doubt the Democrats and
added further ammunition to Republican speeches in the House.
An editorial included in the Record by Herbert A. Meyer (Kansas) states that the
Hiss verdict was a momentous event in United States history.58
This declaration is
representative of the atmosphere in the House in January 1950; its meaning different for
both parties. To the Democratic party and the executive, the Hiss conviction was proof that
Congressional Record, July 24th and 27th, 1950: p. A527-A528, A605-A606.
Congressional Record, January 27th, 1950 : p. A601. The quote comes from an editorial entitled “Has
Morality Changed?” written by Frank C. Sands and published in the Daily Reporter.
57
58
62
communists had succeeded in acquiring influential positions and had written and influenced
the creation of policies, perhaps in favor of Soviet needs. The Hiss case would forever be a
reminder to their party of their failure to remove a threat originally perceived as a „red
herring‟. To the Republican‟s, the importance of the guilty verdict demonstrated that their
perpetual dedication to the fight against Soviet espionage was not a fabricated story to gain
votes, but a real concern that they refused to ignore. Republican perseverance in the House
regarding the subversive issue gives the impression that the party is the defender of
American rights and a democratic system of government.
On the other hand, the
Democratic persistence that communist infiltration is nonexistent in light of the evidence
presented during the Hiss trials exhibits denial by the country‟s leader and his party.
Debates in the House of Representatives and the Senate are similar in 1949 and
1950 in the sense that both legislative houses discuss the details of the trials, the meaning
behind the conviction and the response of prominent government officials such as Dean
Acheson. Contrary to the voluminous exchanges in the House, members of the Senate limit
their participation when debating the scandal. Democrats contribute their thoughts on two
occasions while the Republicans actively make reference to the controversy 12 times. A
significant contrast in the Senate does emerge from the time of the HUAC hearings in 1948
to the subsequent trials and conviction of 1949-1950. Karl Mundt is appointed to the
Senate on December 31st, 1948 where his expertise on the Hiss investigations is prominent
in conversations after the guilty verdict of January 1950.
2.2-Senate
Opinions in the Senate emitted by both Democrats and Republicans were similar
regarding the subject at hand. All agreed that the conviction of Hiss was a great victory for
the United States; an important step towards removing red spies from government
employment. Though Democrats were the majority in the Senate of the 81st Congress,
those predominantly from the North who side with Truman do not take part in discussions
during the trials or after the revelation of the verdict. Their silence is representative of their
surrender after the emerging evidence of Soviet espionage in America. Any defense on
their part would be perceived as protecting the communist cause.
63
2.2.1-Democrats
Democratic senators did not discuss the Alger Hiss trials in 1949. Their sole
contribution was that of Senator Herbert R. O‟Conor (Maryland) arguing the importance of
strengthening immigration laws after revelations of subversive activity. He specifically
makes reference to a new bill introduced by Senator Pat McCarran 59 (Nevada) that would
improve present policies. According to O‟Conor, loopholes in the existing laws allow
entrance to the United States to travelers who are adherents of communism. McCarran‟s
bill would ensure that any immigrant taking part in traitorous activities would immediately
be deported.60 O‟Conor describes how Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not approve of
the bill, claiming that some aspects interfered with legislation already in place.61
Senator O‟Conor‟s recognition of recent espionage cases and the need to exclude or
deport known communists are topics we have come to expect from Southern Democrats
and Republicans.
Although he does not condemn Acheson‟s decision regarding the
McCarran bill, the overall tone of his dialogue radiates disappointment that the Secretary of
State does not endorse the tightening of immigration laws. His anti-communist beliefs may
stem from his position as national chairman of the Interstate Committee on Postwar
Reconstruction and Development from 1943 to 1946.62 O‟Conor‟s duties as chairman
likely included the examination of destruction and destitution caused by the Second World
War. The negative impact of nazism and communism in Europe would have influenced
O‟Conor‟s opinions concerning the safety of democratic government in the United States
and accounts for his inclusion of September 20th, 1949.
The only other Democratic entry occurs after Hiss is convicted on January 21st,
1950. James O. Eastland‟s (Mississippi) inclusion in the Record informs the Senate that the
59
Senator Pat McCarran‟s political beliefs are often referred to in conjunction with those of McCarthy. Both
men adamantly fought against communist infiltration and corruption of government. McCarran, however,
authored two controversial bills (the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 and the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952 to limit immigration); both were vetoed by Truman (who was often called McCarran‟s nemesis).
Although the president was strictly opposed to both pieces of legislation, they were passed by Congress. Alan
Brinkley, “The Elusive Worlds of Joe McCarthy and Pat McCarran,” Reviews in American History 11, 4
(1983), p. 601-603. And John Gizzi, “Angry Liberal Skewers Sen. McCarran,” Human Events 60, 40 (2004),
p. 28.
60
Congressional Record, September 20th, 1949 : p. 13057-13058.
61
Ibid., p. 13058.
62
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, “Herbert Romulus O‟Conor (18961960),” http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=O000032
64
Mississippi House of Representatives has condemned Dean Acheson‟s statements regarding
his continued defense of Hiss. Eastland is adamant that an investigation of government
departments (particularly the State Department), be done to remove all persons who have
not demonstrated their full loyalty to the U.S.63 Eastland‟s beliefs are reminiscent of his
southern upbringing and consistent with statements he made in 1949 regarding the
communist problem.64
While Democratic senators were relatively absent in discussions, Republicans used
their time to reiterate details of the investigation and the trials. In doing so, they were able
to advance their party‟s reputation by blaming Truman‟s administration for the recent
discovery of the extensive spy network in several government departments.
2.2.2-Republicans
Although Republicans in the Senate assessed the Hiss/Chambers affair after the
conviction in 1950, it is interesting to note that they too are completely uninvolved during
the trials of 1949. This lack of participation follows the trend experienced in the House of
Representatives as congressmen were still recovering from the events of the first trial.
Their silence may represent uncertainty that a conviction will come to pass after the first
jury‟s inability to reach a final decision. Senator Homer E. Capehart (Indiana), whose
speech includes five different editorials to uphold his beliefs, is the most vocal Republican
during the week following the Hiss conviction. His thoughts are indicative of Republican
opinions after the emergence of the guilty verdict which encompasses four principal
themes: the first is that Hiss is guilty and although he was solely convicted of perjury, to
American citizens and politicians this decision signifies that he was a Soviet agent in a
communist apparatus. The second point surrounds the other men named by Chambers; that
this ruling essentially includes these men as well, albeit unofficially. The third important
aspect explores Hiss‟ career in government, his contributions as well as influence regarding
63
Congressional Record, January 31st, 1950 : p. 1146.
Senator Eastland, a staunch segregationist, was chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee until
his retirement in 1978. The committee was the Senate‟s equivalent of the House Un-American Activities
Committee and was dedicated to finding and removing communists from influential positions in government
and educational institutions, etc. Sarah Hart Brown, “Redressing Southern „Subversion‟: The Case of Senator
Eastland and the Louisiana Lawyer,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association
43, 3 (2002), p. 295-297.
64
65
policies and his superiors who, according to Capehart, were invested in protecting him.
And finally, most prevalent in Republican speeches for the period of the Hiss/Chambers
controversy is the failure of Truman and his administration to take the case seriously once
the initial accusations were made public. To many, such as Capehart, the safeguard of
national security should have been the main priority and their failure to act was
inexcusable.65
The first of Capehart‟s editorial inclusions is entitled „The Hiss Verdict‟ and was
published in the Indianapolis News of January 23rd, 1950. The editorial ridicules Truman‟s
„red herring‟ statements in the early days of the case and refers to followers of Hiss as
having „red faces‟ now that the final verdict has been pronounced. The author 66 targets
Frankfurter simultaneously and questions whether the Supreme Court judge regrets
introducing Hiss to government work and his now infamous and unprecedented appearance
as a character witness.67 The „historic‟ verdict is discussed in „Hiss is Guilty‟ published in
the Palladium-Item and Sun-Telegram of Richmond, Indiana on January 23rd, 1950. Here,
the journalist endeavors to explain the meaning behind the Hiss conviction in American
history: that the State Department was closely associated to the communist spy system
during an unstable time in US-Soviet relations.68
Even though Hiss is the principle focus of most editorials, Capehart does include
„Next?‟ from the Columbus Evening Dispatch in which the other men accused by Chambers
are discussed.
This inclusion supports Republican beliefs that the problem of Soviet
infiltration has not been solved with the imprisonment of Alger Hiss; that the complete
removal of communists and communist sympathizers from government positions is
necessary to conserve the integrity of the governing body of the United States of America.69
The significance of Hiss‟ participation at Yalta is the topic of discussion in the Indianapolis
Star‟s „Is Hiss Alone?‟ of January 22nd, 1950. The editor70 claims that the classified
65
Congressional Record, January 23rd, 1950 : p. 754-757.
The name of the author of “The Hiss Verdict” from the Indianapolis News was not mentioned in the
Congressional Record.
67
Congressional Record, January 25th, 1950 : p. A537-A538.
68
Ibid., p. A538.
69
Ibid., p. A538.
70
The name of the editor of “Is Hiss Alone?” from the Indianapolis Star was not mentioned in the
Congressional Record.
66
66
material Hiss was privy to during his impressive career and his loyalty to Stalin permitted
him to betray the rights of several countries71 while part of Roosevelt‟s advisers at Yalta.
From the Indianapolis Times of January 23rd, 1950, the editorial entitled „Hiss Case
Lessons‟ entreats its readers to realize that the conviction of Hiss does not signify that the
State Department and other Government Departments are now free of traitors.
The
concluding words sum up Republican sentiment after Hiss‟ conviction in which the final
verdict is not seen as the end to the espionage problem rather that this predicament may reemerge if those in power continue to approve of men whose sole purpose is to destroy the
American democratic system.
The editorial ends with a final plea for change:
“[i]mprisonment of Alger Hiss will do little to protect this country unless there is drastic
change in the attitude of high officials who sought to belittle the charges against him and to
help him escape punishment.”72 The case is instead presented as the first step in a long
battle to remove communists from influential posts.
Thus, Capehart‟s purpose of including these editorials is twofold: first, to
substantiate his beliefs and those of his fellow Republican senators.
And second, to
demonstrate that it is not exclusively his party that has been deeply invested in the case and
its outcome. Journalists on both sides of the political spectrum took advantage of the case‟s
popularity. The majority of which shared anti-Hiss views and their influential writings
went a long way in swaying the political leanings of the American citizens. The apparent
bias in Capehart‟s editorials reflects the feeling of the time period and the widespread
hysteria that began with the original accusations made before HUAC in 1948. His use of
these editorials is
effective in further demoralizing Democrats since most anti-Hiss
newspapers attacked Truman‟s administration and placed doubt on his ability to continue
the communist clean-up ofgovernment departments.
In his first address to the Senate, Karl E. Mundt contemplates the meaning behind
the Hiss case.
He gives a detailed description of HUAC‟s investigation while
complimenting the impeccable work of Nixon whose dedication ensured the case would be
tried. There is a striking contrast in the severity of Mundt‟s previous speeches while a
71
72
Ibid., p. A549-A550.
Ibid., p. A538.
67
House representative and his input in the Senate on January 25th, 1950.
His House
contributions emitted a strong dislike of subversive activity, disapproval of the executive‟s
lack of motivation to assist the Committee and the perseverance to uncover the truth. In
comparison, his statement in the Senate attempts to encompass both points of view when
describing the fact that it is normal to feel some sympathy for what Hiss‟ family is
experiencing. His momentary compassion is then replaced by criticism as he states that it is
“impossible and unreasonable to condone his activities and to ignore their importance and
significance and the part they may have played in shaping the history of the world.”73
Similar to Capehart‟s editorials, Mundt touches on the impact Hiss‟ actions may
have had on our history. His longstanding career in government not only permitted him to
assert his influence at Yalta but also in his contributions to the formulation of foreign
policy, which Mundt believes should be reviewed.74 He concludes by placing some of the
blame upon his own party, albeit in a way to make it seem as though the Republicans had
the responsibility of removing all corruption in lieu of the Democratic executive. Mundt
states: “Perhaps if we Republicans had measured up a little more to our responsibility as a
great minority party we could have come sooner to the rescue and it would have been easier
to undo some of the dreadful damage which now so clearly is shown to have been done.”75
Finally, Joseph R. McCarthy (Wisconsin) makes his debut examining the
Hiss/Chambers affair by questioning Mundt about Acheson‟s refusal to cut ties with the
newly convicted perjurer. It is evident from the onset of his dialogue with Mundt that he is
searching for further scandal.
Though Mundt refuses to answer him, McCarthy asks
whether or not Acheson‟s statement also means that he will not turn his back on any other
communists in the State Department. An interesting point emerges in Weinstein‟s Perjury
in which he states that the Hiss conviction gave McCarthy and his adherents what
credibility their accusations needed.76
His incessant need to expose Acheson as
sympathetic to the Soviet cause foreshadows his eventual drive to uncover subversive
agents in important government positions. Furthermore, his relentless perseverance for red
73
Congressional Record, January 25th, 1950 : p. 889.
Ibid., p. 905.
75
Ibid., p. 905.
76
Weinstein, op. cit., p. 451.
74
68
spies and his infamous „list‟ expose a need to memorialize his efforts. Perhaps witnessing
the fame Nixon gained from taking part in uncovering a plot that touched two presidencies,
the State Department, the Yalta Conference and the creation of the UN charter encouraged
McCarthy to follow the same tactic to advance his career. Unfortunately, he did not gain
the fame he desired as a leading investigator of Soviet espionage but instead his name grew
synonymous with the communist witch hunt of the 1950‟s.
Senator Styles Bridges (New Hampshire) is the lone Republican to ponder the
progression of the next decade, exclaiming that the world will either be dominated by
communism or it will finally be eliminated. He makes reference to China‟s leader Chiang
Kai-shek, a reformed communist who has found Christianity and compares his newfound
beliefs to the religious upheaval of Whittaker Chambers. To Bridges, both these men
should be commended for their “moral courage.” He is the first to perceive Chambers in a
positive way, congratulating him for his actions and perseverance to tell the truth in light of
the backlash he received from the Hiss camp during the investigation and both trials.77
When comparing the early days of the HUAC accusations in 1948 and the trials and
conviction of 1949-1950, the partisan divide becomes more evident. While the NorthSouth division within the Democratic party is expected, their participation in debates drops
significantly over the course of both trials. Only those from the South continue to voice
their approval of the outcome of the case. The silence of the Northern faction can be
interpreted as acknowledgment of the damage done to their party by the spy cases and the
media coverage that could not be overlooked by American citizens. Republican opinions
are united on all fronts and use the details of the proceedings and the conviction as proof
that the Democratic administration has failed to act on an important issue. Although some
may say it was an obvious tactic used to discredit the opposition, its effectiveness silenced
rebuttals by Democrats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
The guilty verdict may have been perceived by most as the end of discussions
regarding Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers, but instead was the beginning of an
evolution of Hiss‟ persona as a State Department red spy into a symbol of subversive
77
Congressional Record, January 24th, 1950 : p. 813-814.
69
activity in America during the Cold War. After Hiss was convicted, Karl Mundt exclaimed
that it was “one of the most serious espionage cases in United States history.” 78 As we will
demonstrate in Chapter 3, Mundt‟s observation was correct; though the case was long over,
congressmen would use the Hiss case as the ultimate example of treachery in American
history. With the election of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952,
Democrats would seek to regain their credibility by accusing his administration of the same
wrong doings that had plagued Truman‟s time in office. Unfortunately, the „red scare‟
emerging with the start of the Hiss case could not be reproduced and Republicans used the
symbolism of the Hiss/Chambers scandal to dominate debates in the House of
Representatives and the Senate until 1961.
78
Congressional Record, January 25th, 1950 : p. 909.
70
CHAPTER 3-Alger Hiss, the New Benedict Arnold: His
Evolution from State Department Red Spy to Symbol of
Cold War Treachery, 1950-1960
While Hiss‟ conviction was seen by many American citizens as the inevitable
conclusion to his spy story, discussions in Congress regarding his involvement with the
Soviet underground did not diminish. If anything, the mention of Hiss‟ activities and the
meaning behind his sentencing evolved. Whereas the early 1950‟s encompassed criticism
of Hiss‟ prominent trial witnesses, the necessary steps needed to avoid future subversive
activity among government employees and enumerable instances of speeches regarding the
case and verdict, the second half of the decade changed its focus. Hiss‟ release from prison
introduced a slew of new issues to discuss as House representatives and senators reflected
on the impact he may have had at Yalta and in drafting policies. The case was still a topic
of debate, however, politicians became preoccupied with the larger implications of Hiss‟
betrayal and the significance his espionage may have had on American history.
This final chapter will appraise the gradual transformation of Alger Hiss: ex-State
Department red spy, to Alger Hiss: symbol of communist infiltration and deception of the
Cold War period from 1950-1960. This transition becomes more evident once Republican
Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected President of the United States in 1952. Other then
speeches regarding Hiss‟ intention to speak at Princeton in 1956 which prompts some to
revisit details of the case, he is no longer discussed in the same way as the years of the
HUAC hearings and the perjury trials. While the dislike is still apparent, his name and case
is used as an example when referring to communism, subversive activity or other espionage
cases. Moreover, there is a striking contrast in Democratic participation when comparing
the perjury trials period, the time immediately after conviction and the years of
Eisenhower‟s presidency. Before 1953, Democrats of the Northern faction were either
completely silent or on the defensive. After 1953, the atmosphere of both Legislative
houses seemed to change: Northern Democrats were now the ones accusing Republicans
and the new administration of being sympathetic to the communist cause. Unfortunately,
71
their allegations could not erase the disgrace that befell their party with the conviction of
Alger Hiss.
As was the case from the early public accusations in 1948 until the conviction of
January 1950, Republicans in the House of Representatives dominate discussions regarding
Hiss, Chambers, subversive activity and communism in America with 57 inclusions. Even
though Democrats are less vocal, there is a noticeable increase in their participation (32
inclusions). Hiss‟ imprisonment seems to have emboldened some to speak on his behalf
while encouraging those from the South to continue their criticism of the administration.
3.1-House of Representatives
Democratic and Republican congressmen were like minded in the 1950‟s and
debated what they believed were important issues in light of the Hiss conviction and the
other espionage cases being tried at the time. These topics included Dean Acheson‟s
approval of Hiss, subversive activity and communism in the United States, the influence of
„red‟ spies on foreign policy, the creation of new laws to prevent future espionage, the
methods of Joseph R. McCarthy and the infamous episode of Hiss‟ invitation to speak in
front of Princeton‟s students in 1956. While the Southern Democrats and Republicans
continued their crusade against Truman‟s administration and communist infiltration in the
early 1950‟s, Northern Democrats began to defend their actions and those of Hiss‟
advocates. The new Republican executive of 1953 incited many to accuse Eisenhower of
failing to eliminate communism. It was the Democratic effort to create the same upheaval
and lack of faith that transpired during Truman‟s time in office.
3.1.1-Democrats
The guilty verdict is referred to in passing by Wayne N. Aspinall (Colorado) on
February 9th, 1950,1 making room for intense analysis of Dean Acheson‟s statements
regarding his refusal to end his friendship with Hiss. Contrary to previous years when
Northern Democrats chose to remain silent whenever espionage in government was
discussed, four congressmen come to Acheson‟s defense. Eugene J. Keogh (New York)
1
Congressional Record, February 9th, 1950: p. A977.
72
rejects Republican demands that the Secretary of State resign for his comments.2 Likewise,
Carl D. Perkins (Kentucky) uses an editorial from the Louisville Courier-Journal to justify
his beliefs: that as an individual, Acheson has the right to support his friend.3
In
comparison, Foster Furcolo (Massachusetts) adopts both sides of the Acheson argument.
Adopting a view similar to Perkins, Furcolo believes that as an American citizen, Dean
Acheson has the right to express his opinions and endorse whomever he wishes but, as
Secretary of State, his position dictates who he calls his friend or enemy. 4 John J. Rooney‟s
(New York) inclusion is perhaps the most approving speech of all and is a prime example
of Democrats who believed that Acheson‟s statements were admirable, that communism in
government was not a big issue and that the Republicans were overreacting. Through his
use of David Lawrence‟s editorial entitled „Today in Washington-Acheson‟s Assertion of
Friendship for Hiss Called Example of Practical Christianity,‟ it is evident that Rooney
advocates the right of politicians to promote the causes they believe in, whether
controversial or not, regardless of public backlash.5
For some Democrats, the Hiss
conviction has yet to convince them that communist infiltration is a reality instead of
Republican delusions.
Democratic participation in discussions diminishes after February with only three
other inclusions in the Congressional Record for 1950. Isidore Dollinger‟s (New York)
contribution is demonstrative of the Northern faction of the Democratic party and their
unwavering denial in the face of the recent conviction. When discussing the communist
issue, he is adamant that the Republicans have fabricated the severity of the problem simply
to advance their careers. In an important passage of his speech, it is apparent that the
outcome of the Hiss case and „red‟ infiltration is still seen by many Northern Democrats as
Congressional Record, February 2nd, 1950 : p. A745.
Ibid., p. A758.
4
Ibid., p. A840.
5
Congressional Record, February 28th, 1950 : p. A1466; The editorial was published in the New York Herald
Tribune on February 28th, 1950. Supporting Rooney‟s beliefs, the editor refers to Acheson‟s loyalty to Hiss
by stating that: “Many people hold that he has a right, of course, to entertain views of sympathy toward his
friend and to doubt the guilt of Hiss but that, as Secretary of State, he shouldn‟t have commented at all. This
is tantamount to saying that, when a man becomes a public official, he must cease to have human feelings and
that a Secretary of State or any other public official is prohibited by political expediency from expressing
himself on any moral question that arises.”
2
3
73
an exaggeration.6 His desperation to restore his party‟s reputation is obvious when he
states: “Mr. Speaker, the current uproar over alleged Communist infiltration of the State
Department is causing great concern among the American people. Whatever the truth or
falsity of current charges it is obvious that the Republican party is seeking to make a
campaign issue of communism.”7 His refusal to admit that communists were able to insert
themselves into the State Department is interesting. Though Hiss has been found guilty of
perjury, and therefore of stealing confidential State Department documents for the purpose
of giving them to the Soviet Union, Dollinger insists that these espionage cases are merely
lies concocted by the Republican party in the hopes of gaining ground in the race for the
presidency. Furthermore, using an excerpt from Ralph de Toldedano‟s Seeds of Treason8,
he tries to demonstrate that Democratic officials tried to reveal the truth about Hiss once
they received the full story from Chambers but that their Republican superiors refused to
act upon the information they had acquired.
Once again, he blames the Republican
opposition for the ten year delay before the true story of Hiss and Chambers was finally
made public. His incessant disbelief that „reds‟ succeeded in infiltrating the government
further demonstrates that some Democrats refused to view the evidence for what it really
was: proof that the Soviet Union had succeeded in gaining classified information from
strategically placed spies.
John E. Rankin and Paul C. Jones (Missouri) are the only Democrats from the
Southern faction of their party to discuss topics in relation to the Hiss/Chambers affair for
1950. While Rankin‟s previous contributions were extensive, his participation decreases
and his last inclusion regarding espionage in the U.S. is on March 20th, 1950. The purpose
of his short speech is to defend himself against the attacks of Time editor Henry Luce9 who,
Rankin claims, bribed Chambers to stay on with Time magazine for nine years in order to
6
Congressional Record, April 3rd, 1950 : p. A2488.
Ibid., p. A2488.
8
Ralph De Toldedano, Seeds of Treason : The True Story of the Chambers-Hiss Tragedy, Western Islands,
196, 241 p.
9
Henry Luce was the co-founder of Time magazine and eventually became its editor. He also founded
Fortune, Life and Sports Illustrated. He was a staunch anti-communist and member of the China Lobby (his
loyalty to China likely stemmed from the fact that he was born there and only moved to the U.S. at the age of
thirteen). His father was a Presbyterian missionary and Luce viewed Chiang Kai-shek‟s religious conversion
as “the best hope of christianizing China.” Even though he was against communism and its growing sphere of
influence in the Far East, Luce was weary of McCarthy‟s motives and used his magazines to attack the
Wisconsin Senator. See Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 240.
7
74
keep him from telling the proper authorities what he knew about his old communist
apparatus in Washington.10
Nonetheless, these charges seem implausible considering
Luce‟s aversion to communism.11 Jones, on the other hand, discusses his endorsement of a
new bill proposed by Senator Eastland which would essentially introduce the death penalty
for spies.12 His approval of this drastic legislation demonstrates the widespread fear of
espionage in America in the 1950‟s and the serious impact these spy cases had on the
mindset of politicians.
Those in favor of Eastland‟s proposition believed it would
discourage any who contemplated betraying their country.13
Democrats in the House in the years leading up to Eisenhower‟s election discuss the
Hiss case in less detail, focusing instead on the larger implications of communism in the
United States. There is also a gradual change in Northern Democratic opinions. Though
some still refuse to acknowledge Hiss‟ guilt, many begin to advocate the need to solve the
communist problem in the U.S. as demonstrated by Representatives Thomas J. Lane
(Massachusetts) and Emanuel Celler (New York). Similar to Eastland‟s proposed bill, Lane
includes a speech made by a former Naval Intelligence Officer named Elliott Earl in which
the repercussions of spying are discussed. Earl questions the reasons why spies in the
United States have not been prosecuted or sentenced to death as would be the custom in
Russia.14 Lane‟s use of this speech represents his own incredulity that many Soviet spies
have yet to be apprehended for their crimes. In reference to the Hiss case, Lane includes an
article from the Boston Sunday Post to demonstrate that the end of the Hiss controversy is
not the end of subversive activity in government. It is evident that the author of the article
is entreating its readers to remember the crucial lessons of the Hiss/Chambers affair as he
states: “Don‟t forget Hiss. Don‟t forget what he was-who helped him get where he was,
and what he did. If we forgive and forget Hiss, we will deserve to lose in the contest with
the Soviets."15 Consequently, his career, his actions while part of the State Department and
his betrayal must never be erased from public consciousness; it should serve as a reminder
of the lengths the Soviet Union was willing to go in order to spread their communist
10
Congressional Record, March 20th, 1950 : p. 3641.
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 240.
12
Congressional Record, August 2nd, 1950 : p. A5608.
13
Ibid., p. A5608.
14
Congressional Record, April 12th, 1951 : p. A2008-A2009.
15
Congressional Record, June 30th, 1952 : p. A4199.
11
75
ideology. The article is significant in that it expresses Lane‟s beliefs regarding the meaning
behind Hiss‟ actions and makes way for the beginning of the evolution of Hiss as a symbol
of Soviet espionage during the Cold War. Whereas before his case was discussed in
relation to his crimes, the progression of the trials, the condemning evidence and the
conviction, Lane‟s inclusion describes the case as a part of America‟s recent history; a
tragic event to be learned from and to encourage the fight against Soviet Russia‟s ambitions
of communist takeover.
Emanuel Celler believes that it is Congress‟ duty to investigate all aspects of
subversive activity and any potential danger to the American citizens. When describing the
state of tension and paranoia within the United States, Celler remarks that the country is
divided into two schools of thought regarding Congress‟ subversive investigations: there
are those who agree, and those who do not are considered reds or communist
sympathizers.16 In order to ensure Soviet agents are justly convicted, Celler suggests the
creation of a single17 investigating committee with members from both legislative houses
taking part in investigations. He recommends that its members be comprised of lawyers;
their understanding of the law will permit them to ask the proper questions and allow them
to attain the necessary information for conviction.18 Celler‟s suggestions demonstrate that
by 1953, some Northern Democrats were acknowledging the significance of an
investigating body.
Their recognition symbolizes the gradual transformation of their
opinions; they are no longer fervently denying the presence of „red‟ spies and are instead
advocating action.
Southerner Dwight L. Rogers‟ (Florida) participation in the House includes an
editorial from the Palm Beach Post-Times comparing communism and democracy. After
elaborating on the finer points of both ideologies (exposing the negative aspects of
communism and the positive aspects of democracy), the editor entreats its readers to choose
16
Congressional Record, May 28th, 1953 : p. A3028.
Celler refers to the fact that there are three separate committees investigating subversive activity.
Dissolving the committees and creating one with members from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives would ensure that all subversive cases would go to the same committee (cases would not fall
between the cracks) and if something should go wrong, Congress would know who to confront. Ibid., p.
A3028.
18
Ibid., p. A3028.
17
76
the right form of government for America.19 Rogers‟ choice of editorial effectively delivers
its targeted message: democracy is tantamount to freedom and civil rights whereas
communism is synonymous with censorship and captivity.
In regards to communist infiltration of professional employment, John S. Wood
expounds the necessity to question all professionals (lawyers, doctors, etc.) and the
disapproval of many who fear they will lose their careers after appearing before the
Committee.
Wood includes a letter written by an American citizen in favor of the
Committee‟s actions and believes that any loyal American would sign a loyalty oath.20
Wood‟s inclusion exhibits the impact of the spy cases as the Committee dedicates it‟s time
to removing Soviet agents from the public and private sectors of employment.
Though the Rogers and Wood inclusions do not directly refer to Hiss or Chambers,
it is clear that the case had an impact on political perspectives. Rogers‟ editorial choice
indicates that for some, the hysteria had succeeded in convincing them that a communist
form of government was a possibility. The extreme atmosphere of the Cold War period
seems to have prompted the editor to write a comparison of both ideologies in order to sway
those who romanticized socialism. In a similar fashion, Wood‟s speech evokes a sense of
paranoia, a need to question all professionals. This instinct to be suspicious of this group
most likely stems from the fact that those accused in the spy cases were considered
intellectuals. They were scientists, economists and lawyers; careers that did not ordinarily
induce a need for revolution.
The implication of Supreme Court Justices appearing as character witnesses in a
criminal case is discussed in James C. Davis‟ speech of June 18th, 1953. Using the Hiss
case as an example, Davis demonstrates the necessity for tighter legislation regarding the
actions of the Supreme Court. In reference to Judge Frankfurter, Davis states that he was
the reason Hiss was hired by the U.S. government and insinuates that the judge helped other
communists achieve influential posts. The effect of his appearance as a character witness
was twofold. It emitted the authority and prominence inherent in his position, adding a
touch of credibility to Hiss and yet disgraced America‟s judicial institution as the evidence
19
20
Congressional Record, February 27th, 1951 : p. A997.
Congressional Record, June 19th, 1952 : p. A3843-A3844.
77
presented at the trials proved Hiss was a traitor and that he had succeeded in fooling some
of the most respected men in American politics.21 Though the Hiss case is discussed, it is
used as an example when describing a related issue. The severity of the case is used to
establish a need for change in the judicial branch. Davis‟ discourse is another instance of
Hiss‟ evolution. Whereas the appearance of character witnesses during the Hiss trial was
analyzed and extensively criticized in 1949 and 1950, the passage of time changed the way
politicians discussed aspects of that time period. Instead, his case and the controversial
appearance of Frankfurter and Reed are used to demonstrate the faults within the judiciary
system.
By 1955, Democrats begin commenting on Eisenhower‟s „supposed‟ failure to
eradicate communism.22
Frank Thompson Jr. (New Jersey) includes pamphlets and
newspaper articles to his speech describing the identifying characteristics of a communist.
These tips expose the impact the spy cases had on the public. Furthermore, Thompson
includes an editorial from the New York Times in which the author claims that the security
problems have gotten worse since Eisenhower was elected.23 His choice of editorials and
communist-spotting-pamphlets is his way of flaunting the fact that the situation hasn‟t
improved with a Republican administration rather that the problem has persisted and in
some cases, took a turn for the worse.
Alger Hiss is once again a topic of discussion in the spring of 1956 as Democrats
and Republicans alike debate the fact that a group of Princeton students have invited the
convicted perjurer to give a presentation on American foreign policy. Congressman T.
James Tumulty (New Jersey) is particularly outraged by Hiss‟ invitation and appears on 13
different occasions over the course of one month in the Congressional Record to express
his disapproval. In his speech of April 11th, 1956, he states that an overwhelming amount
of students and faculty believe Hiss has served his time in prison and should be permitted to
21
Congressional Record, June 18th, 1953 : p. 6879.
Although Democrats begin accusing Eisenhower of failing to remove communist ideology in 1955, Senator
McCarthy initiates his campaign against the president as early as 1953 (claiming there were subversives at the
Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey) which eventually culminates to
his censorship. Kirkendall, op. cit., p. 259 and see p. 117 of this masters thesis for more on McCarthy‟s
conflict with Eisenhower.
23
Congressional Record, June 22nd, 1955 : p. A4556-A4558
22
78
go on with his life.24 His disapproval seems to stem from the fact that Hiss will not be
discussing his crimes, his incarceration or give a confession but was invited to discuss the
Geneva conference (1955)25 and foreign policy. Thus, Tumulty believes that Hiss has lost
his right to analyze the conference (since he was not present) or any foreign policy
considering the reasons for his conviction.26 Given his membership of the Democratic
party and being from the Northeast, his vehemence is surprising and is apparent when he
states that Hiss does not deserve to receive the honor of speaking at an American university.
If anything, he believes Hiss should be percieved as the prime example of an American
traitor.27 He concludes his first speech by pointing out that the Russians would not concede
such a recognition to a traitor of the Soviet Union.28
Tumulty‟s criticism continues the following day as he heartily agrees with
statements made by his Republican colleagues regarding this new scandal.29 He reiterates
that a traitor should not be honored by such a prestigious university. His repetition of this
sentiment is representative of his outrage and incredulity. It is as though he cannot begin to
comprehend the logic behind the decision to bestow an invitation and his use of the same
viewpoint demonstrates the extent to which the Hiss case affected certain politicians. His
objection is ever present in his speech of April 19th, 1956 and includes articles from the
Daily Princetonian to establish the naivety of Princeton‟s students. According to the
article‟s author, Hiss had been asked by several schools to speak before its students and
accepted to appear at Princeton and Swarthmore College (Swarthmore eventually revoked
their offer after several complaints by concerned parents). The author further expresses that
though Hiss is seen by many as a symbol of betrayal, he still has rights and that by speaking
at Princeton he will be able to recover a measure of his reputation that was robbed by his
24
Congressional Record, April 11th, 1956 : p. 6163.
The 1955 Geneva Conference was a series of meetings between the Big Four in the hopes of lessening
tensions between the Democratic nations and the communist Soviet Union. Four main issues of contention
were discussed and included the reunification of Germany, security agreements for Europe, disarmament and
increased trade between the four powers. P.C., “The Summit Talks at Geneva, and after,” The World Today
11, 9 (1955), p. 365.
26
Congressional Record, April 11th, 1956: p. 6164.
27
Ibid., p. 6163.
28
Ibid., p. 6165.
29
Congressional Record, April 12th, 1956: p. 6227-6228.
25
79
conviction.30 Tumulty‟s astonishment and outrage regarding the newspaper‟s pro-Hiss
attitude31 is evident throughout his speech. He questions the school system and their
teaching methods since students are advocating for the rights of a convicted traitor.
Nonetheless, Tumulty seems to believe that their sympathy for Hiss is a result of their age;
that the students were too young when the crime and trials occurred and are romanticizing
the part he played in betraying their country.32 His purpose is to ensure the students realize
the important role Hiss held as a key member of the communist underground.33
For their part, the students writing for the Daily Princetonian disagree with
Tumulty‟s vehemence in the House as is evident in the articles he chose to include in the
Record. They believe that the whole ordeal has been blown out of proportion and that
Tumulty‟s continuous criticism is giving Princeton a bad reputation.
They are also
infuriated by his suggestion that Benedict Arnold should be pardoned and receive an honor
as well.34 The congressman‟s remark is not the first reference to the similarities between
Alger Hiss and Benedict Arnold over the course of the case. The correlation between the
two has emphasized the severity of Hiss‟ actions since Benedict Arnold‟s name is
synonymous with treachery and betrayal of the highest order.
Tumulty adds an editorial to his inclusions in which the author specifically states
that Alger Hiss is a symbol. He emphasizes that Princeton‟s students are not condoning his
actions; they are not there to judge, but to weigh his opinions on current foreign policy.
Interestingly, the article concludes stating “that the man in question is a symbol of treason
to some people is unfortunate, since it calls our sincerity into question.” 35 It is apparent
after reading this quote and the other inclusions that by 1956, the Hiss conviction no longer
had the same effect on the younger generation of Americans as it did in January 1950.
While the Cold War still preoccupied the minds of the citizens of the United States, the
30
Congressional Record, April 19th, 1956 : p. 6693.
The 20 year age difference between Princeton‟s students and Tumulty is evident at this point. The author of
the article attempts to promote Hiss‟ right to regain a certain amount of respectability after his conviction even
claiming that “Hiss is a man with opinions of great interest on international affairs, we cannot legitimately
condemn them.” While Tumulty is struggling to promote caution and weariness when it comes to Hiss, the
students are unable to grasp the severity of his crimes. Ibid., p. 6693.
32
Ibid., p. 6694.
33
Ibid., p. 6694.
34
Ibid., p. 6695.
35
Ibid., p. 6696.
31
80
conclusion of the trials, Hiss‟ incarceration and his eventual release lost its appeal in the
minds of the general public. Those attending university in 1956 had been young children at
the time of the HUAC hearings; they lacked the ability to understand the turmoil the case
had caused. Their elders, such as Representative Tumulty, knew the damage that had been
done by Hiss‟ espionage, the consequences his actions had on foreign policy, at Yalta and
within the State Department.
Tumulty‟s following contributions include a vast array of newspaper articles and
editorials to justify his beliefs. The importance of these articles and editorials demonstrates
the impact Hiss‟ appearance at Princeton had on the press. It was not only an issue being
discussed by politicians in Congress but affected American citizens on a grander scale.
Most noteworthy is the mention of Princeton‟s Chaplain who gave a scathing speech while
at the pulpit regarding Hiss‟ acceptance by the university. 36 Still other newspaper articles
questioned the progression of education in the last 50 years if students were permitted to
invite convicted traitors to speak to them about their foreign policy. 37 The disapproval of
Princeton‟s alumni is presented in an editorial of the Hudson Dispatch entitled „Alumni
Warns on Hiss Invitation‟ in which its members inform the students that the Hiss talk could
damage future fundraising for the university and are quoted saying that “the name of Hiss is
the very symbol of the subversive communist activity in America, even though he was not
convicted as a saboteur or subversive.”38 They too present Hiss as a symbol of the ongoing
battle against Soviet espionage and recognize that while the statute of limitations prevented
an espionage conviction, his crimes against the country were self evident.
Discussions after Hiss‟ controversial appearance at Princeton on April 26th, 1956
continue and emit the same atmosphere of displeasure. In a letter written by a Princeton
alumnus and included in his remarks, Tumulty‟s uproar in the face of Hiss‟ invitation is
congratulated.
This letter also details Hiss‟ standing ovation by the audience at the
conclusion of his speech.39 Both the alumnus and Tumulty seem offended that such a thing
36
Congressional Record, April 24th, 1956 : p. A3324 The article is entitled „Priest Hits Princeton Board Over
Hiss Talk‟ and was published in the Newark Star-Ledger on April 23rd, 1956.
37
Congressional Record, April 25th, 1956 : p. A3345. The article is entitled „A Case of Algers‟ and was
published in the Advocate.
38
Ibid., p. A3350.
39
Congressional Record, May 9th, 1956 : p. A3726.
81
even happened; that a convicted traitor could receive such praise. Finally, L. Mendel
Rivers (South Carolina) also refers to Hiss‟ speech at the distinguished university. Like
Tumulty, Rivers is disheartened by Princeton‟s willingness to welcome the perjurer since
he believes that more invitations to speak will follow and will most likely create doubt
regarding his guilt in the minds of those willing to hear him.40
Democrats are relatively silent for the remainder of the decade and are recorded
discussing issues regarding subversive activity and Alger Hiss on four other occasions.
Reference to Hiss‟ appearance at Princeton is alluded to for the last time in the House on
May 22nd, 1957. Frank Thompson Jr. responds to charges made by a Republican colleague
claiming he had been in favor of Hiss‟ right to speak at Princeton University.41 In his
defense, Thompson attempts to explain that he was simply protecting the university‟s right
to invite guests to speak before their students.42 Unlike Tumulty‟s aggressive response to
Hiss‟ participation in Princeton‟s affairs, Thompson‟ reaction follows the typical Northern
Democratic opinion for the time period. Though he does not give the impression of
defending Hiss, he is still willing to accept Princeton‟s decision regardless of the fact that
his opposition has done everything in their power to prevent any public appearances by the
notorious traitor. Evidently, the Princeton issue created quite an uproar in Congress. To
Democrats who had decided to move on after the conviction, Hiss‟ sudden reappearance in
a social setting was yet another reminder of their party‟s demise. His case contributed to
their political downfall. The extent of Tumulty‟s animosity may be a result of a need to
defend himself and his state. His 13 contributions to the Record are used to assert his
disapproval of Hiss‟ appearance in his state and his ability to potentially influence the
young minds of his constituents.
Daniel J. Flood (Pennsylvania) is the last Democratic representative to discuss
aspects of Hiss‟ involvement with foreign policy and his espionage. His first inclusion of
May 20th, 1958 revolves around Judith Coplon43 and her connection to the Soviet
40
Congressional Record, May 8th, 1956 : p. A3702.
Congressional Record, May 22nd, 1956 : p. 7459.
42
Ibid., p. 7459-7460.
43
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 93-94.
41
82
underground.44 Further evidence of Hiss‟ evolution into a symbol is demonstrated in this
speech as his case and conviction are used as an example of the duplicitous natures of red
spies. Although the Hiss/Chambers scandal still angered many in Congress, references to
Hiss by the late 1950‟s are more analytical and stem less from an emotional response. It is
almost as if the passage of time has permitted the majority of politicians to accept his
betrayal and, instead of using their anger to fuel their contributions, they are now using the
experience of the Hiss case to deal with the ongoing struggle with communism and
espionage in America.
Flood‟s final two inclusions focus on Hiss‟ involvement with foreign policy
regarding Panama.
While initially believed to be a „blunder‟ on the part of Hiss to
incorporate Panama to a list of occupied American territories, most realized the political
implications once the entirety of Hiss‟ betrayal was revealed by 1950. The inclusion of
Panama to this list angered its leaders, further encouraging the growth of communism in the
Caribbean. Flood‟s speeches of February 25th, 1959 and July 1st, 1960 re-examine what
was originally believed to be innocent mistakes made by Hiss while part of the State
Department.45 The end result of the Hiss case forced politicians to scrutinize his work on
policies, which they now believed may have been conceived to benefit the Soviet cause.
3.1.2-Republicans
Like their Democratic colleagues, Republicans continued their ongoing battle with
communism and subversive activity throughout the 1950‟s. They too discussed Acheson‟s
imprudent statements regarding his continued support of Hiss, the larger implications of his
work in government and his connection to subversive activity in America. Unlike the
Democrats, Republicans scrutinized the ramifications of Hiss‟ participation at Yalta as well
as McCarthy‟s quest to destroy communism; a dedication that many believed originated
from the outcome of the Hiss case.
Dean Acheson‟s public acknowledgment of Hiss mere hours after the final verdict
was used as further ammunition by the Republicans of the House. Two congressmen in
particular dominated discussions regarding this issue, making it seem as though Truman‟s
44
45
Congressional Record, May 20th, 1958 : p. 4964.
Congressional Record, February 25th, 1959 : p. 2930 and July 1st, 1960: p. 15522-15524.
83
administration was not taking the communist problem seriously.
Lawrence H. Smith
(Wisconsin) presents a similar opinion to that of Democratic Representative Foster Furcolo;
that as an individual, Acheson had the right to defend his friend but that his position as
Secretary of State and his involvement with the conception of American foreign policy
made any loyalty to Hiss injudicious.46 Smith also inquires into Acheson‟s motives in
backing a convicted traitor in his speech of March 27th, 1950. He questions whether or not
the Secretary of State would have had the same reaction to the Hiss guilty verdict if he
would have been pro-Nazi instead of part of the Soviet underground. According to Smith,
American liberals feared fascism more than communism at the time of the Hiss trials.47
Criticism of Acheson‟s loyalty is expected since Republicans used instances such as this to
their advantage in their quest to prove that the Democratic administration was corrupt.
Likewise, Richard Nixon is deeply invested in castigating the Secretary‟s show of
faith and includes several newspaper articles to assist in demonstrating his beliefs. The
first, entitled „Un-American Probe Should be Continued‟ from the Spokesman-Review of
Spokane, Washington addresses Truman‟s reaction to Acheson‟s press conference. The
author describes Truman‟s inability to answer specific questions and believes his reluctance
is a sign of embarrassment on the part of the administration caused by the Secretary of
State‟s refusal to turn his back on Hiss.48 In Nixon‟s second inclusion entitled „There Are
Times When Damon‟s Bound to Unload Pythias‟ by Robert C. Ruark49 and published in the
Washington Daily News, a new aspect of Acheson‟s speech is introduced surrounding the
use of a Biblical verse. He used well-known quotations from the Bible to rationalize his
loyalty to Hiss.
The author‟s vehemence is evident in his work.
In relation to the
suitability of their friendship and comparing Hiss to a rodent, Ruark exclaims that “I lack
Mr. Acheson‟s nobility of mind. Even if Hiss had been my best chum, fraternity brother,
and steady bankroller, I would be inclined today to regard him as a lavatory rat, and dump
46
Congressional Record, February 6th, 1950 : p. A828.
Congressional Record, March 27th, 1950 : p. A2407-A2408.
48
Congressional Record, February 9th, 1950 : p. A982.
49
Robert C. Ruark was a well known newspaper columnist who often wrote about controversial subjects. His
novel entitled Something of Value studied the Mau Mau terrorists in Kenya. The detailed ritualistic killings
shocked many critics and yet sold for 300, 000$ to Hollywood. Ruark died at the age of 49 on July 1 st, 1965.
“Robert Ruark Dead in London; Author and Columnist was 49: Scripps-Howard Writer Was Often
Controversial-Wrote „Something of Value‟,” New York Times, July 1st, 1965, ProQuest Historical
Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), p. 31.
47
84
him, fast.”50 Furthermore, the author inquires as to the appropriateness of Acheson as
Secretary of State if he willingly and publicly backs a man who betrayed his country to the
enemy.51
Nixon‟s final inclusion entitled „Why Does Acheson Defend Alger Hiss?‟ likewise
from the Spokesman-Review of Spokane, Washington discusses the repercussions of
Acheson‟s statement. The author studies the Secretary‟s refusal to comment on the legal
aspects of the case but instead to proclaim his loyalty to his friend and the damage it would
inevitably have on his career.52 The assumption that his legal reputation and prominent
position as Secretary of State would be questioned is perfectly reasonable; his dedication to
Hiss made many wonder if Acheson himself was tied to the communist conspiracy.
Richard Nixon‟s use of these articles is important for several reasons. First, they
sustained his beliefs on communism, espionage and his personal feelings about Alger Hiss
and his treachery.
Like Ruark, Nixon expressed his distrust of Hiss from the very
beginning during their first meeting before HUAC in 1948. And even though the case was
over, Nixon‟s dedication and perseverance did not waver as he continued to advocate the
importance of the events in American history. The articles served a significant purpose;
they effectively demoralized the Democratic opposition and assisted in undermining
Truman‟s administration. The case itself had already placed doubt in the minds of several
politicians regarding the Democratic executive and their failure to clean up the extensive
corruption in the American government. Secretary of State Dean Acheson‟s comments was
further proof of the Democratic party‟s tenuous power over its members and employees. It
essentially exposed the party‟s weak points and its inability to remove communists and red
sympathizers from the government; an issue that was seen as a priority in the eyes of
politicians and citizens alike.
While Acheson‟s comments caused many in Congress to criticize him, new topics of
discussion eventually replaced the scandal. Many Republicans continued to inspect the
Hiss case and conviction for several months following the guilty verdict. Furthermore, a
50
Ibid., p. A983.
Ibid., p. A983.
52
Ibid., p. A985.
51
85
sense of betrayal is evident in these speeches and inclusions. While Republicans such as
Richard Nixon, Daniel A. Reed (New York), Errett P. Scrivner (Kansas), Lawrence H.
Smith and George A. Dondero criticize the Democratic administration and condemn Hiss‟
actions, their disbelief that such a well educated man could betray their country is apparent
among their many contributions. Lawrence H. Smith‟s February 1st speech and editorial
inclusion is particularly intense. The editorial specifically focuses on the other „traitors‟
that were exposed over the course of both trials and claims that Hiss case witnesses
Frankfurter and Reed should be impeached for taking part in such a high profile trial.
There are several passages in the editorial that hold our attention, notably for its attack of
Alger Hiss and his friendship with Dean Acheson, along with its denunciation of the
Democratic party. The author is particularly outraged that Democrats have done everything
in their power to lessen the severity of the Hiss conviction while criticizing those who have
endeavored to uncover the truth.53
Smith continued to analyze the after effects of the conviction well into March 1950.
He was especially interested in determining the reasons why particular liberals were still
adamant in their approval of Hiss. Using newspaper articles from the Hat Worker and the
New Leader, Smith claims that liberals who disagreed with the trial and consistently
expressed their support of Hiss were actually defending their own actions and unlike most,
did not believe communism was a great danger.54
In a similar fashion, Richard Nixon is distinctly active in discussions in February
1950, contributing on 3 occasions with his final speech appearing in September of that
same year. He seems to focus primarily on the perception of Hiss by different newspaper
columnists.55 His inclusion of February 9th from the Indianapolis Times reveals that those
still doubting Hiss‟ guilt believe he is an innocent, forced to choose between the ideals of
fascism or communism and chose the lesser of two evils in his quest to help those affected
by the Great Depression. Nonetheless, the author entreats his readers to realize that Hiss
was not a naïve man but well educated with a career in government that permitted him to
53
Congressional Record, February 1st, 1950 : p. A758.
Congressional Record, March 22nd, 28th, 1950 : p. A2405-A2406.
55
Congressional Record, February 9th, 1950: p. A976-A977.
54
86
have a hand in American policy making.56 The article‟s purpose is to demonstrate that Hiss
was well aware of the choices he made in favor of the Soviet Union and was a willing
participant in the betrayal of his country.
Still, Nixon considers the importance of Hiss as a symbol by including „The
Conviction of Alger Hiss‟ from the New Leader in his speech of February 9th.57 The
evolution of Hiss‟ persona becomes more apparent with the progression of time after the
conviction. Nixon is able to recognize that the meaning of the Hiss case has already begun
to undergo a transformation. With the conclusion of the case, politicians look to the future
and explore the effects Hiss‟ betrayal has had on politics, foreign policy, the loyalty of
government employees and its impact on American history. Unfortunately, this newfound
knowledge has led many to question the outcome of the Yalta conference, the creation of
the U.N. charter and Roosevelt‟s New Deal initiative.
Thus his symbolism can also
represent a period of time in which the political mindset was struggling to come to terms
with the repercussions of one man‟s actions. Whereas before many had questioned some of
the sanctions given to the Soviet Union at Yalta, the revelations made at the Hiss trials and
strengthened by the conviction seemed to expose the true culprit behind what was originally
believed to be the culmination of negotiations between allies and the ill-health of the
president.
Richard Nixon‟s last speech in the Record regarding aspects of the Hiss case and
Soviet espionage is on September 18th, 1950. His purpose in this final contribution is to
illustrate the way in which the FBI was able to gain valuable information that ensured Hiss
would be convicted of perjury. The details surround the search for the Chambers‟ maid
(found by the FBI the day before the commencement of the second trial) who was able to
corroborate the fact that Whittaker and Esther Chambers received Alger and Priscilla Hiss
on several occasions as guests in their home; proving the couples had been friends during
the time period of Alger‟s involvement with the communist underground.58 Nixon no
longer takes part in House discussions after September since he is appointed to the Senate
on December 1st 1950 to replace Sheridan Downey (who resigned) and is then elected to the
56
Ibid., p. A977.
Ibid., p. A981.
58
Congressional Record, September 18th, 1950 : p. A6777-A6779.
57
87
Senate for the term beginning January 3rd, 1951. Although we expected to see Nixon take
part in discussions in the Senate, he does not appear at any point in speeches regarding Hiss
or Soviet espionage. This time period, however, was spent campaigning with Eisenhower
for the presidential election of 1952.
Subsequently, Richard Nixon is elected Vice
President of the United States on November 4th, 1952.59
The outcome of the Yalta agreement becomes a relevant topic of discussion in the
decade following Hiss‟ conviction.
By February 7th, 1950, his involvement is only
beginning to draw serious attention by representatives and senators alike. For his part,
Antoni N. Sadlak (Connecticut) believes Russia has been appeased and given what they
desire without any disagreements by the Western powers. Sadlak‟s animosity towards the
Democratic executive is evident as he blames them for what he thinks is a terrible
diplomatic mistake by Roosevelt and his advisers at Yalta. He reproaches the decisions
made by the Western powers for the expansion of communism in Europe and the conflicts
emanating from the Near East.60 Although Hiss‟ participation at the conference is not
mentioned, Sadlak‟s dialogue represents the growing discontent of many politicians
regarding the Yalta accords. At this point, rumors abound of secret Yalta agreements
between Roosevelt and Stalin. To radical Republicans, Hiss‟ presence at the meetings was
proof that the United States had made concessions that would not have been issued had it
not been for the Soviet conspiracy in the State Department.
George A. Dondero‟s contribution of February 9th is composed of speeches made by
his Republican colleagues for the annual Lincoln Republican celebration. The majority of
which criticized the Democratic executive for its failure to act when the initial warnings
about Hiss were made public. While others reviewed foreign policy and argued that its
inconsistencies could be blamed on men such as Dean Acheson and Alger Hiss.61
Similarly, Daniel A. Reed ponders the administrations lack of motivation to pursue the Hiss
issue in the early days of the accusations. Reed includes „The Spies Best Friend‟ from the
Washington Times-Herald in which the author seems to imply that Roosevelt was well
aware of the communist agenda and instead of taking the necessary steps to remove the
59
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Richard M. Nixon,” p. 281-284.
Congressional Record, February 7th, 1950: p. A889.
61
Congressional Record, February 9th, 1950 : p. A984-A985.
60
88
problem, stood by as red spies and communist sympathizers infiltrated the government.62
Errett P. Scrivner, on the other hand, questions the authority of those who allowed men
such as Hiss, Pressman and White to gain such prominent government standing without
first attaining verification of their loyalty.63 Dondero, Reed and Scrivner‟s speeches are
similar in that their inclusions place further doubt on the Democratic administrations ability
to lead. Their continuous reference to communist employees coupled with the executive‟s
hesitation and lack of cooperation once Chambers‟ accusations were made public is a
constant reminder of the damage that could have been prevented if both Democratic
administrations had taken the issue seriously.
Other topics of interest in 1950 included the growing prominence of Joseph R.
McCarthy after he delivered his infamous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia on February
9th. Claiming to have details of 57 communists working for the federal government,
McCarthy accused the State Department of being “infested with Communists” and used the
Hiss case as corroboration for his accusations.64 In response to the Wheeling speech,
Lawrence H. Smith and Noah M Mason (Illinois) present their views on the Senator‟s anticommunist tactics.
For his part, Smith assesses Acheson‟s reaction to McCarthy‟s
continuous attacks on communism. According to an editorial from the Washington TimesHerald, the Secretary of State was not impressed with Senator McCarthy‟s crusade. His
disfavor led many to question his beliefs on the communist issue in light of his pro-Hiss
press conference after the conviction.65 Opting to include this editorial to his discourse in
the House represents his own thoughts regarding Acheson‟s loyalty. Focusing instead on
the Wheeling revelations, Mason‟s speech emits an air of admiration as he defends
McCarthy‟s charges, claiming that the Senator would never make accusations without
having the proper evidence.66 Republicans Smith and Mason recognize Joseph McCarthy‟s
growing prominence in the fight against communism in 1950. Any other positive remarks
about the senator will eventually be replaced by disfavor as his unprofessionalism, crude
62
Congressional Record, February 13th, 1950 : p. A1079.
Congressional Record, August 31st, 1950 : p. 13973.
64
Klingaman ed., op. cit., “Appendix V: Speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy
February 9th, 1950,” p. 434-435.
65
Congressional Record, April 28th, 1950: p. A3105.
66
Congressional Record, May 2nd, 1950 : p. A3212.
63
89
personality and dishonest tactics in his drive to uncover spies alienates those who may have
believed in him in the past.
Debates during the summer of 1950 were drawn to the issue of communism in
America and the subsequent consequences of Hiss‟ conviction. As a result, the tone of
these speeches and the way in which the congressmen have taken to referring to Hiss is
characteristic of the gradual evolution of how he is perceived. In an effort to encourage the
passage of the Mundt-Ferguson-Nixon bill, Charles E. Potter alludes to the fact that the
Hiss case is the reason American citizens are now clamoring to know the truth. The
prominence of such a highly placed government official overshadowed the severity of other
spy cases,67 demonstrating further Hiss‟ transformation into a symbol for the Cold War era.
In a short speech of June 29th, 1950, Charles W. Vursell (Illinois) discusses the fact that all
communists within the United States should be treated as the enemy and uses the Hiss case
as an example of the treachery occurring in the country.68 Once again, the Hiss/Chambers
affair is used as a case study, a model to demonstrate to the public the way in which
communism can corrupt even the brightest, most educated of Americans. Potter‟s and
Vursell‟s speeches use the Hiss case to promote the need to eradicate communist ideology
instead of using it as a tool to demolish Democratic popularity as was done previously.
Already we see a change in the way congressmen use the case to their advantage. While
still considered corroboration of Democratic negligence, Republicans begin to refer to the
case as an example of what happens when communism is left to spread.
In a similar fashion, Charles A. Wolverton (New Jersey) takes the communist
problem into account and endorses a new bill that would prevent subversive infiltration in
government departments. He elucidates that communists are ever present and are growing
in number since the start of the Cold War.
Wolverton adamantly warns against the
Communist party‟s militant methods, entreating American citizens to realize that they are
not a true political organization.69 It is apparent that the Hiss/Chambers affair and the spy
cases have marked him. Like Vursell and Potter, his entire discourse emits a sense of
67
Congressional Record, June 19th, 1950 : p. A4521.
Congressional Record, June 29th, 1950: p. A4800.
69
Congressional Record, July 12th, 1950 : p. A5071.
68
90
hysteria and caution, indicating that the fear of communism is still ever present in the eyes
of many politicians.
Similarly, Harold H. Velde disapproves of the way in which the administration is
dealing with communism abroad and domestically.
He is particularly outraged that
American soldiers have been sent to Korea, sacrificing their lives to prevent a communist
takeover while the executive is doing the opposite at home and treating communism as a
„red herring‟. And although Truman admits that American intelligence organizations have
been keeping a close eye on communist activity in the U.S., Velde makes it quite obvious
that watching is not the same as taking action.70 His August 9th speech used examples of
notorious spy cases (the Hiss ordeal most notable of all) to demonstrate the necessity for a
communist registration law.
While Velde claims that Truman has acknowledged the
usefulness of such a law, the passing of the Internal Security Act 71 in 1950 was vetoed by
the president.
Truman believed that passing such a measure was a step too far in
controlling the thoughts and actions of American citizens.72
The progression of Hiss‟ persona as a symbol continues into 1951. It is particularly
evident on February 8th while George A. Dondero, Walter H. Judd, B. Carroll Reece
(Tennessee) and Charles J. Kersten (Wisconsin) study the effects of subversive activity in
light of the recent court cases that have gripped the nation‟s attention. When referring to
spies who have been convicted for their betrayal, Dondero and Judd question the efficacy of
the loyalty boards since they were unable to detect these same men. They are adamant that
those accused by Chambers and Bentley should be considered guilty until further evidence
proves otherwise. Judd believes Chambers and Bentley‟s continued honesty while enduring
criticism has proven that they are dedicated to righting the wrongs of their former
70
Congressional Record, August 8th, 1950 : p. 11995.
Overriding Truman‟s veto, Congress passed McCarran‟s Internal Security Act in 1950. The legislation
ensured that all communist organizations were required to register with the Department of Justice while
including a list of their members and their financial statements. The legislation prohibited these members
from acquiring work in areas related to defense and gave the government the choice of refusing to issue a
passport to a communist. Furthermore, in times of crisis, the Act gave the executive the right to “arrest and
detain” all those suspected of subversive activity. Sitkoff, Harvard, Postwar America: A Student Companion.
Student Companions to American History. Oxford University Press USA, 2000, p. 136.
<http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=56406> ( 16 June 2013)
72
Ibid.
71
91
organization.73 Reece, on the other hand, discusses the fact that he had introduced the
names of communists in government in 1946 but had been ridiculed for his beliefs. He
expresses his satisfaction that his previous accusations had been corroborated by the
subsequent trials and convictions of men like Alger Hiss. Reece concludes by warning that
there may still be communists in strategic positions in the government; that the fight against
infiltration is far from over.74
Finally, Kersten‟s short inclusion considers the Owen
Lattimore75 case and uses the Hiss ordeal as a point of comparison.76 Throughout these
many speeches and newspaper inclusions, the constant theme of Hiss as „traitor‟ is
prevalent. Furthermore, there is a strong contrast in the way Hiss‟ situation is used in
debates in the last four speeches compared to those from earlier years. While previously he
was the main topic of discussion and the target of overwhelming disgust, the speeches of
February 1951 used Hiss as the go-to example for Soviet espionage in government and
betrayal of one‟s homeland.
By March 1951, the Supreme Court‟s refusal to consider Hiss‟ appeal becomes the
theme of several Republican inclusions in the House. Kenneth B. Keating‟s approval of the
court‟s decision is predominant in his contribution of March 13th, 1951. He purposefully
refers to the binding connection between Hiss and the executive;77 a way to continue
blaming the Democratic party for the infiltration of Soviet spies and for the inestimable
amount of classified documents that have fallen into enemy hands. Keating also assesses
the reactions of those who have incessantly made excuses to justify Hiss‟ perjury; those
believing in his innocence claimed a trial would clear his name. After his conviction, these
same supporters concluded that he had been protecting his wife (the real „red‟ spy). Their
final defense claimed that Hiss had never been an important figure in the State Department
73
Congressional Record, February 8th, 1951 : p. 1173.
Ibid., p. 1174.
75
Owen Lattimore, an expert in all things related to China and Asia, was a professor at Johns Hopkins
University and became McCarthy‟s primary suspect for the „loss‟ of China and Chiang Kai-shek‟s defeat in
1949. Initially, he was pegged as the „leader‟ of Hiss‟ spy ring. The ridiculousness of that accusation forced
McCarthy to change tactics. Instead, he claimed Lattimore was one of the principal creators of Far Eastern
policy which could only mean he was at fault where China was concerned. Furthermore, Lattimore was a
strong advocate for the recognition of the new People‟s Republic of China. To conservatives seeking an
explanation for China‟s political upheaval, his support seemed to corroborate his Soviet leanings. Robert P.
Newman, Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1992, p. ixxii, 207.
76
Ibid., p. 1174.
77
Congressional Record, March 13th, 1951 : p. A1417.
74
92
and never had access to classified information linked to national security.78 Using editorials
from the Washington Times-Herald, Keating demonstrates that Hiss was in fact a key figure
in the State Department and that his involvement in drafting the Yalta agreement in addition
to his participation at the San Francisco conference was proof of his importance. 79 Though
Hiss‟ involvement at Yalta and San Francisco is mentioned, it is done in a different way
than other accounts. Keating is simply using the conferences as a way to disprove the
theories of Hiss‟ followers. The purpose of his response to those doubting the guilty verdict
is to expose the fact that the evidence is too strong to convince the world otherwise.
E. Y. Berry (South Dakota), on the other hand, refers Hiss in passing during his
April 6th speech. Though his focus revolves around war, the training of soldiers and the
conscription of young 18 year olds, Berry blames Hiss‟ influence over a sick Roosevelt80
while at Yalta for the eventual collapse of the treaty. Consequently, it is implied that Hiss
is the one at fault for the ongoing tension between the Soviet Union and the United States.81
Hiss becomes the personification of all that has gone wrong since the start of the Cold War.
His imprisonment brought closure to the case and seems to have permitted
congressmen to analyze the aspects of the ordeal with detachment. Many wondered why so
many of Hiss‟ generation felt the need to align themselves with the communist cause even
though most were well educated and led promising careers. Walter H. Judd includes an
analysis on this very issue from Commentary entitled „Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of
Innocence-Who Was Guilty-and of What?‟ in his October 20th speech. The author begins
by pointing out that had Hiss admitted to his treason, he most likely would not have gone to
jail; his constant denial was his undoing as the prosecution was able to prove that he
perjured himself during both trials. An interesting point is introduced regarding a common
78
Ibid., p. A1417.
Ibid., p. A1417.
80
The question of Roosevelt‟s mental capacity in negotiations during Yalta arose during the Hiss case. In
Athan Theoharis‟ The Yalta Myths: an issue in U.S. politics, 1945-1955, Roosevelt is described as looking
tired and frail in 1944. Then in his March 1 st, 1945 speech before the Congress, he stayed seated claiming he
was exhausted after a long trip (he died a month later). Theoharis explains that critics of the Yalta conference
believed Roosevelt‟s failing health did not promote the necessary alertness needed for such an important
meeting between the Great Powers and that coupled with a pro-Soviet Hiss, he was unable to stand firm when
confronted with certain issues. See Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myths: an issue in U.S. politics, 19451955, Missouri, University of Missouri Press, 1970, p. 20-21.
81
Congressional Record, April 6th, 1951 : p. 3440.
79
93
characteristic for this new wave of spies: all were intellectuals whereas the jury, judge and
lawyers in their trials were not. The author theorizes that these intellectuals may have
believed in a different definition of the word „traitor‟ and that their actions were for the
greater good of humanity instead of what the majority of American citizens believed; that
they had betrayed their country to the enemy.82 Judd‟s decision to include this specific
article is surprising since it makes it seem as though Hiss‟ actions were reasonable for a
man of his generation and level of education. The author does not excuse what transpired,
however, the analysis seeks to describe the „why‟ of Soviet espionage by government
employees.
Whereas Alger Hiss is always the key figure in political debates, the two inclusions
for 1952 solely focus on his accuser, Whittaker Chambers. Charles J. Kersten includes a
letter written by a doctor to Chambers‟ children. The letter‟s purpose is to inform them of
their father‟s honorable actions and his persistence in telling the truth. His determination
never wavered; even when his character and reputation were attacked during the days of the
trials. Unfortunately, he is still slandered whenever defenders of Hiss try to prove his
innocence.83 For his part, Richard B. Vail (Illinois) reviews Chambers‟ book Witness. His
short inclusion details his own participation in the House Un-American Activities
Committee‟s hearings that questioned both Chambers and Hiss.
He states that Hiss‟
dishonesty was evident to all the members of the committee.84 Even though Chambers is
guilty of aiding the same cause before his defection, he is presented as the hero by
Republicans and Southern Democrats. Both speeches have succeeded in creating a contrast
in the way Hiss and Chambers are perceived. Chambers‟ own participation in aiding the
Soviets is overlooked. While Kersten and Vail do not refer to Hiss in great detail, their
approving tone when discussing Chambers speaks volumes when compared to all the other
debates consulted. In those two inclusions, we are able to understand the extensive damage
Hiss‟ betrayal has wrought on the mindset of all politicians, not just the Democrats: they are
capable of commending one while denouncing the other.
82
Congressional Record, October 20th, 1951 : p. A6777-A6779.
Congressional Record, April 9th, 1952 : p. A2287.
84
Congressional Record, July 4th, 1952: p. A4333
83
94
By 1953, any allusion of Alger Hiss is used by Republicans as a defense
mechanism. With the appointment of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency,
Democrats immediately began to accuse his administration of being soft on communism85
and of refusing to „clean up‟ subversives in government; he was essentially attacked for the
same reasons as his predecessor. In response to these accusations, George H. Bender
(Ohio) defends his party by bringing up what is now considered „the big mistake made at
Yalta‟-Hiss‟ participation and negative influence at the conference. In his conclusion,
Bender asserts that the Republicans have only been in power for three months and they are
in charge of fixing the mistakes of the past two decades (Democratic disasters). 86 The
Democratic representatives hope to regain some form of credibility by attacking their
opposition but Republicans have the upper hand as they use the Hiss case and other
damaging errors made by the last two administrations to demonstrate that they will finally
solve the communist problem.
Furthermore, Bender states that under Truman, the
conviction of communist leaders and the dismissal of Soviet infiltrators dragged on for
months and, in some circumstances, years. While in the short time Eisenhower has been
president, Bender proudly announces that unlike their predecessors, they have taken
immediate action and are much closer to achieving their goals.
He credits these
accomplishments to the adoption of regulations put in place to limit the communist sphere
of influence.
In particular, the Communist party has been ordered to submit yearly
financial reports and a complete list of its members. Any propaganda or Soviet promotion
has been more or less banned.
Other restrictions include refusal for government
employment and the inability to attain an American passport.87 To Bender, these measures
are proof that the Eisenhower administration has done more in three months in the fight
against Soviet control than the two decades of Democratic blunders by Roosevelt and
Truman.
85
Democratic accusations of being „soft on communism‟ largely stemmed from the fact that the eradication of
communism had been a large part of Eisenhower‟s presidential campaign in 1952. But by 1953, many of his
campaign promises were left behind. Regarding certain issues, the administration continued to promote
programs conceived by Truman and Acheson which only added to the belief that Eisenhower‟s personification
as an anti-communist crusader had been fabricated for his campaign. Theoharis, op. cit., p. 154-156.
86
Congressional Record, April 21st, 1953 : p. 3491-3492.
87
Ibid., p. A2135.
95
Interest in the Hiss case begins to fade by the end of 1953 and by 1954 any
reference to the disgraced ex-State Department official is used to define the corruption of
the previous Democratic executive. Therefore, when referring to the Bricker amendment88,
Wint Smith (Kansas) only uses Hiss‟ „scheming‟ at San Francisco‟s first UN meeting to
demonstrate the necessity to protect the United States and its heritage.89 Similarly, Clare E.
Hoffman‟s March 10th speech discusses the bias of certain newspapers, such as the
Washington Times-Herald (eventually purchased by the Washington Post).
Hiss is
specified in relation to the Washington Times-Herald‟s tendency to claim that they are
staunchly anti-communist and yet publish pro-communist articles that criticize the FBI‟s
work or endorse traitors like Hiss.90 By March 18th, a different trend emerges. Unlike their
colleagues in 1953 and early 1954, Republicans Ralph W. Gwinn (New York), Charles J.
Kersten and Donald L. Jackson begin to reassess aspects of the scandal.
The Jackson and Kersten speeches demonstrate the reason behind this sudden
interest to revisit details of the controversy. Jackson includes an editorial from the PostStandard entitled „Seeds of Treason‟ in which we learn that Victor Lasky, the author of the
The Bricker amendment was introduced to the Senate by John W. Bricker (Ohio) on January 7 th, 1953. The
amendment would essentially restrict the President‟s authority regarding the acceptance of treaties with
foreign powers. It is widely believed that the proposed legislation was a response to the foreign policy of
Roosevelt and Truman as well as a protective measure after details of the Hiss trials revealed the extent to
which certain policy had been conceived for the benefit of the Soviet Union. See Philip A. Grant, “The
Bricker Amendment Controversy,” in the Presidential Studies Quarterly, 15, no. 3 (summer, 1985), p. 572582. The real issue at hand was that of civil rights and the impact international treaties could potentially have
on states still dealing with segregation and discrimination. Duane A. Tananbaum gives a good rendition of
the arguments used by both sides of the conflict (those for the amendment consisted of isolationists and
conservatives while those against were the liberal internationalists). Those in favor claimed to be protecting
the rights of America‟s citizens. Some also supported restricting the president‟s power in international affairs
while others were motivated by a need to reprimand the past two Democratic administrations. Members of
the medical profession as well as business groups also favored the amendment in the hopes of preventing
socialized medicine and international agreements that would change the rules of business and labor
management. The Eisenhower administration was against the amendment and used various tactics to delay
the introduction of the legislation in the Senate. They were forced to approach the Democrats to garner
enough opposition to ensure its failure. Duane A. Tananbaum, “The Bricker Amendment Controversy: Its
Origins and Eisenhower‟s Role,” Diplomatic History, p. 73-87. According to the Congressional Record, the
Bricker Amendment was killed in the Senate by one vote. Congressional Record, March 31st, 1954: p. 4305.
Senators who opposed the amendment included Alexander Wiley (Republican), Leverett Saltonstall
(Republican), Sam Rayburn (Democrat), Thruston Morton (Republican) and John Cooper (Republican).
Those in favor included Price Daniel (Democrat), Everett Dirksen (Republican), Thomas Kuchel
(Republican), William Langer (Republican), Pat McCarran (Democrat), Charles Potter (Republican), Herman
Welker (Republican) and Milton Young (Republican). Eleanora Schoenbaum and Michael L. Levine,
Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, New York, Facts on File, 1980.
89
Congressional Record, February 16th, 1954 : p. 1865.
90
Congressional Record, March 10th, 1954 : p. A2094-A2095.
88
96
newly published book on the Hiss case (Seeds of Treason), plans to publicly discuss his
work plus explain the way Alger Hiss‟ spy cell was able to betray the loyalties of the
United States.91 Similarly, Kersten reacts to Lasky‟s new publication by defending excommunists who testified against members of their underground apparatus. This new
literature analyzing the Hiss case reintroduced the issue and encouraged his supporters to
come to his defense once again. Consequently, Chambers and all other ex-spies who
testified in espionage trials were slandered for their honesty.92 Kersten‟s defense of excommunist informers is reminiscent of his 1952 inclusion commending Chambers for his
sincerity. Although Chambers as a topic of discussion loses its appeal in favor of Hiss after
the conviction, the instances when he is recognized highlight the distinction between both
men. By 1954, Hiss is already beginning to represent betrayal while Chambers has been
elevated to a position of high esteem.
In comparison, Ralph W. Gwinn uses the infiltration of Soviet spies in government
positions to characterize the Soviet Unions‟ relationship with the United States. Like his
Republican colleagues, he maintains that before Roosevelt, the U.S. presidents refused to
recognize the Russian government. To Gwinn, this acknowledgement is what set in motion
the infiltration of communists and red sympathizers in high ranking positions and permitted
the eventual corruption of union groups. Furthermore, the Soviet Unions‟ membership in
the United Nations and the power they received for taking part in such a respected
organization is, according to Gwinn, another factor that permitted the spread of
communism.93
This sentiment is apparent when he states that: “the outlaw breed of
wreckers and despoilers of civilization were taken into the family of nations, offered a place
at the council table of humanity and, in the United States, invited to become a part of
government. And precisely at this point began the most treacherous betrayal of America
since the founding of the Republic.”94 To further prove his point, Gwinn enumerates the
various cells that were eventually uncovered such as the State Department cell made public
by the Hiss trial which began its operations in 1938-1939, the Marzani cell from 1940-
91
Congressional Record, March 18th, 1954 : p. A2109.
Congressional Record, August 3rd, 1954 : p. A6061-A6063.
93
Congressional Record, April 7th, 1954 : p. 4847.
94
Ibid., p. 4847.
92
97
194395, the Judith Coplon ring in the Department of Justice 1943-1946, the Amerasia ring
in the State and Navy Departments, the Office of Strategic Services 1943-194596 and the
atomic-energy ring97 of 1942-1946.98 He specifies how the spies of the New Deal era used
each other‟s names as references when applying for a government job, they hired one
another, promoted one another, etc. which permitted them to stealthily infiltrate Federal
departments to influence policy or steal classified information.99
Gwinn makes an
interesting point when he discloses that the communists took advantage of the Democratic
party‟s liberalism which permitted them to recruit and promote their cause before a serious
stand was taken.100 When referring to the seriousness of a crime such as subversive
activity, Gwinn elucidates that Benedict Arnold is considered an honorable man when
compared to the likes of Hiss, White, Pressman, and Witt.101 Consequently, the country
elevated crimes involving espionage to such a degree of severity that notorious historical
traitors were now considered tame in comparison.
95
Carl Marzani immigrated to the United States from Italy in 1924 with his family. In 1940, he joined the
Communist party USA and was a member for two years. He eventually left the Party (1942) and joined the
office of the Coordinator of Information (which became the Office of Strategic Services). In January of 1947,
he was indicted for perjury for having refrained from informing the State Department of his past with the
Communist party. He was convicted and sentenced but appealed the verdict where nine of the original eleven
charges were overthrown. See Charles Musser, “Carl Marzani and Union Films: Making Left-Wing
Documentaries during the Cold War, 1946-53,” in The Moving Image 9, 1 (2009), p. 112-117. Sibley‟s Red
Spies in America states that Marzani was in fact a Soviet agent even though the government was unaware of
the “extent of his connections.” See Katherine A. S. Sibley, Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the
Dawn of the Cold War, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2004, p. 208. Marzani was also in charge of a
publishing company known for its financial dependence on the KGB. See Max Holland, “I.F. Stone:
Encounters with Soviet Intelligence,” in Journal of Cold War Studies 11, 3 (2009), p. 148.
96
Amerasia is considered the first Cold War spy case. There were six arrests after classified information
about the 1945 Japanese-Thailand conflict appeared in the pro-magazine Amerasia. After illegal entry into
the magazine‟s offices, the OSS discovered a large amount of secret government documents. The case was
eventually turned over to the FBI who performed wiretaps, searches through homes and surveillance without
warrants. Only two of those arrested were actually indicted and were fined for possessing the government
documents; they did not receive any jail time. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 25-40.
97
The atomic espionage ring included several different spies with various connections to the Manhattan
Project who succeeded in transmitting details of the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union. Most noteworthy are
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed for their part in passing atomic secrets to the Soviets. Others include
Klaus Fuchs, a scientist who worked on the atomic bomb project in Great Britain; Theodore Hall, a child
prodigy with an affinity for physics, he began his college career before the age of fifteen and was eventually
recruited for atomic research at Los Alamos; David Greenglass, a machinist and Ethel Rosenberg‟s brother-inlaw and J. Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist also stationed at Los Alamos. Ibid., p. 138-182.
98
Congressional Record, April 7th, 1954: p. 4847.
99
Ibid., p. 4849.
100
Ibid., p. 4850.
101
Ibid., p. 4849. See Chapter 1, footnote 68 for a description of Harry Dexter White, Lee Pressman and
Nathan Witt.
98
The importance of Hiss‟ case is used once again to defend the actions of the
Republican administration in Craig Hosmer‟s (California) speech of January 11th, 1955.
Using excerpts from a report of the Judiciary Subcommittee, Hosmer recounts the leniency
of Eisenhower‟s predecessors which permitted notorious spies such as Hiss to advance in
their careers.102 Though short, his speech is effective in its attack of the Democratic party
as it reminds the House of Roosevelt and Truman‟s failures regarding communist
infiltration. Using Hiss as an example of this failure adds to the humiliation since his high
profile case revealed a weakness in State Department security measures, their inability to
properly verify the loyalty of their employees and made many question the depth of Soviet
infiltration in light of Hiss‟ position and the influence he held at Yalta and San Francisco.
Like Kenneth B. Keating‟s speech of March 13th, 1951, Katharine St. George (New
York) discusses Alger Hiss‟ involvement at Yalta. Using editorials from the New York
Times, St. George strives to demonstrate that Hiss did in fact have an important role at the
conference. She wishes to disprove those who still claim he was a „minor‟ player in the
discussions between the world powers. Although his advocates are correct if we consider
the fact that Hiss was not directly involved in the meetings between Roosevelt, Stalin and
Churchill, he was one of few who advised the Secretary of State and the President on
several issues. Furthermore, he was present during confidential sessions to develop a
strategy for negotiations with the Soviet Union.103
The reaction of Republicans in the House to Hiss‟ participation at the conference is
replaced by his controversial invitation to speak at Princeton in 1956. Contrary to what is
normally the case, their objections resemble that of their Democratic colleagues. Clare E.
Hoffman expresses his disfavor on two separate occasions and firmly believes that a man
who has betrayed his country should be forbidden from speaking before a group about his
country‟s foreign policy.104 According to Hoffman, his duplicity and dishonesty regarding
his actions makes it impossible to believe anything he says about foreign affairs and the
Geneva conference. Reinforcing his own remarks, Hoffman includes a speech made by a
well-known reporter, Willard Edwards, who spoke to Princeton‟s students the day before
102
Congressional Record, January 11th, 1955 : p. 263-264.
Congressional Record, March 23rd, 1955: p. A2038-A2039
104
Congressional Record, April 12th, 1956 : p. 6227.
103
99
Hiss‟ appearance in the hopes of giving them tips to recognize when Hiss falsified
information. His goal was to warn them of Hiss‟ character and inevitable attempt to
persuade them of his innocence.105 Like Hoffman, Edgar W. Hiestand (California) states
that Hiss‟ speech at Princeton is the perfect example of „brainwashing‟ in the hopes of
promoting totalitarian dictatorship. He recommends keeping closer attention to America‟s
universities to prevent a similar event in the future.106 Though their views do not emit the
same amount of disgust as Tumulty‟s 13 inclusions, they contribute to the overall
atmosphere; that Hiss, let alone any convicted traitor, should not be permitted to discuss
their opinions on policy. His expertise is tainted by his crimes and his conviction ceded any
right he may have had to review domestic and international affairs.
Unlike Congress‟ preoccupation with Hiss‟ appearance at Princeton in 1956, topics
of discussion varied by 1957. They focused on reactions to Hiss‟ book In The Court of
Public Opinion, his involvement with foreign policy regarding Panama and a controversial
decision by the Supreme Court regarding communism in the United States. Both Lawrence
H. Smith and Donald L. Jackson examine Hiss‟ excuses for his conviction presented in his
new book. One reason in particular has drawn the attention of the Republicans of the
House. According to Hiss‟ depiction of the political atmosphere at the time of his trials, he
believes that he was framed by the Republicans and HUAC to discredit the Democratic
party, Roosevelt‟s New Deal initiative, the Yalta agreement and the creation of the United
Nations.107 What is interesting about Hiss‟ frame-up theory is that the Republicans did in
fact take his case and use it to their advantage to cast doubt upon the leadership capabilities
of Roosevelt and Truman. The difference between his hypothesis and the way Congress
reacted to the controversy is that all the evidence pointed to his guilt. The political and
social ramifications of the case intensified as the prosecution was able to demonstrate he
was lying. Interestingly, the case most likely would not have escalated if Hiss pled the
Fifth Amendment108 or admitted to his crimes at his first appearance before HUAC.
105
Congressional Record, April 30th, 1956 : p. 7300.
Congressional Record, June 5th, 1956 : p. A4508.
107
Congressional Record, May 9th and June 10th, 1957: p. A3587, A4539.
108
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution stipulates that, among other things, it is impossible
to be called upon to be a witness against yourself in a criminal case. “Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of
1954,” Columbia Law Review 55, 5 (1955): p. 632.
106
100
Like his Democratic colleague Daniel J. Flood, Lawrence H. Smith discusses the
controversy surrounding the inclusion of Panama to a list of occupied U.S. territories
prepared by Hiss while part of the State Department. Panamanian officials learned of this
incorporation when the Soviet Union attacked the United States for having occupied
territories during a United Nations assembly. Though originally perceived by his superiors
as a foolish mistake, the details conceded at the trials demonstrated that his insertion had
been a strategic maneuver advantageous to the Soviet Union. Flood and Smith‟s reason for
discussing the Panamanian issue is to demonstrate that Hiss‟ subtle sabotage began before
Yalta.109 As a result, the trials obligated congressmen to review any and all legislation
conceived by Hiss to determine whether or not they were beneficial to the Soviet Union.
Wint Smith‟s August 30th speech on the Supreme Court‟s controversial decision
regarding laws to minimize the spread of communism is the last inclusion in 1957. He
focuses on Congress‟ and the Presidency‟s introduction of new laws 110 over the past five
years to prevent further infiltration of communism domestically as well as worldwide with
US tax dollars. The Supreme Court, however, has ruled against these new initiatives
claiming that communist ideology is not a threat to democracy in the United States.111
Smith‟s dialogue emits an air of disbelief at the court‟s naivety considering the evidence
that has emerged from several espionage trials. The extensive Soviet infiltration and the
large amount of sensitive material stolen for the purpose of overthrowing the democratic
system of government in America is, Smith believes, proof enough of the dangers of
communism. Furthermore, the appearance of justices Frankfurter and Reed as character
witnesses in the Hiss trial demonstrates that the Supreme Court‟s authority and decision
making capabilities is flawed.112 Instead of being the main topic of discussion, Hiss is now
109
Congressional Record, January 17th, 1957 : p. A309-A310.
These new laws include the „Communist Control Act‟ of 1954. It was introduced by Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey on August 12th, 1954. The act described the communist party as a hostile group with the sole
purpose of compromising the security of the United States for the purpose of overthrowing the government.
Used in conjunction with the Internal Security Act of 1950, the act created penalties for members of the
communist party ranging from 10,000$ fines and up to five years in prison (sometimes both). Mary S.
McAuliffe, “Liberals and the Communist Control Act of 1954,” The Journal of American History 63, 2
(1976), p. 352-353.
111
Congressional Record, August 30th, 1957 : p. 16979.
112
Ibid., p. 16979.
110
101
employed as the standard for betrayal and disloyalty and is used to discredit all those who
believed in his innocence.
Interest in the Hiss story is reinvigorated by 1958, a decade after the accusations
made public at the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings. The publication of
Fred J. Cook‟s113 book The Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss endeavors to rewrite history by
claiming that Hiss was targeted by members of the committee from the very beginning. In
reality, the majority of the committee‟s members were sympathetic to Hiss during his first
appearance and believed Chambers had made a mistake when he testified that Hiss had
been a member of his communist apparatus.114 Timothy P. Sheehan (Illinois) explains that
the passing of time has led many people to forget the details of the trials and the evidence
presented that proved Hiss‟ guilt. With their growing support, this new wave of advocates
(Fred J. Cook included) hope to convince the public that he was wrongfully accused. 115
Like Sheehan, Alvin M. Bentley (Michigan) surveys the way the intervening years have
changed the way a new generation perceives the Hiss case. Regarding the „frame up‟
theory to discredit the administration, Bentley introduces new facts when he declare‟s that
the attorney general and the prosecution were Democrats. 116 His inclusion of these facts is
surprising considering it paints the Democrats in a more favorable light; that they did what
they could to ensure a conviction in the Hiss case. All other Republican speeches from the
start of the ordeal have claimed that the administration has refused to acknowledge Hiss‟
guilt or the extent of infiltration of government departments by red spies. Bentley‟s ability
to admit that some Democrats did everything in their power to convict Hiss indicates that
congressional opinions had changed by the end of the decade. Previous beliefs that all
Democrats were at fault prevalent during the height of the „red‟ scare made way for logical
113
Fred J. Cook started his career in journalism reporting for the Asbury Park Press in the early 1930‟s and
then continued as a freelance writer for the New York World Telegram and Sun from the mid-1940‟s until
1959. During the Hiss case, Cook began to question the FBI‟s authority and their role in bringing Hiss to
justice. Other than his book The Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss, Cook also wrote an article entitled “Hiss:
New Perspectives on the Strangest Case of Our Time” which appeared in The Nation as well as several critical
pieces on the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover. The FBI responded to Cook‟s accusations by investigating his
background and claimed his articles were part of a communist plot to “discredit the bureau.” Cook‟s negative
reputation extended to his peers who believed Cook was an adherent to communist ideology, was not a very
good investigative reporter and was not even well-known in the field. Matthew Cecil, “‟Press Every Angle‟:
FBI Public Relations and the „Smear Campaign‟ of 1958,” American Journalism 19, 1 (2002), p. 39-58.
114
Congressional Record, May 23rd, 1958 : p. A4788.
115
Ibid., p. A4788.
116
Congressional Record, June 18th, 1958 : p. A5581.
102
thinking. While many still blamed the Roosevelt and Truman administrations for not taking
the issue seriously, Eisenhower‟s publication of the Yalta agreements and refusal to
succumb to McCarthy‟s incessant accusations permitted the Democratic party to regain a
measure of respectability.
Fred J. Cook‟s controversial publications are the topic of discussion in 1959.
Although originally discussing the FBI, their fight against communism and a new
resolution to abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee, H. Allen Smith
(California) criticizes the magazine The Nation for hiring Cook to write pro-Soviet articles.
Smith describes one such article in which Cook claims that the FBI and Justice Department
coached Chambers and fabricated evidence to reinforce his accusations that Hiss was a
strategically placed red spy.117 Also referring to a The Nation piece by the notorious Hiss
supporter, August E. Johansen (Michigan) considers Cook‟s arguments surrounding the
FBI‟s work to remove the threat of communism in the country. He claims that there never
was a communist problem and that the FBI is a secret police force dedicated to witch
hunting.118 There have been numerous Hiss sympathizers since the early days of the
HUAC hearings and the trials, however, Cook‟s ongoing fight for his vindication is
different. The early Hiss followers were misled by his impressive career, his appearance,
demeanor and the striking amount of well-known character witnesses who stood by him.
Also, the political atmosphere most likely led many to believe that the Hiss accusations
were an exaggeration of facts, taken advantage of by Truman‟s opposition. Where Cook‟s
battle differs, however, is that by 1959 the evidence that led to Hiss‟ conviction had, in
large part, been accepted and inserted into the annals of American history. And contrary to
their predecessors, this new school of thought was unimpeded by the hysteria of espionage
trials of the late 1940‟s and early 1950‟s and are likely part of the reason Hiss was able to
continue proclaiming his innocence.
Thus, Republican speeches in the House regarding Hiss and subversive activity
developed as time progressed. The high strung atmosphere and emotionally led responses
of the early 1950‟s changed midway through the decade with congressmen focusing instead
117
118
Congressional Record, January 15th, 1959 : p. A288-A289.
Congressional Record, March 3rd, 1959 : p. A1742.
103
on the repercussions of his betrayal; their discussions were fueled by an analytical need to
understand instead of a previous disbelief that such an educated, well placed man could be
an adherent of communism. The trials and the character of Hiss became a less important
factor of debates and were instead used as an example or as a symbol of subversive activity
and of the failure of Truman and his Democrats.
3.2-Senate
Like their colleagues in the House of Representatives, Democratic and Republican
senators were preoccupied with similar issues in the decade following the Hiss conviction.
Acheson‟s controversial show of approval was addressed along with the impact of the Hiss
case and red spies on loyalty screening for government employment. The influence he may
have had at Yalta and on important foreign policy was studied along with criticism for his
appearance at Princeton. Contrary to the House are the extensive debates and arguments
between other senators and Joseph R. McCarthy who is adamant in pursuing his crusade to
rid the world of communism.
The gradual evolution of Alger Hiss as a symbol of subversive activity during the
Cold War is evident in the Senate debates. McCarthy‟s numerous speeches are the perfect
example of Hiss‟ impact on the American psyche and on the way politicians reacted after
the case drew to a close. While some sought to learn from the scandal, others, like
McCarthy, used the fear of communist infiltration and Hiss‟ conviction as a way to gain
political notoriety by continuing the search for Soviet spies. Democratic and Republican
participation is strikingly different at this point.
Democrats appear on six different
occasions over a 10 year span regarding Hiss, subversive activity and communism in the
United States. Furthermore, what contributions they do make is very defensive when
compared to Democrats in the House. This extreme lack of participation indicates that
Democrats in the Senate have accepted that extensive damage has been done to their party‟s
reputation in light of the connections between well-known Democrats and Hiss. Of the six
who do participate, half reflect the typical opinion of Southern Democrats. As expected,
those from the North use Eisenhower‟s nomination as an excuse to accuse the Republicans
of ignoring the communist problem now that they have attained the presidency.
104
3.2.1-Democrats
Unlike their colleagues in the House, Democrats in the Senate did not discuss the
Hiss case in any detail after his conviction. Although they may mention him in passing, it
is done in the hopes of defending Truman and their party. Starting in 1950, Hiss is used by
Democratic senators as a symbol instead of the gradual evolution presented in the House of
Representatives. An accurate example would be Scott W. Lucas‟ (Illinois) speech of
August 8th, 1950. Referring to a statement made by Mundt about how Truman has only
recently admitted to the usefulness of subversive legislation, Lucas adamantly exclaims that
the president has always opposed communism. Though he refers Hiss, it is to assert that the
convicted perjurer is always introduced by senators who wish to discredit Truman‟s
administration.119 It is a well used tactic by the Republicans in which they exploit the
symbolism of Hiss to further encourage their party‟s popularity while damaging the
reputation of their opposition.
By 1951, Democratic senators have forgone acknowledging Hiss in any fashion.
Their absence conforms to the way in which they have tried to distance themselves from the
issue after the conviction. Instead of dwelling on the case, they simply refuse to discuss the
traitor now that he has been imprisoned. The transformation of Democratic opinions from
the start of the case to the guilty verdict is striking when compared to the slow progression
experienced by Republicans. Democratic detachment is even more pronounced in the
Senate then in the House and seems to represent their regret and embarrassment that they
not only denied the existence of a Soviet conspiracy in government but that they were
deceived by one of their own and chose to believe the man instead of the evidence.
Following the same line of defense as Lucas, Hubert H. Humphrey (Minnesota)
glorifies the Truman administration for their creation of programs 120 to oppose communism
119
Congressional Record, August 8th, 1950 : p. 11965.
Jennifer Delton‟s “Rethinking Post-World War II Anticommunism” supports Humphrey‟s argument and
explains that Truman‟s administration created programs to subvert the effectiveness of „red‟ spies long before
J. Edgar Hoover and HUAC became synonymous with the eradication of communist ideology. According to
Delton, Truman‟s Loyalty-Security Program of March 1947 (members of the Communist party or any other
subversive organization became illegible for employment in the federal government with this program), the
prosecution of communist leaders under the Smith act in 1949 and the Hollywood blacklist preventing
communists from working in the film industry were all liberal programs created by the presidency and other
120
105
at home and abroad. This is a response we have come to expect from Democrats who
become defensive in the face of Republican accusations of the executive‟s failure to
eradicate communism in America. While alluding to these programs, Humphrey discusses
the creation of the loyalty boards and the way they have ensured the detection of
communists before they are offered employment with the government.
Humphrey‟s
confidence in the loyalty boards is ironic considering the fact that Alger Hiss had passed
inspection and was one of the Soviet Union‟s top spies in the State Department.121
There is a shift in opinions by April 15th, 1953. President Dwight D. Eisenhower
has been in office for three months and Democratic senators use the same „soft on
communism‟ tactic applied by Republicans while Truman was in power. Matthew M.
Neely (West Virginia) refers to a recent Republican scandal surrounding the Republican
National Chairman, Wes Roberts122, and emphatically states that unlike them, Democrats
do not jump on an issue to discredit their opposition. Once again we have a passing
reference to the time period of the Hiss case.
While Neely attempts to present the
Democrats as a moral and virtuous party devoid of political scheming, he accuses
Eisenhower of portraying himself as an anti-communist crusader solely for his campaign
and that his promises of removing communism have been ignored since taking the
presidency.123
Republican Senator William F. Knowland (California) responds to Neely‟s criticism
with accusations of his own. Knowland exclaims that the Republican party has been in
office for less than 90 days whereas Roosevelt‟s administration received information in
1939 that Alger Hiss was part of a Soviet conspiracy and yet nothing happened until 1948.
In true Democratic form, Neely refuses to acknowledge Knowland‟s statement, claiming
Democrats for the sole purpose of reducing the influence of communism in America. See Jennifer Delton,
“Rethinking Post-World War II Anticommunism,” The Journal of the Historical Society X, 1 (2010), p. 1-41.
121
Congressional Record, April 24th, 1952 : p. 4378.
122
Before becoming the Republican National Chairman, it was alleged that Roberts had collected an 11,000$
commission fee for the sale of a property to the state of Kansas who were already in legal possession of the
land. He had only been Chairman for three months when the scandal broke and resigned from his post soon
after. Democrats were critical since Eisenhower had not demanded his resignation; it seems as though he had
publicly accepted Roberts‟ initial explanation for the sale and had considered the case closed. Congressional
Record, April 15th, 1953: p. 3093-3095.
123
Ibid., p. 3094.
106
that it is a „red herring‟.124 The use of Hiss as a symbol is quite apparent during Neely and
Knowland‟s discussion. He is used as a point of reference when describing the failures of
the previous administrations; a way to demonstrate that three months in office without new
anti-communist legislation is nothing compared to 10 years of disregarding reliable
intelligence about a red spy in government. What is surprising is that Neely still refers to
the Hiss case as a „red herring‟ three years after the conviction. Neely‟s public denial in the
face of the evidence is the sole instance of a Democrat still pushing the „red herring‟ line
after the conviction. The fact that nothing came from his comments demonstrates that the
high strung atmosphere of the late 1940‟s-early 1950‟s has begun to calm. He is able to
continue sponsoring Truman‟s administration and contradict Hiss‟ communist involvement
without being accused of the same affiliation.
McCarthy‟s treatment of those not conforming or adhering to his beliefs is a topic
discussed by two Southern Democrats. Though he claims that he has always fought against
communism, A. S. Mike Monroney (Oklahoma) does not agree with McCarthy‟s methods
and claims that anyone who does not comply is automatically accused of being soft on
communism and his loyalty to the United States is questioned by McCarthy and his
followers.125 Monroney‟s statement indicates that McCarthy‟s rationalized „witch hunt‟ is
already beginning to cause discontent among members of the Senate. In a similar manner,
Price Daniel (Texas) asserts his dedication to the fight against communism but warns
McCarthy to tread carefully when criticizing the Democratic party. Daniel is adamant
when he states that not all Democrats adhere to the same beliefs as the Truman/Acheson
administration and that many regret the way some of the communist cases were handled.
He strives to show McCarthy that the opinions of the members of the Democratic party
vary immensely and often do not agree with the party consensus. To prove his point,
Daniel reveals that instead of voting for the Democratic nominee in the 1952 presidential
elections, he voted for Eisenhower.126 Daniel‟s defense of the Southern faction of the
Democratic party is the first time such a definitive line is drawn between both groups. It is
very important to Daniel that the Senate (and McCarthy) are aware of their inherent
124
Ibid., p. 3095.
Congressional Record, July 21st, 1953 : p. 9346.
126
Congressional Record, January 14th, 1955 : p. 372-373.
125
107
Southern anti-communist opinion and that they are completely dissimilar to the
Truman/Acheson Democrats.
Finally, Thomas J. Dodd (Connecticut) includes details of a British television
program in which Alger Hiss criticizes the United States. In the interview, he blames
American leaders for creating a widespread fear of communism and essentially forcing its
citizens to fear the same thing as its government. He admits to being an advocate of Henry
Wallace127 since he did not conform to the same ideals of communist fear prevalent in
America. Dodd‟s purpose in including the details of this interview is to demonstrate Hiss‟
pro-Soviet leanings. Similar to his „frame-up‟ theory presented in his book In the Court of
Public Opinion, Hiss‟ belief that the communist hysteria was created by the struggle
between America‟s political parties ignores the significance of the overwhelming evidence
that emerged from his own trials and from those of other spies as well. Therefore this fear
of communism, predominant in the years following the Second World War was reasonable
in light of the precarious relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States and
was corroborated by the multiple spy cases.
Democratic senators chose to forgo discussing crucial Hiss related issues in the
1950‟s such as Acheson‟s press statement, the trials and conviction or Hiss‟ invitation to
speak at Princeton. And although they only contribute on six occasions, their participation
has affirmed important aspects about the political mindset of these senators in the decade
following the Hiss guilty verdict. Astoundingly, some Democrats still supported the „red
herring‟ theory stated by Truman in the early days of the Hiss controversy, even after the
127
Henry Wallace began his career in politics as Franklin Roosevelt‟s secretary of agriculture and contributed
to the New Deal. By 1940, Roosevelt chose him as the Vice-presidential candidate. Many members of the
Southern faction of the Democratic party pressured Roosevelt to pick a different running mate for the next
elections, claiming that Wallace‟s name would hurt his chances. Truman was chosen for his loyalty to the
president and for his popularity among the different groups within the party. After Roosevelt‟s death, Wallace
was weary of Truman‟s antagonism towards the Soviet Union. He warned the president that taking a tough
stand in Eastern Europe would only threaten the Soviets and ruin any future cooperation between the two
nations. He was eventually reprimanded by Truman for his constant criticism and was told to refrain from
publicly discussing foreign policy from that point on. Wallace was fired on September 20 th, 1946. In 1947,
he decided to run for the presidency on a third party ticket and was widely supported by communists and
liberals. During the campaign, Truman disapproved of Wallace‟s willingness to accept communist aide.
Those in the Democratic camp claimed Wallace had readily welcomed communists in an effort to sabotage
Truman‟s foreign policy. Wallace‟s campaign was irrevocably linked to the communists in the eyes of the
American citizens and contributed to his lower standing in the polls. His embarrassing defeat (only 2.7
percent of votes and no electoral votes) signaled the end of his political career. Kirkendall ed., op. cit., p. 383385.
108
evidence presented at the trials pointed to his guilt.
Southern Democrats chose to
demonstrate that their opinions were separate to those of the Truman/Acheson group of
Democrats. However, what was most apparent was the use of Hiss as evidence in their
arguments instead of being the main topic of discussion. In using him exclusively as a
reference point, Democrats attempted to distance themselves from their party‟s negative
involvement when the accusations first came to light in 1939. While they are unable to
erase the link between their party and Alger Hiss, refusing to spend more time on the issue
is their way of moving forward.
3.2.2-Republicans
The amount of Republican discussions in the Senate is similar to those in the House.
By examining 43 speeches, the symbolism of the Hiss case experiences a gradual
transformation. Their analysis of Secretary of State Acheson‟s sustaining loyalty in the
early 1950‟s still emits feelings of betrayal and disbelief while their eventual scrutiny of
Alger Hiss‟ involvement in key foreign policy by the end of the decade is much more
detached. The passage of time and the overwhelming information that has emerged allows
them to inspect in greater detail the repercussions of Hiss‟ actions and the impact he will
inevitably have on American history.
Speeches and inclusions by Republicans in the Senate focused on three main topics
in 1950: a re-examination of the details of the Hiss trials in light of the conviction in
January, criticism of Acheson‟s friendship with Hiss as well as whether or not he was fit to
be Secretary of State and the launch of what would eventually be known as McCarthyismJoseph R. McCarthy‟s own transformation into a symbol of the communist witch hunt.
Karl E. Mundt‟s speech of February 3rd, 1950 is reminiscent of his contributions
while a member of the House. He includes a summary of the case in which he enumerates
18 of the most important points. Although most are typical details of the case, the 12th is
interesting as it states that it is “common knowledge” that Truman, Acheson and other
prominent government officials had used their power and influence to prevent the House
Un-American Activities Committee from succeeding in their investigation of Hiss. 128 His
128
Congressional Record, February 3rd, 1950 : p. A803.
109
final point stresses the importance of learning from the Hiss case and concludes with six
tips to ensure the same thing is never repeated. Like Nixon, he suggests changing the
statute of limitations to 10 years instead of three (Hiss would have been convicted of
espionage instead of perjury if the statute had been changed). 129 Second, that legislation
such as the Mundt-Nixon bill should be passed to protect the United States against
communist infiltration of government positions. Thirdly, that congressional committee‟s
should endeavor to remove all communists and red sympathizers from government
departments. Fourth, a complete reorganization of the loyalty boards would be necessary
since men like Alger Hiss were able to pass those presently conducted. Mundt‟s final two
suggestions surround HUAC‟s continued ability to investigate subversive activity and the
need to reassess the present foreign policy.130
Chan Gurney (South Dakota), on the other hand, includes an editorial from the
Washington Herald regarding Senator Capehart‟s demand that Truman force Acheson to
resign. According to information disclosed after the trials, when Chambers told his story to
Adolph Berle in 1938, Acheson vouched for Hiss and gave him a promotion. Acheson‟s
resignation is seen by many as the only solution since he has publicly refused to turn his
back on Hiss.131 For this reason, Acheson‟s choice of Hiss in lieu of obeying his oath of
office is seen by Republican senators as grounds for repercussions. His refusal to place his
nation before his friend is an affront to the American government and no less than his
resignation will placate those who oppose him.
For his part, Homer E. Capehart includes four editorials in his February 6th speech
favoring his beliefs on various topics related to the Hiss case.
The first, from the
Indianapolis Star entitled „Acheson Should Resign‟, criticizes the Secretary of State‟s
loyalty to Hiss. The editor concludes by stating that the President and the Secretary of State
have an obligation to the people of the United States therefore, the nation comes first and
friendships or personal political beliefs must be pushed to the side.132 The second editorial
from the Tulsa Tribune discusses Frankfurter and Reed‟s appearances as character
129
Ibid., p. A803.
Ibid., p. A804.
131
Ibid., p. A789-A790.
132
Congressional Record, February 6th, 1950 : p. A816.
130
110
witnesses in the Hiss trial. Like the first of Capehart‟s inclusions, the editor believes that
both judges should resign from their posts. Furthermore, he blames the Democratic party
and the administration for the power Hiss was able to exert while taking part in the creation
of the United Nations. While the author accuses the president of trying to hide the severity
of Hiss‟ betrayal, it is surprising to note that he also attacks Congress for taking part in an
apparent „cover up‟.133 Considering the work of HUAC, of Republican party members and
Southern Democrats in the fight against communism, the authors accusations against
Congress is astounding. What is even more disconcerting is the fact that Capehart chose to
include this editorial even though Congress is perceived by the author as part of the reason
Alger Hiss was able to betray his nation.
What follows is „A Dramatic Scene From the „Inside‟ at Yalta‟ from the Wheeling
Intelligencer. The author focuses on studying Hiss‟ contributions to the Yalta conference
and states that his actions there were most likely in favor of the Soviet Union. 134 The final
editorial, entitled „How Naïve Can You Be?‟ from the Indianapolis Star, evaluates Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt‟s belief that Whittaker Chambers is guilty of spreading lies about Alger
Hiss. The title of the article is telling and represents the author‟s incredulity. He cannot
comprehend how Eleanor Roosevelt and Dean Acheson can still have faith in Hiss even
with the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.135 Capehart‟s use of the four editorials is
effective as he is able to portray his opinion on various topics regarding the Hiss/Chambers
scandal. Furthermore, the constant theme in his inclusions is comprised of the Democratic
administration‟s failure to act. First, when details of Hiss‟ treachery first emerged and then
again when they denied the need to remove prominently placed men from their posts after
publicly linking themselves to Hiss. The fact that Acheson, Frankfurter and Reed were not
penalized for their loyalty outraged their opposition further and contributed to the opinion
that Truman and his Democrats were sympathetic to the communist cause.
While Capehart‟s staunch Republican beliefs is expected and evident in his
contributions, Edward Martin‟s (Pennsylvania) February 17th speech regarding Acheson‟s
controversial press conference is not as critical of the Secretary of State. He takes a
133
Ibid., p. A816.
Ibid., p. A816-A817.
135
Ibid., p. A817.
134
111
realistic approach when assessing the notorious comments. Despite the fact that wild
accusations of Acheson‟s own ties to communism were being promoted, Martin believes
otherwise; simply that the Secretary of State was unwise in publicly announcing his
enduring loyalty to Hiss.136 Nonetheless, like most Republicans, Martin does denounce the
administration for their apparent denial regarding communists in government. 137
The
consistency with which this accusation is used by Republicans is their way of ensuring that
though the Hiss trials have ended, the executive‟s errors will not be forgotten.
Consequently, the over a decade long „lapse‟ in judgment on the part of previous
Democratic presidency‟s becomes a black mark on their party‟s reputation and is exploited
by the opposition whenever an opportunity presents itself.
Joseph R. McCarthy‟s first inclusion after the conviction questions the reasons why
certain people have actively defended Hiss while resolutely maintaining an anti-communist
stand. Using an article from the New Leader, McCarthy is able to accomplish two things.
The first is to demonstrate the reason some Americans feel sympathy for Hiss and a dislike
of Chambers: they feel guilty for their own past communist leanings. Thus they are
compassionate to Hiss‟ situation while feeling betrayed by Chambers who they feel is also
accusing them. And second, by proving that all those supporting Hiss were once believers
in a communist world order, McCarthy is able to justify his crusade to root out traitors in
government.138
McCarthy‟s drive begins to anger his colleagues by July 1950. In particular, Homer
Ferguson (Michigan) disagrees with the Senator from Wisconsin regarding statements he
made claiming that all communists had been cleared from government employment.
Ferguson refers to a memorandum by the Committee on Appropriations139 in which nine
136
Congressional Record, February 17th, 1950 : p. A1175.
Ibid., p. A1175.
138
Congressional Record, May 22nd, 1950: p. A3853-A3855.
139
The Senate Committee on Appropriations was created in 1867 and became responsible for reviewing all
appropriations bills (previously handled by the Finance Committee). Many of these bills were passed over to
separate committees by 1898 (Agricultre, Commerce, Indian Affairs, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs,
Pensions, Post Office and Post Roads Committees became responsible for appropriations under their own
jurisdictions leaving the Appropriations Committee the task of overseeing executive, legislative and judicial
spending). Nonetheless, by 1921, all spending was reverted to the Appropriations Committee. See Bill
Brock, “Committees in the Senate,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 411,
(1974), p. 25. ; Charles S. Bullock III, “U.S. Senate Committee Assignments: Preferences, Motivations, and
137
112
names of suspected subversive agents still working in the State Department are presented.
Ferguson questions McCarthy‟s effectiveness and authority on the issue since the nine
suspected agents have not been removed from their posts. While Hiss and White are
mentioned in passing, the majority of the dialogue is focused on the ongoing investigation
of strategically placed „red‟ spies.140 The importance of the Hiss case is evident in his
speech; it was the scandal that opened American eyes to the extremes a supposed „ally‟
would go in order to gain classified information. The details conceded at HUAC and both
perjury trials exposed the necessity to evaluate the effectiveness of the loyalty boards. It
forced American politicians to realize that Hiss could not be alone in his treachery and
encouraged a more thorough examination and inspection of employees.
Karl E. Mundt closes 1950 by advising that Hiss‟ bid for appeal was refused which
finally brings the scandal to an end. He adds an interesting editorial from the Washington
Post. Mundt explains that the Post was originally a pro-Hiss paper, constantly publishing
articles defending the State Department spy. With the conviction and subsequent refusal of
appeal however, they have admitted to turning their backs on communists and have realized
their mistake in backing Hiss. The article describes how key Democratic members of
HUAC involved with the investigation that led to Hiss‟ indictment were removed from the
Committee by the administration after the conviction.141 Their dismissal seems to be an
admission by Truman that the Hiss „red herring‟ had done more damage then he thought
possible when he ridiculed the early investigations. Furthermore, we get the sense that the
decision to remove these important Democrats from the Committee was the President‟s way
of forcing unity within his divided party; their membership in HUAC served to emphasize
the split between the Northern and Southern factions.
Mundt continues his analysis of the importance of the Hiss trials in March 1951.
Influenced by Hiss‟ impending imprisonment, Mundt includes new information to the
Record for future historians studying foreign policy after World War II. Understanding the
Hiss affair, according to Mundt, is necessary to fully grasp what occurred during this time
Success,” American Journal of Political Science 29, 4 (1985), p. 789-808. ; and Eric Schickler and John
Sides, “Intergenerational Warfare: The Senate Decentralizes Appropriations,” Legislative Studies Quarterly
25, 4 (2000), p. 551-552
140
Congressional Record, July 24th, 1950 : p. 10807-10810.
141
Congressional Record, December 11th, 1950 : p. A7590.
113
period; that Hiss was not simply an unimportant functionary of the State Department but
had a hand in forming policies at the Bretton Woods Conference, 142 the Yalta Conference
and the San Francisco Conference. The impact of the Hiss/Chambers controversy on
American history is evident in Mundt‟s speech. He suggests that the Korean War, the
atmosphere of the Roosevelt-Truman era and the fear of communism could not be properly
studied without first understanding that these events and situations were shaped by the
influence of men such as Hiss, Chambers, Wadleigh,143 White, Duggan144 and
Remington,145 etc.146 Mundt introduces the case‟s peculiarities that have set it apart from
other espionage trials of the time period. Most noteworthy is the fact that Hiss was able to
gain and maintain the allegiance of very powerful, prominent men while all the evidence
pointed to his guilt.147 Mundt is one of the only congressmen to specifically refer to the
importance of the Hiss case in the study of Cold War history. His dialogue is presented in a
142
The goal of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 was to establish free trade that would not be affected
by “economic isolationism and protectionism.” The conference successfully created the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank and is explained by Pollard as the first step towards the rehabilitation of
the international economy. Unfortunately, Stalin did not participate and did not allow other countries in his
sphere of influence to take part because of disagreements with the Great Powers regarding Eastern Europe.
Kirkendall ed., Robert Pollard, “Bretton Woods System,” op. cit., p. 36-37.
143
Julian Wadleigh worked in the State Department as an economist and admitted to supplying Chambers
with classified material. He testified in both Hiss trials and claimed that Chambers‟ physical appearance had
not drastically changed since their first meeting (demonstrating that Hiss‟ inability to recognize Chambers at
their first HUAC encounter was simply a stalling tactic) as well as acknowledged being aware of another spy
in the State Department but not knowing their identity. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 109-110.
144
Laurence Duggan was a specialist in Latin American Affairs and was associated with suspected
communists such as White and Hiss but was never accused outright of espionage. Suspicious circumstances
surrounding his death led many to believe he knew more than he had revealed while being questioned by the
FBI. Though he fell from the “sixteenth floor of a Manhattan office building” and the police found no
evidence of a planned suicide or murder, a friend claimed he had received a letter from Duggan “written on
the day of his death „in the best of spirits‟.” Therefore, close friends suspected that his death was not
accidental. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 175-176 and 269.
145
William Remington was also an economist and worked for the War Production Board before he was
accused by Elizabeth Bentley as a “minor, low-level source.” Although Truman‟s Loyalty-Security Review
Board flagged Remington as a risk, he denied any connection to the communists while working for the
government and without Bentley‟s testimony, the Board was unable to remove him from his position.
However, by 1950 the FBI had succeeded in collecting enough evidence and Remington was called before a
grand jury. He was indicted after his ex-wife testified that they had both been communists and had passed
information to Bentley. While he was convicted, an appeal was granted after certain technicalities were
revealed in his favor. A second grand jury was summoned followed by another indictment on the grounds
that he had perjured himself. He was found guilty on two of five counts and sentenced to three years in
prison. While incarcerated, he was attacked and succumbed to his injuries. Haynes and Klehr, op. cit., p. 7379.
146
Congressional Record, March 19th, 1951 : p. A1513.
147
Congressional Record, March 29th, 1951 : p. A1697.
114
way that demonstrates his ability to recognize the relevance of key historical events and the
way several figures influenced their outcomes.
The next time Hiss‟ name appears is in 1953 in a debate between Senators Styles
Bridges, Andrew F. Schoeppel (Kansas) and Joseph R. McCarthy regarding the nomination
of Acheson‟s lieutenant Charles E. Bohlen for ambassador of Russia. While discussing his
suitability for the post, they reveal that Bohlen made it seem as though Hiss‟ involvement at
Yalta was minimal while being questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.148
Schoeppel uses Bohlen‟s testimony to demonstrate that he is unfit for the position
considering his connection to Hiss and Acheson. McCarthy, in particular, claims Hiss is
the perfect example of a corrupt government official whose name is always paired with
Acheson‟s in a negative light; to Republican politicians, they have come to represent
Democratic failure and pro-Soviet policies.149 This sentiment is apparent when McCarthy
states: “The name of Hiss […] and Acheson have become synonymous with defeat,
disgrace, and dishonor.”150 For his part, Bridges believes that Bohlen‟s defense of the Yalta
agreements and loyalty to the Truman camp makes him unsuitable for such an important
position.151 It seems as though Republicans are weary of having a defender of Truman‟s
policy in a post that would increase contact with the „enemy‟. This is understandable
considering most anti-communist Republicans have been pushing the theory that the
Democrats and communists have been in collusion for some time; Acheson‟s nomination of
a man sharing similar viewpoints increases their distrust.
References to Hiss for the remainder of the year vary in relevance with the majority
of senators beginning to use his case as the ultimate example of duplicity.
His
transformation into a symbol of the Cold War is much more apparent at this point as the
details of his trials are no longer deeply delved into. In John M. Butler‟s (Maryland) short
review of Chambers‟ book Witness, Hiss is alluded to simply in order to demonstrate that
his name represents the communist infiltration of government.152 Alexander Wiley, on the
other hand, uses Hiss to represent the inadequacy of the nation‟s anti-espionage laws in his
148
Congressional Record, March 25th, 1953 : p. 2289.
Ibid., p. 2294.
150
Ibid., p. 2291.
151
Ibid., p. 2286.
152
Congressional Record, May 15th, 1953 : p. 4972.
149
115
speeches of May 15th and 20th, 1953.153 Furthermore, Republicans no longer need to use
details of the case to prove the existence of subversive activity in America; the conviction
has substantiated their claims. The fact that they have been proven right is what makes
Hiss‟ evolution into a symbol possible. They are no longer dedicated to dissecting and
analyzing his responses during the trials, thus they are able to move on and use the Hiss
case strictly when describing the consequences of Soviet espionage.
McCarthy‟s methods come into question by 1953. While in favor of his actions up
to date, Barry M. Goldwater (Arizona) adds an article from the Building and Construction
Trades Bulletin to demonstrate the growing discontent of Americans who are displeased
with the way he has executed his hunt for subversives.154
Furthermore, the term
„McCarthyism‟ makes its first appearance as his popularity begins to diminish.
Antagonism in the Senate towards McCarthy is evident in an argument with two of his
Democratic colleagues. In a very defensive speech regarding accusations made by other
senators, he uses the Hiss case to justify his crusade. Also in an effort to place more doubt
on the Democratic party, McCarthy betrays the contents of a letter written to the convicted
perjurer by Democratic Senator Herbert H. Lehman (New York) in which he expressed his
confidence in Hiss‟ innocence.155 The details of the letter affirm the extent to which Hiss
was able to gain the trust of a wide range of politicians. Unfortunately for McCarthy, his
attempt to draw attention to the Democratic party is short lived as Lehman responds to his
accusations. He claims that he sent his letter months before any evidence of Hiss‟ guilt was
disclosed and that it was a time when many politicians doubted the veracity of Chambers‟
story.156 In his defense, Lehman demands that McCarthy justify why he accepted a donation
from the Communist party when he was a candidate for the Senate elections of 1946.157
McCarthy‟s deliberate use of the Hiss case in order to recover a measure of acceptance for
153
Ibid., p. A2651-A2652.
Congressional Record, July 15th, 1953 : p. A4388.
155
Congressional Record, July 21st, 1953: p. 9346.
156
Lehman mentions Stanley Reed‟s appearance as a character witness as well as the fact that during the time
of the accusations, Hiss was appointed to the presidency of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
by then chairman John Foster Dulles (who became Secretary of State for President Eisenhower). Therefore,
Lehman was not the only one to be fooled by Hiss‟ charm, education and prominent career. Ibid., p. 9352.
157
Ibid., p. 9352.
154
116
his deplorable methods backfired; his own connection to the Communist party placed
further doubt on his credibility.
This time period is known for the beginning of serious clashes between McCarthy
and the administration.
The first confrontation happened after Charles Bohlen was
nominated by the president for the position of ambassador to the Soviet Union. Bohlen‟s
participation at Yalta and his recommendation to such an important post was to McCarthy a
direct affront to his anti-communist crusade; he contested the choice at every
opportunity.158 He then accused the CIA of Soviet infiltration and was finally persuaded to
drop his investigation into the organization in exchange for a “purge of the agency‟s
personnel.”159 This was soon followed by his investigation of the International Information
Agency. Part of the State Department, the IIA was responsible for several libraries abroad.
McCarthy sent two of his assistants to peruse the contents of these libraries and they were
recorded burning all books with ties to communism and communist sympathizers.160 The
final confrontation was in 1953 after McCarthy accused members of the Army Signal Corps
Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey161 of being influenced by
communism. His lack of professionalism and disrespectful comments culminated to the
Army McCarthy Hearings of April 1954. The televised hearings were McCarthy‟s undoing
as American citizens were able to witness the Senator‟s true character. A motion to censor
McCarthy was submitted by Senator Ralph Flanders on July 20th and on December 2nd,
1954, McCarthy was charged with contempt and abuse after a 67-22 vote by the Senate.162
Debates in 1954 examined whether or not convicted traitors should receive a
pension. This issue came to light when the press published articles claiming that Hiss
would receive a Federal pension upon reaching the age of 62. The President released a
statement that he had no intention of allowing Alger Hiss to collect such an income at the
cost of American tax dollars.163 By August 17th, Senators John J. Williams (Delaware) and
Karl E. Mundt dedicated their time on the floor to the promotion of a bill that would
158
Klingaman ed., op. cit., p. 258.
Ibid., p. 258.
160
Ibid., p. 258.
161
Kirkendall ed., op. cit., p. 259.
162
Ibid., p. 259-260.
163
Congressional Record, July 2nd, 1954 : p. 9604.
159
117
prohibit any payment of government funds (such as pensions) to ex-employees convicted of
particular crimes. According to Williams, the present law did not prevent someone who
had betrayed the country from collecting retirement benefits.164 Although Williams
proposed his own version (S.2631) of what would become the Hiss act, a House bill (H.R.
9909) introduced by Republican Albert Cretella (Connecticut) had already been accepted
by the lower house. Senators chose to promote the passing of H.R. 9909 in lieu of their
own to ensure that the legislation would come into effect with as little delay as possible.
The Hiss act was signed by the president on August 21st, 1954.165 The uproar surrounding
pensions to ex-government employees convicted of a crime is unsurprising. The Hiss case
was long over but politicians were unable to forget the fact that he had stolen classified
material. The act ensured that Hiss would be excluded from receiving any funds from the
government he betrayed.
March of 1955 ushered in a new topic of discussion as the official State Department
records of the Yalta conference were finally released. William F. Knowland and Styles
Bridges take a particular interest in the issue. Contrary to what other congressmen have
argued since the beginning of the Hiss affair, Knowland expresses opinions reminiscent of
Representative Katharine St. George; he does not believe that Hiss was a “principle
architect in the Yalta Conference.”166 Even though Hiss was present during the meetings
and was consulted, he did not actively participate in negotiations which restricted any
influence he may have had on final decisions regarding the Soviet Union. This point is
interesting considering it is the first time a Republican senator reviews Hiss‟ involvement at
Yalta and believes his contribution is not as severe as originally portrayed by his
colleagues.167 While he still acknowledges that the simple fact that Hiss was able to sit and
listen during meetings and was consulted on certain issues caused damage to the nation‟s
security, his ability to objectively analyze Yalta and concede that Hiss did not have a
crucial role at negotiations is not something that would have happened in the years of the
HUAC hearings and the trials.
164
In Knowland‟s March 22nd speech on Yalta, Hiss is
Congressional Record, August 17th, 1954 : p. 14780.
Congressional Record, August 17th, 1954 and August 21st, 1954: p. 14780-14784 and 15560.
166
Congressional Record, March 18th, 1955 : p. 3138.
167
Ibid., p. 3138.
165
118
mentioned in passing168 demonstrating further that by 1955, members of Congress were
able to study events of political significance without rehashing the details of the espionage
case. While they have not accepted his actions, any reference to his name by the mid1950‟s is self explanatory for the treachery that has been committed.
In a similar fashion, Bridges focuses on discussing the problems that emerged after
Yalta and the effort put forth by the American government to meet with Soviet Russia and
Red China to solve their issues without resorting to more fighting. 169 Once again, there is
only one reference to Hiss which is used as justification for the failure of the accords.
Bridges‟ speech gives the impression that Hiss‟ involvement at the conference is the reason
Eisenhower‟s administration has been forced to re-negotiate peace terms with the
communist nations. His opinion takes a step back from the views expressed by Knowland.
He has yet to acknowledge that other contributing factors may have led to the deterioration
of the Yalta agreements.
Evidence of Hiss‟ evolution into a symbol becomes even more apparent by 1956. If
we consider William Langer‟s (North Dakota) February 1st speech in which he defines the
communist plan for world domination, Hiss appears once in reference to another suspected
spy, Harry Dexter White.
The entire inclusion analyses White‟s involvement in the
creation of the Morgenthau Plan170 and his influence in foreign policy in favor of the Soviet
Union. Langer states that Hiss and White were associates and uses this acquaintance as
proof of White‟s communist ideology. Here we see that politicians have begun to use a
relationship with Hiss as evidence of betrayal when accusing government employees of
subversive activity.171 Interestingly, aside from using a link to Hiss as corroboration for
treason, Republicans have ceased employing the case as ammunition against the
Democratic party the way they did during Truman‟s administration. This change in tactic
begins once Eisenhower wins the presidential elections and progresses throughout the rest
168
Congressional Record, March 22nd, 1955 : p. 3380.
Congressional Record, May 11th, 1955 : p. 6074.
170
Named after former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., the Morgenthau Plan theorized that
by diminishing Germany‟s industrial capacity, continued disarmament would be feasible. Frederick H.
Gareau, “Morgenthau‟s Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany,” The Western Political Quarterly 14, 2
(1961), p. 517.
171
Congressional Record, February 1st, 1956 : p. 1791-1792.
169
119
of the decade. As a result, it is apparent that the extent to which Republicans criticized the
Democratic executive and their drive to eliminate communism was motivated by their
political ambitions.
Like members of the House of Representatives, Hiss‟ invitation to speak at
Princeton is referred to by Karl E. Mundt on April 11th, 1956. Though short, Mundt takes
the time to express his disappointment that such a prestigious university has harmed its
reputation by granting a traitor to discuss the Geneva Conference.172 Remarkably, there is
no other inference of Hiss‟ appearance at Princeton by Republican members of the Senate.
Instead, we get the impression that they are solely preoccupied with the impact he may have
had on past legislation and anything else he may be doing after his release is of no
consequence considering he is no longer able to influence policy. Mundt‟s interest in the
„Princeton scandal‟ seems to stem from his previous connection to the case while a House
representative and member of HUAC. It is as though he is trying to reassert his role as the
pre-eminent Hiss expert in the Senate by being the first to introduce any of Hiss‟ postprison activity.
Mundt is the only Republican senator to review Hiss‟ book In the Court of Public
Opinion on May 8th, 1957. According to Mundt, the entire book is a representation of what
Hiss believes actually happened as well as an omission of details regarding the key
evidence that led to his conviction.173 He explains that the majority of the book is dedicated
to proving the „forgery by typewriter‟ theory regardless of the fact that Hiss‟ own defense
team believed it was nearly impossible to achieve. And so, a man like Chambers with
limited resources could not manufacture an exact replica of the Hiss Woodstock for the
purpose of framing a State Department official.174 Like his discussion of Hiss‟ invitation to
Princeton, Mundt cites Hiss‟ book, In the Court of Public Opinion, to inform his colleagues
of Hiss‟ campaign to restore his reputation and to remind the Senate of the important part
he played in ensuring the conviction of a notorious spy.
172
Congressional Record, April 11th, 1956 : p. 6041.
Congressional Record, May 8th, 1957 : p. 6584-6585.
174
Ibid., p. 6585.
173
120
By 1959, interest in Alger Hiss has decreased significantly.
Any remark by
Republican senators appears solely if Hiss tries to take advantage of services reserved for
loyal Americans. The attention of Styles Bridges is drawn to such a case on April 24 th,
1959. Using articles from the New York Journal American, the Baltimore News-Post, and
the New York Daily News, Bridges expresses his outrage that Hiss has applied for a passport
to travel to Europe. He is a staunch believer that traitors of the United States who commit
espionage for the Soviets should not receive the privileges reserved to American citizens
and sponsors the creation of legislation that would prevent this from happening. 175 His
outrage is understandable considering Hiss‟ allegiance to the Soviets.
Unfortunately, by January 27th, 1960 it is evident that passport legislation was not
enacted as Bridges describes Hiss‟ appearance on a British television program.
The
premise of the interview is to present the difficulty of certain American citizens to adjust to
life in the US. Bridges is disgusted that Hiss is in Great Britain complaining about the
United States considering his involvement in one of the biggest scandals in his nation‟s
history.176
Furthermore, Hiss criticizes the American populace for taking part in the
communist hysteria of the 40‟s and 50‟s. Other than included transcripts of testimony
during the trials, this is the first time statements made by Hiss are referenced. And while
aspects of his testimony established his culpability, Bridges‟ analysis of the Great Britain
television interview exposes a different side of Hiss. The ease with which he criticizes the
United States government and its citizens during the „red‟ scare is not the kind of reaction
we would expect from an innocent man.
The final inclusion for our time period is on behalf of Kenneth B. Keating in May
1960. His speech re-introduces the controversy of the Hiss act and attempts to determine
whether or not the legislation was effective in preventing Hiss (and other convicted
government officials) from collecting apension.177 Keating explains that several senators
believe the law is still too broad and should be amended so that strictly those serving a year
or more in prison would be impacted by the change.178 Although it was Hiss‟ situation that
175
Congressional Record, April 24th, 1959 : p. A3398.
Congressional Record, January 27th, 1960 : p. 1515.
177
Congressional Record, May 1960: p. 18261.
178
Ibid., p. 18261.
176
121
motivated the creation of such an act, his case is not the topic of discussion.
The
significance of the title cannot go unnoticed. While the Hiss/Chambers scandal is no longer
discussed with the same passion and disappointment of the late 1940‟s-early 1950‟s, the
relevance of his case in American history influenced congressmen to create new legislation
to limit Hiss‟ access to the benefits and privileges conceived for loyal American citizens.
Hiss‟ gradual transformation into a symbol of the Cold War is less defined in the
Senate then what was presented in the House of Representatives. While speeches on behalf
of Democrats in the House experienced a progression from 1950 to 1960, their counterparts
in the Senate distanced themselves from the issue after the final verdict. Republicans, on
the other hand, used the Hiss/Chambers controversy to their advantage on numerous
occasions.
In the early 1950‟s, Republican congressmen of both legislative houses
continued their fight against communism. The Hiss trials and conviction served to justify
their cause. Eisenhower‟s presidential win in 1952 changed the way Republicans used the
communist issue in their political campaigns. While Alger Hiss was still used as an
effective tactic to antagonize their Democratic colleagues, the Republican rise to power
meant attacking the Truman administration for their shortcomings was no longer necessary.
While some events such as Hiss‟ appearance at Princeton and the release of the State
Department‟s official report on Yalta made many congressmen revisit aspects of the trials,
reaction to his betrayal was different. The decade following the conviction permitted
politicians to objectively analyze the influence Hiss may have had in foreign policy, in the
State Department and while participating at Bretton Woods, Yalta and San Francisco.
Although Alger Hiss‟ treason is unfortunate, his case contributed in shaping the political
atmosphere of the United States and has become a critical aspect in understanding the
mindset of the early Cold War period.
122
Conclusion
Congressional reactions have evolved from the early accusations in 1948 to the end
of Eisenhower‟s term in office in 1961. What has persisted was the way in which party
members of both sides of the political spectrum responded to the betrayal.
While
participation in the Congressional Record may have fluctuated for some, Republicans and
Southern Democrats have been steadfast in their criticism of the Truman administration
during the early stages of the case and continued their fight against communist ideology as
the years progressed. Northern Democrats, on the other hand, were steadfast in their
support of their presidential candidate, continued to believe communist infiltration was a
manufactured issue by their opposition and attacked Eisenhower for being unable to
completely eliminate the „red‟ problem after three months as chief executive.
Debates in both legislative houses sought a solution for subversive activity in early
1948.
Karl Mundt and Richard Nixon‟s H.R. 5852 was seen by a majority of their
colleagues as the logical next step in the prevention of „red‟ infiltration. While some from
the Hiss camp have claimed the accusations were a Republican political tactic, the
examination of the proposed Subversive Activities Control Bill has demonstrated that the
fear of communism and espionage was perceived as a real and present danger months
before Alger Hiss‟ name was mentioned at HUAC.
His notoriety and prominence in government added to the already growing hysteria.
In a sense, the scandal was used by Truman‟s opposition as justification for their anticommunist beliefs. As details of the HUAC hearings emerged, Republicans and Southern
Democrats increased their criticism of the Democratic executive‟s failure to remove the
threat to their national security. In contrast, Northern Democrats (or the Truman-Acheson
Democrats) continued to express their confidence in Hiss‟ innocence and promoted the
theory that the accusations and HUAC hearings were essentially a witch hunt; a propaganda
effort for the sole purpose of upsetting the 20 year reign of Democrats in the executive.
Speeches by both parties are at a minimum in 1948 for two reasons. First, while
newspapers were actively writing about the scandal the instant Hiss was accused of being a
communist, our study only examines debates included in the Congressional Record. John
123
E. Rankin‟s presentation of the HUAC report in December 1948 is the first time aspects of
the hearings are made public. Therefore, their silence from August to December 1948 was
due to the minimal amount of official details released by the Committee during that period
of time. Second, a lack of Democratic participation in the early stages of the case was
expected as many staunchly stood by Hiss and did not believe anything would come from
the Committee investigations. Most noteworthy is Truman‟s „red herring‟ statement used
in reference to the espionage hearings and the Republican crusade against what he believed
was an imaginary foe.
Still, Chambers‟ story forced Hiss to sue him for libel in the hopes of protecting his
already precarious reputation. Unfortunately, the libel suit served to discredit Hiss further
as Chambers divulged the apparatus‟ true duties (espionage) and submitted documentary
proof in the form of the „Baltimore Documents‟ and the „Pumpkin Papers‟ to support his
version of events.
Congressmen in both the House and Senate began debating the
repercussions of his actions with the onset of the first perjury trial on May 31 st, 1949. For
the most part, Southern Democrats and Republicans discussed Judge Samuel H. Kaufman‟s
notorious favoritism for Hiss. His actions and condescending tone of voice during witness
testimony was extensively delved into by several Republicans. They used the controversy
and Kaufman‟s dubious nomination by Truman to further their claims that the
administration was unfit to govern.
Northern Democrats sought to downplay the importance of the Hiss trials. They
avoided even bringing up his name and instead criticized HUAC for their intensive
espionage investigations and continued to deny that communists had succeeded in attaining
prominent government positions. There is a noticeable difference in Northern Democratic
contributions; during the second trial and subsequent conviction they are completely silent
in both the House and the Senate. They do not even acknowledge the fact that Hiss has
been convicted of perjury.
The meaning behind their refusal to participate is very
significant as it illustrates not only their shock that one of their own was in fact in league
with the enemy, but also a realization of the impact such a verdict would inevitably have on
their party.
124
And even though overall Democratic participation is at an all time low during this
period of time, Southern Democrats still appear on three occasions to criticize the men who
helped Hiss attain such an important place in the world of American politics. Moreover,
they questioned his involvement with foreign policy now that his Soviet allegiance was
made public and condemned Acheson‟s unwavering friendship.
In a similar fashion,
Republicans reacted to the conviction as anticipated. They too were offended by the
Secretary of State‟s loyalty and used it as proof that a Republican led administration would
succeed in righting the wrongs of their predecessors. They congratulated their HUAC
colleagues who had worked tirelessly to ensure a Hiss indictment and were incessantly
advocating their party‟s accomplishments while reminding their opposition of their
damaging mistakes.
References to the Hiss case and its importance in American history begin to interest
congressmen after January 1950 and we are introduced to a gradual evolution of opinions
by members of both parties. The way in which Alger Hiss is perceived from 1948 to 1950
transforms in the following decade. Perhaps most surprising is the way in which several
Northern Democrats in the House begin to encourage the need for programs that would
prevent further communist infiltration. Despite the fact that they do not discuss the Hiss
trials or verdict, they seem to have finally acknowledged the existence of subversive agents
whose purpose was to promote the dissolution of the American democratic form of
government. By 1952 and Eisenhower‟s presidential win, Northern Democratic speeches
are reminiscent of those evoked by their Republican associates in the early years of the
HUAC hearings and both perjury trials. In an effort to repair their party‟s reputation, they
accused the new administration of the same failure to eradicate communism.
Republicans in the House, however, experienced a different type of evolution.
While they incessantly use the case as undeniable evidence of a Democratic link to
communism, the harshness with which they use this argument changes by 1952.
As
Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected to the presidency, the vehemence of their
accusations is no longer a political necessity. The significance of the Hiss case is still used
to counter Democratic accusations but solely as a form of defense. By the end of the
decade, the symbolism of Alger Hiss becomes much more apparent. Though details of the
125
controversy are reintroduced in conjunction with Hiss‟ Princeton talk, any other reference is
solely for the purpose of giving meaning to another situation or espionage case. Thus, he is
used as an example for the treason committed during the Cold War era. Like the adoption
of McCarthy‟s name to symbolize the communist „witch hunt‟ of the 1950‟s, Alger Hiss‟
name becomes synonymous with Soviet espionage.
Democratic reactions in the Senate vary immensely in relation to the evolution of
Hiss‟ persona. Whereas those in the House experienced a gradual progression from the
conviction in 1950 to the 10th anniversary in 1960, Democrats in the Senate immediately
distance themselves from the case after the guilty verdict. Though they do mention his
name, it is to defend themselves against constant Republican accusations regarding the
Hiss/Chambers ordeal.
Perhaps the most striking is Price Daniel‟s altercation with
McCarthy in which he adamantly states that the Northern and Southern factions of the
Democratic party do not always emit the same opinions and that the incessant barrage of
„Hiss‟ remarks should not be applied to the party in its entirety.
The Democratic
transformation of opinions from 1948 to 1960 is evident. No longer are the details of the
trials discussed; their decision to refer to Hiss in passing is their way of distancing
themselves from the matter. By moving forward, they are ensuring that the controversy that
plagued the end of Truman‟s presidency does not become a tantamount characteristic of the
Democratic party.
For their part, Republican opinions in the Senate underwent a much more gradual
evolution in comparison to their Democratic counterparts. In early 1950, they scrutinized
the details of the trials that led to Hiss‟ conviction while criticizing Acheson‟s enduring
friendship. They also discussed the importance of the case in American history while
continuing to refer to Hiss as the ultimate traitor. By 1953, his symbolic transformation
reaches a new stage as the trials and conviction are pushed aside and the impact he may
have had in foreign policy begins to draw the attention of Republican senators. Although
Hiss‟ participation in the creation of policy still evokes disapproval, the intervening years
has permitted congressmen to react in a less emotional fashion. Similarly, the release of the
official Yalta records in 1955 was met with analytical interest. Though Hiss‟ involvement
was included, it was done in passing; a way to remind the Senate of his crimes and used as
126
an excuse for the failure of the Yalta agreement. His story has lost its appeal as the
principal object of discussion and it is no longer referred to as an ongoing danger to
national security. By the end of the decade, he is not acknowledged in any capacity save
for a few speeches in which his attempts to take advantage of the privileges relegated to
loyal Americans are discussed. And when he is referred to, it is done in a detached way; his
name does not cause hysteria reminiscent of the late 1940‟s but is instead used as a
symbolic reminder of that fear.
Finally, through the use of the Congressional Record, we hope to have successfully
portrayed the overall reaction of the United States Congress to the Alger Hiss case over a
12 year period. We believe our research substantiated our thoughts on the Republican use
of the Hiss/Chambers scandal as a political tactic to promote their party‟s reputation while
demoralizing their opposition. This was evident once Eisenhower took the presidency as
Republican speeches regarding the communist issue were no longer wrought with the same
intensity that was always present in previous years. The Democratic response experienced
greater fluctuation as the 1949-1950 period is completely devoid of Northern contributions.
Although their lack of participation is frustrating since it is impossible to compare their
reactions to those of Republicans for the same period, their silence is a powerful message in
its own right. When compared to their 1948 speeches in which they denied communists
had succeeded in infiltrating the government, their silence during the trials and conviction is
an acknowledgment of their grave error. And while Alger Hiss‟ conviction was a victory
for Republicans and Southern Democrats who had been ridiculed for their crusade, the
guilty verdict foreshadowed the Democratic administration‟s eventual downfall.
Our thesis endeavored to explore the gradual evolution of Alger Hiss‟ persona. By
examining the details of the HUAC hearings in 1948 and the trials in 1949, he was
portrayed as a traitor of the nation. His personality, career and case were treated as
necessary topics to dissect in order to understand the communist motive. As the trial‟s
celebrity died down and the ensuing decade progressed, Hiss was less discussed as an
actual person and instead was used as an all encompassing example for subversive activity
during the post War period. No longer was Alger Hiss presented as a man who had worked
127
in the State Department or as a Soviet spy whose case enraptured the nation, but as a
symbol for the fear of communism during the Cold War.
By studying the Hiss perjury trials, we were able to gain a better understanding of
the strained atmosphere of the Cold War period. The Hiss/Chambers conflict was one of
several cases, all of which contributed to the notion that „red‟ spies had invaded the United
States. An examination of other espionage cases (such as Igor Gouzenko, Judith Coplon,
William Remington or Carl Marzani) in conjunction with the impact of the Hiss affair
would be beneficial in order to grasp the full meaning of the „red‟ scare in America.
128
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Congressional Record. 1948-1960
U.S. Government Printing Office. Congressional Record.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/index.html.
United States Senate. Reference: Statistics and Lists.
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/stats_and_lists.htm
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-present.
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp
“The Daily Compass Ends Publication: Left-Wing Papers Runs Out of Funds-Equipment is
Sold After Lamont Forecloses.” New York Times, November 4th, 1952. ProQuest
Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), p. 37.
“Robert Ruark Dead in London; Author and Columnist was 49: Scripps-Howard Writer
Was Often Controversial-Wrote „Something of Value‟.” New York Times, July 1st,
1965. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009), p. 31.
Articles
BARROS, James. “Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White: The Canadian Connection”. Orbis,
(1977), p. 593-605.
BELHUMEUR, Andréa. “Le débat au Sénat américain entourant l‟adhésion des ÉtatsUnis à la cour permanente de justice internationale de janvier 1935.” mémoire de
maîtrise, Université Laval, 2007.
BERRESFORD, John W. “The Grand Jury in the Hiss-Chambers Case.” American
Communist History 7, 1 (2008), p. 1-38.
BIRD, Kai and Svetlana Chervonnaya. “The Mystery of Ales: The Argument that Alger
Hiss was a WWII-era Soviet Asset is Flawed. New Evidence Points to Someone
Else.” American Scholar 76, 3 (2007), p. 20-35.
BOUGHTON, James M. “The Case Against Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven.”
History of Political Economy 33, 2 (2001), p. 219-239.
BRINKLEY, Alan. “The Elusive Worlds of Joe McCarthy and Pat McCarran.” Reviews in
American History 11, 4 (1983), p. 598-603.
129
BROCK, Bill. “Committees in the Senate.” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 411, (1974), p. 15-26.
BULLOCK III, Charles S. “U.S. Senate Committee Assignments: Preferences,
Motivations, and Success.” American Journal of Political Science 29, 4 (1985), p.
789-808.
BURTON, Orville Vernon. “The South as „Other,‟ the Southerner as „Stranger‟.” The
Journal of Southern History 79, 1 (2013), p. 7-50.
CECIL, Matthew. “ „Press Every Angle‟: FBI Public Relations and the „Smear Campaign‟
of 1958.” American Journalism 19, 1 (2002), p. 39-59.
DELTON, Jennifer. “Rethinking Post-World War II Anticommunism.” The Journal of the
Historical Society X, 1 (2010), p. 1-41.
DISALVO, Daniel. “Party Factions in Congress.” Congress & the Presidency 36, (2009),
p. 27-57.
FARNSWORTH, Stephen J. “Patterns of Political Support: Examining Congress and the
Presidency.” Congress & the Presidency 28, 1 (2001), p. 45-61.
“Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of 1954.” Columbia Law Review 55, 5 (1955), p.
631-732.
FRENCH, David. “Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915.” The Historical Journal 21,
2(1978), p. 355-370.
FRY, Michael J. and Miles Hochstein. “Epistemic Communities : Intelligence studies and
international relations.” Intelligence and National Security 8, 3 (1993), p. 14-28.
GAREAU, Frederick H. “Morgenthau‟s Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany.”
The Western Political Quarterly 14, 2 (1961), p. 517-534.
GILLON, Steven M. “The Future of Political History.” Journal of Policy History 9, 2
(1997), p. 241-255.
GIZZI, John. “Angry Liberal Skewers Sen. McCarran.” Human Events 60, 40 (2004),
p.28.
GRANT, Philip A. “The Bricker Amendment Controversy.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 15, 3 (summer 1985), p. 572-582.
HART BROWN, Sarah. “Redressing Southern „Subversion‟: The Case of Senator Eastland
and the Louisiana Lawyer.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana
Historical Association 43, 3 (2002), p. 295-314.
130
HAYNES, John Earl and Harvey Klehr. “Alexander Vassiliev‟s Notebooks and the
Documentation of Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States during the
Stalin Era.” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, 3 (2009), p. 6-25.
---. “Revising Revisionism: A New Look at American Communism.” Springer Science
+ Business Media, (2009), p. 452-462
HEVENER KAUFMAN, Natalie and David Whiteman. “Opposition to Human Rights
Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment.”
Human Rights Quarterly 10, 3 (1988), p. 309-337.
HITZ, Frederick P. “The Myths and Current Reality of Espionage.” International Journal
of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18, 4 (2005), p. 730-733.
HOLLAND, Max. “I.F. Stone: Encounters with Soviet Intelligence.” Journal of Cold War
Studies 11, 3 (2009), p. 144-205.
HULT, Karen M. et al. “Qualitative Research and the Study of the U.S. Presidency.”
Congress & the Presidency 26, (1999), p. 133-152.
KRAATZ, Matthew S. and Edward J. Zajac. “Exploring the Limits of the New
Institutionalism: The Causes and Consequences of Illegitimate Organizational
Change.” American Sociological Review 61, 5 (1996), p. 812-836.
LINDSAY, James M. “Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism.”
International Studies Quarterly 38, (1994), p. 281-304.
LUCAS, DeWayne and Iva Ellen Deutchman. “Five Factions, Two Parties: Caucus
Membership in the House of Representatives, 1994-2002.” Congress & the
Presidency 36, (2009), p. 58-79.
LUKES, Igor. “The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and Western Reactions to the
Communist Coup d’Etat of February 1948.” Intelligence and National Security 8, 4
(1993), p. 73-85.
---. “The 1948 Coup d’Etat in Prague Through the Eyes of the American Embassy.”
Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, (2011), p. 431-449.
MACRAKIS, Kristie. “Technophilic Hubris and Espionage Styles during the Cold War.”
Isis 101, 2 (2010), p. 378-385.
MANTEL, Howard N. “The Congressional Record: Fact or Fiction of the Legislative
Process.” The Western Political Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1959), p. 981-995.
McAULIFFE, Mary S. “Liberals and the Communist Control Act of 1954.” The Journal of
American History 63, 2 (1976), p. 351-367.
131
McKINNEY, Richard J. “An Overview of the Congressional Record and Predecessor
Publications.” Law Library Lights, (winter 2002), p. 16-22.
MEYER FILARDO, Peter. « What is the C/case? C/communism/s, Communist/s, AntiC/communism/ist/s, and the „C/capitalization question‟ ». American Communist
History 7, 1 (2008), p. 139-161.
MUSSER, Charles. “Carl Marzani and Union Films: Making Left-Wing Documentaries
during the Cold War, 1946-53.” The Moving Image 9, 1 (2009), p. 104-160.
New York University. “The Alger Hiss Story: Search for the Truth.”
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~th15/home.html, consulted septembre 2010.
P.C. “The Summit Talks at Geneva, and after.” The World Today 11, 9 (1955), p. 365-369.
PARRISH, Michael E. “Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs.”
American Historical Review 82, 4 (1977), p. 805-842.
RITCHIE, Donald A. “Beyond the Congressional Record: Congress and Oral History.”
The Maryland Historian 13, no. 2 (1982), p. 7-16.
ROBERTSON, David Brian. “The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in
American Political Science.” Social Science History 17, 1 (1993), p. 1-36.
SCHICKLER, Eric and John Sides. “Intergenerational Warfare: The Senate Decentralizes
Appropriations.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25, 4 (2000), p. 551-575.
SCHLESINGER, Hank. “For Your Eyes Only.” Smithsonian 32, 4 (2001), p. 1-14.
SCHRECKER, Ellen. “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism”.
Social Research 71, 4 (2004), p. 1041-1086.
---. “History in Red-and White and Blue.” Radical History Review 93, (2005), p. 159-169.
---. “Archival Sources for the Study of McCarthyism.” The Journal of American History,
(1988), p. 197-208.
--- and Maurice Isserman. “The Rights‟ Cold War Revision.” The Nation, (2000), p. 2224.
SELVERSTONE, Marc J. “A Literature so Immense: The Historiography of
Anticommunism.” OAH Magazine of History, (October 2010), p. 7-11.
SPRINGER, Michelle M. “The Congressional Record: Substantially a Verbatim Report?.”
Government Publications Review 13, (1986), p. 371-378.
132
TANANBAUM, Duane A. “The Bricker Amendment Controversy: Its Origins and
Eisenhower‟s Role.” Diplomatic History, p. 73-93.
TREMBLAY, Patrice. “La faillite du libéralisme et le concensus anticommuniste :
l‟opposition au McCarthysme à la Chambre des représentants, 1950-1954.”
mémoire de maîtrise, Université Laval, 2002.
WALKER, Donald Edwin. “The Congressional Career of Clare E. Hoffman, 1935-63.”
doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1982.
WHITAKER, Reg. “Cold War Alchemy : How America, Britain and Canada Transformed
Espionage into Subversion.” Intelligence and National Security 15, 2 (2000), p.
177-210.
ZELLNER, Dorothy M. “Red Roadshow: Eastland in New Orleans, 1954.” Louisiana
History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 33, 1 (1992), p. 31-60.
Books
AMBROSE, Stephen E., Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987. 752p.
---. Eisenhower: Volume One-Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 637p.
BAKER, Liva. Felix Frankfurter. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969. 376p.
BERNSTEIN, Barton J. et al. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. 330p.
BINKLEY, Wilfred E. American Political Parties: Their Natural History. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949. 420p.
Biographical Encyclopedia of America. New York, The Colonial Press, Inc., 1940.
BREWER, Mark D. and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. Dynamics of American Political Parties.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 242p.
BRINKLEY, Alan. The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of the American People.
Toronto: McGrawHill, 2008. 957p.
CAUTE, David. The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and
Eisenhower. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 697p.
COOKE, Alistair. A Generation on Trial: U.S.A. v. Alger Hiss. 3e edition. Baltimore:
Penguin Books Inc., 1968 (1950). 371p.
133
DE GRAZIA, Alfred. et al. Congress: The First Branch of Government: Twelve Studies of
the Organization of Congress. Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1966. 515p.
FRIED, Albert. McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997. 234p.
GRAHAM, Otis L. Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander. Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and
Times-An Encyclopedic View. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985. 483p.
GREENBERG, Ellen. The House and Senate Explained: The People’s Guide to Congress.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996. 173p.
HAYNES, John Earl and Harvey Klehr. Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 650p.
---. Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1999. 487p.
---. Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 251p.
HEFFER, Jean et François Weil. Chantiers d’histoire américaine. Paris: Belin, 1994.
469p.
HOUCK, Davis W. and Amos Kiewe. FDR’s Body Politics: The Rhetoric of Disability.
Texas A&M University Press, 2003. 141p.
JACOBS, Meg et al. The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political
History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 421p.
JACOBY, Susan. Alger Hiss and the Battle for History. New Haven & London, Yale
University Press, 2009. 256p.
JOHNSON, Robert David. Congress and the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006. 346p.
JONES, Charles O. The Republican Party in American Politics. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1965. 153p.
KAENEL, André. Anti-Communism and McCarthyism in the United States (1946-1954):
essays on the politics and culture of the Cold War. Paris: Éditions Messene, 1995.
189p.
KAMMEN, Michael. The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United
States. London: Cornell University Press, 1980. 524p.
134
KIRKENDALL, Richard S. The Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia. Boston: G.K. Hall &
Co., 1989.
KLINGAMAN, William K. Encyclopedia of the McCarthy Era. New York: Facts on File,
Inc., 1996.
LAGAYETTE, Pierre. L’anticommunisme et la “chasse aux soricères” aux États-Unis,
1946-1954. Paris: Ellipses, 1995. 158p.
LEUCHTENBURG, William E. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 377p.
LEVERING, Ralph B., et al. Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian
Perspectives. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. 200p.
LONGUET, Claire-Emmanuelle. Le Congrès des États-Unis. Paris : Presses
Universitaires de France, 1989. 127p.
LUBLIN, David. The Republican South : Democratization and Partisan Change.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 245p.
MAYER, George H. The Republican Party 1854-1964. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1964. 563p.
McCOY, Donald R. and Richard T. Ruetten. Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the
Truman Administration. Manhattan: The University Press of Kansas, 1973. 427p.
MERRILL, Dennis and Thomas G. Paterson. Major Problems in American Foreign
Relations: Volume II: Since 1914. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005.
590p.
MORGAN, Ted. Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America. New York: Random
House, 2003. 685p.
MUCCHIELLI, Alex. Dictionnaire des méthodes qualitatives en sciences humaines et
sociales. Paris : Armand Colin, 2009. 303p.
NEWMAN, Robert P. Owen Lattimore and the “Loss” of China. Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1992. 669p.
NIXON, Richard, M. Six Crises. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962. 460p.
ORBAN, Edmond. Le système politique des États-Unis. Montréal : Les Presses de
l‟Université de Montréal, 1987. 344p.
PARMET, Herbert S. The Democrats: The Years After FDR. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976. 371p.
135
PERMAN, Michael. Pursuit of Unity: A Political History of the American South. Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009. 390p.
PLANO, Jack C. and Milton Greenberg. The American Political Dictionary. Hinsdale:
The Dryden Press Inc., 1972. 462p.
RAE, Nicol C. Southern Democrats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 208p.
REICHARD, Gary W. Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower. Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1988. 196p.
REYNOLDS, David. The Origins of the Cold War in Europe. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1994. 271p.
ROSENBERG, Victor. Soviet-American Relations, 1953-1960: Diplomacy and Cultural
Exchange During the Eisenhower Presidency. Jefferson: McFarland & Company,
Inc., Publishers, 2005. 324 p.
ROSSITER, Clinton. Conservatism in America. Cambridge : Harvard University Press,
1982. 306p.
ROUGÉ, Jean-Robert. L’anticommunisme aux États-Unis de 1946 à 1954. Paris : Presses
de l‟Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995. 286p.
SCHMIDT, Regin. Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States.
Denmark: Narayana Press, 2000. 391p.
SCHOENBAUM, Eleanora and Michael L. Levine. Political Profiles: The Eisenhower
Years. New York: Facts on File, 1980. 757p.
SCHRECKER, Ellen. Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of
Communism. New York: The New Press, 2004. 359p.
SCHULZINGER, Robert D. U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008. 419p.
SIBLEY, Katherine A. Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold
War. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 370p.
SITKOFF, Harvard. Postwar America: A Student Companion. Student Companions to
American History. New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2000.
<http://lib.myilibrary.com?ID=56406> ( 16 June 2013). 292p.
SMITH, John Chabot. Alger Hiss: The True Story. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1976. 485p.
136
STAROBIN, Joseph R. American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972. 331p.
THEOHARIS, Athan G. The Yalta Myths. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970.
263p.
---. Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1971. 238p.
WEINSTEIN, Allen. Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case. Toronto: Random House of
Canada Limited, 1997 (1978). 622p.
--- and Alexander Vassiliev. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America-The Stalin
Era. New York: The Modern Library, 2000 (1999). 402p.
WHITE, G.Edward. Alger Hiss's Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy.
New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2004.
YOUNG, Roland. The American Congress. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958.
333p.
137